JCMS 2002 Volume 41. Number 1. pp.

1–13

De la démocratie en Europe:
Old Concepts and New Challenges1

YVES MÉNY
European University Institute

Abstract
Since David Marquand coined his famous phrase ‘democratic deficit’ to describe the
functioning of the European Community, the debate has raged about the extent and
content of this deficit. However, little attention has been paid to the ambiguous na-
ture of democracy both at the national and supranational levels. This paper argues
that dissatisfaction with democracy has to do, at least for a substantial part, with the
creeping expansion of constitutionalism and the parallel decline of popular impact
on government. This phenomenon is often felt at the national plane and feeds out-
bursts of populism. But it is even more acute at the European level, which combines
weak popular input with the most sophisticated and developed forms of constitution-
alism. This imbalance should be redressed both at a national level as well as in the
EU, as a nascent polity.

Introduction
Citizens’ lack of confidence in their democratic institutions is not new. Among
the existing democratic systems there have always been, in some periods or
places, manifestations of dissatisfaction or unhappiness with democracy. The
20-year period between the two world wars offers a particularly dramatic
illustration: most of the new democracies failed to consolidate and most of
them had to leave room for authoritarian or fascist regimes. Older democra-
cies were also challenged by leftist social movements or extreme right and
undemocratic parties. Even during the rosy period of the ‘Trente glorieuses’,
dissatisfaction manifested itself in various forms: social movements of all
kinds, especially amongst the young generation (May 1968), and even the use
of violence and terrorism (in Italy and Germany in particular). However, dur-
ing both the 1920s–30s and the post-war period, these manifestations of
* This article is a revised version of the JCMS Annual Lecture, delivered on 12 April 2002 at the European
University Institute in Fiesole near Florence.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
2 YVES MÉNY

discontent were taking place against a different background: all these move-
ments or anti-system parties were looking for an alternative to western de-
mocracy.
Today’s conditions for democratic regimes differ in several ways. The first
is related to the unchallenged supremacy of the two victorious paradigms of
market and democracy. The second is related to the weaker capacity of new
or old democracies to deal with the new challenges they have to face: old
instruments, such as the extension of suffrage or expansionist redistributive
policies, have exhausted their potential or their means. Thirdly, the relative
positions of market and democracy, always an unhappy couple according to
Robert Dahl (1998), have changed in favour of the market and to the detri-
ment of democracy defined as the capacity of the people to control their own
fate.
If ‘there is no alternative’, to paraphrase Mrs Thatcher’s opinion about her
policies, then attention focuses on the only option left. The comparison is no
longer between an unsatisfactory system and others which are perceived as
worse, but between the ideals proposed by the democratic system and the
much more prosaic everyday realities. The reasoning could even go further:
disillusion with democracy is caused not only by the increasing gap between
ideal and reality, but by the growing tendency to discount what constituted
the democratic ideals. The Weberian disenchantment with the world might
have worked too well: the ultimate goals of politics have been redimensioned
and political leaders who used to increase the expectations of the citizenry are
pleading every day for their own incapacity. Politics should not go against the
market, governments should not interfere, bureaucracies should roll back,
budgets should shrink, etc. What remains important, however, is the growing
awareness by the people that governments are unable or do not want to de-
liver goods that they used to promise or to distribute. Many factors might
explain this change in attitude: the growing cost of past commitments which
makes further promises impossible; globalization which impedes any maver-
ick strategy by national governments; deregulation which increases competi-
tive pressures and opens the way to a potential ‘Delaware effect’ or race to the
bottom, and so on.
All these new trends may constitute good reasons for a redefinition of
governments’ duties and of the relationship between democratic politics and
the economic and social spheres. However, this different approach to policy
problems by ruling elites is a source of tension in many political systems. Not
only because it implies an often painful redistribution of costs and benefits,
but also because the expectations of citizens might not evolve along the same
path as government policies. The adjustment to the new order of things, to a
new vision of the world, may put ruled and rulers at odds, with the risk of
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DE LA DÉMOCRATIE EN EUROPE: OLD CONCEPTS AND NEW CHALLENGES 3

