The Unity of Imagining

PhR 9
Malcolm Budd, FBA,
Emeritus Grote Professor of the
Philosophy of Mind and Logic,
University College London

Fabian Dorsch

The Unity of Imagining

ontos

9 783868 381740

Distributed in North and South America

by Transaction Books
ISBN 978-3-86838-174-0

Herausgegeben von / Edited by

Johannes Brandl Andreas Kemmerling
Wolfgang Knne Mark Textor

Fabian Dorsch

In this highly ambitious, wide ranging,

immensely impressive and ground-breaking
work Fabian Dorsch surveys just about every
account of the imagination that has ever been
proposed. He identifies five central types of
imagining that any unifying theory must
accommodate and sets himself the task of
determining whether any theory of what
imagining consists in covers these five
paradigms. Focussing on what he takes to be the
three main theories, and giving them each equal
consideration, he faults the first two and
embraces the third. The scholarship is
immaculate, the writing crystal clear and the
argumentation always powerful.

Philosophische Forschung
Philosophical Research

verlag
9

Fabian Dorsch
The Unity of Imagining

Philosophische Forschung
Philosophical Research
Herausgegeben von / Edited by
Johannes Brandl Andreas Kemmerling
Wolfgang Knne Mark Textor
Band 9 / Volume 9

Fabian Dorsch

The Unity of Imagining

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Table of Contents

Detailed Table of Contents

ix

Acknowledgements

xv

Introduction

Part One The Nature and Variety of Imagining

Introduction to Part One

23

Unified Accounts of Imagining

27

Key Features of Imaginative Episodes

59

Key Features of Sensory Imaginings

79

Imagination and Knowledge

115

Other Theories of Imagining

149

Part Two The Epistemological Account

Introduction to Part Two

191

OShaughnessys View

197

OShaughnessys Arguments

221

Critical Assessment

253

viii

Part Three The Dependency Account

Introduction to Part Three

275

The Representational Account

281

10 Visual Imagining As Experiential Imagining

313

11 Emotional Imagining As Experiential Imagining

337

12 Semantic Dependency, Simulation, and Pretense

365

Part Four The Agency Account

Introduction to Part Four

381

13 Imaginative Agency

385

14 Meeting the Desiderata

409

Conclusion

431

Bibliography

443

Index

455

Detailed Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

xv

Introduction

1
5
7
11
17

(i) The Need for a Unified Account

(ii) Three Main Theories of Imagining
(iii) Other Theories of Imagining
(iv) The Structure of the Book

Part One The Nature and Variety of Imagining

Introduction to Part One

23

Unified Accounts of Imagining

27
28
32
37
41
42
44
46
47
51
52
53
54
55

1.1 Two Desiderata

1.2. Five Central Cases of Imagining
(i) Sensory Imagining
(ii) Affective Imagining
(iii) Intellectual Imagining
(iv) Experiential Imagining
(v) Imaginative Projects

1.3. Mental Episodes and Complexes Thereof

1.4. Non-Central Cases of Imagining
(i) Imaginative Dispositions
(ii) Dream Representations
(iii) Unusual or Pathological Cases
(iv) Fanciful Expectation, Anticipation, Etc.

x
2

Key Features of Imaginative Episodes

2.1. Imaginative Attitude
2.2. No Epistemic Function
2.3. Reference to Reality

Key Features of Sensory Imaginings

3.1. Diminished Vivacity
3.2. No Immediacy
3.3. Indeterminacy
3.4. Quasi-Observationality
3.5. Immunity to Error through Misidentification
3.6. Intellectuality
(i) Peacockes View
(ii) Sartres View
(iii) Imaginative Thought vs. Intention-in-Action
(iv) Explanatory Power

Imagination and Knowledge

4.1. Two Examples of Cognising Imaginings
4.2. The Absence of Alternative Grounds
4.3. Similarities to Perception (and Memory)
4.4. Differences from Perception (and Memory)
4.5. Imagination and Information
4.6. Spontaneity, Attention, and Filling-In
4.7. Voluntariness and Cognitive Constraints

Other Theories of Imagining

5.1. The Quantitative Account
5.2. The Phenomenal Account
5.3. The Ontological Account
5.4. The Modal Account
5.5. The Attitude Account
5.6. The Spontaneity Account

59
61
68
73
79
81
83
85
87
94
96
96
100
103
106
115
116
122
126
128
133
138
142
149
150
152
154
161
168
176

xi

Part Two The Epistemological Account

Introduction to Part Two

191

OShaughnessys View

197
199
202
213

6.1. A Brief Synopsis

6.2. The Three Main Claims
6.3. The Argumentative Strategy

OShaughnessys Arguments
7.1. The Argument from Origin
(i) Standard Constraints on Cognitions
(ii) Wakefulness as a Further Constraint
(iii) The Origin of Imaginings

7.2. The Argument from Attention

Critical Assessment
8.1. The Explanatory Power of Negation Claims
(i) General Limitations
(ii) The Limitations of (NC*)
(iii) The Limitations of (NI) and Similar Claims
(iv) The Limitations of (NC)

8.2. The Extensional Adequacy of Negation Claims

221
222
223
232
242
247
253
254
254
256
258
264
266

Part Three The Dependency Account

Introduction to Part Three

275

The Representational Account

281
282
290
292
294
302
309

9.1. Humes Copy Principle

9.2. Objections to Humes View
9.3. Causal Echo Claims
9.4. Representational Echo Claims
9.5. Intellectual Imagining
9.6. Imaginative Projects

xii
10 Visual Imagining As Experiential Imagining
10.1. Martins Argument: Perspectivalness
10.2. A Second Argument: Egocentric Orientation
10.3. Replies to Objections
10.4. The Nature of Experiential Imagining

11 Emotional Imagining As Experiential Imagining

11.1. The Puzzle of Fiction
11.2. Waltons Account of Emotional Imagining
11.3. Moran on the Various Forms of Imagining
11.4. Morans Account of Emotional Imagining
11.5. The Experiential Nature of Emotional Imagining

12 Semantic Dependency, Simulation, and Pretense

12.1. Semantic Dependency
12.2. Imagination as Simulation
12.3. Imagination as Pretense
12.4. Conclusion and Outlook

313
314
322
325
332
337
340
346
351
356
360
365
366
368
373
377

Part Four The Agency Account

Introduction to Part Four
13 Imaginative Agency
13.1. Mental vs. Bodily Agency
13.2. The Nature of Imaginative Agency
13.3. Qualifications
(i) Concreteness
(ii) Voluntariness
(iii) Directness

13.4. The Essentiality of Imaginative Agency

13.5. The Subjection to the Will Account

14 Meeting the Desiderata

14.1. Explanatory Power
(i) Informativity
(ii) Fundamentality

381
385
386
387
391
391
392
394
396
404
409
409
410
413

xiii
14.2. Extensional Adequacy
(i) Non-Imaginative Phenomena
(ii) Imaginative Phenomena

14.3. Non-Representationality: the Case of Imagined Pains

14.4. Passivity: the Case of Spontaneous Images & Thoughts

Conclusion
(i) The Agency Account
(ii) The Epistemological and the Dependency Account
(iii) Other Theories of Imagining
(iv) Some Loose Ends

414
414
417
421
423

431
431
434
437
439

Bibliography

443

Index

455

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the following journals for permission to reproduce material: Enrahonar for parts of my paper Emotional Imagining and Our Responses to Fiction (Enrahonar, vol. 46, 2011; reprinted by permission of
the publisher, Universitat Autnoma de Barcelona); Rivista di Estetica for
parts of my paper The Recreative Imagination (Rivista di Estetica, vol.
54, 2013; reprinted by permission of the publisher, Rosenberg & Sellier);
and Philosophical Explorations for parts of my paper Transparency and
Imagining Seeing (Philosophical Explorations, vol. 13, 2010; reprinted by
permission of the publisher, Taylor & Francis).
My special thanks are due to Malcolm Budd, without whom I would not
have started and continued to work on the imagination; Mike Martin, who
has challenged and pushed me further on the topic than anyone else; Lucy
OBrien, who made sure that I finished my PhD thesis on the imagination
in time; Sebastian Gardner and Gianfranco Soldati, who taught me a lot
about the phenomenological approach to the mind and the imagination; and
Rob Hopkins, who has always been most helpful in his criticism.
In addition, I am very grateful, both for their constructive criticisms and
for their sympathetic encouragements, to Jiri Benovsky, Davor Bodrozic,
Johannes Brandl, Josep Corbi, Peter Goldie, Henning Hahn, David Harris,
Frank Hofmann, Eduard Marbach, Aaron Meskin, Richard Moran, Kevin
Mulligan, Matt Nudds, Martine Nida-Rmelin, Matt Soteriou, Kathleen
Stock, Juan Suarez, Mark Textor, Gian-Andri Toendury, Cain Todd, Lambert Wiesing, Marcus Willaschek, Richard Wollheim, several anonymous
referees, as well as audiences at University College London, the University

xvi
of Valencia and the University of Fribourg.
Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to Johannes Brandl, Andreas
Kemmerling, Wolfgang Knne and Mark Textor, for their personal assistance and editorial guidance; the Graduate School of University College
London and the Swiss National Science Foundation, for their financial support of my research; and to my family and friends, for their uncomplaining
patience during the last years.

For Evgenia

Introduction

Introduction

The principal aim of this monograph is to present and compare the main
theories of imagining in a systematic and opinionated way.
The presentation is systematic in so far as it is structured by the concern
with the unity and common nature of the many forms of imagining, such as
visualising, supposing or daydreaming. Accordingly, the book involves
both a close study of the distinct kinds of imagining and of their main features, similarities and differences; and a critical discussion of the principal
accounts of imagining put forward in the literature. The book therefore
serves as an introduction to the main ideas and positions that have been adopted with respect to imaginative phenomena. But it does so in a strictly
problem-oriented manner, namely from the perspective of the possibility of
providing an account of imagining that unifies its different incarnations. As
a consequence, the discussion is organised around the possible sources of
the unity of imagining and centres less on particular philosophers and their
specific views.1
The comparison of the corresponding principal theories of imagining is
1

Another reason for this is that with some notable exceptions, such as the works by
Husserl (2006), Sartre (1940), Casey (1976), White (1990), OShaughnessy (2000)
and McGinn (2004) many philosophers have not presented fully developed and focused theories of imagining, but instead embedded their claims in discussions of
other, often more general issues (see, e.g., Collingwood (1938), Ryle (1949/1963),
Scruton (1974), Peacocke (1985), Walton (1990, Hopkins (1998) or Martin (2002a)).
Even of the noted exceptions, who devote whole books or lecture series to the topic,
some have not aimed at formulating a cohesive account of all forms of imagining,
but rather focused on discussing particular kinds of imagining, or on developing a
list of more or less loosely connected ideas and observations.

Introduction

opinionated, on the other hand, in so far as a more specific goal of the book
is to defend the Agency Account of imagining as the best unified account of
imagining available. The main claim of this theory is that imaginings are,
essentially and fundamentally, mental actions of a certain kind. Accordingly, imagining is something that we actively and voluntarily do.
A unified account of imagining is characterised by the fact that it captures the common nature of the central cases of imagining (e.g., visualising, supposing, or daydreaming) in fundamental terms and is able to distinguish them from the central cases of non-imaginative mental phenomena, notably cognitive representations (e.g., perceptions, judgements, or
memories). The minimal goal of any theory intended as a unified account
of imagining should therefore be to achieve extensional as well as explanatory adequacy: it should be valid for the paradigm cases of imaginative
and non-imaginative phenomena; and it should correctly describe and explain the distinctive and fundamental nature of the former. A main theme of
the discussion is therefore the elucidation of primary examples of imagining, and of what distinguishes them from other, non-imaginative mental
phenomena. Another and closely related guiding issue is whether it is possible to account for the specific character of these imaginings by identifying a set of features distinctive of them and responsible for their imaginative status (i.e., their property of being instances of imagining). That is, the
book addresses the issue of whether it is possible to specify and elucidate
this status in terms of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for something to be an imagining, at least with respect to the
paradigm cases.
The issue of formulating a unified account of imagining has often been
neglected in the philosophical tradition. Many of the discussions of imagining in the past and the present have focused, not on the nature of imaginings, but on their role in our mental lives and our interactions with other
people and the world. It has been widely acknowledged that imagining is
very prominent in and significant for various parts of our lives, ranging
from our emotional engagement with other people (e.g., Goldie (2000):
194ff.) and our moral evaluation of actions (e.g., Johnson (1993)) to the
aesthetic appreciation of artworks (e.g., Walton (1990) and its many fol-

Introduction

lowers) and even the acquisition of knowledge about the external world.2
Moreover, even when philosophers address the question of what it
means for a mental phenomenon to be imaginative (i.e., possess the property of being an imagining), they usually concentrate exclusively on specific forms of imagining, notably on sensory or visual imaginings. 3 Indeed,
the neglect of the issue of what all imaginings have in common as imaginings may be closely linked to the neglect of non-sensory or complex kinds
of imagining. Finally, philosophers writing about the imagination have not
always succeeded, or been particularly interested, in developing their ideas
into a proper theory of what is distinctive of imaginings.
As a result, most discussions of imaginings have been concerned either
2

Although imaginings are typically held not to constitute knowledge about the external world or provide relevant epistemic justification by themselves (though see
Chapter 4 for an opposing view), it seems beyond doubt that they are often involved
in other ways in the acquisition of knowledge. See, for instance, the discussions on
thought experiments (e.g., Sorensen (1992) and Gendler (2000a)), the link between
conceivability and possibility (e.g., Gendler & Hawthorne (2002)), the role of mental imagery in geometry (e.g., Giaquinto (1992)) and in counterfactual reasoning
(e.g., Williamson (2008)), or the involvement of visualisation in memory-based
cognitive projects, such as the project of determining whether frogs have lips, or
how many windows are in ones own house (e.g., Kosslyn (1980): 1, or Pylyshyn
(2002): especially 164).
See Collingwood (1938): chs. 9f., Sartre (1940), Peacocke (1985), Hopkins (1998):
ch. 7, and, it seems, Wittgenstein (1984c): vol. II, sec. 63-147, to name just a few of
those who focus more or less exclusively on sensory or visual imaginings. Kind
(2001) does the same: while she argues that all instances of imagining involve
sensory imagery, she distinguishes the resulting sensory imagining from intellectual supposition. Scruton (1974), White (1990), Casey (2000), OShaughnessy
(2002), Currie & Ravenscroft (2002) and McGinn (2004) address both sensory and
intellectual imaginings, but no emotional imaginings (in contrast to emotional responses to imagining), and imaginative projects only in passing and not in relation to
their commonality with imaginative episodes. Besides, although McGinn discusses
various forms of imagining, he does not aim to provide a unified account of them.
Instead, he argues merely that they form an imagination spectrum which extends
from the most simple and temporally and conceptually prior imaginative phenomena
(e.g., those involved in sensory representation) to the most complex and developed
ones (e.g., those involved in creativity; see McGinn (2004): 13). See also the discussion of the five main forms of imagining in Section 1.2 for further references to accounts which focus on particular kinds of imagining.

