Ludwig Wittgenstein

Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812
www.elsevier.com/locate/pragma
Philosophy and pragmatics: A language-game

with Ludwig Wittgenstein
Roman Kopytko
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland
Received 4 October 2004; received in revised form 19 March 2006; accepted 30 April 2006
Abstract
The major objective of the present project is a critical assessment of Ludwig Wittgensteins philosophy
of language use in view of the claims of modern holistic, non-Cartesian pragmatics. The most important of
Wittgensteins ideas discussed in this paper are the following: language-games, rule-following, family
resemblance, forms of life, the inner versus outer dichotomy, meaning as use, grammar and grammatical
rules, the private language argument, and essentialism. In addition, we consider Wittgensteins stand on the
issue of Cartesian dualism, the innateness hypothesis, as well as his account of holism and the problem
of communicative certainty versus uncertainty. Finally, this article evaluates Wittgenstein as (1) a
pragmatician, (2) an anti-mentalist/anti-cognitivist and social constructionist, and (3) a holist in his
approach to pragmatics. New ideas suggested in the paper include language-game certainty, the gradability
of rules, the overruling of rules, multiple articulation of the linguistic sign, among others.
# 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Wittgenstein; Language-games; Rule-following; The private language argument; Holistic pragmatics;
Communicative certainty; Pragmability
1. Introduction
Ludwig Wittgenstein, considered by many the greatest thinker of the last century was, first of
all, a philosopher and in particular, a philosopher of language use. Thus, the relevance of his
philosophy to theoretical pragmatics is undeniable. This paper is an initial step towards a critical
evaluation of Wittgensteins ideas associated with linguistic communication bearing in mind the
claims of modern holistic, non-Cartesian pragmatics (cf. Kopytko, 1995, 2001; for further
reading see also Kopytko, 2000, 2003, 2004). Holistic pragmatics embraces all contextual
aspects of linguistic communication: mental, social, cultural, physical, interactional, and
E-mail address: kopytko@main.amu.edu.pl.
0378-2166/$ see front matter # 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2006.04.011
R. Kopytko / Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812
793
historical. The final section of the paper evaluates Ludwig Wittgenstein as (1) a pragmatician, (2)
anti-mentalist/cognitivist and social constructionist, and (3) holist in his approach to pragmatics.
Since the essential ideas of holistic pragmatics are briefly discussed in the course of the present
investigation, no previous knowledge of its claims is necessary to follow the argument in this
article.
It should be noted at the outset that even such a limited project faces numerous obstacles and
has to solve many methodological problems. First, the number of publications on Wittgensteins
philosophy is enormous and is likely to increase each year (cf. Philipp, 1996); second, the
controversial issues associated with Wittgensteins views as well as the different and often
contradictory interpretations of the latter are also growing in number; third, Wittgensteins
Nachlassthe unpublished writings (see Pichler, 1994); available in electronic form in the
Wittgenstein Archive in Bergen, Norway (WAB), number about 20,000 pages. Obviously, such
an amount of available data may radically influence our interpretation of Wittgensteins thought
by providing the indispensable interpretative context.
It is important to recall that after 1929, Wittgenstein reassessed and criticized his earlier views
(especially as advocated in the Tractatus Logico-PhilosophicusTLP, 1921), on logic,
philosophy, mind, psychology, language, and others, and became an ardent anti-Cartesian in his
thinking. Note, however, that many eminent Wittgensteinians (cf. Haller, 1988; Hacker, 1996b,
2001) hold that in his later works, Wittgenstein continued to develop, or modify some of the
themes present, or latent in the Tractatus.
2. The dangerous and mind-blowing ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein
Ludwig Wittgensteins vile defection in the 1930s from the respectable company of true,
infallible, and inestimable logicians, mathematicians, and philosophers undoubtedly came as a
shock to Bertrand Russell, his mentor and admirer. Logical investigations proved for
Wittgenstein to be tautological games lacking sense; mathematical logic a failure; mathematics a
work of social constructionism (cf. Gergen, 1999, 2001); philosophy (except for critical analysis
of language) a waste of time; and psychology not a science at all.
The agenda of philosophical problems associated with the thought of the late Wittgenstein is
enormous. This paper first of all focuses on the standard collection of controversial issues
criticized, discussed, revisited, and revised in a number of Wittgensteinian studies (cf. Baker and
Hackers four volume exegesis, 19801996; Glock, 2001; Hacker, 1986, 1996b, 2001; Sluga and
Stern, 1996) and many other, studies related to current research in pragmatics. For obvious
reasons, the present discussion is not exhaustive and definitive but rather, on the one hand,
informative and suggestive, and on the other, critical and challenging. The most representative
and fascinating topics in Wittgenstein studies to be taken up include the following closely
interrelated ideas, suggestions, and claims: (1) language-games, (2) rule-following, (3) family
resemblance, (4) meaning as use, (5) the inner versus outer dichotomy, (6) essentialism, (7) the
private language argument, (8) forms of life, (9) grammar and grammatical rules, and (10)
certainty.
2.1. Language-games and forms of life or how to become a sophisticated
crypto-pragmatician
When in the early 1930s, Wittgenstein abandoned the idea of language as a calculus (that is, an
analysis of language according to explicit rules) and similar (to say the least) unrealistic attempts
794
to identify the essence of language, proposition, description, or rule, etc., and started to
think dangerously, that is, in an unorthodox fashion, by embracing instead a view of language as a
game with the concept of family resemblance replacing that of essence, he embarked on the
long and thorny road of a proto-pragmatician. Remarkably, over half a century after the
posthumous publication of the Philosophical Investigations (PI), many students of language have
not absorbed his linguistic message and in their research show a family resemblance to the early
utopian period of the Tractatus rather than to his mature thought. Although for devoted
Wittgensteinians, the Tractatus has still many attractions, modern pragmaticians have to refer
first of all to the Investigations and the Nachlass.
The notion of a language-game1 belongs to the central concepts of Wittgensteins later
philosophy. In order to avoid many possible misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the
term, we should emphasize that Wittgensteins simile should obviously not be viewed as an
instance of an essentialist (analytic) definition of the concept of game, but rather as describing a
collection of games associated only by the weak and vague notion of a family resemblance
(that is, partially overlapping and criss-crossing similarities). For Wittgenstein, a language-game is
first of all a custom, a socially constrained pattern of interaction. Therefore, words and expressions
take on their significance when they are used in a custom-regulated pattern of interaction (or to use
Wittgensteins metaphor, the stream of life; cf. Schatzki, 1993; Stern, 1991). Language-games do
not share any essence; each one of them has its own specific features, rules, and goals. New types of
language and language-games may come into existence and others may disappear. Because family
resemblance cannot be adequately defined, Wittgenstein instead proposes examples, such as (1)
giving orders, and obeying them, (2) describing the appearance of an object, or giving its
measurements, (3) constructing an object from a description (a drawing), (4) reporting an event, (5)
speculating about the event, (6) forming and testing a hypothesis, (7) presenting the results of an
experiment in tables and diagrams, (8) making up a story; and reading it, (9) play-acting, (10)
singing catches, (11) guessing riddles, (12) making a joke; telling it, (13) solving a problem in
practical arithmetic, (14) translating from one language into another, an d(15) requesting, thanking,
cursing, greeting, and praying (PI 23).
Looking closer at the list of items above, we see a rather mixed collection of language-games.
On the one hand, we have simple, primitive games such as a greeting or ordering, and on the other
there appear games that involve solving complex problems in practical arithmetic, proposing and
testing hypotheses, etc. Wittgenstein used the term language-game2 in different senses. First,
speech acts like requesting or greeting; second, activities like play-acting, singing catches or
guessing riddles; third, primitive languages like the language of builders consisting of four
words: block, pillar, slab, and beam (PI 2); and fourth, there is the whole of language
viewed as language and the actions into which it is woven (PI 7).
It appears that Wittgensteins simile of language-game supposedly was to emphasize that (1)
