Literature & Theology, Vol. . No.
, September , pp.

"



doi:10.1093/litthe/frn029 Advance Access publication 31 July 2008

BEYOND THE VEIL: A WOMAN

NAMED TRUTH AND THE
TRUTH OF WOMAN
Matthew Bennett
Abstract
Beyond the Veil seeks to understand the relation between truth and
woman in Nietzsches works. I will attempt this by asking two questions.
First: how does Nietzsche establish an anthropomorphic feminine truth, and
what is achieved by this metaphor? Second: what is Nietzsches truth about
woman? Through analysis of selected passages, I will argue that Nietzsche,
through gendering truth, displays a conviction that what we believe to be
true functions as such only when veiled; the metaphor of a veiled woman
named truth, I will argue, presents truth as something that retains its value
insofar as the truth remains shrouded, distant and unexamined. With this rst
answer established, the second question will prove to be undermined by
Nietzsches numerous and at times ironic truths about woman. I will argue
that the diverse range of women in Nietzsches texts problematises the
possibility of a Nietzschean ambition to reveal woman in her true form.
Moreover, I will claim that Nietzsches critique of the dogmatic
philosophers will to truth subverts the notion that Nietzsche intends to
offer a sincere, unveiled, truth about woman.

Geheimniszvoll am lichten Tag,

Laszt sich Natur des Schleiers nicht berauben,
Und was sie deinem Geist nicht offenbaren mag,
Das zwingst du ihr nicht ab mit Hebeln und mit Schrauben
(Goethe, Faust)1
Dark in daylight,
Nature will not allow the stripping of her veil,
And what she chooses not to reveal to your mind,
You will not seduce with lever and with bolts.

Nietzsches preoccupation with woman shows itself in his discussions of truth,

his critique of the philosophical tradition, his distaste for feminism and
his rejection of equal rights. His proclamations about the weaker sex are
notorious, and some of his more quotable remarks about woman appear
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NIETZSCHE AND A WOMAN NAMED TRUTH

unequivocally misogynistic. These comments pose a problem for the

Nietzsche scholar, and can make it difcult to maintain that Nietzsches
work is relevant at a time when feminist discourse is established and respected.
However Nietzsches attitude towards woman holds a greater signicance and
has the potential to yield much more for the reader than a hermeneutical
puzzle. The role that woman has to play in Nietzsche is an important part to
understanding his broader claims about traditional philosophy and the value of
truth. As we shall see, Nietzsches critique of the tradition that preceded him is
partly established through his discussion of woman.
The intricacies of Nietzsches critique of the philosophical tradition are
developed through two such interrelated uses of woman. The rst is his
anthropomorphisation of truth; through examining the gendering of truth
in Nietzsche, we can better understand his critique of the philosophical pursuit
of this woman named truth. The second focuses not on a woman named
truth, but on the truth of woman. At stake in this second enquiry is our
reading of Weib-an-sich, a notion that is of paramount importance in its
translation, meaning and application. If the rst technique uses woman to
reveal the mistakes of philosophys will to truth, the second demonstrates in
practice the shortcomings of the traditional philosophical enterprise.
How then do we begin our examination of woman in Nietzsche? Perhaps
we could take direction from Nietzsche himself. In the preface to Beyond Good
and Evil, we are asked to imagine truth as a woman:
Supposing truth is a woman what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion
that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert
about woman?2

Nietzsche portrays the philosopher as a luckless suitor who lusts after a woman
who has not allowed herself to be won. The dogmatic philosopher is portrayed as a sad bumbling gure whose gruesome seriousness, clumsy obtrusiveness and adolescent awkwardness leave him unsuccessful. This rather
pathetic gure is not only incompetent, but also impotent; his dogmatism
is left standing dispirited and discouraged. If it is left standing at all.3 Later
Nietzsche goes further, to speculate that even if the dogmatist were able to rise
to the task, probably he will be too short, for all fundamental problems of
life . . . incapable of attaining any depth.4 Nietzsches characterisation of the
traditional philosopher is far from complimentary.
Unfortunately, it seems that Nietzsches explicit instruction leads only to
bawdy phallic puns. If we wish to pay signicant respect to this topic, we must
strive to understand Nietzsches gendered anthropomorphised truth beyond
ridicule of orthodox philosophy. Further questions must be asked of the
myriad aphorisms dealing with woman, not just in Beyond Good and Evil