Introduction

with aspects of imaginings other than (though perhaps dependent on or

otherwise related to) their imaginativeness, or with the imaginativeness of
only certain kinds of imagining. Just a few philosophers have attempted to
provide a satisfactory account of imagining in its (more or less) full variety.4 The less comprehensive philosophical discussions have certainly shed
light on important aspects of many different kinds of imagining, such as
sensory imaginings (e.g., visualising a face), intellectual imaginings (e.g.,
supposing or imagining that it rains), affective imaginings (e.g., imagining
an itch), experiential imagining (e.g., imagining having the experiences of
someone else) or imaginative projects (e.g., daydreaming about being
rich).
But the imaginative nature common to all forms of imagining has remained largely uninvestigated. A good example for this and the underlying
way of thinking is Waltons account of imagining (1990: ch. 1). He spends
considerable time on specifying a number of dimensions along which imaginings can vary, but also insists that we cannot spell out what they have
in common and have instead to be content with an intuitive understanding
of what it is to imagine (ibid., 19). Indeed, it is rather common in discussions about imaginings and their role in our mental lives to take for granted
4

See Scruton (1974): chs. 7f., Casey (1976), OShaughnessy (2000): chs. 11f., and
McGinn (2004) for clear examples. But none of them discusses imaginative projects
(fantasies, daydreams, etc.) in any detail. Whether other proposals are intended or
able to constitute a unified account of imagining is less clear. Humes account of all
imaginings as forming a certain sub-class of ideas suffers from its treatment of the
differences between sensory and intellectual representations and between imaginative and cognitive representations as quantitative (i.e., a matter of vivacity) rather
than qualitative (see Chapter 9 for discussion and references). Although Ryle discusses mainly sensory cases, his account of imagining as a form of internal pretending or pretending in ones head might be applied to intellectual imagining as
well (see Section 12.3, and Ryle (1949/1963): chs. 7f., especially sec. 8.6). White
analyses both visualising and intellectual imagining in terms of thinking of the possible, but does not explicitly connect the two analyses (see Section 5.4, and White
(1990): 122f; 184). Despite the fact that Currie and Ravenscroft treat both sensory
and intellectual imaginings as simulations of their respective cognitive counterparts
(see Section 12.2, and Currie & Ravenscroft (2002): 11 and 49), their main concern
is with the involvement of the imagination in adopting a perspective on the world
different from ones current one, rather than with the general nature of imagining
(ibid: 8f. and 11).

Introduction

that it is sufficiently clear what it means to imagine something as it is

likewise often assumed that we have a good grasp of, say, what it means to
perceive or believe something, or to desire it.
One particular difficulty with this approach is, however, that imagining
perhaps in contrast to perception, belief or desire does not obviously
constitute a natural kind (more on this point in Section 1.1). In fact, the
suspicion that imagining understood as the class of visualising, supposing, empathizing, daydreaming, and so on is not among the most basic or
primitive mental phenomena may explain why it has by no means been the
subject of philosophical investigation to the same extent, and with the same
exclusivity, as perception, belief and desire. Similarly, it is not evident that
there is unity in imagining; nor, if so, what it consists in or comprises. This
may lead to a situation in which a certain kind of imagining is postulated or
appealed to in the context of explaining a given phenomenon; while the
lack of any further elucidation of the nature of this type of imagining raises
in others considerable skepticism about the proposed role or even existence
of the kind of imagining in question.5
Such complications as well as, more generally, the significance and
prominent position of imagining in our lives and interactions with each
other and the world provide sufficient motivation for the investigation of
the possibility of a unified account of imagining. In particular, it will be
helpful and illuminating to learn more about what it means for a
representation to be imaginative, and how this relates to or influences the
various forms of engagement or project involving imagining.

(i) The Need for a Unified Account

The nature and unity of imagining is of theoretical interest both in itself
and in relation to many important aspects of our lives. But the general interest inherent in the question of whether we can provide a unified theory
of imagining and the significant role of imaginings in our mental lives are
5

See, for instance, the skepticism expressed in Budd (1992), Hopkins (1998): ch. 1,
Wollheim (2003) and Dorsch (2012c) about the existence of the specific form of
imagining seeing the depicted, which Walton refers to in his account of pictorial experience (see Walton (1990): ch. 8, and (2002)).

Introduction

not the only motivations for the search of a unified account. The expectation that the central cases of imaginings share a common nature arises also
from the need to explain two facts about our actual treatment of such representations.
The first is simply that, even after discounting the less obvious cases,
we do group together a large variety of mental occurrences in the class of
imaginings, while excluding many others. Thus we accept visualising, supposing, daydreaming, being engaged with fictions, empathizing, and so on,
as paradigm instances of imagining, or at least as essentially involving
such instances; but not seeing, judging, deliberating, or feeling an emotion
or desire. If such imaginings had nothing in common with each other, but
shared features with the non-imaginative phenomena, this tendency in how
we categorise mental phenomena would be rather mysterious: there has to
be something about the imaginative mental phenomena which causes us to
treat them but not other mental phenomena as members of one and the
same class (see Scruton (1974): 91f.).
The second relevant observation is that our corresponding classifications are stable, and that we usually have a good grasp of whether though
not necessarily of why a given mental state is imaginative or not. Three
observations are particularly relevant here. First of all, we repeat the same
categorisations and do not locate certain representations today on one side
of a divide and tomorrow on the other. There is no change in opinion about
whether, say, visualising is an instance of imagining. Then, it normally
does not take us much effort or thought to come to a classification of a given mental phenomenon as imaginative or non-imaginative. Identifying an
instance of daydreaming as an example of imagining, say, is typically very
straightforward. Finally, we are seldom unsure about how to treat a certain
mental phenomenon. This may happen with borderline cases (e.g., spontaneously occurring images and thoughts), or when we are confronted with an
unusual or rare kind of representation (e.g., Macbeths awareness of Banquo, or of the dagger). But, in most cases, we are not in doubt about whether some mental episode is an instance of imagining. These three aspects of
the stability of our relevant classification, too, strongly suggest the existence of a certain kind of unity among imaginings, to which we furthermore
have easy epistemic access, but which is still in want of further elucidation.

Introduction

Otherwise, it would be very difficult to explain the firmness and ease with
which we take the sometimes very different instances of imagining to be of
the same kind, and why it is that they, but no other phenomena, count for
us as imaginative. Any satisfactory analysis of imagining needs to provide
an elucidation of this unity of the paradigm instances of imaginings.
The idea pursued in this book is that the unity under consideration is due
to some features shared by and distinctive of imaginings. This is the
simplest and most straightforward explanation of their homogeneity; and it
is adopted by all theories of imagining that have the ambition to provide a
unified account. But it is not the only possible account of the two noted
facts and the resulting apparent unity of imagining. One could, for instance, maintain that our grouping together of the variety of phenomena
described as instances of one and the same type of phenomenon is merely
accidental or conventional, without any substantial grounding in shared
features of the mental phenomena concerned. But such a claim would be
difficult to support in view of the facility and assurance with which we categorise mental states as either imaginative or non-imaginative. Until it has
been confirmed that such a strong form of skepticism is inevitable, the
realistic hope for a more positive theory of the common nature of imaginings should outweigh any doubts about the possibility of a unified characterisation of imagining. It is thus reasonable to demand from a theory of
imagining that it account for the fact that we classify a large variety of phenomena as imaginative; and the fact that this classification is not a pure coincidence or convention. A unified theory of imagining promises to provide
such an explanation by treating these facts as a consequence of the presence of certain features shared exclusively by all imaginings.

(ii) Three Main Theories of Imagining

This raises the question of which proposals for a unified account of imagining are on offer and should be considered. When looking at the theories
of imagining put forward in the philosophical tradition, three major recurring themes can be identified: the relationship (or lack thereof) of imaginative representations to reality, their relationship to cognitive representations, and their relationship to the will. These motives identify the three

Introduction

principal ways in which the common and distinctive nature of the core instances of imagining may be elucidated: in terms of their irrelevance for
our epistemic interaction with the world, in terms of their dependency on
perceptions and (occurrent) beliefs, or in terms of their origin in a specific
kind of mental agency.6 The resulting theories of imagining may be labelled the Epistemological, the Dependency and the Agency Account. The
prominence in the literature of these approaches and their central ideas
about the nature of imagining is indicative of the fact that they are the main
contenders for a unified theory of imagining. Accordingly, I concentrate
my discussion primarily on these three proposals and devote to each a
whole part of the book.
The Epistemological Account specifies the difference between imaginings and cognitions by reference to the idea that only the latter are concerned with the representation of reality at least in a particular sense still
to be specified. Our minds interact with the world by means of cognition
and action. Both forms of interaction are primarily the domain of cognitive
representations, such as perceptions, memories or beliefs. In accordance
with this observation, the versions of the Epistemological Account to be
found in the literature identify a lack of cognitive concern with reality and,
especially, the failure to play a substantial role in cognition as the distinctive feature of imaginings. Different versions of this approach may vary in
how they characterise the assumed lack of cognitive concern.7
It is conceivable that a unified account of imagining may also be formulated in terms of their specific insignificance for our active engagement
6

Although it might be possible to endorse a view that characterises imaginings in

terms of their relationship both to reality and to agency (without also tracing back
one relationship to the other), such an approach to imagining would seem to be overcomplex. As will become clear in the subsequent chapters, reference to the presence
and nature of one kind of relationship suffices to account for the distinctive nature of
imagining and, if necessary, for the presence and nature of the other kind of relationship. The general idea is that imaginings will turn out either to lack a cognitive concern with reality precisely because they are voluntarily formed by us; or instead to
(be able to) be mental actions precisely because they are not cognitively constrained
by how reality is like.
The main proponent of this view is OShaughnessy (2000). But very similar ideas
can be found in the writings of Hume (1739), Sartre (1940), Wittgenstein (1984c)
and McGinn (2004), among others (see also the introduction to Part Two).

Introduction

with the world. The idea is that imaginings in contrast to, say, desires, intentions, beliefs or perceptions cannot motivate us to act or guide us in
our actions (e.g., by providing us with information about our relevant environment, or about adequate means to achieve our goals). However, the
claim that imaginings lack a guiding role in agency can be traced back to
the idea that they lack a cognitive concern with the world: they cannot
guide us in action because they do not provide us with knowledge about
the relevant aspects of reality (i.e., the environment and the means). The
idea that imaginings cannot move us to act, on the other hand, is not only
controversial (see Note 16 in Chapter 1); it also does not distinguish them
from many non-imaginative phenomena. Hence, it is not very promising to
formulate a unified account of imagining specifically in terms of their
seeming unimportance for our actions; and not very surprising that the
focus in the literature on imagining has rather been on the apparent lack of
cognitive concern.
The Dependency Account, by contrast, puts emphasis on the asymmetric
dependency of imaginings and cognitions. It argues that imaginative phenomena are constitutively dependent on and, hence, have to be elucidated
by reference to their cognitive counterparts. While cognitions exist and can
be made sense of independently of imaginings, the opposite is false. Proponents of the Dependency Account disagree about the nature of the kind
of dependency concerned.8 Philosophers in the Humean tradition, for example, focus on the idea that imaginings depend on cognitions in so far as
they represent them (possibly due to a suitable causal link). Another prominent approach is to assume that, in some sense, imaginings imitate or
mimic cognitions for instance, in the shape of off-line simulation or inner
pretense. Besides, it is widely accepted that there is also some form of semantic dependency: that we acquire much of our ability to represent something in an imaginative way by means of engaging in cognition (i.e., in per8

Hume (1739): 1.1.1.6ff. and 1.3.7.7), and OShaughnessy (2000): 363, endorse the
representational version of the Dependency Account for all forms of episodic imagining; while Peacocke (1985): 22, Martin (2001): 273 and (2002): 404, and Dorsch
(2010c) accept this view for sensory imaginings; and Dorsch (2011b) which is
more or less identical with Chapter 11 for emotional imaginings. Currie &
Ravenscroft (2002): 49, and Ryle (1949/1963): 250ff., may be read as defending a
version of the Dependency Account formulated in terms of simulation or imitation.

10

Introduction

ceiving, sensing, judging, and so on) and developing the relevant recognitional and conceptual capacities.
Finally, the already introduced Agency Account proposes mental activity
as the characteristic element of imagining. It maintains that imaginings are,
in a particular way, essentially active; while cognitions are either passive,
or active in a different way. The general idea is thus that imaginings are
mental actions of a special kind: they are imaginative determinations or expressions of the will. They differ in this respect from mental passions,
among them: judgemental thoughts or occurrent beliefs that are formed in
response to epistemic reasons; episodic memories that are determined by
past experiences; perceptions and sensations that are determined by their
external objects; and deviantly caused instances of the each of the preceding cognitive kinds of episode. Again, distinct versions of the Agency Account vary in how exactly they individuate the active character distinctive
of imaginings.9
The particular version, that I intend to put forward in this book, maintains that imaginings are mental actions, that aim at the active and direct
formation of mental representations with specific contents. The requirement of representational specificity demands that the underlying motivational states (e.g., tryings, desires or intentions) determine which particular
features are to be represented as being instantiated by which particular objects; while the directness requirement is meant to ensure that the motivational states end up determining the content of the formed representations
without making use of epistemic or merely causal mechanisms of content
determination and, notably, those mechanisms involved in the actively
triggered manifestation of mnemonic or other mental dispositions, or those
relied on during the voluntary formation of beliefs on the basis of evidence
as means. My defense of this version of the Agency Account of imagining is paired with a rejection of the Epistemological and the Dependency
Account.
9

The Agency Account (or something very much like it) has been endorsed by, among
others, Wollheim (1973): 69, Scruton (1974): 95 (see in general 94-100), Levinson
(1998): p. 232, n. 3, Kind (2001): 90ff., and McGinn (2004): 12ff.; 131f. Most of
these endorsements have been inspired by Wittgensteins comments on sensory imaginings (see, for instance, his (1984b): vol. II, sec. 63 and 627; see also Budd
(1989): 104ff.).

Introduction

11

However, since the present book is not only finite in its length, but also
primarily centred on the issue of the unity of imagining and aimed at giving a balanced overview of the various approaches to this issue, the discussion of the Agency Account has to be confined to roughly the same number
of pages as the two other main theories (or, in the case of the Dependency
Account, as its most promising namely representational version). This
means, unfortunately, that there is not enough space for a comprehensive
elaboration and vindication of the Agency Account, which definitely merits
a monograph on its own. The chapters devoted to this theory therefore concentrate just on the principal aspects of this theory, such as its characterisation of imaginings as mental actions of a certain kind, the essentiality of
the imaginative activity involved in voluntary imaginings, or the special
status of spontaneously occurring images and thoughts in relation to imaginative agency. Other necessary elements of a full defense of the Agency
Account such as its application to daydreams and other imaginative projects, or a discussion of pictorial experience, association, guessing, and
other problematic cases have to be left for another occasion.

(iii) Other Theories of Imagining

In addition to the three parts dealing with the main theories of imagining,
there is a fourth and introductory part of the book in which, among other
things, I briefly consider and argue against less important contenders for a
satisfactory account of the unity of imagining. Some of these additional
views start from the same or at least very similar basic ideas as the Epistemological, the Dependency or the Agency Account. This is part of the
explanation of why there are some considerable overlaps in convictions,
arguments and motivations among the individual major and minor views.
But these shared elements do not undermine the fact that the various accounts of imagining exclude each other as unified theories in so far as they
identify different features as the fundamental constituents of the common
nature of the otherwise heterogeneous forms of imaginings.
One alternative proposal the Quantitative Account takes imaginative
and non-imaginative phenomena to differ solely in degree (e.g., a difference in vivacity), rather than in kind. As a result, imaginings are assumed

12

Introduction

to possess the same essence as their non-imaginative counterparts.10

The Phenomenal Account assumes the most basic differences between
imaginative and non-imaginative phenomena to be phenomenal in nature:
that is, to be differences in what the respective episodes are subjectively
like. Accordingly, theories of imagining should focus on the phenomenological description of imaginings and their non-imaginative counterparts,
rather than on the formulation of more fundamental explanations of the
noted phenomenal differences. The Phenomenal Account therefore takes it
to be distinctive of imaginings that they subjectively seem to have a certain
kind of object, attitude or origin in contrast to some of the following theories which assume that it is distinctive of imaginings that they indeed
have a certain kind of object, attitude or origin.
The Ontological Account, for instance, elucidates the distinctive character of imaginings in terms of the specific nature of the imagined entities.
The central idea is that there is a categorical ontological difference between
objects which are perceived, remembered or judged to be a certain way and
objects which are visualised or supposed to be a certain way. In particular,
it may be said that imagined and cognised objects differ in their type of existence, their spatio-temporality, their determinacy or (as also proposed by
one version of the following account) their modal status.11
The central idea of the Modal Account is that, while it is characteristic
of imaginings that they represent possibilities, it is characteristic of cognitions that they represent actualities.12 The most promising version of this
theory maintains that the difference is one in attitude, rather than content.
This means that both types of representation are concerned with the same
kind of objects and states of affairs. But while cognitions purport to represent them as part of the actual world, imaginings lack such a commitment
and replace it with a stance of non-neutrality towards some possible world
(or situation). That is, imaginings are said to make a claim, not about how
10

The idea that perceptions and imaginings differ merely in vivacity is central to
Humes view (see Section 9.1). Compare also Hopkins (2011a) approach to sensory
memories, according to which they belong to the class of sensory imaginings and
differ merely contextually from its non-mnemonic members.
11
Some of these ideas can be found in Sartre (1940) and Casey (1976), for instance.
12
The view presented in White (1990) comes close to the Modal Account, although
White presumably does not intend to restrict imaginings only to mere possibilities.

