Patton Report No.
61
Regulatory Fraud
Regulatory Fraud Defined
Fraud is defined by Webster as "deceit, trickery, an act of
deceiving or misrepresenting. An impostor or a cheat".
To most people the word "fraud" also implies an illegal act,
where the perpetrator is subject to prosecution by law. For
example, when a man deceives his wife by telling her he's
going bowling, when he has other things on his mind, we call
that cheating, but not necessarily fraud. When a man mis-
represents what he's selling, and deliberately deceives the
customer in order to cheat him out of money, then we have a
situation usually considered to be fraudulent and punishable
by law. So, fraud is not only trickery, and cheating, it is also
a criminal activity, as we define in this paper.
How about "regulatory fraud"? What is different about it.
Well, here I am coining the expression to cover situations
which would be, under normal circumstances, considered to be
fraudulent, criminal by nature; but which in the final analysis
are not usually prosecutable under law because the acts are
sheltered under the protective umbrella of a code system. In
the following paragraphs we'll explain how this is done.
March 1985
THE GRANDEST FRAUD IN THE
HISTORY OF MAN: Our fire code system is not
a cure to fire, it is a guarantor of fire and a pre-
server of the fire marketplace. In truth, this
code system may well be the most elaborate,
complex, and profitable fraud ever conceived
of by the mind of man. The net "take" from
the code fraud system over these many years
may be more than one thousand billion dollars
(one trillion dollars) and the cost may well be
as high as 500,000 deaths and many million
major injuries and maimings.
PRICE FIXING AND COLLUSION
Under the Federal Sherman Anti Trust Act it is illegal for
businesses of like kind to have their executives meet to set
prices or to collude together to bar others (newcomers) from
the market place, or erect improper barriers to free commerce.
Many businesses have been fined, and some business executives
have been put in jail for such activities. A free and open
marketplace is the cornerstone to honesty in the business
world.
But, under the protective umbrella of a code making
operation, collusion is often standard operating procedure.
The fire codes have been a cover for at least indirect price
fixing. The code, for example, defines a "fire pump" in such a
restrictive manner, that all such pumps become essentially
equals, and those that manufacture to the mandated criteria
have no incentive to compete through technology. Through
the code key people meet to "standardize", and out of these
meetings come regulated products such as fire pumps that
command prices two, three or four times the cost of "non
approved" pumps that could supply adequate water at
adequate pressure with equal or better reliability. But such
things as collusion, price fixing, and cheating are extremely
difficult to prove when those who meet, presumably do so as
public spirited volunteers "helping the fire safety effort".
For example, it would be most difficult to prove that those
who manufacture or sell fire pumps, or those who regulate the
fire sprinkler technology, have engaged in any illegal activities.
However, we can show that a fire pump and required gear will
normally cost $10,000 to $15,000, but that an excellent "non
labeled" pump, drive, starter and necessary equipment can be
purchased for the $2,000 to $5,000 range. Has there been
"price fixing" of the equipment or collusion in setting criteria
so as to prevent inexpensive pumps from entering the market-
place? OF COURSE NOT! There has been a "protecting of the
public" with a cooperative code making effort.
SELLING OF DANGEROUS EQUIPMENT
For years extinguisher salesmen sold "Carbon Tetra-
chloride" fire extinguishers to the public, and for good prices,
even though they seldom put any fires out, but frequently put
the user out with deadly fumes. Only after there was a public
outcry were they removed from the marketplace.
Thin wall fire extinguishers, which are capable of producing
high internal pressure and exploding, and taking the user's
hand and face away in the process, have been sold for many
years without benefit of any warnings to the public at all. And
they also seldom put the fire out.
When automobile manufacturers conceal flaws that could
cause injury or death to the public, they have been dealt with
harshly. When a fire equipment manufacturer sells a product
with an inherent danger, and with perhaps a 50 percent failure
track record, he's got the codes and the approving laboratories
in his corner shielding him.
DECEPTIVE LABELING
Many manufacturers sell products to the building industry
with code words such as "non combustible","fire retardant",
"fire treated" or "fire proofed". To the public, the idea
conveyed is simple. The materials do not burn. But, in the
mysterious world of the codes and the labels, meanings are
often deceptive. A testing laboratory will structure a specific
test for testing specific materials. A label of "non combusti-
ble" or "fire retardant" means only that the product passed
that specific test, which could be a severe test, or a not very
severe test, or even an irrelevant test. The manufacturer gets
his "label", which convinces the public the product is safe, and
therefore it sells, and the laboratory gets its fees for using the
label.
