Marmont Hotel vs Guiang

Facts:
a Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and petitioner Marmont Resort
Hotel Enterprises, Inc. Under the agreement, Maris Trading undertook to drill for water and to provide all
equipment necessary to install and complete a water supply facility to service the Marmont Resort Hotel in
Olongapo. In fulfillment of its contract, Maris Trading drilled a well and installed a water pump on a portion of a
parcel of land situated in Olongapo City, then occupied by respondent spouses Federico and Aurora Guiang. Five
(5) months later, a second Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and Aurora Guiang,
with Federico Guiang signing as witness., After some time, the water supply of the Marmont Resort Hotel became
inadequate to meet the hotel's water requirements. Petitioner Marmont secured the services of another
2
contractor. Marmont filed a Complaint against the Guiang spouses for damages resulting from their refusal to
allow representatives of petitioner and the second contractor firm entry into the water facility site. the Guiang
spouses moved to dismiss the Complaint. The spouses there assailed the validity of the second Memorandum of
Agreement, alleging that the subject matter thereof involved conjugal property alienated by Aurora Guiang
without the marital consent of her husband, Federico Guiang.
Issue:
nd

WON the 2 Memorandum Agreement was invalid for having been executed by Aurora Guiang without
the marital consent of Federico
Held:
Article 165 and 172 state the general principle under our civil law, that the wife may not validly bind the
conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband, who is legally the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. In this particular case, however, as noted earlier, the second Memorandum of Agreement, although
ostensibly contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with Maris Trading, was also signed by her husband Federico, as one
of the witnesses thereto. This circumstance indicates not only that Federico was present during the execution of
the agreement but also that he had, in fact, given his consent to the execution thereof by his wife Aurora.
Otherwise, he should not have appended his signature to the document as witness. Respondent spouses cannot
now disown the second Memorandum of Agreement as their effective consent thereto is sufficiently manifested in
the document itself.
Lacson vs Diaz
Facts:
In connection with a final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, the court
issued a writ of execution. the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental sent to the manager of Talisay-Silay Milling
Company, wherein defendant Diaz was employed, a notice to garnish one-third of his monthly salary and of any
other personal properties belonging to said defendant. Diaz filed with the court a motion to quash the writ of
execution and to lift the notice of garnishment (of his salary), on the ground that the same are not enforceable
against his present family. It was claimed that since the money-judgment arose out of a contract entered into by
him during his first marriage said judgment cannot be enforced against his salaries which form part of the conjugal
properties of the second marriage. Plaintiffs opposed this motion, for the reason that re-marriage is not a cause for
extinction of obligations. Appellant does not dispute the existence of the money-judgment against him in the

amount abovestated. It appears, however, that appellant, who became a widower in 1951, remarried in 1960. The
writ of execution and notice of garnishment in this case were issued and implemented in 1961. It is now
contended that, as the conjugal partnership resulting of the second marriage is different from that of the first
marriage, during which existence the obligation arose, such obligation, as far as the second conjugal partnership is
concerned, is personal to the husband and cannot be charged against the properties of the second union.
Issue:
nd

WON his salaries can be garnished being a conjugal property of the 2 marriage
Ruling:
[[ ]]

As a general rule, therefore, debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, 2 as well
as fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However,
[[ ]]
such obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 3 of
the new Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive property or the same is
insufficient. In the instant case, although it is not controverted that there is due and owing the plaintiffs-appellees
a certain sum of money from the appellant-debtor a personal obligation yet, it has not been established that the
latter does not have properties of his own or that the same are not adequate to satisfy appellees' claim.
Furthermore, there is no showing that the responsibilities named in Article 161 of the new Civil Code have already
been covered in order that the personal obligation of the husband may be made chargeable against the properties
of the second marriage.
Garcia vs Manzano
Facts:
Gonzalo Garcia alleged in his complaint that he and defendant are husband and wife but they have been
living separately from each other since 1948, all attempts at reconciliation between them having failed, and that
plaintiff and defendant acquired and accumulated real and personal properties; that upon the separation of the
spouses, the defendant assumed the complete management and administration of the conjugal partnership
property, has been enjoying said property as well as its accessions and fruits to the exclusion and prejudice of
plaintiff. Wherefore, plaintiff prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render a complete
accounting of the conjugal partnership property and its fruits, that judicial pronouncement be made ordering the
separation of the conjugal partnership property of the spouses, and that the rightful share therein of each of them
be adjudicated pursuant to law. Upon receipt copy of the complaint and summons, defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action because "it does not allege any of the
grounds recognized by Article 191 of the new Civil Code for decreeing a judicial separation of properties. Plaintiff
vigorously opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that he is entitled to some relief, legal or equitable, under the
allegations of his complaint, and that Article 191 of the new Civil Code may also be availed of by the husband
where the administration of the conjugal partnership property has been forcibly taken from him by his wife and
she abuses the management thereof.
Issue:
WON there is a separation of property
Ruling:

In the system established by the Code the wife does not administer the conjugal partnership unless with
the consent of the husband, or by decree of court and under its supervision "with such limitations as they (the
courts) may deem advisable". Legally, therefore, the wife can not mismanage the conjugal partnership property or
affairs, unless the husband or the courts tolerate it. In the event of such maladministration by the wife, the
remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the
wife and resume the administration of the community property and the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal
partnership. He may enforce his right of possession and control of the conjugal property against his wife and seek
such ancillary remedies as may be required by the circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any
unauthorized alienations or incumbrances, upon proper action filed for that purpose. For this reason, the articles
above quoted contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife (who is not the legal administrator of the
partnership) against the abuses of her husband because normally only the latter can commit such abuses.
Baluyut vs Baluyut
Facts:
The petition alleged that petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the deceased Enrique M.
Baluyut; that petitioners-minors are the illegitimate children of the deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said
deceased and petitioners' mother and guardian ad litem Norma Urbano; that petitioners were conceived and
born at the time when Norma Urbano cohabited with the deceased while the latter was already married to
Felicidad S. Baluyut; that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of children of the
deceased during his lifetime by direct overt acts of said deceased having supported and maintained
them. Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed administratrix of his estate, opposed the petition. A
decision was rendered declaring the intervenors Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza the forced heirs of
deceased Enrique Baluyut and ordering administratrix Felicidad Vda. de Baluyut to pay P150.00 monthly support
to Norma Urbano, guardian ad litem for the three minor children.
Issue:
WON petitioners were voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious
children
Ruling:
There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the petitioners were recognized by
the deceased during his lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners' records of birth, although in the name
of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was no authentic writing presented nor any statement
in a court of record which would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased. With regard to
compulsory recognition, Article 283 enumerates the cases where the father is obliged to recognize the child as
his. since the recognition sought in the case is compulsory, strictness in the application of the rules applies. In
actions to compel the alleged father to acknowledge his natural child, based upon recognition in an indubitable
writing, article 135, par. 1, of the Civil Code, requires that the father must expressly recognize his paternity.
De Jesus vs De Jesus
Facts:
Antonia Loanco was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendants brother in law Vicente
Mendoza. Cesar Syquia was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with
Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born, In

the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. he even wrote a letter to a rev father
confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country,
he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and juniors sake. After giving
birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for
about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married
with another woman at this time.
Issue:
Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia
during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
Ruling:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are
sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing
shall be indubitable.
Luna vs IAC
Facts:
This case involved a contest of the custody of a nine year old child, Shirley, who was given by her parents,
just two or four months after her birth, to the custody of Mr. and Mrs. Horacio Luna. Horacio was the illegitimate
father of Shirleys mother. The natural parents were awarded custody over Shirley. When the judgment became
final, execution was issued, but a new development happened whereby the child manifested that she would kill
herself or run away from home if she should be taken away by the parents from the grandparents
Issue:
WON procedural rules should prevail over and above the desire and preference of the child, to stay with
her grandparents instead of her biological parents
Ruling:
In the instant case, the petitioners claim that the child's manifestation to the trial court that she would kill
herself or run away from home if she should be forced to live with the private respondents is a supervening event
that would justify the cancellation of the execution of the final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. The
manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be taken away
from the herein petitioners and forced to live with the private respondents, made during the hearings on the
petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of execution. This means that the best interest of the minor can override
procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life and
existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts
can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in
an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development.
Pineda vs IAC
Facts:

Prime Marine Services, Inc. procured a Group Policy from Insular LifeAssurance Co., Ltd. to provide life
insurance coverage to its sea-based employees. During the effectivity of the policy, sixcovered employees perished
at sea when their vessel sunk. They were survived by the complainants-appellees, thebeneficiaries under the
policy. The beneficiaries, except the spouses Alarcon, executed special powers of attorney authorizing Capt. Nuval,
President and General Manager of PMSI, to , among others, follow
up, ask, demand, collect and receive for their
benefit indemnities of sums of money due them relative to the sinking of the vessel. By virtue of these written
powers of attorney, complainants-appellees were able to receive their respective death benefits.
Unknown to them, however,PMSI, in its capacity as employer and policyholder of the life insurance of its deceased
workers, filed with Insular Lifeformal claims for and in behalf of the beneficiaries, through Capt. Nuval. When the
complainants-appellees learned that they were entitled, as beneficiaries, to life insurance benefitsunder a group
policy, they sought to recover these benefits from Insular Life but the latter denied their claim on theground that
the liability to complainants-appellees was already extinguished.
Issue:
Whether or not Insular Life is bound by the misconduct of the employer
Ruling:
We are convinced that the employer is the agent of the insurer in performing the duties of administering
group insurance policies. It cannot be said that the employer acts entirely for its own benefit orfor the benefit of
its employees in undertaking administrative functions. While a reduced premium may resultif the employer
relieves the insurer of these tasks, and this, of course, is advantageous to both the employerand the employees,
the insurer also enjoys significant advantages from the arrangement. The reduction in thepremium which results
from employer-administration permits the insurer to realize a larger volume of sales,and at the same time the
insurer's
own
administrative
costs
are
markedly
reduced.