Introduction

13

things actually are, but about how things might possibly be.
The resulting modal theory of imagining is, in fact, nothing but a specific version of the Attitude Account, according to which the difference
between imaginative and cognitive episodes is fundamentally attitudinal.
Minimally, the idea is that cognitions involve a cognitive attitude that is,
the commitment that reality is just like they represent it to be while imaginings lack it. Versions of the Attitude Account may stay neutral on the issue of whether this means that imaginings possess instead a distinctively
imaginative attitude. However, the need to distinguish imaginative episodes not only from cognitive episodes, but also from other kinds of episode
has moved proponents of the Attitude Account to assume that imaginings
are non-neutral as well, and to specify the commitment distinctive of imaginings in more positive terms, such as by reference to an act of positing
entities as non-existent, absent or, indeed, non-actual.13
Next comes the Spontaneity Account which maintains that imaginings
differ from cognitions in their specific origin in the voluntary or involuntary spontaneity of the mind, rather than in the impression of the external world onto the mind. In its most promising incarnation, the view
comes close to the Agency Account especially in its insistence that the
origin of imaginings is not merely causal, but essentially involves some
subjective response or doing. But the two theories differ in that the Spontaneity Account extends the realm of the imagination to the involuntary,
thereby loosely drawing on a distinction between perceiving and imagining
that is similar to the Kantian distinction between receptivity and spontaneity.
The Subjection to the Will Account is also similar to the Agency Account. While the last-mentioned takes imagining to always involve voluntary control, the first-mentioned requires merely that there is the possibility
of such control, without the need for its actual exertion. The Subjection of
the Will Account has the advantage of being able to capture what seem to
be involuntary instances of imagining, while distinguishing them none the
less strictly from, say, perceptions and impression, the passivity of which
13

The idea of a specifically imaginative attitude has been put forward notably in the
writings of the phenomenologists, such as Husserl (2006), Sartre (1940) and Casey
(1976).

14

Introduction

resists any attempts to bring them under voluntary control.14

Finally, the Subpersonal Account the only one that I do not return to at
one point or another in the subsequent chapters characterises imaginings
in terms of the specific nature or use of the subpersonal neurofunctional
processes or modules involved in imagining, as they are studied by the
cognitive sciences. In other words, proponents of this approach maintain
that what is distinctive about imaginings is that they are subpersonally
formed in a special way, whether by means of the stimulation of certain
imaginative areas in the brain, or by means of certain imaginative ways
in which standard cognitive mechanisms are employed. It is of course an
empirical and, especially, experimental question whether it is possible
to identify neurofunctional areas or operations that are unique to imagining
and, if so, what their nature is. Accordingly, the formulation of the Subpersonal Account is primarily a matter of the empirical sciences, and only secondarily a matter of philosophy, which is by and large a non-experimental
discipline. In this respect, the Subpersonal Account differs sharply from the
much more philosophical theories of imagining listed above. 15 This difference is closely related to the three main reasons of why I do not discuss the
Subpersonal Account any further.
The first is that the cognitive sciences are yet simply not advanced
enough to formulate a satisfactory unified theory. Central to the explanation of this fact is that the unity of imagining has not been of much scientific interest, and that, hence, the relevant studies have typically focused
14

The noted similarities among the Agency, Spontaneity and Subjection to the Will
Accounts may also be captured by reference to the fact that they are all instances of
the more general Origin Account: that is, the view that imaginative and non-imaginative phenomena differ essentially in what does or can determine their occurrence
and representationality.
15
Of course, philosophy should take into account experimental findings; and philosophers may be engaged in experimental investigations. But philosophical methodology is not itself experimental at least not in the sense of being concerned with the
designing and carrying out of repeated observations or experiments with replicable
results. This is true even of the so-called empirical or experimental philosophy: it
simply incorporates some scientific discipline (e.g., cognitive psychology) and applies its experimental methodology to empirical phenomena or problems, that are selected because of their relevance for certain philosophical issues. Hence, there is still
a division of labour between philosophy and the empirical sciences.

Introduction

15

on particular forms of imagining, notably visualising and belief-like imagining.16 What this may reflect is that the mental category of imagining is
perhaps not a very interesting category with respect to the subpersonal
level; while, as noted above, it plays an important role on the personal
level. Indeed, at least to my knowledge, there has been no serious attempt
so far to spell out, in terms of the neurofunctional entities and processes
recognised by the cognitive sciences, what the sensory, affective,
intellectual, experiential and more complex forms of imagining have
fundamentally in common.
Moreover, it is unclear whether it is reasonable to expect to be able to
formulate such a theory. Perhaps there are several distinct and fairly independent neural or otherwise subpersonal correlates of the feature distinctive of all imaginings on the personal level for instance, one correlate for
each of the basics form of imagining. That is, it is unclear whether such
correlates need to share a scientifically interesting feature in virtue of
which they count as correlates of one and the same personal level phenomenon (i.e., imagining). For instance, green or, more generally, coloured objects arguably do not have any physical property in common that
is significant from the perspective of physics.17 Perhaps the same is true of
16

Tye (1991), Thomas (1999) and (2010) provide an overview of recent empirical
studies on sensory imagining, while Nichols (2006) and especially Gendler (2011)
do the same with respect to different kinds of intellectual imagining and related phenomena, such as pretense, empathy or delusions. Harris (2000) offers a developmental perspective on intellectual imagining and pretense, while Currie &
Ravenscroft (2002), Heal (2003) and Goldman (2006) look at it from a simulationist
perspective. More specifically, Currie & Ravenscroft (2002) and Gendler (2011) discuss evidence linking intellectual imagining to empathy, autism and delusion; while
Weinberg & Meskin (2006) develop an empirically-based account of intellectual
imagining partly based on the work by Nichols & Stich (2003) and apply it to
various philosophical problems namely the problems of emotional responses to
fiction (see Chapter 11), of imaginative resistance, and of distinguishing imagining
from supposing (see Note 18 in Chapter 1). By contrast, the empirically informed
debate about the nature of sensory imagining has been largely dominated by the
dispute between Kosslyn (see, for instance, his 1980) and Pylyshyn (see, for
instance, his 2002).
17
If at all, colour hues of surfaces should be identified with certain classes of reflectance properties, the members of which are individuated and grouped together in
terms of their dispositional power to bring about a certain pattern of stimulation in

16

Introduction

the neurofunctional correlates of imagining. Besides, the prospects of securing a satisfactory unified theory of imagining are likely to dwindle further, the more removed from the personal level an account becomes. Perhaps, generality is to be had only very close to or, indeed, only at the
level of theorising about persons.
My second reason for not further investigating the prospects of the Subpersonal Account is that it is not really in competition with the unified theories aiming to capture the personal level of imagining. Rather, the two
kinds of account should be seen as complementing each other. While the
previously introduced theories aim to capture the nature of imagining in relation to subjectively accessible features (e.g., representationality, rational
role, origin, passivity, and so on) and in contrast to other conscious mental
phenomena (i.e., perception, feeling, judgement, action, and so on), the
Subpersonal Account intends to identify the neurofunctional foundation of
whichever aspects of our conscious mental lives are essential to imagining.
That is, the Subpersonal Account is concerned with how imagining is realised in the brain, and not what it means to imagine something from the
point of view of persons. Accordingly, personal and subpersonal theories
that is, philosophy and the cognitive sciences have different goals and
employ distinct notions of fundamentality. The same is true of physics or
biochemistry and their concern with happenings in the mind or brain.
My third and final motivation for not spending more time on discussing
the Subpersonal Account is that the more philosophically minded theories
show a certain priority over it most notably with respect to issues of epistemic authority. If philosophy comes up with a satisfactory account of
imagining that makes good sense of the unity of the various forms of imagining on the personal level, it would be no reason to revise or give up this
philosophical view that the cognitive sciences were to reveal that there are
the relevant opponent processing channels and, hence, to bring about certain phenomenally individuated colour experiences. However, from the perspective of physics, these classes of reflectance properties in contrast to the reflectance properties
themselves are of no scientific interest. Physicists have been concerned with
developing and experimentally testing theories of how much of the incoming light
surfaces reflect, but not of the extent to which surfaces stimulate the opponent processing system or cause phenomenally different colour experiences (see Dorsch
(2009a) and (2010b)).

Introduction

17

no significant or interesting commonalities among all the different instances of imagining. Instead, and in the absence of further reasons to
question the philosophical view, it would be more reasonable to conclude
that imagining, as a personal-level phenomenon, has no single correlate on
the subpersonal level. Similarly, the fact that physics is not really concerned with colours does not undermine the attempt to formulate an adequate philosophical theory of colours (see Notes 17f. above). Of course,
philosophical theories of imagining need to be given up if they contradict
empirically well-supported versions of the Subpersonal Account (if there
are any). But, on the whole, the best philosophical theories of imagining
tell the cognitive sciences what to look for (e.g., for the neurofunctional
correlate of a particular kind of mental agency), and not the other way
round.18 Indeed, whether a given version of the Subpersonal Account is
successful should in part be evaluated in respect of whether it captures the
feature, or set of features, identified as being distinctive of all instances of
imagining by the best philosophical unified theory.

(iv) The Structure of the Book

As already touched upon, the book consists of four parts. Part One has the
function to set the stage for the subsequent critical discussions of the Epistemological, the Dependency and the Agency Account. It does so in three
steps.
First, it specifies the two main desiderata for any unified account of
imagining: extensional adequacy and explanatory power (see Chapter 1).
As part of this characterisation, Part One involves a characterisation of the
five central forms of imagining to be unified: sensory imagining, affective
imagining, intellectual imagining, experiential imagining, and imaginative
projects (see Chapter 1). It also includes a description of the main features
of imaginative episodes to be explained most notably their lack of a cognitive attitude and of an epistemic function and, indeed, provides a first
tentative reason for the endorsement of the Agency Account, namely that it
18

See Dorsch (2010b) and Dorsch (2010a) for a similar division of labour between
philosophy and the empirical sciences in the case of colours and of hallucinations,
respectively.

18

Introduction

promises the best explanation of the quasi-observationality of sensory imaginings (see Chapters 2f.).
Second, Part One is concerned with the relationship between imagining
and knowledge. In particular, it argues that certain instances of sensory
imagining can constitute knowledge in a way very similar to that of perceptual experiences and, in response to this observation, asks in which
sense (if any) imaginings can still be said to be uninformative with respect
to the external world (see Chapter 4).
Third, Part One finishes with a discussion of the less important unified
accounts of imagining listed above (see Chapter 5). The only exceptions
are the Causal Account and the Subjection to the Will Account, which are
briefly discussed in the Chapters 9 and 13, respectively; as well as the Subpersonal Account, which is, as mentioned above, not further discussed at
all.
Part Two is concerned with the characterisation (see Chapters 6f.) and
rejection (see Chapter 8) of the various versions of the Epistemological Account of imagining, formulated in terms of the alleged inability of imaginings to be reliable or rationally integrated with our picture of reality, to inform us or provide us with knowledge about the external world, or to possess the commitment, justificatory power or epistemic function essential to
cognitions. The central component of this discussion is a detailed and
scholarly examination of OShaughnessys version of the Epistemological
Account.
Part Three deals with the various versions of the Dependency Account.
Chapter 9 highlights the relevant causal and representational elements in
Humes conception of imaginings and reveals its continuity with more contemporary neo-Humean views that understand the assumed dependency
of imaginings on cognitions in purely representational terms. Together with
the following two chapters, it is also devoted to the applicability of the resulting Representational Account that is, the representational version of
the Dependency Account to intellectual imaginings (see Section 9.5),
imaginative projects (see Section 9.6), sensory imaginings (see Chapter 10)
and emotional imaginings (see Chapter 11). The conclusion to be put forward is that, while the Representational Account is probably true of sensory and emotional imaginings, it fails to pay justice to the nature of the

Introduction

19

other two forms of imagining. Part Three concludes with a negative assessment of the prospects of devising a unified account of imagining by reference to the idea that imaginings simulate or otherwise imitate cognitions
(see Chapter 12).
The final Part Four develops and defends the Agency Account of imagining. It does so, first of all, by spelling out the main thesis of the theory,
distinguishing it from the Subjection to the Will Account and presenting an
argument in favour of the endorsement of the Agency Account (see
Chapter 13). The central claim of this account is that imaginings are to be
identified with mental actions that have the purpose of producing mental
mental representations and of applying direct control over which states of
affairs are thereby represented. And it is crucial for the truth of this view is
that the kind of mental agency involved is essential to the formed
imaginative representations, thus ruling out the possibility of passive
imaginings. In addition, Part Four illustrates how the Agency Account can
meet the two desiderata for unified theories of imagining established
earlier and deal with potential counterexamples, notably the imaginative
counterparts to non-representational phenomena, as well as spontaneously
occurring images and thoughts (see Chapter 14).
Many of the parts, chapters and sections of the book are more or less
self-contained and can be read fairly independently of the others. Engagement with Part Two and the Epistemological Account requires mainly
knowledge of Chapter 1 and Sections 2.1f., although reading at least the
first half of Chapter 4 will be helpful as well. In addition, the reader may
decide to skip most of Chapter 6 and all of Chapter 7 if (s)he is not interested in the details of OShaughnessys theory of imagining and his more
general approach to conscious awareness. For Chapter 6 begins with a brief
synopsis of the main claims and arguments of OShaughnessys, which
provides all the information necessary to proceed directly with Chapter 8.
Part Three (the Dependency Account) and Part Four (the Agency Account)
presuppose even less than Part Two, namely really not much more than acquaintance with the content of Chapter 1, as well as perhaps Sections 2.1f..
Both Chapter 10 and Chapter 11 on sensory and on emotional imagining,
respectively can be read largely on their own, which is in part due to the
fact that they are based on previously published material. Similarly, the dis-

20

Introduction

cussion of the (neo-)Humean approach to imagining and its rejection as a

unified account in Chapter 9 is relatively self-contained; as is the discussion of the idea that imaginings imitate cognitions in Chapter 12. Chapter
13 constitutes a reasonably free-standing vindication of the Agency Account, with some additional support by Chapter 14. Besides, the Chapters
1, 2, 3 and 5 in Part One may be used as introductory readings to the topic
of imagining, given that they highlight the main forms and features of imagining and portray many of the theories of imagining to be found in the
literature.
Although the outlook and structure of the book is primarily systematic
in its focus on the issue of the unity of imagining, it also includes substantial critical studies of the views of particular philosophers. These views do
not always constitute proper theories or provide comprehensive accounts
of imagining, or of some of its specific forms (the views of Hume and Wittgenstein are good examples). But even if not, they are informative and instructive with respect to the ambition to provide a unified theory of imagining and, more generally, to understand what it means to imagine something. Discussions of the views of the following philosophers, among others, are scattered across the book: Hume (Chapter 9); Husserl (Sections
2.1, 3.1f., 5.2f. and 5.5); Sartre (Sections 3.4ff., 4.5f., 5.2f. and 5.4f.); Wittgenstein (Sections 3.4f., 4.7 and 5.3); Ryle (section: 12.3); Casey (Sections 3.3, 5.2, 5.5f. and 13.5); White (Section 5.4); Peacocke (Sections 3.2,
3.5f. and 9.4); Walton (Chapter 11 and Section 13.5); Moran (Chapter 11);
OShaughnessy (Chapters 6ff. and Sections 9.4ff.); Martin (Sections 2.3,
3.2, 9.4 and Chapter 10); and Currie and Ravenscroft (Sections 12.1f.). Especially Husserls theory of imagining would deserve more attention. But it
is some compensation that most of his relevant and important ideas still receive due attention in so far as they can be found again in the Husserlian
account defended by Sartre (1940).
Finally, due to the partially modular structure of the book, many passages depend on or allude to discussions in other parts, chapters, sections
or notes of the book. Throughout the text, I use capital letters (and no
abbreviations) to distinguish these internal cross-references from external
references to particular elements or portions of cited works.