challenging democratic rules and principles. If leaders are right, they are
blessed by electoral returns; if they are wrong or do not have enough time to
show they have chosen the right direction, they are punished electorally. Prob-
lems arise when consensus among the ruling elites diverges deeply from pub-
lic opinion’s expectations. The people might send messages of all kinds but
not be heard by the representatives who are convinced they are choosing the
right options. People’s frustration derives partly from the incapacity to put
their problems on the political agenda in spite of ‘sending messages’ to those
who govern. Evidence of this dissatisfaction is plentiful and takes many forms:
the evolution of public opinion, electoral absenteeism and political anomie,
the emergence of new forms of mobilization and political parties. Very few
countries seem able to escape this common fate of democratic malaise.

I. Understanding the Paradox: The Two Pillars of Democracy

When confronted with the establishment of democracy, the Founding Fathers
of the American Constitution were faced with a crucial dilemma: how to em-
power people while avoiding the tyranny of the majority? This delicate prob-
lem found its solution in a sophisticated mix of popular input and checks-
and-balances, which avoided giving too much power to any one institution
and made sure that representatives would be accountable to the people.
In spite of the diversity of their histories, cultures and preferences, most, if
not all, present democracies reflect this dual composition. On the one hand,
democracies are, above all, the expression of popular will and choice. There
is no democracy without free association of citizens, free elections, free ex-
pression of political views. Democracy is the power of the demos. Unfortu-
nately, too many citizens are still convinced that democracy is only the power
of the demos and it is rather natural that they think so. Politicians and parties
continue to speak about democracy as if it was only about the people’s choice
through various electoral devices and control mechanisms. One of the most
radical, and at the same time misleading, mottoes is the famous ‘government
of the people, by the people, for the people’. This might well be the ideal form
of democracy conceived by citizens as it appears so often in American politi-
cal debate, for instance. Unfortunately, the reality of democracy is far from
this dream (or nightmare?). All of today’s democracies are ‘impure’. They are
made up of a mix: the popular element and the constitutionalist one inherited
from the liberal approach to government. Since the World War II and the
disastrous experiences of many countries which had brought to power dicta-
tors via democratic elections, the constitutionalist elements have been strength-
ened everywhere: once universal suffrage and the free elections principle was
secured, all attention focused on the other pillar. An emphasis on Bills of
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Rights, the independence of the judiciary, autonomous institutions (central

banks, regulatory agencies), judicial review, territorial or functional devolu-
tion of power have contributed to the growing expansion of the constitution-
alist part. As a consequence, the space left for popular input has been reduced
or placed under control. The demos is still the first and ultimate reference of
any democratic system. However, the constraints within which the demos can
act are considerable and vary according to time and space. Democratic gov-
ernment expands when government activities and actions open new fronts,
in, for instance, the economic field. It shrinks when economic space is left to
market forces, rather than regulated by public and accountable authorities. To
sum up, there is no natural definition of what should be left to pure demo-
cratic politics, or left to the market or civil society, or ruled by constitutional
principles.
However, it could be argued that an ideal democracy, as conceived by
accepted standards, is neither a purely popular democracy or a purely consti-
tutionalist one, but rather a system able to realize a satisfactory equilibrium
between the two. Once again this equilibrium is not fixed. As is the case with
any ideal, it is subject to variations according to time and space. But to con-
form to the principles at the basis of its constitution, any ideal democracy
should seek to balance one element with the other, taking great care that none
of the components offsets the other. If this analysis is correct, it can be argued
that the growing dissatisfaction with democracy, particularly in Europe, is the
result of the continuing expansion of the constitutional pillar to the detriment
of the popular one.
Democratic citizens have the feeling that their votes matter less and less,
that parties in power do not deliver what they promised while in opposition,
that policies do not fit their needs and aspirations. It is not so much democ-
racy that is at stake, but rather the main mechanism of western democracies,
i.e. representation. The legitimacy of the system is weakened when citizens
perceive their representatives as incapable of acting according to the mes-
sages they have sent through their votes, protest or other forms of mobiliza-
tion. This feeling can be attenuated or exacerbated according to various cir-
cumstances: by the capacity of the opposition to propose credible alterna-
tives; by the international environment; by rates of economic growth, etc.
However, these variations in time and space cannot hide a paradigm shift in
Europe over the years. One pillar of democracy – the popular one – has be-
come weaker and weaker while the other has been strengthened, contributing
to the progressive isolation of governing elites from people’s pressures.