MATTHEW BENNETT

315

but throughout Nietzsches works. Why, for instance, does Nietzsche proclaim that life is a woman?5 How are we to read his suggestion that perhaps
truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons?6 Why is
Zarathustra asked to give his thoughts on woman?7 As we embark on
a broader examination of the appearance of woman in Nietzsche, we will
nd that she is not just an opportunistic rhetorical device used to mock the
impotence of traditional philosophy, but offers a more profound understanding of Nietzsches position.
The search for further signicance in Nietzsches allusions to woman takes
us deeper into his critique of the dogmatic philosopher. As noted above,
Nietzsches ridicule of the tradition implies that conventional philosophy has
set itself a task that it is unable to complete. More specically, Nietzsche attacks
what he calls a will to truth exhibited in philosophical orthodoxy.8
Traditional philosophy assumes for the more highly valued thing a miraculous
source in the very kernel and being of the thing-in-itself9; the tradition sets
itself the task of revealing this miraculous source or true nature of the world.
Nietzsches reference to the thing-in-itself echoes Kants Ding-an-sich and
invites an illuminating contextualisation of Nietzsches opponent. Kant is
a consistent target for Nietzsche; further allusions to Kant appear, among
others, in Beyond Good and Evil10 and again in Section 3 of the History of
an Error in The Twilight of the Idols.11 Kants answer to the problem of
metaphysics is in fact paradigmatic of the philosophy Nietzsche attacks.
Konigsbergian ontology differentiates the phenomenal world of our experience, composed of empirical objects, from a noumenal reality that transcends
experience and is by denition unknowable. This two-world opposition of
phenomena and noumena is symptomatic of the dogmatic philosophy that
Nietzsche objects to; it is an example of the tenacious insistence throughout
the history of philosophy to maintain an ontological distinction between a
real world and an apparent world. Even Kant, whose Copernican revolution was intended to end philosophys preoccupation with transcendent reality, posited a vacuous notion of Ding-an-sich, and perpetuated the two-world
philosophy of his predecessors.12
Thus the dogmatic philosopher is impotent in the face of his self-appointed
task: to reveal the thing-in-itself . His obsession with a two-world reality
has led him to pursue an end that, according to Nietzsche, he is unable to
reach. Why, then, does Nietzsche see traditional philosophy as a Sisyphean
endeavour? This question will prove to be crucial to our understanding of
Nietzsches attitude towards woman and truth. Before attempting an answer,
we must heed the concluding warning of the History of an Error: with the
real world we have also abolished the apparent world!13 Nietzsche does not achieve
his departure from traditional metaphysics through rejecting one ontological
category (the real world) and clinging to another (the apparent world).

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NIETZSCHE AND A WOMAN NAMED TRUTH

Such a misunderstanding can lead to a horrendous mischaracterisation of his

position. For example, Nietzsches problematisation of incorporeal, eternal,
unchanging truth has lead Catherine Zuckert to infer that meaning occurs
and can only occur in an individual human being.14 Such an individualist or
existentialist reading of Nietzsche will only serve to erroneously simplify
Nietzsches epistemology and would mislead our own attempts to answer
this vital question.
Bearing his caution in mind, we can proceed to investigate Nietzsches
woman named truth and explain why the dogmatic philosopher fails to
seduce her. To establish what Nietzsche achieves through gendering truth,
we need to examine the qualities embodied in this woman. For some commentators, accounting for the type or types of woman that appear in Nietzsche
has proved a difcult task; there seem to be many conicting and contradictory
perspectives on woman throughout his work. Whilst at times we meet
apparently derogatory descriptions of woman,15 at others Nietzsche exhibits
admiration for her.16
Failure to comprehend womans diversity in Nietzsche can lead to misplaced criticism. Christine Allen has understandably, though incorrectly, interpreted the variety of attitudes towards woman in Nietzsche as an ambivalence
towards a single category of person. Allen identies a marked difference
between Nietzsches opinion of strong women and weak women, yet follows
this by claiming it is true to Nietzsches style not to make distinctions between
some women who are weak and some who are strong.17 Allens mistake,
which we must take care to avoid, is to read Nietzsche as holding contradictory opinions of a single object of investigation. The woman that Nietzsche
espouses at one moment for her strength of will is not the same woman that
he later criticises for being the weaker sex. It is important to follow on
from commentators who have observed a variety of forms of woman in
Nietzsche.18 This diversity displays an expansive array of characteristics that
Nietzsche evaluates on their individual merits, rather than with reference to a
universal or abstract category of woman. Maintaining one attitude towards
one female character and a substantially different attitude towards another is
neither contradictory nor ambivalent. To avoid mistaking Nietzsches discussion of woman for ambivalence we should recognise that it is a particular type
of woman that he compares to truth, and we must resist the temptation to
mistake all references to woman for discussions of gendered truth.
What then are the characteristics that Nietzsche wishes to attribute to truth
by way of this gendered anthropomorphism? How does Nietzsche portray the
woman that evades the dogmatic philosopher? When we narrow focus upon
the appearance of this particular woman named truth, we nd that her role is
established in terms of exposure, revelation and unveiling. Take for example
Nietzsches claim that science offends the modesty of all real women in its