Conclusion

(i) The Agency Account

The principal aim of this book has been to investigate the prospects of formulating a satisfactory unified account of imagining. Its main conclusion
has been partly negative and partly positive: while most theories notable
among them the Epistemological and the Dependency Account fail to explain the unity of imagining, the Agency Account in its presented
manifestation promises to be true. Although the presented defense of this
view has by no means been complete and needs to be continued in more
detail elsewhere, it put forward four arguments for endorsing the Agency
Account: first, that all alternative theories cannot account for the unity of
imagining (see especially Chapters 5, 8f., 12, and Section 13.5); second,
that the Agency Account satisfies the chief desiderata for a unified theory
of imagining (see Chapter 14); third, that it promises the best explanation
of the quasi-observationality of sensory imaginings (see Section 3.6); and,
fourth and most important, that the imaginative agency involved in voluntary instances of imagining is essential to them and, hence, rules out the
possibility of involuntary instances (see Section 13.4).
The championed Agency Account takes imaginings to be mental actions
of a particular kind. More precisely, it claims with certain qualifications
that imaginings are mental actions aimed at the formation of one or more
mental representations of specific states of affairs, that are directly determined by the mental agency involved (see Chapter 13). That the determination of which states of affairs are represented is direct means thereby that

432

Conclusion

our voluntary control over what is represented is not mediated by the reliance on epistemic or merely causal processes as means. The resulting account can distinguish imaginative episodes from their cognitive counterparts and other non-imaginative episodes, given that the latter allow at best
for an indirect voluntary determination of their content. It also can distinguish imaginative projects from other kinds of mental projects, notably
from cognitive ones, which aim instead at the formation of cognising representations.
More generally, while the explanatory power and fundamentality of the
Agency Account with respect to the unity of imagining should be fairly uncontroversial, its extensional adequacy needs to be further defended against
several potential counterexamples. On the assumption that cognitive and
other non-imaginative representations do not allow for the voluntary and
direct determination of their content, my discussion has been primarily
concerned with cases that appear to be either non-representational, or passively or indirectly determined instances of imagining.
The best candidates for non-representational imaginings are imaginings
with non-representational counterparts. Plausible examples are imagined
pains or imaginatively felt anxiety assuming, for the sake of argument,
that genuine feelings of pain or anxiety do not show any form of
representationality. However, such cases are most fittingly understood as
instances of experiential imagining: namely as representations of their nonimaginative counterparts. Imagining a pain thus amounts to imaginatively
representing the occurrence of a real pain.
The array of potential examples of passively or indirectly determined
imaginings, on the other hand, is more varied, ranging from spontaneous
images and thoughts via obsessive mental representations to pictorial experiences or non-purposive associations (although the last two are not
really discussed in this book). The already mentioned argument to the effect that the direct mental agency involved in voluntary imagining is essential to its instances entails, however, that there is a basic difference in
nature between active imaginings and all passive representations, indicating that the latter belong to a different and, presumably, non-imaginative
mental kind. Hence, none of the listed phenomenal poses a threat to the
Agency Account of imagining. Spontaneous representations, for instance,

Conclusion

433

are simply very closely related to imaginings in so far as and in contrast,

say, to perceptual images they allow for their voluntary sustainment and
transformation, albeit with the major consequence that they change in
nature and turn from spontaneous into imaginative episodes, once they are
subjected to imaginative activity. I return to the issue of how the Agency
Account might deal with obsessive images and thoughts further below.
The explanatory power and extensional adequacy of the Agency Account also ensures that it has the resources to satisfy the basic need that has
motivated the search for a unified account of imagining: namely the desire
to explain the fact that we group together a variety of apparently very different phenomena under the heading imaginings, as well as the fact that
our corresponding categorisations of phenomena as either imaginative or
non-imaginative are typically immediate, assured and stable. The idea is, of
course, that our classifications track a certain feature that is responsible for
the unity of the class of imaginings, and the presence of which we can normally become aware of by means of introspection. According to the
Agency Account, the feature in question is the distinctive and phenomenologically salient active character of imaginings, as specified by the thesis
(ACT).1
There is a closely related and particularly noteworthy respect in
which the approach of the Agency Account differs from the other theories
of imagining, notably the Epistemological and the Dependency Account.
The strategy of the alternative views has usually been to investigate the
nature of imaginative episodes (e.g., visualisings or suppositions) and to
compare them with, and set them apart from, cognitive episodes. As a result, they fail to pay attention or do justice to imaginative projects or other
mental complexes involving imaginative episodes. In contrast, the Agency
Account deliberately centres on mental activity, of which imaginative projects are a prime example, and contrasts it with mental passivity (independently of whether it pertains to cognition or not).
Before I continue with this last point in a short moment, it is worthwhile
to briefly pause and consider one especially significant consequence of the
active nature of imagining: namely that at least some visual imaginings
manage to constitute quasi-perceptual knowledge about the external world.
1

See Dorsch (2009b) for further and independent arguments and observations in
support of the phenomenological salience of direct (but not indirect) mental agency.

434

Conclusion

For they do so if and, presumably, only if they occur in the context of

mental projects, the successful pursuit of which guarantees that the visual
imaginings concerned turn out to be reliable and possibly non-arbitrarily
veridical representations of certain aspects of reality (see Chapter 4). The
projects in question involve the active imaginative manipulation of perceptually acquired or mnemonically stored information; and they thereby take
into account the relevant ways, in which entities like the originally perceived or remembered objects behave in the actual world. Thus, despite the
fact that imagining cannot provide us with new evidence about reality, it
can none the less provide us with (a priori) access to new information
about the external world, that could not be read off of the underlying cognitive states by non-imaginative means (e.g., simply by means of introspection and reflection). The existence of such cognising imaginings is one
reason why the Epistemological Account does not come to much. But there
are others, to which I turn now.

(ii) The Epistemological and the Dependency Account

While the Agency Account is able to satisfy the two desiderata for a unified account of imagining, its two main rivals remain wanting in this respect. This is primarily due to the fact that both the Epistemological and
the Dependency Account characterise imaginings in terms of their noncognitivity. While the Epistemological Account takes imaginings to be
non-cognitive in so far as they lack one or more features distinctive of cognitive or cognising phenomena (e.g., an epistemic function, or the power to
constitute knowledge), the Dependency Account assumes imaginings to be
non-cognitive in so far as they are constitutionally dependent on and,
hence, distinct from cognitive phenomena (namely in some substantial way
that reaches beyond the general restriction on what we can imagine by our
conceptual capacities and our past experiences). Both the Epistemological
and the Dependency Account are therefore first and foremost concerned
with differentiating imaginings from cognitions. By contrast, and as
already mentioned, the Agency Account does not particularly concentrate
on the relationship between these two kinds of mental state, but instead
takes the distinction between mental actions and mental passions to be fun-

Conclusion

435

damental.
The focus on the non-cognitivity of imaginings is problematic since
characterising imaginings solely in terms of, and in contrast to, cognitive
phenomena significantly limits the scope of the Epistemological and the
Dependency Account. For certain forms of imagining notably affective
imaginings and imaginative projects do not have cognitive counterparts
and, hence, resist specification in terms of them. As a result, the relevant
theories turn out to be explanatorily unilluminating if not extensionally
inadequate with respect to certain central cases of imagining. For instance, it is not a substantial truth about affective imaginings that they cannot constitute knowledge, because this applies to all kinds of affective
states, including non-imaginative ones. And that emotional imaginings are,
indeed, representations of non-imaginative experiences does not distinguish them from, say, episodic memories and, moreover, does not amount
to a characterisation of them in terms of cognitive phenomena.
However, accounting for imaginings instead by reference to both cognitive and non-cognitive phenomena threatens to lead to a disjunctive theory:
while the nature of some imaginings (e.g., sensory or intellectual ones)
would be elucidated in terms of how they differ from or depend on cognitions, the nature of others (e.g., affective imaginings) would be described
by mention of how they differ from or depend on cognitions. The pair of
intellectual and affective imaginings shows that this would result in some
form of disjunctivism, given that intellectual imaginings depend merely
generally and semantically on judgements or beliefs, whereas affective
imaginings are representationally dependent on specific emotional feelings.
Such a disjunctive treatment is, by itself, unproblematic but becomes untenable once it is presumed to provide a unified account of imagining.
In addition, the Epistemological Account and, in particular, OShaughnessys rich and sophisticated version of it faces objections that are more
specifically directed at its central claim that imaginings lack a cognitive
concern with reality, or a closely related cognitive feature. To begin with,
the Epistemological Account possesses only limited explanatory power.
For postulating such an absence of a cognitive property does not say anything positive about what it means to imagine something which is in part
why OShaughnessy, as the principal proponent of the Epistemological Ac-

436

Conclusion

count, supplements his theory with a representational version of the Dependency Account.
Another problem is that, depending on which cognitive feature imaginings are said to lack, the respective versions of the Epistemological Account are either false, or uninteresting, with respect to the ambition to
provide a unified account. Some are interestingly false because they cannot
allow for the already noted possibility that sensory imaginings may, under
suitable circumstances, constitute knowledge and possess the required cognitive features (see above and Chapter 4). Accordingly, imaginings are not
always deprived of the properties of being reliable, informative, grounded
in perception, rationally integrated with our picture of the world and, possibly, constitutively linked to the relevant aspects of reality. The other versions of the Epistemological Account, by contrast, are uninterestingly true
because their denial that imaginings do not show certain other cognitive
features does not distinguish imaginings from other non-cognitive phenomena. The observation that imaginings lack a cognitive attitude, have no epistemic function and possess no prima facie justificatory power with respect
to first-order beliefs does not reveal much about their nature, given that the
same may be discerned, say, in emotional or conative states and in nonimaginative mental projects.
On the other hand, much of the Dependency Account notably in its
representational version can be preserved, not the least its identification
of a core divide, on the level of sensory and affective episodes, between
original or genuine occurrences and mere representations or imitations of
such occurrences. This crucial distinction has already constituted a central
element of Humes approach to (non-intellectual) imaginings and is as illustrated in Part Three still present in many contemporary theories, the
history of which can often be traced back to Humes theory of the mind.
However, the Dependency Account does not apply to intellectual imaginings and imaginative projects and should therefore be rejected as a theory
of the unity of imagining.
Moreover, the main truths noted by the Dependency Account as well
as by the Epistemological Account can be accommodated and explained
by the Agency Account. For example, visualising a tree amounts to imagining seeing a tree in part because the only direct way of actively bringing

Conclusion

437

about a visual image of a tree is precisely to represent the instantiation of

the phenomenal character of a perceptual image of a tree, given that we do
not have any voluntary control over perceptual or mnemonic images, and
only some limited active influence on spontaneous images (see Section
14.4). Similarly, imaginings do not normally play a role in cognition precisely because they originate in epistemically unreliable imaginative activity (see Section 14.1). Because of this explanatory power, the Agency Account is also more fundamental as a unified account than its two rivals.

(iii) Other Theories of Imagining

In Chapter 5 and Section 13.5, I discussed further alternatives to the
Agency Account of imagining and argued that they are equally untenable
as theories of the nature shared by, and unique to, imagining.
The Quantitative Account, which takes the basic difference between
imaginative and cognitive episodes to be merely one in degree, cannot capture the various phenomenologically salient differences in kind between
the two types of phenomena, notably the episodic differences in attitude
and epistemic function.
By contrast, the Phenomenal Account is wrong in assuming the fundamental difference between imaginative and non-imaginative episodes to be
phenomenal in nature, primarily because phenomenal differences among
mental episodes (such as the difference in attitude and seeming origin
between imaginings and cognitions) should and can be explained in
more fundamental terms.
One problem for the Ontological Account which claims that the difference between imaginative and cognitive phenomena consists fundamentally in the fact that they are concerned with entities of two very different
ontological categories is that its postulation of the two distinct categories
of objects lacks independent motivation. In particular, neither semantic
considerations about the status of fictional entities, nor phenomenological
considerations about the difference in attitude can be of help here. More
important, however, the Ontological Account fails to accommodate the fact
that imaginings can and often do refer to precisely those entities which

438

Conclusion

we can cognise, namely aspects of the actual world.2

The best version of the Modal Account of imaginings assumes that what
is distinctive of them is that they are committed to things being a certain
way in some possible world, rather than the actual world. The resulting
view is, in fact, an instance of the Attitude Account and faces the same
general objections as the latter. On a more specific level, the Modal Account cannot satisfactorily deal with cases in which we imaginatively take
some state of affairs to be impossible.
The idea of one or more distinctive imaginative attitudes, as proposed
by the Attitude Account, is problematic for two main reasons. First, it has
difficulties to avoid the conclusion that non-imaginative phenomena like
episodic memories, spontaneous images or pictorial experiences also involve the proposed kind(s) of attitude. Second, it does not identify the most
fundamental difference between cognitions and imaginings, given that the
phenomenologically salient attitude of mental episodes is further constituted by some underlying aspects of their nature. Besides, some versions of
the Attitude Account apply only to some forms of imagining, but not others.
The Spontaneity Account, too, is forced to treat spontaneously occurring
images and thoughts as imaginative. For it specifies the nature of imaginings in terms of their special origin in the mind, namely in subjective responses or doings rather than in externally imposed mere happenings
which may be either voluntary (in the shape of agency) or involuntary (in
the shape of spontaneity). But the views attempts at characterising spontaneity do not enable us to distinguish imaginings from hallucinations or
episodic memories. Moreover, the account fails to unify the postulated voluntary and involuntary forms of imagining and, relatedly, wrongly entails
that spontaneous representations are phenomenologically closer to rational
judgemental thoughts and mental actions than to passive perceptions and
sensations.
2

Besides, any ontological difference between imagined and cognised objects would
very likely to be linked to and perhaps even due to some co-extensional difference in how imaginings and cognitions relate to the world or the will (e.g., if imagined objects would turn out to be mind-dependent). The investigation of the latter
difference might thus render the investigation of the former at best supplementary,
and at worst superfluous.

Conclusion

439

Finally, the Subjection to the Will Account (which was discussed in Section 13.5 rather than Chapter 5) is a watered down cousin of the Agency
Account, given that it demands the possibility rather than the actuality
of voluntary and direct control over what imaginings represent. But, partly
because of this weakening of the requirement on the involvement of imaginative agency, it is to be rejected for three reasons. First, it cannot pay
justice to the fact that directly determined mental actions are essentially
active in this way. Second, it wrongly locates the difference between imaginative and non-imaginative phenomena in the ability to engage in imaginative activity, rather than in the nature of that activity. Third, it wrongly
turns the question of whether an episode is an instance of imagining into an
essentially empirical question, thus ignoring the phenomenological salience of the difference between imaginative and non-imaginative phenomena.