language is a rule-guided activity embedded in specific forms of life (such as biological, social,
and cultural); (2) conventional and arbitrary rules constitute games as well as grammars; (3) the
1
Wittgenstein writes rather vaguely: We call something a language-game if it plays a particular role in our human
life BEE item 149, p. 72 (19361936).
[A list of abbreviations of Wittgensteins works appears at the end of this articleEditors Note].
2
Hark (1990) attempted to put some order into the heterogeneous class of games and discover new relationships of
concepts in language games; he suggests to distinguish between horizontal and vertical relations, the former expressing a
relation of a concept within language-games and the latter a relation between language games. Predictably, languagegames constitute the primary context for words and expressions.
795
rules are viewed as being correct or incorrect; (4) the meanings of words are determined by rules
of their use (rather than by the objects they stand for); (5) a proposition or a move in a game takes
on significance in the system to which it belongs; and (6) players are involved in social
(linguistic) practice, which they acquired by training their skills and mastering techniques.
Evidently, isomorphic similes or metaphors exist neither in nature nor in our lives; as a result,
every comparison or analogy must break down at some point. So does the game simile. The
acquisition of language-games rests on the assumption about inborn linguistic faculty (which is
not the case in non-linguistic games). The goals of games are usually to have fun or win;
language-games may show a multitude of aims and functions. Disappointingly, Wittgenstein
does not pay sufficient attention to the players. They acquire the desirable linguistic skills, master
the technique of language use3 by training and show/confirm the required abilities in social
practice by obeying rules of social (linguistic) interaction. The interpersonal communication is a
matter of social praxis. He writes: Um das Phanomen der Sprache zu beschreiben, mu man
eine Praxis beschreiben, nicht einen einmaligen Vorgang welcher Art immer er sei.4
Wittgenstein clearly understands the role of context in an account of linguistic interaction;
nonetheless, he uses the term context sparingly. In the Investigations, it appears six times and
always in the ordinary rather than the technical sense. This is so because he idiosyncratically
reconceptualizes linguistic interaction in terms of language-games and forms of life. Thus,
according to Wittgenstein, a hierarchy of embedding consists of words and expressions
embedded in language-games, which in turn, are embedded in a variety of forms of life
(for instance, biological, social, or cultural). This rather simplified account of the relation
between an expression and its context is certainly far from satisfying. In addition, the dynamic
context of social (linguistic) interaction is, to say the least, not in the center of Wittgensteins
interest.5 Although Wittgensteins language-games are to some extent contextualized in forms
of biological, social, and cultural life, the question remains, however, whether such
contextualization is sufficient to account for human action and verbal behavior without taking
into consideration the mental (cognitiveconativeaffective) system and the numerous
phenomena of social (linguistic) interaction. In fact, the social or linguistic phenomena in a
group can hardly be reduced to the individual behavior of its members (clearly even the
composition of a group can produce different social behavior in its members). Additionally, in
interpersonal communication there appear numerous unpredictable, emergent phenomena,
e.g., embarrassment, faux pas, misunderstanding, conflict, loss of face, humor, etc., that have to
be handled ad hoc, contextuallyso that no ready-made, emergency language-games are
available. On such occasions, the players have to show some ingenuity, creativity, and presence
of mind. The emergent phenomena, creativity, and spontaneity of the players undermine to a
great extent the view of discourse, social interaction, and linguistic communication as a strictly
rule-governed game. We can identify a considerable space of human social and linguistic
3
Surprisingly, Wittgenstein does not see that expressions such as language use or language user are grammatical
fictions (in Wittgensteins sense of the term), or category mistakes, that is, the properties of some material objects have
been projected onto them without justifications. Thus, languages are not hammers or knives, to be used in pounding or
cutting. (Do we not rather speak and read our languages than use them?) Therefore, any expressions involving language
use (and related ones) have been avoided in this paper, except for those that indicate Wittgensteins own usage or
represent his claims.
4
To describe the phenomenon of language one must describe practice rather than a single occurrence of whatever type
it is (BEE item 164, p. 99; 19411944; my translation).
5
Note also the failure of John Austins considerably decontextualized speech act theory.
796
intercourse as being either devoid of the linguistic-game element, or showing only a very distant
resemblance to it. Consequently, a scale or continuum representing a cline from the most typical
(prototypical) linguistic-games to non-games (where no specific rules of linguistic practice are
available) in linguistic interaction could be suggested.
A significant aspect of Wittgensteins approach to linguistic-games frequently left
unaccounted for by his commentators is the issue of game certainty (my term) and its
implications for the theory of linguistic communication. Wittgenstein writes as follows: The
primitive form of the language game is certainty, not uncertainty. For uncertainty could never
lead to action . . . I want to say: it is characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it
grows consists of steady ways of living, regular ways of acting. Its function is determined above
all by action, which it accompanies (CE 409).
One cannot but agree with Wittgensteins insistence upon, and call for certainty associated
with the primitive (linguistic) human action. However, we must note once again that there exists a
vast space of human social (linguistic) interaction (especially in the most complex languagegames), where the reliance on and recourse to certainty collapses and doubt appears. Moreover,
certainty abandons us not only, for instance, in the case of interaction with Wittgensteins texts
but also in the case of the primitive human action, when the accompanying context (and the nonstandard development of interaction) is simply boggling our mind, so that certainty seems to
vanish into thin air. Thus, we are frequently not certain of what indeed is going on, neither do we
know how to proceed, nor which action to take.
Accordingly, in contrast to real game players, language-game players may be uncertain
about what kind of game they are participating in; they must pay attention to the course of
interaction and react to unpredictable events, as well as adapt to new situations and dynamically
changing contextual elements. In addition, they may be negotiating (and changing) the rules of
the game during the game, as well as showing creative linguistic behavior and learning social
(linguistic) practice from other participants in the interaction. Furthermore, the uncertainty of our
linguistic practice is clearly increased by the fact that we only have mastered a limited number of
linguistic-games to a certain degree. As a result, in reality, we are not prepared to participate in
the majority of available language-games, but only in some of them and with a different effect
(e.g., discussing Wittgensteins philosophy, giving a speech in parliament, solving a moral
dilemma, persuading, convincing, etc.).
Evidently, in social interaction we may be engaged in several language-games at different
levels (along the scale from language-game to non-game) at the same time. Compare that the
language-game of requesting may be accompanied by the game of face saving (politeness), the
game of persuasion (using cunning), the emotional game, allusion, intimidating, blackmailing,
promising, etc.
Wittgenstein is not interested in the results of language-games (their perlocutionary effects).
However, any approach that neglects the perlocutionary effect of verbal interaction renders the
account seriously incomplete. Accordingly, a study of the linguistic-game of persuasion, for
instance, must (in addition to some psychological factors) involve linguistic aspects, namely, the
pragmability and affectability of participants. Pragmability and affectability are two central
concepts in non-Cartesian pragmatics (cf. Kopytko, 2004). Pragmability is considered as the
ability to communicate and understand/interpret meaning in linguistic/textual interaction. The
notion of affectability (analogous to that of pragmability) refers to the ability of linguistic
communicators to (a) experience, (b) express, (c) apply strategically, (d) control, and (5) interpret
emotions and emotional events. Affectability may be characterized as an individualized, personspecific set of affective properties and patterns of emotional response, both inborn and acquired
797
in social interaction. Significantly, affectability is an indispensable component of pragmability