The public often gets a product it assumes to be safe, but
which may actually burn vociferously in the field. Also, since
most fire retardants tend to produce unusually toxic gases, the
"labled" product may actually be far more dangerous than the
normal combustibles we've lived with for years. But,
dangerous or not, the lab gets the fee, and the manufacturer
gets the controlled market and the bigger profits. How many
deaths have occurred due to the public thinking they had a
safe product, when in reality the product was quite dangerous,
is i mpossible to estimate.
Incidentally, for many years "fire retardant" electrical
cables were sold to the nuclear power industry with the idea
that protecting the cables with fire extinguishing systems was
not necessary because the cables wouldn't burn. Years ago, I
predicted such cables would burn, quite well. And in recent
years actual fire tests at Sandia testing laboratories have
proven me right, but the test results are still not publicized.
These are the cables the industry depends on for "safe shut-
down" in an emergency.
FIRE INVESTIGATIONS RIGGED TO SELL
CODES AND CONCEAL THE TRUE CAUSES OF
THE FIRE
When a major fire occurs, which includes a large loss of life,
invariably the National Fire Protection Association investigates
the fire. Of course, the NFPA does not find its own codes
faulty, even if the building was constructed as per the code.
Invariably, they find some "code deviations" (which is not
difficult as there are 200 codes and many change each year).
Then they use the fire to promote further acceptance of and
use of the codes they are selling.
Almost invariably, these investigations are self-serving and
actually conceal very critical factors in the loss. For example,
when the Nursing Home fire occurred in Marietta, Ohio, Jan.
9, 1970 and 31 people died, they died in a facility that was
"nearly in perfect" compliance with NFPA-101 - the Life
Safety Code (which I call the Death Code). Since the building
fit the code almost perfectly, and since the code could not
possibly be the killer (of course), it was essential to the NFPA
that they find a "deviation" from the code. The facility was
carpeted and the NFPA code did not deal with carpeting,
because carpeting had never been found to be an important
factor in fire. The carpet was sent up to Underwriters
Laboratory for testing. It passed the "pill" test, which was the
"standard" test for carpeting at the time. This proved that the
carpet - in a normal position on the floor would not burn of
itself. The carpet would burn only when everything else
combustible in the room was already burning and the ceiling
was radiating intense heat down onto the carpeting. (The floor
is the last to burn). In other words, by the time that carpeting
was burning, flashover had occurred and any person in that
area was already dead.
But this was not an acceptable conclusion because it would
then leave NFPA-101 as a defective code. So, the carpet
was placed upside down in the tunnel test (which is the test
for testing ceiling tile). When the test fire was cranked up
below the rug on the ceiling of the test tunnel the mastic
melted and the carpet fell down. But they persevered, got the
carpet to stay on the ceiling, and eventually "proved" that it
burned. Thus, the true causes of the fire, FLASHOVER in
the normal combustible contents typical to the industry, and a
faulty NFPA code, were hidden.
Then, in order to capitalize on this disaster, new regulations
and new testing requirements were cranked up. So, the fire
establishment concealed the holes in their own code and
parlayed the human suffering into a new bonanza.
Through such methods the NFPA has protected the reputa-
tion of its codes. I have always considered the deception
in relation to the Marietta Nursing Home fire to be an under-
lying factor in many fires that occurred at a later time, as
an honest report would have initiated corrective action prio
to the more recent tragedies. The MGM Hotel fire is a
tip
example: Probably, the MGM Hotel fire would never have
occurred except for the trickery following the Marietta fire.
But of course the investigation into this MGM Hotel fire was
also a masterpiece of deception and concealment.
 FIRE SPRINKLER CODE CONTROLS
In many newsletters I have detailed the enormous and
eticulous pains taken by the NFPA to obstruct and prevent
•the evolution of low cost and effective fire sprinkler systems,
or life safety systems as I coined the term, so that there is no
need to elaborate further here.
RIGGED TESTING TO PRODUCE THE "RIGHT"
ANSWERS
The American public has preconceived notions about who
is honest, and who is dishonest, which are possibly as harmful
as the prejudices regarding race. In the "dishonest" class some
people include used car salesmen, real estate salesmen, lawyers,
and politicians. Tell someone that a certain politician is
dishonest and he'll say "what else is new".
