Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 84464 June 21, 1991

SPOUSES JAIME AND TEODORA VILLANUEVA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA I. SANCHEZ, respondents.
Franco L. Loyola for petitioners.

CRUZ, J.:p
The Regional Trial Court of Cavite dismissed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale,
holding that it was not spurious. It was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which found that the
vendor's signature on the questioned document had indeed been forged. The petitioners are now
before us and urge that the decision of the trial court be reinstated.
In her complaint below, herein private respondent Catalina Sanchez, claiming to be the widow of
Roberto Sanchez, averred that her husband was the owner of a 275 sq. meter parcel of land located
at Rosario, Cavite, which was registered without her knowledge in the name of the herein petitioners
on the strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their favor by her late husband on February 7,
1968. Involving the report of a handwriting expert from the Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service, who found that the signature on the document was written by another person,
she prayed that the deed of sale be annulled, that the registration of the lot in the name of the
petitioners be cancelled, and that the lot be reconveyed to her. 1
In their answer, the petitioners questioned the personality of the private respondent to file the
complaint, contending that the late Roberto Sanchez was never married but had a common-law wife
by whom he had two children. On the merits, they claimed that Roberto Sanchez had deeded over
the lot to them in 1968 for the sum of P500.00 in partial settlement of a judgment they had obtained
against him. They had sued him after he had failed to pay a P1,300.00 loan they had secured for
him and which they had been forced to settle themselves to prevent foreclosure of the mortgage on
their property. 2
On the petitioner's motion, the trial court required the examination of the deed of sale by the National
Bureau of Investigation to determine if it was a forgery. Trial proceeded in due time, with the
presentation by the parties of their testimonial and documentary evidence. On June 25, 1986, Judge
Alejandro C. Silapan rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners.
In his decision, 3 the trial judge rejected the testimony of the handwriting experts from the PC and the
NBI, who had both testified that the standard signature of the late Roberto Sanchez and the one written
on the alleged deed of sale "were written by two different people." He cited Go Fay v. Bank of the
Philippine Islands 4 in support of his action. Explaining the supposed differences between the signatures,

he said that Roberto Sanchez was "under serious emotional stress and intensely angry" when he
reluctantly signed the document after he had lost the case to them, "with the added fact that they only
wanted to accept his lot for P500.00 and not for the settlement of the entire obligation of P1,300.00." At
that, he said there were really no fundamental differences between the signatures compared. Moreover,
the signatures examined were from 1970 to 1982 and did not include those written by Roberto Sanchez in
1968.

The decision also noted that Roberto Sanchez did not take any step to annul the deed of sale
although he had knowledge thereof as early as 1968. He thus allowed his action to prescribe under
Article 1431 of the Civil Code. As for the contract of a marriage submitted by the private respondent,
this should also be rejected because although the document was dated September 21, 1964, the
Torrens certificate issued to Roberto Sanchez over the subject land on August 25, 1965, described
his civil status as "single." It was also doubtful if she could bring the action for reconveyance alone,
even assuming she was the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez, considering that he left
illegitimate children and collateral relatives who were also entitled to share in his estate.
As earlier stated, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 5 which held that the trial court
did err, as contended by the appellant, in holding that the deed of sale was not spurious; that the action to
annul it had already prescribed; that Catalina Sanchez was not the widow of Roberto Sanchez; and that
she had no capacity to institute the complaint.

Before us now, the petitioners fault the respondent court for: a) upholding the testimony of the expert
witnesses against the findings of fact of the trial court; b) annulling the deed of sale; c) declaring that
the action to annul the deed of sale had not yet prescribed; d) not declaring the private respondent
guilty of estoppel; and e) not sustaining the decision of the trial court.
We see no reason to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is consonant with the evidence
of record and the applicable law and jurisprudence.
The Court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez has proved her status as the widow of Roberto
Sanchez with her submission of the marriage contract denominated as Exhibit "A." 6 That evidence
rendered unnecessary the presumption that "a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" and may also explain why Roberto Sanchez could
not marry the woman by whom he supposedly had two illegitimate children, assuming these persons did
exist. It is strange that the trial court should reject Exhibit "A" in favor of the Transfer Certificate of Title
describing Roberto Sanchez as "single," 7 disregarding the elementary principle that the best
documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. A Torrens certificate is the best
evidence of ownership of registered land, not of the civil status of the owner.

