Nehru and Indian Federalism

Indian Political Science Association
NEHRU AND INDIAN FEDERALISM

Author(s): H.M. Rajashekara
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2 (April - June 1994), pp. 135-148
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
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NEHRU
AND INDIAN
FEDERALISM
H.M. Rajashekara*
The institutionalfabricof a political systemis sustainedby

leadersendowedwithstatesmanshipand politicalvision. Even to-day,
thetheoreticalargumentsadvancedby federalistslike Jefferson
provide
legitimacyfor federalismin the United States. JawaharlalNehru,the
'gentle colossus' of modernIndia, played a critical role in nurturing
democraticinstitutionsin this country. Nehru's dynamicleadership
decades afterIndependence
and dominantrole duringtheone-and-a-half
was a positivefactorin protectingthe federalfabricand in promoting
cooperativefederalism. His role has unquestinablycontributedto an
era of unpralleled political stability. This paper is addressed to an
analysisofNehru's perceptionsoffederalismand his paradoxcicallegacy
thatcombinesinstitutionalbalance in the political arena with erosion
of state autonomyunder a centralisedeconomic edifice.
JawaharlalNehru's perceptionsof federalismchanged from
time to time, keeping in view the notion of unityduringthe period
concerns
offreedomstruggleand, later,thesecurityand nation-building
the
and theeconomicdevelopmentstrategy
Although
Congress
pursued.
leadershipwas initiallyin favourof a centralisedfederalstructure,by
1943 it was inclinedtowardsa loose federationas a concessionto the
Muslim League to keep India united and to preemptthe demand for
partitionof thecountry.The electionmanifestoissuedbythe Congress
Working
Committeein 1945 hadendorsedthisapproach.1Maulana Abdul
Kalam Azad, who was the Presidentof the Indian National Congress
from1939 to 1946, also proposeda classical federalmodeland opposed
The resolutionon the basic objectives
partitionof the sub-continent.2
* Reader
ofMysore,
in Political
Science,
Mysore.
University
Science
IndianJournal
ofPolitical
1994.
Vol.55, No. 2 April- June,

136
TheIndianJournalofPoliticalScience
of the Constitution,moved by JawaharlalNehru in the firstsession

of the ConstituentAssemblyand subsequentlyadopted by it endorsed
the classical model of federalism. To quote the resolution:
... wherein
thesaid territories
... shallpossessandretainthestatus
of autonomous
withresiduary
units,together
powersand exercise
all powersandfunctions
ofgovernment
andaministration,
saveand
such
and
functions
as
are
vested
in
or
except
powers
assignedto
the Union,or as are inherent
or impliedin the Union...3
Speaking at thejoint meetingof the State NegotiatingCommitteeand
theCorresponding
CommitteeoftheConstituent
AssemblyNehrustated:
TheunitsoftheUnionwouldhavea verygreatdegreeofautonomy.
will deal withUnionsubjectsand
Now, the UnionConstitution
common
matters
concerned.
So faras theother
areconcerned,
subjects
the provincesand the stateswill be sovereign.4
WiththeMuslimLeague's decisionto boycottthethirdsession
of the ConstituentAssemblyand the announcement
of the Mountbatten
Plan underwhichpartitionof thecountrybecame a settledfactit found
immediatereflectionin the changed perspectiveof JawaharlalNehru
and otherleaders. The change is reflectedin the followingassertion
of Report of the Union Powers Committee(July5, 1947) of which
Nehru was the Chairman:
In particular
we are notnowboundbythelimitations
on thescope
ofUnionpowers... We are unanimously
oftheviewthatit would
be injuriousto theinterests
of thecountry
to providefora weak
Centralauthority...4
The 'partition-climate',
the problemof refugees,the Kashmir
the
secessionist
threat
the
question,
by Naga tribais,thefearofcentrifugal
forcesand the hostilityof Pakistan had influencedNehru and other
membersof the ConstituentAssemblyin favourof a federal system
witha strongUnion. As the Chairmanof boththe Union Constitution
Committeeand the Union Powers CommitteeNehrumade it clear that
he was stronglyin favourof a powerfulUnion. Therefore,he not
only favouredthe inclusionof residuarypowers in the Union list, but
also supportedthe principleof appointmentof State Governors.7 He
believedthat' 'theelectedGovernorsmightencourageseparatist
provincial