MATTHEW BENNETT

317

drive to expose what lies under their dress and nery and to peep under their
skin.19 Elsewhere he tells us that the most powerful magic of life is its veil of
beautiful possibilities, leading him to declare: Yes, life is a woman20; whilst
Zarathustra proclaims that Everything about woman is a riddle and that her
nature is surface, a changeable, stormy lm upon shallow waters.21 The
connotations, in light of what we have established regarding Kants exemplary
two-world philosophy, suggest that if truth is this particular kind of woman,
she is the veiled, hidden noumenal world that the dogmatic philosopher has
striven to seduce. The scientist works to expose not only what lies under the
literal dress and nery of woman, but wants to go further than a physical
uncovering to peep under the skin. This woman named truth is to be
dissected in order for her nature to be examined and her riddle to be solved.
The personication of truth should not return us to the simplied reading
of Nietzsche we discarded earlier; nor should it lead us to suggest that
Nietzsche intends to divert philosophy from its project of uncovering to a
discussion of mere appearance. As discussed, Nietzsches criticism of the
philosophical will to truth does not result in a rejection of the real world
in favour of the apparent world. We nd additional evidence for this in the
preface to The Gay Science:
. . . one will hardly nd us again on the paths of those Egyptian youths who . . .
want by all means to unveil, uncover, and put into a bright light whatever is kept
concealed for good reasons. No, this bad taste, this will to truth, to truth at any
price, this youthful madness in the love of truth, have lost their charm for us . . .
We no longer believe that truth remains truth when the veils are withdrawn: we
have lived too much to believe this. Today we consider it a matter of decency
not to wish to see everything naked, or to be present at everything, or to
understand and know everything.22

Nietzsche is critical of the adolescent pride of the youthful madness that

constitutes the will to truth. This desire to lift the veil of truth is condemned
for its immaturity and naivety. But one should not read Nietzsches use of a
recurrent theme of veiling, his critique of the will to withdraw this veil, and
his unmitigated admiration held for the beauty of that veil, as indications that
he is critical of the notion that something may lie beyond it. What is clear
from the preface to The Gay Science, along with the gendering of truth and a
theme of unveiling and exposure, is that Nietzsche is critical of a drive to
unveil, uncover: a will to truth. We must appreciate the important difference between criticising the will to truth and denying truth altogether.
How then are we to read Nietzsches attitude towards truth, his metaphor
of the veil and his image of a woman named truth? We have seen
that Nietzsche is critical of the metaphysical tradition that preceded him;

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NIETZSCHE AND A WOMAN NAMED TRUTH