As the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez, the private respondent could validly file the complaint
for the recovery of her late husband's property, without prejudice to the succession rights of his other
heirs. Parenthetically, (and curiously), although the supposed common-law wife and her illegitimate
children were never presented at the trial, their existence was readily accepted by the trial court on
the basis alone of the petitioner's unsupported statements.
Coming now to the questioned signature, we find it significant that the examination by the NBI was
requested by the petitioners themselves but in the end it was the private respondent who presented
the NBI handwriting expert as her own witness. 8 The explanation is obvious. The petitioners hoped to
refute the findings of the PC handwriting expert with the findings of the NBI handwriting expert, but as it
turned out the findings of the two witnesses coincided. Both PC Examiner Corazon Salvador and NBI
Examiner Zenaida J. Torres expressed the informed view that the signature on the deed of sale was not
written by Roberto Sanchez. 9

They did not conjure this conclusion out of thin air but supported it with knowledgeable testimony
extensively given on direct and cross-examination on the various characteristics and differences of
the signatures they had examined and compared. 10 The trial judge said the testimony of PC Examiner
Salvador was not reliable because her examination of the document was "done under circumstance not
so trustworthy before the action was instituted." But he did not consider the fact that her findings were
corroborated by NBI Examiner Torres, who conducted her own examination at the instance of the
petitioners themselves and after the action was instituted. It is worth noting that the competence of the
two expert witnesses was never assailed by the petitioners nor was it questioned by the trial judge. The
petitioners also did not present their own handwriting expert to refute the findings of the government
handwriting experts.

The Court has itself examined the signatures of Roberto Sanchez in the several instruments among
the records of this case, including those dating back to before 1968 11 and is inclined to accept the
findings of the handwriting experts. The case invoked by the petitioners is not applicable because the
differences in the signatures compared in the case at bar were, as the trial judge found, caused not by
time but by the tension gripping Roberto Sanchez when he signed the deed of sale.

Incidentally, the petitioners have not sufficiently established the reason for such tension, which
appears to be a mere conjecture of the trial judge. No proof was submitted about their filing of the
complaint against Roberto Sanchez. Petitioner Jaime Villanueva himself admitted under oath that he
did not read the decision in the case nor did he ask his lawyer how much had been awarded against
the defendant. 12 Nobody testified about Roberto's state of mind when he allegedly signed the document,
and in Manila at that although the persons were residing in Cavite. Even the witnesses to the Bilihan were
not presented nor was any explanation for their absence offered.

The explanation given by the petitioners for their delay in registering the deed of sale is not
convincing. That delay lasted for all of thirteen years. The petitioners suggest they are simple
peasants and did not appreciate the need for the immediate transfer of the property in their name.
They also say that they forgot. The evidence shows, however, that they understood the need for
registering their property for purposes of using it as collateral in case they wanted to borrow money.
It would appear that they thought of simulating the sale registering the subject lot when their own
lands were insufficient to secure a P100,000.00 loan their daughter wanted to borrow.
Concerning the question of prescription, we find that the applicable rule is not Article 1391 of the
Civil Code but Article 1410. Article 1391 provides that the action for annulment of a contract
prescribes in four years in cases where the vice consists of intimidation, violence, undue influence,
mistake, fraud or lack capacity. The deed of sale in question does not suffer from any of these
defects. The supposed vendee's signature having been proved to be a forgery, the instrument is
totally void or inexistent as "absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article 1409 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 1410, "the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe."
Finally, petitioners invoke Article 1431 of the Civil Code and contend that the respondent court erred
in not declaring the private respondent and her late husband estopped from questioning the deed of
sale until after fourteen years from its execution. The inference that Roberto Sanchez and the private
respondent knew about the instrument from that date has not been proved by the evidence of
record. Moreover, we fail to see the applicability of Article 1431, which provides that "through
estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Neither the private respondent
nor her late husband has made any admission or representation to the petitioners regarding the
subject land that they are supposed to have relied upon.

Our own finding is that the petitioners have not proved the validity and authenticity of the deed of
sale or even the circumstances that supposedly led to its execution by the late Roberto Sanchez. On
the contrary, we are convinced from the testimonies of the handwriting experts that his signature had
been forged on the questioned document and that he had not conveyed the subject land to the
petitioners. The deed of sale being a forgery, it was totally void or inexistent and so could be
challenged at any time, the action for its nullification being imprescriptible. The private respondent,
as the widow of Roberto Sanchez, has the capacity to sue for the recovery of the land in question
and is not estopped from doing so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-46626-27 December 27, 1979
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, A & A TORRIJOS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, FRANCISCA S.
BOMBASI, HERCULINO M. DEO, FRUCTUOSA LABORADA and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CALOOCAN CITY,respondents-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Gonzalo D. David for respondents.