and of the (linguistic) capacity to communicate with others.
Thus, a game of persuasion that involves a number of players may bring varied results: from
players being persuaded, through being partly persuaded, to being non-persuaded. Such results
may be accounted for better in terms of pragmability and affectability rather than psychological
factors only. If somebody presents a lecture which few understand (which indeed was a rule in the
case of Wittgenstein; cf. Monk, 1990), the pragmability of the communicators involved is to be
blamed, rather than psychological factors or the social practice.
In social interaction, it is the context that triggers game-switching (my term), such as from
requesting to apologizing, from persuading to lying, and so on. Language-games are clearly
context-dependent and the players are even more so. Furthermore, language-games are so
intimately related to their contexts (in the sense of human causality) that they may produce
contextual changes that, in turn, influence the course of the social interaction. For illustration, a
game of joking or humor may create an atmosphere of intimacy, friendship, emotional security,
etc., which may evoke new games practiced on such occasions; or an emergent phenomenon such
as a faux pas may produce embarrassment and an urgent need to get out of the predicament by
engaging in an appropriate language-game.
Wittgensteins game simile perfectly fits the idea of a non-private activity in sense perception
and the like; compare, for instance, his analysis of private language,6 pain, or understanding
as social phenomena. Consequently, games and their rules cannot be considered as private
(mental, individual, subjective) entities. Similarly, according to Wittgenstein, language-games,
linguistic rules, and language as such are not private, but social phenomena embedded in a variety
of forms of life. Private games or private interaction (not only in the Wittgensteinian sense) do
not make sense at all.
In Wittgensteins philosophy, the concept of form of life (Lebensform) refers to the
non-linguistic context of linguistic communication. Again, as in the case of terms such as
context and social, the expression form of life appears seldom in Wittgenstein texts; the
result has been much confusion, different interpretations, and additional detective work
imposed on researchers (cf. Scheman, 1996). Here, it is suggested that a form of life is the totality
of the social practice (or social activities) which contextualize Wittgensteins language-games.
The preponderance of the social factor in Wittgensteins thinking is clearly visible.
Language-game players faithfully adopt the rules immanent in social practices and make
unfailing use of them when need arises. Social practice is a source of certainty in social
(linguistic) action and the standard and the sole criterion of correctness. Hence competent players
should reflect and reproduce the social practice. Additionally, the assumption seems to be that the
social practice (and its rules) represents correct practice. Wittgenstein does not seem to put into
question or contest the social practice (for instance such as advocated by Critical Discourse
Analysis). Therefore, for him it is more important to know what are the rules of the game and
their applications than\ whose game it is or who are the players.
2.2. The rules of the game and how to overrule them
The concepts of rule and rule-following belong to the most discussed and debated aspects
of Wittgensteins philosophy (cf. Kripke, 1982; Baker and Hacker, 1985; Williams, 1999; Miller
For an attempt to refute Wittgensteins view of the private language argument see Moser (1992).
798
and Wright, 2002). Kripkes (1982) (mis)-interpretation of the famous section 201 of the
Investigations started a heated debate around the issue of rule-skepticism. Wittgensteins
paradox holds that no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of
action could be made out to accord with the rule. Thus, it seems that one procedure or activity
can be freely translated by means of suitable rules into another. Rules appear to have lost their
foundation. For Wittgenstein, the way out of this quandary is a way of grasping a rule which is
not interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call obeying the rule and going against
it in actual cases. In PI 201, Wittgenstein clearly rejects a hermeneutic approach (in terms of a
series of interpretations) to grasping a rule, and favors a social approach, which views obeying a
rule as a social practice (202). Clearly, then, it is not possible to obey a rule privately; following
a rule is for Wittgenstein analogous to obeying an order: it is a skill acquired by training. Obeying
a rule is not a matter of choice; we obey rules blindly. Again, we see how the unreflected
certainty associated with obeying a rule is emphasized. Rules7 always tell us the same and we
do what they tell us. On the whole, rules obtain their identity from the very practices in which they
are embedded. Those who can successfully perform the practices can understand them fully
(cf. Johannessen, 1981; Schatzki, 1996).
Wittgensteins social and anthropological point of view is clearly visible in PI 206, where he
maintains that the common behavior of mankind takes on the role of a reference system for
interpreting an unknown language and its games and rules (such as giving orders, obeying them,
rebelling against them, etc.). Note that in Wittgensteins language-games the concept of the
common behavior of mankind refers evidently to the socio-cultural reality of a game and shows
no relation to the mentalist or nativist claims.
As in the case of terms such as language, proposition, or game, Wittgenstein has also not
provided an analytic definition of rule; he considered it to be a family resemblance concept
best clarified by means of examples (often taken from his favorite basic arithmetic). Because
rules are to be interpreted as standards of correctness, they are not only descriptive, but also
prescriptive. Furthermore, the concept of rule-following implies some kind of knowledge (about
the rule) and an intention of using it on the part of the player. Clearly, Wittgenstein rejects the idea
that understanding is a mental state or process (PI 143184). As a matter of fact, both in the
Investigations and in the Nachlass he argues against explaining the idea of understanding a rule
in terms of mechanism, mentalism, hermeneutics, or Platonic thinking (cf. Glock, 1996). Instead,
understanding a rule is to know how to apply it.
Crucial for the present discussion of rules and rule-following is Wittgensteins conviction that
the term rule is a family resemblance concepts; this implies that although there exist a variety
of rules8 that show some resemblances, rules which cannot be analyzed in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions. The abandonment of futile essentialism (cf. Janicki, 1999) was a
Obviously Wittgenstein is aware of the uncertain status of linguistic rules. He writes: What do I call the rule
according to which he proceeds? The hypothesis which describes satisfactorily his use of the words as we observe it, or
the rule which he looks up in using the signs, or the rule which he gives as an answer when we ask him what his rule is?
But what if our observation doesnt show us clearly any rule, and the question doesnt elicit one?For he gave me an
explanation in answer to my question, what he meant by N, but he was prepared to withdraw this explanation and alter
it. So how shall I determine the rules according to which he plays? He doesnt know them himself.Or more correctly:
what use is there left for the expression rule according to which he plays? (BEE item 226, p. 58).
8
Interestingly enough Fogelin (1996:50) maintains that Wittgenstein views language as a rule-governed activity but at
the same time holds that these rules need not be clear, complete, or consistent. Relatedly, Schatzki (1996) claims that the
rules of use cannot even be formulated.
799
momentous step in the philosophy of language, enabling it to focus on the study of linguistic
practices in their natural milieu. Furthermore, researchers started to investigate actual data and
linguistic interaction, rather than objectified meanings and formalized rules of logicomathematical provenance; linguistic practices are now thought of as resting on classes of rules,
represented on a scale/continuum from strict rules through principles to non-rules. Referring to
all such categories along the continuum as rules is clearly inadequate, as they reveal different
properties and serve diverse functions (on principles, see Leech, 1983).
Another problem that the investigation of rules and rule-following has to face is that of the
contradiction between the non-essentialist approach of family resemblances and the clearly
essentialist uses and claims associated with terms such as rules. Rules are generally linked with
necessity, normativity, universality, formalizability, representability, certainty, etc.; the same is
not necessarily the case for the rules of linguistic communication. Notably, linguistic rules are
conventional and arbitrary rather than natural and law-like; however, those who insist on thinking
(acting) or arguing in terms of rules cannot escape a relapse into the essentialist predicament.
Consider in this context a pragmatic rule such as Be clear or Be polite, or Grices
conversational maxims. As communicators, we have to deal with social/linguistic rules in the