(iv) Some Loose Ends

The acceptance of the Agency Account as the most promising unified theory of imagining does not mark the end of inquiry. As already pointed out
in the Introduction to this book, it is indeed necessary to provide further
support for the Agency Account and to elucidate in more detail how it can
accommodate a whole range of mental phenomena, in particular those
which could not be discussed in this book a task which I have to leave for
a future occasion.
As it stands, the Agency Account is true only if pictorial experiences,
non-purposive associations and similar passive phenomena are indeed not
imaginative; and only if we really cannot actively and directly determine
the content of our judgements, beliefs, memories, intentions, and other
non-imaginative representations. Although these two assumptions are presumably less controversial than many other claims made in the book, more
work needs to be done to furnish them with a satisfactory argumentative
grounding (see Dorsch (2009b) and (2012c)). Similarly, some of the accounts discussed in Chapter 5 probably deserve more attention, not the
least with respect to how they are related to the idea that imaginings are
mental actions of a certain kind. Especially the Modal and, more generally,

440

Conclusion

the Attitude Account may have much to say about the nature of imaginative
episodes (if not also of complexes thereof) and, in particular, about the distinctive commitment of imagining.
It would also be interesting to investigate the extent to which mental
phenomena, that are neither clearly imaginative nor clearly non-imaginative, involve or are at least closely related to imagining. I already briefly
listed examples of such phenomena in Section 1.3 and discussed there also
why their status is rather undecided. But the truth of the Agency Account
may have interesting consequences for them, which are worthwhile of further exploration. Pathological or psychologically unusual phenomena (e.g.,
intrusive or inserted thoughts, compulsive representations, delusions, hallucinations, etc.) may turn out to involve some form of suppressed, non-deliberate or unacknowledged imaginative activity. Hopes, wishes, expectations, anticipations or speculations may likewise involve imagining, perhaps to the extent to which they mark or recognise the concerned non-actual states of affairs as unrealistic or unlikely to occur (i.e., to the extent to
which they fail to take the represented states of affairs to be present in the
actual future). Finally, although experiences of grouping phenomena, or of
noticing aspects, allow for voluntary switches between experiencing one
thing and experiencing another (or, perhaps more precisely, between
experiencing something as one thing or experiencing it as another), it is unlikely that they involve some imaginative activity as part of, or in addition
to, active attention. For which groupings or aspects we can choose between
does not seem to be up to us. In particular, we cannot decide to see a horse
in the famous duck-rabbit picture, just as we cannot decide to see a horse
in an unambiguous picture of a duck (see Dorsch (2012c)). And this list of
applications of the Agency Account to borderline cases can surely be extended much further.
Besides, it is very appealing to bring the conclusions about the distinctive nature of imagining to bear on relevant issues in other areas of philosophy. As mentioned in the Introduction to this book (see especially Note
2), the imagination is a central ingredient in accounts of such diverse phenomena as thought experiments, modal knowledge and knowledge of
counterfactuals, our simulation of and empathy with other people, pretense
and acting, games of make-believe, the aesthetic appreciation of artworks

Conclusion

441

and other linguistic or pictorial representations, or moral evaluation. The

gained insight that imaginings are mental actions of a certain kind may
very well help to clarify the nature of some of these phenomena even if
only by disclosing that they involve imagining to a far lesser extent than
originally thought.3
However, the general limits on the length of a book like this meant that
the discussion of the nature and unity of imagining had to be restricted to
the critical presentation of the various candidates for a unified account of
imagining to be found in the literature, as well as to an elementary defense
of the Agency Account as the best available unified theory. As the main
thesis (ACT) of this theory states, a mental phenomenon is imaginative just
in case and, fundamentally, because it constitutes a mental action with
the ultimate intrinsic purpose of actively forming one or more representations with specific and directly determined contents.

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In this book, I discussed three specific applications of the imagination to other philosophical issues: to the acquisition of factual knowledge (see Chapter 4); to the acquisition of conditional and modal knowledge (see Sections 2.1 and 2.3, as well as
Williamson (2008)); and to our (emotional) engagement with art and fiction (see
Chapter 11, as well as Walton (1990) and Moran (1994)). I intend to elaborate on
these and other utilisations of the imagination in epistemology and aesthetics in a
future monograph.

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Index

Index

acquaintance 19, 361, 363; see also: mental representation

(ACT) 390-1, 395-7, 409-10, 413-5, 417-8, 420, 423, 433, 441; see also:
Agency Account
action see: agency
actualities 12, 161-2
actual world/situation 61-2, 64, 66-7, 75-6, 83-4, 115-6, 161-70, 172, 174,
246, 260, 297, 317, 341, 348, 372, 434, 438; see also: external
world; reality
aesthetic appreciation 2, 14, 46, 49-50, 52-3, 64, 270, 338, 340-1, 356,
387, 440-1; see also: art
affective imagining 4, 17, 27, 36, 41-2, 81, 256, 259-61, 263, 265, 279,
292-3, 295, 298, 301, 306, 308, 337-64 passim, 370, 373, 382, 413,
420-3, 435; see also: bodily sensation; emotional imagining
agency 101-3, 138-9, 180-1, 184-8, 381-7, 396-407; see also: intention;
motivation; volition
bodily 121, 374-6, 386-7, 399-401
involving control 13-4, 19, 63, 119, 140, 142-6, 157, 180-1, 200, 243,
249, 264, 269, 272, 357, 364, 382, 386, 388-9, 404-7, 414, 432,
437, 439
direct 10, 19, 52, 112, 185, 188, 264, 357-8, 385, 389-90, 392-8, 4017, 411-5, 417-8, 420-1, 423, 426, 431-3, 436, 439, 441
mental 2, 8, 10-1, 17, 19, 31, 93, 105, 110, 116, 133, 176, 179-181,
183-8, 192, 249-250, 262, 264, 271-2, 357, 378, 381-407 passim,
410-1, 413-7, 426, 431-4, 438, 441; see also: Agency Account

456

Index

agency (contd.)
non-mental 179, 386-7
sub-intentional 93, 111, 143, 249-50, 392, 401, 424, 440
voluntary 2, 8, 10-1, 13-4, 63, 101-2, 112, 138-44, 146, 157, 178-82,
184-7, 199-200, 210, 247, 357-8, 364, 372, 381-2, 385, 388-90,
392, 394, 397, 399, 404-6, 413, 431-3, 437-40
Agency Account 2, 8, 10-1, 13, 17, 19-20, 24, 30-1, 55, 83, 85, 104-6,
111-2, 139, 143, 146, 149-50, 176, 188, 192, 247, 262, 271-2, 279,
364, 370, 378-9, 381-429 passim, 431-4, 436-7, 439-41; see also:
(ACT); Constitutive View of voluntary imaginings
Alain 140
anaesthesia see: states of consciousness
anticipation 51, 55-7, 354, 374, 440
anxiety 260, 421, 432
Argument from Attention 214, 218, 221, 247
Argument from Origin 200-1, 214, 216, 219, 221-2, 242, 247, 251, 257,
268, 271, 378
Armstrong, D. 54, 394
art 2, 46, 53, 328, 339-41, 343, 345-7, 349-51, 355-6, 360, 363-4, 440-1;
see also: aesthetic appreciation
assertion 35, 63, 72, 375
association 11, 93, 104, 110-1, 140, 145, 179-80, 184, 227, 249, 266, 281,
393, 405, 419, 424, 428, 432, 439
assuming 42-3, 64, 68
attention 20, 39-40, 47, 52-3, 72, 91-3, 124-5, 138, 140-1, 174, 182, 195,
197, 214, 218, 221-5, 228, 247-51, 318, 323, 349, 376-7, 390, 392,
404, 425, 433, 439-40; see also: Argument from Attention
object-directed 92, 178, 222
attitude/commitment 12-3, 18, 23, 32-4, 59-68, 73, 75, 83-4, 87, 129, 143,
149-52, 154, 156-8, 161-78 passim, 184-5, 187, 206, 224, 243, 245,
254, 296-7, 303, 307, 333-4, 351, 368, 377, 407, 412, 416, 422,
437-8, 440
conative see: attitude, practical
cognitive 13, 17, 54, 59, 62-4, 72-3, 80, 83, 128-9, 144, 163, 166,
169-70, 172-4, 238, 245, 258, 260, 267-8, 271, 290, 294, 297, 305,

Index

457

309, 332, 375, 396, 410, 412-3, 424-5, 428, 436

attitude/commitment (contd.)
denying actuality 13, 51, 67, 161, 163, 170-5
denying existence 13, 170-5, 428
denying presence 13, 65, 171-5, 184, 186
imaginative 13, 64-5, 74-5, 159, 163-4, 166, 169-175, 303, 306, 377,
438
neutralising/suspending 171-5
practical 35, 67-8, 71, 111, 118-9, 122, 184-5, 187, 338, 385, 388, 415
theoretical 10, 12-3, 61-70, 75, 84, 90, 93, 99, 111-2, 116, 144, 155,
157, 162-4, 175-6, 185, 187, 258, 310, 338, 388, 416
Attitude Account see: imagining, accounts of
Audi, R. 395, 400-401
auditory awareness see: sense modalities
autism 15, 331
awareness see: consciousness; mental representation
awareness of the outer world 234-42; see also: perceptual contact with
reality; rational integration
Bayne, T. 55
belief 5, 8-10, 15, 24, 30-1, 33-5, 42-3, 46, 52-3, 55-56, 60-1, 63-6, 6973, 76, 89-91, 93, 115-8, 121-4, 126, 128-30, 136, 144, 149, 162,
170, 172-4, 194-5, 199, 202, 206-7, 210, 214-9, 221, 223, 228-34,
236-47, 256-8, 260, 262, 267-71, 275-7, 282, 284, 289-91, 293-5,
297-8, 300, 302-10, 316, 318, 337, 339, 341, 343-7, 356, 358-9,
366, 369-74, 376, 378, 386-9, 410-3, 415-6, 419, 422, 428, 435-6,
439-40
Berg, A. 73, 75, 229
Berkeley, G. 37, 82
blind people 367
Block, N. 47
blur 85, 318
bodily sensation 10, 37, 41, 47, 81, 85, 180, 186, 194, 224-8, 249, 259-60,
266, 275-6, 281-2, 293, 297, 314, 322, 337, 346, 353, 361, 438; see
also: sense modalities

458

Index

real vs. imagined itches 4, 41, 50, 61, 306, 315, 318, 322-3, 361, 4201, 423
bodily sensation (contd.)
real vs. imagined pain 36, 41, 82, 85, 150, 292, 315, 322, 338, 361-2,
386, 421-3, 432
Bodrozic, D. 154, 156-157
Braddon-Mitchell, D. 71
brain see: neural/neurofunctional
Budd, M. 5, 10, 45, 48, 59, 73, 82, 143, 145, 180, 270, 277, 382, 394
Burge, T. 48, 69, 71, 294, 325-6, 329-30, 366
Campbell, J. 316, 324
Carroll, N. 392
Carruthers, P. 41, 47, 370
Casey, E. 1, 3-4, 12-13, 20, 37, 42, 46, 73, 80, 85-7, 139, 152, 155-6, 164,
172-3, 177-8, 180-3, 185-6, 188, 269, 405, 424, 426-8
Causal Account see: imagining, accounts of
Causal View of voluntary imaginings 398-403
chess 261, 387
children 44, 330-1, 374
cognising episodes/states 3, 12, 18, 24, 60, 71, 73, 81, 115-8, 122-5, 1279, 131-4, 136-7, 141, 144, 146, 154-5, 195, 199-200, 202, 205-6,
211-6, 221-2, 226, 228-32, 234, 236, 239-41, 244-5, 257-65, 267-8,
270-2, 293, 305, 311, 378, 381-2, 396, 410-4, 428, 432, 434-6, 438;
see also: cognition; knowledge; perception; recognition
cognition 8-9, 32, 56, 59, 62, 70-2, 84, 103, 115, 128-9, 149, 154, 187,
195, 199, 203, 207, 245, 259-62, 296, 298, 300-1, 428, 433, 437;
see also: cognising episodes/states; perception; knowledge; recognition
cognitions 8-10, 12-3, 18-20, 23-4, 27, 30, 34-5, 56, 59-64, 68-73, 80, 845, 115, 124, 128-9, 134, 143, 146, 149, 151-7, 159-63, 165-7, 16970, 172, 175, 177, 187-8, 192-3, 195, 199, 201, 208, 211, 213-5,
218-20, 222-3, 231, 241-5, 247, 254-5, 258-9, 262, 265-8, 272,
275-9, 288, 293-302, 306, 308, 310, 365-73, 375-7, 381, 389, 407,
410-3, 424, 426-9, 433-5, 437-8; see also: belief; judgement; per-

Index

459

ceptual experience; memory

cognitive commitment see: attitude
cognitive constraints 8, 40, 44, 99, 115-6, 138, 141-6, 187, 195, 199-201,
214, 217, 219, 221-42 passim, 245-6, 256, 258, 267-8, 272, 328-9,
332, 392, 416; see also: awareness of the outer world; mental
representation; perceptual contact with reality; rational integration;
reliability; veridicality
cognitive episodes/states see: cognitions
cognitive ideal see: cognitive prototype
cognitive penetration 105, 110
cognitive projects 3, 35, 59-60, 76, 145, 192, 261-3, 266, 269-70, 272,
310, 377, 385, 414, 416-7
cognitive prototypes 127-8, 198-209, 211-9, 221-3, 226, 228-9, 232-3,
240, 242, 244, 246-7, 257-8, 267-8, 300, 304, 308
cognitive role see: epistemic function
coherence see: rational integration
Collingwood, R. 1, 3, 81-3, 272, 382-3, 405, 423
colour 15-7, 62, 67-8, 82, 90, 95, 102, 110, 124, 134, 136, 159, 176, 2258, 248-9, 285-6, 289, 293, 299, 309, 346, 366-7, 388-9, 414
commitment see: attitude
Conan-Doyle, A. 52, 68
conceivability 3, 162
conceptualisation see: mental representation
consciousness 16, 19, 30, 35, 41, 44, 47, 49, 51-2, 54, 60, 63, 69, 71, 88,
92-3, 100-2, 111, 113, 125, 140-1, 151, 155, 165, 172-3, 177-9,
183-7, 197-8, 200, 207, 218, 223, 225, 230, 233-5, 237-9, 241, 247,
249-50, 260, 283-4, 290, 302-3, 308, 386-7, 389, 394, 399, 407,
410, 425; see also: phenomenal character/aspects; phenomenological salience
consistency see: rational integration
constituting knowledge see: cognising episodes/states
Constitutive View of voluntary imaginings 398-403
content 4, 10, 12, 19, 33-4, 37-42, 44, 48, 52, 59, 61-3, 74, 84, 87, 93, 95,
97-8, 103-4, 106-7, 111, 113, 118, 120-1, 134-5, 139-42, 144, 146,
157, 161-2, 171, 173, 175, 180, 182, 206-8, 225-6, 235, 240, 245,

460

Index

248-9, 264, 275, 277, 285, 287, 293, 295-300, 303-7, 309, 334-5,
339-40, 343, 347, 351, 353-4, 356-61, 365, 368, 370-1, 388-90,
393, 395, 397-8, 404-5, 411-2, 414-8, 420, 422, 425-7, 432, 439,
441; see also: mental representation
conventions 7, 328, 346-7, 349
copies see: dependency of imaginings on cognitions
counterfactuals 3, 66, 310, 369, 440
counterparts see: echo claims
Crane, T. 33, 62, 96, 168, 260, 421
creativity 3, 24, 32, 46-7, 64, 177-8, 184, 307, 338, 383; see also: imaginativeness
Crowther, T. 182
Cruz, J. 69-70, 240, 256, 305
Currie, G. 3-4, 9, 15, 20, 37, 41-4, 46, 59, 84, 276-7, 304, 326, 330, 3345, 337, 353, 366, 368-71, 374-5, 395
Dancy, J. 270, 399
Danto, A. 395
Davidson, D. 240
daydreaming see: imagining, forms of
delusions 15, 54-6, 216, 378, 440
Dennett, D. 47
dependency of imaginings on cognitions; see also: echo claims
asymmetric 9, 370-2
causal (EC) 284-5, 288, 292-4, 296, 298, 365, 368; see also: imagining, accounts of
conceptual 369-71, 373
constitutive 272, 301, 369-71, 373
copies/reproductions 80, 84, 87, 159, 206, 208, 279, 282, 285, 287-9,
291-3, 298, 300, 302, 410; see also: Humes Copy Principle; pictures
imitational (EI) 9, 19-20, 205, 275-7, 280, 365, 368-9, 373, 375-7,
436; see also: imagining, accounts of
representational (ER) 84, 193, 197, 201-2, 205-6, 208-10, 212-3, 216,
220, 247, 279-80, 288, 292, 294-311, 313-6, 322, 325-8, 330-1,

Index

461

334-5, 337, 362, 364-5, 370, 377; see also: imagining, accounts of
dependency of imaginings on cognitions (contd.)
semantic (ES) 9, 146, 275-6, 280, 366-71, 393, 411; see also: imagining, accounts of
types vs. tokens 277-8, 286-7, 298-301
Dependency Account 9-11, 18-9, 30, 84, 149, 159, 188, 192-3, 197, 2002, 207, 213, 220, 255, 272-3, 275-80, 282, 295, 377-8, 381, 431,
433-7; see also: dependency of imaginings on cognitions; echo
claims
depiction see: pictures
Descartes, R. 240
desire 5-6, 9-10, 33-35, 41, 44, 52, 56, 67, 71, 73-4, 133, 146, 163, 209,
227, 260-1, 282, 293-294, 297, 303-4, 307-308, 337, 359, 370-372,
389, 405, 411, 415-6, 420, 425; see also: intention; mental representation; volition
Devil 168
direct agency see: agency
direct object/reference see: mental representation
disjunctivism 24, 33, 47-9, 89-90, 153, 258, 263, 305, 314, 334-5, 399,
435
disorders, mental see: states of consciousness
dispassionate imagining 266, 339, 351, 353, 356, 358-9, 361
dramatic imagining see: imagining, forms of
dreams see: states of consciousness
Dretske, F. 33, 71, 82, 95, 120-121, 128-129, 134, 153, 223, 233, 248
drugs see: intoxication
(EC) see: dependency of imaginings on cognitions
echo claims 34, 77, 84, 159, 171, 192-3, 197-8, 202, 205, 208-9, 212-3,
216-20, 255, 275-80, 288, 292-5, 298-9, 301-4, 307-10, 365-6, 3689, 371, 377, 422; see also: Dependency Account; dependency of
imaginings on cognitions
idea of counterparts 4, 9, 12, 19, 27, 37, 41, 59, 73, 80-1, 133, 149,
160, 173, 193, 195, 200, 204, 216, 243-4, 257, 260-1, 265, 272,
275-9, 288, 291, 293, 295, 300, 337, 365, 367, 369-71, 373, 377,