In the "honest" category are scientists, engineers, and
researchers. If the man is making a "scientific study" it is
generally perceived that the study will be meticulously ac-
curate. Because of this many researchers and engineers, in
the fire safety field at least, have a great disdain for the truth
as everything published tends to be believed.
I have seen "fire research" and "fire testing" that has been
so deliberately phonied, so structured in order to produce
the "right" answers, that I almost expect the sky to fall down
and smash the perpetrators for their deception. Yet, they
trot out their frauds - and frauds are what they are - in front of
- the assembled code makers, and everyone oohs and aahs, and
applauds, and passes into the codes that which was planned to
• be entered to begin with.
Deception is not only tolerated in the fire community, it is
almost a revered custom. A case in point is the fraudulent
test by which the "standard" sprinkler heads, which sell for $2
were found "not satisfactory" for dwellings, making way for
the $10 fast heads and some other shenanigans. These tests are
covered in a separate article in this Patton Report. This fraud,
in particular, will produce a loss into the thousands of lives.
Indeed, I predict that thousands of youngsters, below age 10,
will die as a result of the deception.
ELIMINATING THE GOOD SO THE BAD CAN
SURVIVE
A fire protection pioneer, who incidently is largely ignored
by the fire protection community, did some amazing things
many years ago. His name was Lloyd Layman and he was from
West Virginia. He pioneered fire fighting with small hose lines
and fog (fine water spray) when most others liked to knock
the walls down with the big pumpers and the heavy streams.
It's said of Lloyd Layman he could put out a fire in a home
with a thimble full of water. Lloyd used hose remarkably
similar to the good quality, high pressure garden hose that can
be bought in a hardware store for $15 a length. And maybe
that was his undoing. The fire community is not yet ready for
a $15 hose when the big, (but nearly impossible to use) PA
le inch hose is still selling at 10 times that price via those codes
that mandate its use in buildings, for use by untrained people.
Check into any fire department, any place in this country,
on any day of the week, and what will the fire prevention
men be up to? Riding around the community, knocking on
-3-
doors, demanding to see the extinguishers, and see if they
have been retested in the last y ear. There's 100,000 firemen
out there, going door to door, "selling" fire extinguishers
for the fire industry because the NFPA code says they're
needed. Put a UL labeled fire extinguisher beside a non labeled
garden hose and spray nozzle, and it's like comparing a beat up
1948 Chevy with a 1985 Porsche. But, behind the deception
of the codes, not only does the beat up Chevy sell at twice the
cost of the Porsche, but there's a hundred thousand salesmen,
paid for by you and me, out there selling them.
And, let a businessman throw out the ineffective fire
extinguisher, or have the 11/2 inch hose lines removed from his
building for being unwieldy or dangerous to life and limb; and
then put in that which he knows how to handle (and that
which puts the fire out) and guess what will happen to him.
He'll change his ways, or end up in jail, or heavily fined, or put
out of business. So under the codes businessmen are forced to
p
urchase terribly overpriced eauipment, which most often is
not only ineffective, but dangerous to use. Then, when his
property burns, because the UL ap p roved extin g uisher didn't
put the fire out, the NFPA will be out to investigate him, and
find some reason to denounce him, because he failed to
"com p ly with the codes". There are over 200 fire codes, and
hundreds of thousands of regulations, and every year
thousands more are thought up. It's not difficult to find "code
violations" after the fire and convince the public the
"violations" were the key factors in the loss. The loss then, if
s p ectacular enou g h, can be used by the fire business to pro-
mote further markets for further regulated products which
also will be overpriced.
REGULATORY FRAUD DEFINED
So, what then is "regulatory fraud"? Here is the Patton
definition:
"Regulatory fraud is cheating the public and/or en-
dangering lives through methods of concealment, collusion,
false advertising, misrepresentation, price fixing, or deceit;
but doing it in such a manner under the protective umbrella
of a code system so as to avoid criminal prosecution or legal
liability for the consequences."
How extensive, how serious, is regulatory fraud in the fire
safety field? I summarize it this way. The solution to fire
is cheap and easy. It takes 30 GPM or less of water to control
more than 99 percent of the fires when initiated, and the
basic solutions, the fire sprinkler system and small fog nozzle
have been available since the 1860s. Today there is a $100
billion dollar a year market for the "fire safety" industry. This
industry has grown primarily by approving and overpricing
products that have little impact on the loss experience, and by
denying approvals to and obstructing systems that are in-
expensive and very efficient at fire control. Probably three out
of every four fire deaths that have occurred due to building
fires are a legacy of fraudulent practices in the fire code field.