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DE LA DÉMOCRATIE EN EUROPE: OLD CONCEPTS AND NEW CHALLENGES 5

II. The Strengthening of Constitutionalism and its Rationale

Most lawyers and political scientists have warmly welcomed the transforma-
tion and evolution of European democracies since the World War II. The painful
and often dramatic experience of the 1920s and 1930s contributed to an ideo-
logical shift, from a conception of democracy based on the power of the peo-
ple to a more American-inspired type characterized by more division of power
along territorial or functional lines. The territorial division of power was a
challenge to central governments, but not to popular democracy. By transfer-
ring power and resources to local elected officials, the new constitutions were
contributing, at least in principle, to the empowerment of citizens at the grass-
roots level.
The functional allocation of competencies, on the contrary, was a serious
challenge to the traditional conception of democracy that was dominant in
Europe after the French Revolution. In particular, the transfer of new powers
(considered formerly as belonging to elected elites) to constitutional courts,
has provoked a sea-change, 150 years after the US experienced a similar chal-
lenge.
This radical innovation, for so long completely foreign to Europe, has
spread everywhere. The countries without constitutional review have become
a rare occurrence in both western Europe and the new democracies of the
former socialist world. Moreover, the European Court of Justice in Luxem-
bourg and the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg have extended vigor-
ously, and with success, these principles to the European plane.
Today, the constitutional map of Europe differs completely from what could
be considered as the continental democratic model, deeply influenced during
the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries by the French revo-
lution and philosophers or lawyers who helped to disseminate the dominant
paradigm of sovereignty of the people embodied in parliamentary law. This
institutional shift has been accompanied by a similar U-turn in political, legal
and ideological terms, with very few exceptions. The transformation has been
acclaimed as a mark of tremendous progress, and it was indeed in contrast
with the many weaknesses and drawbacks of the previous situation. By the
mid-1980s one of the major European thinkers, Norberto Bobbio (1987, p.
193) could write: ‘What’s democracy if not a set of rules (the so-called rules
of the game) for the solution of conflicts without bloodshed?’. It can certainly
be argued that such a radical definition does not run counter to the power of
the people given that rules are made by the people or its representatives. In-
creasingly, however, rules are not made by elected bodies. The power to change
radically the rules of the game through constitutional revision is an excep-
tional rather than normal occurrence.

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The power courts have acquired through constitutional review is signifi-

cant since they are in charge of protecting, but also defining and redefining,
citizens’ rights without being accountable to the electorate. But this is only a
small part of the landscape. Another important element of Europe’s develop-
ment during the second part of the twentieth century has been the progressive
and sometimes very detailed and tight control by governmental authorities of
the economy through regulation, nationalization and redistribution. Over the
past 30 years this magic triangle has been challenged and partly dismantled:
deregulation has been the order of the day, privatization has taken place eve-
rywhere and redistributive policies are under pressure.
Governmental capacity to steer and control the market has been drasti-
cally reduced, with the supposedly ‘invisible hand’ of the market replacing
the sometimes heavy hand of the state. Altwater (1999, p. 51) summarizes
these conflicting approaches by stating that ‘while economic rationality in its
pure form is deregulation, the pure form of political rationality is regulation’.
Economic regulation, privatization, and the restructuring of redistributive poli-
cies are more often than not part of the responsibility of a new set of institu-
tions accountable to the courts, the market or a specific regulated sector, but
not to the public at large. These institutions are not themselves new, as the
example of central banks indicates. The novelty stems first of all from their
multiplication in one form or another (regulating agencies, quangos, quasi-
jurisdictional bodies, etc.) and also from their status. Most of the time, politi-
cal authorities are forbidden to interfere, to appoint or fire members of the
board, or even attempting to influence them. Economic efficiency has be-
come more important than political accountability. ‘In view of the authority
of the market’, as Altwater (1999, p. 51) rightly underlines, ‘the substance of
political democracy turns out to be rather thin, even if the form is strong’
(emphasis in original).
On several occasions, Giandomenico Majone (1996) has presented argu-
ments in defence of this shift in regulatory modes from political intervention
to agency-type regulation. The justification is that ‘democracies need non-
majoritarian institutions’. Policy credibility and long-term commitments are
necessary to the good functioning of markets, but political authorities whose
horizon is fixed by the next electoral race are poor providers of these necessi-
ties. Therefore, there is a need for regulation by professional and independent
bodies. Majone is very conscious that the emergence of this fourth branch of
government challenges the traditional principle of accountability towards the
people. On the other hand, Majone does not hide the main difficulty of this
solution: that is, accountability and legitimacy. Legitimacy is based on the
output these agencies achieve (for instance the monetary policy of the central
bank) and the accountability guaranteed by a combination of control instru-
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DE LA DÉMOCRATIE EN EUROPE: OLD CONCEPTS AND NEW CHALLENGES 7