462

Index

413-4, 429, 432, 435

echo claims (contd.)
idea of dependency 276-7, 369
idea of inheritance 84, 277, 289, 295, 297, 333-4
OShaughnessys echo claim 201-2, 205-9, 212-3, 216-20, 255, 276
Eco, U. 43, 392
egocentric orientation see: perspectivalness
(EI) see: dependency of imaginings on cognitions
emotional imagining 19, 301, 337-64 passim, 419, 421;
see also: affective imagining
emotion 2-3, 6, 10, 15, 33, 35, 41-2, 46, 52, 63, 74, 187, 227, 260, 266,
270, 275, 282, 284, 289, 294, 297, 301, 309, 337-46, 349-64, 371,
374, 405, 415, 418, 434, 436, 441; see also: emotional imagining;
mental representation; moods; quasi-emotion
empathy 5-6, 15, 46-7, 271, 338, 353-5, 440
empirical evidence 14-7, 41, 43, 66, 131-2, 151, 179, 242, 310, 331, 338,
353, 367, 406-7, 439
empiricism 82, 241, 281, 298
entertaining a proposition 34, 37, 43, 167, 171, 270, 276, 295, 303, 305,
307-9, 353, 374, 376-7, 415-6, 425
entitlement see: justification
episodic memory see: memory
epistemic function/role 17-8, 23, 60, 62, 68-74, 81, 115, 129-30, 149-50,
152, 169, 187, 194, 228, 269, 272, 290-1, 296-7, 411-2, 424, 434,
436-7
Epistemological Account 8, 18-9, 30, 116, 149, 176, 187, 189, 191-4,
196-8, 200, 202, 204, 206, 208, 210, 212-4, 216, 218, 220, 222,
224, 226, 228, 230, 232, 234, 236, 238, 240, 242, 244, 246-8, 2501, 253-4, 256, 258, 260, 262, 264, 266, 268, 270-2, 276, 378, 396,
434-7
(ER) see: dependency of imaginings on cognitions
(ES) see: dependency of imaginings on cognitions
Escher, M. 168
evaluations 2, 27, 44-5, 51, 89, 144, 146, 149, 167, 181, 191, 195, 202,
248-9, 338-41, 354, 394, 441

Index
Evans, G. 134, 146, 258
evolution 71-2, 120, 129, 406, 411
examples
calculating a sum in ones head 130, 261, 386
chiliagon 406
Columbus 419
counting windows 3, 124, 393
Devils tuning fork 168
elephant in the city 64-6
field of daffodils 247-8
frogs and their lips 3, 125, 137, 141-2
Hamlet 341
hearing voices 54
Hercules 328
Hertford College 94-9, 103-4, 106-7, 411
imposter 95, 374
Jean of Arc 328
Macbeth 6, 155, 216, 244-5, 425
missing shade of blue 290, 299, 366
Mller-Lyer illusion 110
Napoleon 44, 46-7, 50, 287, 332, 417
Odysseus 154, 162
old friend 116-33 passim, 144-5, 267, 269
Pantheon 140-1, 249-50
Pegasus 176
Perkys experiments 151
Pierre 102, 179, 186
pink elephant 224-5, 232
Rambutan 367
Rome in snow 35-6, 41-2, 44, 46, 141, 391
Saint John 328
Sherlock Holmes 52-3, 68, 156
sofa in the shop 116-33 passim, 144-5, 267, 269, 414
suitcase with a cat behind it 97, 99, 328
Twin Earth 366

463

464

Index

examples (contd.)
Ulysses 107
unicorns 154, 299, 386, 417
Waterfall illusion 168
Wellington 395
wax replicas/fakes 90-1, 108-11, 254, 277
Wozzeck in the Opera Bastille 73-5, 229
expectations 6, 42, 55-7, 163-4, 173, 440
experiential imagining 4, 17, 37, 44-7, 49-50, 84, 97-100, 207, 295, 298,
308, 313-364 passim, 419-20, 422, 432; see also: imagining seeing;
S-imagining
Experiential Rationalism 412
experiments see: empirical evidence
explanatory power 17, 27-9, 106, 108, 210, 253-6, 259, 261, 264-5, 268,
334, 396, 409-10, 432-3, 435, 437
fundamentality 2, 11-3, 15-6, 29-30, 33, 48, 59, 77, 101, 133, 149,
152-4, 156-7, 161, 165, 169, 176, 187, 192-4, 197-8, 200, 202, 204,
207, 210-3, 220, 254-7, 264-5, 268, 271, 275, 293, 295, 302, 304,
345, 365-6, 372, 378, 382, 390-1, 394, 396, 403, 405, 409-10, 4134, 417, 432, 437-8, 441
informativity 20, 28, 254-7, 371, 409-12
extensional adequacy 2, 17, 27-28, 33, 51, 210, 213, 224, 253, 261, 2667, 310, 396, 409, 414-29 passim, 432-3, 435
external world 3, 13, 18, 69, 80, 115-116, 134-5, 141-2, 144-6, 158, 169,
184, 194, 219, 224, 233-5, 237-9, 241, 248, 256, 258-9, 267, 416,
433-4; see also: actual world; reality
factivity see: mental representation
faculty of imagination 31-2, 281
faith 338
fancy/fantasy see: imagining, forms of
fear 33, 42, 55, 164, 342-6, 349-50, 355, 357, 361, 363-4, 374
ficta/fictional objects 41, 154, 340, 342, 344-345, 349-352, 356, 363-364,
437
fiction 6, 15, 36, 41-3, 46, 68, 71, 97, 146, 154, 156-7, 170, 283-4, 338-

Index

465

52, 355-6, 363-4, 410, 416, 437, 441; see also: paradox of fiction
fictional worlds/situations 97, 338, 340-1, 343, 345-9, 352, 356
filling-in 140-3
first-order thought see: thinking
first-personal see: perspectivalness
Fodor, J. 71
foundationalism 240
Frege, G. 162, 416
function, biological/evolutionary 71-2, 120, 411
Furlong, J. 42
games of make-believe see: making-believe
Gendler, T. 3, 15, 42-3, 162, 168, 392
generic memories 93, 137, 141, 145, 393; see also: memory
Gettier, P. 232, 241
Giaquinto, M. 3
Gill, A. 77
Ginet, C. 104, 399
God 416
Goldie, P. 2, 46, 163, 260, 345, 354
Goldman, A. 15, 368
Gordon, R. 309
Goya, F. 395
grounding knowledge see: cognising episodes/states
grouping phenomena see: noticing an aspect
guessing 11, 187, 327, 386, 388
hallucinations see: perceptual experience
Harris, P. 15
Hawley, K. 67
Hawthorne, J. 3, 162
Heal, J. 15, 368
hearing see: sense modalities
higher-order thought see: thinking; introspection
Hjort, M. 42, 343

466

Index

Hobbes, T. 110
hope 33, 51, 55-6, 163-4, 340, 343, 371, 440
Hopkins, R. 1, 3, 5, 12, 37, 39-40, 46-7, 65, 84, 92, 101, 111, 151, 158,
175-6, 201, 250, 269, 277, 287, 305, 307, 309, 320, 348-9, 382,
419, 423
Hornsby, J. 104, 399-400
Hume, D. 4, 8-9, 12, 18, 20, 32-3, 62, 79-82, 150-1, 159, 184, 194, 201,
208, 269, 275, 279, 281-94, 296, 298-302, 333, 436
Humes conception of imagining see: imagining, accounts of
Humes copy principle 281-94 passim, 299, 333
Husserl, E. 1, 13, 20, 33, 47, 62, 64, 79-81, 83-4, 152, 158-9, 169-71,
173-5, 281
hypnosis 231, 234, 236, 240, 389, 397, 415, 417
hypothetical imagining 353; see also: intellectual imagining
illusions see: perceptual experiences
images 3, 6, 11, 19, 34, 38, 44, 54, 64, 74, 77, 79, 82, 86, 88-9, 92, 94, 98102, 112-3, 117-9, 121-5, 128, 131-2, 134, 139-41, 145-6, 172,
175-6, 178-9, 181, 183, 186, 224, 232, 249, 282, 285, 287, 296,
301, 309, 320, 329, 333, 357, 367, 369, 376, 378, 386, 393-4, 3978, 401-2, 405-6, 409, 423-9, 432-3, 437-8
images and thoughts 423-9; see also: images; imagining; mental episodes/states; thinking
difficult to banish 55, 393, 425
fleeting/transient 113, 140, 182, 357, 424-6
hypnagogic 140, 249, 378, 424
instantaneous 35, 140, 181-2, 424
passive/involuntary 13, 82, 102-3, 138-43, 177-82, 184-6, 199-200,
244, 247, 272, 383, 394, 397, 399, 402, 415, 424-5, 427, 431, 438
persisting 140, 175, 243, 246, 429
spontaneous 423-9; see also: spontaneity
surprising/unexpected 113, 181-2, 249, 419, 424
sustainment 103, 113, 177, 244, 357, 425-7, 433
transformation 113, 425-7, 433
imagination as faculty see: faculty of imagination

Index

467

imaginative commitment see: attitude

imaginativeness of persons/idea 24-5, 32, 355; see also: creativity
imaginative perception see: pictorial experience
imaginative projects 3-4, 11, 17-8, 27, 36, 46-7, 64, 66, 68, 77, 98-100,
116, 119, 128, 135-7, 142, 144-5, 150, 165, 192, 250, 259, 261-3,
265, 269, 279, 301, 309-11, 313, 320, 328-9, 353-4, 357, 365, 3778, 382, 396, 410, 413-20, 432-3, 435-6
imagined worlds/situations 61, 64-8, 75-6, 116, 250, 319-21, 325, 328,
330-1, 335, 347; see also: fiction
imagining
active/voluntary 10-1, 112-3, 139, 146, 178, 184-8, 199-200, 211,
246-7, 265, 381-2, 392-4, 396, 402-3, 413, 420, 432-3; see also:
Agency Account; Causal View of voluntary imaginings; Constitutive View of voluntary imaginings
akratic 143, 393-4
borderline cases 6, 27, 31, 49, 51, 401, 440
central/paradigm cases 2, 6-7, 17, 23, 27-9, 31-2, 34-8, 41, 50-1, 53,
55-6, 149, 210, 245, 255, 259, 266-7, 276, 280, 365, 378, 382, 385,
390, 409, 414-5, 417-21, 435
cognising 115-133 passim; see also: cognising episodes/states
compulsive 55, 143, 394, 405, 424, 440
conative 337
concept/definition 31, 202-13 passim, 217-8, 247, 308, 378
concreteness 388-91; see also: mental representation, general subject
matter
difference from cognitions 59-73, see also: mental episodes, difference in attitude/epistemic function
directness see: agency, direct; imagining, immediacy
dispositional 52-3, 376
effort 38, 393
embedded in wider mental projects 43, 64, 116, 145, 182, 269, 295,
298, 392, 414-5
essence/nature 2, 4, 7-8, 11-2, 16, 24, 27-8, 30, 116, 150, 192-4, 197,
199, 200-2, 205-7, 211, 213, 220, 245, 254-8, 261, 263, 265, 269,
275-6, 278-80, 294-5, 304, 306, 368, 371-2, 390, 396-403 passim,

468

Index

406, 409-10, 426, 432-3, 438, 440

imagining (contd.)
immunity to error through misidentification see: immunity to error
through misidentification
immediacy 76, 79-81, 83-5, 87, 127, 156-7, 160-1, 170-1, 208, 251,
287, 291, 295-6, 299, 322-5, 421; see also: mental representation
indeterminacy 68, 85-7, 375
informativity 18, 24, 80-81, 116, 126, 133-47 passim, 194-5, 381; see
also: learning
intellectual element 37, 77, 80, 92, 95-113 passim, 135-6, 139, 157;
see also: intention; S-imagining
limitations 9-10, 46, 160, 328-9, 366-8, 392-3, 434
mental kind see: mental episodes/states, mental kinds
non-central cases 51-7, 378
non-cognitivity 24, 54, 64, 163, 173, 175, 191-4, 213, 253, 260, 262,
265, 271-2, 276, 375, 378, 381, 413, 415, 424, 427-8, 434-6
non-representational 19, 62, 82, 85, 260, 265, 340, 383, 388, 409, 418,
420-3, 432
obsessive 54-55, 143, 393-4, 425, 432-3
object-directed 303, 314, 331, 334, 362-3, 419
objects of 23, 29, 32, 60, 71, 73-7, 94-6, 107, 121, 133, 145-6, 15461, 367, 410, 412; see also: imagining, particularity; imagining,
immediacy
origin in the mind 133, 176-9, 187-8, 193, 200, 222, 243, 428, 438;
see also: Argument from Origin; spontaneity
particularity 77, 95-6, 106-8, 112, 154
passive/involuntary 13, 178, 181, 199-200, 244, 246, 272, 383, 399,
424, 431; see also: images and thoughts
purpose 50, 390, 414-5, 441
quasi-observationality see: quasi-observationality
rationality 43-4, 65-6; see also: attitude, imaginative/theoretical; inference
reference to reality see: imagining, objects of
reliable see: reliability
repleteness 81, 334

Index

469

imagining (contd.)
simplest instances 47, 49-50, 99, 400
simultaneity with perception 38-41, 320-1
specificity in content see: imagining, concreteness
sub-intentional see: agency
surprising 131-2, 249-50
transparent see: transparency
unity 1, 5, 7, 11, 14, 16, 20, 57, 59, 105, 149-50, 152, 154, 167, 174,
176, 185, 294, 310, 359, 382, 431-3, 436, 441; see also: unified accounts of imagining
vagueness 81-2, 86, 406
veridical/correct see: veridicality
imagining, accounts of
Agency Account see: Agency Account
Attitude Account 13, 164, 167-70, 173, 175, 438, 440
Causal Account 18, 279; see also: dependency of imaginings on cognitions
Dependency Account see: Dependency Account; dependency of imaginings on cognitions
Epistemological Account see: Epistemological Account
Humes conception of imagining 18, 81, 279, 281-92, 294
Imitation Account 275-276, 365, 368-77; see also: dependency of
imaginings on cognitions
Modal Account 12, 24, 161-70, 176, 372, 438-9
Ontological Account 12, 24, 76, 154-6, 158-61, 167, 437-8
Origin Account 14
Phenomenal Account 12, 152-5, 169, 437
pictorial model 158-9, 170-1
Quantitative Account 11, 24, 150-1, 437
Representational Account 18, 30, 76, 159-60, 208, 275-313 passim,
370, 436; see also: dependency of imaginings on cognitions
Semantic Account 275, 366-8; see also: dependency of imaginings on
cognitions
Spontaneity Account 13, 24, 176-88, 438
Subjection to the Will Account 13, 18-9, 24, 143, 149, 383, 404-7,