Nehru and Indian Federalism
137
tendenciesand reduce the commonlinks with the Centre".8 Further,

it was feltthatthegoals of socio-economicrevolutioncould be achieved
rapidlyby a strongCentral government.Thus, the Congressdid not
andeventually
contributed
federation
allowtheestablishment
ofa contractual
to the victoryof the centripetalforces.9 In the words of Granville
Austinthe ConstituentAssembly"produced a new kind of federalism
to meet India's peculiar needs".10
II
A studyof the Indian federal structureas envisaged in the
Constitutionreveals the dominantpositionof the Centralgovernment.
It maybe describedas "prefectorialfederalism"underwhichthe very
and theirlimitedautonomy
existenceof states,theirelectedgovernments,
are dependentupon the will of the Centralgovernmentand the states
are subjectedto the commandand controlof the Centre.11Withinthe
framework
of "prefectorialfederalism",Nehru's perspectiveson Centre
- staterelationsweredemocraticand cooperativeand constructive
rather
In his letter(April 15, 1959) to theChiefMinisters.
thanconfrontational.
Nehru worte:
therights
ofIndia,defining
Wehavea fullanddetailedConstitution
oftheCentreandofthestates... The element
andresponsibilities
counselwitheach otherand of
of cooperation,
of seekingfriendly
everkeepingthelargerend in view,are of paramount
importance.
we shall have that
I trustthat,as in the past,so in the future,
forachievement
ofcomrades
intimate
relationship
working
together
of commonends and havingfaithin each other.12
Nehru's extraordinary
qualities of leadership,his statesmanly
a
decent
for
approach and democraticmanagement
style,preference
of Centre state relationshad won him accolade, acclaim, and respect
fromall quarters. It was true that all issues of a federalcharacter
were based on 'great source of unity'13. And decision on the issues
werearrivedat byconsensus,bothat thepartylevel and in Government.
Tn the federal set-up he was above regions; in the partyset-up he
and
was above factions;and thus he acted as an umpirein intra-party
14
conflicts' . ThecreationofAndhrain 1953 andthereorganisation
inter-state
of states in 1956 were the glowing examples of his deferenceto the
sentiments.As Professor
RajniKothari
popularwilland regional/linguistic

138
resultedin rationalisingthe politicalmap

observes:"the reorganisation
of India withoutseriouslyweakeningits unity"15. The reorganisation
of statesnot only providedthe groundfor 'national integration'"5,
but
also gavethestates'a federaloutlookwhichtheyneverpossessedbefore'1".
offiveZonal Councils,undertheStatesReorganisation
The establishment
Act of 1956, to develop a cooperativeapproach at the institutional
level indicatesNehru'sapproachtowardscooperativefederalism.Under
Section21 of this Act,the main functionsof theZonal Councils include
with regard to mattersof common
discussions and recommendations
interestin thefield ofeconomicand social planning,mattersconcerning
waterdisputes,linguisticminorities,
inter-state
andothermatters
transport
connectedwith the reorganisation of states. In his letter (Jan.
16, 1956 ) to the Chief Ministers, Nehru said:
Theformation
ofZonalCouncilsshouldencourage
between
cooperation
theseveralstates... Theyare notmeantto takeawayanypower
fromthe states... The functioning
of theseZonal Councilswill
notonlyresultin settling
numerous
whicharisefrom
problems
dayto-daybetweenadjoiningstatesbutalso helpin economicplanning
of thatlargerarea."
The Zonal Councils were very active during the N ehru era. During
the sevenyearperiodfrom1957 to 1963, 33 meetingsof different
Zonal
Councils were held (average being 4.7 meetingsper year), and during
the period from1963 to 1985 about 51 meetingswere held (average
2.2 per year).19 The Sarkaria Commissionon Centre State relations
hasreiterated
Nehru'sperspective
andhasrecommended
stepsforstrengthening
the Zonal Councils.
Nehrushowedhisdemocratic
approachandfederalspiritregarding
the official language policy. He did not impose Hindi as the only
official language. He decided to continue English as an associate
betweenthe
lingua-francaof India and therebyavoided confrontation
Centreand non-Hindispeakingpeople,especiallyof thesouthernstates.
Speaking in the Lok Sabha he had assured:
Theremustbe no imposition...
foran indefinite
period... I should
have Englishas an associate additionallanguagewhichcan be
used... So I wouldhave it as an alternatelanguageas longas
peoplerequireit and thedecisionforthat,I wouldleave notto