 The Foundation Of The Fire Code Fraud
The fire codes, as they have evolved in America, accomplish
two things: First, they set a framework upon which has
grown a truly enormous protected market, with prices artifi-
cially maintained far above a fair worth for value received.
Secondly, in the process of protecting the marketplace
created, the codes have gravitated toward allowing that which
poses no threat to the system, and prohibiting that which does
threaten the system, to the degree that the continuity of fire
loss is assured.
FIRE CODES GUARANTEE FIRE
Bluntly stated, the fire codes in America are no longer
oriented toward reducing fire (if indeed they ever were). Quite
the opposite, they protect the profits derived from the system
by assuring that fire continues unabated in America; and that
year by year the "take" from fire grows.
There is no place where this trend is more evident than in
the "investigatory" process following each major fire. In-
variably, there is a mad rush by the profiteers to get in on the
creation of new fire code requirements to mandate their own
wares. And, within this maelstrom of fire investigations and
code writing, it becomes abundantly clear that the impetus is
toward allowing in all regulations that will add to the profits,
but none of the systems that could actually reduce the losses.
HOW IT IS DONE
But it is not easy to keep increasing the take from fire while
never reducing the enormity of fire. How is it done? There are
many ways in which it is done, and I have covered these ways
extensively in prior Patton Reports. But there are two basics
upon which the entire system is dependent. One is subdivision
of risk as the alternate to fire suppression. The other is to
prevent water from being effectively applied to the incipient
fire.
Subdivision of risk may also be termed compartmentation;
or in its most refined form, the "fireproof" building. All are
the same concept. Assume there is a city of wood frame
houses, side by side, block by block. If one burns, they could
all burn; and this level of fire which is called a conflegration is
unacceptable for a variety of reasons, including that con-
flegrations put insurance companies out of business.
Now, take the same city, but between each row house put a
fire wall, from ground up, parapeted above the wood roof.
Now the conflegration problem has been solved, the entire city
does not burn, only a single house burns at a time. Note,
however, this "solution" in no way reduces fire frequency
within any one unit. Similarly, multi-story buildings are
"compartmented" floor by floor with concrete slabs and
enclosed shafts. (But toxic fire gases do not "compartment").
Within the framework of the compartmentation "solution"
the fire insurance system is protected because fire continues at
a random but predictable rate, but the "break the bank" loss
does not occur.
Within the framework of the fireproof (compartmented)
building an enormous market for fire related products has
evolved, and since fire continuity on a unit by unit, or floor by
floor basis, is assured, the market growth for the products is
assured.
-4-
So, the first stage in the use of fire codes to maintain fire,
and to continue the profits, is to set the compartmentation
"non solution" as the foundation of fire science; that is to
create a universally accepted area of expertise where the "non
solution" to fire becomes the accepted "solution"; and where
blind adherence to codes rather than engineering logic be-
comes the norm.
WATER IS A DANGER TO THE FIRE
ESTABLISHMENT
The compartmentation concept, however, would not
suffice of itself. In the event a major reduction in fire ex-
perience within the compartment occurred, this would then
result in a major reduction in the market place. The dollar cash
flow would also drop as frequency or severity fell. So, along
with subdivision of risk (concentration on the non solution)
the system also needed guarantees that reduction in fire loss,
not occur within the compartment.
Therefore, the second key element in the fire code scheme
for profits was to prevent available water from being effec-
tively used on the early fire. The reason this was necessary is
that water is so plentiful (available in every building) and so
extremely effective in controlling the early fire, that fire
would all but disappear as a national problem if water were
allowed to be used both early and effectively. The first five
minutes in a fire is what counts. The time factor eliminates the
fire department, and the water restrictions cripple the earli
fire control effort.
Summarizing, the two basic factors built into the codes in
order to guarantee the continuity of the business of fire were:
1. The compartmentation plan which allowed fire to
continue unabated within the unit.
2. Code prohibitions on the use of water to prevent its
effective use on the early fire.
FIRE SPRINKLER CODE CONTROLS
In many newsletters I have detailed the enormous and me-
ticulous pains taken by the NFPA to obstruct and prevent the
evolution of low cost and effective fire sprinkler systems, or
life safety systems as I coined the term, so that there is no
need to elaborate further here.
