Statutory Construction Part 1

[STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] July 15, 2014
G.R. No. 11530, U.S. v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
August 12, 1916
G.R. No. 11530
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:
The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of illegal importation of opium,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did,
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board
the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and
that, then and there, the said accused, also conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did receive and conceal
the said quantity of opium and aided each other in the transportation, receipt and concealment of the same after the
said opium had been imported, knowing that said drug had been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally introduced
into the Philippine Islands from a foreign country; an act committed in violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been arrested.)
Each were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for
the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that
he was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him
has become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of error) and are greatly multiplied by their
reiteration in a somewhat changed form of statement under the many propositions embraced in the elaborate printed
brief, but their essence, when correctly understood, are these: The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion,
dated May 6, 1915, and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal evidence of record establishes the
guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if
found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the
same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special
session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having
violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces
itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and
(2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals. These questions will be considered in the reversed order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties which would properly be required
of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the
Philippine Commission provides, among other things, "that the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and
accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall be the duty of the Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the
proceedings of the Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for the ordinary and special
sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature, the following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine die of the Commission as a Chamber of
the Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as
a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly
"shall keep in journal of its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this mandate, the journal of the
Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was duly published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the
Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts of the legislative, executive,
and judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine Islands ... shall be judicially recognized by the court
without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section states,
when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or
evidence." And section 313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same Code also provides that:
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Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order: Provided, That in the case of Acts of
the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding
officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due
enactment thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts may take judicial
notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States that such journals may be noticed by the courts in
determining the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio,
348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice
of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not ambiguous
or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature
adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as
to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose
of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this
investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On
the one hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at midnight on February 28,
1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact may be established by extraneous evidence; while, on
the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of
adjournment. In order to understand these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and character of
the evidence thus involved. Evidence is understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in question or to
influence the belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that which establishes the fact, as in the instance of
conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.) Counsel for the appellant, in order to
establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative
journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the
Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel
in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight
and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock
were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's
proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the
clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the
probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain
oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long
centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to
legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence
of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many
contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same point the court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886,
said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases upon this question; and, out of a multitude of
citations, not one is found in which any court has assumed to go beyond the proceedings of the legislature, as recorded
in the journals required to be kept in each of its branches, on the question whether a law has been adopted. And if
reasons for the limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters have not generally been stated, in doubtless arises from
the fact that they are apparent. Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of laws should rest upon
public memorials of the most permanent character. They should be public, because all are required to conform to them;
they should be permanent, that right acquired to-day upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions of the various states in the
American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date
where the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the
Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government and the various states, we
do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the Legislature
adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go
behind these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain,
bringing, among other cargo, twenty-five barrels which were manifested as "wine" and consigned to Jacinto Lasarte.
Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this cargo, engaged in the business of a wine merchant, with an office
and warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five
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barrels were delivered to Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were indorsed as follows:
"Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident to the release
of the merchandise from the customhouse and the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due course to the warehouse of
Beliso at the aforementioned street and number. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery. Shortly thereafter the
custom authorities, having noticed that shipments of merchandise manifested as "wine" had been arriving in Manila
from Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not listed as merchants, and having some doubt as to the nature
of the merchandise so consigned, instituted an investigation and traced on the 10th of April, 1915, the twenty-five
barrels to Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the customs registry number of the shipment, the entry number, and the
serial number of each barrel. It was found that the twenty-five barrels began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse
about 11 o'clock on the morning of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons, went
to Beliso's warehouse and joined Beliso in the latter's office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left and
shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded in Beliso's bodega. He called one of his employees,
Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go out and get a bull cart. This Sese did and returned with the vehicle. Beliso then
carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment of twenty-five and told Sese to load these five on the cart and to
deliver them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General Solano. This order was complied with by Sese and the barrels
delivered to Pons at the place designated. Pursuing their investigation, which started on the 10th, the customs secret
service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date before the office was opened and awaited the arrival of Beliso.
Sese was found in the bodega and placed under arrest. The agents then proceeded to separate the recent shipment
from the other merchandise stored in the warehouse, identifying the barrels by the customs registry and entry numbers.
Only twenty of the twenty-five barrels could be found on Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or interrogated,
Sese informed the customs agents that the five missing barrels had been delivered by him to Pons at 144 Calle General
Solano by order of Beliso. The agents, accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and here found
the five missing barrels, which were identified by the registry and entry numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The
five barrels were empty, the staves having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, each
corresponding in size to the heads of the five barrels, were found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed
several baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house and on further search they found 77 tins of opium in
one of these baskets. There was no one in the house when this search was made, but some clothing was discovered
which bore the initials "J. P." It then became important to the customs agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of
house No. 144 on Calle General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The owner was found, upon
investigation, to be Mariano Limjap, and from the latter's agent it was learned that the house was rented by one F. C.
Garcia. When the lease of the house was produced by the agent of the owner, the agents saw that the same was
signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons." After discovering these facts they returned to the house of Beliso and selected
three of the twenty barrels and ordered them returned to the customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was
found to contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats and securely nailed. Each large tin
contained 75 small tins of opium. A comparison of the large tins taken out of the three barrels with the empty ones found
at 144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial court, "that they were in every way identical in size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso on the morning of April 10, Pons, apparently
unaware that anything unusual was going on, arrived there and was placed under arrest, and taken to the office of
Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret service, and according to Hawkins, voluntarily confessed his participation
in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained, however, that the 77 tins of opium found at 144 Calle General Solano
represented the entire importation. Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the three barrels were
opened and the customs officers appearing to be no doubt as to which end of the barrels contained the opium, Pons
showed the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that the end of the barrel, which had the impression of a
bottle stamped in the wood, contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of opium taken from the three barrels, Pons
further stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of opium of this shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning
of April 10, following the instructions given him by Beliso. On being further questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso
had been partners in several opium transactions; that the house at No. 144 Calle General Solano had been leased by
him at the suggestion of Beliso for the purpose of handling the prohibited drug; and that he and Beliso had shared the
profits of a previous importation of opium. Sese testified that he had delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle General
Solano. The customs agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard several large tin receptacles, in
every way similar to those found at 144 Calle General Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse. At
first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in the between the Provinces of Isabela and
Cagayan, and later he retracted this statement and admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person. But during the trial of
this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia was a wine merchant and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia had
written him a letter directing him to rent a house for him (Garcia) and retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of
Garcia. According to Pons this letter arrived on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels of "wine," but that he
had destroyed it because he feared that it would compromise him. On being asked during the trial why he insisted, in
purchasing wine from Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had just arrived on the Lopez y Lopez, answered,
"Naturally because F. C. Garcia told me in this letter that this opium was coming in barrels of wine sent to Beliso by a
man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the reason I wanted to get these barrels of wine."
The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these fats establish the guilt of the appellant beyond
any question of a doubt, notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that the opium as shipped to him from Spain by a
childhood fried named Garcia. The appellant took a direct part in this huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby.
The penalty imposed by the trial court is in accordance with la and the decisions of this court in similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1123
March 5, 1947
ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.
Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio Barredo, and Jose W.
Diokno for petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Taada, and First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both
houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto." The
members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the
Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and the petitioners are eight senators, seventeen representatives, and the
presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. The validity of the abovementioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of the case it is unnecessary to go into the
facts at length. We will mention only the facts essential for the proper understanding of the issues. For this purpose it
suffices to say that three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a
majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held
on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of
Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since
their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the
same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in
the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the present
petition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the questioned
resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is
required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in
either branch of Congress.
At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents deny that this Court has
jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some merit in the
petitioners' contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness of an
enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice. This objection, however, is purely academic.
Whatever distinction there is in the juridical sense between the two concepts, in practice and in their operation they boil
down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in that both are founded on the regard which the
judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent departments of the Government. If a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the
judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the province of
the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of
powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining
what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents
and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle
with the actions of the political departments of the government.
But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court reported and annotated in 122 A.L.R., 695. The case, by a majority decision delivered by Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable. The Court further held that the
decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the questions of whether an amendment has been
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adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the state legislature, is not subject to review by the
court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question.
The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the
amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct
parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character
from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even
independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary
be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into
that of a ratification. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has once said:
There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed, or
that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government; because the measure derives all its vital force
from the action of the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an established
form, to a free people, the proposition whether they will change their fundamental law. The means provided for
the exercise of their sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a construction as not to
trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments in its exercise are in derogation of the right of
free government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security against tumult and revolution is the free
and unobstructed privilege to the people of the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed by the
instrument. (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 150.)
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas, in
Miller vs.Coleman, supra, finds no basis for discriminating between proposal and ratification. From his forceful opinion
we quote the following paragraphs:
The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments. Final
determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is conclusive upon
the courts." In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However,
whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the
commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department" of questions of a type which this
Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a "political question" by the "political department" to
which the Constitution has committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and
subjects of . . . government." Proclamation under authority of Congress that an amendment has been ratified
will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken place as the Constitution
commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of the Constitution,
leaving to the judiciary its traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion in the
present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive constitutional
authority of Congress over submission and ratification of amendments, we are unable to agree.
The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is being followed
between submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon
a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly
authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State may
reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are all consistent only with
an intimate control over the amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the course of
amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution
solely to the political branch of government.
The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as subject to judicial
construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the
conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly submitted
amendment must die unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior
assumption of power to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has
constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in Article 5 of the Constitution. On the other
hand, the Court's opinion declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the "political questions" of
whether as State whose legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its
position, and whether, in the circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead because an
"unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such division between the political and judicial branches of the
government is made by Article 5 which grants power over the amending of the Constitution to Congress alone.
Undivided control of that process has been given by the Article exclusively and completely to Congress. The
process itself is "political" in its entirely, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution,
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three justices subscribed, arrives at the same
conclusion. Though his thesis was the petitioner's lack of standing in court a point which not having been raised by
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the parties herein we will not decide his reasoning inevitably extends to a consideration of the nature of the legislative
proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that case assailed. From a different angle he sees the matter as
political, saying:
The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130; 66
Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a voter's right to protect his franchise. The historic source of this doctrine and
the reasons for it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U.S., 436, 540; 71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S. Ct.,
446. That was an action for $5,000 damages against the Judges of Elections for refusing to permit the plaintiff
to vote at a primary election in Texas. In disposing of the objection that the plaintiff had no cause of action
because the subject matter of the suit was political, Mr. Justice Homes thus spoke for the Court: "Of course the
petition concerns political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage
may be caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for
over two hundred years, since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521;
3 Ld. Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710, and has been recognized by this Court." "Private damage" is the clue
to the famous ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its scope as well as that of cases in this Court of
which it is the justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is permeated with the conception that a voter's franchise
is a personal right, assessable in money damages, of which the exact amount "is peculiarly appropriate for the
determination of a jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler, 179 U.S., 58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17, and for which
there is no remedy outside the law courts. "Although this matter relates to the parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it
is an injury precedaneous to the parliament, as my Lord Hale said in the case of Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev.,
114, 116; 83 Eng. Reprint, 175. The parliament cannot judge of this injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff for it:
they cannot make him a recompense." (2 Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)
The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it leave intra-parliamentary controversies
to parliaments and outside the scrutiny of law courts. The procedures for voting in legislative assemblies who
are members, how and when they should vote, what is the requisite number of votes for different phases of
legislative activity, what votes were cast and how they were counted surely are matters that not merely
concern political action but are of the very essence of political action, if "political" has any connotation at all.
Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 649, 670, et seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct., 495;
Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are they matters of
"private damage." They pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political representatives executing the
legislative process. To open the law courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the
manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative assemblies. If the doctrine of
Ashby vs. White vindicating the private rights of a voting citizen has not been doubted for over two hundred
years, it is equally significant that for over two hundred years Ashby vs. White has not been sought to be put to
purposes like the present. In seeking redress here these Kansas senators have wholly misconceived the
functions of this Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme Court should therefore be dismissed.
We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles of political jurisprudence and
represent liberal and advanced thought on the working of constitutional and popular government as conceived in the
fundamental law. Taken as persuasive authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of the United
States institutions after which ours are patterned.
But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be presently shown, they are the opinions
which should operate to adjudicate the questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is necessary, at
the risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to make a statement and an analysis of the Coleman vs. Miller case.
Fortunately, the annotation on that case in the American Law Reports, supra, comes to out aid and lightens our labor in
this phase of the controversy.
Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-one
members of the Senate, including twenty senators who had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child Labor
Amendment, and by three members of the House of Representatives, to compel the Secretary of the Senate to erase in
indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Senate and to indorse thereon the words "as
not passed." They sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of Representatives from signing the
resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor.
The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor Amendment was proposed by Congress in
June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the legislature of Kansad adopted a resolution rejecting it and a copy of the
resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States; that in January, 1927, a new resolution was
introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment; that there were forty senators, twenty of whom
voted for and twenty against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the Lieutenant Governor cast his vote in favor
of the resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set forth prior rejection of the proposed
amendment and alleged that in the period from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment had been rejected
by both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified only in five states, and that by reason of
that rejection and the failure of ratification within a reasonable time, the proposed amendment had lost its vitality.
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The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but dismissed the petition on the merits. When
the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States the questions were framed substantially in the following
manner:
First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had standing to seek to have the judgment of the
state court reversed; second, whether the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of a tie, as he did, it being
the contention of the petitioners that "in the light of the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor and his relation to
the Senate under the state Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court of the state, the Lieutenant Governor was
not a part of the 'legislature' so that under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, he could be permitted to have a deciding
vote on the ratification of the proposed amendment, when the Senate was equally divided"; and third, the effect of the
previous rejection of the amendment and of the lapse of time after its submission.
The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding the authority of the Lieutenant
Governor to vote, the court avoided, stating: "Whether this contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a question
which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally divided and
therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the third question, the Court reached the conclusion
before referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the
Federal Constitution is a political question, within the ultimate power of Congress in the exercise of its control and of the
promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the decision by Congress, in its control of the action of the
Secretary of State, of the questions whether an amendment to the Federal Constitution has been adopted within a
reasonable time, is not subject to review by the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed but in the grounds stated in the
United States Supreme Court's decision. The nine justices were aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts, Black,
Frankfurter and Douglas opined that the petitioners had no personality to bring the petition and that all the questions
raised are political and non-justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that all the questions were justiciable;
that the Court had jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition should have been granted and the decision of
the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal to amend had died of old age. The Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as political and non-justiciable, passed by
the question of the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to case a deciding vote, on the ground that the Court was
equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the rest of the questions.
The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the one hand and the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the result to be
reached, these two groups were divided. The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, on
the one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed, on the other, was on the result and on that part of
the decision which declares certain questions political and non-justiciable.
As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four opinions "show interestingly divergent but
confusing positions of the Justices on the issues discussed. "It cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, amusingly
entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the light of the divergencies in the opinions rendered, aptly queries"
whether the proper procedure for the Supreme Court would not have been to reverse the judgment below and direct
dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction." It says that these divergencies and line-ups of the justices "leave power to
dictate the result and the grounds upon which the decision should be rested with the four justices who concurred in Mr.
Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the failure of the Court to decide the question of the right of the Lieutenant
Governor to vote, the article points out that from the opinions rendered the "equally divided" court would seem under
any circumstances to bean equal division of an odd number of justices, and asks "What really did happen? Did a justice
refuse to vote on this issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make up his mind, or is it possible to saw a
justice vertically in half during the conference and have him walk away whole?" But speaking in a more serious vein, the
commentator says that decision of the issue could not be avoided on grounds of irrelevance, since if the court had
jurisdiction of the case, decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have required reversal of the judgment
below regardless of the disposal of the other issues.
From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be considered as laying down the rule of the
case.
The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts. This is the rule prevailing in England. In the United States, "In point of num bers, the
jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con the general principle (of these, two or three have changed from their
original position), two or three adopted a special variety of view (as in Illinois), three or four are not clear, and one or two
have not yet made their decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, 685, footnote.) It is important to bear in mind,
in this connection, that the United States Supreme Court is on the side of those which favor the rule.
(Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854; Field vs. Clark, 36 Law. ed., 294.)
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to follow the rule.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be
proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided
Page 7 of 63

for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the
case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by
the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof."
But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.
This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries written with evident vehemence.
Arguments for and against the rule have been extensive and exhaustive. It would be presumptuous on our part to
pretend to add more, even if we could, to what has already been said. Which such vast mass of cases to guide our
judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent selection and borrowing of materials and arguments under
the criterion of adaptability to a sound public policy.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which opposed it are, in our opinion, almost
decisive. Some of these reasons are summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:
SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. It has been declared that the rule against going behind the enrolled
bill is required by the respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government, and it would be
an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of
which must lead to endless confusion in the administration of the law. The rule is also one of convenience,
because courts could not rely on the published session laws, but would be required to look beyond these to the
journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments which might be found after the
adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills,
authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act
theretofore enforced had never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that these is quite enough
uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an act of the legislature has
become such until the issue has been determined by some court whose decision might not be regarded as
conclusive in an action between the parties.
From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we extract these passages:
I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation, few things would be more
mischievous than the introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for is that the Court should look
at the journals of the Legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the act attested and filed with the Secretary of
State conforms in its contents with the statements of such journals. This proposition means, if it has any legal
value whatever, that, in the event of a material discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled copy, the
former is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the act is to be rejected. This is the test which is to be
applied not only to the statutes now before the Court, but to all statutes; not only to laws which have been
recently passed, but to laws the most ancient. To my mind, nothing can be more certain than that the
acceptance of this doctrine by the Court would unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We have before us
some evidence of the little reliability of these legislative journals. . . . Can any one deny that if the laws of the
State are to be tested by a comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated, the stability of all
written law will be shaken to its very foundations? . . . We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of
such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely
too much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative act would be at the mercy of all persons
having access to these journals. . . . ([1866], Beasley, C.J., in Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N.J.L., 29, 34.)
But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts, then less than a quorum of each
House may be the aid of corrupt presiding officers imposed laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of
the Constitution. It must be admitted that the consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and
political power must of necessity be confided to officers, who being human may violate the trusts reposed in
them. This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the
Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that
its high places have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not constituted it with faculties to
supervise coordinate departments and correct or prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot authenticate a
statute; that power does not belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative journal. (1869, Frazer, J., in
Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind., 514, 524.)
Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence considered a classic, and described by one who himself is a noted jurist,
author, and scholar, as "a permanent contribution to American law" and having "put the matured nineteenth-century law
in form to be used in a new era of growth" unequivocally identifies himself with those who believe in the soundness of
the rule. The distinguished professor, in answer to the argument of Constitutional necessity, i.e., the impossibility of
securing in any other way the enforcement of constitutional restrictions on legislative action, says:
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(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as it is urged, the Judiciary are bound
to enforce the constitutional requirements of three readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if therefore an
act must be declared no law which in fact was not read three times or voted upon by two-thirds, this duty is a
duty to determine according to the actual facts of the readings and the votes. Now the journals may not
represent the actual facts. That duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be shown beyond doubt
that the facts were otherwise than therein represented. The duty to uphold a law which in fact was
constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong as the duty to repudiate an act unconstitutionally voted upon. The
Court will be going as far wrong in repudiating an act based on proper votes falsified in the journal as it will be in
upholding an act based on improper votes falsified in the enrollment. This supposed duty, in short, is to see that
the constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop short with the journals. Yet, singularly enough, it is
unanimously conceded that an examination into facts as provable by the testimony of members present is not
allowable. If to support that it be said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and impracticable, then it is
answered that this concedes the supposed constitutional duty not to be inexorable, after all; for if the duty to get
at the facts is a real and inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at any cost; and if it is merely a duty that
is limited by policy and practical convenience, then the argument changes into the second one above, namely,
how far it is feasible to push the inquiry with regard to policy and practical convenience; and from this point of
view there can be but one answer.
(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is treated thus inconsistently and pushed
only up to a certain point suggests that it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption whose defect is
exposed only by carrying it to its logical consequences. Such indeed seems to be the case. It rests on the
fallacious motion that every constitutional provision is "per se" capable of being enforced through the Judiciary
and must be safeguarded by the Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet there is certainly a large field
of constitutional provision which does not come before the Judiciary for enforcement, and may remain
unenforced without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is not necessary to invoke in illustration such provisions
as a clause requiring the Governor to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature to pass a law for a certain
purpose; here the Constitution may remain unexecuted by the failure of Governor or Legislature to act, and yet
the Judiciary cannot safeguard and enforce the constitutional duty. A clearer illustration may be had by
imagining the Constitution to require the Executive to appoint an officer or to call out the militia whenever to the
best of his belief a certain state of facts exists; suppose he appoints or calls out when in truth he has no such
belief; can the Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his belief? Or suppose the
Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to pass a law upon a certain subject whenever in their belief certain
conditions exist; can the Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the Legislature, or its
majority, did not have such a belief? Or suppose the Constitution commands the Judiciary to decide a case only
after consulting a soothsayer, and in a given case the Judiciary do not consult one; what is to be done?
These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of applying and enforcing the
Constitution ceases to operate. That situation exists where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect the
motives and judgment of a particular independent department of government, Legislature, Executive, and
Judiciary. Such duties are simply beyond enforcement by any other department if the one charged fails to
perform them. The Constitution may provide that no legislator shall take a bribe, but an act would not be treated
as void because the majority had been bribed. So far as the Constitution attempts to lay injunctions in matters
leading up to and motivating the action of a department, injunctions must be left to the conscience of that
department to obey or disobey. Now the act of the Legislature as a whole is for this purpose of the same nature
as the vote of a single legislator. The Constitution may expressly enjoin each legislator not to vote until he has
carefully thought over the matter of legislation; so, too, it may expressly enjoin the whole Legislature not to act
finally until it has three times heard the proposition read aloud. It is for the Legislature alone, in the latter case
as well as in the former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is no more the function of the Judiciary in the one
case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature to its duty:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a
second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to
check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch
and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose
hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (4 Wigmore on
Evidence, 699-702.)
The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case of United
States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued that this Court examined the journal in that case to find out whether or not
the contention of the appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in error.
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that,
roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or
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resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the
Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the documents
offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed before
the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have held the copyconclusive
proof of the due enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that the Court expressly stated that it "passed over the
question" of whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its passage.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This
Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the
effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness
of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No
discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that
duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators and
representatives who were ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members of Congress
within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.
The petition is dismissed without costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J., with whom concurs PADILLA, J., concurring:

Although I maintain that we have jurisdiction as petitioners contend, I can't vote for them, because the enrolled copy of
the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us.
A. The overwhelming majority of the state courts are of the opinion that the question whether an amendment to the
existing constitution has been duly proposed in the manner required by such constitution properly belongs to the
judiciary. That is the position taken by Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin. (See 12 C. J., 880 and 16C.J.S., 437.) (See
also 11 Am. Jur., 639.) Only North Dakota and Oklahoma have adopted a different view. (16 C.J.S., 437, notes 41 and
43.)
"The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has been
properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question."
(McConaughy vs. Secretary of State, 106 Minn., 392, 409; 119 N.W., 408.) (12 C.J., 880.)
"An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to
determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments. It has been
judicially determined whether a proposed amendment received the constitutional majority of votes.
(Knightvs. Shelton, 134 Fed., 423; Rice vs. Palmer, 78 Ark., 432; 96 S. W. 396; Green vs. State Canvassers, 5
Ida., 130; 47 P., 259; 95 Am. S.R., 169; In re Denny, 156 Ind., 104; 59 N.E., 359; 51 L. R. A., 722;
Dayton vs. St. Paul, 22 Minn., 400; Tecumseh Nat. Bank vs. Saunders, 51 Nebr., 801; 71 N.W., 779;
Bott vs. Wurts, 63 N.J.L., 289; 43 A., 744, 881; 45 L.R.A., 251; State vs. Foraker, 46 Oh. St., 677; 23 N.E., 491;
6 L.R.A., 422.)" (12 C.J., 880.)
As our constitutional system ("limitation" of powers) is more analogous to state systems than to the Federal theory of
"grant" of powers, it is proper to assume that the members of our Constitutional convention, composed mostly of
lawyers, and even the members of the American Congress that approved the Tydings-McDuffie enabling legislation,
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contemplated the adoption of such constitutional practice in this portion of the world. Hence, my conclusion that in
Philippine polity, courts may and should take cognizance of the subject of this controversy.
B. The petitioners' grievance is that, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution (Article XV), the proposed amendment
was not approved "by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives."
They complain that certain Senators and some members of the House of Representatives were not allowed to
participate and were not considered in determining the required three fourths vote.
The respondents, besides denying our power to revised the counting, assert that the persons mentioned, for all practical
purposed did not belong to the Congress of the Philippines on the day the amendment was debated and approved.
Central target of attack is Republic Act No. 73 "to submit to the Filipino people, for approval or disapproval, the
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress
of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, etc."
Petitioners would have a declaration of invalidity of that piece of legislation. Its first section provides that "the
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress
of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, adopted on September eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty-six, shall
be submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, at a general election which shall be held on March eleven,
nineteen hundred and forty-seven, in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
By this provision, the Legislative Department with the concurrence of the Executive, declares in the most solemn
manner that the resolution proposing the amendment was duly carried. Therefore, it would be pertinent to inquire
whether those petitioners who are members of the Congress that approved Republic Act No. 73 are not precluded from
questioning its validity or veracity, unless they assert and prove that in Congress they opposed its enactment. In default
of a contrary showing, it is not reasonable to suppose that as members of Congress they endorsed-- or at least are
bound by the declarations of Republic Act No. 73? And if a private party is estopped from challenging the
constitutional efficacy of a law whose enactment he has procured (see 16 C.J.S., 198 and 11 Am. Jur., 767) should not
a member of Congress be estopped from impugning a statute he helped (presumably) to pass? Parenthetically it should
be added that the remaining petitioners, as mere citizens, would probably have no suable claim. (Cf. 16 C.J.S., 169.)
C. But perhaps these points should be left to future study and decision, because the instant litigation may be solved by
the application of other well-established principles founded mainly on the traditional respect which one department of
the Government entertains for the actions of the others.
On account of the separation of powers, which I firmly believe, I agree to the applicability and binding effect of section
313 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2210, which, in my opinion, has not been abrogated by the Rules of Court. I
likewise believe the soundness of the doctrine expounded by the authoritative Wigmore on a question admittedly within
the domain of the law on evidence: conclusiveness of the enrolled bill of resolution upon the judicial authorities.
D. Withal, should that principle of conclusiveness be denied, the respondents could plausibly fall back on the timehonored rule that the courts may not go behind the legislative journals to contradict their veracity. (United
Statesvs. Pons, 34 Phil., 729.)
According to the minutes of the joint session Exhibit 3, in the Senate sixteenth (16) senators approved the resolution
against five (5), with no absences; whereas in the house sixty-eight (68) congressmen voted "yes", eighteen(18) voted
"no", one abstained from voting and one was absent. Therefore, 16 being three-fourths of the total membership of
twenty-one of the Senate (16 plus 5), and 68 being more than three-fourths of the total membership of eighty-eight (88)
of the House of Representatives (68 plus 18 plus 1 plus 1), it is crystal clear that the measure was upheld by the
number of votes prescribed by the Constitution.
True, there are in the said exhibit statements by two Senators and one congressman to the effect that the votes did not
constitute the majority required by the Constitution. However, in the fact of the incontestable arithmetical computation
above shown, those protests must be attributed to their erroneous counting of votes; none of them having then asserted
that "there were absent Senators or Congressmen who had not been taken into account. "Ford although we might have
judicial notice of the number of proclaimed members of Congress, still we are no better qualified than the Legislature to
determine the number of its actual membership at any given moment, what with demises or demissions, remotions or
suspensions.
HILADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result of the majority opinion as well as in the grounds supporting the same in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the applicable reasons supporting my concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). But I
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dissent from that part of the majority opinion (page 3, ante) wherein it is stated that if the suspended members of the
Senate and House of Representatives had been counted "the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths of vote in either branch of Congress."
The basic theories underlying my aforesaid concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino, supra, are, first, that the questions
therein raised were political in nature within the exclusive province of the legislature, and, second, that the judiciary
does not possess jurisdiction over such questions. It is to me evidence that the questions involved in the present
proceeding are no less political than those involved in that former Senate case. It is deemed unnecessary to dwell at
more length upon the grounds of my said concurring opinion.
The ground for my dissent from the above-quoted statement of the majority opinion in the instant proceeding is that the
suspension of the said members of the Senate and the House of Representatives being a political question, the
judiciary, being without jurisdiction to interfere with the determination thereof by the proper political department of the
government, has perforce to abide by said determination if it were to go any further in the consideration of the case. In
other words, any further discussion of the case in this Court will have to start from the premise that said members have
been suspended by the respective Houses of Congress and that we, being powerless to interfere with the matter of said
suspension, must consider ourselves bound by the determination of said political branches of the government. As said
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Philipps vs. Payne (2 Otto. [U.S.], 130; 23 Law. ed., 649), "in cases
involving the action of the political departments of the government, the judiciary is bound by such action."
(Williams vs. Insurance Co., 13 Pet., 420; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet., 511; Kennel vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38;
Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 209; Nabob of Carnatio vs. East Ind. Co., Ves., Jr., 60; Lucer vs. Barbon, 7 How., 1;
R.I. vs. Mass., 12 Pet., 714.)
If, then, we are to proceed, as I think we should, upon the premise that said members have been thus suspended, there
will be to my mind, absolutely no justification, ground nor reason for counting them in the determination of whether or
not the required three-fourths vote was attained. Their case was entirely different from that of members who, not having
been suspended nor otherwise disqualified, had the right to vote upon the resolution. In the case of the latter, they had,
like all other members similarly situated, three alternatives, namely, to vote in favor of the resolution, to vote against it,
or to abstain from voting. If they voted in favor, of course, their votes had to be counted amount those supporting the
resolution. If they voted against, of course, their votes had to be counted with those opposing. And if they abstained
from voting, there would be sound justification for counting them as not in favor of the resolution, because by their very
abstention they impliedly but necessarily would signify that they did not favor the resolution, for it is obvious that if they
did, they would have voted in favor of it. On the other hand, those suspended members who, by reason of the
suspension, whose validity or legality we are devoid of jurisdiction to inquire into, cannot be similarly treated. In their
case there would be no way of determining which way their votes would have gone or whether or not they would have
abstained from voting. In this connection, in considering the hypothesis of their voting in case they had not been
suspended, I must go upon the assumption that while those suspended members may belong to the political party
which, as a party, was opposed to the resolution, still they would have voted independently and following their individual
convictions. In this connection, it might not be amiss to mention that there were quite a number of minority members of
the legislature who voted for the resolution. Hence, we are not in a position to say that said suspended members, if they
had not been suspended, would have voted against the resolution, nor in favor of it either, nor that they would have
abstained from voting. Why then should they bed counted with the members who voted against the resolution or those
who, having the right to vote, abstained from doing so? Why should we count them as though we knew that they would
have voted against the resolution, or even that they would have abstained from voting? Soundly construed, I submit that
the Constitution does not, and could not, include suspended members in the determination of the required three-fourths
vote.
I take it, that the drafters in providing in Article XV, section 1, of the Constitution that "The Congress in joint session
assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting (emphasis supplied) separately . . .", advisedly used the vital and all-important word "voting"
therein. I take it, that they meant to refer to the members voting, undoubtedly expecting that all members not suspended
or otherwise disqualified, would cast their votes one way or the other. But I am here even making a concession in favor
of the opponents when I say that those who, with the right to vote, abstain from voting, may be counted among those
not in favor of the measure. But what I cannot bring myself to conceive is that the quoted provision should have
intended to count suspended or disqualified members as opposed to the measure, or not being in favor of it, without it
being possible to know which way they would have voted or that they would have abstained from voting that they
would never have voted in favor of the measure. If I should ask why we should not count such suspended or disqualified
members among those in favor of the measure, I am sure those who opine differently would answer, because we do not
know that they would have voted in favor of it. By the same token, if they should ask me why we should not count them
among those against the measure, I would answer that we do not know that they would have voted against it or that
they would have abstained from voting. All this inevitably leads to the conclusion the only one possible that such
suspended or disqualified members should not and cannot be counted due to that very impossibility of knowing which
way they would have voted or whether they would have abstained from voting. I stand for a sound and rational
construction of the constitutional precept.
Page 12 of 63

PARAS, J.:
I fully concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Hilado.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

To surrender or not to surrender, that is the question.
The last bastion of democracy is in danger.
Those who are manning it are summoned to give up without the least resistance, and the banner of the Constitution is
silently and meekly hauled down from its pole to be offered as a booty to the haughty standard bearers of a new brand
of Farcism. In t he words of Cicero, "recedere de statu suae dignitatis."
Cardinal moral bearings have been lost in the psychological chaos suffered by those, throwing overboard all ideals as
burdensome and dangerous ballast, in desperate efforts to attain at all costs individual survival, even in ignominy, could
not stand the impact of initial defeats at the hands of invading fearsome military hordes.
The present is liable to confusion. Our minds are subjected to determinate and indeterminate ideological pressures.
Very often man walks in the darkness of a blind alley obeying the pullings and pushings of hidden and unhidden forces,
or the arcane predeterminations of the genes of human chromosomes. A rudderless ship floating in the middle of an
ocean without any visible shoreline, is bound to be wrecked at the advent of the first typhoon. From early youth we
begin to hear and learn about the true ideals. Since then we set them as the guiding stars in our actions and decisions,
but in the long travel of life, many times the clouds dim or completely darken those stars and then we have only to rely
on our faith in their existence and on habit, becoming unerring if long enough followed, of adjusting our conduct to their
guidance in calm and cloudless nights. We are sitting in judgment to pass upon the conflicts, disputes and
disagreements of our fellowmen. Let us not forget that the day shall come that we will be judged on how are are judging.
Posterity shall always have the final say. When the time solvent has dissolved the human snag, then shall be rendered
the final verdict as to whether we have faced our task fearlessly or whether our hearts have shrunk upon the magnitude
of our duties and have chosen the most comfortable path of retreat. Then it will be conclusively known whether did keep
burning the tripod fire in the temples of old. Some of us will just return into anonymity, covered by the cold mist of
historical oblivion; others will have their names as by words repeatedly pronounced with popular hate or general
contempt; and still others will be remembered with universal gratefulness, love and veneration, the guard on accorded
to all those who remained faithful to the fundamental tenets of justice. Winnowing time will sift the chaff from the grain.
This is one of the cases upon which future generations will decide if this tribunal has the sturdy courage to keep its
responsibility in proper high level. It will need the passing of decades and perhaps centuries before a conclusive verdict
is rendered, whether we should merit the scorn of our fellow citizens and our decision shall be cursed as the Dred Scot
decision of Chief Justice Taney, the one that plunged the United States into civil war, or whether in the heart of each
future Filipino citizen there will be a shrine in which our memory will be remembered with gratefulness, because we
have shown the far-reaching judicial statesmanship of Chief Justice Marshall, the legal genius who fixed and held the
rock bottom foundations which made of the American Constitution the veritable supreme law of the land and established
the role of the tribunals as the ultimate keepers of the Constitution. But for sure it will be rendered, and it will be impartial
and unbiased, exacting and pitiless, with unappealable finality, and for the one condemned Dante wrote this lapidary
line: "lasciate ogni speranza."
Unless the vision of our mental eyes should be shut up by the opaque cornea of stubborn refusal to see reality or should
be impaired by the polaroid visors of prejudice, there is no question that at the time when the resolution in question,
proposing an amendment to the Constitution, was adopted, the members of the Senate were 24 and the members of
the House of Representatives were 96, and that the 16 members of the Senate who voted in favor of the resolution, by
undisputable mathematical computation, do not constituted three-fourths of the 24 members thereof, and the 68
members of the House of Representatives who voted for the resolution, by equally simple arithmetical operation, do not
constitute three-fourths of the 96 members of the said chamber. The official certifications made by the presiding officers
of the two houses of Congress to the effect that three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and three-fourths of all
the members of the House of Representatives voted for the resolution, being untrue, cannot change the facts. Nothing
in existence can. The certification, being a clear falsification of public document punished by article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000, cannot give reality to a fiction based in a narration of
facts that is in conflict with the absolute metaphysical reality of the events.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Page 13 of 63

Petitioners are citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers and electors, and besides some of them are members of the
Senate, others are members of the House of Representatives, and still others are presidents of political parties, duly
registered, with considerable following in all parts of the Philippines.
The first three respondents are chairman and members, respectively, of the Commission on Elections and the
remaining three are respectively the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of the Bureau of
Printing.
Petitioners alleged that the Senate is actually composed of 24 Senators, 8 elected in 1941 and 16 in April 23, 1946, and
that the House of Representatives is composed of 98 members, elected on April 23, 1946, minus 2d who resigned to
assume other positions in the Government.
On September 18, 1946, there was presented for adoption by the Congress of the Philippines a resolution proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto, which reads as follows:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote
of not less than three-fourths of all the Members of each House voting separately. To propose, as they do
hereby propose, the following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
Ordinance thereto:
ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the
foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the
Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six,
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to
extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development,
and utilization, of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United
States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United
States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or
corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines."
This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an
election at which it is submitted to the people for the ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Sixteen Senators voted in favor of the resolution and 5 against it, and 68 Representatives voted in favor and 18 against.
Thereafter, Congress passed Republic Act No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on March 11, 1947, for the purpose of
submitting to the people the proposed amendment embodied in the resolution, and appropriating P1,000,000 for said
purpose.
Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 73 as unconstitutional because Congress may not, by said act, submit
to the people for approval or disapproval the proposed amendment to the Constitution embodied in resolution Exhibit B
inasmuch as, to comply with the express provisions of Article XV of the Constitution, requiring the affirmative votes of
three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, three-fourths of
the 24 members of the Senate is constituted by at least 18 Senators, 2 more than those who actually voted for the
resolution in question, and three-fourths of the 98 members of the House of Representatives should at least be 72
Representatives, or 4 more than those who actually voted for the resolution.
Respondents deny that the Senate is composed of 24 Senators, by excluding from them petitioners Jose O. Vera,
Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero and allege that the House of Representatives is not composed of 98 members but
of only 90. They admit that at the joint session of Congress to consider the resolution Exhibit B, in favor of the resolution
16 votes were cast in the Senate and in the House of Representatives 68 and 5 in the Senate and 18 in the House of
Representatives had voted against. They admit the approval of Republic Act No. 73 and that necessary steps to hold
the plebiscite therein provided are being taken, but deny that said act is unconstitutional, and byway of defense, allege
that the resolution Exhibit B was adopted by three-fourths of all the qualified members of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives voting separately and, consequently, Republic Act No. 73, ordering its submission to the people for
approval or disapproval, fixing a date for a general election, and appropriating public funds for said purpose, is valid and
constitutional.
At the hearing of this case both parties submitted the following stipulation:
The parties through their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate the following facts:
Page 14 of 63

1. That Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero were, by the majority vote of the
Commission on Elections, proclaimed elected senators in the election of April 23, 1946;
2. That when the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, the said senators-elect took part in the election of the
President of that body; but that before the senators-elect were sworn in by the President of the Senate, a
resolution was presented, and subsequently approved, to defer the administration of oath and the seating of
Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, pending the hearing and decision of the protest
lodged against their election;
3. That on the 25th of May, 1946, the said senators individually took their alleged oath of office before notaries
public, and not on the floor, and filed said oaths with the Secretary of the Senate during the noon recess of the
said date;
4. That Messrs. Vera and Romero filed with the Auditor of the Senate other oaths of office accomplished by
them outside of the floor before a notary public and the Secretary of the Senate, on September 5 and August
31, 1946, respectively; and that their corresponding salaries from April 23, 1946, were paid on August 31, 1946;
5. That Mr. Diokno, having left for the United States, his son Jose W. Diokno filed a copy of Mr. Diokno's alleged
oath of office dated May 25, 1946, with the Auditor of the Senate on October 15,1946, and on said date his
salary was paid corresponding to the period from April 23 to October 15, 1946;
6. That all three have subsequently received their salaries every fifteen days;
7. That since the approval of the resolution deferring their seating and oaths up to the present time, the said
Messrs. Vera, Diokno, and Romero have not been allowed to sit and take part in the deliberations of the Senate
and to vote therein, not do their names appear in the roll of the Senate;
8. That before May 25, 1946, the corresponding provincial boards of canvassers certified as having been
elected in the election held on April 23, 1946, ninety-eight representatives, among them Messrs. Alejo Santos
and Jesus B. Lava for Bulacan, Jose Cando and Constancio P. Padilla for Nueva Ecija, Amado M. Yuson and
Luis Taruc for Pampanga, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental;
9. That the aforesaid eight members-elect of the House of Representatives took part in the election of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives held on May 25, 1946;
10. That before the members-elect of the House of Representatives were sworn in by the Speaker, Mr. Topacio
Nueno, representative for Manila, submitted a resolution to defer the taking of oath and seating of Luis Taruc
and Amado Yuson for Pampanga, Constancio P. Padilla and Jose Cando for Nueva Ecija, Alejandro Simpauco
for Tarlac, Alejo Santos and Jesus Lava for Bulacan, and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental "pending the
hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their election," copy of the resolution being attached to and
made part of this stipulation as Exhibit 1 thereof;
11. That the resolution Exhibit 1 was, upon motion of Representative Escareal and approved by the House,
referred for study to a committee of seven, which up to the present has not reported, as shown by the
Congressional Record for the House of Representatives;
12. That the eight representatives-elect included in the resolution were not shown in on the floor and have not
been so sworn in or allowed to sit up to the present time, nor have they participated in any of the proceedings of
the House of Representatives except during the debate of the Escareal motion referred to in paragraph 11
hereof, nor cast any vote therein since May 25, 1946, and their names do not appear in the roll of the members
of the House except as shown by the Congressional Record of the House of Representatives, nor in the roll
inserted in the official program for the inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines hereto attached as Exhibit
2 hereof;
13. That the eight representatives-elect above mentioned took their alleged oaths of office on the date set
opposite their names, as follows:
Jose
Cando
Vicente
Gustilo
Constancio
Padilla
Alejo
Santos
Luis
M.
Taruc
Amado M. Yuson
Jesus
B.
Lava
Alejandro Simpauco
May 25, 1946

May 25, 1946
May 22, 1946
May 23, 1946
May 25, 1946
May 25, 1946
May 25, 1946
May 25, 1946
Page 15 of 63

all of which oaths were taken before notaries public, with the exception of the first four who took their oaths
before Mr. Narciso Pimentel, Secretary of the House;
14. That said oaths were filed with the Auditor through the office of the Secretary of the House of
Representatives;
15. That the persons mentioned in paragraph 13 were paid salaries for the term beginning April 23, 1946, up to
the present, with the exception of Messrs. Luis Taruc and Jesus Lava, to whom payment was suspended since
August 16;
16. That Messrs. Alejo Santos and Vicente F. Gustilo took their oaths before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and were allowed to sit on September 30, 1946, the last day of the Special Sessions;
17. That in addition to the eight persons above mentioned, two members of the House, Representatives Jose C.
Zulueta and Narciso Ramos, had resigned before the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution
was discussed and passed on September 18,1946;
18. That the voting on the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution was made by the Secretary
calling the roll of each house and the votes cast were as shown in the attached certificate of the Secretary of
the House of Representatives hereto attached, marked Exhibit 3 and made a part hereof; and
19. That the Congressional Records for the Senate and House of Representatives and the alleged oaths of
office are made a part of this Stipulation by reference thereto, respondents reserving the right to question their
materiality and admissibility.
Manila, Philippines, November 25, 1946.
For the petitioners:
JOSE
E.
ANTONIO BARREDO
For the respondents:

ROMERO
ROMAN
Secretary of Justice
JOSE
B.L.
First Asst. Solicitor General
OZAETA
REYES
PETITIONER'S PERSONALITY
Whether petitioners have or have not the personality to file the petition in this case is the first question we have to
consider.
No party raised the question, but it having arisen in the course of the Court's deliberation, we should not evade deciding
it and giving what in law and justice should be the answer.
To our mind there is no doubt that petitioners have the personality to institute the present recourse of prohibition. If
petitioners should lack that personality, such legal defect would not certainly have failed to be noticed by respondents
themselves.
Respondents' failure to raise the question indicates their conviction that petitioners have the necessary legal personality
to file the petition, and we do not see any reason why such personality should be put in doubt.
Petitioners are divided into three groups: the first is composed of senators; the second, of representatives; and the third,
of presidents of four political parties.
All of the individuals composing the first two groups, with the exception of Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and
Jose E. Romero, are members of either of the two houses of Congress and took part in the consideration of Resolution
Exhibit B and of Republic Act No. 73, while the above three excepted senators were the ones who were excluded in the
consideration of said resolution and act and were not counted for purposes of determining the three-fourths
constitutional rule in the adoption of the resolution.
In paragraph eight of the petition it is alleged that respondents have taken all the necessary steps for the holding of the
general election on March 11, 1947, and that the carrying out of said acts "constitute an attempt to enforce the
resolution and act aforementioned in open violation of the Constitution," is without or in excess of respondents'
jurisdiction and powers, "violative of the rights of the petitioners who are members of the Congress, and will cause the
Page 16 of 63

illegal expenditure and disbursement of public funds and end in an irreparable injury to the taxpayers and the citizens of
the Philippines, among whom are the petitioners and those represented by them in their capacities mentioned above."
There should not be any question that the petitioners who are either senators or members of the House of
Representatives have direct interest in the legal issues involved in this case as members of the Congress which
adopted the resolution, in open violation of the Constitution, and passed the act intended to make effective such
unconstitutional resolution. Being members of Congress, they are even duty bound to see that the latter act within the
bounds of the Constitution which, as representatives of the people, they should uphold, unless they are to commit a
flagrant betrayal of public trust. They are representatives of the sovereign people and it is their sacred duty to see to it
that the fundamental law embodying the will of the sovereign people is not trampled upon.
The four political parties represented by the third group of petitioners, represent large groups of our population, perhaps
nearly one-half of the latter, and the numerous persons they represent are directly interested and will personally be
affected by the question whether the Constitution should be lightly taken and can easily be violated without any relief
and whether it can be amended by a process openly repugnant to the letter of the Constitution itself.
As a matter of fact, the vital questions raised in this case affect directly each and every one of the citizens and
inhabitants of this country. Whether our Constitution is, as it is supposed to be, a paramount law or just a mere scrap of
paper, only good to be thrown into a waste basket, is a matter of far-reaching importance to the security, property,
personal freedom, life, honor, and interests of the citizens. That vital question will necessarily affect the way of life of the
whole people and of its most unimportant unit. Each and every one of the individuals inhabiting this land of ours shall
have to make plans for the future depending on how the question is finally decided. No one can remain indifferent;
otherwise, it will at his peril.
Our conclusion is that petitioners have full legal personality to institute the present action; and much more, those who
are members of Congress have the legal duty to institute it, lest they should betray the trust reposed in them by the
electorate.
24 SENATORS
The first question raised by respondents' answer refers to the actual number of the members of the Senate. According
to petitioners there are 24 of them while according to respondents there are only 21, excluding Senators Jose O. Vera,
Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, because, according to them, "they are not duly qualified and sworn in members of
the Senate."
This allegation appears to be belied by the first seven paragraphs of the stipulation of facts submitted by both parties.
No amount of sophism, of mental gymnastics or logo-daedaly may change the meanings and effects of the words
placed by respondents themselves in said seven paragraphs. No amount of argument may delude anyone into believing
that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero are not senators notwithstanding their having been proclaimed as elected
senators, their having taken part in the election of the President of the Senate, their having taken their oaths of office,
and their receiving salaries as senators.
Such a paradoxical proposition could have been driven into acceptance in the undeveloped brains of the
pithecanthropus or gigantopithecus of five hundred millennia ago, but it would be unpardonably insulting o the human
mind of the twentieth century.
Our conclusion is that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero should be counted as members of the Senate, without
taking into consideration whatever legal effects the Pendatun resolution may have produced, a question upon which we
have already elaborated in our opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). Suspended or not suspended, they are
senators anyway, and there is no way of ignoring a fact so clear and simple as the presence of the sun at day time.
Therefore, counting said three Senators, there are 24 Senators in all in the present Senate.
96 REPRESENTATIVES
The next question raised by respondents is their denial of petitioners' allegations to the effect that the present House of
Representatives is composed of 98 members and their own allegation to the effect that at present "only 90 members
have qualified, have been fully sworn in, and have taken their seats as such."
Again respondents' allegations are belied by paragraphs eight to seventeen of the stipulation of facts.
The disagreement between the parties is as to whether or not Representatives Cando, Gustilo, Padilla, Santos, Taruc,
Yuson, Lava and Simpauco, mentioned in paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts, are members of the House of
Representatives.
Page 17 of 63

The facts stipulated by the parties proved conclusively that said eight persons are actual members of the House of
Representatives. We may even add that the conclusiveness about said eight representatives is even greater than in the
case of Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero, because no resolution of suspension has ever been adopted by the House
of Representatives against said eight members, who are being deprived of the exercise of some of their official
functions and privileges by the unipersonal, groundless, dictatorial act of the Speaker.
That illegal deprivation, whose counterpart can only be found in countries where the insolence of totalitarian rulers have
replaced all constitutional guarantees and all concepts of decent government, raises again a constitutional question:
whether it is permissible for the Speaker of the House of Representatives to exercise the arbitrary power of depriving
representatives duly elected by the people of their constitutional functions, privileges, and prerogatives. To allow the
existence of such an arbitrary power and to permit its exercise unchecked is to make of democracy a mockery.
The exercise of such an arbitrary power constitutes a want on onslaught against the sovereignty itself of the people, an
onslaught which may cause the people sooner or later to take justice in their own hands. No system of representative
government may subsist if those elected by the people may so easily be silenced or obliterated from the exercise of
their constitutional functions.
From the stipulation of facts, there should not be any question that at the last national election, 98 representatives were
elected and at the time the resolution Exhibit B was adopted on September 18, 1946, 96 of them were actual members
of the House, as two (Representatives Zulueta and Ramos) has resigned.
Applying the three-fourth rule, if there were 24 senators at the time the resolution was adopted; three-fourths of them
should at least be 18 and not the 16 who only voted in favor of the resolution, and if there were 96 representatives,
three-fourths of them should certainly be more than the 68 who voted for the resolution. The necessary consequence is
that, since not three-fourths of the senators and representatives voting separately have voted in favor of the resolution
as required by Article XV of the Constitution, there can be no question that the resolution has not been validly adopted.
We cannot but regret that our brethren, those who have signed or are in agreement with the majority opinion, have
skipped the questions as to the actual membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, notwithstanding the
fact that they are among the first important ones squarely raised by the pleadings of both parties. If they had taken them
into consideration, it would seem clear that their sense of fairness will bring them to the same conclusion we now
arrived at, at least, with respect to the actual membership of the House of Representatives.
Upon our conclusions as to the membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, it appears evident that the
remedy sought for in the petition should be granted.
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Without judging respondents' own estimate as to the strength of their own position concerning the questions of the
actual membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, it seems that during the oral and in the written
arguments they have retreated to the theory of conclusiveness of the certification of authenticity made by the presiding
officers and secretaries of both House of Congress as their last redoubt.
The resolution in question begins as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines
in joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the members of each House voting separately,
. . .."
Just because the adoption of the resolution, with the above statement, appears to be certified over the signatures of the
President of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the Secretaries of both Houses, respondents want us to
accept blindly as a fact what is not. They want us to accept unconditionally as a dogma, as absolute as a creed of faith,
what, as we have shown, appears to be a brazen official falsehood.
Our reason revolts against such an unethical proposition.
An intimation or suggestion that we, in the sacred temple of justice, throwing overboard all scruples, in the
administration of justice, could accept as true what we know is not and then perform our official functions upon that
voluntary self-delusion, is too shocking and absurb to be entertained even for a moment. Anyone who keeps the
minimum sense of justice will not fail to feel aghast at the perversion or miscarriage of justice which necessarily will
result from the suggestion.
But the theory is advanced as a basis to attack the jurisdiction of this Court to inquire behind the false certification made
by the presiding officers and the secretaries of the two Houses of Congress.
Respondents rely on the theory of, in the words of the majority opinion, "the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled
bill or resolution."
Page 18 of 63

