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The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countriesBahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emiratestogether spend nearly $80 billion a year on defense, ranking the
region third among the worlds biggest defense spenders, behind the United States and China.1
At more than $48 billion a year, Saudi Arabia leads the GCC countries in defense spending
(see figure 1).
Figure 1
Saudi Arabias military budget is the highest in the GCC
(2011; $ billion)
711.0
143.0
78.9
48.5
16.7
United
States
China
GCC
5.6
Saudi
United
Kuwait
Arabia Arab Emirates
4.2
3.0
0.9
Oman
Qatar
Bahrain
A.T. Kearney estimate based on 2008 data, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
The real significance of these expenditures goes beyond their massive totals: They signal a
unique growth opportunity for the regions manufacturing and knowledge sectors. Consider
this: Between 2013 and 2025, GCC countries will have spent about $1 trillion on defense and
roughly 30 percent of this is dedicated to capital expenditures. If a 35 percent offset requirement is enforced, this means a whopping $105 billion could be either reinvested or sourced
domestically, creating more than 280,000 advanced jobs84,000 in Saudi Arabia aloneand
an opportunity to build sustainable value chains in the regions nascent aerospace, automotive,
and marine sectors. Because these opportunities have gone largely untapped, defense offset
programs are essential to tapping them.2
Around the world, defense offset programs have drawn criticism because of inconsistencies
in generating economic value. Indeed, transferring knowledge and technology to boost
manufacturing, information communications technology (ICT), or other industries in recipient
countries can be tricky. Yet it can be done with the right incentives in place for the various
participants: Exporting countries want to keep jobs, contractors want to maintain control
of intellectual property, and recipient countries want to remove barriers to building industrial
ecosystemsimproving prepared human capital pools, supply chains, and ancillary services
to take advantage of the opportunity.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
An offset program is a mechanism to compensate the local industry for foreign purchases and to offset the effects of that purchase on
the trade balance of a country. More precisely, it is the practice of requiring foreign contractors that receive government contracts to
contribute to the local economy.
Aligning these incentives and overcoming other challenges takes more than well-orchestrated
combinations of offset policies and national strategies. It requires business pragmatism and
active incentive management to bring together the interests of the public and private sectors
and of the exporting and recipient countries.
Mixed Outcomes
Offset programs in the GCC have produced defense and non-defense companies, but with
varying degrees of success. In past years, major GCC offset programs have focused on indirect
offsets, mainly through off-the-shelf purchases, capital investments, and joint ventures in civilian
sectors (electronics, pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, healthcare, education, shipbuilding,
aquaculture, and aircraft MRO). Direct offsets have also been tapped, but it is too early to gauge
their degree of success.
The point is clear: There is a sizable opportunity to maximize the commercial and
economic impact of offset ventures, and
thereby better support the GCC nations'
hyperspeed growth.
For example, according to Saudi Arabias Economic Offset Program (EOP), by the end of 2006,
36 companies had been established with a total capitalization of $4.5 billion. However, these
figures pale in comparison with the military capital expenditures of $150 billion between 1988 and
2006 or $45 billion to $55 billion in offsets due to the enforcement of a 35 percent requirement.3
On the employment front, EOP reports the creation of about 6,500 jobs, or 120 to 150 advanced
jobs for every $1 billion in contract value. Comparing this to ratios of average foreign direct
investment (FDI) to advanced employment reveals that an additional 750 to 2,600 jobs per
$1 billion spent could be created.
The differences in value and job creation can be partly explained by multipliers in offset calculation,
but the point is clear: There is a sizable opportunity to maximize the commercial and economic
impact of offset ventures, and thereby better support the GCC nations hyperspeed growth.
Conflicting Interests
A number of GCC offset companies face a common pitfall: They maintain a contract manufacturing view of their operations, and in doing so miss the opportunity to expand beyond fulfilling
the original offset obligation, be it the manufacturing of a particular subsystem, the MRO of
a particular type of equipment, or the maintenance of a software solution. High reliance on a
particular system or platform renders the offset company unable to compete in other market
segments after fulfilling its offset obligation.
SIPRI; A.T. Kearney analysis, 2013
Our advice for avoiding this pitfall is to realign ostensibly conflicting stakeholder interests with
the right incentives for OEMs, local partners, and offsets government agencies to work jointly to
create economic-development and commercial value beyond the asset being procured at the
time. Incentives to expand into adjacencies in the value chain early in the program life, to seek
export leadership, and to capitalize on other simultaneous programs in the country, are examples.