human context. Such rules may conflict with one another, for example, clarity with politeness,
efficiency with politeness, and so on. In such situations, players have to make choices between
the competing rules in accordance with their actual preferences. Thus, in specific contexts some
rules may be suspended, others activated.
Obviously, the infinite linguistic potential of linguistic communication is not rule-guided on a
number (or perhaps even the majority) of occasions). So-called rule-governed linguistic behavior
may, for specific reasons (frequently triggered contextually), be replaced by other techniques of
linguistic interaction. For instance, in the case of contextual uncertainty we may try the trial and
error methods of guessing, preempting, suggesting, provoking, misleading, pretending, making
fun of, confounding, outsmarting, rehearsing, and so on.
The issue of language learning reappears frequently in Wittgensteins writings. The reason is
that the social embedding of grammatical rules starts with acculturation and language
acquisition. Here, it may be useful to propose a distinction between the context of language
acquisition and the context of communication. We all have learned how to speak our native
languages (in accordance with grammatical rules) in specific mental, social, cultural, and
physical contexts. This clearly suggests that the relation between rules and their contexts of
acquisition is, to a great extent, idiosyncratic for each learner. Moreover, we may predict that the
context of communication of our grammatical rules will be also unique for each actor and his/her
interactional (linguistic) experience/history.
In sum, in contrast to the players of non-linguistic games, there is no ground to assume that
linguistic actors/players acquired the same rules of communication and to the same degree. Thus,
while we may claim that the majority of chess players have mastered all the rules of the game and
to the same extent, this is not the case for language players; we may safely assume that it would
be near-impossible to point to two language players showing exactly the same linguistic
pragmability.
Obviously, each language community possesses both a specific linguistic inventory and an
unspecified linguistic communicative potential. Language learners and researchers have limited
access to the overall linguistic practice of their communities. Therefore, they acquire only a
fraction of the language-games and subset of the grammatical rules available in a specific
language community, which they apply with a different degree of certainty, understanding, and
awareness of following a rule. The player is supposed to follow rules blindly, that is,
800
unthinkingly; while this kind of social practice certainly is quite common, still, when we enter the
vast region of linguistic uncertainty, blind obedience has to be replaced by hit-and-miss methods
relying on creativity, problem solving, or any other available linguistic techniques that will
reduce uncertainty about how to proceed. In Wittgensteins opinion, the rules of language use are
first of all social (rather than mental), being closely related to those of action and reaction. In fact,
the correctness of use of a word, an expression, or a sentence is the only criterion that validates
their grammatical status.
We should emphasize that context shows instability both in the situation of actual social
(linguistic) interaction and on the occasion of any other involvement in language such as
delivering a lecture, giving a speech, participating in a debate, or reading a book. Clearly, context
is dynamic, unstable, and uncertain, and this has consequences for linguistic communication.
Manifestly, it is context that overrules the meanings of words, phrases, sentences/utterances,
speech acts, etc.; thus, in an ironic context, the meaning of the utterance You are a genius is
exactly the opposite of what the same utterance conveys in its regular or normal context of
occurrence.
Obviously, such meanings have to be contextually inferred. In Wittgensteins interpretation,
however, the rules of use of these expressions are an element of the social linguistic practice and
should be obeyed blindly. In contrast with this, the dynamic context usually produces disorder
and in effect overrules the linguistic social practice and customary social action. Such overruling
practices are social practices par excellence, while at the same time undermining the idea of the
autonomy and objectivity of rules and rule-following (cf. Baker and Hacker, 1985; Hark, 1990).
Language-game players have to identify the dynamic interactional contexts in order to show
the mastery of their linguistic technique. The problem they encounter is that no two
communicative contexts are the same. Differences may have to do with the participants of the
interaction, with the setting (time and place), or with the configurations of the social,
psychological, and cultural features of the players; moreover, their diverse aims, emotional
involvement, and most significant, their different pragmabilities come into play. Nonetheless, the
players have to go on with their business as usual, but in a novel, poorly known, and uncertain
context. As a result, we may predict many occurrences of contextual overruling, emergent
phenomena (faux pas, embarrassment, etc.), social and linguistic uncertainty, and the like. In
extreme situations, we can imagine a language-game in which some (or all) rules misfire and
players engage in uncooperative, uncoordinated game such as a fierce political debate, a quarrel,
or a comedy of errors.
Evidently, language is not able to fully encode the mental, social, cultural, and interactional
reality of a language-game; therefore, what is left unexpressed linguistically must be
contextually inferred by way of implicature, be deduced, or be guessed. Contextual and
interactional instability produce an additional burden for language-game players. The notion of
the social (linguistic) practice and the community view of rule-following (that is, as agreed on by
the speech community) imply a significant role of the social context in the acquisition of
language and social (linguistic) interaction. Even so, the interactional aspect of human
communication in Wittgensteins approach does not occupy the place that it deserves; significantly,
the concept of interaction does not appear in the Investigations at all. However, in his earlier
texts Wittgenstein did write about the stream of life (or of conversation, cf. Stern, 1995). The
metaphor clearly refers to the interactional phenomena of conversation, as seen from the following
quote: Words only have meaning in the river of thought and life (Z 174, RPP I 240). Any
investigation of the social practice without a serious study of social interaction will prove to be
incomplete and inadequate.
801
One further issue should be addressed, namely, that of strategic discourse. This is evidently
associated with uncertainty, creativity, unpredictability, surprise, camouflage, goals, etc., rather
than with automatic, thoughtless reactions in the context of a social practice. Note here that the
social practice of linguistic interaction is unequally distributed among the members of a speech
community. But the social distribution of linguistic practice is not only unequal; it is also
manifestly incomplete. No two language-game players can be attributed the same amount of
experience and skill in the social practice of linguistic communication. For Wittgenstein, the term
social practice (like that of grammar) belongs to the primary or basic concepts that do not
require any justification9: the practice must speaks for itself (OC 139).
Another problem that emerges in connection with rules and their contexts is that of the alleged
stability of the rules and the certainty of their application, as contrasted with the clearly volatile,
unstable, and dynamic nature of linguistic interaction; except on a theoretical level, it is hard even
to imagine a univocal communicative context. Only in such a situation, one might want to make the
claim of one rule of language use in one context in order to secure the absolute certainty
associated with the idea of blind obedience and that of the authoritative social practice as the
highest referee in all linguistic matters. The phenomenon of contextual ambiguity, uncertainty, and
instability cannot be swept under the rug; but we have to handle such situations on a daily basis.
2.3. Meaning, use, and understanding
The meaning and applications of such terms as meaning, use, and understanding changed
so radically in Wittgensteins private language-games since the early 1930s that until this day
they produce unrelenting confusion, misunderstanding, and incessant debates (cf. Hacker, 1990;
1996a). The major change in Wittgensteins later philosophy is an alteration from the Tractarian
mentalist view to the social view of meaning presented in the Investigations and the Nachlass. To
illustrate the problem of changing language-games in Wittgensteins writings, consider the
following proposition from the Tractatus (6.211): In philosophy the question, What do we
actually use this word or this proposition for? repeatedly leads to valuable insights. The
difference between the meaning of the word use in the proposition above and similar
applications of the word use in later texts is that the former refers to a mental operation and the
