PEOPLE v ANTICAMARA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178771
June 8, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO and FERNANDO CALAGUAS FERNANDEZ a.k.a. LANDO CALAGUAS,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556, affirming the
trial court's judgment finding appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando) and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara
(Al) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 4498-R and of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case No. 4481-R.
Lando, Al, Dick Taedo (Dick), Roberto Taedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), Necitas Ordeiza-Taedo (Cita), and
Fred Doe are charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate
Informations, which read:
For Murder (Criminal Case No. 4498-R)
That on or about the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Municipality of Rosales,
Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then armed with a hand gun, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take Sulpacio Abad, driver of the Estrellas, hog tied (sic) him, brought (sic) to a secluded place, shoot and bury in
a shallow grave, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.
For Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention (Criminal Case No. 4481-R)
That on or about the 7th day of May 2002, more or less 3:00 o'clock in the early morning, at the Estrella
Compound, Brgy. Carmen East, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who are private persons, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, armed with firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap
Sulpacio Abad and AAA,2 both employees of the Estrellas, thereby depriving them of their liberty, all against their
will for a period of twenty-seven (27) days.
That in the course of the kidnapping, Sulpacio Abad was killed and buried in Brgy. Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan
and AAA was raped for several times by her abductors.
Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to RA 7659.
When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all pleaded not guilty, while Dick, Bet, Marvin
and Fred Doe remained at-large. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
As summarized in the People's brief, the facts as established by the evidence of the prosecution are as follows:
About 3 o'clock in the early morning of May 7, 2002, househelper AAA and driver Abad Sulpacio were sleeping in
their employers' house located in Barangay Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan. Their employers, Conrado
Estrella and his wife, were out of the house at that time (TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 4-7). Momentarily, AAA was
jolted from sleep when she heard voices saying, "We will kill her, kill her now" and another voice saying, "Not yet!"
Hiding under her blanket, AAA later heard someone saying, "We only need money, we only need money."
Thereafter, she heard someone talking in Ilocano which she could not understand. Then she heard somebody
say, "Cebuana yan, Cebuana yan, kararating lang galing Cebu." AAA heard the persons conversing which she
estimated about four to five meters away (TSN, ibid., pp. 11-12).
Thereafter, AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who she later identified as accused Dick
Taedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Taedo, a certain Fred and appellants Alberto Anticamara alias "Al Camara," and
Fernando Fernandez alias "Lando Calaguas." One of the intruders approached her and told her not to move
(TSN, ibid., p. 8).
Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she attempted to run but to her surprise, someone
wearing a bonnet was watching her. Someone, whom she later recognized as Dick Taedo, tapped her shoulder.
AAA asked Taedo, "Why Kuya?" Taedo replied, "Somebody will die." After a brief commotion, appellant alias
"Lando Calaguas" asked the group saying, "What shall we do now?" They then decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA
was untied and led her outside the house. Outside, AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and blindfolded, seated
inside a vehicle (TSN, April 26, 2004, pp. 6-10).
The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their employers. AAA saw Cita Taedo there.
The group brought Abad outside the vehicle and led him away (TSN, December 2, 2002, pp. 13-18; TSN,
February 17, 2003, pp. 5-8).
Later, alias "Fred" returned telling the group, "Make the decision now, Abad has already four bullets in his body,
and the one left is for this girl." When Cita Taedo made a motion of cutting her neck, appellant alias "Lando
Calaguas" and "Fred" boarded the vehicle taking along with them AAA. They later proceeded towards San Miguel
Tarlac, where Lando Calaguas resided. They stayed in Lando's house where they kept AAA from May 7 to May 9,
2002 (TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 18-22; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 7-9).
On May 9, 2002, appellant Lando Calaguas told AAA that Fred and Bert Taedo would kill her. Lando then
brought AAA to a hotel in Tarlac, telling AAA that he would leave her there as soon as Fred and Bert Taedo
leave the place. However, once inside the hotel room, appellant Lando Calaguas sexually molested AAA. Lando
told AAA to follow what he wanted, threatening her that he would turn her over to Fred and Bert Taedo. After
Lando raped AAA, he brought her back to his house. Later, Fred, Bert Taedo and Lando Calaguas transferred
AAA to Riles, Tarlac (TSN, ibid., pp. 9-13).
AAA was brought to the residence of Fred's niece, a certain Minda, where Fred kept AAA as his wife. At
nighttime, Fred would repeatedly ravish AAA, threatening her that he would give her back to appellant Lando
Calaguas who, AAA knew, killed Abad Sulpacio. She was afraid Lando might also kill her (TSN, ibid., pp. 14-16).