Mature ventures will achieve the coveted position of engines of not only commercial gains, but
also of economic-development outcomes (see figure 2). Following is a look at the various
stakeholder interests:
Home government interests: Employment retention and exports. The aerospace and defense
sectors are essential not only to the national security of exporting countries, but also to their
economic and strategic interests. Economically, these are high-value sectors replete with
intellectual property, advanced jobs, and export potential. Strategically, they secure national
capabilities. As a result, home governments of most defense exporters regulate and create
incentives to keep vital operations on their home turf.
Host government interests: Employment creation and capability building. Recipient governments interests are similar, if diametrically opposed, to those of exporting governmentsthat
is, recipient governments also seek the benefits that aerospace and defense sectors offer.
Contractor interests: Fiduciary duty to shareholders. Defense contractors are driven by two
main shareholder imperatives. The first of these is profit, which requires contractors to focus
on their bottom line with levers such as low-cost outsourcing, operational improvements, and
improved sales-effectiveness. Growth, the second imperative, dictates a focus on sustaining
revenues, expanding into attractive markets, and protecting intellectual property. Thus, the
contractors optimum environment is one where it can strike a balance between these imperatives and the requirements of its home and host governments.
Figure 2
A well-run offset program can help reconcile conflicting interests of stakeholders
Exporter
Importer
Home government
Host government
Conflicting
interests
Contractor
Armed forces
Maximize profits
Ensure long-term business
prospects
Expand into attractive markets
Protect intellectual property
Armed forces interests: Capability building and readiness. The armed forces primary concern
is to quickly build defense capabilities and readiness. Thus, avoiding delivery risks, building
mission-critical capabilities, and managing life-cycle costs are primary concerns. However, this
can lead to conflict between a nations defense apparatus and its economic-development priorities. For instance, sustainment provided by an international supplier may ensure operational
readiness, but may limit economic-development agencies efforts to build national capability.
Figure 3
The gradual evolution of defense offset programs
Stage 1
Nascent sector
Seed
Value to
government
Value to
vendor
Stage 2
Stage 3
Value chain
participation
Domestic
market maker
Discounts or rebates
in the form of pure
financial investments
(do not rely on contractors expertise or
owned technologies)
Contractual burden
Opportunistic
compromise (such as
low-cost foreign labor)
Emerging high-growth
opportunity
High-value international
asset
Less international
dependency
Control of technology
Expansion from
simulation to assembly
and testing in aerospace and automotive
Capabilities acquired
Capabilities acquired
Example
Stage 4
Consolidated sector
Commercial
and defense
capabilities
Foreign-domestic joint
ventures in flight
simulation
Value created
Export
leadership
Economic,
commercial, and
defense capabilities
For example, externalities such as war, as happened with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
Figure 4
Success factors for defense offset programs
Integration
Ensure interoperability. Empower a strong, high-level agency to orchestrate ecosystem, integrate offsets with national
defense industrial strategy and other national efforts, actively manage performance, and recommend updates to policy
Strategy
Enablers
Execution
Notes: C4ISTAR is command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.
KPIs are key performance indicators.
Source: A.T. Kearney analysis
of technology through licensing or co-production. The key is to create enablersa talent pool,
R&D sponsorship, taking advantage of established industrial playersthat allow the sector to
not only assimilate but also commercialize the technology.
2. Fostering win-win joint venture (JV) dynamics. There are three main components to this:
First, the JV ownership structure must create an incentive for the venture to expand to value
chain adjacencies, innovate, and create value for shareholders. The local partner must have
an incentive to develop and manage long-term capabilities, as opposed to focusing only on
short-term dividends. An ownership structure in which the OEM eventually exits can create
such an incentive. Second, government support in the form of financial investments, talent
supply, and R&D is vital. Third, an ongoing working relationship with international partners
through co-marketing efforts, for examplecan create win-win opportunities for all partners,
local and international.
Authors
Anshu Vats, partner,
Middle East
anshu.vats@atkearney.com
Atlanta
Bogot
Calgary
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Houston
Mexico City
New York
San Francisco
So Paulo
Toronto
Washington, D.C.
Asia Pacific
Bangkok
Beijing
Hong Kong
Jakarta
Kuala Lumpur
Melbourne
Mumbai
New Delhi
Seoul
Shanghai
Singapore
Sydney
Tokyo
Europe
Amsterdam
Berlin
Brussels
Bucharest
Budapest
Copenhagen
Dsseldorf
Frankfurt
Helsinki
Istanbul
Kiev
Lisbon
Ljubljana
London
Madrid
Milan
Moscow
Munich
Oslo
Paris
Prague
Rome
Stockholm
Stuttgart
Vienna
Warsaw
Zurich
Middle East
and Africa
Abu Dhabi
Dubai
Johannesburg
Manama
Riyadh
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