yet his critique falls short of a complete denial of the concept of truth. Rather,
I suggest, Nietzsches complex relation to this woman named truth concedes
her value whilst rejecting the validity of a traditional philosophical project that
aims to unveil her. Nietzsche does not deny the possibility of truth; nor does
he deny its value and its important function. Ironically, Nietzsche criticises the
will to truth not for its strong belief in truth, but for its destructive impulse to
reveal truth. The goal of metaphysics is to investigate and expose the woman
behind the veil, or the truth behind the world of mere appearance. This goal
is self-defeating, Sisyphean, in virtue of the fact that truth [never] remains
truth when the veils are withdrawn.23 The philosophical will to truth, the
dogmatic philosophers desire to lift the veil of this woman named truth,
fails to appreciate that the truth will no longer remain true once it is disclosed.
This invites one further question: why would this woman named truth lose
her veracity when unveiled? Precisely because her nature is surface,24 her
action is at a distance25 and she is a woman who has reasons for not letting us
see her reasons.26 Truth is valuable, and remains true, so long as she remains
assumed, unexamined, veiled and distant. Once under the scrutiny of the
dogmatic philosopher, truths become untenable, unravelled, exposed and
are rendered false. Womans veil has an irreducible dual nature; the supercial
beautiful possibilities lie on the surface, along with the ever-present promise
of the truth beyond the veil. If the enticing promise of a beautiful shroud and
the value of its concealed truth are to persist, then we must mature into a
modest restriction to our inquisitive philosophical will to truth. We cannot
do away with the concept of truth, and expect the veil of mere appearance to
remain. Nor can we lift the veil, and expect truth to conform to the expectations we held of it. Rather, it is through refraining from examining truth that
her veil, and the woman who hides behind it, persist.
With a better understanding of Nietzsches relation to truth, we can turn our
attention to Nietzsches discussion of the truth about woman. As we have
established, Nietzsches woman named truth derives her value from her modesty. The adolescent over exuberance of the dogmatic philosopher drove him to
peep under her veil. Yet when we examine Nietzsches exploration of the truth
of woman, do we not witness his own hypocritical will to truth? If Nietzsche
offers proclamations about woman, would he not be vulnerable to the same
critique that he directed towards the dogmatic philosopher? Nietzsches
complex relation to the philosophical project of unveiling truth deeply problematises the way that the truth of woman can manifest itself in his work.
Let us remind ourselves, for instance, of Nietzsches criticism of the scientic investigation of woman:
Science offends the modesty of all real women. It makes them feel as if one
wanted to peep under their skin yet worse, under their dress and nery.27

MATTHEW BENNETT

319

This interrogation of woman goes beyond the physical; the scientist peeps
under their skin in order to expose an essence that is not just physical, but
metaphysical. Nietzsche is no less critical of this will to the-truth-of-woman
when it is perpetrated by woman herself:
Woman wants to become self-reliant and for that reason she is beginning to
enlighten men about woman-in-itself : this is one of the worst developments
of the general uglication of Europe.28
. . . the ascetic priest will hardly even be the most successful defender of his ideal
for the same reason that a woman tends to fail when she wishes to defend
woman-in-itself. . ..29

The feminists goal of revelation is symptomatic of the philosophical will to

truth at any price.30 If the dogmatic philosopher strives to explicate truth, the
dogmatic feminist strives to explicate woman in the same way. The wish to
unveil the reality behind the mere appearance of woman is implicitly compared to the projects of Kant, Plato et al., and her attempt to disclose womanin-itself is vulnerable to the same critique aimed at the dogmatic philosophers
desire to reveal the thing-in-itself.
How then are we to account for Nietzsches approach to the topic of
woman without reading into his text a similar disclosure of woman-initself ? Exploring the truth of woman in Nietzsches text seems to presume
an aspect of Nietzsches writing that could only be hypocritical. This dilemma
is exacerbated by the diversity of forms woman takes in Nietzsche. As we have
already mentioned, Nietzsche discusses a variety of types of woman; for every
disparaging comment about her an expression of reverence and awe is given
elsewhere. Yet our exploration of the truth of woman seems to demand that
this broad spectrum of female images be brought together under one investigation. The difculty posed for our reading transforms from the danger of
reading a hypocritical will to truth into Nietzsche, to the problem of incorporating a wide variety of Nietzsches themes under one examination. If our
task is to understand Nietzsches discussion of woman, then the lack of a
consistent female character in his work could threaten the legitimacy of our
project. When confronted with a heterogeneous object of enquiry, we may
question the very validity of that enquiry.
Perhaps we need to reect briey on the question we are asking. We have
established how Nietzsche relates to a woman named truth; in light of this, we
wish to explore Nietzsches discussion of the truth of woman, i.e. what is true
of woman? This will initially involve collating the aphorisms that deal with a
common theme of woman. This is more problematic than we may have
thought, given the diversity of personalities that are discussed with reference
to woman. What then is the common element of the disparate passages

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NIETZSCHE AND A WOMAN NAMED TRUTH

we aim to bring together in our interrogation? The problematic variance of

our object of enquiry forces from us the most obvious answer: our investigation of Nietzsches discussion of woman examines passages that refer to something that he calls woman, whatever that may be. In other words, we are
interested in Nietzsches uses of the linguistic item woman.
Our search for a stable basis for our question is now clutching at straws.
However, even this desperate appeal to the fundamental linguistic function of
woman fails to establish a simple object of enquiry. Certainly, we can collect
together each of Nietzsches aphorisms that refer to woman in the English
translation. However, the original German poses further difculties; even the
most basic linguistic uniformity is undermined when we refer back to the
original text. Nietzsche mostly refers to woman as das Weib, but at times will
use die Frau. Take for example the following two lines from Zarathustra:
A child is concealed in the true man: it wants to play. Come, women (Frauen),
discover the child in man!
Let woman (Weib) be a plaything, pure and ne like a precious stone illumined
by the virtues of a world that does not yet exist.31