CONTROLLING METHODS OF WATER USAGE
With the means to prevent automatic early fire control with
water thwarted, that left manual fire control with water
another distinct danger to the system. The system, the NFPA,
and the fire testing laboratories rose to the occasion again,
however, and successfully thwarted the effective use of water
manually on an early fire. How? By "standardizing" the code
approved ways of using water into impractical methods.
One of the two code and laboratory methods (of using
water) allowed is the water base fire extinguisher, which emits
a pencil lead thick stream of water for 50 seconds, and which
is about as effective as a biologically administered stream. The
water base fire extinguisher would be a farce if it were not als
an enormous human tragedy.
The other allowed method of water use is the 11/2 inch
racked hose, which requires two trained firemen to handle,
and which is not only useless but very dangerous in the hands
of the amateur who is most likely to discover the fire.
 Let's run through this once again. By and large it was
usually near impossible to market "non approved" fire pro-
tection equipment. The manual application of water to the
early fire was thwarted by making the "standard" and
"approved" equipment for such use too small to be effective
(extinguisher) or too big to be able to be used by a non trained
fire fighter (the 11/2 inch hose). The measure of the power of
the system is that a truly effective water application tool
(garden size hose and spray nozzle) is almost never used
against fire because fire prevention training and built-in
equipment follows closely the "code approved" concepts. The
codes have amazingly resulted in water rarely being applied
effectively to the early fire (before fire department arrival).
The exception has been those large industrial type properties
where fire sprinkler systems became practical under the code.
With their enormous powers of advertising, promotion, and
influence, the NFPA and its friends have thus removed water
as an effective tool in controlling the early fire.
SUMMARY
There are many other facets to the code system conspiracy
to keep the fires burning, but the two that are most basic are
these:
1. The promotion of compartmentation (a "non solu-
tion"), as the accepted solution to fire, and the struc-
turing of a "fire science" so oriented.
A Most Deadly Fraud
"Statistics on 1978 fires published by the U.S. Fire Ad-
ministration show that residential fires account for 77 percent
of the civilian fire fatalities, 46 percent of the dollar loss, and
over 50 percent of the fire-fighter injuries. It is evident that
residential fires are our nation's number one fire problem".
The above statement is taken from the Factory Mutual
Research Technical Report, FMRC Serial No. 22574,
"Sprinkler Performance in Residential Fire Tests", dated July
1980.
Factory Mutual is reported to be the world's largest fire
insuring system, with research and testing facilities equivalent
to Underwriters Laboratory. Factory Mutual had some other
things to say about residential fire sprinkler systems, in the
above referenced, U.S. Federal Government sponsored, re-
search report. Let's see what they said.
THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION
RESIDENTIAL SPRINKLER SYSTEM STANDARD IS
"TOO COSTLY TO BE WIDELY INSTALLED".
In 1980, at the time of the writing of the referenced report
(FM RC Serial No. 22574), following the government funded
research into residential sprinklers, the 1975 NFPA-13D
residential sprinkler standard, was in force. What did the
U.S. funded F.M. research program conclude about NFPA-
13D. Here we quote directly from the F.M. engineering -
research report No. 22574.
-5-
2. The orientation of the fire codes so that available water
is seldom applied effectively to the early fire, either
automatically or manually.
By such methods the very codes that presumably prevent or
reduce fire in reality guarantee fire continuity.
THE GRANDEST FRAUD IN THE HISTORY
OF MAN
Our fire code system is not a cure to fire, it is a guarantor
of fire and a preserver of the fire marketplace. In truth this
code system may well be the most elaborate, complex, and
profitable fraud ever conceived of by the mind of man. The
net "take" from the code fraud system over these many years
may be more than one thousand billion dollars (one trillion
dollars) and the cost may well be as high as 500,000 deaths
and many million major injuries and maimings.
Fire continues as a national problem today only because
near 100 percent reliable solutions to fire, available 70 years
and more ago, have been systematically barred from the
market place by a code-profit system that will not tolerate a
true solution to fire.
"A National Protection Association (NFPA) Standard on
residential sprinkler systems (NFPA 13-D - 1975) has been
available since 1975. However, NFPA-13-D, resulting from a
relaxation of the industry - oriented sprinkler standard,
produces a system too costly to be widely installed".
"Thus, sprinklers, the most effective means yet devised for
fire suppression, are still limited almost exclusively to the
protection of industrial and commercial properties".
DEVASTATING CONCLUSIONS
At this point, let's pause for a moment and reflect upon the
enormity of the situation that existed in 1975 with respect
to the loss of human life from fire, and the residential fire
sprinkler system.