To avoid repeating the arguments advanced by the parties, we have made part of this opinion, as Appendices A, B, and
1
C, the memoranda presented by both petitioners and respondents, where their attorneys appear to have amply and
ably discussed the question. The perusal of the memoranda will show petitioners' contentions to be standing on
stronger ground and, therefore, we generally agree with their arguments.
In what follows we will try to analyze the positions taken in the majority opinion.
POLITICAL QUESTIONS
The majority enunciates the proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the judiciary," except "by
express constitutional or statutory provision" to the contrary. Then argues that "a duly certified law or resolution also
binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' out of respect to the political departments."
The doctrine is predicated "on the principle of the separation of powers."
This question of separation of powers is the subject of discussion in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, supra. We deem
unnecessary to repeat what we have already said in our opinion in said case, where we have elaborated on the
question.
Although the majority maintains that what they call the doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the
judiciary is "too well-established to need citation of authorities," they recognize the difficulty "in determining what matters
fall under the meaning of political questions."
This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its face value. We do not accept it even as a good doctrine. It is a
general proposition made without a full comprehension of its scope and consequences. No judicial discernment lies
behind it.
The confession that the "difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question" shows
conclusively that the so-called doctrine has recklessly been advanced.
This allegedly "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of the confessed difficulty in determining what
matters fall within the designation of political question. The majority itself admits that the term "is not susceptible of
exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the acts of the political department of the government."
Doctrine is that "what is taught; what is held; put forth as true, and supported by a teacher, a school, or a sect; a
principle or position, or the body of principles, in any branch of knowledge; tenet; dogma; principle of faith. "It is a
synonym of principle, position, opinion, article, maxim, rule, and axiom. in its general sense, doctrine applies to any
speculative truth or working principle, especially as taught to others or recommended to their acceptance. Therefore, to
be true, it should be expressed on simple and self-evident terms. A doctrine in which one of the elemental or nuclear
terms is the subject of an endless debate is a misnomer and paradox.
A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting point for developing new propositions, as a
guiding principle in the solution of many problems. It is a groundwork for the building of an intellectual system. It is the
basis of a more or less complex legal structure. If not the cornerstone, it should at least be one of the main columns of
an architectonic construction. If that groundwork, cornerstone or column is supported by a thing whose existence still
remains in dispute, it is liable to fall.
We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine which is based on the unsettled meaning of
political question. The general proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the judiciary" is just one
of the many numerous general pronouncements made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or uncourageous
tribunals to refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to them.
It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted principle of separation of powers, the handful of sand with which judicial
ostriches blind themselves, as if self-inflicted blindness may solve a problem or may act as a conjuration to drive away a
danger or an evil.
We agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and the process to make it effective, as provided
in Article XV of the Constitution, are matters of political nature, but we cannot agree with their conclusion that a litigation
as to whether said article has been complied with a violated is beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunals, because to arrive
at this conclusion we must accept as a major premise the pseudo-doctrine which we have precisely exposed as
erroneous and false.
Page 19 of 63

Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all questions relating to it, therefore, betaken away
from the courts? Then, what about the constitutional provision conferring the Supreme Court with the power to decide
"all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or a law?"
COLEMAN versus MILLER
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman vs. Miller (122 A. L. R., 625) is invoked as the mainstay of
the majority position.
No less than eight pages of the majority opinion are occupied by the exposition and analysis of the decision of the
Supreme Court.
The case is invoked as authority for the conclusion that "the efficacy of ratification by the State legislature of a proposed
amendment to the federal Constitution" and that "the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State of the
questions of whether an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the
State legislature," are political questions and not justiciable.
At the outset it must be noted that the two above mentioned questions have no similarity or analogy with the
constitutional questions herein discussed. The questions as to the efficacy of the ratification by the Senate of Kansas of
the Child Labor amendment proposed by the United States Congress in June, 1924, and upon the decision of said
Congress, "in its control of the Secretary of State," whether the amendment has been adopted "within a reasonable time
from the date of submission to the State legislature," either one of them does not raise a controversy of violation of
specific provisions of the Constitution as the ones raised in the present case.
No specific constitutional provision has been mentioned to have been violated because in January, 1925, the
Legislature of Kansas rejected the amendment, a copy of the rejection having been sent to the Secretary of State of the
United States, and in January, 1927, a new resolution ratifying the amendment was adopted by the Senate of Kansas
on a 21-20 division, the Lieutenant Governor casting the deciding vote. Neither was there such mention of constitutional
violation as to the effect of the previous rejection and of the lapse of time after submission of the amendment to the
State legislature.
No constitutional provision has been pointed out to have been violated because the Lieutenant Governor had cast his
vote or because by the lapse of time from June, 1924 to March, 1927, the proposed amendment had allegedly lost its
vitality.
It is only natural that, in the absence of a constitutional provision upon the efficacy of ratification by a State legislature of
a proposed amendment, it was within the ultimate power of the United States Congress to decide the question, in its
decision rendered in the exercise of its constitutional power, to control the action of the Secretary of State, and the
promulgation of the adoption of amendment could not be controlled by the courts.
Evidently, the invoked authority has no bearing at all with the matters in controversy in the present case.
We note, as observed in the majority opinion, that the four opinions in Coleman vs. Miller, according to the American
Law Reports, show "interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the justices," and are the subject of an amusing
article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," asking how it happened that the nine-member
United States Supreme Court could not reach a decision on the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor of
Kansas to cast his vote, because the odd number of justices was "equally divided."
How such a "confusing" and "amusing" four-opinion decision in Coleman vs. Miller could be an authority is beyond our
comprehension.
GREEN versus WELLER
One of the authorities upon which the majority relies is the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court in Green vs.Miller
(32 Miss., 650), quoting one paragraph thereof.
Here again we have a case of inapplicable authority, unless taken in its reversed effect.
The Mississippi Supreme Court maintains that there is nothing in the nature of the submission to the people of a
proposal to amend the Constitution which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed or that could render it
dangerous to the stability of the government, but in making this pronouncement, it assumes that the submission is made
"in a established form," adding that the means provided for the exercise by the people of their sovereign right of
changing the fundamental law should receive such a construction as not to trample upon the exercise of their right, and
that the best security against tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of the state to
change their Constitution "in the mode prescribed by the instrument."
Page 20 of 63

So the authority, if clearly interpreted, will lead us to the conclusion that the majority position is wrong because the
Mississippi Supreme Court, in making the pronouncement, upon the assumption that the submission to the people is
made "in a established form" and "in the mode prescribed" by the Constitution, namely, in accordance with the
provisions of the instrument, the pronouncements would be the opposite if, as in the present case, the submission of the
proposal of amendment to the people is made through a process flagrantly violative of the Constitution, aggravated by
wanton falsification of public records and tyrannical trampling of the constitutional prerogatives of duly elected
representatives of the people.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined in by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
Douglas, in the "confusing" and "amusing" decision in Coleman vs. Miller, is also invoked by the majority, but this other
authority seems equally reluctant to offer its helping hand to a helpless, desperate position.
The major premise of the concurring opinion is as follows: "The Constitution granted Congress exclusive power to
control submission of constitutional amendments."
Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited, unchecked, omnipotent power is granted by our fundamental law to
the Congress of the Philippines. Our Congress may propose amendments or call a convention to make the proposal,
but that is all. Nowhere in the Constitution can be found any word, any grammatical sign, not even the faintest hint that
in submitting the proposed amendments to the people, Congress shall have "exclusive power to control the
submission." That submission must be provided by law, and no law may be enacted and come into effect by the
exclusive power of Congress. It needs the concurring action of the President of the Philippines. And if the law happens
to violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. After the law is enacted, its
execution devolves upon the Executive Department. As a matter of fact, it is the Executive Department which actually
submits to the people the proposed amendment. Congress fixes the date of submission, but the President of the
Philippines may refuse to submit it in the day fixed by law if war, rebellion, or insurrection prevents a plebiscite from
proceeding.
After showing that Mr. Justice Black started his argument from a major premise not obtainable in the Philippines, his
conclusions cannot help the majority in anyway.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the "confusing" and "amusing" case of Coleman vs. Miller is the
next authority invoked by the majority, but the opinion does not offered much help. The justice maintains that the
proceedings for voting in legislative assemblies "are matters that concern not merely political actions but are also of the
very essence of political action," and then advances the following argument: "To open the law-courts to such
controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in
legislative assemblies."
The argument has no weight at all. The argument merely displays an attitude, one of simple distaste for the idea, but
fails to give any sensible reason for the attitude. Ina totalitarian regime, where decisions are rendered not in answer to
the promptings of a sense of justice, but as expressions of moods, caprices and whims of arbitrary rulers, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's attitude could be taken as the law, but then it would be necessary to elevate him first to the category of
a fuehrer.
In our jurisdiction personal attitudes are not the law. Here, justice must be founded on reason, but never on passing
unreasoned moods, judicial or otherwise.
We regret that we cannot agree with the majority's sharing Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views, which in their judgment are in
accord "with sound principles of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought on the workings of
constitutional and popular government. "Our regret is not for ourselves alone but for those who happen to accept as
authority the unreasoned and unexplained mental attitude of a judicial officer of a foreign country, praising it even with
the much-abused label as "liberal," notwithstanding the fact that it represents the whimsical rule of personal attitudes
and not the rule of well-matured reason.
THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY
This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of the parties attached hereto as Appendices A, B, and C. Although
we consider it unnecessary to enlarge the discussion, we deem it convenient to make a little analysis of what is stated in
the majority opinion. Respondents contend, with the full approval of the majority, that a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of the theory. How can we accept the absolute verity of the
presiding officers' certification that the resolution in question has been adopted by three-fourths of all the members of
Page 21 of 63

the Senate and of the House of Representatives, when as a matter of undisputable fact the certification is false? How
can we accept a theory which elevates a false-hood to the category of truth?
The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing in England. Because the English have committed the nonsense of
accepting the theory, is that reason for Filipinos to follow suit? Why, in the administration of justice, should our tribunals
not think independently? Our temple of justice is not presided by simians trained in the art of imitation but by human
beings, and human beings must act according to reason, never just to imitate what is wrong, although such mistakes
may happen to be consecrated as a judicial precedent. It would be inconceivable for our courts to commit such a
blunder.
Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 685, footnote), the majority states that in the United States
the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con on the theory, although in petitioners' memorandum Appendix A
there appears more up-to-date evidence to the effect that there is a great majority for the rejection. But to our mind,
mere numbers as to pro and con seem to us immaterial in the decision as to whether the theory is or is not correct.
Numbers do not make reason nor justice.
The majority contends that the theory conforms to the express policy of our law-making body, invoking to said effect the
now obsolete section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210.
Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of deciding issues upon the authority of laws which have been
repealed or abolished, still the evidence pointed out by the majority does not support their contention. Section 313
alluded to enumerates the evidence that may prove the procedures of the defunct Philippine Commission or of any
legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippines, with the proviso that the existence of a copy of acts of said
commission or the Philippine Legislature, signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, is a conclusive
proof "of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof."
This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court. Sections 5 and 41 of Rule 123 show
conclusively that this Supreme Court, in making the rules effective since July 1, 1940, rejected the proviso as
unreasonable and unjust. Section 5 provides that we may take judicial notice of the official acts of Congress and section
41 provides what evidence can be used to prove said official acts, but nowhere in the rules can a provision be found
that would make conclusive a certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both House of Congress even if
we know by conclusive evidence that the certification is false.
The allegation that the theory in question conforms to the express policy of our lawmaking body, upon the very evidence
used in support thereof, after a little analysis, has to banish as a mid-summer night's dream.
50 AMERICAN JURISDICTION, SECTION 150
In support of the theory of conclusiveness of the enrollment, the authority of 50 American Jurisprudence, 150 is invoked
as reasons for the theory.
We will analyze the reasons adduced:
1. Respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government. This must be the strongest one, when it is
first mentioned. It is so flimsy to require much discussion. Shall we sacrifice truth and justice for the sake of a social
courtesy, the mutual respect that must be shown between different departments of the government? Has our sense of
evaluation of spiritual values become so perverted that we can make such a blunder in our choice? Since when have
the social or official amenities become of paramount value to the extent of overshadowing the principles of truth and
justice?
2. Because without the theory, courts would have to make "a n inquisition into the conduct of the members of the
legislature, a very delicate power." This second reason is premised not on a democratic attitude, but rather on a
Fascistic one. It is premised on the false belief that the members of the majority are a king of emperos of Japan, to be
worshipped but never to be discussed. The ideology depicted by the second reason should be relegated to where it
belongs: the archeological museum.
3. "The rule is also one of convenience." This reason again shows a perverted evaluation of human values. Is justice to
be sacrificed for the sake of convenience?
4. "Otherwise after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills authenticated as executed by the
Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act heretofore enforced had never become a
law." This last reason personifies unreasonableness to the nth degree. So we leave it as it is, as a perpetual evidence of
the extent to which legal stupidity may reach.
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
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Now let us examine the arguments of the next authority invoked by the majority, Wigmore on Evidence. We will also
analyzed the arguments relied upon.
1. That to go beyond the enrolled bill "would unsettle the entire statute law of the State." This argument, as it appears
quoted in the majority decision, is premised on the unreliability of legislative journals, and it seems to depict a mind
poisoned by prejudice, as shown by the following: "We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a
doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely too much to say
that the legal existence of almost every legislative action would be at the mercy of all persons having access to these
journals. . . ."
The argument should be taken into consideration in connection with American experience, which seems not to be too
flattering to our former metropolis.
Our own personal experience of more than a decade in legislative processes convinces us that Wigmore's assumption
does not obtain in the Philippines. It is true that in the pre-constitution legislative enactments we have seen few
instances in which there had been disagreement between what has actually been passed, as shown by the journal, and
the authenticated enrolled bill. But the instances were so few to justify entertaining here the same fears entertained by
Wigmore in America. Although those instances were few, we fought to correct the evil in the Constitutional Convention,
where we were able to introduce the following revolutionary provision in the Constitution: "No bill shall be passed by
either House unless it shall be printed and copies thereof in their final from furnished each member at least three
calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate
enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the journal." (Section 21 [2], Article VI of the
Constitution.)
This provision is an effective guarantee against the situation depicted by Wigmore's fears.
2. To the argument that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the courts, then less than a quorum of each House
may by the aid of presiding officers impose laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution, Wigmore
answers: "This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the
judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high
places have not been disgraced."
The answer is unconvincing. Because there can be and there have been blundering, disgraceful, or corrupt judicial
officers is no reason why arbitrary presiding officers and members of the legislature should be allowed to have their way
unchecked. Precisely the system of checks and balances established by the Constitution presupposes the possibility of
error and corruption in any department of government and the system is established to put a check on them.
When the question of an unconstitutional, arbitrary or corrupt action by the legislature is placed at the bar of justice, the
judiciary must not shrink from its duty. If there is corruption in the judiciary, our laws provide the proper remedy. Even
we, the members of the highest tribunal, cannot with impunity commit "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, or other high crimes" without being liable to be removed from office on impeachment, and we hope, if there is
such a case, that the House of Representatives and the Senate will do their duty in accordance with Article IX of the
Constitution, and not follow the uncourageous example which is given under the intellectual tutelage of Wigmore.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL NUMERICAL RULES
The three-fourth rule has been provided in Article XV of the Constitution as a guarantee against the adoption of
amendments to the fundamental law by mere majorities.
The Constitution must be accorded more stability than ordinary laws and if any change is to be introduced in it, it must
be in answer to a pressing public need so powerful as to sway the will of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives. Said three-fourth rule has been adopted by the Constitutional Convention, as all
the other numerical rules, with the purpose of avoiding any doubt that it must be complied with mathematical precision,
with the same certainty of all numbers and fractions expressed or expressible in arithmetical figures.
Where the Constitution says three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, it means an exact number, not susceptible of any more or less. All the members means that no single
member should be excluded in the counting. It means not excluding three Senators and eight Representatives as
respondents want us to do in order not to cause any inconvenience to the presiding officers and secretaries of both
Houses of Congress who had the boldness of certifying that the three-fourth rule had been complied within the adoption
of the resolution in question, when such a certification is as false as any falsehood can be.
The three-fourth rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary majorities, otherwise it would be the death knell of
constitutionalism in our country. If a constitutional provision can be so trifled with, as has happened in the adoption of
Page 23 of 63

the resolution in question, it would mean breaking faith with the vitality of a government of laws, to enthrone in its stead
a whimsical government of men.
The Constitution contains several numerical provisions. It requires that the Senate shall be composed of 24 Senators
(section 2, Article VI); that Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise (section 5, Article VI); that each House may expel a member with the concurrence of
two-third of all the members (section 10 [3], Article VI); that electoral tribunals shall each be composed of nine
members, three Justices of the Supreme Court and six legislature members (section 11, Article VI); that to overrun the
veto of the President, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House is necessary (section 20 [1],
Article VI), and in certain cases the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of each House is necessary
(section 20 [2], Article VI); that Congress shall, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House,
have the sole power to declare war (section 25, Article VI); that no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the Supreme Court (section 10, Article VIII); that the House
of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment by a vote of two-thirds of all its members (section 2,
Article IX); and that the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments, but no person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate (section 3, Article IX).
So it can be seen that the numerical rules inserted in the Constitution affect matters not of momentary but of
momentous importance. Each and every one of them should be given effect with religious scruple, not only because our
loyalty to the sovereign people so requires, but also because by inserting them the Constitutional Convention had
abided by the wise teachings of experience.
By denying the petition and allowing those responsible for the unconstitutional adoption of the resolution in question to
have their way is to set up a precedent that eventually may lead to the supremacy of an empire of lawlessness. It will be
tantamount to opening Pandora's box of evils and disasters.
The power to declare was can only be exercised by Congress with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of
each House. From now on, by the simple expediency of certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both
Houses that two-thirds had voted where a bare majority had voted in fact, said majority may plunge our people into a
maelstrome of war.
The Constitution provides that the power of impeachment needs the vote of two-thirds of all the members of the House
of Representatives. From now on, a mere plurality of one will be enough to put impeachable high officials, including the
President, on the carpet.
To convict an impeached officer the fundamental law requires the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate. From now on, that three-fourth rule may be dispensed with or circumvented by not counting three actual
Senators, as has been done in the resolution in question, and thereby oust the President of the Philippines if he
happens not to be in the good graces of a senatorial majority.
Without entering into the merits of the proposed constitutional amendment, to submit which to the people high-handed
means have been resorted to, there can be no question that it is of vital importance to the people and it will affect future
generations to unimaginable extent. The Constitutional Convention had thought it wise that before such a momentous
proposal could be submitted to the people the three-fourth rule should be adhered to by Congress.
QUOTATION FROM THE JALANDONI CASE
Months ago we stated: "It is high time to sound the clarion call that will summon all the forces of liberalism to wage a
crusade for human freedom. They should put on the armor of righteousness and rally behind the banner for the
vindication of the principles and guarantees embodied in the Constitution and the high purposes of the Chapter of the
United Nations." This, we said in our dissenting opinion in People vs. Jalandoni, L-777. Concerning the judgment that
the future may pass upon the actuations of the Supreme Court, in that same opinion we ventured that the historian
army, under the heading of "Epoch of Great Reaction," write as follows:
At no epoch of its history has the Supreme Court shown to be most reactionary and retrogressive. When the
victims of a constitutional violation, perpetrated by a group of the highest officials of the government, came to if
for redress, it adopted a hands-off policy, showing lack of the necessary vitality to grapple with the situation and
finding refuge in a comfortable retreat, completely disappointing those who have pinned their faith and hope in it
as the first pillar of the Constitution and the inexpugnable bulwark of human fundamental rights. The issue of
human freedom was disposed of by them most discouragingly by nullifying the right of an accused to be free on
bail on appeal, in flagrant violation of a constitutional guarantee and of one of the fundamental purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
Upon touching the decision of this Court in the instant case, the same historian may record that the highest tribunal of
the new Republic of the Philippines has struck the hardest blow to the Philippine constitutional system, by refusing to do
its duty in giving redress in a clear case of violation of the fundamental law, to the great disappointment, despair and
Page 24 of 63

apallment of millions of souls all over the world who are pinning their hopes on constitutionalism for the survival of
humanity.
The ideal of one world oftenly enunciated by progressive leaders in the deliberations of the several organs of the United
Nations is predicated in the adoption of a single standard of laws, compulsory within all jurisdictions of our planet. The
ethology of all mankind must be shaped under the pattern of that single legal standard. But the whole system is liable to
crash if it is not founded on the rock bed of the elemental principle that the majesty of the law must always be held
supreme.
To keep inviolate this primary principle it is necessary that some of the existing social organs, moral attitudes and habits
of thinking should undergo reforms and overhauling, and many fixed traditional ideas should be discarded to be
replaced with more progressive ones and inconsonance with truth and reason. Among these ideas are the wrong ones
which are used as premises for the majority opinion in this case.
The role of innovators and reformers is hard and often thankless, but innovation and reform should continuously be
undertaken if death by stagnation is to be avoided. New truths must be discovered and new ideas created. New
formulas must be devised and invented, and those outworn discarded. Good and useful traditions must be preserved,
but those hampering the progressive evolution of cultured should be stored in the museum of memory. The past and the
present are just stepping stones for the fulfilment of the promises of the future.
Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, physical science had progressed by leaps and bounds. Polonium and
radium were discovered by Madam Curie, Rontgen discovered the X-ray, and Rutherford the alpha, beta and gamma
particles. Atom ceased to be the smallest unit of matter to become an under-microscopic planetarian system of
neutrons, protons, and electrons.
Ion exchangers are utilized to make of electrons veritable lamps of Aladdin. Plants are grown in plain water, without any
soil, but only with anions and cations. Sawdust has ceased to be a waste matter, and from it is produced wood sugar,
weighing one-half of the sawdust processed. Inter-stellar space vacuum, almost absolute, is being achieved to serve
ends that contribute to human welfare. Bacteria and other microbes are harnessed to serve useful human purposes.
The aspergillus niger is made to manufacture the acetic to produce vinegar for the asking. Thepenicillum notatum and
the bacillus brevis are made to produce penicillin and tyrothricin, two wonder drugs that are saving many lives from
formerly lethal infections. DDT decimates harmful insects, thus checking effectively malaria, an illness that used to claim
more than one million victims a year in the world. The creation of synthetics had enriched the material treasures offered
to man by nature. Means of transportation are developed to achieve supersonic speeds. Many scientific dreams are fast
becoming marvelous realities. Thus, science marches on. There is no reason why the administration of justice should
not progress onward, synchronized with the rhythm of general human advancement towards a better future.
The fact that the majorities of the two chambers of Congress have without any qualm violated Article XV of the
Constitution and the majority of this Court, instead of granting the proper relief provided by law, preferred to adopt the
comfortable attitude of indifferent by-standers, creates a situation that seems to be ogling for more violations of the
fundamental law. The final results no one is in a position to foresee.
Our vote is for the granting of the petition.
BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., disidente:

Por segunda vez en menos de un ao nos Ilaman a decidiry arbitrar sobre una violacion de la Constitucion elcodigo
fundamental de nuestro pais. A media dos del ao pasado se trataba del recurso interpuesto ante esta misma Corte
1
Suprema por tres Senadores que se quejaban dehaber sido privados injusta y arbitrariamente de su derecho a
sentarse en el Senado de Filipinas y a particular y votar en sus deliberaciones, con grave infraccion y detrimento de la
Constitucion que ampara tal derecho. Ahora esos mismos Senadores acuden de nuevo a esta Corte para quejarse de
otra violacion de la Constitucion, pero estavez no vienen solos: les acompaan otros cinco miembros del Senado,
diecisiete miembros de la Camarra de Representantes y tres jefes de aagrupaciones o partidos politicos Democratic
Alliance, Popular Front y Philippine Youth Party. Jose O. Vera es recurrente en su doble capacidad de miembro del
Senado y Presidente del Partido Nacionalista. De modo que los recurrentes suman veintiocho: 8Senadores, 17
Representantes y 3 particulares.2 Tienenun comun denominador, a saber: que son todos ciudadanos de Filipinas, y,
ademas, contribuyentes y electores.
Los recurridos son el Presidente y miembros de la Comision de Elecciones, el Tesorero de Filipinas, el Auditor General
3
y el Director del Buro de Imprenta.
El objeto del recurso es recabar de esta Corte un mandamiento de prohibicion dirigigo a los recurridos para que estos,
sus agentes, empleados, subordinados y otras personas que actuen bajo su superintendencia o en su nombre "se
Page 25 of 63