ments. There is no lack of examples showing that this difficult problem can
be dealt with properly, and the central banks of the United States, Germany or
Italy are cases in point. However, if people are unhappy with the system,
because the chosen solutions privilege market interests rather than citizens’
preferences, they have no option other than to manifest their discontent vis-à-
vis parties and government authorities, which are themselves unable to curb
or change the policy in question.
To sum up, recent years have seen a considerable change in the nature,
scope and modus operandi of market regulation. The new regulations may
have many desirable qualities, but they lack one which is crucial: direct ac-
countability to the people. Once again, it is not a problem as such if analysed
with the perspective of what western democracy is, provided that the equilib-
rium between the popular and the constitutionalist pillar remains balanced.
From this point of view, the United States offers an interesting alternative.
American democracy was by some considerable distance the first to develop
checks-and-balances as a counterweight to the people’s voice: both the Fed-
eral Reserve and the Judicial Review emerged in the early nineteenth century,
while universal suffrage was still indirect for both the election of the Presi-
dent and the Senate. Fierce opposition to the bank and the court was voiced at
the time, although it was unable to reverse the trend. By the end of the cen-
tury, however, the opposition to an institutional system dominated by market
forces was strong enough to create an impulse for reform at the state level and
to make the ‘people’s voice’ heard. Changes in local and state government
structures, and the introduction of direct democracy tools such as referenda,
recalls or popular initiatives, radically transformed the political life of the
country. Parties and politicians, especially in the west and south of the US,
were placed under tight scrutiny. Political agendas, taxation and budget poli-
cies at the local level were heavily determined by political mobilization at the
risk, indeed, of introducing or allowing many evils: discrimination, intoler-
ance, versatility and inconsistency.
However, in spite of these drawbacks, the system managed to survive,
adjust and compensate for the considerable strengthening of constitutional
politics, in particular through the Supreme Court. The strength of American
institutions is probably to be found in a more balanced mix, combining the
virtues of a strong constitutionalist component with the dynamism and the
versatility of popular input through frequent elections, multiple initiatives,
etc. My purpose is not to celebrate this system, which has also so many de-
fects (from the constitutional right to possess weapons up to the often anti-
liberal spirit of many referenda), but to emphasize the equilibrium reached by
American democracy. The two pillars have evolved in a parallel way, while
European regimes are affected by a persistent disequilibrium. It might also be
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recalled that, while the constitutionalist element has developed, first and mainly
at the federal level, the popular component is particularly strong and diversi-
fied at the local/state level. In Europe, on the contrary, the constitutionalist
revolution has gained ground at both the national level and the European level.
On the one hand, national systems have considerably reduced the input di-
mension of democracy, while being unable to take responsibility for its out-
put dimension, which is so dependent on regional or global market forces.
The European system, on the other hand, is the most sophisticated machinery
ever invented of constitutionalist democracy, but it is still underdeveloped
when it comes to its popular element.