470

Index

439
imagining, accounts of (contd.)
Subpersonal Account 14-8
unified accounts see: unified accounts
imagining, forms of
affective imagining see: affective imagining; emotional imagining
daydreaming 1-2, 4-6, 11, 30, 46, 53, 141, 269, 310, 337, 353, 357,
377, 385, 417-9
dramatic imagining 352-356
experiential imagining see: experiential imagining
fancy 43, 51, 55-6, 283
fantasy 4, 46, 175, 393
imaginative projects see: imaginative projects
imagined pain see: bodily sensation
imagined itches see: bodily sensation
intellectual imagining see: intellectual imagining
reverie 46, 72
sensory imagining see: sensory imagining; visualising
imagining seeing 5, 37, 45, 47, 49-50, 64, 97-8, 100, 207, 266, 298, 300,
313-35 passim, 348, 419-20, 436
imagining that see: intellectual imagining
imitation see: dependency of imaginings on cognitions
Imitation Account see: imagining, accounts of
immediacy see: imagining; mental representation
immunity to error through misidentification 79-81, 88, 94-6, 103, 106-8,
112-3, 131-3, 136, 139, 306, 396, 411-2
impossibilities 68, 168, 170
impressions vs. ideas see: Hume's Copy Principle
inclination see: motivation
indefeasibility see: justification
indeterminacy see: imagining
inference 15, 43, 66, 89, 103, 120, 123, 130, 185, 187, 246, 263, 270-1,
305, 316, 321, 353, 368-71, 376-7, 402, 407, 416, 418; see also: attitude, practical/theoretical
informativity see: explanatory power; new information

Index

471

inheritance see: echo claims

insanity see: states of consciousness
inserted thoughts see: thought insertion
intellectual imagining 3-4, 15, 17-8, 27, 36, 42-5, 52-3, 61, 64-6, 74, 77,
81, 96, 109, 159-60, 162, 165-8, 174, 199, 202, 205, 212, 215, 229,
246, 256-7, 271, 279, 293-5, 298, 301-10, 313, 347-54, 357, 35961, 364-6, 370, 373-4, 376-8, 392, 413, 415-416, 419, 421 435-6;
see also: assuming; dispassionate imagining; hypothetical imagining; make-believing; propositional imagining; S-imagining; supposing
intention 37, 71, 81, 86, 93, 100-7, 109, 111-3, 119, 121, 136-7, 139, 141,
144, 157, 171, 181, 243, 371-2, 383, 385-6, 388-91, 395-6, 399,
401-2, 404-5, 410-1, 419-20
intention-in-action 37, 81, 100, 103-6, 109, 111-2, 139, 396, 399, 410
prior intention 103-5, 137, 139
intentionalism 49, 208, 299-300, 314-5, 320, 335
intentionality see: mental representation
internal pictures see: pictures
intoxication 54-5, 187, 236, 244, 378, 397, 417, 424-5, 428
introspection 47-9, 54, 63, 65, 69, 93, 119, 151, 160, 178, 183, 187, 243,
260, 271, 402, 407, 433-4; see also: higher-order thought; immunity to error through misidentification; perspectivalness; subjective access
intuition 4, 407
inventiveness see: creativity; imaginativeness of people/ideas
Ishiguro, H. 73, 103, 373
itches see: bodily sensation
Jackson, F. 71
Johnson, M. 2
judgements 2, 6, 10, 12, 16, 24, 33-5, 43, 48, 55, 61-3, 65, 67, 69, 74, 76,
83, 88, 103-4, 115, 117-8, 121-8, 130, 150, 155, 158, 161-2, 165,
167, 173-4, 178-9, 183-7, 199, 206, 210, 215, 228, 231-3, 236, 241,
245, 247, 256-7, 260-2, 268, 270-1, 275-7, 282-4, 290-2, 293, 2958, 302-5, 307-8, 316, 337, 340, 353, 366, 370, 376, 385-6, 388-9,

472

Index

394, 412, 414, 416, 418, 427, 435, 438-9

justification 18, 31, 43, 59-60, 69-73, 89-90, 128-9, 137, 149, 197, 201,
233, 241, 267, 270, 279, 293, 316, 318, 340, 411, 425, 428, 436
defeasible 69-70, 72, 89-93, 108-9, 111-2, 136, 240
indefeasible 89-93, 108-9, 111-2, 136
prima facie 69, 128-9, 258, 260, 262, 267-8, 330, 410-1, 413, 436
Kant, I. 13, 32-3, 179-80, 184
kinaesthesia see: sense modalities
Kind, A. 3, 10, 42, 382, 392
knowledge 3, 9, 15, 18-19, 23-4, 31, 43, 55-6, 60, 66, 68-9, 71, 73-4, 76,
79, 81, 88-94, 100-3, 107-13, 115-38, 141-2, 144-6, 151, 186, 188,
195, 199-206, 209-10, 212-9, 222-3, 226, 228-37, 239-44, 246,
256-8, 261-2, 264-5, 267-8, 270-2, 276, 283, 287, 300, 304-5, 307,
316, 333-4, 338, 347, 357-8, 367, 374, 381-2, 385, 389, 393, 395-6,
402, 404, 410, 412-4, 416-7, 424, 433-6, 440-1; see also: cognising
episodes/states; cognition; justification; perception; recognition
Kosslyn, S. 3, 15, 124
learning 76, 88-9, 92, 134-6, 138, 142-3, 145, 270, 389; see also: imagining, informativity
new evidence 92, 130, 133, 146, 434
new information 120, 125, 130, 133, 136-8, 141-2, 144, 146, 195, 434
Levinson, J. 10, 42, 343, 382, 395
Lewis, D. 54, 73, 75, 120, 228
Locke, J. 33
Lowe, E. 395
Macpherson, F. 67, 88, 168
madness see: states of consciousness
making-believe 42-3, 46, 53, 71, 207, 243, 300, 302, 346-51, 363-4, 3734, 387, 410, 416, 440
Marbach, E. 159, 171
Martin, M. 1, 9, 20, 24, 33, 37-8, 41, 48-9, 52, 54, 62-6, 68-9, 73, 75, 77,
80-1, 83-4, 90, 100, 129, 137, 146, 153, 156, 159-60, 187, 201,

Index

473

240, 245, 248, 250, 254, 256, 258, 267, 276-8, 288, 297-9, 302,
306, 313-6, 318-23, 325-7, 333-4, 355, 361, 423
McCann, H. 104, 395, 401
McDowell, J. 90, 126, 146, 180, 184, 240, 258, 267
McGinn, C. 1, 3-4, 8, 10, 46, 52, 54, 155, 194, 269, 337, 357-8, 382
Meinong, A. 154
memory 2-3, 8, 10, 12, 24, 30, 32-5, 39-40, 48, 50, 54-5, 61, 63, 69, 73-4,
76-7, 79, 81-4, 87-8, 93-5, 98, 107, 111, 113, 117-9, 121-30, 136-7,
140-1, 144-5, 151, 153, 158-9, 164-5, 174-5, 185, 194-5, 199-201,
207, 214-5, 234, 241-2, 249, 257-8, 261, 267-9, 278, 280, 282-3,
285, 289-94, 296-9, 301, 309, 319, 321, 334, 353, 361-4, 367, 371,
383, 385-6, 388-90, 393, 395, 413-5, 417-9, 421-2, 427-428, 434-5,
437-9; see also: generic memory
mental agency see: agency
mental episodes 47-49; see also: imagining; mental representation
as indivisible 50, 400
as self-contained 49, 99, 176, 400, 416
complexes thereof 46-51, 68, 74, 100, 105, 262, 357-8, 396-403, 410,
417-420, 433, 440; see also: mental projects
difference in attitude 23, 59-68, 87, 152, 157-8, 162-76, 407
difference in degree/quantity 4, 11, 80, 143, 150, 290-1, 296, 418,
422, 437
difference in epistemic function 59-60, 68-73, 152, 169; see also: epistemic function/role
difference in kind/quality 4, 11, 59, 80, 108-9, 127, 143, 150-2, 251,
290-2, 296, 362, 422, 437
difference in nature 143, 177, 181, 188, 218-9, 222, 277, 399, 432
mental/natural kinds 5, 30-1, 150, 181, 201, 211, 340-1, 391, 398, 432
non-representational 19, 62, 82, 85, 260, 265-6, 340, 383, 388, 409,
418, 420-3, 429, 432
phenomenal difference 12, 48, 63, 73, 150-5, 157-9, 169, 177-9, 1845, 334-5, 437; see also: mental episodes, difference in attitude
introspective error 143, 151, 334-5
mental projects 46-50, 105, 115-118, 133, 180, 261-5, 355, 382, 415-6,
432-6

474

Index

mental projects (contd.)

cognitive see: cognitive projects
imaginative see: imaginative projects
practical 35
mental pictures see: pictures
mental representation 14, 16, 25, 32-4, 37, 76, 81, 96, 112, 120, 145, 153,
229, 232-3, 245, 260-1, 280, 295, 302, 313, 315, 341, 412-3, 421,
423, 432; see also: content
affective 33-4, 41-2, 260, 420; see also: affective imagining; bodily
sensation; desire; emotion; emotional imagining; moods
conative 41, 67, 100-1, 103, 112, 138-9, 158, 163, 169, 260, 265-6,
337, 354, 359, 436; see also: desire; intention; motivation; volition
conceptual 9-10, 32-3, 96, 123, 160, 181, 216, 236, 240, 293, 298-9,
328, 353, 359, 392, 418, 434
de dicto 109
de re 96-7, 101, 105
determinacy 12, 38, 68, 80-2, 85-7, 140, 150, 155, 249-50, 322, 334,
361, 364, 393, 410, 422
direct/immediate 37, 44, 66, 76, 83-4, 87, 126-7, 158, 160, 205-6,
208, 217, 224, 244, 259, 276, 278, 295, 300, 308, 361-2, 364; see
also: imagining
factive 74, 127, 259, 309, 320
general content 95-6, 160-1, 208, 300; see also: imagining, particularity
general subject matter 69, 388-9, 395
intensity 82, 150, 322, 334, 346, 361, 364, 406, 422
intentional/non-relational 33, 41, 49, 121, 128, 159, 164, 172, 205-9,
216, 223-6, 231-3, 238, 242, 258-9, 268, 282, 284, 298, 300-2, 311,
314-5, 320, 334, 383, 421-2
making a claim see: attitude
mode/manner 91, 96, 100-1, 157, 168, 176, 207, 215, 230, 307, 316,
339, 341, 351, 354, 357-63, 365, 370, 391
non-propositional/object-directed 32-3, 45, 101, 144, 156, 260, 302-3,
314, 334, 337, 339, 349, 361-4, 419
propositional 32-3, 41-2, 45, 62, 98, 144, 156, 205, 207, 212, 215,

Index

475

222, 224, 229, 276, 302-3, 307, 337, 339, 352-4, 356, 358-64, 4156; see also: propositions
mental representation (contd.)
relational/non-intentional 19, 49, 178, 187, 202, 206-9, 216-7, 258,
267, 276, 282, 284, 286, 298, 300-2, 361-3
representational element 34, 39, 93, 125, 159, 165, 171, 175, 293,
359-60, 377, 403, 416, 426-7; see also: images and thoughts; propositions
sensory vs. intellectual 32-3
teleological 71, 262
truth-evaluable 144-6, 195
vehicle 65
vivacity see: vivacity
mental rotation 66, 80, 88-9, 117-8, 130-2, 138, 145, 414
Meskin, A. 15, 168
Millar, A. 67, 90
Millikan, R. 71
Modal Account see: imagining, accounts of
modality 12-3, 61, 66, 161-4, 167-9, 175, 204-5, 327, 367, 391, 440-1
Mondrian, P. 270
moods 35, 255, 260, 266, 385, 388, 390, 402-3, 415, 421, 423
morality 2, 43-4, 338-9, 356, 392-3, 441
Moran, R. 20, 42, 337-339, 341, 345, 350-363, 441
motivation 9-10, 35, 42, 50, 59, 69-71, 100, 103, 142, 145-6, 175, 180-1,
185, 232, 238, 283-4, 318, 337, 339, 344, 346, 359, 363, 391, 3934, 410-1, 417, 424
Mulligan, K. 39
multiple use thesis 37, 98-100
negation claims 133, 193-5, 197-201, 205, 209-14, 216-20, 247, 251, 25369, 271, 279, 306, 308, 310, 410, 428; see also: Epistemological
Account
(NC) 194-5, 197, 200-2, 206, 212, 221, 253, 264-66, 268-71, 305
(NC*) 194-195, 197-202, 206, 210-2, 221, 247, 251, 253, 256-9, 2678, 271, 304, 306, 308, 378

476

Index

negation claims (contd.)

(NI) 133-8, 142, 146, 194-5, 253, 258-59, 266
(Ny) 258-65, 267-8
neural/neurofunctional processes 14-7, 40, 153, 160, 179, 248-9, 424, 428
new evidence/information see: learning
Nichols, S. 15, 41, 53, 374
Nida-Rmelin, M. 88
non-accidental veridicality 115, 118-9, 121, 145, 199-200, 229, 235-6,
239-40, 367, 434
non-actual objects 13, 51, 67-8, 161, 163, 170, 173, 440; see also: fiction;
possibilities; possible worlds/situations
non-imaginative phenomena 2, 6-7, 9, 11-2, 14, 27-9, 34-5, 43, 46, 51-2,
56, 149-50, 152-4, 163, 174-5, 185, 210, 212, 215, 255, 259-1, 2656, 270, 294, 297-8, 301, 309-10, 355, 358, 372, 378, 382, 385, 388,
395, 409-10, 413-7, 420-1, 426-7, 429, 432-40; see also: cognitions; cognitive projects
non-neutrality see: attitude, theoretical
normativity 305, 412
Noordhof, P. 37-8, 45-6, 84, 98-100, 207, 269, 326-33, 400, 419
noticing an aspect 52, 171, 440
object awareness see: mental representation
OBrien, L. 30, 180, 250
Ontological Account see: imagining, accounts of
Origin Account see: imagining, accounts of
OShaughnessy, B. 1, 3-4, 8-9, 18-20, 30, 32-3, 42, 46-7, 52, 54-5, 59, 62,
69, 73, 75, 84, 104, 116, 126-7, 129, 134, 138-9, 159, 178, 181,
187, 191-251 passim, 253, 255-9, 266-9, 271-2, 276, 278-9, 298302, 304, 306, 308, 313, 337, 349, 357-8, 378, 381, 383, 392, 3956, 399, 423, 425, 427-8, 435
Owens, D. 388
Pacherie, E. 55
pain see: bodily sensation
Papineau, D. 63, 71

Index

477

paradox of fiction 42, 340-5, 351-2; see also: fiction

particularity see: imagining
passions see: emotion
Peacocke, C. 1, 3, 9, 20, 33, 37-38, 42, 44-6, 69, 73, 75, 84-5, 94, 96-101,
103-5, 112-3, 139, 141, 250, 269, 276, 298, 302, 306-7, 313, 318,
328, 419, 427
perception 5, 16, 24, 33-4, 37, 39-40, 44, 48-9, 62-3, 65, 67, 70-2, 77, 812, 84-6, 88-93, 95-6, 102, 104, 107, 116-8, 123, 126-30, 132, 141,
144, 159-60, 171-3, 175-6, 178, 180, 182-3, 197-206, 208-9, 212-8,
222-30, 233-43, 245, 247-51, 257-8, 261, 266, 268, 281, 284-5,
290-1, 297, 299-300, 304, 309, 314-21, 323-7, 329-35, 337, 339,
341, 348-9, 362-3, 366, 369, 393, 407, 418-20, 427, 436; see also:
perceptual experience
perceptual contact with reality 126, 235-42, 258-62; see also: awareness
of the outer world; cognitive constraints
perceptual experience 2, 8-10, 12-3, 18, 23-4, 32-5, 37-9, 47-9, 54-5, 613, 69-71, 74, 76-7, 79-85, 87-9, 91-2, 94-8, 101, 113, 115-6, 11824, 126-9, 132, 134, 136, 139-41, 144, 150-3, 158-61, 165, 168,
171-3, 175-87, 194-5, 198-202, 205-6, 210, 214-9, 221, 223-6, 228,
230-42, 245-51, 254, 256-9, 261, 267-9, 275-8, 281-2, 284-5, 28893, 296-7, 299, 302, 305, 309-10, 314-7, 319-22, 326-7, 329, 3312, 334-5, 343, 352-3, 363, 366, 369-71, 376, 378, 383, 410, 412-3,
418-9, 424, 427-8, 438; see also: perception
conceptual 96, 240; see also: mental representation, conceptual
hallucinatory 17, 24, 44, 49, 54-5, 64, 75, 89, 97-9, 153, 155, 175,
178, 185, 187, 216-7, 225-6, 243-6, 254, 258, 315, 324, 328, 332,
378, 383, 401, 425, 428-9, 438, 440
illusory 89, 95, 110, 168, 217, 225, 224, 258, 324, 383
non-veridical 47-9, 153, 171, 224-5, 258-9; see also: veridicality
transparent see: transparency
veridical 47-9, 70, 153, 216, 226, 228, 230-1, 235-6; see also: veridicality
Perky, C. 151
perspectivalness
emotional 350, 354