AQUlNO, J.:
These two cases are about the cancellation and annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose
originals are existing and whose reconstitution was, therefore, uncalled for.
1. Lots Nos. 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty-five and twenty-four
hectares, respectively, located at Novaliches, Caloocan, now Quezon City, are registered in the
name of theCommonwealth of the Philippines, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594
and 34596 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal both dated April 30, 1938.
The originals of those titles are on file in the registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal. They were not
destroyed during the war. Even the originals of the preceding cancelled titles for those two lots,
namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 15832 and 15834 in the name of the Philippine Trust
Company, are intact in the registry of deeds.
2. The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa Laborada, a widow residing at 1665 Interior
12 Dart Street, Paco, Manila, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City a petition
dated November, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title covering the above-mentioned Lot No. 915.
She alleged that she was the owner of the lot and that the title covering it, the number of which she
could not specify, was "N.A." or not available (Civil Case No. C-677). The petition was sworn to on
November 16, 1967 before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino (48-52, Consolidated Record on
Appeal).
3. On April 2, 1968, the lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on June 14, 1968.
The notice of hearing was published in the Official Gazette. Copies thereof were posted in three
conspicuous places in Caloocan City and were furnished the supposed adjoining owners (53-54,
Consolidated Record on Appeal). The registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal were not served
with copies of the petition and notice of hearing.

4. State Prosecutor Enrique A. Cube, as supposed counsel for the Government, did not oppose the
petition. Laborada presented her evidence before the deputy clerk of court. Judge Serafin Salvador
in his "decision" dated July 6, 1968 granted the petition.
He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer certificate of title which was not available and
which was issued to Maria Bueza who sold the lot to Laborada. The transfer certificate of title
covering the lot was allegedly destroyed during the war. The plan and technical description for the lot
were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration who recommended favorable action on
the petition (pp. 53-56, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
5. The lower court directed the register of deeds of Caloocan City to reconstitute the title for Lot No.
915 in the name of Laborada. The order of reconstitution was not appealed. It became final and
executory.
6. Acting on the court's directive, the register of deeds issued to Laborada on August 14, 1968
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) 3-(R) Lot No. 915 was later subdivided into seven lots, Lots
Nos. 915-A to 915-G. The Acting Commissioner of Land Registration approved the subdivision plan.
The register of deeds cancelled TCT No. (N.A.) 3-(R) and issued on October 15, 1968 seven titles to
Laborada, namely, TCT Nos. 30257 to 30263 (pp. 56-59, 61-83, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
7. In another and later case, Civil Case No. C-763 of the lower court, one Francisco S. Bombast,
single, residing at 2021 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila filed in the lower court a petition dated
November 16, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title of another lot, the aforementioned Lot No. 918.
She could not specify the number of the title. She alleged that the title was "N.A" or not available.
She claimed to be the owner of the lot and that the title covering it was destroyed during the war.
Like the first petition, the second petition was sworn to on the same date, November 16, 1967,
before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino. Why it was not filed simultaneously with Laborada's
petition was not explained. (17-21, Consolidated Record on Appeal.)
8. The lower court set the second petition for hearing on January 31, 1969. As in Laborada's petition,
the notice of hearing for Bombast's petition was published in the Official Gazette. It was posted in
three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and copies thereof were sent to the supposed adjoining
owners (22, Consolidated Record on Appeal). But no copies of the petition and notice of hearing
were served upon the registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal, the officials who would be
interested in the reconstitution of the supposed lost title and who could certify whether the original of
the title was really missing.
9. Bombast's petition was assigned also to Judge Salvador. It was not opposed by the government
lawyers, Enrique A. Cube and Conrado de Leon, Judge Salvador in his order of April 3, 1969
granted the petition.
The court found from the evidence that the allegedly missing or "not available" title was issued to
Regino Gollez who sold the land to petitioner Bombast. The owner's duplicate of Gollez's title was
supposedly destroyed during the war. Taxes were paid for that land by Gollez and Bombast. The
technical description of the land the plan were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration
who submitted a report recommending the reconstitution of the title (pp. 22-25, Consolidated Record
on Appeal).
10. The lower court ordered the register of deeds to reconstitute the missing title of Lot No. 918 in
the name of Bombast. Acting on that directive, the register of deeds issued to Bombast Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N.A.4(R) dated August 27, 1969(pp. 24-27, Consolidated Record on Appeal).