Factory Mutual research engineers concluded (and correctly
so) that:
1. The residence accounts for 77 percent of the fire deaths,
and 44 percent of the dollar loss from fires, in the U.S.
2. The residential fire is America's No. 1 fire problem.
3. The fire sprinkler system is "the most effective means
yet devised for fire suppression".
4. The NFPA design code for residential sprinklers pro-
duced a sprinkler system "too costly to be widely
installed".
Well, didn't the F.M. engineers describe one hell of a
situation? We have a number one fire problem in America. It
accounts for 77 percent of all fire deaths in the U.S. (mostly
the elderly and the children, incidently). And this nation's
leading fire safety organization, the NFPA, has countered the
problem with a standard that defines a system "too costly"
to be useful.
The 1980 NFPA - Code
Between 1975 and 1980 the U.S. Federal Government
financed much research into residential sprinklers. Spending
went into the millions. But, when it came to producing a
standard to define the "new" residential sprinkler system, they
went back to the same fire code establishment source for the
code writing. In 1980 the NFPA produced its "corrected"
standard for residential sprinklers, No. 13-D (1980). This was a
revision to the 1975 issue which F.M. concluded was "too
costly to be widely installed". What changes did NFPA make?
They are listed below:
1. The permitted sprinkler spacing was reduced from 256
sq. ft. to 150 sq. ft. (more sprinklers needed to do the
job).
2. The inexpensive standard sprinkler was barred from use.
A new fast sprinkler was mandated for residences at
much higher cost.
3. The requirement that the system be fed by a water
supply greater than that available in most homes was
retained. (13-D, 1980 requires 38 gpm. The rating of
most 5/8 or 3/4 inch residential meters and supply lines
is 25 gpm).
In short, the "too costly to be widely installed" 1975 code
was replaced by a substantially more costly 1980 code. Now
isn't that a situation when one considers the fact that 77
percent of all fire deaths occur in the home.
WHAT FACTORY MUTUAL DID NOT SAY
Although the findings of the Factory Mutual engineers, as
per the quotes from FMRC Serial No. 22574, could be taken
as a devastating indictment of the NFPA, F.M. did not directly
make any such judgments or accusations. Indeed, they might
have, but did not, make the following observations:
1. That the NFPA had been in existence for 79 years prior
to 1975, and was well aware of the carnage due to fire in
the American home, and yet had not produced a sprink-
ler code pertinent to residences prior to 1975.
2. That in the early 1970s Richard Patton had already
pioneered and proven out a life safety sprinkler system
and code that was unanimously endorsed by a research
committee of representatives of virtually all of the
important code and fire safety organizations of the time:
including the three model building code organizations,
(Uniform, Basic and Standard Building Codes organiza-
tions) and also the [AFC, the National Bureau of Stan-
dards, and even by the NFPA assigned committee man.
3. That after first cooperating with the Life Safety System
research and code making, NFPA reversed itself, pro-
duced its own residential standard, and worked to defeat
the wide acceptance of the Life Safety System arguing
that their own new standard (13-D, 1975) would do the
job better.
4. That at hearings Patton correctly argued that
NFPA-13-D was too costly to sell. It was only five years
later (1980) when F.M. finally officially stated, that
13-D was "too costly to be widely installed". By then,
residential sprinklers had already been dealt a crippling
blow.
-6-
CODE MAKING BEFORE THE DATA IS
AVAILABLE
I was completely astounded in 1980, when the NFPA at its
national convention in San Diego referenced fire research
data that "proved" that the standard, low cost sprinklers
would not function properly in a residence. At the time we
had over 80 years' experience with "standard" sprinkler heads
in nursing homes, hotels, clubs, rooming houses, hospitals
and similar light hazard properties. The 80 years of actual data
showed loss of life in sprinklered buildings very close to zero.
For 80 years the "old" heads worked, nearly perfectly. How
come, then, federally funded research suddenly "proved" the
opposite?
In San Diego, I found that the new code (13-D, 1980) was
to be voted into existing without first being a "temporary
standard" for a year, as was the normal procedure, and I found
out the research that proved the "old sprinklers would not
work" was not yet published and available to those who would
vote. And I found that the "new", fast sprinklers were not yet
approved or being manufactured. But, we were told, the
matter of the new code was "so vital" that the extremely
unusual procedures to standardize before the data was pub-
lished, was justified because human safety in dwellings was
such a critically important issue (after 84 years without a
practical code).