139
theHindiknowing
peoplebutto thenon-Hindi
knowing
people.20
Nehrualso favouredto conductAll-IndiaSen ices examination
in three languages -- English, Hindi and regional language(s).21This
'consensualand conciliatoryapproach' to Centre- staterelationsdefused
withpotentialforfragmentation
controversies
manypossibleCentre-state
and balkanisationof thecountry.One foreignscholarrightlyremarked:
A largeamountof politicalenergywas expendedon ameliorating
thelanguagecontroversy
the1950sand1960s...and language
during
in India todayis not the burningissue thatit was in 1955 or
1965."
Ill
Given his backgroundas a leader of the freedommovement,
as Gandhi's choice forleadershipin post-IndependenceIndia and his
and charismaticpersonality,Nehru weilded considerable
multi-faceted
authorityand unrivalledin the Party and the Government. Yet, he
reposedtrustand confidencein the Chief Ministers,in theirskills as
politicalmobilizersand as powerfulleaders. Nehru's approachtowards
the state level leaders of the dominantCongress Partywas extremely
the delicate fabricof Indian federalism. Although
helpfulin nurturing
was
his authority
great and his decisions were final "the heightened
centralauthoritywas not generallycruel and ruthless"23.Despite his
enormouspowerNehrudid notrideroughshodoverthestates.24Whenever
therewere 'incumbencycrises' in any statehis taskconsistedof merely
facilitatingthe change over withoutactive involvement. Most of the
As Amai Ray notes: "By
to observestrictneutrality.
time,he preferred
and large therewas no organisedattemptto destabilisethegovernmental
process or to interferewith the election of the partyleadershipat the
state level duringthe Nehruera".25 When the leadershipissue posed
a threatto the unityof the CongressParty,then onlyNehru interfered
in the politicalprocessof a state. In 1956, therewas a seriouscontest
forleadershipin AndhraPradesh.The CongressHighCommandremained
neutral and in the contestfor leadershipN. Sanjiva Reddy defeated
B. Gopala Reddy. In Assam, Nehru refusedto issue any directiveto
the State legislaturepartyto supportB.P. Chaliha, in 1957, although
was forhim. The latterwas electedas theChiefMinister
his preference