abstengan y desistan de dar los pasos tendentes haciala celebracion de un plebiscito e eleccion general el 11 de
Marzo, 1947, y de imprimir la resolucion (sobre reformade los articulos 13. y 14. de la Constitucion), las balotas y
otros papeles necesarios en relacion con dicho plebiscito,y de desembolsar o de autorizar el expendio de fondos
publicos para dicho proposito."
Para la mejor comprension del asunto estimo necesariopublicar integro a continuacion el texto de la Resolucion
conjunta que contiene la propuesta reforma a la Constitucion, resolucion que constituye la materia u objeto de la
consulta popular en el referido plebiscito de 11 de Marzo, y es la misma que en el lexico corriente de la prensa y del
publico se conoce por resolucion sobre paridad o igualdad de derecdhos constitucionales a favor de los americanos,
esdecir, que concede a estos iguales derechos que a los filipinosen la propiedad y cultivo de terrenos publicos, en la
explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales como bosques,minas, pesca y fuerza hidraulica, y en la propiedad y
operacion de utilidades publicas. He aqui su texto:
RESOLUTION
OF
BOTH
HOUSES
TO
THE
CONSTITUTION
TO BE APPENDED AS AN ORDINANCE THERETO.
PROPOSING
OF
AN
THE
AMENDMENT
PHILIPPINES
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote
of not less than three-fourths of all the Members of each House voting separately, to propose, as they do
hereby propose, the following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
Ordinance thereto;
ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION
Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the
foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the
Philippines with the President of the United States on the Fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forth-six,
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to
extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development,
and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United
States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United
States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or
corporation or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.
This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an
election at which it is submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
JOSE
President of the Senate
AVELINO
(Sgd.)
EUGENIO
PEREZ
Speaker of the House of Representatives
We hereby certify that the foregoing Resolution was adopted by both Houses in joint session assembled in the
Hall of the House of Representatives on September 18, 1946.
(Sgd.)
ANTONIO
Secretary of the Senate
ZACARIAS
(Sgd.)
NARCISO
PIMENTEL
Secretary of the House of Representatives
Para comprobar la voluntad popular sobre la reforma constitucional propuesta el Congreso de Filipinas ha aprobadola
Ley No. 73 de la Republica que dispone y ordena la celebracion de un plebiscito para el 11 de Marzo de esteano,
provee a la forma de celebrarlo y consigna el presupuesto necesario para sufragar los gastos del mismo. Siuna
mayoria de los electores votare afirmativamente, la reformaquedara ratificada y estara en vigor por un periodo de 28
aos; en caso contrario, quedara rechazada.
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Los recurrentes alegan y sostiened que la resolucion conjuntade que se trate es ilegal y nula por no haberse
aprobadocon los votos de las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) del Congreso, conforme a lo provisto en el Articulo XV de la
Constitucion, a saber:
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution
or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification.
Se alega que cuando se considero y aprobo la citada Resolucion conjunta el Senado se componia actualmente de 24
miembros, es decir, el numero exacto fijado en la Constitucion, y la Camara de Representantes de 96 miembros, es
decir, dos menos que el numero sealado en la Constitucion, pues does dimitieron despues de las elecciones, uno
para aceptar un cargo en el ramo ejecutivo del gobierno y otro para aceptar un nombramiento en el servicio
diplomatico. Sin embargo, segun la demanda de los recurrentes, en el Senado solo se permitio votar a 21 miembros,
excluyen dose de las deliberaciones y votacionfina l de la Resolucion a tres miembros, a saber; los Senadores Vera,
Diokno y Romero. De los referidos 21 miembros, votaron a favor de la Resolucion 16 y en contra 5; asi que arguyen
los recurrentes la Resolucion no quedo aprobada, por parte del Senado, con el numero constitucionalde tres
cuartas-partes (3/4) de los miembros, elcual debia ser 18.
En la Camara de Representantes, segun los recurrentes, solo se permitio votar a 88 miembros, excluyen dose de las
deliberaciones y votacion final de la resolucion a 8 miembros, a saber: Representantes Alejo Santos y Jesus B. Lava,
de Bulacan; Reps. Jose Cando y Constancio P. Padilla, de Nueva Ecija; Reps. Amado M. Yuson y Luis Taruc, de
Pampanga; Rep. Alejandro Simpauco, de Tarlac; y Rep. Vicente F. Gustilo, de Negros Occidental. De los referidos 88
miembros votaron a favor de la Resolucion solo 68; asi que arguyen los recurrentas la Resolucion tampoco quedo
aprobada, por parte de la Camara, con el numero constitucional de tres cuartas-partes (3/4) partes de sus miembros, el
cual debia ser 72, por lo menos, y no 68, aun dando por descontados los dos miembros que despues de las elecciones
aceptaron cargos en otros ramosdel gobierno.
Siendo inconstitucional y nula la Resolucion basica deque se trata, consiguientemente los recurrentes tachantambien
de inconstitucional e invalida la referida Ley de la Republica No. 73 que convoca una eleccion general o plebiscito para
el 11 de Marzo de 1947 a fin de someter alpueblo para su ratificacion o repudio la enmienda constitucional propuesta, y
que consigna la suma de P1,000,000 para los gastos en que se hubiere de incurrir con motivo dela celebracion de
dicho plebiscito, entre habilitacion deprecintos electorales, pago de dietas de los inspectores y costo de la a impresion,
publicacion, fijacion y distribucion gratuita de copias de la propuesta enmienda en ingles, espaol y otros dialectos del
pais.
Los recurridos, despues de admitir ciertas alegacioneses enciales de la demanda y negar otras, plantean las siguientes
defensas especiales:
Primera defensa especial: que una ley o resolucion impresa (enrolled Act or Resolution) de ambas Camaras del
Congreso, adverada o autenticada con las firmas de los Presidentes de dichas Camaras, es prueba concluyente deque
la misma fue aprobada por el Congreso; que, en virtud del respeto que se debe a un ramo igual y coordinado del
gobierno, no es permisible una investigacion judicial desi la misma a fue o no aprobada debida y propiamente por el
Congreso; y que, por tanto, esta Corte Suprema carecede jurisdiccion para conocer y enjuiciar los puntos suscitados
por los recurrentes en relacion con la validez y constitucionalidad de la resolucion en cuestion.
Empero si la primera defensa especial no fuese sostenida, los recurridos alegan, por via de segunda defensa
especial, que la resolucion controvertida fue aprobada a conlos votos de tres cuartas-partes (3/4) de todos los
miembros cualificados del Senado y de la Camara de Representantes votando separadamente, en consonancia con el
Articulo XV, apartado 1, de la Constitucion, y que consiguientementela ley de la Republica No. 73 que ordena
suplanteamiento ante el pueblo para su ratificacion o desaprobacion, senala una fecha para la celebracion de
estaconsulta plebiscitaria y consigna fondos publicos para talfin, es valida y constitucional.
Consta en autos una estipulacion de hechos concertadaentre las partes, pero no se extracta aqui para no alargar
innecesariamente esta disidencia, pero se hara particular referencia a ella mas adelante a medida que las exigenciasde
la argumentacion lo demanden.
Es preciso hacer constar que los abogados de ambas parteshan hecho cumplida justicia a la tremenda importancia del
asunto haciendo extensos estudios y pacientes investigaciones de la jurisprudencia pertinente, en particular la
americana, teniendo en cuenta la influencia profunda y decisiva de aquel pais en nuestras ideas politicas y
constitucionales en virtud de la historica y estrecha convivenciade casi medio siglo.
Es que la cosa no era para menos. Puede decirse, sinexageracion, que excepto en cuatro momentos culminantes de
su historia el primer grito de rebelion contra Espaa en Agosto de 1896, la ruptura de hostilidades contra Americaen
Febrero de 1899, la aceptacion de la Ley de Independencia en el plebiscito nacional de 1935, y la guerra contra el
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Japon en 1941 en ningun momento, en los ultimos 60 aos, ha sido Ilamado el pueblo filipino a rendiruna decision
tan importante, de trascendencia e implicacionestan graves, tan tremendas, como la que tiene que hacer en el
plebiscito de 11 de Marzo proximo con motivode la Resolucion congresional discutida en el presente asunto.
Es una de esas decisiones que hacen historia; que parabien o para mal sacuden los cimientos de un pais tal quesi
fuese un fenomeno cosmico; que determinan el curso desu existencia y deytinos nacionales; que deciden, en una
palabra, de la suerte de generaciones ya existentes y degeneraciones que no han nacido todaviaa. Es una de esas
decisiones que para hacerla los pueblos deben hincarse humildemente de rodillas, de cara al cielo, pidiendo al Dios de
los pueblos y naciones la gracia de una salvadora inspiracion de Su infinita sabiduria . . ..
II
Para los efector de una amplia perspectiva historica quepermita destacar en toda su plenitud los contornos de
losformidables "issues" o puntos constitucionales debatidos en el presente asunto, parece conveniente que repasemos,
4
siquiera brevemente (en las notas marginales lo que no cabeen el mismo texto de esta disidencia), los preceptos
basicos de la Constitucion que se trate de reformar conla Resolucion congresional de que tantas veces se ha
hechomerito. Helos aqui:
ARTICLE XIII. CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
ARTICLE XIV. GENERAL PROVISIONS
xxx
xxx
xxx
SEC. 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the
Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No
franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall
be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires.
Como queda dicho, la reofrma propuesta es en el sentidode que, no obstante lo dispuesto en los preceptos
arribatranscritos, "durante la efectividad del Convencio Ejecutivo perfeccionado entre el Presidente de Filipinas y el
Presidente de los Estados Unidos el 4 de Julio de 1946, al tenorde las disposiciones de la Ley del Commonwealth No.
733, pero que en ningun case se extendera mas alla del 3 de Julio de 1974, la disposicion, explotacion, desar rollo y
utilizacionde todos los terrenos agricolas, forestales y minerales de dominio publico, de aguas, minerales, carbon,
petroleo y otros minerales petroliferos, de todas las fuerzasy fuentes de energia potencial, asi como de otros recursos
de Filipinas, y la operacion de utilidades publicas, si abiertos para cualguier persona, quedan abiertos para los
ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y para todas las formas de negocio y empresa de la propiedad o controladas,
directao indirectamente, por ciudad aos de los Estados Unidos, de la misma manera y bajo las mismas condiciones
impuestasa los ciudadanos de Filipinas o a las corporaciones o asociaciones de la propiedad o controladas por
ciudadanos de Filipinas (Resolucion conjunta del Congreso filipino, supra).
Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial pues, sobre ser historia contemporanea, se trata de las labores y procesos
deliberativos de la misma Asamblea Constituyente de quelos preceptos capitales arriba transcritos constituyen la
expresion acabada de toda la madurez de juicio, de toda laprudencia y sabiduria de que eran capaces no solo los
autores de la Constitucion y los Delegados que la aprobaron, sino el pueblo filipino que la ratifico en el correspondiente
plebiscito nacional convocado al efecto. En pocas resoluciones ha habido tanta firmeza y tan fuerte unanimidadentre
nuestros partidos politicos y sus caudillos como enesa recia y constructiva afirmacion de nacionalismo. Nadamejor,
creo yo, que las siguientes palabras para definir elespiritu, la filosofia que informa esas provisiones:
This provision of the Constitution has been criticized as establishing the outworn Regalian doctrine which, it is
suggested, may serve to retard the economic development of the Philippines. The best encomium on this
provision is probably the very criticism launched against it. It is inconceivable that the Filipinos would liberalize
the acquisition, disposition and exploitation of our natural resources to the extent of permitting their alienation or
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of depriving the people of this country of their heritage. The life of any nation depends upon its patrimony and
economic resources. Real freedom, if it is to be lasting, must go hand in hand with economic security, if not
economic prosperity. We are at most usufructuaries of ourdomains and natural resources and have no power to
alienate them even if we should want to do so. They belong to the generations yet unborn and it would be the
height of folly to even think of opening the door for their untrammelled disposition, exploitation, development or
utilization to the detriment of the Filipinos people. With our natural resources in the hands of foreigners what
would be there left except the idealism of living in a country supposedly free, but where freedom is, after all, an
empty dream? We would be living in a sumptuous palace that it not ours! We would be beggars in our own
homes, strangers in our own land!
Friendship and amity towards all nations are compatible with the protection of the legitimate interests of the
Filipino people. There is no antagonism or hostility towards foreigners but sane nationalism and self-protection
which every country of the world is practising today in the interest of self-preservation. (The Three Powers of
Government, by Laurel, pp. 117-118.)
Los criticos de la enmienda constitucional propuesta pueden discutir libremente, como cumple a los ciudadanos de un
pais democratico, los meritos y demeritos de lamisma. Pueden combatirla con toda clase de razones morales,
politicas, economicas, financieras, internacionales, y hasta de decencia y naturalmente defenderla tambiensus
partidarios desde todos los angulos. Podrian los opositoreshacer una minuciosa diseccion de su fraseologia yacaso
hallar en sus repliegues peligrosas implicaciones, posibles riesgos, como en ese par de adverbios "directa o
indirectamente", a cuyo socaire podrian acogerse corporacioneso asociaciones extranjeras controladas solo
indirectamente por ciudadanos americanos para concurrir en la explotacion de nuestros terrenos publicos y recursos
naturales, y en la operacion de utilidades publicas. Todo estolo pueden hacer, y algo mas. Pero es obvio, elemental
quesemejante discusion no compete a esta Corte Suprema, sinoen todo caso a otros poderes constituidos.
Nosotros no estamos para determinar y enjuiciar labondad o maldad de la enmienda propuesta. Lo unico quenos
incumbe hacer, ya que la cuestion se halla propiamente planteada ante nosotros, es resolver si la enmienda ha sido
aprobada por el Congreso de acuerdo con el mandato expreso de la Constitucion en materia de enmiendas; si
losrequisitos que la Constitucion seala para poder enmendarla requisitos que son mandatorios, categorica
menteimperativos y obligatorios se han cumplido o se han violado. Como se dijo bien en el asunto de Gray vs.Childs
([1934], 156 So., 274, 279), ". . . No podemos decir queel estricto requerimiento relativo a las enmiendas se puede
renunciar a favor de una buena enmienda e invocar encontra de otra mala. . . . No compete a los tribunales el
determinar cuando una enmienda propuesta es sabia y cuando no lo es. Los tribunales nada tienen que ver conla
sabiduria de la politica. Pero es deber de los tribunales, cuando se les pide que lo hagan, el determinar si o no el
procedimiento adoptado para la aprobacion de la enmiendaes el sealado por los terminos de la ley organica.
Todo lo que se lha dicho hasta aqui para poner de relievela filosofia de nuestra Constitucion en materia de recursos
naturales y utilidades publicas, se ha dicho no como expresion de un criterio propio, sino tan solo para subrayar todala
gravedad, toda la densidad del asunto, y prevenir entodo caso los peligros de una rutinaria y complacienteliviandad.
Como tambien se dijo en el citado asunto deGray vs. Childs, "la enmienda de la ley organica del Estado o nacion no es
una cosa para ser tomada ligeramente, ni para ser hecha de lance o al azar.Es una cosa seria. Cuando la enmienda es
aprobada, viene a ser parte de laley fundamental del pais y puedesignificar el bienestar omaldicion de las generaciones
de la nacion donde se haceparte del codigo fundamental."
Este pronunciamiento adquiere todo el valor y toda la resonancia de una consigna en el presente caso en que
lareforma propuesta afecta vitalisimamente al patrimonionacional del pueblo filipino. No son los recursos naturalesy
las utilidades publicas el tesoro de una nacion, labase que sustenta su existencia, la espina dorsal de sueconomia? Por
tanto, jamas se podra exagerar el celo, la vigilancia que el pueblo y sus organos naturales ejercenpara que las
salvaguardias impuestas por la misma Constitucionen relacion con el proceso y tramitacion de todaenmienda
constitucional se cumplan y observen con el maximo rigor.
Aqui no caben excusas ni subterfugios. Ni siquiera cabeescudarse tras la doctrina de la separacion de poderes quela
mayoria de esta Corte invoca para justificar su inaccion, su pasividad, su politica de "manos fuera", alegando que el
presente asunto es coto vedado para nos otros, algo quecae fuera de nuestra jurisdiccion, eso que en derecho politico
y constitucional se llama materia politica no-justiciable.
III
La mayoria rehusa asumir jurisdiccion sobre el presente caso porque dice que versa sobre una cuestion politica, ylas
cuestiones politicas caen fuera de la competencia de los tribunales de justicia. Creo que esto es un error, dicho seacon
todos los respetos debidos a mis ilustres compaeros que sostienen tal opinion. Hay acaso algun documento mas
politico que la Constitucion? Si la opinion de lamayoria fuese valida y acertada, practicamente ninguna violacion de la
Constitucion podria ser enjuiciada por los tribunales, pues cual mas, cual menos, casi todas las
transgresionesconstitucionales, sobre todo las que comete elpoder legislativo o el poder ejecutivo, tienen caracter
politico. Bajo esa opinion la Constitucion seria una letramuerta, un simple pedazo de papel: los poderes constituidos,
los individuos que los componen, podrian infringirim punemente la Constitucion sin que ningun arbitro constitucional
pudiera intervenir ordenadamente para restaurarla suprema majestad de la ley fundamental violada. Esclaro que esto
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podria conducir facilmente al caos, a la anarquia, a la revolucion, dependiendo solo el resultado de lamayor o menor
docilidad del pueblo, del grado de elasticidad politica de las masas. Y es claro que ninguno puedequerer este triste
destino para nuestro pais.
Creo sinceramente que una mejor y mas correcta evaluacion de nuestro sistema de gobierno que esta esencial
mentecalcado en el americano, es que bajo la teoria relativa de las eparacion de poderes, ningun poder es superior al
pueblo cuya voluntad esta encarnada en la Constitucion. Los poderes no son mas que agentes, mandatarios,
servidores: el pueblo es el amo, el mandante, el soberano. Y el pueblo ordena y manda por medio de la Constitucion
esta es suvoz el verbo hecho carne politica y social, el soplo vital quetraduce y transmuts su espiritu en postulados
esenciales deregulacion y gobierno.
Todo eso esta bien, no puede haber seria objecion a ello,dicen los sostenedores absolutistas de la teoria de la
sedparacion de poderes. Pero se pregunta: quien seala lavoluntad del pueblo tal como esta plasmada en la
Constitucion? ?Quien es el profeta que desciende del Sinai para revelar las tablas de la ley? Quien ha de arbitrar en
los conflictos constitucionales, o quien ha de decidir los litigios propiamente planteados en que se ventilan una
infraccion de la Constitucion? Hay un peligroso vacio en nuestro mecanismo constitucional, o por el contrario, los
resorteestan todos bien situados, capaces de operar y funcionarade cuada y eficientemente? Esto es precisamente
el busilis, la cuestion batallona.
No puede haber duda en la contestacion a tales preguntas. Bajo nuestro sistema de gobierno el poder judiciales el
llamado a sealar, a interpretar la ley; y en los conflictoso transgresiones constitucionales esta Corte Suprematiene la
ultima palabra, le compete el arbitraje supremoy final. Bajo nuestra mecanica constitucional, igual quebajo la
americana, se da la aparente paradoja de que la superior facultad, el supremo negocio de interpretar la voluntad del
pueblo tal como esta expresada mas o menos permanentemente en la Constitucion, no corresponde propiamentea
ninguno d e los poderes electivos, los que se renuevanperiodicamente, sino al poder que si bien es denombramiento
en su origen, tiene, sin embargo, sentido deperpetuidad, quiero decir, es vitalicio en la complexion y funcion de los
individuos que los componen el poder judicial. La sabiduria peculiar, la originalidad del sistemaconsiste
precisamente en eso: en haber alojado el supremo arbitraje con relacion a los conflictos y transgresiones
constitucionales en un poder del Estado al cual deliberadamentese le ha dotado de un clima psicologico y moral el
maspropicio posible a la objetividad y desasimiento de lasdisputas politicas y discordias civiles, situandosele por
encimade los vaivenes de la politica al uso y las veleida desde la suerte electora. "Esto es lo que va implicto en la
expresion supremacia judicial, que propiamente es la facultad de revision judicial bajo la Constitucion" (Angara contra
Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 171).
The very essence of the American conception of the separation of powers is its insistence upon the inherent
distinction between law-making and law-interpreting, and its assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a notion
which, when brought to bear upon the Constitution, yields judicial review." (Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme
Court, p. 146.)
En el famoso asunto de Marbury vs. Madison, supra, el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos, por boca de
sugran Chief Justice John Marshall, en terminos inequivocos definio y explico las facultades de la judicatura para
poneren vigor la Constitucion como la suprema ley del pais, y declaro que es terminantemente de la competencia y
deberdel departamento judicial el decidir cual es la ley querige.
The reasoning of Webster and Kent is substantially the same. Webster says: "The Constitution being the
supreme law, it follows of course, that every act of the Legislature contrary to the law must be void. But who
shall decide this question? Shall the legislature itself decide it? If so, then the Constitution ceases to be legal
and becomes only a moral restraint for the legislature. If they, and they only, are to judge whether their acts be
conformable to the Constitution, then the Constitution is advisory and accessory only, not legally binding;
because, if the construction of it rest wholly with them, their discretion, in particular cases, may be in favor of
very erroneous constructions. Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when the case arises, must decide upon the
validity of particular acts." Webster, Works, Vol. III, 30. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol.
1, 2d edition, pp. 4, 5.)
En el citado asunto de Angara contra Comision Electoral dijimos tambien lo siguiente:
. . . Y la judicatura, a su vez, con el Tribunal Supremo por artbitro final, frena a con efectividad a los demas
departament of en elejercicio de su facultad de determinar la ley, y de aqui que pueda declarar nulos los actos
ejecutivos y legislativos que contravengan la Constitucion.
Esta doctrina reafirmo en el asunto de Planas contra Gil (67 Phil., 62), a saaber:
. . . As far as the judiciary is concerned, which it holds' neither the sword nor the purse' it is by constitutional
placement the organ called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme Court is entrusted
expressly or by necessary implication the obligation of determining in appropriate cases the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Section 2 [1], Art. VIII, Constitution of the
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Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent, the judiciary restrains the other departments of the government
and this result is one of the necessary corollaries of the "system of checks and balances" of the government
established.
No es que con esto el poder judicial assume un complejode superioridad sobre los otros poderes del Estado, no.
Setrate simplemente de que, dentro de las limitaciones de todacreacion humana, alguien tiene que arbitrar y dirimir
losconflictos y las transgresiones a gue puede dar lugar la Constitucion, y se estima que el poder judicial, pro la
razonde su ser y de sus funciones, es el mas llamado a ser esearbitro. Se trate de una propia y graciosa inhibicion
delos otros poderes en virtud de una necesidad impuesta porunas teorias y practicas de gobiernio que han resistido la
prueba del tiempo y el choque con la realidad y la experiencia. En mi disidencia en el asunto de Vera contra Avelino (77
Phil., 192), hablando sobre este particular dijelo siguiente y lo reitero ahora, a saber:
En parte, el argumento expuesto es correcto y acertado. No sepuede discutir que los tres poderes del Estado
son iguales e independientesentre si; que ninguno de ellos es superior al otro, mucho menos el poder judicial
que entre los tres es el menos fuerte y elmas precario en medios e implementos materiales. Tampoco se
puede discutir que bajo la Constitucion cada poder tiene una zona, una esferade accion propia y privativa,
y dentro de esa esfera un cumulode facultades que le pertenecen exclusivamente; quedentro de esaesfera y
en el uso de esas facultades cada poder tiene absoluta discreciony ningun otro poder puede controlar o revisar
sus actos so pretexto de que alguien los cuestiona o tacha de arbitrarios, injustos, imprudentes o insensatos.
Pero la insularidad, la separacion llegasolo hasta aqui. Desde Montesquieu que lo proclamo cientificamente
hasta nuestros dias, el principio de la separacion de poderes hasufrido tremendos modificaciones y
limitaciones. El consenso doctrinal hoy es que la teoria es solo relativa y que la separacionde poderes queda
condicionada por una mecanica constitucional lamecanica de los frenos y cortapisas. (Willoughby, On the
Constitution of the United States, tomo 3, pags. 1619, 1620, 2. edicion.) Como queda dicho, cada poder es
absoluto dentro de la esfera quele asigna la Constitucion; alli el juego de sus facultades y funcionesno se
puede coartar. Pero cuando se sale y extravasa de esa esferainvadiendo otras esferas constitucionales,
ejerciendo facultades queno le pertenecen, la teoria de la separacion ya no le ampara, la Constitucion que es
superior a el le sale al encuentro, le restringe uy leachica dentro de sus fronteras, impidiendo sus incursiones
anti-constitucionales. La cuestion ahora a determinar es si bajo nuestrosistema de gobierno hay un mecanismo
que permite restablecer eljuego normal de la Constitucion cuando surgen estos desbarajustes, estos conflictos
que podriamos llamar de fronteras constitucionales; tambien es cuestion a determinar si cuando surgen esos
conflictos, un ciudadano sale perjudicado en sus derechos, el mismo tiene algun remedio expedito y adecuado
bajo la Constitucion y las leyes, y quien puede concederle ese remedio. Y con esto llegamos a la cuestion
basica, cardinal en este asunto.
Nuestra opinion es que ese mecanismo y ese remedio existen son los tribunales de justicia.
La mayoria no define en su decision lo que llama cuestion politica no-justiciable ni las maaterials o casos que caen
dentro de su significado. "The difficulty lies" dice la ponencia "in determining what matters fall within the meaning
of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political
departments of the government." Pero razonando por analogia cita un precedente, una autoridad el caso de
Coleman vs. Miller decidido no hace muchos aos por la Corte Suprema Federal de los Estados Unidos. La mayoria
cree que este es el caso mas semejante al que nos ocupa. Creo que la mayoria padece error: el caso de
Coleman contra Miller es precisamente un buen argumento en favor del recurso.
Compendiado el caso es como sigue: En Junio, 1924, el Congreso de los Estados Unidos propuso una reforma ala
Constitucion, conocida por "Child Labor Amendment" (enmienda sobre el trabajo infantil). En Enero, 1925, la
Legislatura del Estado de Kansas adopto una resolucion rechazandola enmienda y una copia certificada de la
resolucionse envio al Secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos. En Enero, 1937, o sea 12 aos despues, una
resolucion conocida como "Resolucion Concurrente del Senado No. 3" se presento en el Senado del Estado de Kansas
pararatificar la propuesta enmienda. Habia 40 Senadores. Alconsiderarse la resolucion 20 Senadores votaron en favor
y 20 Senadores en contra. El Teniente Gobernador, que era entonces el Presidente del Senado en virtud de la
Constitucion estatal, emitio su voto en favor de la resolucion, rompiendo asi el empate. La resolucion fue
posteriormente adoptada por la Camara de Representantes de Kandas mediante una mayoria de los votos de sus
miembros.
Fued entonces cuando se interpuso ante la Corte Suprema de Kansas un recurso de mandamus por los 20 Senadores
adversos a la resolucion y por otros 3 miembros de la Camarade Representantes. El objeto del recurso era (a)
compeler al Secretario del Senado a borrar el endoso favorable de la resolucion y poner en su lugar las palabras "no ha
sido aprobada"; (b) recabar la expedicion de un interdicto contra los oficiales del Senado y Camara de Representantes
prohibiendo les que firmaran la resolucion y contra el Secretario de Estado de Kansad prohibiendole que autentic
aradicha resolucion y la entregara la Gobernador. La solicitud cuestionaba el derecho del Teniente Gobernadora emitir
su voto decisivo en el Senado. Tambien se planteabaen la solicitud el hecho de que la resolucion habiasido rechazada
originariamente y se alegaba, ademas, quedurante el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre Junio,1924, y Mayo, 1927,
la enmienda habia sido rechazada porambas Camaras de las Legislaturas de 26 Estados y solose habia ratificado en 5
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Estados, y que por razon de dicho rechazamiento y por no haberse ratificado dentro de untiempo razonable la
enmienda habia perdido su validez y vitalidad.
La Corte Suprema de Kansas hallo que no habia ninguna disputa sobre los hechos, asumio competencia sobre el
casoy sostuvo que el Teniente Gobernador tenia derecho a emitirvoto decisivo, que la proyectada enmienda
conservabasu vitalidad original a pesar del tiempo transcurrido, y quela resolucion, "habiendo sido aprobada por la
Camara de Representantes y por el Senado, el acto de ratificacion dela propuesta enmienda por la Legislatura de
Kansas erafinal y complete." Consiguientemente el recurso de mandamus fue denegado.
Elevado el asunto en casacion para ante la Corte Suprema Federal, esta asumio jurisdiccion sobre el caso, conla
concurrencia y disidencia de algunos Magistrados que opinaban que el recurso debia rechazarse de plano, sin
masceremonias, por la razon, segun los disidentes, de que los recurrentes no tenian personalidad ni derecho de accion
para pedir la revision de la sentencia de la Corte Supremade Kansas, y porque ademas se trataba de una cuestion
puramente politica, por tanto no-justiciable. Bajo la ponenciade su Presidente el Sr. Hughes, la Corte Suprema Federal
conocio del caso a fondo, discutiendo y resolviendo las cuestiones planteadas. He aqui sus palabras: "Our authority to
issue the writ of certiorari is challenged upon the ground that the petitioners have no standing to seek to have the
judgment of the state court reviewed and hence itis urged that the writ of certiorarishould be dismissed.We are unable to
accept that view." Esto viene a ser comouna replica a las siguientes palabras de los disidentes: "It is the view of Mr.
Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and myself (Mr. Justice Frankfurter) that the petitioners have no
standing in the Court." Delo dicho resulta evidente que la Corte Federal no adoptola actitud de "manos fuera" (hands
off), sino que actuo positivamente sobre el caso, encarandolo.
La decision consta de tres partes. La primera parte, que es bastante extensa, esta consagrada enteramente adiscutir la
cuestion de la jurisdiccion de la Corte. Ya hemosvisto que esta cuestion se ha resuelto enteramente enfavor de la
jurisdiction, en virtud de las razones luminosas que alli se explanan y que no reproduzco por no ser necesario y para no
alargar indebidamente esta disidencia. La segunda parte es bien breve, apenas consta de dos parrafos. Se refiere a la
cuestion de si el voto del Teniente Gobernador, que rompio el empate, era o no valido. La Corte nolo resuelve, por que
dice que sus miembros se dividieron porigual sobre si era una cuestion politica y, por tanto, nojusticiable. La tercera
parte, tan extensa como la primera, esta dedicada a estudiar y discutir las siguientes proposiciones :(a) Si habiendo
sido rechazada originariamentela enmienda, una ratificacion posterior podia validamente dejar sin efecto dicho
rechazamiento y tomarse como unaratificacion legal al tenor de la Constitucion; (b) si ellargo tiempo transcurrido entre
el rechazamiento y la ratificacion unos 13 aos no habia tenido el efecto de darcaracter final a la repudiacion de
la enmienda, causando estado juridico definitivo.
El analisis que hace el ilustrado ponente de las cuestiones planteadas es muy interesante y desde luego acabado. Se
estudian y comentan luminos amente los precedentes. Sobre la cuestion de si el rechazamiento de unaenmienda
propuesta impide que la misma sea ratificada posteriormente, se puntualiza lo siguiente: que el articulo V de la
Constitucion Federal sobre enmienda esta fraseadoen terminos positivos, es decir, habla de ratificacion y node
rechazamiento, y que por tanto "el poder para ratificarlo confiera al Estado la Constitucion, y que, como poder
ratificante, continua y persiste, a pesar de un previo rechazamiento. "Luego la Corte dice, examinando los precedentes,
que el Congreso, en el ejercicio de su control sobrela promulgacion de las enmiendas a la Constitucion, ha resuelto
esta cuestion repetidas veces en el sentido indicado, esto es, considerando inefectivo el previo rechazamientofrente a
una positiva ratificacion; y la Corte concluye que esta accion del Congreso es valida, constitucional; por consiguiente,
los tribunales no estan autorizados para revisarla. Es en este sentido, creo yo, como la Corte dice que se trate de una
cuestion politica no-justiciable, es decir una cuestion que cae dentro de la zona constitucional exclusion del Congreso;
por tanto, se trate deuna accion valida, constitucional. Pero no hay nada enesa decision que diga, o permita inferir, que
cuando el Congreso viola un mandato expreso de la Constitucion, como en el caso que nos ocupa, los tribunales no
pueden intervenir, bajo el principio de la supremacia judicial entratandose de interpretar la Constitucion, para resolver el
conflicto o enjuiciar la transgresion, y conceder el remedio propiamente pedido. En otras palabras, en el caso de
Coleman contraMiller la Corte Suprema Federal hallo que el Congreso, al declarar valida la ratificacion de la enmienda
constitucional sobre trabajo infantil (Child labor), no habia infringibo el articulo V de la Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, y
la Corte lo razona diciendo, con la vista delos precedentes, que el referido articulo V habla de ratificacion y no de
rechazamiento, y que, por tanto, "el poderpara ratificar continua y persiste a pesar de un previo rechazamiento." De
suerte que, en realidad de verdad, no escierto que la Corte Suprema Federal declaro injusticiablela materia, pues que
mejor prueba de justiciabilidad que ese dictum categorico, positivo y terminante?
Sobre la proposicion de si el largo tiempo transcurrido entre el rechazamiento y la ratificacion unos 136 aos no
habia tenido el efecto de dar caracter final a la repudiacion de la enmienda, causando estado juridico definitivo, la Corte
Suprema Federal fallo que no, es decir, declarovalida la ratificacion no obstante dicho lapso de tiempo, aduciendo
razones muy atinadas, entre ellas la de que las condiciones de caracter moral, medico, social y economico que
aconsejaban la prohibicion del trabajo infantil en las fabricas eran tan validas y existentes, si no mas, cuandose sometio
la enmienda por primera vez para su ratificacion como 13 aos despues. Y luego la Corte cita autoridades y
precedentes en apoyo de su conclusion, entre ellosel caso tipico y decisivo de Dillon vs. Glass (256 U.S., 368; 65
Law.ed., 994; 41 Sup.Ct., 510). En este caso la Cortedeclaro que el Congreso, al proponer una enmienda a la
Constitucion, pueded fijar un tiempo razonable para su ratificacion, y sostuvo la accion del Congreso al disponer enla
proyectada 18. Enmienda que la misma seria ineficaza menos que se ratificase dentro de siete aos.
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Ahora bien, en el caso de Coleman contra Miller ocurre todo lo contrario: el Congreso no habia fijado ningun plazopara
la ratificacion. En vista de esto, los recurrentes pretendian que la Corte supliera la omision del Congreso declarandolo
que era tiempo razonable, teniendo en cuentalos precedentes judiciales y el precedente congresional de 7 aos ya
sostenido en el caso citado de Dillon contra Glass; y que desde luego el periodo de 13 aos era demasiado largo para
ser razonable. La Corte Suprema dijo que no, queno eran los tribunales los que debian fijar ese tiempo razonable; que
en esta cuestion entraban muchos factores denaturaleza varia y compleja politicos, economicos y sociales que
solo el Congreso estaba en condiciones de determinar ya mediante la correspondiente legislacion como enel caso de la
18. Enmienda, ya en cada caso concreto deratificacion al ejercer su control sobre la promulgacion de las enmiendas.
Ahora bien, pregunto: no es esto un dictum judicial? no es esto justiciar? no esta aqui la Corte Suprema Federal
sentandose en estrados y emitiendo judicialmente su opinion sobre una materia juridica y constitucional sometida a su
consideracion? En realidad, puede decirse que la unica cuestion que la Corte ha dejado de resolver es la validez o
nulidad del voto decisivo del Teniente Gobernador, por la razon de que sobre este punto, segun se dice en la misma
decision, la opinion del Tribunal estaba igualmente dividida. Todas las demas cuestiones han sido enjuiciadas,
resueltes, y esta accion dela mayoria, asumiendo plena jurisdiccion sobre el caso y las materias en el discutidas, es lo
que ha motivado la disidencia de 4 Magistrados los Sres. Black, Roberts, Frankfurter y Douglas. En efecto, estos
disidentes no disimulansu desagrado al ver que la Corte asume en el caso, siquier implicitamente, el poder de
interpretacion judicial, y aunvan mas alla expresan un notorio desencanto al ver que la Corte "trata el proceso
enmendatorio provisto por la Constitucion, como sujeto a interpretacion judicial en algunos respectos, y en otros sujeto
a la autoridad final del Congreso", y al ver tambien que en la decision "no hay desaprobacion de la conclusion
establecida en el asunto de Dillon contra Glass, de que la Constitucion requiere tacitamente que una enmienda
propiamente sometida debe darsepor muerta, a menos que se ratifique dentro de un tiempo razonable." Es decir, los
Magistrados disidentes esperaban que la Corte revocase y abrogase lo hecho por ella en elcitado asunto de
Dillo contra Glass en donde la Corte, envez de abstenerse de conocer del caso por tratarse en el, segun los disidentes,
de materia politica no-justiciable, ejercio plena jurisdiccion sobre el mismo asumiendo supoder tradicional de interpretar
la Constitucion y declarando valida la lay del Congreso que fijaba un plazo de7 aos para la ratificacion de la 18.
Enmienda. No puedo resistir a la tentacion de reproducir las mismas palabrasde la disidencia: ellas, mejor que todo lo
que yo pueda decir, demuestran de modo inconcuso las irreconciliables diferencias de criterio entre la mayoria,
representada porel ilustre ponente Sr. Hughes, y los disidentes, pues mientraspor un lado el
ponente justicia decididamente el caso considerando, discutiendo y resolviendo todas las cuestionesplanteadas, menos
la cuestion del voto del Teniente Gobernador, citando profusamente autoridades y precedentes, los disidentes, en su
opinion, preconizan una actitudde absoluta abstencion, de "manos fuera" (hands off), portratarse, segun ellos, de una
materia politica no-justiciable que cae exclusivamente bajo el control del Congreso. He aqui las palabras de los
disidentes:
. . . To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial
interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification of
amendments, we are unable to agree.
The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is being followed
between submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon
a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly
authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State may
reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions,are all consistent only with
an ultimate control over the amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the course of
amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution
solely to the political branch of government.
The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as subject to judicial
construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the
conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Glass, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a property submitted
amendment must die unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior
assumption of power to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has
constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in article 5 of the Constitution. On the other
hand, the Court's opinion declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the political questions of
whether a State whose legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its
position, and whether in the circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead because an
"unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such division between the political and judicial branches of the
government is made by article 5 which grants power over the amending of the Constitution to Congress alone.
Undivided control of that process has been given by the article exclusively and completely to Congress. The
process itself is "political" in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.
Since Congress has sole and complete control over the amending process, subject to no judicial review, the
views of any court upon this process cannot be binding upon Congress, and in so far as Dillon vs. Glass
attempts judicially to imposed a limitation upon the right of Congress to determine final adoption of an
amendment, it should be disapproved. . . . (Coleman vs. Miller, 122 A.L.R., 695, 708, 709.)
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La distribucion de los votos con relacion a las cuestiones planteadas en el referido asundo de Coleman vs. Miller
esalgun tanto confusa, como han podido notar los mismos comentaristas; asi que necesita de alguna explicacion.
Escierto que no suscriben la ponencia mas que 3 Magistrados, a saber: el ponente Sr. Hughes y los Sres. Stone y
Reed, pero en cuanto a la jurisdiccion plena que la Corte asumio sobre el caso y la materia hay que aadir los votos de
los Sres. McReynolds y Butler. Estos dos ultimos no soloconcurrian implicitamente en la accion de la Corte al
enjuiciarel caso, sino que inclusive opinaban que debia concederse el recurso, esto es, que debia anularse la
ratificacion tardia de la Enmienda sobre Trabajo Infantil (Child Labor) hecha por la Legislatura de Kansas. De modo
queen cuanto al "issue" de la jurisdiccion, la justiciabilidad del caso, la votacion era de 5 contra 4 por la
jurisdiccion,la justiciabilidad, el ponente Sr. Hughes, y los Magistrados Sres. Stone, Reed, McReynolds y Butler; por la
actitud de absoluta abstencion, de "manos fuera" (hands off), los Magistrados Sres. Black, Frankfurter, Roberts y
Douglas.
Repito lo dicho mas arriba: el caso de Coleman vs. Miller, en vez de ser una autoridad a favor de los recurridos,
juntamente con el caso de Dillon vs. Glass constituyen precedentes decisivos en la jurisprudencia federal americana a
favor de los recurrentes.
V
Pero si la jurisprudencia federal milita en favor de latesis de que tenemos jurisdiccion para enjuiciar y decidirel presente
caso, en el ejercicio de nuestras supremas funciones como interprete de la Constitucion bajo el principio firmemente
establecido de la supremacia judicial en asuntos propiamente planteados sobre conflictos y transgresiones
constitucionales, la jurisprudencia de los Estados estodavia mas indubitable e inequivoca, mas terminante y decisiva.
La importancia de esto sube de punto si se tieneen cuenta que, mas que con el gobierno federal, nuestra analogia,
nuestros puntos de contacto en lo politico, constitucional y juridico es mas bien con los diferentes Estados de la Union
americana. Nuestro sistema de gobierna es unitario. Aqui nuestras provincias no son Estados autonomos y semiindependientes como lo son los Estados americanos. Asi que la cedula, la unidad politica mas semejante a la nuestra
no es la federal, sino la estatal. Por eso si bienes cierto que las constituciones de los Estados, como lanuestra, todas
estan fundamentalmente calcadas en el patron de la Constitucion federal, se vera que en ciertosrasgos caracteristicos
del sistema unitario nuestra Constitucionse aproxima evidentemente mas a las de los Estados que a la federal. Esa
semejanza es sobre todo notabilisimaen la parte que se refiere al proceso enmendatorio de la Constitucion. Es que, en
realidad, los Estados de la Union americana, para todos los efectos de la vida interior, domestica, son practicamente
naciones independientes; asi que nuestra evolucion, nuestro transitode la condicion de Commonwealth a la de
Republicas oberana e independiente si bien nos distingue de ellos enel derecho internacional, ninguna diferencia, sin
embargo, ha operado en el campo constitucional, ora en la parte dogmatica de la Constitucion, ora en la parte
organica. Y la mejor prueba de esto es que con la independencia nohemos tenido necesidad de cambiar de
Constitucion: lamisma que nos servia cuando eramos simple Commonwealth, es decir, cuando estabamos sujetos a la
soberania americana, es la misma que nos sirve hoy cuando ya somos Republic; y no cabe duda de que nos serviria
perfectamente bien si no la tuvieramos asendereada y malparada en nuestras pecaadoras manos con repetidas
violaciones, confrecuentes asaltos contra su integridad . . ..
Ahora bien; sin petulancia se puede retar a cualquieraa que seale un caso, un solo caso en la jurisprudencia de los
Estados de la Union americana en que los tribunales de justicia se hayan negado a conocer y enjuiciaruna violacion
constitucional semejante a la que nos ocupapor la razon de que se trataba de una cuestion politica no-justiciable. No
hay absolutamente ninguno; por esoque los recurridos, a pesar de las pacientes y laboriosas investigaciones que
denota su habil y concienzudo alegato, no han podido citar ni un solo caso.
En cambio, los tomos de jurisprudencia de various Estados dan cuenta de casos indenticosd al que nos ocupa y
entodos ellos se ha declarado invariablemente que la violacion de la Constitucion en lo que se refiere al precepto que
regula el proceso de la enmiendas a la Ley organica esuna cuestion judicial, y ninguna Corte Suprema de Estados e ha
lavado jamas las manos bajo la teoria de la separacion de poderes. Es mas: creo que in siquiera seha planteado
seriamente la objecion fundada en el argumentod e la injusticiabilidad.
Para no alargar demasiado esta disidencia no voy a citarmas que algunos casos los mas conocidos y representativos,
tomados de la jurisprudencia de algunos Estados, a saber: Florida, Minnesota, Georgia e Indiana. De la Corte Suprema
de Florida tenemos dos casos: el de Crawford vs .Gilchrist y el de Gray vs. Childs.
En el asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist (64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 963l Ann. Cas., 1914B, 916), se trataba de una accionde
prohibicion interpuesta por el Gobernador del Estado, Albert W. Gilchrist, contra el Secretario de Estado, H. Clay
Crawford, para impedir que cierta propuesta enmiendaa la Constitucion se publicara y se sometiera al electorado en un
plebiscito para su ratificacion o rechazamiento. Esdecir, lo mismo de que se trate en el case que tenemos
antenosotros. La enmienda habia sido aprobada por la Camarade Representantes de Florida con el voto necesario y
constitucional de tres quintas (3/5), y fue enviada al Senado para su concurrencia. El Senado tambien la aprobo conel
voto de tres quintos, pero esta votacion fue reconsiderada posteriormente. Asi estaba el asunto, pendiente de
reconsideracion cuando se clausuro la Legislatura. Despues, sin embargo, diose por aprobada la propuesta enmienday
el Secretario de Estado trato de dar los pasos parasu publicacion y ratificacion plebiscitaria. De ahi la accionde
interdicto prohibitorio, fundada en la alegacion de quela enmienda no habia sido aprobada debidamente por la
Legislatura de acuerdo con los metodos prescritos en la Constitucion de Florida. Igual que en el presente casetambien
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hubo alli una batalla forense colosal, con untremendo despliegue de habilidad y talento por cada lado. El ponente no se
recata en alabar el esfuerzo de las partesy dice: ". . . we think the parties to this litigationare to be commended, both for
taking the proceedings that have brought these unsual questions before the court for determination and for the great
ability with which their counsel have presented them to this court."
Se lavo las manos la Corte Suprema de Florida declarandose incompetente para conocer del asunto por la razonde
que se trataba de una cuestion politica y, por tanto, nojusticiable? De ninguna manera. La Corte asumio resueltamente
su responsabilidad y poder tradicional de interpretarla Constitucion y fallo el asunto en su fondo, declarando que la
cuestion era propiamente judicial y que laenmienda constitucional propuesta no se habia aprobada deconformidad con
los requisitos establecidos por la Constitucionpara el proceso y tramitacion de la enmiendas. Por tanto, se denego la
peticion de supersedeas interpuestapor el recurrido para enervar el recurso; es decir, al recurrentegano su inusitado e
historico pleito. Y las esferas politicas de Florida no se desorbitaron por esta decisivaderrota de la teoria de la
separacion de poderes. Vale la pena reproducir algunar de las doctrinas sentadas en elasunto, a saber:
Constitutional Law Power of Courts to Determine Validity of Action by Legislature in Proposing Constitutional
Amendment.
A determination of whether an amendment to the constitution has been validly proposed and agreed to by the
Legislature is to be had in a judicial forum where the constitution provides no other means for such
determination.
Injunction Subject of Relief Act of Secretary of State in Certifying Proposed Amendments.
The act of the secretary of state in publishing and certifying to the country commissioners proposed
amendments to the constitution is in its nature ministerial, involving the exercise of no discretion, and if the act
is illegal it may be enjoined in appropriate proceedings by proper parties, there being no other adequate remedy
afforded by law.
Injunction Governor as Complainant, Secretary of State as Defendant.
The governor of the state, suing as such, and also as a citizen, taxpayer, and elector, is a proper complainant in
proceedings brought to enjoin the secretary of state from publishing at public expense and certifying proposed
amendments to the constitution upon the ground that such proposed amendments are invalid because they
have not been duly "agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to each house" of the legislature.
Amendments to Constitution Effect of Ignoring Mandatory Provisions of Constitution.
If essential mandatory provisions of the organic law are ignored in amending the constitution, it violates the right
of all the people of the state to government regulated by law.
Duty of Court to Enforce Constitution.
It is the duty of the courts in authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing constitution.
Mandatory Provisions of Constitutions as to Manner of Amending Constitution.
The provision of the organic law requiring proposed amendments of the constitution to "be agreed to by threefifths of all the members elected to each house" of the legislature is mandatory, and it clearly contemplates that
such amendments shall be agreed to by the deliberate, final, affirmative vote of the requisite number of the
numbers of each house at a regular session.
Construction of Constitution to Give Intended Effect Mandatory Character of Provisions.
Every word of a state constitution should be given its intended meaning and effect, and essential provisions of a
constitution are to be regarded as being mandatory. (Crawford vs. Gilchrist, Ann. Cas., 1914 B, pp. 916, 917.)
El asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist se decidio en 1912. Enm 1934 otro asunto constitucional importante, el de
Gray contra Childs, se decidio en virtud de la autoridad y sentencia dictada en dicho asunto de Crawford.
En el caso citado de Gray contra Childs (156 So. Rep., 274; Fla.), tambien se trataba de una demanda de prohibicion