I made it my business to find and analyze the research data
that "proved" the "old" heads would not work in a residence.
The research procedures were astounding.
NOWONDER "THAT OLD SPRINKLER" FAILED 11110
I could not believe that a proper research program could
"prove" conventional sprinklers would not save lives in a
dwelling because for 80 years sprinklers had been almost 100
percent perfect at protecting life. But after I studied the
research report, I knew how the researchers had reached the
conclusions they reached.
The fire research test room conditions varied, but under
some of the worst conditions (where most failures occurred)
the walls and the ceilings were sheathed with combustible
materials. And under the most adverse conditions the fire was
located in the corner, and furniture was placed between the
sprinkler and the fire so the spray could not reach the fire.
Realize, the fire was arranged to burn shielded from the
sprinkler spray.
Having set up test conditions where the room as well as the
contents were combustible, with the water spray prevented
from reaching the fire, a condition for "failure" was further
defined as follows:
1. Theoretically, a person would remain in the fire room
for a full 15 minutes AFTER the sprinkler opened. In
other words, the sprinkler would operate, and then for
15 minutes (as the obstructed fire continued to burn)
theoretically a person would remain within the room
amidst the sprayed water and combustion products.
2. Under the above conditions, if during the 15 minutes •
AFTER the sprinkler opened, the carbon monoxide
reached a level that would kill with approximately a
ONE HOUR exposure time, the sprinkler head was
judged to have "failed".
 For those who do not realize it, a sprinkler is NOT
•
guaranteed to completely extinguish a fire. There can be
no such guarantee because a fire could be under a bed,
for example, or behind furniture, etc. The sprinkler
system CONTROLS the fire, prevents flashover, keeps
the fire small, allows people safe exit from the im-
mediate fire area, drops the heat, and keeps the toxic
gases to a minute level when compared to the
TREMENDOUS toxicity produced by an out of control
fire. Sprinklers, nearly 100 percent of the time, prevent
fire deaths under these parameters. Those who know fire
sprinklers and who structured the test parameters
undoubtedly were DELIBERATELY AND IN-
TENTIONALLY setting conditions for failure so as to
GUARANTEE FAILURE!
INCREDIBLE! The test was structured to GUARANTEE
failure.
FAST SPRINKLERS FAILED TOO
I continued my researching of the "research that proved
that sprinklers don't work". It was the fire test series con-
i
ducted in the City of Los Angeles during 1979 and 1980,
largely financed by the federal government. During this
test program prototypes of the "fast" sprinklers were also
tested. These "fast" sprinklers were not yet into the manu-
facturing stage, and presumably were waiting on "favorable
conclusions" from the research program so as to justify
the manufacturing.
Well, as I studied the research, it became apparent that
whether or not the sprinkler head was "fast" was irrelevant to
the tests. Under the test conditions described above the "fast"
sprinklers "failed" just as readily as the "standard" sprinklers.
Interestingly enough, there were MORE failures produced with
the "fast" sprinklers than with the standard ones.
Another interesting thing I discovered was that this L.A.
test program was also used as a justification for reducing the
allowed sprinkler spacing to 150 sq. ft. (1980 NFPA-13-D)
from a previously allowed spacing of 256 sq. ft. (1975 N FPA-
13-D). Yet, there were actually MORE failures during the test
program with sprinklers spaced 150 sq. ft. or less, than when
sprinkler spacing was more than 150 sq. ft. How about that!
Of course, this "research" set the stage for forcing the public
to buy more expensive sprinklers, and more of them, to gain a
"certified" system. I personally believe that the research, the
misrepresenting of the research at the NFPA convention, and
the code locking the public into unnecessarily expensive
sprinkler systems, represented criminal fraud.
TRUTH IS NOT ALWAYS VICTORIOUS
At the 1980 NFPA convention in San Diego, I went up to a
microphone during the preceedings and although the research
referenced above was "not yet available", I told those as-
sembled the information I had developed, as outlined above.
But, there was a very well orchestrated presentation with
important people in the fire protection community assuring
he audience that the conventional sprinklers won't work
atisfactorily in the home (it was proven, they said), that the
otests proved that fast heads were needed, that the tests proved
the fast sprinklers would work better, that the test proved
reduced spacing was needed, etc. The well orchestrated shift to
the new standard No. 13-D, 1980, swept through of course.
They say the truth will set you free. I'm not so sure.