III. Europe and the ‘Democratic Deficit’

In the 1970s a British political scientist, David Marquand (1979), in an analy-
sis of the functioning of European Community institutions, underlined the
weakness of their democratic components. In particular, at the time, the As-
sembly – the forerunner of the European Parliament – was still composed of
indirectly elected members chosen by their respective national parliaments.
To correct what he labelled a ‘democratic deficit’, he argued in favour of a
directly elected parliament. But as experience then showed, this major leap
was not sufficient. In fact, the democratic deficit argument never raged as
much as it did after the election of MEPs by universal suffrage. It might have
been a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to fulfil the democratic re-
quirements expected of Europe’s people, media and elites. However, there is
a kind of mystery in such a harsh assessment given that, after all, the demo-
cratic credentials of Europe do not appear so distant, in practice, from those
of democracies at the national level. How can the pervasiveness of negative
opinion about the Union’s democratic credentials throughout Europe be ex-
plained?
Several explanations can be suggested from the least important to the most
fundamental:
1. First, the democratic deficit is a powerful catchword, which can be eas-
ily manipulated by all those who are not fully satisfied with the working of
European institutions. In other words, a lot of people find it useful: not only
the most extreme Eurosceptics, such as the right of the Conservative Party in
the UK or of the Gaullists in France, but also deeply convinced Europhiles
who wish to improve the rather complex, cumbersome and obscure system of
government set up in Brussels. The motto can rally not only those who be-
lieve that democracy is exclusively feasible at the national level, but also
their counterparts, i.e. those who aim to substitute a single European polity
for the present confederation of Member States. This strange, critical and
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DE LA DÉMOCRATIE EN EUROPE: OLD CONCEPTS AND NEW CHALLENGES 9

heterogeneous coalition was made possible by the imprecise character of the

‘deficit’ concept. How big was it? How detrimental would it be to the very
existence of democracy? Nobody really dared to discuss the magnitude of
this gap, forgetting that all democracies suffer from some kind of deficit.
None is perfect and the only interesting problem is the identification and
measurement of the imperfections in order to redress them.
2. A second problem stems from a false conception of what democracy is.
Underlying this deficit is an implicit definition of democracy as a system
which does not exist, to use the words of Giovanni Sartori in his study of
democracy. In the public debate, the political elites and the media have al-
ways behaved as if democracy was the ‘government of the people, by the
people, for the people’. As we have shown, this mythical definition does not
encompass the reality of democracies. It is certainly a powerful image, but a
wrong one. It offers precisely the kind of emotional appeal that populist par-
ties are so prompt to manipulate, as the Austrian or Italian cases – to mention
two examples among the many in Europe – have recently shown. In other
words, there is certainly a case for emphasizing the weakness of popular in-
put in European institutions, but the same kind of critique should also be
addressed to national systems. It is telling, for example, that these criticisms
have been particularly virulent in the UK, a country where the supremacy of
Parliament is a mythology which is still very much alive. The landscape be-
comes much more uncertain and blurred when a comparison is made between
the systems as they are rather than as they could be. For instance, the Euro-
pean Parliament is as democratically elected as any other national parliament.
A decision taken by 15 heads of state and government, whether democrati-
cally elected or chosen, is no less democratic than a decision taken by the
International Monetary Fund or Nato, on the contrary. An endless number of
institutions which are the heart of democratic systems are in fact not demo-
cratic (central banks, judiciaries, professional bodies with regulatory powers,
etc.) or have only an indirect or weak democratic component (such as the
Bundesrat in Germany or the Senate in France). However, most people would
oppose the elimination of these institutions or even their complete ‘democra-
tization’. They are seen, indeed, as valuable and irreplaceable elements of
checks and balances. Power has to originate in the people. But, in a repre-
sentative system, the minority has to be protected from the excesses of the
majority. From this point of view, the European system does not suffer from a
democratic deficit, but rather from a ‘democratic’ overload: majority rule ap-
plies only partially and when it is formally used it is, usually, where a consen-
sus has been previously reached. Veto points are everywhere. Great care is
taken to avoid confrontation with what the governments consider vital inter-
ests. Checks and balances are too many rather than too few.
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3. A third problem arises from the comparison of democratic values at