140
on his own strengths.In Bihar also Nehru did not interferein the
leadershipcrises,bothin 19S2 and 1957. In Gujarat,BalawantraiMehta,
a close associate of Morarji Desai, was unanimouslyelected leader of
the Congresslegislaturepartyin 1963. In Madya Pradeshtoo, Nehru
remainedneutralwhen RavishankarShukla,a followerof SardarPatel,
had won a vote of confidence,in 1954. A crisis developed within
the Congress Part)' in UttarPradesh in October 1960. Nehru was in
a fix. To sustain the unityof the Congress Partyhe persuadedDr.
Sampurnanandto handoverleadershipto C.B. Gupta. Thus the Centre,
under Nehru's leadership,preferrednot to dabble too much in state
politics exceptin exigencies.26However,he did nothesitateto support
competentand able Chief Ministerswheneverthey faced a crisis in
the party. Even when he had to defendsome ChiefMinistersin crisis
heoften
actedwithmoderation
andself-restraint
of"a constitutionalist
. situations
and in a style largely inoffensive".27
Nehru oftenexhortedthe state governmentsto be in close
touch with the people and to develop policies and programmesthat
would fulfilthe aspirationsof the people. A few Chief Ministerslike
B.C. Roy(WestBengal),Kamaraj(Madras)and Y.B. Chavan(Maharastra)
set a patternof independentbehaviour. In areas reservedstrictlyfor
theCentre,somestateshadassertedthemselves
andentered
intonegoatiations
on specific items of trade with foreigncountries. The mattercame
to light when B.C. Roy had enteredinto a trade agreementwith a
foreignconcernon behalfof his State. But thiswas ignoredby Nehru2".
Asa resultofNehru'sapproachthestatesenjoyedconsiderable
administrative
in
the
1950s.37
Nehru
acted
as
a
constitutional
autonomy
patriarch
in coordinatingthe work of Chief Ministersof states by giving them
administrative
guidanceandpoliticaldirection
through
periodicdespatches.
he
took
them
about
the duties and
the
initiative
Often,
by reminding
inthetoneand tenorofan elderstatesmen.
obligationsofstategovernments
Considerthe following quote froma letter (July5, 1952) addressed
to the Chief Ministersabout the significanceof decentralisation:
I feelmoreand morethatwe mustfunction
morefrombelowthan
fromthetop... toomuchofcentralisation
meansdecayat theroots
and ultimately
a withering
of branches,leaves and flowersn.
In the of appointmentsof GovernorsNehru use ' to consult

Sehnt and Indian Federalism
141
the state governments. It was reportedthat when Nehru wanted to

appoint a non-Bengalias the Governorof West Bengal in 1952. the
then Chief Minister.B.C. Roy. stronglyobjected on the ground that
his State would not toleratea non-BengaliGovernor. Then the Union
Government
appointedH.C. Mukherjee.a Bengali by domicile. When
the same problemarose sometimelater (1957) Miss.Padmaja Naidu,
witha bilingualparentage(motherwas a Bengali
a prominent
personality
and fatheran Andhra)was discoveredto the satisfactionof bothNehru
and Roy. In the'sameyear,theformer
Maharaja ofMysore.Jayachamaraja
of
Governor
was
Mysore. These instancesindicate
Wadeyar
appointed
thatNehruwas a firmbelieverin consultationin his approachto Centre
- state relations. He never thoughtof the Governorsas agents of the
Central Government. He encouragedthe Governorsto renderadvice
to the respectiveChief Ministersand the latterto deriv benefitfrom
consultationwith the Governor.30
Some writersviewed the "Kamaraj Plan" adoptedby the All
India Congress Committee,on August 10, 1963, as Nehru's political
conspiracyto dethronepowerfulChief Ministersand unwantedCentral
Ministers. Althoughhe was describedby Kuldip Nayar as "a God
thathad failed"31after1962, Nehrudid notlose his hold over Congress
Partyand the Government. It was Kamaraj who conceived this Plan
in the firstplace for his State i.e., Madras. As a man of the people
who had somewhatreluctantly
Kamaraj
acceptedtheChiefMinistership,
felthe was losingcontactwithhis people and desiredto establishrapport
withthem.32Accordingto Nejiru, "the Kamaraj Plan" was intended
to revitalisethe Congress by takingthe Partyback to its roots in the
people. Referringto this Plan, Rajni Kothari comments:
and
It was nottheremoval"forpartywork"of CentralMinisters
of Partymanagersintoposition
ChiefMinistersbutthe induction
ofpowerat thenationallevelwhichprovedofgreater
consequence.
not only
Plan
the
into
Kamaraj
partymanagers power,
By putting
to
restored
also
affairs
but
in
national
their
importance
recognised
the prestigeand importance...Seen in
the Centralorganisation
thislight,theKamarajPlan was no coup stagedby adventurists;
it was rathera restoration".32