para impedir la publicacion de una propuesta enmienda constitucional que iba a ser sometida al electorado de Florida
para su ratificacion o rechazamiento en una eleccion general o plebiscito fijado para Noviembre, 1934. La enmienda
habia sido aprobada por la Camara de Representantes con el voto de tres quintos (3/5), pero en el Senado hubo cierta
confusion acerca del texto finalmente aprobado. La Legislatura, antes de clausurarse aprobo unafs resolucion conjunta
autotizando a ciertos oficiales de las Camaras para que despues de la clausura hiciesen ciertas correciones enlas
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actas y en el diario de sesiones a fin de formar la verdaderahistoria de los procedimientos y compulsar el textode la
enmienda tal como habia sido aprobada. Se alegabaen la demanda que esto era ilegal y anticonstitucional. Eltribunal
de circuito estimo el recurso de prohibicion. Elevado el asunto en apelacion para ante la Corte Suprema del Estado, la
misma confirmo la sentencia apelada concediendo el interdicto prohibitorio. Hed aqui los pronunciamientos de la Corte
que parecen estereotipados para el caso que nos ocupa, a saber:
(4,5) Section 1 of article 17 of our Constitution provides the method by which the Constitution may be amended.
It requires that a proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective Journals of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate with the yeas and nays showing a three-fifths vote in favor of such
amendment by each House. The proposed amendment here under consideration nowhere appears upon the
Journals of the Senate, and therefore it is unnecessary for us to consider any other questions presented or any
authorities cited.
The amendment of the organic law of the state or nation is not a thing to be lightly undertaken not to be
accomplished in a haphazard manner. It is a serious thing. When an amendment is adopted, it becomes a part
of the fundamental law of the land, and it may mean the weal or woe of the future generations of the state
wherein it becomes a part of the fundamental law. We cannot say that the strict requirements pertaining to
amendments may be waived in favor of a good amendment and invoked as against a bad amendment. If the
Constitution may be amended in one respect without the amendment being spread upon the Journals of one of
the respective House of the Legislature, then it may be ameqnded in any other respect in the same manner. It is
not for the courts to determine what is a wise proposed amendment or what is an unwise one. With the wisdom
of the policy the courts have nothing to do. But it is the duty of the courts, when called upon so to do, to
determine whether or not the procedure attempted to be adopted is that which is required by the terms of the
organic law.
Finding that the organic law has not been complied with, as above pointed out, the decree appealed from
should be, and the same is hereby, affirmed on authority of the opinion and judgment in the case of
Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 953; Ann. Cas., 1914B, 9156. (Gray vs. Childs, 156 Southern
Reporter, pp. 274, 279.)
Note se que la clausula sobre enmiendas en la Constitucion de Florida es semejante a la nuestra, a saber: (1) la
propuesta enmienda tiene que ser aprobada por la Legislatura, en Florida con el voto de tres quintos (3/5) de los
miembros, en Filipinas con el voto de tres cuartos (3/4); (2) los sies y los nos tienen que hacersesd constar en el diario
de sesiones (Articulo VI, seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20, inciso 1, Constitucion de Filipinas); (3) despues de aprobada
la enmienda por la Legislatura se somete al electorado en una eleccion o plebiscito, para su ratificacion
orechazamiento.
El procedimiento sobre enmiendas prescrito en la Constitucion federal americana es diferente, a saber: el Congreso
puede proponer la enmienda bien (1) mediante la aprobacion de dos tercios (2/3) de sus miembros; bien (2) mediante
una convencion que se convocara al efecto apeticion de las Legislaturas de dos tercios (2/3) de los diferentes Estados.
En cualquiera de ambos casos la enmiendasera valida para todos los efectos y fines comoparte de la Constitucion
siempre que fuera ratificada porlas Legislaturas de tres cuartos (3/4) de los Estados, o porconvenciones de tres
cuartas-partes de los mismos, segun que uno u otro modo de ratificacion hubiera sido propuestopor el Congreso.
Esta diferencia de procedimientos es la que, segun digomas arriba, me inclina a sostener que la jurisprudencia
constitucional propiamente aplicable a Filipinas es la jurisprudencia de los Estados, puesto que es con estos con los
cuales tenemos analogia o paridad constitucional en lo que toca a la forma y manera como se puede reformar la
Constitucion.
Seguire ahora citando mas casos.
Tenemos un caso de Minnesota, identico a los ya citados de Florida. En el asunto de In re McConaughy (106 Minn.,
392; 119 N.W., 408), tambin se suscito la cuestion de si una propuesta enmienda constitucional habia sido aprobada de
acuerdo con los requisitos sealados en la Constitucion de Minnesota. Alli como aqui tambien hubo disputa sobre si
esto era una cuestion judicial o una cuestion politica no justiciable. La Corte Suprema deaquel Estado declaro sin
ambajes que era una cuestion judicial. He aqui sus palabras que no tienen desperdicio:
The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has been
properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question. There can be
little doubt that the consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to
determine whether the constitution has been amended in the manner required by the constitution, unless a
special tribunal has been created to determine the question; and even then many of the courts hold that the
tribunal cannot be permitted to illegally amend the organic law. There is some authority for the view that when
the constitution itself creates a special tribunal, and confides to it the exclusive power to canvass votes and
declare the results, and makes the amendment a part of the constitution as a result of such declaration by
proclamation or otherwise, the action of such tribunal is final and conclusive. It may be conceded that this is true
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when it clearly appears that such was the intention of the people when they adopted the constitution. The right
to provide a special tribunal is not open to question; but it is very certain that the people of Minnesota have not
done so, and this fact alone eliminates such cases as Worman vs.Hagan, 78 Md., 152; 27 Atl., 616; 21 L. R. A.,
716, and Miles vs. Badford, 22 Md., 170; 85 Am. Dec., 643, as authorities against the jurisdiction of the courts.
(In re McConaughy, 106 Minn., 392; 119 N. W., 408.)
Tambien tenemos un caso de Georgia. En el asunto de Hammond vs. Clark (136 Ga., 313; 71 S.E., 479; 38
L.R.A.[N.S.], 77), se suscito igualmente una disputa sobre siuna enmienda habia sido aprobada de acuerdo con los
requisitos de la Constitucion era una cuestion judicial o no. La Corte Suprema de aquel Estado declaro
afirmativamente. He aqui su inequivoca pronunciamiento:
Counsel for plaintiff in error contended that the proclamation of the governor declaring that the amendment was
adopted was conclusive, and that the courts could not inquire into the question. To this contention we cannot
assent. The constitution is the supreme state law. It provides how it may be amended. It makes no provision for
exclusive determination by the governor as to whether an amendment has been made in the constitutional
method, and for the issuance by him of a binding proclamation to that effect. Such a proclamation may be both
useful and proper, in order to inform the people whether or not a change has been made in the fundamental
law; but the constitution did not make it conclusive on that subject. When the constitution was submitted for
ratification as a whole, a provision was made for a proclamation of the result by the governor. Const. art. 13,
section 2, par. 2 (Civ. Code 1910, section 6613). But in reference to amendment there is no such provision.
Const. article 13, section 1, par. 1 (Civ. Code 1910, section 6610). In the absence of some other exclusive
method of determination provided by the constitution, the weight of authority is to the effect that whether an
amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of the existing constitution is a judicial
question. (Hammond vs. Clark, 136 Ga., 313; 71 S.E., 479;38 L.R.A. [N.S.], 77.)
Tambien tenemos el siguiente case de Indiana:
(1) In the beginning we are confronted with the contention on the part of appellees that this court has no
jurisdiction to determine the questions in issue here. In the case of Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind., 336, 391; 99
N.E., 1, 21 (Ann. Cas. 1915C, 200), this court, after reviewing many decisions as to the power of the courts to
determine similar questions, sums up the whole matter as follows:
"Whether legislative action is void for want of power in that body, or because the constitutional forms of
conditions have not been followed or have been violated (emphasis supplied) may become a judicial question,
and upon the courts the inevasible duty to determine it falls. And so the power resides in the courts, and they
have, with practical uniformity, exercised the authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or
ratification of change in the organic law. Such is the rule in this state" citing more than 40 decisions of this
and other states.
(2) Appellees further contend that appellant has not made out a case entitling him to equitable relief. The trial
court found that the officers of the state, who were instructed with the execution of the law, were about to
expend more than $500,000 under the law, in carrying out its provisions; indeed, it was suggested, in the
course of the oral argument, that the necessary expenditures would amount to more than $2,000,000. This
court, in the case of Ellingham vs. Dye, supra, involving the submission to the people of the Constitution
prepared by the Legislature, answered this same question contrary to the contention of appellees. Seepages
413 and 414 of that opinion. (186 Ind., 533; Bennett vs. Jackson, North Eastern Reporter, Vol. 116, pp. 921,
922.)
Creo que la posicion de la jurisprudencia americana tanto federal como de Estado sobre este punto, esto es, cuandoes
judicial la cuestion y cuando no lo es, se halla bien definida en el tomo 12 del Corpus Juris, en la parte que llevael
encabezamiento de "Constitutional Law" y bajo el subepigrafe que dice: "Adoption of Constitution and
Amendments" (12 Corpus Juris, 880, 881). Es un compendiocuidados amente elaborado en que se da un extracto de la
doctrina con las citas sobre autoridades al pie. Reproducire el compendio, pero omitiendo las citas para no alargar
demasiado esta disidencia: el que desee comprobarlas no tienemas que consultar el tomo. En realidad, leyendo este
extracto se ve que parece un resumen del extenso analisis que llevo hecho sobre la doctrina tanto federal como estatal.
Su meollo es, a saber: la cuestion de si o no una nueva constitucion se ha adoptado la tienen que decidir los
departamentos politicos del gobierno; pero la cuestion de si una enmienda a una constitucion existente ha sido
debidamente propuesta, adoptada y ratificada de acuerdo con los requisitos provistos por la Constitucion, para que
vengaa ser parte de la misma, es una cuestion que los tribunales de justicia tienen que determinar y resolver, excepto
cuandola materia ha sido referida por la Constitucion a un tribunale special con poder para llegar una conclusion final.
He aqui el sinopsis:
SEC. 382. b. Adoption of Constitution and Amendments. Whether or not a new constitution has been
adopted is a question to be decided by the political departments of the government. But whether an amendment
to the existing constitution has been duly proposed, adopted, and ratified in the manner required by the
constitution, as as to become part thereof, is a question for the courts to determine, except where the matter
has been committed by the constitution to a special tribunal with power to make a conclusive determination, as
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where the governor is vested with the sole right and duty of ascertaining and declaring the result, in which case
the courts have no jurisdiction to revise his decision. But it must be made clearly to appear that the constitution
has been violated before the court is warranted in interfering. In any event, whether an entire constitution is
involved, or merely an amendment, the federal courts will not attempt to pass on the legality of such constitution
or amendment where its validity has been recognized by the political departments of the state government, and
acquiesced in by the state judiciary. (12 C.J., pp. 880, 881.)
VI
Otra razon que aduce la mayoria para desestimar el recusro es que la copia impresa de la resolucion en
cuestionaparece certificada por los presidentes de ambas Camaras del Congreso; que en esa certificacion consta que
dicha resolucion fue debidamente aprobada por el Congreso conlos votos de las tres quintas-partes (3/5) de sus
miembros; que, por tanto, la debida aprobacion de dicha resolucion nose puede cuestionar, es una prueba concluyente
para todoel mundo y para los tribunales de justicia particularmente. Este argumento se funda en la doctrina inglesa
llamada "enrolled act doctrine," cuya traduccion mas aproximada al espaol es "doctrina de la ley impresa." Esto, por
unlado.
Por otro lado, la representacion de los recurrentes arguye que lo que rige y prevaleced en esta jurisdiccion noes la
doctrina inglesa o "enrolled act doctrine," sino ladoctrina americana que se conoce con el nombre de "journalentry
doctrine," en virtud de la cual la prueba de siuna ley o una resolucion ha sido debidamente aprobadapor el Congreso
debe buscarse en el diario de sesiones mismo del Congreso. Lo que diga el diario de sesiones esconcluyente y final.
Los recurrentes tienen la razon de su parte. Este punto legal ya se resolvio por esta Corte en la causa de los Estados
Unidos contra Pons (34 Jur. Fil., 772), que ambaspartes discuten en sus respectivos informes. Una de las defensas del
acusado era que la Ley No. 2381 de la Legislatura Filipina en virtud de la cual habia sido condenado era nula e ilegal
porque so aprobo despues ya del cierrede las sesiones especiales que tuvo lugar el 28 de Febrero de 1914, a las 12 de
la noche; es decir, que, en realidad de verdad, la aprobacion se efectuo el 1. de Marzo, puesla sesion sine die del dia
anterior se prolongo mediante una ficcion haciendose parar las manecillas del reloj a las 12 en punto de la noche. Esta
Corte, sin necesidad deninguna otra prueba, examino el diario de sesiones correspondientea la referida fecha 28 de
Febrero, y habiendo hallado que alli constaba inequivocamente haberse aprobadola mencionada ley en tal fecha, fallo
que esta pruebaera final y concluyente para las partes, para los tribunales y para todo el mundo. La Corte desatendio
por completoel "enrolled act," la copia impresa de la ley, pues dijo, asaber: "Pasando por alto la cuestion relativa as si
la Ley Impresa (Ley No. 2381), que fue aprobada por autorizacion legal, constituye prueba concluyente sobre la fecha
desu aprobacion, investigaremos si los Tribunales pueden consultar otras fuestes de informacion, ademas de los
diarios de las sesiones legislativas, para determinar la fecha enque se cerraron las sesiones de la Legislatura, cuando
talesdiarios son claros y explicitos." Y la Corte dijo que nohabia necesidad de consultar otras fuestes, que el diario de
sesiones era terminante, definitivo; y asi fallo la causaen contra del apelante.
Y no era extrao que asi ocurriese: habia en la Corte una mayoria americana, familiarizada y compenetrada
naturalmente con la jurisprudencia pertinente de su pais Quede extrano habia, por tanto, que aplicasen la doctrina
americana, la doctrina del "journal entry," que es mas democratica, mas republicana, en vez de la doctrina inglesa, el
"enrolled act doctrine," que despues de todo tiene ciertotinte monarquico, producto del caracter peculiar e influencia
tradicionalista de las instituciones inglesas? (Vease Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., 371; Del.) Firman, como se sabe, la
decision el ponente Sr. Trent, y los Magistrados Sres. Torres, Johnson, Moreland y Araullo, sin mingun disidente.Y
notese que cuando se promulgo esta sentencia todavia estaba en vigor el articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento
Civil, tal como estaba reformado por la Ley No. 2210. que entre otras cosas proveia lo siguiente: ". .
. Entendiendose, que en el caso de las Leyes de la Comisionde Filipinas o de la Legislatura Filipina, cuando existeuna
copia firmada por los Presidentes y los secretarios de dichos cuerpos, sera prueba concluyente de las dispociones de
la ley en cuestion y de la debida aprobacion delas mismas." Que mejor prueba de la voluntad expresa, categorica, de
hacer prevalecer la doctrina americana sobrela doctrina inglesa? Lo mas comodo para esta Cortehubiera sido aplicar el
citado articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil. No lo hizo, paso por alto sobreel mismo, yendo directamente al
diario de sesiones dela Legislatura, tomando conocimiento judicial del mismo. Si aqui hay algun respeto a la regla
del stare decisis, estaes una magnifica ocasion para demostrarlo. Una regla bien establecida no ha de abrogarse asi
como asi; sobretodo cuando de por medio anda la Constitucion como enel presente caso en que se ha formulado ante
nosotros la queja de que la ley fundamental ha sido violada en unrespecto muy importante como es el capitulo sobre
enmiendas, y la queja no solo no es temeraria sino que se hallaapoyada en buenas y solidas razones.
Mas todavia: cuando se establecio la doctrina en lacitada causa de los Estados Unidos contra Pons (1916, Agosto 12)
adoptando en esta jurisdiccion la doctrina americana del "journal entry" en lugar de la inglesa del "enrolled act," en
nuestra Ley Organica que, por cierto, no era aun la Ley Jones sino la Ley del Congreso de 1902, no habia ninguna
disposicion que proveyera mandatoriamente que en el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura sehiciesen constar los sies y
los nos en la votacion de cualquier proyecto de ley o resolucion, consignando especifica mentelos nombres de los
miembros que hayan votado enpro y en contra, ni tampoco habia ninguna disposicione statutoria a dicho efecto. De
modo que en aquella epoca el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura carecia aun de las fuertes garantias de veracidad
que ahora posee en virtud de esa disposicion que hace obligatoria la constancia oconsignacion de
los sies y nos, disposicion incorporada enla Constitucion del Commonwealth, ahora de la Republica.
(Vease Constitucion de Filipinas, Articulo VI, seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20, incico 1; seccion 21, inciso 2.)
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Sobre la derogacion del articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil no puede haber duda. Ese articulo, que equivale
a una regla de prueba, no se ha incorporado enel Reglamento de los Tribunales. No tratandose de una regla fundada
en un principio general y unanimemente establecido, sino de algo peculiar aislado, acerca del cuallas autoridades estan
divididas, con una mayoria de los Estados de la Union americana decididamente en contra, suno inclusion en el
Reglamento de los Tribunales tiene queconsiderarse necesariamente como una derogacion. Indudablemente esta
Corte, al no incluir dicho articulo en el Reglamento de los Tribunales, ha querido derogarlo en vistade los resuelto en la
citada causa de Estados Unidos contraPons y de la novisima disposicion insertada en la Constitucion del
Commonwealth, ahora de la Republica, que exige la consignacion en el diario de sesiones de los sies y nos en cada
votacion final de proyecto de ley o resolucion conjunta, con especificacion de los nombres de los que hasvotado.
Resulta evidente de lo expuesto que ahora existen masrazones para reafirmar en esta jurisdiccion la doctrina
americana del "journal entry" o "constancia en el diario desesiones" (1) porque el citado seccion 313 del Codigo de
Procedimiento Civil ya no rige con la vigencia del Reglamento de los Tribunales; (2) porque esa disposicion denuestra
Constitucion que hace obligatoria la consignacion de los sies y nos en la votacion de cada bill o resolucion, con
especificacion de los nombres de los que hayan votado enfavor y en contra, hace del diario de sesiones la mejor
prueba sobre autenticidad de los actos legislativos y es, porconsiguiente, la ley sobre la materia en este pais, con
entera exclusion de la doctrina inglesa o "enrolled act doctrine."Las autoridades americanas son contestes en que
siempreque en un Estado de la Union Federal la Constitucioncontiene una disposicion semejante a la nuestra
sobre sies y nos la regla de prueba no es la copia impresa de la leyo "enrolled act," sino el "journal entry" o constancia
enel diario de sesiones. (Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra.)
Aqui se podria dar por terminada toda discusion sobre este punto si no fuera porque los abogados de los recurridos
arguyen fuertemente en favor de la doctrina de la copia impresa o "enrolled act doctrine," y la mayoria de esta Corte
acepta sus argumentos. Se cita, sobre todo, el asunto federal de Field vs. Clark en apoyo de la doctrina.
He examinado la jurisprudencia americana sobre este particular con toda la diligencia de que he sido capaz y he
llegado a la conclusion de que nuestros predecesores enesta Corte merecen todo encomio por su indubitable aciertoal
adoptar en esta jurisdiccion, en la causa de los Estados Unidos contra Pons, supra, la doctrina americana del "journal
entry" o constancia en el diario de sesiones legislativas. No cabe duda de que esta doctrina es mas democratica, mas
liberal, y tambien mas humana y mas concorde con la realidad. La doctrina inglesa del "enrolled act" ocopia impresa de
la ley esta basada en el derecho comun y se adopto en Inglaterra donde, como se sabe, no hay constitucion escrita y la
forma de gobierno es monarquica,y se adopto en un tiempo en que el poder del Parlamento que era tambien el mas
alto tribunal de justicia, era absoluto y transcendente y las restricciones sobre el mismo eran muy ligeras. Por eso un
tribunal americano ha dicho: "Because such a rule obtains as to the Parliament of Great Britain, under a monarchial
form of government, that cannot be regarded as a very potent reason for its application in this state, where the will of the
sovereign power hasbeen declared in the organic act." (Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra, pag. 379; cito con frecuencia este
asunto famoso de Delaware porque es en el mismo donde he hallado una discusion mas acabada y comprensiva sobre
ambas doctrinas: la americana del "journal entry" y la inglesa del "enrolled act.")
Es indudable que el sesgo de la jurisprudencia americana hoy en dia es a favor de la doctrina del "journal entry." Lo
resuelto en el asunto federal de Field contra Clark, enque tanto enfasis ponen los recurridos, no ha hecho mas que
fortalecer ese giro, pues en dicho asunto va en vuelta lainferencia de que cuando la Constitucion establece ciertos
requisitos para la aprobacion de una ley o resolucion, conla consignacion de los sies y nos y los nombres de los que
han votado afirmativa y negativamente, el diario de sesioneses el que rige y prevalece como modo e instrumento de
autenticacion. Por eso que en el asunto tipico y representativode Union Bank vs.Commissioners of Oxford (199 N.C.,
214; 25 S.E., 966; 34 L.R.A., 487), la Corte Supremade North Carolina ha declarado lo siguiente.
According to the law it is well settled in nearly 100 well-adjudicated cases in the courts of last resort in 30
states, and also by the Supreme Court of the United States, that when a state Constitution prescribes such
formalities in the enactment of laws as require a record of the yeas and nays on the legislative journals,these
journals are conclusive as against not only a printed statute, published by authority of law, but alsoagainst a
duly enrolled act. The following is a list of the authorities, in number 93, sustaining this view either directly or by
very close analogy. . . . It is believed that no federal or state authority can be found in conflict with them.
Decisions can be found, as, for instance, Carr. vs. Coke (116 N.C., 223; 22 S.E. 16; 28 L.R.A., 737; 47 Am. St.
Rep., 801, supra, to the effect that, where the Constitution contains no provision requiring entries on the journal
of particular matters such, for example, as calles of the yeas and nays on a measure in question the
enrolled act cannot, in such case, be impeached by the journals. That, however, is very different proposition
from the one involved here, and the distinction is adverted to in Field vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 671 (12 Sup. Ct., 495;
36 Law. ed., 294. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 377.)
Y en el asunto de Ottawa vs. Perkins la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos ha dicho lo siguiente:
But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of South Ottawa vs. Perkins, 94 U.S., 260; 24 Law.,
ed., 154, on appeal from the United States court for the Northern district of Illinois (Mr. Justice Bradley
delivering the opinion), said: "When once it became the settled construction of the Constitution of Illinois that no
act can be deemed a valid law, unless by the journals of the Legislature it appears to have been regularly
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passed by both houses, it became the duty of the courts to take judicial notice of the journal entries in that
regard. The courts of Illinois may decline to take that trouble, unless parties bring the matter to their attention,
but on general principles the question as to the existence of a law is a judicial one and must be so regarded by
the courts of the United States." (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 387.)
Se dice que el interest publico exige que el "enrolled act" o copia impresa de la ley firmada por los Presidentes
deambas Camaras del Congreso de declare concluyente y final, porque de otra manera habria caos, confusion:
cualquierase creeria con derecho a atacar la validez de una ley o resolucion, impugnando la autenticidad de su
aprobacion ode su texto. Pero esto pone en orden las siguientes preguntas que se contestan por si mismas: ?no es el
diariode sesiones un documento constitucional, exigido por la Constitucion que se lleve por las dos camaras del
Congreso, controlado y supervisado por dichas camaras y por los oficiales de las mismas? que mejor garantia de
autenticidad, contra la falsificacion, que ese requerimiento constitucional de consignar obligatoriamente en el diario, en
la votacionde todo bill o resolucion, los sies y los nos, y haciendoconstar los nombres tanto afirmativos como
negativos? se ha producido por ventura caos y confusion en los Estados americanos que han adoptado esta regla y
que, segun admiten los mismos recurridos, forman una decisiva mayoria? se acaso posible concebir que el sentido
americano, tan practico, tan utilitario, tan, realista, optase poruna regla que fuese origen de caos y confusion?
Prescindiendo ya de la jurisprudencia que, ya hemos visto, estadecididamente inclinada a favor de la doctrina
americana del "journal entry" ?que dicen los tratadistas mas autorizados, los de nombradia bien establecida, y sobre
todolos especialistas en derecho constitucional?
El Juez Cooley, en su celebrada obra sobre Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 193, dice lo siguiente a favor del "journal
entry rule":
Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed., 193), says: "Each house keeps a journal of its
proceedings which is a public record, and of which the courts are at liberty to take judicial notice. If it would
appear from these journals that any act did not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to it the
Legislature did not follow any requirement of the Constitution or that in any other respect the act was not
constitutionally adopted, the courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute void. But whenever it is
acting in apparent performance of legal functions, every reasonable presumption is to be made in favor of the
action of a legislative body. It will not be presumed in any case, from the mere silence of the journals, that either
house has exceeded its authority, or disregarded a constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative acts,
unless when the Constitution has expressly required the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance,
where it requires the yeas and nays to be entered."
Sutherland, en su tambien celebrada obra sobre Statutory Construction, seccion 46 y siguientes, tambien sedeclara a
favofr del "journal entry rule" con el siguiente pronunciamiento:
The presumption is that an act properly authenticated was regularly passed, unless there is evidence of which
the courts take judicial notice showing the contrary. The journals are records, and, in all respects touching
proceedings under the mandatory provisions of the Constitution, will be effected to impeach and avoid the acts
recorded as laws and duly authenticated, if the journals affirmatively show that these provisions have been
disregarded. . . . The journals by being required by the Constitution or laws, are record . . ..
When required, as is extensively the case in this country, by a paramount law, for the obvious purpose of
showing how the mandatory provisions of that law have been followed in the methods and forms of legislation,
they are thus made records in dignity, and are of great importance. The legislative acts regularly authenticated
are also records. The acts passed, duly authenticated, and such journals are parallel records; but the latter are
superior, when explicit and conflicting with the other, for the acts authenticated speak decisively only when the
journals are silent, and not even then as to particulars required to be entered therein. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl.
Rep., p. 378.)
Desde luego la opinion de Wigmore, en que se apoya la mayoria, merece toda clase de respetos. Pero creo no seme
tachara de parcial ni ligero si digo que sobre el punto constitucional que estamos discutiendo, me inclino mas y doy
mayor peso a la opinion del Juez Cooley y de Sutherland, por razones obvias. Wigmore nunca pretendio
serespecialista en derecho constitucional. Con mucho tino elponente en el tantas veces citado asunto de
Rash contra Allen dice lo siguiente de la opinion del celebrado constitucionalista:
We have quoted Judge Cooley's language because of the great respect that his opinions always command, and
also because of the fact that it is upon the authority of his opinion that many of the decisions in support of
the American rule have been based. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 378.)
Un detenido y minucioso examen de la jurisprudencia y de los tratados sobre el particular lleva a uno al convencimiento
de que la tendencia actual en America es a tomar la substancia, el fondo mismo de las cosas en vez de la simpleforma,
el caparazon, a prescindir del artificio, de la ficcion legal, para ir a la realidad misma. Y no cabe duda deque el "enrolled
act" se presta a veces a tener mas apoyo en el artificio y ficcion legal, mientras que el diario desesiones, con las fuertes
garantias de autenticidad como las que se proveen en nuestra Constitucion y en Constituciones similares americanas,
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reproduce y refleja la realidad de los hechos relativamente con mas exactitud y fidelidad. Tomemos como ejemplo el
presente caso. La copia impresade la resolucion cuestionada, firmada por los Presidentes de ambas Camaras del
Congreso, reza que la misma fueaprobada debidamente con los votos de las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) del Congreso,
pero esto no es mas que unaopinion, una conclusion legal de los presidentes, pues noconsta en dicha copia impresa el
numero concreto de votos emitidos, ni el numero concreto de la totalidad de miembros actuales de cada camara.
Tampoco constan en dichacopia impresa, tal como manda la Constitucion, los sies y nos de la votacion, con los
nombres de los que votaron afirmativa y negativamente. Asi que, con solo esa copiaimpresa a la vista, no podemos
resolver la importantisima cuestion constitucional que plantean los recurrentes, a saber: que la votacion fue
anticonstitucional; que arbitrariamente fueron excluidos de la votacion 11 miembros debidamente cualificados del
Congreso 3 Senadores y 8 Representantes; que, por virtud de la exclusion ilegal y arbitraria de estos 11 miembros,
el numero de votos emitidosen cada camara a favor de la resolucion no llegani constituye las tres cuartas-partes (3/4)
que requiere la Constitucion; y que, por tanto, la resolucion es ilegal, anti-constitucional y nula. Para resolver estas
cuestiones, todastremendas, todas transcedentales, no hay mas remedio queir al fondo, a las entraas de la realidad, y
todo ello no sepuede hallar en el "enrolled act," en la copia impresa dela ley, que es incolora, muda sobre el particular,
sino enel diario de sesiones donde con profusion se dan tales detalles. No es verdad que todo esto demuestra
graficamentela evidente, abrumadora superioridad del "journalentry" sobre el "enrolled act," como medio de prueba?
Mi conclusion, pues, sobre este punto es que el giro dela legislacion jurisprudencia en los diferentes Estados de la
Union es decididamente en favor de la doctrina americana del "journal entry"; que en Filipinas desde 1916 en que se
promulgo la sentencia en la causa de Estados Unidos contra Pons la regla es el "journal entry rule"; que esta regla se
adopto por este Supremo Tribunal enun tiempo en que estaba vigente el articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil
y cuando el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura no gozaba de los prestigios de que goza hoy, en virtud de las rigidas y
fuertes garantias sobre autenticidad de las votaciones legislativas provistas en nuestra Constitucion; que ahora que el
referido articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil ya ha sido derogado porel Reglamento de los Tribunales y se
hallan vigentes esasgarantias constitucionales que son mandatorias, la reglaindiscutible y exclusiva sobre la materia es
el "journal entry rule"' que la regla americana es mas liberal y mas democratica que la regla inglesa, la cual tiene un
evidente sabormonarquico; que el puebo filipino jamas tolerara un sistemamonarquico o algo semejante; que el
cambiar de regla ahora es un paso muy desafortunado, un injustificado retroceso, un apoyo a la reaccion y puede dar
lugar a la impresionde que las instituciones de la Republica filipina tienden a ser totalitarias; que la doctrina inglesa del
"enrolled act" es un instrumento harto inadecuado, ineficaz, para resolver conflictos constitucionales que se iran
planteando ante los tribunales, e inclusive puede fomentargroseros asaltos contra la Constitucion; que, por el contrario,
la doctrina americana del "journal entry" es amplia, eficaz, y permite que con toda libertad y desembarazose puedan
resolver los conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales, sin evasivas ni debilidades; y, por ultimo, que nuestro deber, el
deber de esta Corte, es optar por la doctrina que mejor asegure y fomente los procesos ordenadosde la ley y de la
Constitucion y evitef situaciones en que el ciudadano se sienta como desamparado de la ley y dela Constitucion y
busque la justicia por sus propias manos.
VII
La mayoria, habiendo adoptado en este asunto una posicion inhibitoria, estima innecesario discutir la cuestion de si los
3 Senadores y 8 Representantes que fueron excluidos de la votacion son o no miembros del Congreso. Es decir, lo que
debiera ser cuestion fundamental el leitmotiff, la verdadera ratio decidendi en este caso se relegaa termino
secundario, se deja sin discutir y sin resolver. No puedo seguir a la mayoria en esta evasion: tengo que discutir este
punto tan plenamente como los otros puntos, si no mas, porque es precisamente lo principal el meollo del caso.
Comencemos por el Senado. Los 3 Senadores excluido seran miembros actuales del Senado cuando se voto la
resolucion cuestionada, por las siguientes razones:
(a) Segun la estipulacion de hechos entre las partes y los ejemplares del diario de sesiones que obran en autoscomo
anexos, dichos Senadores fueron proclamados por la Comision de Elecciones como electos juntamente con sus 21
compaeros. Despues de la proclamacion participaron en la organizacion del Senado, votando en la eleccion del
Presidente de dicho cuerpo. De hecho el Senador Vera recibio 8 votos para Presidentecontra el Senador Avelino que
recibio 10. Tambien participaron en algunos debates relativos a la organizacion.
(b) Tambien consta en la estipulacion de hechos y enel diario de sesiones que prestaron su juramento de cargo ante
Notarios particulares debidamente autorizados y calificados para administrarlo, habiendose depositado dicho juramento
en la secretaria del Senado. Se dice, sin embargo, que ese juramento no era valido porque no se presto
colectivamente, en union con los otros Senadores. Esto es unerror. La Ley sobre la materia es el articulo 26 del Codigo
Administrativo Revisado, a saber:
By whom oath of office may be administered. The oath of office may be administered by any officer generally
qualified to administer oath; but the oath of office of the members and officers ofeither house of the legislature
may also be administered by persons designated for such purpose by the respective houses.
Este articulo es demasiado claro para necesitar mas comentarios. Es evidente que el Senador y Representante puede
calificarse prestando el juramento de su cargo antecualquier funcionario autorizado para administrarlo; y la disposicion
de que tambien pueden administrar ese juramento personas designadas por cada camara es solo decaracter
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permisivo, opcional. Y la mejor prueba de estoes que antes del advenimiento de la Republica el Senadodhabia
reconocido la validez del juramento de cargo prestadoante un Notario Publico por otros Senadores de la minoria los
Sres. Mabanag, Garcia, Confesor y Cabili. Amenos que estas cosas se tomen a broma, o la arbitrariedadse erija en ley
la ley de la selva, del mas fuerte no esconcebible que el juramento ante Notario se declare validoen un caso y en
otro se declared invalido, concurriendo lasmismas circunstancias;
(c) Tambien consta, en virtud de la estipulacion de hechos y de los ejemplares del diario de sesiones que obran en
autos como anexos, que los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero han estado cobrando todos sus sueldos y
emolumentos como tales Senadores desde la inauguracion del Senado hasta ahora, incluso naturalmente el tiempo en
quese aprobo la resolucion cuestionada. Es violentar demasiadola argucia el sostener que un miembro de una camara
legislativa puede cobrar todos sus haberes y emolumentos y, sin embargo, no ser legalmente miembro de la misma. El
vulgo, maestro en la ironia y en el sarcasmo, tiene unamanera cruda para pintar esta situacion absurda: "Tiene, pero
no hay". Como es posible que las camaras autoricen el desembolso de sus fondos a favor de unos hombres que,
segun se sostiene seriamente, no estan legalmente cualificados para merecer y recibir tales fondos?
(d) Se arguye, sin embargo, que los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero no son miembros del Senado porque, envirtud
de la Resolucion Pendatun, se les suspendio el juramento y el derecho a sus asientos. Respecto del juramento, ya
hemos visto que era valido, segun la ley. Respecto dela suspension del derecho al asiento, he discutido extensamente
este punto en mi disidencia en el asunto de Vera contra Avelino, supra, calificando de anticonstitucional ynula la
suspension. Pero aun suponiendo que la mismafuera valida, los recurrentes alegan y arguyen que no poreso han
dejado de ser miembros los suspendidos. La alegaciones acertada. La suspension no abate ni anula lacalidad de
miembro; solo la muerte, dimision o expulsion produce ese efecto (veaseAlejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil., 100,
101; vease tambien United States vs. Dietrich,126 Fed. Rep., 676). En el asunto de Alejandrino contra Quezon hemos
declarado lo siguiente:
Es cosa digna de observar que el Congreso de los Estados Unidos en toda su larga historia no ha suspendido
a ninguno de sus miembros.Y la razon es obvia. El castigo mediante reprension o multavindica la dignidad
ofendida de la Camara sin privar a los representados de su representante; la expulsion cuando es
permisiblevindica del mismo modo el honor del Cuerpo Legislativo dando asi oportunidad a los representados
de elegir a otro nuevo; pero la suspension priva al distrito electoral de una representacion sin quese le de a ese
distrito un medio para llenar la vacante. Mediante la suspension el cargo continua ocupado, pero al que lo
ocupa se le ha impuesto silencio. (Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil.,100, 101.)
La posicion juridica y constitucional de los 8 Representantes excluidos de la votacion es todavia mas firme.Consta
igualmente, en virtud de la estipulacion de hechos y de los ejemplares del diario de sesiones obrantes en autos, que
dichos 8 Representantes tambien se calificaron, alinaugurarse el Congreso, prestando el juramento de sucargo ante
Notarios Publicos debidamente autorizados; quesu juramento se deposito en la Secretaria de la Camara; que han
estado cobrando desde la inauguracion hasta ahoratodos sus sueldos y emolumentos, excepto dos los Representantes
Taruc y Lava que han dejado de cobrar desde hacealgun tiempo; que tambien han participado en algunas
deliberaciones, las relativas al proyecto de resolucion parasuspenderlos.
Pero entre su caso y el de los Senadores existe estadiferencia fundamental: mientras con respecto a estos ultimosla
Resolucion Pendatun sobre suspension llego aaprobarse adquiriendo estado parlamentario, en la Camarade
Representantes no ha habido tal cosa, pues la resolucionde suspension se endoso a un comite especial para su
estudioe investigacion, y hasta ahora la Camara no ha tomadosobre ella ninguna accion, no favorable ni adversa.
Demodo que en el caso de los Representantes hasta ahora nohay suspension, porque de tal no puede calificarse la
acciondel Speaker y del macero privandoles del derecho detomar parte en las deliberaciones y votaciones. Para
queuna suspension produzca efectos legales y, sobre todo, constitucionales, tiene que decret arla la Camara misma,
pormedio de una resolucion debidamente aprobada, de acuerdocon los requisitos provistos en la Constitucion. Nada
deesto se ha hecho en la Camara.
El Articulo XV de nuestra Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, dice que "El Congreso, en sesion conjunta, por el voto detres
cuartas partes de todos los miembros del Senado y dela Camara de Representantes votando separadamente, puede
proponer enmiendas a esta Constitucion o convocar unaconvencion para dicho efecto." Donde la ley no distingueno
debemos distinguir. La frase todos los miembros debeinterpretarse como que incluye todos los miembros elegidos, no
importa que esten ausentes o esten suspendidos; mas naturalmente cuando no estan suspendidos como en el casode
los ya citados 8 Representantes. El Juez Cooley, ensu ya citada obraConstitutional Limitations, hace sobreeste
particular los siguientes comentarios que son terminantes para la resolucion de este punto constitucional, a saber:
For the votre required in the passage of any particular law the reader is referred to the Constitution of his State.
A simple majority of a quorum is sufficient, unless the Constitution establishes some other rule; and where, by
the Constitution, a two-thirds of three-fourths vote is made essential to the passage of any particular class of
bills, two-thids or three-fourths of a quorum will be understood, unless the terms employed clearly indicate that
this proportion of all the members, or of all those elected, is intended. (A constitutional requirement that the
assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill
appropriating the public money or property for localor private purposes, is mandatory, and cannot be evaded by
calling a bill a "joint resolution".)
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(Footnote: "Such a requirement is too clear and too valuable to be thus frittered away." Allen vs. Board of State
Auditors, 122 Mich., 324; 47 L.R.A., 117.)
(Footnote: "By most of the constitutions either all the laws, or laws on some particular subjects, are required to
be adopted by a majority voted, or some other proportion of "all the members elected," or of "the whole
representation." These and similar phrases require all the members to be taken into account whether present or
not. Where a majority of all the members elected is required in the passage of a law, an ineligible person is not
on that account to be excluded in the count. (Satterloo vs. San Francisco, 23 Cal.,314.)" (Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1, p. 291.)
VIII
Los recurridos no cuestionan la personalidad o derecho de accion de los recurrentes para plantear el presente litigio.
Sin embargo, en nuestras deliberaciones algunos Magistrados han expresado dudas sbore si los recurrentestien en
interes legal suficiente y adecuado para demandar y, por tanto, para invocar nuestra jurisdiccion en el presentecaso. La
duda es si el interes que alegan los recurrentesno es mas bien el general y abstracto que tiene cualquier otro
ciudadano para defender la integridad de la Constitucion, en cuyo caso seria insuficiente para demandarante los
tribunales, los cuales, segun el consenso de las autoridades, no estan establecidos para considerar y resolver
controversias academicas y doctrinales, sino conflictos positivos, reales, en que hay algun dano y perjuicioo amago de
dano y perjuicio.
Creo que la personalidad o derecho de accion de losrecurrentes es incuestionable. En primer lugar, 11 de ellosson
miembros del Congreso, y alegan que se les privo delderecho de votar al considerarse la resolucion cuestionaday que
si se les hubiese permitido votar dicha resolucion no hubiese obtenido la sancion de las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) que
requiere la Constitucion. Que mayor interes legalque este? Ellos dicen que sus votos hubieran sido decisivos, que con
su intervencion parlamentaria hubies en salvado alpaid de lo que consideran amago de una tremenda calamidad
publica la concesion de iguales derechos a los americanos para explotar nuestros recursos naturales y utilidades
publicas. No es este amago de dano, para ellos individualmente y para el pais colectivamentem, adecuado y
suficiente para crear un interes legal? En el asunto de Coleman vs. Miller,supra, se suscito esta misma cuestion y se
resolvio a favor de los recurrentes. Como ya hemos visto, estos eran 20 Senadores del Estado de Kansas que
alegaban que en la propuesta ratificacion de la 18. Enmienda a la Constitucion Federal sus votos que daron abatidos
por elvoto decisivo del Teniente Gobernador. La Corte Federal declaro que esto constituia interes legal suficiente y
adecuado.
En segundo lugar, los recurrentes alegan ser ciudadanos, electores y contribuyentes de Filipinas. Naturalmente, como
tales tienen derecho a participar en la explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales y operacion de utilidades publicas,
con exclusion de los americanos y otros extranjeros. De ello se sigue logicamente que cualguier actolegislativo que
anule y abrogue esa exclusividad afectarapersonalmente a sus derechos, amagandolos de un probable perjuicio. Esto,
a mi juicio, crea un interes legalade cuado u suficiente para litigar. Esto no es un interesmeramente academico,
abstracto. (Vease Hawke vs.Smith, 253 U.S., 221, 227; 64 Law. ed., 871, 875; 40 Sup.Ct., 495; 10 A. L. R.,
1504; veanse tambien Leser vs.Garnett, 258 Ud.S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 571; 42 Sup.Ct., 217;
Coleman vs. Miller, 122 A. L. R., 698.)
En el asunto de Hawke vs. Smith, supra, el demandante alegaba ser "ciudadano y elector del Estado de Ohio, y
comoelector y contribuyente del Condado de Hamilton, en sunombre y en el de otros similarmente situados, presento
una solicitud de prohibicion ante el tribunal del Estado para que se prohibiera al Secretario de Estado a que gastara
fondos publicos en la preparacion e impresion de balotaspara la sumision al electorado de la 18. Enmienda a la
Constitucion Federal para su ratificacion. La Corte Suprema Federal fallo que el demandante tenia intereslegal y, por
tanto, personalidad y derecho de accion para demandar.
En el asunto de Leser vs. Garnett, supra, los demandantes alegaban ser electores cualificados de Maryland y
solicitaban la exclusion de ciertas mujeres del censo electoralpor el fundamento de que la Constitucion de Maryland
limitaba el sufragio a los varones y la 19. Enmiendaa la Constitucion Federal no habia sido validamente ratificadaa. Lo
Corte Suprema Federal fallo tambien que los demandantes tenian interes legal suficiente y adecuado.
IX
Cuando se celebraron las audiencias en este asunto sele pregunto a uno de los abogados de los recurridos, creo que
el mismo Secretario de Justicia, cual seria el remedio legal para los recurrentes, ya que se sostiene que en elpresente
caso se trate de una materia no judicial, injusticiable, y, que, por tanto, los tribunales nada tienen que hacer. El
Secretario de Justicia contesto: ninguno. Lounico que los recurrentes pueden hacer es esperar las elecciones y
plantear el caso directamente ante el pueblo, unico juez en las controversias de caracter politico. Esto mismose dijo en
el caso de Vera contra Aveino, supra, y reiterolo que alli he dicho sobre este argumento, a saber:
Solo nos queda por considerar el argumento deprimente, desalentadorde que el caso que nos ocupa no tiene
remedio ni bajo la Constitucion ni bajo las leyes ordinarias. A los recurrentes se lesdice que no tienen mas que
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un recurso: esperar laas elecciones y plantear directamente la cuestion ante el pueblo elector. Si los
recurrentes tienen razon, el pueblo les reivindicara eligiendoles o elevandoa su partido al poder, repudiando, en
cambio, a los recurridoso a su partido. Algunas cosas se podrian decir acerca de este argumento. Se podria
decir, por ejemplo, que el remedio no es expeditoni adecuado porque la mayoria de los recurridos han sido
elegidos para un periodo de seis anos, asi que no se les podra exigir ninguna responsabilidad por tan largo
tiempo. Se podria decir tambien que en una eleccion politica entran muchos factores, y es posible quela
cuestion que se discute hoy, con ser tan fervida y tan palpitante, quede, cuando llegue el caso, obscurecida por
otros "issues" maspresionantes y decisivos. Tambien se podria decir que, independientemente de la justicia de
su cuasa, un partido minoritario siemprelucha con desventaja contra el partido mayoritario.
Pero, a nuestro juicio, la mejor contestacion al argumento esque no cabe concebir que los redactores de la
Constitucion filipina hayan dejado en medio de nuestro sistema de gobierno un peligros ovacio en donde
quedan paralizados los resortes de la Constituciony de la ley, y el ciudadano queda inerme, impotente frente a
lo que el considera flagrante transgresion de sus derechos. Los redactoresde la Constitucion conocian muy
bien nuestro sistema de gobierno sistema presidencial. Sabian muy bien que este no tiene la flexibilidaddel
tipo ingles el parlamentario. En Inglaterra y en lospaises que siguen su sistema hay una magnifica valvula
de seguridad politica; cuando surge una grave crisis, de esas que sacudenlos cimientos de la nacion, el
parlamento se disuelve y se convocanelleciones generales para que el pueblo decida los grandes "issues" del
dia. Asi se consuman verdaderas revoluciones, sin sangre, sin violencia. El sistema presidential no tiene esa
valvula. El periodo que media de eleccion a eleccion es inflexible. Entre nosotros, porejemplo, el periodo es de
seis aos para el Senado, y de cuatro aos para la Camara de Representantes y los gobiernos provinciales y
municipales. Solamente se celebran elecciones especiales para cubrir vacantes que ocurran entre unas
elecciones generalesy otras. Se comprendera facilmente que bajo un sistema asi esharto peligroso, es jugar
con fuego el posibilitar situaciones dondeel individuo y el pueblo no puedan buscar el amparo de la
Constitucion y de las leyes, bajo procesos ordenados y expeditos, paraprotegar sus derechos.
(Vera contra Avelino, pags. 363, 364.)
Fued Jefferson quien dijo que como medida de higiene politicaera conveniente que el pueblo americano tuviera una
revolucion cada veinte aos. Parece que el gran democratadijo esto no por el simple prurito de jugar con laparadoja,
con la frase, sino convencido de que la revoluciones el mejor antidoto para la tirania o los amagos de tirania.
Grande como es el respeto que merecen las opiniones delinmortal autor de la Decaraction de Independencia, creoque
la revolucion es siempre revolucion, la violencia es siempre violencia: caos, confusion, desquiciamiento de los resortes
politicos y sociales, derramamiento de sangre, perdidade vidas y haciendas, etcetera, etcetera. Asi que normalmente
ninguno puede desear para su pais la violencia, aun en nombre de la vitalidad, de la salud publica.
Estoy convencido de que el mejor ideal politico es la revolucionsin sangre, esa que no pocas veces se ha
consumado v. gr. en la historia contemporanea de Inglaterra, yaun de America misma. Y ese ideal es perfectamente
realizable permitiendo el amplio juego de la Constitucion y delas leyes, evitando pretextos a la violencia, y no
posibilitando situaciones de desamparo y desesperacion.
Por eso creo sinceramente que la mejor politica, la mejordoctrina judicial es la que en todo tiempo encauza y
fomentalos procesos ordenados de la Constitucion y de la ley.
Footnotes
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
1
Omitted.
BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., dissidente:

1
Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno y Jose E. Romero.
Senadores: Alejo Mabanag, Carlos P. Garcia, Eulogio Rodriguez, Tomas Confesor, Tomas Cabili, Jose O.
Vera, Ramon Diokno, y Jose E. Romero.
Representantes: Juvenal Almendras, Paulino Alonzo, Apolinario Cabigon, Floro Crisologo, Gabriel Dunuan,
Cosme B. Garcia, Agustin Y. Kintanar, Vicente Logarta, Francisco A. Perfecto, Cipriano P. Primicias, Nicolas
Rafols, Jose V. Rodriguez, Juan de G. Rodriguez, Felixberto M. Serrano, Conrado Singson, George K. Tait, y
Leandro A. Tojong.
Page 44 of 63

Presidentes de Partido: Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Emilio Javier y Sofronio Quimson, Nacionalista Party,
Democratic Alliance, Popular Front y Philippine Youth Party, respectivamente.
3
Comision de Elecciones: Jose Lopez Vito, Francisco Enage y Vicente de Vera, respectivamente.
Marciano Guevara, Paciano Dizon y Pablo Lucas, Tesorero, Auditor y Director de Imprenta, respectivamente.
4
La politica de nacionalizacion de la recursos naturales yutilidades publicas incorporada en nuestra

Constitucion no es unapolitica nueva, sino que trae su origen de nuestro pasado remoto, dela historia colonial
misma de Espaa en Filipinas. Los primeros conflictos de los filipinos con los conquistado es tenian por
causala propiedad de la tierra; los filipinos se esforzaban por reivindicarel dominio del suelo que creian
detentado por los colonizadores. Estos conflictos fueron agravandose con el tiempo condensan dose enla
formidable cuestion agraria que en las postrimerias del siglo diecinueve fue enm gran parte la causa de la
revolucion contra Espaa. Lass campanas de Rizal y de los laborantes, y el Katipunan de Bonifacio tomaron
gran parte de su fuerza, de su valor combativo, delos agravios provocados por la cuestion agraria. La Liga
Filipinade Rizal estaba fundamentalmente basada en un ideario economico nacionalista, de control y dominio
sobre la riqueza y recursos delpais.
"Cuando America establecio aqui su soberania su mayor acierto consistio en echar los cimientos de su politica
fundamental de 'Filipinas para los filipinos.' Primero el Presidente McKinley, y despues los Presidentes Taft y
Wilson, consolidaron esta politica. El congresoaprobo leyes tendentes a la conservacion de terrenos publicos
yrecursos naturales, entre ellas la Ley de 1. de Julio de 1902 conocida por Ley Cooper. En estas leyes se
limitaba y restringia la adquisiciony uso de bienes de dominio publico por particulares.
"Una pruebaf palmaria del celo del Congreso americano por mantener rigidamente la politica de conservacion
del patrimonio delos filipinos fue la investigacion congresional provocada por el Congresista Martin, de
Colorado, en relacion con la venta de terrenos delos frailes en Mindoro, a una compaia americana en exceso
de las 1,024 hectareas fijadas en las leyes de terrenos publicos. Esto diolugar a uno de los episodios mas
famosos en la carrera del Comisionado Residente Quezon. Este relata su campaa en su autobiografia 'The
Good Fight,' a saber:
"'My next address to Congress took place when a congressional investigation was being urged by
Congressman Martin of Colorado to determine how the Government of the Philippines was carrying out the
policy laid down by Congress, that limited to 1024 acres the maximum area of government land that could be
sold to corporations or individuals. This law had been enacted soon after the United States has taken the
Philippines to prevent the exploitation of the Filipino people by capitalists, whether foreigners or natives.
American capital interested in the sugar industry has acquired two very large tracts of land which the Philippine
Government had bought from the friars with the funds bonds issued under the security of the Philippine
Government. The avowed purpose in buying these extensive properties from the Spanish religious orders was
to resell them in small lots to Filipino farmers, and thus to do away with absentee landlordism which had been
the most serious cause of the Philippine rebellion against Spain. The reason given for the sale of these lands to
American capital by the American official in charge of the execution of the congressional policy were two-fold:
First, that the act of Congress referred only to lands of the public domain not to lands acquired by the
Government in some other way. And second, that the sale of these lands was made in order to establish the
sugar industry in the Philippines on a truly grand scale under modern methods, as had been done in Cuba. It
was further alleged that such a method would bring great prosperity to the Philippines.
"'I spoke in support of the proposed investigation, contending that the establishment of the sugar industry under
those conditions would mean the debasement of the Filipinos into mere peons. 'Moreover,' I argued, 'large
investments of American capital in the Philippines will inevitably result in the permanent retention of the
Philippines by the United States.' At the climax of ny speech I roared: If the preordained fate of my country is
either to be a subject people but rich, or free but poor, I am unqualifiedly for the latter.'
"'The investigation was ordered by the House of Representatives, and although the sales already made were
not annulled, no further sales were made in defiance of the Congressional Act. (The Good Fight, by President
Quezon, pp. 117-119.)'
"Para implementar la politica de nacionalizacion el gobierno filipino bajo la Ley Jones y la Ley del
Commonwealth fundo con una gruesa capitalizacion las corporaciones economicas del Estado comoel
Philippine National Bank, National Development Company, National Cement Company, National Power
Corporation, y otras.
"Para reglamentar y supervisar las utilidades y servicios publicos se creo la Comision de Servicios Publicos."
Page 45 of 63

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17931
February 28, 1963
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine
Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a
uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a
memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in
said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co.,
Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood
and hardwood producers bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the
main raw materials in the production of said glues and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating
P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as
margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the
Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar
request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the
corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and
approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate
importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act
No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the
Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the
payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be
imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:.
xxx
xxx
xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as
"ureaand formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the
Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of
Science and Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time
Page 46 of 63

of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a
fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and
"formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde".
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between
the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde"
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the
latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily
reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat
Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29,
1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea
and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs.
Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system
the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Page 47 of 63

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115525 October 30, 1995
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary of Finance;
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 115543 October 30, 1995
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115544 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION;
PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA L. DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity
as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754 October 30, 1995
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC., (CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781 October 30, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE
T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON,
RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT
COALITION, INC., and PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC. and WIGBERTO TAADA,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115852 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115873 October 30, 1995
Page 48 of 63

COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity
as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115931 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE BOOK
SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, as the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as the
Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The
motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners in these cases, with the exception of the
Philippine Educational Publishers Association, Inc. and the Association of Philippine Booksellers, petitioners in G.R. No.
115931.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated comment, to which the Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and the Philippine Press Institute, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan T. David,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115525, each filed a reply. In turn the Solicitor General filed on June 1, 1995 a rejoinder to the
PPI's reply.
On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.
I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills. Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc.,
Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous
claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by
Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where
it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the
Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings.
Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner
Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of
the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."
The contention has no merit.
The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an amendment to a House
revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two occasions during the Eighth Congress, the
Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which, in consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became the
enrolled bills. These were:
R.A. No. 7369 (AN ACT TO AMEND THE OMNIBUS INVESTMENTS CODE OF 1987 BY EXTENDING FROM FIVE (5)
YEARS TO TEN YEARS THE PERIOD FOR TAX AND DUTY EXEMPTION AND TAX CREDIT ON CAPITAL
EQUIPMENT) which was approved by the President on April 10, 1992. This Act is actually a consolidation of H. No.
34254, which was approved by the House on January 29, 1992, and S. No. 1920, which was approved by the Senate
on February 3, 1992.
R.A. No. 7549 (AN ACT GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO WHOEVER SHALL GIVE REWARD TO ANY FILIPINO
ATHLETE WINNING A MEDAL IN OLYMPIC GAMES) which was approved by the President on May 22, 1992. This Act
is a consolidation of H. No. 22232, which was approved by the House of Representatives on August 2, 1989, and S. No.
807, which was approved by the Senate on October 21, 1991.
Page 49 of 63

On the other hand, the Ninth Congress passed revenue laws which were also the result of the consolidation of House
and Senate bills. These are the following, with indications of the dates on which the laws were approved by the
President and dates the separate bills of the two chambers of Congress were respectively passed:
1. R.A. NO. 7642
AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR TAX EVASION, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE THE
PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992).
House Bill No. 2165, October 5, 1992
Senate Bill No. 32, December 7, 1992
2. R.A. NO. 7643
AN ACT TO EMPOWER THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO REQUIRE THE
PAYMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX EVERY MONTH AND TO ALLOW LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS TO SHARE IN VAT REVENUE, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992)
House Bill No. 1503, September 3, 1992
Senate Bill No. 968, December 7, 1992
3. R.A. NO. 7646
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO PRESCRIBE THE
PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES BY LARGE TAXPAYERS, AMENDING
FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED (February 24, 1993)
House Bill No. 1470, October 20, 1992
Senate Bill No. 35, November 19, 1992
4. R.A. NO. 7649
AN ACT REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS,
INSTRUMENTALITIES OR AGENCIES INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS (GOCCS) TO DEDUCT AND WITHHOLD THE VALUE-ADDED TAX DUE AT THE
RATE OF THREE PERCENT (3%) ON GROSS PAYMENT FOR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS AND
SIX PERCENT (6%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS FOR SERVICES RENDERED BY CONTRACTORS (April
6, 1993)
House Bill No. 5260, January 26, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1141, March 30, 1993
5. R.A. NO. 7656
AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO DECLARE
DIVIDENDS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES (November 9, 1993)
House Bill No. 11024, November 3, 1993
6. R.A. NO. 7660
AN ACT RATIONALIZING FURTHER THE STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE
DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR SPECIFIC
PROGRAMS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (December 23, 1993)
Page 50 of 63

House Bill No. 7789, May 31, 1993
7. R.A. NO. 7717
AN ACT IMPOSING A TAX ON THE SALE, BARTER OR EXCHANGE OF SHARES OF STOCK
LISTED AND TRADED THROUGH THE LOCAL STOCK EXCHANGE OR THROUGH INITIAL PUBLIC
OFFERING, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED, BY INSERTING A NEW SECTION AND REPEALING CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS
THEREOF (May 5, 1994)
House Bill No. 9187, November 3, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1127, March 23, 1994
Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in the exercise of its power to propose
amendments to bills required to originate in the House, passed its own version of a House revenue measure. It is
noteworthy that, in the particular case of S. No. 1630, petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as members of the Senate, voted
to approve it on second and third readings.
On the other hand, amendment by substitution, in the manner urged by petitioner Tolentino, concerns a mere matter of
form. Petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would make if, as the Senate actually did in this case, a
separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead enacted as a substitute measure, "taking into Consideration . . . H.B. 11197."
Indeed, so far as pertinent, the Rules of the Senate only provide:
RULE XXIX
AMENDMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
68. Not more than one amendment to the original amendment shall be considered.
No amendment by substitution shall be entertained unless the text thereof is submitted in writing.
Any of said amendments may be withdrawn before a vote is taken thereon.
69. No amendment which seeks the inclusion of a legislative provision foreign to the subject matter of
a bill (rider) shall be entertained.
xxx xxx xxx
70-A. A bill or resolution shall not be amended by substituting it with another which covers a subject
distinct from that proposed in the original bill or resolution. (emphasis added).
Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the Philippine Senate possesses less
power than the U.S. Senate because of textual differences between constitutional provisions giving them the power to
propose or concur with amendments.
Art. I, 7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.
Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.
Page 51 of 63