478

Index

perspectivalness (contd.)
first-personal 48, 63, 113, 151, 160, 178, 186-7, 283, 314, 323, 348,
361, 406-7
hidden aspects of objects 80, 89, 99, 131-2, 138, 340
point of view 16, 40-1, 44-5, 80, 88-91, 131-2, 136, 317-8, 320, 325,
333, 342, 348, 354-5, 392
quasi-observational see: quasi-observationality
egocentric orientation 92, 316-8, 320, 322-7, 329-30, 332, 388
third-personal 47, 314, 348
visual 45, 88-9, 93, 108, 131-2, 136, 277, 306, 314-22, 325-7, 330,
332-3, 347-8, 355, 361
Phenomenal Account see: imagining, accounts of
phenomenal character/aspects 45, 47-9, 60, 62-3, 73, 81-2, 96, 152-4,
157, 169, 177-8, 183, 186-7, 201, 254, 283, 287, 289, 303, 310,
314-20, 322, 327, 329-30, 332, 337, 339, 361-3, 402-3, 412, 437
of judgements/beliefs 48, 303, 307
phenomenological salience 47, 59-61, 63, 65, 73, 81, 83-5, 129, 151, 157,
169, 175, 177, 179-80, 183-5, 188, 238, 245, 254, 272, 289-90,
297, 306, 339, 403, 407, 412, 433, 437-9
phenomenology 13, 49, 79, 143, 152-3, 157, 159, 169-70, 176, 186, 437
physics 15-7
physiology 249, 342-4, 425
pictorial experience 5, 11, 39, 45, 51, 64-5, 76, 101, 151, 159, 171, 175-6,
205, 210, 266-7, 309, 347-50, 358, 378, 423, 432, 438-9; see also:
pictures
imagination-based accounts 39, 347-50
as imaginative perception 205, 349
twofoldness 349-50
pictures 5, 34, 39, 64-5, 67, 69, 74, 76-7, 80, 91, 102, 111, 140, 158-60,
168, 171, 175-6, 210, 266-7, 270, 286-7, 298, 309, 318, 321, 328,
333, 335, 338, 347-50, 358, 395, 423, 440; see also: pictorial experience
ambiguous 358, 440
content 110-1, 175, 327-8, 441
internal/mental 34, 76, 88, 158-60

Index

479

pictures (contd.)
paintings 39, 111, 159, 176, 270, 287, 298, 328, 333-5, 347-8, 389
photocopies/reproductions reproductions 287-9, 333-5
photographs 102, 121, 130, 287-8, 333
portraits 158, 298, 328, 338
representing types vs. tokens 286-7
Pietroski, P. 400
Pink, T. 104, 139, 388, 415
pleasure 36, 41, 50, 63, 283, 342, 344, 385
Pollock, J. 69-70, 240, 256, 305
positing see: attitude
possibilities 12, 56, 66, 108, 161-4, 309, 352
possible worlds/situations 12, 67-8, 73, 155, 161-70, 319, 321, 324, 366,
405, 438
practical attitude/reasoning see: attitude
pretense 4, 9, 15, 89, 280, 365, 373-7, 440
propositions 34, 43, 45, 68, 162-3, 166-7, 205, 207, 270-1, 276, 285, 300,
303, 305, 307-9, 343, 347, 350, 353-4, 359, 370, 376-7, 388, 415-6,
425
Priest, G. 167
priming 110
proprioception see: sense modalities
propositional imagining 207, 212, 215, 229, 352-4, 359-61, 364; see also:
intellectual imagining
Pryor, J. 240
psychology 14
Putnam, H. 48, 294, 366
Pylyshyn, Z. 3, 15, 124
Quantitative Account see: imagining, accounts of
quasi-emotion 342-4, 346, 349-52, 356-8, 360, 363-4
quasi-observationality 18, 79-81, 86-94, 106, 108-9, 111-2, 131-3, 136-9,
156, 396, 410, 431
rational integration 18, 126-9, 172, 183, 187, 231-42, 246, 256-8, 260-1,

480

Index

267, 270, 345, 348, 368, 428, 436

Radford, C. 345
rationality 6, 18, 43, 60, 62, 65, 69-70, 73, 103, 122, 126, 128-9, 138,
153, 168, 174, 177, 179-80, 184-5, 187, 199-200, 219, 230-3, 23643, 246, 256-8, 260-1, 267-8, 284, 290, 305, 345, 368-9, 371, 376,
389, 392, 412, 418, 422, 424, 436, 438; see also: attitude,
practical/theoretical; inference; rational integration
Ravenscroft, I. 3-4, 9, 15, 20, 37, 41-4, 46, 59, 84, 276-7, 304, 326, 330,
334-5, 337, 353, 366, 368-71, 374-5, 395
reality 7-9, 13, 18, 23-4, 29, 32, 38, 41-2, 54-6, 60-3, 67-9, 71, 73-6, 81,
83, 87, 90-1, 94, 97-8, 106-7, 111, 115-6, 118-21, 124, 126-9, 1325, 141-6, 154-60, 171-3, 176, 178-9, 184, 187, 195, 200, 203, 205,
210-3, 215, 219, 221, 223-6, 228, 230, 232-47, 254, 256, 258-21,
264-5, 267-72, 275, 277, 284, 287, 289, 297, 321-22, 338-46, 34857, 360-4, 367-8, 375-7, 381, 396, 410-3, 420-3, 425, 428, 432,
434-6; see also: actual world; external world
reasoning see: attitude, practical/theoretical; inference
receptivity 13, 179-80
recognition 10, 118, 122-7, 171, 250, 269-70, 328, 331, 343, 347, 349,
355, 414; see also: cognition; knowledge; perception
recollection see: memory
reflexes 184, 401
regret 163, 340, 354
Reicher, M. 157
reliability 18, 71-2, 115-116, 118-9, 121-2, 125-126, 128, 130, 146, 199,
217, 219, 221, 223, 225-230, 232-3, 235-6, 239-40, 242, 246, 256258, 260-3, 267-269, 272, 411-3, 434, 436-7
religion 338
remembering see: memory
Representational Account see: imagining, accounts of
representational element see: mental representation
representationality see: mental representation
reproductions see: dependency of imaginings on cognitions; pictures
retina 224, 227
Roessler, J. 55, 394, 425

Index

481

Routley, R. 154
Russell, B. 157
Ryle, G. 1, 4, 9, 20, 34, 194, 276, 281, 373-6
sadness 125, 338, 354, 356, 389
Salmon, N. 154, 156
Sartre, J.-P. 1, 3, 8, 12-3, 20, 24, 34, 38, 62, 64, 73, 79-80, 86-92, 94, 96,
100-3, 116, 134-5, 138-40, 142-4, 151-2, 154-6, 158-9, 170-5, 17781, 183-6, 188, 193-5, 253, 258, 269, 272, 281, 320, 382-3, 394,
427-8
science 14-7, 33, 137, 248-9, 338; see also: empirical evidence; experiments
Scruton, R. 1, 3-4, 6, 10, 42, 46, 51-2, 54, 61, 151, 180, 304, 337, 357-8,
367, 369, 381-2, 394, 423
sculpture 85-6, 171
Searle, J. 33, 68, 103, 395
Sellars, W. 32
Semantic Account 287
seeing an aspect see: noticing an aspect
seeing-as 52
sense-data 49, 65, 160, 198, 206-7, 223-7, 259, 302
sense modalities 37-8; see also: bodily sensation
hearing 33, 35, 84, 207-8, 307, 348, 353-4, 359, 391
kinaesthesia 38
proprioception 38
smell 367
taste 71, 270, 286, 289, 293, 327, 367
touch 38, 88, 176, 353, 359, 367, 391
vision see: perception; perceptual experience; perspectivalness; visualising
sense of reality 243-4, 286, 289, 425
sensory imagining 4, 9-10, 12, 15, 17-8, 23, 27, 36-9, 41, 50, 54, 62, 65,
67, 74, 76-7, 79-98, 100-8, 111-3, 115-6, 118-9, 121-2, 127-31,
133-46, 151-2, 155-6, 158-9, 161, 165-6, 170-5, 177-80, 184-5,
199-202, 205, 210, 214, 217-8, 221-2, 246-51, 256-7, 263, 267,

482

Index

276-8, 292, 297, 299, 301-2, 305, 307, 313-4, 316, 325-7, 348, 3524, 357-8, 366-7, 369, 376-7, 382, 391, 393, 396, 410, 428, 431,
436; see also: affective imagining; visualising
Shakespeare, W. 341
Shorter, J. 373-374
Siegel, S. 144
Siewert, C. 47, 303
S-imagining 96-8, 100, 103, 105
simulation 4, 9, 19, 271, 275, 280, 365, 368-73, 377, 440; see also: imitation; Imitation Account
simulationalism 15, 371
sleep see: states of consciousness
smell see: sense modalities
Soames, S. 162
Socrates 287
Soldati, G. 41, 48-9, 73, 75, 85, 96, 169, 178, 187, 245, 259, 303, 307,
318, 370, 403
somnambulism see: states of consciousness
Sorensen, R. 3
Soteriou, M. 180
space 11-2, 39-40, 91-2, 99, 117, 145, 154-6, 173, 235, 316-7, 319-24,
330; see also: perspectivalness
spontaneity 6, 11, 13-4, 19, 24, 51, 100-4, 138-9, 175-88, 296, 301, 309,
357, 382-3, 393-4, 397, 402, 409, 420, 423-9, 432-3, 437-8
Spontaneity Account see: imagining, accounts of
Stich, S. 15, 374
Stock, K. 51, 358, 423
Strawson, G. 303
Strawson, P. 32
Stroud, B. 150
subjection to the will 82, 142-3, 146, 181, 243, 357-8, 404-5, 426, 428
Subjection to the Will Account see: imagining, accounts of
subjective access/indistinguishability 12, 16, 47-9, 54, 63, 87, 89, 127,
151-2, 183, 216, 245, 254, 283, 289-91, 297, 299, 339-40, 361-3,
378, 402; see also: introspection

Index

483

subjectivity 13, 60, 139-40, 159, 177, 179-80, 183, 185-6, 222, 242, 254,
283-4, 289, 315-6, 320-7, 329-30, 332, 335, 338, 342, 348, 350,
361, 438; see also: perspectivalness; phenomenal character; subjective access
subpersonal phenomena 14-8, 93, 104, 110, 152, 160, 179, 185, 428; see
also: neuronal/neurofunctional processes
Subpersonal Account see: imagining, accounts of
supposing 1-6, 12, 15, 30, 34, 42-3, 48, 61, 63, 69, 73, 96, 137, 150, 155,
164, 229, 270-1, 292-3, 295, 298, 307, 328, 351, 353, 359, 370,
416-7, 420, 433
states of consciousness/mind
anaesthesia/coma 230, 234
disorders/pathologies 27, 51, 54-5, 187, 231, 425-6, 440
dreams 51, 53-4, 216, 230-1, 234, 236, 238, 240, 245-6, 378
insanity/madness 282, 378
sleep 198, 230, 237, 241, 249, 282
somnambulism 236, 240
trance 230, 236
unconsciousness 52, 179, 230, 234, 238, 241, 424-5
wakefulness 54, 197-8, 230, 232-7, 239-42
stream of consciousness 47, 49, 140, 198, 233, 238, 284, 399, 425; see
also: consciousness; phenomenal character
taste see: sense modalities
theology 338
theoretical attitude/reasoning see: attitude
thinking 4, 38-9, 64, 93, 104-5, 110, 125, 150, 164-6, 251, 282, 295-6,
331, 347, 385, 400-1, 416, 419, 421, 425; see also: mental episodes; images and thoughts
first-order 68-71, 73, 149, 151, 207, 260, 262, 411, 422, 436
higher-order 209, 216, 260, 270, 295, 303, 307, 419
Thomas, N. 15, 367
thought experiments 3, 43, 310, 338, 353, 416, 440
thought insertion 54, 425, 440
touch see: sense modalities

484

Index

trance see: states of consciousness

transparency 65, 160, 250-1, 300, 313
Travis, C. 33
tryings see: volition
twofoldness see: pictorial experience
Tye, M. 15, 82, 153
unconsciousness see: states of consciousness
unified accounts/theories 2-9, 11, 14, 16-20, 23-5, 27-57 passim, 60, 79,
83, 106, 146, 149, 152-4, 159, 161, 164, 166, 170, 175, 178, 181,
187, 191-3, 195, 197-9, 202, 210-1, 213, 220, 247, 253-7, 261, 263,
265-6, 268-9, 271, 275, 278-81, 292-4, 298, 301, 311, 365-6, 371,
377-8, 381-3, 396, 399, 406-7, 409, 414, 431-9, 441; see also: imagining, accounts of; imagining, unity
desiderata 17, 19, 23-4, 27-9, 56, 60, 146, 161, 210-1, 213, 253, 383,
396, 409-29 passim, 431, 434
exhaustiveness/purity 192-3, 197, 201-2, 254-5, 266, 278-9, 294, 29799, 410, 435-6
explanatory power see: explanatory power
extensional adequacy see: extensional adequacy
unreal/non-existing objects 73, 154-8, 160-1, 170, 172-4, 203, 236, 244;
see also: fiction
values see: evaluations
Velleman, D. 41, 43, 46, 64, 68-9, 260
veridicality 31-2, 44, 47-9, 54, 62, 70, 75, 97-8, 115, 117-21, 125-6, 128,
144-6, 153, 158, 162, 178, 195, 199-201, 216-7, 219, 221, 223-33,
235-6, 239-40, 242, 246, 258, 268, 280, 300, 315, 322, 326, 367,
413, 420, 434; see also: non-accidental veridicality
visualising 1-6, 12, 15, 28, 30, 34-35, 37-40, 44, 48-50, 60-7, 69-70, 73-7,
83, 86-9, 91-6, 99-100, 103-4, 106-11, 117-20, 124-6, 130-3, 135-8,
140-2, 144-6, 150-1, 153, 157-60, 162, 164-6, 168, 171, 176-7,
207, 232, 243, 249-51, 269-70, 277-8, 293-5, 298-301, 313-35
passim, 345, 348, 353, 356, 358-9, 363, 366-7, 374, 387, 391, 393,
395-6, 399, 401-2, 405-6, 411, 417, 419-21, 426, 428, 433, 436; see

Index

485

also: imagining seeing

vivacity 4, 11-2, 56, 79-85, 87, 140, 143, 150-1, 282-5, 287-92, 294, 296,
299, 361, 364, 410, 421-2
volition 10, 35, 93, 104-5, 111, 117, 121, 123, 135, 139, 184, 250, 290,
310, 374, 399-401, 410, 415
Voltolini, A. 154
voluntariness see: agency
wakefulness see: awareness of the outer world; states of consciousness
Walton, K. 1-2, 4-5, 20, 41-2, 44-6, 51, 53, 71, 73, 295, 337-9, 341-343,
345-52, 356, 358, 360, 363, 374, 387, 405, 410, 415, 423, 441
Warnock, M. 32
warrant see: justification
Weatherson, B. 42
Weinberg, J. 15, 168
White, A. 1, 3-4, 12, 20, 37, 42, 164-6, 269, 337, 373-6
Williams, B. 37, 46, 63
Williamson, T. 3, 24, 66, 69, 76, 126, 129, 256, 258, 267, 441
willings see: volition
wishes 51, 55-6, 191, 440
Wittgenstein, L. 3, 8, 10, 20, 24, 31, 34, 38-9, 48, 73, 80, 87, 94, 97, 116,
134, 137-9, 142-6, 151, 155-6, 193-5, 200, 253, 258, 264, 269, 281,
320, 328, 381-2, 394, 429
Wollheim, R. 5, 10, 37, 43, 45-6, 77, 111, 171, 269, 298, 320, 349, 382,
392
wondering 36, 48, 61, 66, 125, 163, 169, 173, 303, 308, 415-6