On May 22, 2002, Fred brought AAA to Carnaga (should be Kananga), Leyte, together with his wife Marsha and
their children. AAA stayed in the house of Marsha's brother Sito, where she was made as a house helper (TSN,
ibid., p. 17).
On June 4, 2002, AAA escaped from the house of Sito. She proceeded to Isabel, Leyte and sought the help of her
friend Susana Ilagan. After hearing AAA's plight, Susana called AAA's brother in Cebu, who later fetched AAA in
Isabel, Leyte and brought her to Mandaue City. When they arrived in Mandaue City, they immediately reported
the incident to the police authorities. On June 23, 2002, AAA executed a Sworn Statement (Exh. "D," TSN, ibid.,
pp. 18-20).
Meanwhile, Dr. Ronald Bandonil, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), conducted
an autopsy on the cadaver of Sulpacio Abad. Dr. Bandonil prepared Autopsy Report No. N-T2-23-P (Exh. "A")
which contains the following findings, to wit:
x Remains placed in a sealed metal coffin, wrapped in two (2) layers of black, plastic garbage bags, and covered
in (sic) a red-stripped cotton blanker. A thick layer of lime embeds the whole torso.
x Remains in a far advanced state of decomposition, with the head completely devoid of soft tissue. A cloth is
wrapped around the eyesockets and tied to the back of the skull. The skull does not show any signs of dents,
chips nor fractures. The other recognizable body part is the chest area which retained a few soft tissues and skin,
but generally far advanced in decomposition. The whole gamut of internal organs have undergone liquefaction
necrosis and have been turned into grayish-black pultaceous masses. Worn on top of the remaining chest is a
sando shirt with observable holes at the left side, both front and back. A large hole is seen at the area of the left
nipple, with traces of burning at its edges and inward in direction. A tied cloth is also observable at the remnants
of the left wrist.
x At the upper chest, which is the most recognizable, remaining and intact part of the torso, a hole, 1.0 cm. x 2.0
cms., with signs of burning, edges inverted, is seen at the left anterior axillary line just below the left nipple.
Another hole is seen 1.5 cms. x 2.5 cms. in diameter, edged averted (sic) at the right chest, along the right
anterior axillary line, 5.0 cms. below the right nipple. A 3rd hole, almost unrecognizable is seen at the left groin
area.
x The other parts of the cadaver are too far advanced in decomposition to have remarkable findings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUNSHOT WOUNDS, TRUNK3
In his defense, Lando denied having committed the crimes charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He claims
that at the time of the incident on May 7, 2002, he was in Barangay Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac, with his family.
He denied ever going to the Estrella farm in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his companions if any person or vehicle would
approach the house of the Estrellas. He said that he was forced to follow what was ordered of him and did not

report the matter to the police because he was threatened to be killed, including the members of his family who
were in Cebu.
On August 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, rendered its
Decision,4the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
A. Accused Nicetas "Cita" Taedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence;
B. Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara)
are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the presence of aggravating
circumstance of pre-meditation, with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the penalty of DEATH is
hereby imposed upon the two (2) accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto
Anticamara (Al Camara). They are also ordered jointly and severally [to] pay the heirs of the victim Abad Sulpacio
the following:
1) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as indemnity for the death of the victim;
3) Fifty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Two Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P57,122.30) as actual damages;
and
4) The cost of suit.
II. Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention:
A) Accused Nicetas "Cita" Taedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence;
B) Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara)
are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal
Detention of the victim AAA as charged, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659. Considering that the victim AAA was raped during her detention, the maximum penalty of
DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two accused, Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto
Anticamara (Al Camara). The two accused are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the victim AAA the
amount of:
1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages;
2) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
3) Cost of suit.
As to the rest of the accused who are still at-large, let this case be set to the archives until they are apprehended.
SO ORDERED.5
In light of the Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,6 the records of the cases were forwarded by the RTC to the CA
for its review. The CA rendered a Decision dated December 15, 2006, affirming the decision of the RTC in
Criminal Case Nos. 4498-R and 4481-R. However, in view of the abolition of the death penalty pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, which was approved on June 24, 2006, the appellants were sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
On January 9, 2007, Lando, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), appealed the Decision of the CA to this
Court. Lando had assigned the following errors in his appeal initially passed upon by the CA, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN AND AMONG
THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH FOR THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, AGGRAVATED
BY RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS NOT DULY PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN THAT OF THE
PROSECUTION
V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On January 9, 2007, Al, through the PAO, appealed the Decision of the CA to this Court. Al had assigned the
following errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE
CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH FOR THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH
RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT HE HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF [TWO] SEXUAL
ABUSES AGAINST THE VICTIM.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE SAME.8
In capsule, the main issue is whether the appellants are guilty of the crimes charged.