latter to a social activity. Thus, meaning must refer/appeal not only to the current use or languagegame and the rules behind it, but also to the larger (also historical) context in which the particular
language-game is played (in this case, the one to do with Wittgensteins current beliefs about the
mental or social nature of meaning). In other words, the meaning of use in the proposition 6.211
depends evidently on the players (that is, their pragmability, intentions, current beliefs, etc.) and
only indirectly on the rules and norms that they acquired in the process of socialization. The
phenomenon clearly indicates that words, expressions, or propositions cannot be contextualized
in a single language-game, but rather are distributed over many, hierarchically organized games.
Therefore, we suggest that there are many uses (of various linguistic units) that are not
determined uni-contextually: rather, they show a multi-contextual dependence in their
interpretation. Furthermore, the example above reveals that there are numerous cases in which
applications of words evidently require multi-contextual interpretations, so as to reduce the
uncertainty associated with their occurrence in language-games that are characterized by
The autonomy of such concepts as language (rules), logic, and practice is frequently emphasized in Wittgensteins
writings.
802
inadequate constraints on some of the words applications, or by the need to interpret the words in
terms of a higher order language-game.
Finally, we could advance a more radical claim by suggesting that each language-game,
contextual configuration, and linguistic interaction is different and requires a specific
interpretation rather than blind obedience (especially in the case of complex discourses that
show insufficient contextual (or language-game) constraints).
Clearly, in many language-games the role of the player is crucial not only for their
(perlocutionary) effect (this issue, according to Wittgenstein, goes beyond the study of language
use), but also for a properly constrained use of the words in a language-game (as in the example
above). Moreover, the role and significance of the player differ from one language-game to
another: consider the multiplication game and its rules, where social players blindly perform or
react to multiplication operations (high certainty), as opposed to the language-game of a
philosophical discussion (such as in the Tractatus or the Investigations) or any discourse showing
some independence from the socially accepted conventionality, where the role of the players is
decisive for the understanding of the game (low certainty).
It is the considered view of the present author that we have to abandon the idea of considering
the case of multiplication as the correct pattern of linguistic interaction and understanding in
human communication. In this connection, it is of interest to note that for quite a long time,
Wittgenstein was the sole player10 in his language-games. Other prospective players such as
Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, or George E. Moore somehow failed to understand the rules of
the game (the uses of words and expressions), despite the fact that they participated in an
indefinite number of logical and philosophical games of their own (cf. Monk, 1990; see also
footnote 12). Here, the issue of subjectivity and uncertainty comes up again. In addition, it should
be noted that the fact whether you join in to play, how you play the game, and most important,
how you understand the rules of the game depends also on other players. Wittgensteins account
of language-games without players who, in reality, are reduced to mirrors that faithfully reflect
social practices and reproduce them in their social (linguistic) action is manifestly incomplete, to
say the least.
The notion of an autonomous grammar implies the need to list all the uses of words and
expressions. Each word or expression has to play in at least one language-game; most of them
play in an indefinite or even infinite number of games. Frequently, words have to cross the fuzzy
boundaries between the individual language-games and in consequence lose their conventional
meanings in favor of new possible interpretations. Obviously, linguistic communication raises
the issue of correctness, standardization, social prestige, didactic recommendations, etc. Thus,
while in one case we can observe more and less typical, familiar, or conventional interaction, in
another we note visible individual preferences of linguistic practice, which in many dimensions
may deviate from some idealized social practice.
For Wittgenstein, to use a word is to utter it in a language-game (PI 43). Its meaning depends
on how it can be applied, rather than on its associations with some abstract, mental, or material
objects (its referents). In brief, the conventional uses of words determine their meanings.
Significantly, according to Wittgenstein, the uses of rules (words) are functionally related to and
embedded in grammar rather than in the intentions of the language-game players.
Wittgenstein notes the conceptual connections between meaning and notions such as
understanding and explanation (cf. von Wright, 1971). For him, grammatical rules are
10
He writes as follows: Nearly all my writings are private conversations with myself (CV 77).
803
explanations of the meanings of words in terms of their use. In consequence, any difference of
use reflects a difference of meaning. Wittgenstein manifestly rejects the causal theories11
of meaning, as earlier advocated by Bertrand Russell, and by Carl Ogden and Ian Richards in
the 1920s.
Thus, in Wittgensteins view, conventionalized uses of words or expressions (expressed by
means of grammatical rules) in specific language-games produce meaning understandable to
competent players of the language-game. Problems, however, may inevitably arise (1) when the
linguistic expressions are not sufficiently conventionalized, (2) when such expressions depend on
multiple-contextualization, or (3) when the pragmabilities of the players are for some reason
incompatible or divergent, due to either social or cultural differences (social relativism), or to
the players diverse aims and emotions, to their unwillingness to cooperate in the game, or to
cognitive differences.
To play a language-game, you have to follow the rules and to do that you have to understand
them. The late Wittgenstein advocates a non-psychologistic account of understanding.
Understanding is ability12 rather than a mental act or process (PI 154). He argues that there
is no logical necessity to claim that understanding depends on mental or physiological
phenomena; moreover, the presence of mental phenomena does not assure understanding, and
finally, understanding is not an activity (see footnote 11). Rather, linguistic understanding is an
ability to use words in language-games: it is a skill which manifests itself in three player abilities:
(1) using the word, (2) reacting to its use in linguistic interaction, and (3) explaining its meaning
(if necessary).
Wittgenstein considered understanding as a family resemblance term (PG 49, 74) and no
doubt he was aware of diverse types of understanding (such as linguistic, aesthetic, or scientific).
Wittgensteins approach to the concept of understanding is certainly ground-breaking, however,
several questions suggest themselves in this connection, first, whether understanding as an
ability (skill) accounts for all aspects of that notion; second, what are the varieties of
understanding (especially within the category or family of linguistic understanding); and third,
whether an account of misunderstanding can throw some new light on the operation of
understanding.
In regard to the first issue, it is important to realize that although the ability to apply a term,
expression, or proposition is certainly indispensable (at least in the majority of cases) for their
understanding, it does not always guarantee a satisfactory comprehension: we may use words
properly without understanding them13 them, or we may understand them to a certain degree
only. We must also draw attention to the evident gradability of understanding from full
understanding (as, for instance, in the case of the rules of multiplication), through partial
understanding, to non-understanding and a variety of misunderstandings, misrepresentations,
11
The main idea behind this causality is that words evoke in our interlocutors the same mental images that they do in us.
Wittgenstein writes as follows: The use of the word understanding however is such that it is very misleading to say it
refers to an activity. Lots of activities are signs that we have understood. The technique of use of the verb understanding
is most similar to the technique of use of the verb to be able to. In particular in such cases as to be able to play chess
BEE Item 166/p. 29v (1935).
13
It is remarkable that Gottlob Frege could not understand any of the propositions appearing on the first page of the
Tractatus, which for a logician like Frege was quite a feat (see Monk, 1990). From this, we can draw at least two
conclusions: first, that Wittgensteins idiosyncratic language-games had not reached the level of accepted social practice
at that time; and second, more importantly, that private (individual) language-games (like the ones Wittgenstein for quite
a long time played with himself) after all, are possible.
12
804
and misinterpretations. In contrast, the concept of understanding, as conceived of in terms of