142
IV
Nehru did not resortto frequentuse of Article 356 which

deals with the impositionof President's rule in states. He expressed
the view: "It would not be rightto impose President's rule till all
otheravenues have been explored".54 He used article 356 sparingly
and selectively. His Governmentused it only 7 times,whereasit was
used twice by the ShastriGovernment,48 timesby the Indira Gandhi
Government, 16 times by the Janata regime,6 times by the Rajiv
Gandhi Government,
twiceby the V.P. Singh Governmentand 4 times
by the ChandrashekarGovernment. P.V.'s Governmenthas used it
9 times duringOct. 1991 - Dec. 1993. The impositionof President's
ruleforthefirsttime,in 1951, in Punjabto unseatGopichandBhargava
who claimed to be the followerof Sardar Patel,35and the imposition
of President's rule to prevent:(a) the United Front Ministryheaded
by Rarewala from continuingin power in PEPSU, in 1953; (b) the
Communistsfromformingan alternativegovernmentin Andhraafter
the collapse of the Congress Government,
in 1954 (c) the PSP leader,
PattomThanuPillai,fromforming
an alternative
inTravancoregovernment
Cochin afterthe resignationof the CongressGovernment,
in 1956; and
(d) the CommunistMinistryto continuein power in Kerala, in 1959
were the controversialprecedentsset by the Nehru Government. Dr.
Ambedkardescribedthe invocationof article 356 in PEPSU as "the
most violent kind of rape on the Constitution". Siwach notes that
"in Andhraarticle 356 was used not because constitutional
machinery
had failed but because the Governorand the CentralGovernmentwere
bothkeentoprevent
theCommunists
fromcomingintopower".36Criticising
the partisanrole of the thenRajpramukhand the CentralGovernment,
the then Speaker of the Travancore-CochinAssemblycondemnedit as
undemocratic.37
The agitationsstartedby the oppositionparties against the
CommunistGovernmentin Kerala did create the problemof law and
orderin 1959. Nehruwas statedto be initiallyreluctantto bringKerdla
underPresident's ruledespitethebreakdownoflaw andorder.Provocative
statementsmade by the Communistleaders had createdapprehensions
in the minds of the central leaders. P. Sundarayyahad stated that
"if the Union Governmentdid not agree with the Kerala Ministry's
policies, the CommunistPartywould resortto other means".3* The

143
thenChiefMinister.E.M.S. Namboodripad.referredto, in Coimbatore

on June3, 1958, the possibilityof civil war, as in China.59 But Nehru
wished to show that he was toleranton three counts: First,because
the Congress was in power at the Centre and in all other states he
did not want the non-Congresspartiesto feel thatCongresscould not
tolerateopposition. Second, he had to take the Russian factoralso
in theinternational
context.Third,althoughCommunist
intoconsideration
commitment
to democraticnormshad to be takenwitha pinchof salt,
the Communistsin kerala had got in throughthe ballot box and Nehru
was thelastpersonto denythemtherightto governwithintheframework
of the Constitution. He declared: "So far as I am concerned,I do
not propose,nor intend,nor look forwardto, nor expect governments
40
falling except throughdemocraticprocesses"
During his visit to Kerala in late June, 1959, Nehru had
suggesteda three-foldremedy:talks by the State Governmentleaders
with the oppositionand othr interestson issues arising out of the
Kerala EducationBill and the variouschargesagainst the Government;
public inquiries into the firings;and mid-termpoll. On July7, he
'
electionsas ' 'themostdemocratic'
reiteratedthesuggestionformid-term
solutionand an alternativeto Central interventionin the State. He
agreed to allow the CommunistMinistryto functionas the care-taker
Governmentduringthe election period. But this offerwas rejected
bytheCommunistParty'sNationalCouncil. Althoughtherigidattitude
of the Communistleaders,was blamed as the main reason,Mrs. Indira
Gandhi, the new Congress President,has declared that "I will make
special effortsto win back Kerala for the Congress".41 One view is
that Nehru yielded to pressurefromMrs. Gandhi in the imposition
of President's rule in Kerala. In any case, the dismissal of the first
democraticallyelected communistState Governmentin India remains
a controversialdecision in IndependentIndia's political history.
because a fresh
The other two cases were non-controversial
in
rule
the new State
was
issued
to
continue
President's
proclamation
of Kerala in which Travancore-Cochinhad merged,and President's
rule became a 'rescue-operation'in Ori$sa, in 1961, when no party
came forwardto forman alternativegovernmentafterthe exit of the
Congress GanatantraParishad coalition Ministry. However,Nehru
failed to realise that 'article 356 is a serious irritantin Centre- state