different levels of government and without consideration of time. A demo-
cratic system in the making and operating at the supranational level is as-
sessed and compared to fully-fledged and highly sophisticated democracies
that took years or even centuries to reach their present state of development.
There is another implicit assumption behind this comparison: national demo-
cratic systems in their present shape constitute the standards of reference to
measure democratic achievement. This assumption is misleading over time
and space. Robert Dahl (1999) has underlined how much the word ‘democ-
racy’ can be devoid of meaning if its variations over time and space are not
carefully considered. The very same word applies to the Athenian govern-
ment, to de Tocqueville’s America, to the British or continental parliamentary
systems, to the new political systems emerging from the collapse of commu-
nism, etc. In other words, it is commonly accepted that democracy has varied
over time, evolving from a rather elitist and restrictive form to a more open
and participatory system of government. There is also a wide consensus about
the ineluctability of space variations, even within the framework of a single
state (for example in Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, and so on).
By contrast, the democratic standards to which the European Union’s per-
formance is compared are those established at the national level, or rather
those mythical rules and principles which are supposed to prevail. Such a
mismatch can be explained by the fact that there is no other supranational
democracy to which Europe can be compared and against which it can be
judged. Its uniqueness obliges us to use fallback positions: a comparison with
the most familiar and the closest reference point, the national democracy.
This comparison, in the way it is done, is inadequate and probably unfair. Its
only advantage is to stimulate, to improve and to challenge les situations
acquises communautaires. But it has also important drawbacks.
If democracy has to be introduced at the supranational level – and it has to
be done unless we accept that democracy is concerned only with the leftovers
of a global system of governance – we have to change or to adapt expecta-
tions, rules and institutions. The worst course would be to replicate through
mimicry rules and practices at the national level. The temptation is powerful,
as it is much easier to address the unknown with the well-known rules of the
game. But this is a recipe for disillusion as the experience of the European
parliament shows. It is not enough.
Adding a second chamber, as suggested by some governments and groups,
would be a remedy worse than the sickness. Such a solution is appealing as it
reminds everybody of familiar schemes. But, far from solving the democratic
deficit, it would probably exacerbate the problem by adding to the already
overloaded system of checks and balances, by making even more complex a
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DE LA DÉMOCRATIE EN EUROPE: OLD CONCEPTS AND NEW CHALLENGES 11

decision-making system which is already too cumbersome, and by making

more difficult the application of accountability principles.
However, even if the so-called democratic deficit is not what it is said to
be in the public debate, nobody can deny that there is a real problem: many
citizens feel frustrated by the way the European institutions work. And this
challenge must be addressed. As a matter of conclusion, I will limit myself to
underlining the following points when considering the question ‘what to do?’:
1. If we wish to make the European Union more democratic, we have to
invent new paradigms, rules and institutions rather than try to duplicate na-
tional recipes. It is a major intellectual shift, comparable to the one that took
place at the time of the American and French Revolutions. Up until these
major political changes, there was a general consensus about, on the one hand,
the eminent quality of democracy (the best possible regime) and, on the other
hand, its intrinsic limitation (democracy, it was argued, unfortunately can work
only in tiny states and cities). The ‘miracle’ resulted from the combination of
the representative principle with the democratic principle into something that
was still called ‘democracy’, but had little to do with what the enlightenment
had in mind. The challenge we have to face today is similar in nature. Our
task is to conceive something called democracy at a higher, supranational
level. But it would be wrong to think that a simple transposition of our na-
tional schemes could work. We have to invent not only adequate rules but,
first of all, a new concept of ‘post-national democracy’.
2. As nobody has yet been able to propose a credible and acceptable solu-
tion, progress can only result – at least for the time being – from adjustments,
tentative explorations, trials and errors. For my part, I would suggest going
down the lines along which democracy has progressively transformed itself
over time: that is, shifting from a theoretical and purely popular regime to a
mixed and impure system relying not only on the power of the demos but also
on liberal components (checks and balances, division of powers), the rule of
law, the social covenant, and so on. As emphasized previously, I would argue
that the ‘liberal’ component of the European Union is overdeveloped while
the popular pillar is rather meagre. Redressing the situation might be done
through various small adjustments rather than by one or two large – but dis-
appointing – changes. These could include, for instance, making all the ele-
ments of the institutional triangle (Commission, Council, Parliament) more
accountable directly or indirectly to the people; strengthening the transmis-
sion belts (such as transnational parties and organizations); reinforcing the
role of national parliaments vis-à-vis Union policies; defining better the re-
spective competencies; or introducing – why not? – some forms of direct
democracy such as European referenda.