The notion of a uniform category of woman seems to be undermined in

Nietzsches discussion of Weib and Frau. Take as another example Section
239 of Beyond Good and Evil. Among a number of claims about das Weib
(woman is retrogressing; womans inuence in Europe has decreased proportionately as her rights and claims have increased; what inspires respect for
woman . . . is her nature) appears a single reference to Frau: the most powerful
and inuential women of the world . . . owed their power and ascendancy
over men to the force of their will. Contrasted with numerous derogatory
comments about Weib, Nietzsche is curiously respectful of die Frau.
We could be forgiven for reading this as ambivalence towards woman.
However, as we discovered earlier, Nietzsches alleged ambivalence need
not be read as such; it is a failure to heed womans plurality that leads to
this inaccurate criticism. Our appreciation of womans plurality is now creating a more profound difculty. It seems that asking how Nietzsche discusses
the truth of woman may be begging the question; there is arguably no
equivalent for this English term in the German idiom that Nietzsche wrote
in, nor does there seem to be a common element to the various discussions of
Weib and Frau. Should we not ask ourselves, following from Sarah Kofman,
Is there for Nietzsche woman in herself?32 As Kofman recognised, approaching the question of woman in Nietzsche may set itself the impossible task
of searching for an aspect of Nietzsches texts that does not exist.
We are struggling to nd a coherent set of claims about woman, an account
for what is true about her, an exposition of woman-in-itself. This struggle

MATTHEW BENNETT

321

leads us to a crisis of condence in our investigation; this crisis reveals that

potential hypocrisy and inconsistency lies not in Nietzsches text, but in our
interpretation. We have established both that Nietzsche criticises a will to
unveil truth and opposes the feminist project to reveal the truth about
woman; yet we seek out a Nietzschean attempt to unveil and reveal
woman. This endeavour seems to deny what we now know about
Nietzsches attitude towards truth. It also ignores textual evidence that
Nietzsche himself is conscious of the irony of his discussion of the truth of
woman. Take for example Section 231 of Beyond Good and Evil. This aphorism
precedes an extensive passage dealing with woman, and offers a disclaimer:
After this abundant civility that I have just evidenced in relation to myself I shall
perhaps be permitted more readily to state a few truths about woman in itself
assuming that it is now known from the outset how very much these are after all
only my truths.

Nietzsche acknowledges that, when addressing the question of woman, he

will only discover ultimately how this is settled in him . Nietzsche primes
us for what will follow: his truths about woman. He deliberately undermines
the possibility that he can (and moreover believes he can) speak about
woman-in-itself . The following nine aphorisms therefore appear as ironic
attempts to disclose truths about woman.
Walter Kaufmann notes that Nietzsches various claims about woman descend to a lower level stylistically as well as in content.33 These ironic nine
aphorisms are no exception; there are moments within these aphorisms when
Nietzsches grand rhetoric and profound poetry seem to have been abandoned. Take for example Section 237: seven pithy, throwaway epigrams
that clearly fail to live up to Nietzsches literary talents. Yet Kaufmann fails
to note that Nietzsche draws attention to this distinct change in tone with a
disclaimer about his truths. With a technique very different from the dogmatic philosophers sincere will to unveil truths about woman, Nietzsche is
keen to point out that if he unveils anything, it is merely what is settled in
him regarding woman. What ensues is a parody of the clumsy obtrusiveness
and gruesome seriousness that the luckless dogmatic philosopher employed
in his failed attempt to win over truth. Through punctuating his truths about
woman-in-itself, Nietzsche mocks that incompetent and impotent gure
who insisted on disclosing the thing-in-itself. Far from the sincere will to
truth displayed by the philosophical and feminist traditions, Nietzsches truths
are self-aware, perspectival and ironic.
The irony of Nietzsches elucidation of the truth of woman echoes his
broader position of truth itself. If truth were a woman, then this woman
derives her value from her modesty, her mystery and her distance from the