fixed rules, is clearly categorical and discrete rather than gradable.
For Wittgenstein, only full understanding (as illustrated by the rules of multiplication) counts
as legitimate (see also Stern, 1995:191). He seems to have left the family resemblance view of
understanding of the transitional period and retreated to that of the Tractarian. Obviously,
Wittgenstein had good reasons for narrowing down the concept of understanding as presented
above; first, he wanted to save the view of language as a rule-governed activity, and second, he
wished to escape the infinite regress of (rule) interpretation. The price to pay for that decision is
evidenced by the theoretical and practical problems that arise from such an approach to
understanding. Thus, the belief that we are acting on a complete, perfect, and immediate
understanding of other players in the game, or in general, of texts and discourses proves to be a
myth. Most of the time (indeed, almost always) our understanding is incomplete, imperfect, only
apparent, uncertain, and frequently non-immediate. The reason is that our affectabilities,
pragmabilities, the experienced and learned social practices, interactional aims, social skills, the
level of acculturation, cognitive abilities, etc., are different from person to person (cf. Kopytko,
2004). In addition, the understanding and applications of specific concepts (such as pragmatics,
logic, use, interpretation, etc.) and most significantly, the understanding and handling of the
interactional context and the vast background of innumerable texts and discourses are an
inexhaustible source of imperfect understanding, confusion, misunderstanding, non-understanding, and virtual understanding.
As to the latter, we engage in virtual understanding by playing virtual language-games, that is,
apparent or make-believe games. Consider the sentence: Brian Greenes belief in the
11-dimensional space needs empirical support. This sentence illustrates both incomplete and
virtual understanding, as the hypothetical concept of an 11-dimensional space (cf. Greene, 2004)
is not only poorly understood but in addition, can hardly be imagined. Nonetheless, it appears in
the language-game of the theory of strings and indeed such a kind of understanding is
characteristic of in innumerable other virtual games14 (which clearly observe rigorously the rules
of use). The best illustration of the problem is of Alan Sokals famous hoax in which he published
a parodic article crammed with nonsensical but authentic quotations from prominent French and
American intellectuals15 (cf. Sokal and Bricmont, 1998).
Since evidently, we have to handle texts and verbal encounters of different comprehensibility,
the idea of viewing understanding as an all or nothing event is too limited to account for all the
variegated social-cognitive phenomena. It should be also emphasized that Wittgensteins view of
understanding as a social skill (or a know-how), rather than as propositional knowledge, applies also
to knowledge itself, because understanding knowledge requires a social skill, which is a gradable
notion.
As mentioned above, Wittgenstein argued for the superiority of understanding over
interpretation the latter being unreliable and leading to an infinite regress of interpretations;
moreover, it implies duration rather than a momentary event, and some amount of uncertainty to
14
For an excellent illustration of a virtual tennis game see Michelangelo Antonionis masterpiece Blow-up. All the
rules of the game of tennis are observed, but the game has no true content/meaning; it is a virtual game.
15
The virtual language users include Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Bruno Latour, Jean Baudrillard,
Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Paul Virilio and others. Actually, all the stars of postmodernism engage in some form of
incomprehensible games. In all likelihood, only ordinary people using ordinary language would meet (at least some of)
Wittgensteins constraints on language use and understanding.
For an excellent analysis of the Sokal incident, see Kuzar (2001). [Editors Note].
805
boot. Now, this is exactly what we are facing in language-games, where (in contrast to regular
games) you cannot play the same game twice: the dynamic interactional context continuously
changes the understanding and interpretation of the ongoing linguistic communication. However,
this view of understanding seriously undermines the rule-governed view of linguistic practices.
To save it, it would be necessary to propose a set of rules for each possible context, something
which would lead to an infinite set of rules; clearly a counterproductive move. Such a view of
language use also puts into question Wittgensteins game simile, because the linguistic and social
phenomena in social (linguistic) interactions are much less constrained than is the case in rulegoverned games. (Note, however, that the latter similarly are less constrained than are logical
calculi.) Once again, we are confronted with a continuum of rule-governed operations (activities)
from the strongly to the weakly constrained. A study of verbal interaction can manifestly
exemplify those diverse varieties of constraints.
Finally, a few words on the question of a possible common basis for the phenomena of
misunderstanding and understanding are in order. Clearly, communicative misunderstanding
between language-game players is closely related to the players social, cultural, linguistic,
pragmatic/contextual, mental, cognitive, emotional, conative, and perceptual conditions, as
does the corresponding understanding. For example, understanding cognitively depends on
memory, attention, recognition, and other similar skills. Wittgensteins account of understanding is clearly social and non-mentalist. While he correctly criticizes the mostly unjustified
and exclusive reliance on cognitive explanations, he does not dismiss them completely. Thus, in
the Investigations he writes about a game of chess whose players experience the appropriate
mental accompaniments (PI 200).
2.4. The mental versus the social and the physical
This section focuses on the relation between the mental and human behavior (PI 243315)
and the idea of a private language which initiated the celebrated private language
argumenta long-standing and controversial debate on the impossibility of a private
language, sense-experiences16 such as pain, or emotions (except as conceived of in social
terms). In this dispute, Wittgenstein holds a consistent anti-mentalist view17 and argues in
favor of a social account of language, sense-data, and emotions. His stand in this debate clashes
with that of Rene Descartes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Bertrand Russell, and modern
cognitive representationalism. Thus, the Cartesian mental theater of psychological terms is
accessible only to the individual. So are sensations, experiences, and thoughts. The idea of a
private language must face the problem of the standard of correctness, because in such a
presumed language no such standard could be established. By implication, there is no such a
thing as a private rule, inasmuch as a standard of correctness must be testable. Similarly, there
are no recognized methods of comparing sensations and no criteria of identity18 for private
mental entities; therefore, a description of something private is not possible. Note, however,
that that view does not imply that such mental objects do not exist; Wittgensteins anti16
Rather the private experiences which we imagined as an unknown x , y, z, etc., behind our actions, dissolve into a
mist and into nothing BEE item 149/p. 36 (19351936)).
17
The private experience is a degenerate construction of our grammar (comparable in a sense to tautology and
contradiction) (BEE item 151/p. 32 (1936)).
18
The private experience is to serve as a paradigm and at the same time admittedly it cant be a paradigm (BEE item
151/ p. 31 (1936)).
806
mentalism does not mean that he embraced behaviorism. He writes as follows: In fact the
private object is one about which neither he who has it nor he who hasnt got it can say anything
to others or to himself (BEE item 166/ p. 12r (1935)). According to Wittgenstein, the mental
is not something hidden behind the outer; rather, it instills our behavior and is articulated in it
(see Glock, 1996:175).
Significantly, for Wittgenstein, avowals (cf. Savigny, 1990), that is, first-person, presenttense psychological assertions such as I am in pain, or I intend to go do not describe the inner;
rather, they are expressions of the inner that are, to some degree, comparable to natural reactions,
gestures, grimaces, etc. Wittgenstein writes: I have been trying in all this to remove the
temptation to think that there must be what is called a mental process of thinking, hoping,
wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.
And I want to give you the following rule of thumb: If you are puzzled about the nature of
thought, belief, knowledge, and the like, substitute for the thought the expression of the thought,
etc. (BEE item 309/ p. 68 (19331934)). The misguided notion that avowals are descriptions
leads to confused ideas such as that of pain as an inner object, which in consequence produces a
false picture of the mind.
Note also that the alleged impossibility of a private language (cf. Schroeder, 2001a) is
manifestly consistent with the idea of rule-following. This is so because using language entails
following rules, and following rules entails social practice (cf. also Kripke, 1982). Wittgensteins
view of language and sensations as non-private is further shored up by the argument that the
meaning of words19 (e.g., blue, pain, anger, etc.) can be kept constant, first of all, by public
criteria (as embodied in their applications). Thus, according to Wittgenstein, the mental loses
out to the social. The actual status of the loser is, however, unclear and still ardently debated
(cf. Budd, 1989; Diamond, 1995; Johnston, 1993).
An alternative to the dichotomy of the private versus the social (resolved by Wittgenstein in
favor of the social) is the idea of the double (social and private) or even multiple articulation of
the linguistic sign and of human communication, that is supposed to account for the phenomena
of communicative uncertainty, miscommunication, and non-understanding. In this approach, the
different pragmabilities of the players and the dynamic interactional context give rise to overlap
between the private and the social meaning (either total or partial), or even to various degrees of
divergence. Finally, the mental also loses out to the physical20 in the game of the inner versus the
outer (recall the issue of Cartesian dualism). We conclude that Wittgensteins approach to (a) the
idea of a private language, (b) psychological expressions (avowals), (c) sensations, and
(d) emotions, put into question the picture of the mind that is based upon the distinction between
inner and outer.
Rather unconventionally, Wittgenstein argues against a universal correlation between the
mental and the physical. Thus, he does not suggest any causal explanations of the mental
processes. Furthermore, Wittgenstein holds that the explanation and application of mental terms
do not depend on physiological notions. He writes as follows: Why should there not be
psychological lawlikeness to which no physiological lawlikeness corresponds? If this upsets our
19
Was bedeutet das Wort mir? Was bedeutet es ihm? Wenn wir miteinander spielen so spielen wir dasselbe Spiel.
Ich kenne keine wesentlich private Bedeutung (BEE item 147/ p. 18v (1934)). (What does the word mean to me? What
does it mean to him? When we play together, we play the same game. I do not know of any really private meaning (my
translation).
20
Is there then no mind, but only a body? Answer: The word mind has meaning, i.e., it has a use in our language;
but saying this doesnt yet say what kind of use we make of it (BEE item 309/p. 117 (19331934)).
807
concepts of causality it is high time they were upset (RPP I 905). Wittgenstein repudiates both
behaviorism and physicalism because of their unacceptable tendency towards reductionism and
simplification (cf. Schulte, 1993). Nonetheless, he is often claimed to be a crypto-behaviorist, or
logical behaviorist.
As to Wittgensteins views on nativism and its significance for learning languages
(see Williams, 1999), his concessions are rather modest. Even the most primitive technique of