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There is a real need to redress the present imbalance and even to rethink
the merits of some innovations accepted too easily without ‘esprit critique’.
For instance, a European Charter of Fundamental Rights is certainly an ex-
cellent thing in itself. But its concrete impact is as simple as it is brutal: the
constitutional pillar is more powerful than ever while nothing has been done
to strengthen the popular one.
3. Finally, by focusing on the democratic deficit we might miss the target,
at least partially. The problem might be more a question of legitimacy than
democracy. Let us repeat the concluding premise: the democratic credentials
of the EU are no worse than most of those in use in the uncontested democra-
cies; they can even be favourably compared in some cases. But a large and
growing body of public opinion refuses the Union the right to interfere in
some questions or domains which, in its view, should be addressed elsewhere
at local or national levels. This view is sometimes wrong or illusory. It is not
specific to Europe as the American experience testifies. In the US, the Wash-
ington bureaucracy attracts no less hatred and anger than the Brussels bu-
reaucracy. Such a battle over the attribution of power is an unavoidable part
of the political process and nothing should be done to repress these legitimate
claims. The acquis communautaire discourse might not be the most appropri-
ate answer from this point of view. The legitimacy battle over who does what,
at which level and according to which rules will be with us forever, but it is
not a sufficient reason to practise some kind of escamotage or sleight of hand
in order to maintain the status quo. It means, on the contrary, that we have to
accept changes, disparities and differences over time and space, and not con-
sider this a traumatic situation. Far from being a rational, well-ordered, uni-
form type of polity, the European Union can survive only by accepting – and
organizing – these variations, be they beliefs, rules or institutions.
In conclusion, I would like to rely on the wisdom of both de Tocqueville
and Madison. They concur in underlying the need for a fresh approach to new
problems.
Let us consider the views of de Tocqueville’s (1994, pp. 315–16) first, as
he underlines the necessity to refer to empirical observation rather than to
past knowledge:
When I compare the Greek and Roman republics with these American states;
the manuscript libraries of the former, and their rude population, with the
innumerable journals and the enlightened people of the latter; when I re-
member all the attempts that are made to judge the modern republics by the
aid of those of antiquity, and to infer what will happen in our time from
what took place two thousand years ago, I am tempted to burn my books in
order to apply none but novel ideas to so novel a condition of society.

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003

DE LA DÉMOCRATIE EN EUROPE: OLD CONCEPTS AND NEW CHALLENGES 13

Fifty years before, Madison was coming to a similar conclusion, underlining

the major innovation put forward by the American Revolution:
Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which
a precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which
an exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States might,
at this moment, have been numbered among the melancholy victims of mis-
guided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight of some
of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind.
Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole human race, they
pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which
has no parallel in the annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of
governments which have no model on the face of the globe. (Hamilton et
al., 1974, p. 154)
The American model cannot be copied and replicated. But we can still draw
lessons from the past. Europe cannot simply copy the well-known recipes of
previous experiences. Europe has to invent a new democratic system, a sys-
tem which as yet has no name.

Correspondence:
Yves Mény
European University Institute
Via dei Roccettini 9
I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy
email: Yves.Meny@iue.it

References
Altwater, E. (1999) ‘The Relation of Material and Formal Democracy’. In Shapiro I.
and Hacker-Córdon, C. (eds) Democracy’s Edges (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press), pp. 41–62.
Bobbio, N. (1987) The Future of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press).
Dahl, R.A. (1998) On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press).
Dahl, R.A. (1999) ‘The Past and Future of Democracy’. CIRCAP Occasional Paper
No. 5, Siena.
Hamilton, A. , Jay, J. and Madison, J. (1974) The Federalist (Cambridge MA: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press).
Majone, G. (1996) ‘Temporal Consistency and Policy Credibility: Why Democracies
Need Non-Majoritarian Institutions’. RSC Working Paper No. 96/57 (Florence:
European University Institute).
Marquand, D. (1979) Parliament for Europe (London: Jonathan Cape).
Tocqueville A. de (1994) Democracy in America (London: David Campbell).

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003