144
relationsand an aberrationfromtrue federalism*. His Government

could have amended or deleted article 356 which, in the opinion of
JusticeV.R. Krishna Iyer, tantamountsto 'constitutionalterrorism'.
V
Jawaharlal
Nehru's earnestdesireforrapideconomicdevelopment
ofthecountry
madehimto introduce
policiesaimedat centalisedplanning.
His Governmentto createdtheNationalPlanningCommissionto advise
in theplanningprocess. Althoughsomewritersdescribed
thegovernment
it as the 'Economic Cabinet5of India, in practiceit has not superseded
federalism. The resolutionwhich the Planning Commissionstates is
thatin framingits recommendations,
it will act in close understanding
and consultationwith the Ministriesof the Central Governmentand
thegovernments
ofthestates.Further,
setting
upoftheNationalDevelopment
Council (NDC), in August1952, maybe regardedas themostsignificant
and consultationbetweenthe Union
step forpromotingunderstanding
and the Stategovernments
on planningand commoneconomicpolicies.
Morris-Jones
has expressedtheviewthattheNDC hasbecomea significant
manifestation
of cooperativefederalism~ an all-India Cabinetstanding
above both'Union and State governments.It may be noted here that,
followingcriticismsby some Chief Ministers,a Standing Committee
of the National DevelopmentCouncil was createdin 1954, to promote
coordinationbetweenthe Centreand the statesin the fieldof planning.
During the Nehru era manyCentral Acts were enacted and
statutorybodies created to promoteCentre state collaborationand
coooperationin vital areas of nationalimportance.In 1952, the Union
governmentformulatedthe National Forestpolicy, which set a target
of bringingone-third(about 100 million hectares) of the total area
of India under forestcover. The States, however,did not seriously
implementthis policy.42In 1954, the CentralCouncil of Local SelfGovernment
was establishedforthepurposeof coordinatingthepolicies
of th states relatingto local government. The Rivers Board Act of
of River
1956, enactedbytheParliament,providesfortheestablishment
Boards in consultationwiththestategovernments
forthe reulationand'
riversand rivervalleys. The Inter-State
Water
developmentofinter-state
Disputes Act of 1956 providesfor adjudicationof disputesrelatingt
the sharingofwaterof inter-state
riversby theconcernedStates. About