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NIETZSCHE AND A WOMAN NAMED TRUTH

intrusive gaze of the philosophical tradition. The will to truth displayed by the
dogmatic philosopher is criticised by Nietzsche for its nave attempts to unveil
this woman and destroy her value. Nietzsches elucidations on woman reect
this attitude to truth; his texts mock the very notions of a truth about woman
and woman-in-itself. Nietzsches variegated truths about woman, as well as
our struggle to nd a consistent female theme in his work, demonstrate the
futility of the philosophical endeavour to disclose such truths. The lack of a
simple and straight forward truth about woman (in all her forms) in
Nietzsches work evidences his critique of the proud over-enthusiasm of the
philosophical will to truth.
Department of Philosophy, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester.
CO
SQ, UK
mbenneb@essex.ac.uk

REFERENCES
1

3
4

10

11

The German is taken from J.W.V.

Goethe, Faust [1808], A. Hayward (trans.)
(London: G.Bell & Sons, 1892), p. 48. The
translation has been modied.
F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil [1886],
W. Kaufmann (trans.) (New York:
Vintage Books, 1989), p. 1.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Section
238.
F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science [1882],
W. Kaufmann (trans.) (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), Section 271.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, preface Section 4.
F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra
[1885], R. J. Hollingdale (trans.) (London:
Penguin, 1969), pp. 913.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Section 1
and Nietzsche, 1974, preface Section 4.
F. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human
[1878], R. J. Hollingdale (trans.)
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986), Section 1.
Nietzsche, The equally stiff and decorous
Tartuffery of the old Kant in Beyond Good
and Evil, Section 5.
Nietzsche, pale, northerly, Konigsbergian
in The Twilight of the Idols. [1888],

12

13
14

15

16

R. J. Hollingdale (trans.) (London:

Penguin, 1990), p. 50.
This sentiment is developed along similar
lines in Nietzsches discussion of the
ascetic priest in On the Genealogy of
Morality [1887], III Section 12. The ascetic
self-contempt of such philosophers has led
them to posit a realm of truth and being,
leading to life-denying principles that
defer value to a metaphysical realm. I
should also note that the quick and simple
depiction of the Kantian project presented
here is only intended to echo Nietzsches
attitude towards Kant. I do not claim that
this is an accurate reading of Kant.
Nietzsche, 1990, p. 51.
C. H. Zuckert, Postmodern Platos:
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Strauss,
Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1996), pp. 1011.
For example: when a woman has scholarly
inclinations there is usually something
wrong with her sexually (Nietzsche,
1989, Section 144).
For example: the most powerful and
inuential women of the world . . . owed
their power and ascendancy over men to
the force of their will (Nietzsche, Beyond
Good and Evil, Section 239).

MATTHEW BENNETT
17

18

19

20
21

22

23
24
25
26
27

C. G. Allen, Nietzsches Ambivalence

About Women in The Sexism of Social
and Political Theory: Women and
Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche, eds.
L. M. G. Clark and L. Lange
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1979), p. 119.
J. Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsches Styles, B.
Harlow (trans.) (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1979), p. 101, and
P. Deutscher, Distancing Nietzsche from
Rousseau in Nietzsche, Feminism, and
Political Theory, ed. P. Patton (London:
Routledge 1993), p. 167.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Section
127.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Section 339.
Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, pp.
912.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, preface Section 4.
Ibid.
Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, p. 92.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Section 60.
Ibid., preface Section 4.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Section 127.

28
29

30

31
32

33

323

Ibid., Section 232.

F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality
[1887], M. Clark, and A. J. Swensen
(trans), (Indianapolis: Hackett,1998), III
Section11. Here I part company with the
translations of Walter Kaufmann, Maudemarie Clark and Alan Swensen. Weib-ansich is translated by Kaufmann as woman
as such, whilst Clark and Swensen opt for
woman in herself. I have chosen to
translate Weib-an-sich as woman-in-itself
for two reasons: rstly, the reference to
Kants Ding-an-sich, usually translated as
thing in itself, is crucial to my reading
of Nietzsche; secondly, I have avoided
woman-in-herself to make clear the
neutered abstraction of Weib-an-sich.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, preface Section 4.
Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, p. 92.
S. Kofman, Baubo: Theological Perversion and Fetishism in Nietzsches New Seas:
Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics and
Politics, eds. M. A. Gillespie, and T. B.
Strong (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1988), p. 180.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Section 361 n.

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