language teaching (e.g., using the ostensive method) requires the learner to have some behavioral
and perceptual capacities indispensable for learning and linguistic communication. In brief, the
learner cannot be a tabula rasa.
3. Summary and conclusions
In the final section of this article we shall draw some conclusions concerning Ludwig
Wittgensteins philosophical/pragmatic involvement with linguistic communication. We can
distinguish between three roles played by Wittgenstein: first, Wittgenstein as a pragmatician,
second, Wittgenstein as a social constructionist and third, Wittgenstein as a holist in his approach
to pragmatics.
3.1. Wittgenstein as a pragmatician
The investigation presented in section 2, has clearly shown that Ludwig Wittgenstein is not
only a proto-pragmatician, but also the first modern pragmatician. The claim made here rests on
the following grounds: (1) Wittgenstein abandons the idea of language as calculus in favor of
contextualized language-games embedded in forms of life; (2) he rejects the inner versus outer
dichotomy; (3) the view of grammar as the mirror of reality; (4) he replaces the analysis of
language in essential terms with the idea of family resemblance; (5) he advocates the idea of
meaning as use; (6) he construes description, rule, and language-game as family resemblance
concepts; (7) he weakens the idea of the rule; (8) he supports the idea of non-modular pragmatics
(analyzed in terms of language games and forms of life); and (9) he rejects Cartesian dualism.
These elements of Wittgensteins thinking about investigating language in its context indicate
clearly his pragmatic stance.
Yet, Wittgenstein shows some inconsistence and uncertainty in regard to some aspects of a
pragmatic investigation of the linguistic phenomena, which is not surprising, inasmuch as these
phenomena are scalar, non-discrete, and fuzzy. Therefore, (1) Wittgensteins holism must be read
alongside his patent overly reductionist view of the cognitive aspects of the mind and their role
in linguistic communication; (2) his non-essentialism must be contrasted with his idea of
rule-governed language behavior; and (3) his advocacy of non-discreteness should be confronted
with his notion of rules being fixed on the one hand, and viewed as a family resemblance concept
on the other.
3.2. Wittgenstein as a social constructionist
Wittgensteins anti-mentalist stance has led him to embrace a form of social constructionism
which underlies his view of such ideas as meaning, use, understanding, recognition, memory,
certainty, as well as sensations (pain) or emotions (anger). As a matter of fact, he reinterprets the
mentalist concepts mentioned above in social terms. Consequently, Wittgenstein repudiates
Cartesian dualism and makes only a minor concession to the innateness hypothesis (we are not
808
born tabula rasa). He manifestly rejects21 (or does not consider) Cartesian claims associated with
modern cognitivism such as the hypotheses concerning (a) the modularity of the mind, (b)
common cognitive processing mechanism, (c) the representational view of the mind, and (d)
cognitive rationality (cf. Kopytko, 2001).
Another central aspect of Wittgensteins philosophy concerns the dichotomy of the private
versus the public, or the individual (mental) versus the social. Here, the social wins over all the
other contestants and reigns supreme. Thus, rules, meaning, language, understanding, sensations,
and emotions are socially constituted and grounded in the social practice. Wittgensteins social
reinterpretation of those concepts is among his greatest and most penetrating insights. On the
whole, his critique of cognitivism should be welcome. Even so, although his attempt to make the
private public proved to be a success, it only succeeded to a degree. While we may agree that
language-game players have no private means (language) to express their private thoughts but
rather have to rely on the social code (language) of their specific, linguistic community, still,
players reveal manifestly different pragmabilities and affectabilities, which, along with the
dynamic phenomena of context, constitute the main source of communicative uncertainty. As a
result, communicators have to deal with what has been called the double or multiple articulation
of linguistic signs.
It should be also noted that the relation between the social and the private is certainly not that
of a complete overlap. Players do not mirror the social practices; most of the time, they rather
exhibit a family resemblance, reflect the social imperfectly and to a certain degree only, or even
show a false reflection. Thus, in practice, language-game players have to relate themselves to a
continuum stretching from relative (context-dependent) rule certainty through rule uncertainty to
rule skepticism (a non-game). In other words, linguistic practices take advantage of different
types of rules such as strict rules, principles, and non-rules. Most importantly, the dynamic
communicative context overrules the linguistic practices, rules, meanings, and understandings
of the individual players.
Wittgensteins social constructionism brought about considerably reduced and marginalized
version of cognitivism/mentalism. Such a reduction is to some extent justified, however, it could
also lead to a situation in which the mental context of linguistic communication is completely
unaccounted for. Again, unless we are satisfied with a view of the language-game player as a
rule-following, blindly obedient, clockwork-like mechanism, grounded in social practice, a
holistic approach to linguistic practice will have to investigate the mental context (the
cognitiveaffectiveconative triad mentioned earlier). As indicated in section 2.1, the
pragmability of the player rests on more than merely blind obedience to linguistic social
practices.
3.3. Wittgenstein as a holist in his approach to pragmatics
In view of Wittgenstein holistic claims (cf. Stern, 1995; Williams, 1999), expressed in terms of
similes such as language-game, forms of life, or stream of life, it is crucial to examine (1)
how he handles these intricate issues and to what effect, and (2) how we can relate them to the
holistic claims of modern pragmatics.
Language-games or linguistic interactions consist minimally of the following indispensable
elements: (1) players, (2) rules, (3) actions and interactions, and (4) (perlocutionary) effect(s).
21
Note, however, that Wittgensteins stand on particular matters frequently is implied rather than expressly stated.
809
In his analysis, Wittgenstein focuses mainly on rules and to some extent on actions and
interactions. Surprisingly, players and results do not attract his attention or interest. Note that for
him rules (rule following), interactions, and understanding are autonomous social skills or
abilities, grounded in the social practice. Here, it should be underscored that perlocutionary effect
appears to be crucial for the understanding and decision how to go on (in linguistic interaction). A
false understanding and decision brings about interactional confusion, uncertainty about how to
proceed, or even virtual understanding. Wittgenstein fails to account for these problems and
issues.
Of far greater importance, however, are the roles that the players fill in holistic approaches to
linguistic communication. In Wittgensteins view, players are perfect rule-followers, social
mechanisms blindly obedient to, and grounded in the social practices. Such practices certainly
are not unfamiliar; however, linguistic communicators, using their creativity, frequently take
advantage of specific cognitive faculties to achieve their communicative objectives. To avoid the
pitfalls of rule skepticism, Wittgenstein, according to some commentators, deliberately
concentrates on the social communicative certainty guaranteed by fixed rules grounded in social
practices. However, as indicated above, players almost constantly have to handle situations
characterized by the communicative uncertainty that is due to the dynamic, unstable context, to
the emergent interactional phenomena, to the different pragmabilities and affectabilities of
other players, to the very frequent instances of linguistic creativity and innovation, spontaneity
and improvisation, etc., and finally, to such phenomena as misunderstanding, nonunderstanding, misinterpretation, jumping to conclusions, false inferences, linguistic and
cultural relativity, etc.
Clearly, game certainty is a matter of degree. Thus, we could suggest a social-cognitive space
of relative, context-dependent determinacy and a vast space (continuum) of indeterminacy and
uncertainty. The critical role of players in language-games cannot be disregarded. Unlike for
instance, the game of multiplication, where the role of players is minimal, language games which
involve negotiating, control of the interaction, strategic communication, or even (re)shaping the
rules of the game (interaction) show the significance of the participants in the game; frequently,
too, different players constitute different games. In relation to this, it should also be emphasized
that the concept of certainty/uncertainty is gradable and that absolute certainty is a grammatical
fiction; hence, despite Wittgensteins claim that uncertainty could never lead to action
(see section 2.1), people frequently have take action in situations of social, cognitive, and
communicative uncertainty.
To sum up, a holistic approach to linguistic practices has to account for the vast space of
communicative uncertainty, linguistic variation, creativity, and innovation (including spontaneity
and improvisation), all phenomena that are incompatible with Wittgensteins notion languagegames (recall the continuum from games to non-games that was mentioned earlier, in section 2.1).
In conclusion, Wittgenstein succeeds to a great extent as a theoretical pragmatician (see the
points 19 listed in section 3.1); but while he is likewise very successful as a social
constructionist, his constructionist pragmatics leads to a radical anti-mentalist stance, and in
consequence clearly over-socializes human communication. (Note, however, that the social
constructionists among pragmaticians certainly would embrace, without reservations,
Wittgensteins de-mentalized view of linguistic communication.) Finally, although holistically
oriented in a social constructionist framework Wittgenstein clearly does not make the grade as a
holist in his approach to pragmatics: his account of the phenomenon of linguistic communication
fails to do justice to its complex reality. Above, it has been indicated where he went wrong; but
note that he went wrong to a certain degree only. When, for instance, he embraced holism, his
810
version of holism proved to be incomplete; however, this is a matter of scope only, not of any
incompatible assumptions. As to the relation between the mental and the social, the question
remains open. Wittgensteins social view and his interpretation of linguistic phenomena
possesses a considerable explanatory power in some contexts, but not all (see sections 3.3 and
3.4). For theoretically oriented pragmaticians, Wittgenstein works are obligatory reading; his
invaluable insights and his social critique of everything, especially of Cartesianism,
mentalism, and cognitivism are still valid and indisputably reveal his genius. Wittgenstein was a
philosopher rather than an empirical researcher; even so, his significance for, and his
contributions to modern science (cf. Chapman and Dixon, 1992), to the philosophy of mind
(Schroeder, 2001a, 2001b), and to the philosophy of science (cf. Winch, 1958; Bloor, 1983)
cannot be overestimated.
Acknowledgements
It would have been impossible to accomplish this project without my scholarly visit to the
Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) Norway, in September 2003, under the
EU ARI WAB program. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the devoted
Wittgensteinian Alois Pichler and his staff for their hospitality, inestimable help and friendship.
The access to the famous Bergen Electronic Edition (BEE) of Wittgensteins Nachlass and other
materials associated with the life and work of Ludwig Wittgenstein proved to be indispensable
for my research.
Appendix A. Abbreviations of Wittgensteins works
BEE
Wittgensteins Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition. Oxford University Press,