The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine Constitution and the decision to drop the phrase "as on other
Bills" in the American version, according to petitioners, shows the intention of the framers of our Constitution to restrict
the Senate's power to propose amendments to revenue bills. Petitioner Tolentino contends that the word "exclusively"
was inserted to modify "originate" and "the words 'as in any other bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to show that these
bills were not to be like other bills but must be treated as a special kind."
The history of this provision does not support this contention. The supposed indicia of constitutional intent are nothing
but the relics of an unsuccessful attempt to limit the power of the Senate. It will be recalled that the 1935 Constitution
originally provided for a unicameral National Assembly. When it was decided in 1939 to change to a bicameral
legislature, it became necessary to provide for the procedure for lawmaking by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The work of proposing amendments to the Constitution was done by the National Assembly, acting as
a constituent assembly, some of whose members, jealous of preserving the Assembly's lawmaking powers, sought to
curtail the powers of the proposed Senate. Accordingly they proposed the following provision:
All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. In case
of disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote
of all its members, and thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted
to the President for corresponding action. In the event that the Senate should fail to finally act on any
such bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days from the opening of the next regular session of the same
legislative term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the Assembly. And
upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the President for
corresponding action.
The special committee on the revision of laws of the Second National Assembly vetoed the proposal. It deleted
everything after the first sentence. As rewritten, the proposal was approved by the National Assembly and embodied in
Resolution No. 38, as amended by Resolution No. 73. (J. ARUEGO, KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION 65-66 (1950)). The
proposed amendment was submitted to the people and ratified by them in the elections held on June 18, 1940.
This is the history of Art. VI, 18 (2) of the 1935 Constitution, from which Art. VI, 24 of the present Constitution was
derived. It explains why the word "exclusively" was added to the American text from which the framers of the Philippine
Constitution borrowed and why the phrase "as on other Bills" was not copied. Considering the defeat of the proposal,
the power of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on other
Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate
cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the
House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the
coequality of the two chambers of Congress.
That this is also the understanding of book authors of the scope of the Senate's power to concur is clear from the
following commentaries:
The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently without restriction. It
would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can practically re-write a bill required to come from
the House and leave only a trace of the original bill. For example, a general revenue bill passed by the
lower house of the United States Congress contained provisions for the imposition of an inheritance tax
. This was changed by the Senate into a corporation tax. The amending authority of the Senate was
declared by the United States Supreme Court to be sufficiently broad to enable it to make the alteration.
[Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389].
(L. TAADA AND F. CARREON, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES 247 (1961))
The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House of Representatives because it is
more numerous in membership and therefore also more representative of the people. Moreover, its
members are presumed to be more familiar with the needs of the country in regard to the enactment of
the legislation involved.
The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power to propose or concur with
amendments to the bills initiated by the House of Representatives. Thus, in one case, a bill introduced
in the U.S. House of Representatives was changed by the Senate to make a proposed inheritance tax a
corporation tax. It is also accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is known as an amendment
by substitution, which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House of Representatives.
(I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 144-145 (1993)).
In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds,
Page 52 of 63

"but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an
entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a bill
is referred may do any of the following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or
altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it will
be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at all.
(A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (1950))
To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the House by prescribing that
the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting clause must be preserved although the text of the
Senate amendment may be incorporated in place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any
rate there is no rule prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment of
H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made.
II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that S. No. 1630 is
an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its certification that it was passed by the Senate
"in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is
something substantially different between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197. From this
premise, they conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the Senate and that it is the product of
two "half-baked bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by both houses of Congress."
In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere amendments of the
corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No.
1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two
bills, at the same time indicates that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the
House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill was a mere
amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass the Senate on second and three
readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and
Means. Neither was it required that S. No. 1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could
be referred to the Conference Committee.
There is legislative precedent for what was done in the case of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. When the House bill and
Senate bill, which became R.A. No. 1405 (Act prohibiting the disclosure of bank deposits), were referred to a
conference committee, the question was raised whether the two bills could be the subject of such conference,
considering that the bill from one house had not been passed by the other and vice versa. As Congressman Duran put
the question:
MR. DURAN. Therefore, I raise this question of order as to procedure: If a House bill is passed by the
House but not passed by the Senate, and a Senate bill of a similar nature is passed in the Senate but
never passed in the House, can the two bills be the subject of a conference, and can a law be enacted
from these two bills? I understand that the Senate bill in this particular instance does not refer to
investments in government securities, whereas the bill in the House, which was introduced by the
Speaker, covers two subject matters: not only investigation of deposits in banks but also investigation of
investments in government securities. Now, since the two bills differ in their subject matter, I believe
that no law can be enacted.
Ruling on the point of order raised, the chair (Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr.) said:
THE SPEAKER. The report of the conference committee is in order. It is precisely in cases like this
where a conference should be had. If the House bill had been approved by the Senate, there would
have been no need of a conference; but precisely because the Senate passed another bill on the same
subject matter, the conference committee had to be created, and we are now considering the report of
that committee.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 13, July 27, 1955, pp. 3841-42 (emphasis added))
III. The President's certification. The fallacy in thinking that H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 are distinct and unrelated
measures also accounts for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's) contention that because the President separately
certified to the need for the immediate enactment of these measures, his certification was ineffectual and void. The
certification had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which at the momentwas being considered.
Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it would be necessary for the President to certify as many bills as are presented
in a house of Congress even though the bills are merely versions of the bill he has already certified. It is enough that he
Page 53 of 63

certifies the bill which, at the time he makes the certification, is under consideration. Since on March 22, 1994 the
Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill which had to be certified. For that matter on June 1, 1993 the
President had earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment because it was the one which at that time was
being considered by the House. This bill was later substituted, together with other bills, by H. No. 11197.
As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main decision that the phrase
"except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26 (2) qualifies not
only the requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the members three days
before its passage" but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it must have passed "three readings on
separate days." There is not only textual support for such construction but historical basis as well.
Art. VI, 21 (2) of the 1935 Constitution originally provided:
(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its
final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the
President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a
bill, no amendment thereof shall be allowed and the question upon its passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.
When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, it was provided in Art. VIII, 19 (2):
(2) No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to the Members three days before its passage, except
when the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art. VI, 26 (2) of the present Constitution,
thus:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before
its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeasand nays entered in the
Journal.
The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on separate days are required
and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed, the need for a law may be rendered academic by the
occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity which it is meant to address.
Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency, especially in a country like the
Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic condition. Even if this were the case, an enormous budget deficit does not
make the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for its enactment any less an emergency.
Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these cases) believed that there was an
urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded to the call of the President by voting on the bill
on second and third readings on the same day. While the judicial department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance
of the President's certification, the respect due coequal departments of the government in matters committed to them by
the Constitution and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a stay of the judicial hand.
At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate where it was discussed for
six days. Only its distribution in advance in its final printed form was actually dispensed with by holding the voting on
second and third readings on the same day (March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission of the
bill on February 8, 1994 on second reading and its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by
the Senate on third reading.
The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1) to inform the members of
Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is progressing through the enacting
process, thus enabling them and others interested in the measure to prepare their positions with reference to it. (1 J. G.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 (1972)). These purposes were
substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No. 7716.
IV. Power of Conference Committee. It is contended (principally by Kilosbayan, Inc. and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI)) that in violation of the constitutional policy of full public disclosure
Page 54 of 63

and the people's right to know (Art. II, 28 and Art. III, 7) the Conference Committee met for two days in executive
session with only the conferees present.
As pointed out in our main decision, even in the United States it was customary to hold such sessions with only the
conferees and their staffs in attendance and it was only in 1975 when a new rule was adopted requiring open sessions.
Unlike its American counterpart, the Philippine Congress has not adopted a rule prescribing open hearings for
conference committees.
It is nevertheless claimed that in the United States, before the adoption of the rule in 1975, at least staff members were
present. These were staff members of the Senators and Congressmen, however, who may be presumed to be their
confidential men, not stenographers as in this case who on the last two days of the conference were excluded. There is
no showing that the conferees themselves did not take notes of their proceedings so as to give petitioner Kilosbayan
basis for claiming that even in secret diplomatic negotiations involving state interests, conferees keep notes of their
meetings. Above all, the public's right to know was fully served because the Conference Committee in this case
submitted a report showing the changes made on the differing versions of the House and the Senate.
Petitioners cite the rules of both houses which provide that conference committee reports must contain "a detailed,
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or other amendments." These changes are shown in the bill attached to
the Conference Committee Report. The members of both houses could thus ascertain what changes had been made in
the original bills without the need of a statement detailing the changes.
The same question now presented was raised when the bill which became R.A. No. 1400 (Land Reform Act of 1955)
was reported by the Conference Committee. Congressman Bengzon raised a point of order. He said:
MR. BENGZON. My point of order is that it is out of order to consider the report of the conference
committee regarding House Bill No. 2557 by reason of the provision of Section 11, Article XII, of the
Rules of this House which provides specifically that the conference report must be accompanied by a
detailed statement of the effects of the amendment on the bill of the House. This conference committee
report is not accompanied by that detailed statement, Mr. Speaker. Therefore it is out of order to
consider it.
Petitioner Tolentino, then the Majority Floor Leader, answered:
MR. TOLENTINO. Mr. Speaker, I should just like to say a few words in connection with the point of
order raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan.
There is no question about the provision of the Rule cited by the gentleman from Pangasinan, but this
provision applies to those cases where only portions of the bill have been amended. In this case before
us an entire bill is presented; therefore, it can be easily seen from the reading of the bill what the
provisions are. Besides, this procedure has been an established practice.
After some interruption, he continued:
MR. TOLENTINO. As I was saying, Mr. Speaker, we have to look into the reason for the provisions of
the Rules, and the reason for the requirement in the provision cited by the gentleman from Pangasinan
is when there are only certain words or phrases inserted in or deleted from the provisions of the bill
included in the conference report, and we cannot understand what those words and phrases mean and
their relation to the bill. In that case, it is necessary to make a detailed statement on how those words
and phrases will affect the bill as a whole; but when the entire bill itself is copied verbatim in the
conference report, that is not necessary. So when the reason for the Rule does not exist, the Rule does
not exist.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 2, p. 4056. (emphasis added))
Congressman Tolentino was sustained by the chair. The record shows that when the ruling was appealed, it was upheld
by viva voce and when a division of the House was called, it was sustained by a vote of 48 to 5. (Id.,
p. 4058)
Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert new provisions as long as these are
germane to the subject of the conference. As this Court held in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703
(1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to resolving
differences between the Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision. What is important is that its
report is subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled that it would not entertain
allegations that, because new provisions had been added by the conference committee, there was thereby a violation of
the constitutional injunction that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed."
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Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copiesthereof in
its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26
(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
(Id. at 710. (emphasis added))
It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees in the Philippines in a 1979 study:
Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed. These committees may be given
instructions by their parent bodies or they may be left without instructions. Normally the conference
committees are without instructions, and this is why they are often critically referred to as "the little
legislatures." Once bills have been sent to them, the conferees have almost unlimited authority to
change the clauses of the bills and in fact sometimes introduce new measures that were not in the
original legislation. No minutes are kept, and members' activities on conference committees are difficult
to determine. One congressman known for his idealism put it this way: "I killed a bill on export
incentives for my interest group [copra] in the conference committee but I could not have done so
anywhere else." The conference committee submits a report to both houses, and usually it is accepted.
If the report is not accepted, then the committee is discharged and new members are appointed.
(R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND LEGISLATURES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J. D. LEES AND M. SHAW, eds.)).
In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference committees. We cite it only to say that
conference committees here are no different from their counterparts in the United States whose vast powers we noted
in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. At all events, under Art. VI, 16(3) each house has the power "to
determine the rules of its proceedings," including those of its committees. Any meaningful change in the method and
procedures of Congress or its committees must therefore be sought in that body itself.
V. The titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197. PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI, 26 (1) of the
Constitution which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof." PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption
from the VAT is not expressed in the title of the law.
Pursuant to 13 of P.D. No. 1590, PAL pays a franchise tax of 2% on its gross revenue "in lieu of all other taxes, duties,
royalties, registration, license and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or description, imposed, levied,
established, assessed or collected by any municipal, city, provincial or national authority or government agency, now or
in the future."
PAL was exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other entities by 103 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, which provides as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which the
Philippines is a signatory.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including that granted to PAL, by amending 103, as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential Decree
Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
The amendment of 103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716 which reads:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE
AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND
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REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM [BY] WIDENING
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND
REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES," Congress thereby clearly expresses its intention to amend any provision of the NIRC which
stands in the way of accomplishing the purpose of the law.
PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of the law by specific reference to P.D. No.
1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the constitutional requirement, since it is already stated in the
title that the law seeks to amend the pertinent provisions of the NIRC, among which is 103(q), in order to widen the
base of the VAT. Actually, it is the bill which becomes a law that is required to express in its title the subject of
legislation. The titles of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to 103 of the NIRC as among the
provisions sought to be amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice had been given of the pendency of these bills in
Congress
before
they
were
enacted
into
what
is
now
R.A.
No. 7716.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now made by PAL was rejected. R.A. No.
7354 is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS,
FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES CONNECTED THEREWITH. It contained a provision repealing all franking privileges. It was contended
that the withdrawal of franking privileges was not expressed in the title of the law. In holding that there was sufficient
description of the subject of the law in its title, including the repeal of franking privileges, this Court held:
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the
statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation
impossible. [Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297] As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of
the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the
same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties
for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters
are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that
they should also have special mention in the title. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170
Fed. 725)
(227 SCRA at 707-708)
VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have held that, as a general proposition, the press is not exempt
from the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which
single out the press or target a group belonging to the press for special treatment or which in any way discriminate
against the press on the basis of the content of the publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those
granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could
take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the
State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other
businesses have long ago been subject. It is thus different from the tax involved in the cases invoked by the PPI. The
license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) was found to be discriminatory
because it was laid on the gross advertising receipts only of newspapers whose weekly circulation was over 20,000,
with the result that the tax applied only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large papers were critical of
Senator Huey Long who controlled the state legislature which enacted the license tax. The censorial motivation for the
law was thus evident.
On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295
(1983), the tax was found to be discriminatory because although it could have been made liable for the sales tax or, in
lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of using, storing or consuming tangible goods, the press was not. Instead,
the press was exempted from both taxes. It was, however, later made to pay a special use tax on the cost of paper and
ink which made these items "the only items subject to the use tax that were component of goods to be sold at retail."
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The U.S. Supreme Court held that the differential treatment of the press "suggests that the goal of regulation is not
related to suppression of expression, and such goal is presumptively unconstitutional." It would therefore appear that
even a law that favors the press is constitutionally suspect. (See the dissent of Rehnquist, J. in that case)
Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O. No. 273 are withdrawn "absolutely and unqualifiedly"
by R.A. No. 7716. Other exemptions from the VAT, such as those previously granted to PAL, petroleum
concessionaires, enterprises registered with the Export Processing Zone Authority, and many more are likewise totally
withdrawn, in addition to exemptions which are partially withdrawn, in an effort to broaden the base of the tax.
The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is highlighted by the fact that transactions, which are profit
oriented, continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An enumeration of some of these transactions will suffice to
show that by and large this is not so and that the exemptions are granted for a purpose. As the Solicitor General says,
such exemptions are granted, in some cases, to encourage agricultural production and, in other cases, for the personal
benefit of the end-user rather than for profit. The exempt transactions are:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine and forest
products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn
livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn, sugar
cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of citizens returning
to the Philippines) or for professional use, like professional instruments and implements, by persons
coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for manufacture of petroleum
products subject to excise tax and services subject to percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services rendered under
employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)
The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because "even
nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." PPI cites in support of this
assertion the following statement in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection afforded by the First
Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity because
it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of
hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the
ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in preferred position.
The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its
imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although
its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the
Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the
U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing
to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957) which
invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged in the sale of general merchandise. It
was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale of bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining the
free exercise of its right to propagate.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange
of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden
Page 58 of 63

the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to
violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds derived from the sales
are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the
sales would be to increase the price, while reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the resulting
burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other
economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly. Otherwise, to follow the
petitioner's argument, to increase the tax on the sale of vestments would be to lay an impermissible burden on the right
of the preacher to make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by 107 of the NIRC, as amended by 7 of R.A. No. 7716,
although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of registration and enforcement of provisions such as
those relating to accounting in 108 of the NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not liable to pay
the VAT does not excuse it from the payment of this fee because it also sells some copies. At any rate whether the PBS
is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
VII. Alleged violations of the due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on taxation. CREBA
asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt
without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall
"evolve a progressive system of taxation."
With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the application of the tax to existing contracts of the sale of real
property by installment or on deferred payment basis would result in substantial increases in the monthly amortizations
to be paid because of the 10% VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out, is something that the buyer did not
anticipate at the time he entered into the contract.
The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an early case: "Authorities from numerous sources are cited by
the plaintiffs, but none of them show that a lawful tax on a new subject, or an increased tax on an old one, interferes
with a contract or impairs its obligation, within the meaning of the Constitution. Even though such taxation may affect
particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose
additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by
the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense." (La
Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-Siong, 39 Phil. 567, 574 (1919)). Indeed not only existing laws but also
"the reservation of the essential attributes of sovereignty, is . . . read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order."
(Philippine-American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22 SCRA 135, 147 (1968)) Contracts must be understood as
having been made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of the government and no obligation of
contract can extend to the defeat of that authority. (Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935)).
It is next pointed out that while 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food
items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is
equally essential. The sale of real property for socialized and low-cost housing is exempted from the tax, but CREBA
claims that real estate transactions of "the less poor," i.e., the middle class, who are equally homeless, should likewise
be exempted.
The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services was
already exempt under 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in
claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions, while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment
of the VAT. Moreover, there is a difference between the "homeless poor" and the "homeless less poor" in the example
given by petitioner, because the second group or middle class can afford to rent houses in the meantime that they
cannot yet buy their own homes. The two social classes are thus differently situated in life. "It is inherent in the power to
tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result
from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.'" (Lutz v.
Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955). Accord, City of Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil. 912 (1968); Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130
SCRA 654, 663 (1984); Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371
(1988)).
Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, 28(1) which provides
that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."
Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the
same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation.
To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and
corporations placed in similar situation. (City of Baguio v. De Leon, supra; Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, supra)
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Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273 long before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted. R.A. No. 7716 merely
expands the base of the tax. The validity of the original VAT Law was questioned in Kapatiran ng Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 383 (1988) on grounds similar to those made in these cases, namely,
that the law was "oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive in violation of Art. VI, 28(1) of the Constitution." (At
382) Rejecting the challenge to the law, this Court held:
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. . . .
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public, which
are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons
engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sarisari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of
farm and marine products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are
from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general
public.
(At 382-383)
The CREBA claims that the VAT is regressive. A similar claim is made by the Cooperative Union of the Philippines, Inc.
(CUP), while petitioner Juan T. David argues that the law contravenes the mandate of Congress to provide for a
progressive system of taxation because the law imposes a flat rate of 10% and thus places the tax burden on all
taxpayers without regard to their ability to pay.
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it
simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." The constitutional provision has been
interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be
minimized." (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. (1977)). Indeed, the
mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes, which
perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with the proclamation of Art. VIII, 17(1) of the
1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI, 28(1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.
Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid
them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the
regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, 3, amending
102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4, amending 103 of the
NIRC).
Thus, the following transactions involving basic and essential goods and services are exempted from the VAT:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine and forest
products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn
livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn sugar
cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of citizens returning
to the Philippines) and or professional use, like professional instruments and implements, by persons
coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for manufacture of petroleum
products subject to excise tax and services subject to percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services rendered under
employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)
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On the other hand, the transactions which are subject to the VAT are those which involve goods and services which are
used or availed of mainly by higher income groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to customers or
for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business, the right or privilege to use patent, copyright, and other similar
property or right, the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, motion picture films, tapes
and discs, radio, television, satellite transmission and cable television time, hotels, restaurants and similar places,
securities, lending investments, taxicabs, utility cars for rent, tourist buses, and other common carriers, services of
franchise grantees of telephone and telegraph.
The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad claims of constitutional violations by tendering issues not at
retail but at wholesale and in the abstract. There is no fully developed record which can impart to adjudication the
impact of actuality. There is no factual foundation to show in the concrete the application of the law to actual
contracts and exemplify its effect on property rights. For the fact is that petitioner's members have not even been
assessed the VAT. Petitioner's case is not made concrete by a series of hypothetical questions asked which are no
different from those dealt with in advisory opinions.
The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A mere allegation, as
here, does not suffice. There must be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint. Considering
that petitioner here would condemn such a provision as void on its face, he has not made out a case.
This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that where the due process and equal protection
clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a
need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a
showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.
(Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661)
Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of a concrete case. It may be that postponement of
adjudication would result in a multiplicity of suits. This need not be the case, however. Enforcement of the law may give
rise to such a case. A test case, provided it is an actual case and not an abstract or hypothetical one, may thus be
presented.
Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for adjudicating abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication
would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion that does not really settle legal issues.
We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, 1, 2 to decide whenever a claim is made that "there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This duty can only arise if an actual case or controversy is before us. Under Art . VIII, 5 our jurisdiction is
defined in terms of "cases" and all that Art. VIII, 1, 2 can plausibly mean is that in the exercise of that jurisdiction we
have the judicial power to determine questions of grave abuse of discretion by any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
Put in another way, what is granted in Art. VIII, 1, 2 is "judicial power," which is "the power of a court to hear and
decide cases pending between parties who have the right to sue and be sued in the courts of law and equity" (Lamb v.
Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 559 (1912)), as distinguished from legislative and executive power. This power cannot be directly
appropriated until it is apportioned among several courts either by the Constitution, as in the case of Art. VIII, 5, or by
statute, as in the case of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296) and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.
Blg. 129). The power thus apportioned constitutes the court's "jurisdiction," defined as "the power conferred by law upon
a court or judge to take cognizance of a case, to the exclusion of all others." (United States v. Arceo, 6 Phil. 29 (1906))
Without an actual case coming within its jurisdiction, this Court cannot inquire into any allegation of grave abuse of
discretion by the other departments of the government.
VIII. Alleged violation of policy towards cooperatives. On the other hand, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines
(CUP), after briefly surveying the course of legislation, argues that it was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax
exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives
to the VAT would therefore be to infringe a constitutional policy. Petitioner claims that in 1973, P.D. No. 175 was
promulgated exempting cooperatives from the payment of income taxes and sales taxes but in 1984, because of the
crisis which menaced the national economy, this exemption was withdrawn by P.D. No. 1955; that in 1986, P.D. No.
2008 again granted cooperatives exemption from income and sales taxes until December 31, 1991, but, in the same
year, E.O. No. 93 revoked the exemption; and that finally in 1987 the framers of the Constitution "repudiated the
previous actions of the government adverse to the interests of the cooperatives, that is, the repeated revocation of the
tax exemption to cooperatives and instead upheld the policy of strengthening the cooperatives by way of the grant of tax
exemptions," by providing the following in Art. XII:
1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit
of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
Page 61 of 63

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources,
and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect
Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of cooperatives as
instruments for social justice and economic development.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. In the first place, it is not true that P.D. No. 1955 singled out cooperatives by
withdrawing their exemption from income and sales taxes under P.D. No. 175, 5. What P.D. No. 1955, 1 did was to
withdraw the exemptions and preferential treatments theretofore granted to private business enterprises in general, in
view of the economic crisis which then beset the nation. It is true that after P.D. No. 2008, 2 had restored the tax
exemptions of cooperatives in 1986, the exemption was again repealed by E.O. No. 93, 1, but then again cooperatives
were not the only ones whose exemptions were withdrawn. The withdrawal of tax incentives applied to all, including
government and private entities. In the second place, the Constitution does not really require that cooperatives be
granted tax exemptions in order to promote their growth and viability. Hence, there is no basis for petitioner's assertion
that the government's policy toward cooperatives had been one of vacillation, as far as the grant of tax privileges was
concerned, and that it was to put an end to this indecision that the constitutional provisions cited were adopted. Perhaps
as a matter of policy cooperatives should be granted tax exemptions, but that is left to the discretion of Congress. If
Congress does not grant exemption and there is no discrimination to cooperatives, no violation of any constitutional
policy can be charged.
Indeed, petitioner's theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation. Such
theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable institutions,
churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, 28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of
Art. XIV, 4 (3).
CUP's further ground for seeking the invalidation of R.A. No. 7716 is that it denies cooperatives the equal protection of
the law because electric cooperatives are exempted from the VAT. The classification between electric and other
cooperatives (farmers cooperatives, producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, etc.) apparently rests on a
congressional determination that there is greater need to provide cheaper electric power to as many people as possible,
especially those living in the rural areas, than there is to provide them with other necessities in life. We cannot say that
such classification is unreasonable.
We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity of R.A. No. 7716. We have in
fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining its enforcement pending resolution of these cases. We have now come to
the conclusion that the law suffers from none of the infirmities attributed to it by petitioners and that its enactment by the
other branches of the government does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as to its necessity,
desirability or expediency must be addressed to Congress as the body which is electorally responsible, remembering
that, as Justice Holmes has said, "legislators are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in
quite as great a degree as are the courts." (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270, 48 L. Ed. 971,
973 (1904)). It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing that we should enforce the public
accountability of legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in question by voting for it in Congress should
later thrust to the courts the burden of reviewing measures in the flush of enactment. This Court does not sit as a third
branch of the legislature, much less exercise a veto power over legislation.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the temporary restraining order previously
issued is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla and Vitug, JJ., maintained their separate opinion.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno, JJ, maintained their dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., took no part.
Page 62 of 63
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[STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] July 15, 2014

G.R. No. 11530, U.S. v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729

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ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,

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BENGZON, J., with whom concurs PADILLA, J., concurring:

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HILADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

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PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

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May 25, 1946

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For the respondents:

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BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., disidente:

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BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., dissidente:

Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno y Jose E. Romero.

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La politica de nacionalizacion de la recursos naturales yutilidades publicas incorporada en nuestra

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February 28, 1963

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,

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G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

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