The State Fire Marshal of California, and his staff produced
a residential sprinkler code that truly makes sense. This
standard; which ties into much of the Patton research:
1. Uses small orifice sprinkler and a finer spray to allow
homes to be protected with water already available
within the home. There is no need to dig up the front
lawn to put in a new supply line especially for the
sprinkler system.
2. Requires the water density proven adequate by research,
and in line with "standard" protection in most other
industrial nations in the world. A water density of 0.05
GPM/sq. ft. is allowed.
3. Allows the use of the low cost sprinklers and the wider
spacing normal to sprinkler design. The standard sprink-
ler covering 225 sq. ft. is permitted.
4. Allows other innovations that will result in a practical,
affordable, life safety system for the home.
THE BIG PICTURE
Yes, Factory Mutual said it. Yes, it's true! The dwelling is
the number one fire problem in America. The 1975 NFPA-
13-D standard was too costly to be installed. The number of
sprinkler systems installed to meet the criteria of this code
between 1975 and 1980 was probably less than 100.
In 1980 the NFPA revised their "too costly" sprinkler
system, and made it more costly. After nearly 100 years in
existence, and 25 years after Richard Patton proved out the
technicalities for practical sprinkler systems, and more than
10 years after he proved them out in front of a panel of
national fire protection engineers, the NFPA codes still
represent a near insurmountable barrier to fire safety in the
home.
The number of deaths that could have been prevented, but
weren't, must be well into the hundreds of thousands by
now. And, a high percentage are children.
TOO MANY PROFESSIONALS LOOK THE OTHER
WAY
When an honest engineer looks at the research that was
used as a basis to bar low cost sprinkler heads from use in the
home, it is just so obviously spurious that one can only won-
der why it is that no public agency has as yet leveled charges
of fraud and dishonesty against the perpetrators. I mean, the
data is there in black and white - how can any man of integrity
close his eyes to the situation? How can the fire "profes-
sionals" close their eyes to what's going on, and the cost in
human life?
The home is the number one fire problem in America, and
the child is the number one victim in the home. And, I am
afraid, that so long as manipulated research, orchestrated
codes, and indifference among the professionals prevails, that
it will continue to be so.
 THE AUTHOR'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FAST RESPONSE SPRINKLER
The concept of the faster response sprinkler is a good one.
In fact, in Patton Reports years ago, I advocated the develop-
ment of faster response sprinklers as one of many changes
needed in the sprinkler system. When Harry Shaw was pro-
moting research into this matter for the National Fire Ad-
ministration he called me in as a consultant, and I gave him my
ideas. He told me that my writings on the subject were an in-
spiration for the research.
I have no conflict with the idea at all. What I find revolting,
however, is that the price of entry into the marketplace for
this device was instant corruption. The device rolled in on
manipulated research, falsifications, and trickery. It was used
to further increase system costs, further oversize pipe, and to
lock in on an atrocious excess of water requirement. Since the
research was phony we still do not know how it will operate in
the home compared to the standard head. Those who recog-
nize no technology except a corrupted technology prevailed.
The "fast" sprinkler increases the chance for more than two
sprinklers to open in a fire. If they were five gpm sprinklers,
and three opened, the 15 gpm needed would be available and
the fire would be controlled. When two open sprinklers are
keyed to approximately a 40 gpm flow in a home with a 15 to
PATTON FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS, INC.
P. O. Box 41878 • Sacramento, California 95841 • Phone (916) 338-0943 • California Contractors License No. 355636
25 gpm water supply, three open sprinklers will spell system
failure; indeed even two open heads will produce failure under
many conditions in the home with the present regulations.
The code fraud concept of pricing higher, and giving less,
came through, in spades.
In my judgment, the Federal Government in its usual way
came into the fire picture with the very best of intentions,
placed bureaucratic type minds in charge, appropriated 10 times
as much money as was needed, and assumed all would come
out well. Those who were in charge knew little to nothing
about true fire technology as opposed to code reading, even
less about the politics of fire; and their greatest fear was the
fear of making a decision without committee backup.
The sharks of fire safety came in with their white knights in
shining armor attire, volunteered their usual 1000 percent
cooperation, stroked the right egos, and dazzled the govern-
ment worker with charm, expertise and affluence. And they
led them right down the garden path.
The "fast" sprinkler could have been the key to unlock an
opening in the stone wall. Instead, it was used to further
reinforce the fortress.
Professional Engineers No. F.P.280