Oxford, 2000.
CE
Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness. Edited by Rush Rhees, translated by Peter Winch.
Philosophia 1976/6, 392445.
CV
Culture and Value. Edited by G.H. von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman,
translated by Peter Winch. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980.
OC
On Certainty. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, translated by Denis
Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe. Blackwell, Oxford, 1969.
PG
Philosophical Grammar. Edited by Rush Rhees, translated by Anthony J.P. Kenny.
Blackwell, Oxford, 1974.
PI
Philosophical Investigations. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees, translated
by G.E.M. Anscombe. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.
RPP I Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. I. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H.
von Wright, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.
TPL
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by David F. Pears and Brian F. McGuinness.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961.
Z
Zettel. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, translated by G.E.M.
Anscombe. Blackwell, Oxford, 1967.
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Roman Kopytko received a Ph.D. in English linguistics at Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland. His postdoctoral dissertation Polite discourse in Shakespeares English was devoted to socio-historical pragmatics. He published
articles on Middle English syntax and semantics, Polish-English contrastive analysis, and the language of William
Shakespeare. He taught at Fredonia SUC, NY, and American University, Washington, DC; and conducted research in
London University and Brown University, Providence, RI. Most recently, he has been involved in two projectsthe first
dealing with holistic pragmatics and the second with conflict discourse. He is particularly interested in the philosophy of
language and the philosophy of science, and the relation between science and philosophy. At present he is professor in the
Institute of English at Adam Mickiewicz University and in the School of Foreign Languages in Poznan, Poland.

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Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812

Philosophy and pragmatics: A language-game

R. Kopytko / Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812

R. Kopytko / Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812

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in social interaction. Significantly, affectability is an indispensable component of pragmability

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and misinterpretations. In contrast, the concept of understanding, as conceived of in terms of

R. Kopytko / Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812

R. Kopytko / Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812

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R. Kopytko / Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812

R. Kopytko / Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812

R. Kopytko / Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812

Wittgensteins Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition. Oxford University Press,

R. Kopytko / Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812

R. Kopytko / Journal of Pragmatics 39 (2007) 792812

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