133 rivervalley projectswere executed by the Central Government
forthe benefitof various states.43 In 1962 the Governmentof India
andmaintaining
hadconstituted
theCentralCouncilofHealthforpromoting
cooperationin the sphereof healthbetweenthe Centreand the states.
Moreover,during Nehru's period reliance on some informaldevices
tendedto ensuregreaterharmonyin Centre- staterelations. The more
importantof such devices were: (i) ad hoc committeesof specialists;
(ii) regularconferences;and (iii) Central studyteams. The Central
had ppointeda numberof Committees
ofspecialistsdealing
Government
weregenerally
withvariousaspectsofagriculture
whoserecommendations
acceptedby both the Union and the state governments.A systemof
oftheUnion
annualconferences
was encouragedin whichrepresentatives
and the states used to discuss problemsof mutual interest.44
VI
JawaharlalNehru, an embodimentof the federalspirit,did
strivehardto promotepartnership
and collaborationbetweentheCentre
and the states. The maintenanceand sustenanceof balance between
the requirementsof national unityand the need for state autonomy
was an outstandingcontributionof Nehru to the theoryand practice
of Indian federalism. Under his stewardshipcooperativefederalism
in shapingIndia's politics,in discouragingfanaticism,
was instrumental
incontainingdivisiveforces,inshapingnationaloutlookandinfacilitating
the search forbroadlyacceptable solutions. His penchantfornational
unityand his commitmentto economic progressdid not stultifythe
'limited' autonomyof statesbeyondcertainlimits. In embarkingupon
national economic planning, he did not intend to usurp the powers
of the states. He was merelyinterestedin seeing to it that national
minimalstandards
wereensured.Unfortunately,
theNehruvian
ofwell-being
in
Nehru's
admiration
too
far
the
economic
was
carried
sphere.
legacy
had
the
unintended
fortheSovietmodelofeconomicplanning
consequence
of cripplingbasic thrustof the federalpolity. Whateverlittleinitiative
the stateshad in the economic spherehad got dissipatedby centralised
economicplanning. Dependenceof the stateson the Centreincreased
enormously. Discretionarygrantsturnedout to be political handouts.
inmanystates,patronage
ofnon-Congress
Withtheemergence
governments
A
and command
became
centralised
and partisanapproaches
prominent.
- centredeconomyhad the most damaginginfluenceon the autonomy

146
of the states. Nehru,being its original author,had to take part of

the blame forits onslaughtson federalism. Had he been at the helm
suitablealterations.
ofaffairsforlonger,hewouldhaveperhapsintroduced
On balance, Nehru was a democratand a firmbelifeverin
federalismand decentralisation. He did not deliberatelymisuse the
forpersonalhegemony.Ofthe17 constitutional
Constitution
amendments
the
1951
one
of
them
3rd
enactedduring
amendment
1964, only
(the
of 19S4) empoweredthe Centre to legislate on mattersrelatingto a
state subject i.e., essential commodities.42 Most of the abuses such
as the blatantrecourseto Article3S6, Prime Ministerialhegemonyof
intonewareas which
theCongress-IParty,extensionof Union authority
made the states subservientto the Union are later developments. In
retrospect, Nehru's perceptionsof Centre - state relationsare more
relevanttodaythaneverbefore.The emulationofhis federalperceptions
in strengthening
would go a long way in safeguarding
unityin diversity,
political stabilityin various states and in helping themto regain the
spiritof the Constitutionenvisagedby the foundingfathers. Most of
the subsequentaberrationsand central intrusionsinto the sphere of
the states that contributedto the emergenceof the 'federal octopus'
and radicalalterationsto restoretheinstitutional
balance.
needcorrectives
NOTES
Freedom
AbdulKalam,
IndiaWins
1. See Azad,Maulana
, OrientLongman,
Madras,
1988,p. 130.
2. Ibid,pp. 150-152.
Nehru
andthe Constitution
inS.C. Kashyap,
Jawaharlal
3. Quoted
, Metropolitan
BookCo.,NewDelhi,1982,p.76.
4. Ibid,p. 257.
5. Ibid,p. 85.
Nehru- A Political
OxfordUniversity
6. Brecher,
Michael,
Press,
Biography,
London,
1961,p. 165.
Vol.III, Indian
7. See ShivaRao,B.,Framing
Institute
ofIndia'sConstitution,
NewDelhi, p. 456.
ofPublicAdministration,
8. Ibid.
9. See Ray,Amai,
AsiaPublishingHouse,
Relations,
Inter-governmental
Bombay,
1960,p. 20.

147
TheIndianConstitution:
10. Austin.
Cornerstone
Clarendon
Nation.
Granville,
ofa
Oxford.
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