11. On March 25, 1969 or five months before the issuance of the reconstituted title, Francisca
Bombast, now Identified as single (not widow) and a resident of 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street Paco,
Manila, which was the same address used by Fructuosa Laborada (Bombast used first the address
2021 San Marcelino Street) sold Lot No. 918 to Herculano M. Deo allegedly for P249,880. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34146R was issued to Deo.
On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation allegedly for
P250,000. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34147-R was issued to the corporation (pp. 10-11, 29-34,
Consolidated Record on Appeal).
12. On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for the cancellation and annulment of the
reconstituted titles and the titles issued subsequent thereto (Civil Cases Nos. 1784 and 1785). Judge
Salvador, who had ordered the reconstitution of the titles and to whom the two cases for cancellation
were assigned, issued on June 5, 1970 restraining orders enjoining the register of deeds, city
engineer and Commissioner of Land Registration from accepting or recording any transaction
regarding Lots Nos. 915 and 918.
13. The respondents in the two cases, through a common lawyer, filed separate answers containing
mere denials. The Commissioner of Land Registration filed pro forma answers wherein he
interposed no objection to the issuance of the preliminary injunction sought by the State. After a joint
trial of the two cases, respondents corporation and Laborada filed amended answers wherein they
pleaded the defense that they were purchasers in good faith and for value.
14. On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not bother to inhibit himself) rendered a decision in
the two cases holding that the State's evidence was insufficient to establish its ownership and
possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918 and that Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation
were purchasers in good faith and for value and, consequently, their titles are not cancellable and
annullable.
Judge Salvador further held that the titles, whose reconstitution he had ordered allegedly in
conformity with law, could not be attacked collaterally and, therefore, "the reconstituted titles and
their derivatives have the same validity, force and effect as the originals before the reconstitution"
(pp. 160-161, Consolidated Record on Appeal). The State appealed.
15. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court's judgment, held that the orders of
reconstitution dated July 6, 1968 and April 3, 1969 could no longer be set aside on May 26, 1970,
when the petitions for annulment and cancellation of the reconstituted titles were filed, and that if
there were irregularities in the reconstitution, then, as between two innocent parties, the State, as
the party that made possible the reconstitution, should suffer the loss. The Court of Appeals cited
section 101 of Act 496 to support its view that a registered owner may lose his land "by the
registration of any other person as owner of such land".
The State appealed to this Court. We hold that the appeal is justified. The Appellate Court and the
trial court grievously erred in sustaining the validity of the reconstituted titles which, although issued
with judicial sanction, are no better than spurious and forged titles.
In all candor, it should be stated that the reconstitution proceedings, Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C763, were simply devices employed by petitioners Laborada and Bombast for landgrabbing or for the
usurpation and illegal appropriation of fifty hectares of State-owned urban land with considerable
value.

The crucial and decisive fact, to which no importance was attached by the lower court and the Fifth
Division of the Court of Appeals (Reyes, L.B., Domondon and Ericta, JJ.), is that two valid and
existing Torrens titles in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines were needlessly
reconstituted in the names of Laborada and Bombast on the false or perjurious assumption that the
two titles were destroyed during the war.
That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud foisted on the courts of justice. It was
a stultification of the judicial process. One and the same judge (1) allowed the reconstitution and
then (2) decided the two subsequent cases for the cancellation and annulment of the wrongfully
reconstituted titles.
The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the
reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged
ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot be given any credence. The two proceedings were
sham and deceitful and were filed in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be
countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of
title that are missing and not fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a patent absurdity to
reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds. The
reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C- 763 are void because they are contrary
to Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are actually
subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26
to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing (See Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and
Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480, per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent
machinations for depriving a registered owner of his land, to undermine the stability and security of
Torrens titles and to impair the Torrens system of registration. The theory of A & A Torrijos
Engineering Corporation that it was a purchaser in good faith and for value is indefensible because
the title of the lot which it purchased unmistakably shows that such title was reconstituted. That
circumstance should have alerted its officers to make the necessary investigation in the registry of
deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal where they could have found that Lot 918 is owned by the State.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and set aside.
The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763 are declared void and are set
aside. The reconstituted titles, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N.A. 3-(R) and N.A. 4-(R) and
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34146-R, 34147-R and 30257 to 30263 and the survey plans and
subdivision plan connected therewith are likewise declared void. The register of deeds is directed to
cancel the said titles.
The Republic of the Philippines, as the successor of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is hereby
declared the registered owner of Lots 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, as shown in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the registry of deeds of Rizal. Costs against the private
respondents-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

My vocabulary is inadequate to express my disgust and indignation at this brozen landgrabbing.
BARREDO, (Chairman), J., concurring:
I concur fully in the well-reasoned main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, if only because it is to me
inconceivable how any court can order the reconstitution of a supposed lost torrens title when the
record shows beyond doubt that the land in question, per its technical description and location, is
covered already by another title actually subsisting in the office of the corresponding register of
deeds.
I am writing this separate opinion only to underscore my considered view that considering the
records that the various offices of the government having to do with the matter should keep
regularly, like the Land Registration Commission, the Bureau of Lands and the corresponding
Register of Deeds, only bad faith and bad faith alone can give occasion to occurrences like what
happened in this case. The Torrens system of land registration was conceived to give every duly
registered owner complete peace of mind as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right
over the same in the manner allowed by law that he would be safe in his ownership and its
consequent rights. The provision about recourse to the Assurance Fund was not included in the Act
for the benefit of scoundrels who might ingeniously "steal" lands nor to open opportunities for
chicanery of any shade or mode.
Nor is the judiciary without any responsibility in the premises. Judges must bear in mind that. the
reconstitution of torrens titles after a war or other national catastrophe is a function that deserves the
most careful and scrupulous attention, certainly not a perfunctory, much less ministerial chore to be
performed on the basis simply of easily obtainable pro forma certificates of other officials concerned.
I would go as far as to require oral testimony of the said official, unless this be very inconvenient,
subject to closest scrutiny as to the veracity of his records. There is absolutely no excuse for a judge
to ignore the actual existence of a title in the office of the Register of Deeds covering the same land
claimed by another who alleges his title thereto his been lost, absent any showing of voluntary
transfers or other lawful transmission by the registered owner in favor of a person from whom the
petitioner could have obtained his right.
There are too many fake titles being peddled around and it behooves every official of the
government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has
made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion,
honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large.

# Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
My vocabulary is inadequate to express my disgust and indignation at this brozen landgrabbing.
BARREDO, (Chairman), J., concurring:
I concur fully in the well-reasoned main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, if only because it is to me
inconceivable how any court can order the reconstitution of a supposed lost torrens title when the
record shows beyond doubt that the land in question, per its technical description and location, is
covered already by another title actually subsisting in the office of the corresponding register of
deeds.
I am writing this separate opinion only to underscore my considered view that considering the
records that the various offices of the government having to do with the matter should keep
regularly, like the Land Registration Commission, the Bureau of Lands and the corresponding
Register of Deeds, only bad faith and bad faith alone can give occasion to occurrences like what
happened in this case. The Torrens system of land registration was conceived to give every duly
registered owner complete peace of mind as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right
over the same in the manner allowed by law that he would be safe in his ownership and its
consequent rights. The provision about recourse to the Assurance Fund was not included in the Act
for the benefit of scoundrels who might ingeniously "steal" lands nor to open opportunities for
chicanery of any shade or mode.
Nor is the judiciary without any responsibility in the premises. Judges must bear in mind that. the
reconstitution of torrens titles after a war or other national catastrophe is a function that deserves the
most careful and scrupulous attention, certainly not a perfunctory, much less ministerial chore to be
performed on the basis simply of easily obtainable pro forma certificates of other officials concerned.
I would go as far as to require oral testimony of the said official, unless this be very inconvenient,
subject to closest scrutiny as to the veracity of his records. There is absolutely no excuse for a judge
to ignore the actual existence of a title in the office of the Register of Deeds covering the same land
claimed by another who alleges his title thereto his been lost, absent any showing of voluntary
transfers or other lawful transmission by the registered owner in favor of a person from whom the
petitioner could have obtained his right.
There are too many fake titles being peddled around and it behooves every official of the
government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has
made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion,
honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large.