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
Circumstantial Evidence
The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the early morning of
May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution adduced sufficient
circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the
main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience .9 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.10 A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.11
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken together, lead to
the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. The Court quotes with
approval the lower court's enumeration of those circumstantial evidence:
The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:
1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad Sulpacio were sleeping inside
the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to rob the
place;
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Taedo, and heard the latter
uttering "somebody will die";
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was
blindfolded and with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Taedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Taedo,
Alberto Anticamara and Fred;
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome,
Rosales, Pangasinan;
6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by Lando, Fred,
Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Taedo stayed with her in the vehicle;
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): "Make a decision now. Abad has
already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl."12
In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter "Usapan natin pare,
kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan." (Our agreement is that whoever comes our way should be eliminated).
Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as

lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio
from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a
shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio
were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that
several holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of
the victim's death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped
around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also found tied at the remnants of
the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a
clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and
brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.
Conspiracy
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after
the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal
design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.13 To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or
need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact,
constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act
of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.14
In the present case, prior to the commission of the crime, the group met at the landing field in Carmen,
Pangasinan and discussed their plan to rob the house of the Estrellas with the agreement that whoever comes
their way will be eliminated.15 Appellant Al served as a lookout by posting himself across the house of the
Estrellas with the task of reporting any movements outside. Fred then climbed the old unserviceable gate of the
Estrella compound and then opened the small door and the rest of the group entered the house of the Estrellas
through that opening.16 After almost an hour inside the house, they left on board a vehicle with AAA and
Sulpacio. AAA and Sulpacio were brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. In that
place, Sulpacio was killed and AAA was brought to another place and deprived of her liberty. These
circumstances establish a community of criminal design between the malefactors in committing the crime. Clearly,
the group conspired to rob the house of the Estrellas and kill any person who comes their way. The killing of
Sulpacio was part of their conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of arming himself with a gun constitutes direct evidence
of a deliberate plan to kill should the need arise.
Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was only forced to participate in the
commission of the crime because he and his family were threatened to be killed. Al's defense fails to impress us.
Under Article 1217 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the
compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury,
because such person does not act with freedom.18 To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must
establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear
of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed.19 For such defense to prosper, the duress, force,
fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.20
There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that he was under duress from his coaccused while participating in the crime that would suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability. The
evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and directed to station himself across the house of the
Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.21 of the following day, while the rest of the group was waiting
in the landing field. Thus, while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to
a real, imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay across the house of the Estrellas for almost six (6)
hours,22 and thereafter returned to the landing field where the group was waiting for his report. Subsequently, the
group proceeded to the Estrellas house. When the group entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour
outside to wait for his companions. Later, when the group left the house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them in
going to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and
AAA.23Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he wished to, but he never did. Neither did he
request for assistance from the authorities or any person passing by the house of the Estrellas during the period
he was stationed there. Clearly, Al did not make any effort to perform an overt act to dissociate or detach himself
from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof that would exempt himself from
criminal liability.24 Therefore, it is obvious that he willingly agreed to be a part of the conspiracy.
Alibi and Denial
Appellant Lando denied having committed the crime charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at
the time of the incident he was in his house at Tarlac, together with his family. On the other hand, the appellants
were positively identified by AAA, as two (2) of the six (6) malefactors who forcibly took her and Sulpacio from the
Estrella house in the early morning of May 7, 2002. Both the trial court and the CA found the testimony of AAA
credible. The Court gives great weight to the trial courts evaluation of the testimony of a witness because it had
the opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying; thus,
making it in a better position to determine whether a witness is lying or telling the truth.251avvphi1
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare denial of the appellant,
on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony
especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered
with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but
also because they are easily fabricated and concocted.26 Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the appellants.27
As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at the time of the
incident, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible for Lando to be at the scene of the
crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.Physical
impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the
place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.28 Where there is the least
chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.29 During the trial of the
case, Lando testified that the distance between his house in Brgy. Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac to the town of
Rosales, Pangasinan is only around forty (40) kilometers. Such distance can be traversed in less than 30 minutes
using a private car and when the travel is continuous.30 Thus, it was not physically impossible for the appellant
Lando to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. In addition, positive identification destroys the defense
of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.31
Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances
In convicting the appellants, the courts a quo appreciated treachery in qualifying the killing to murder and evident
premeditation in imposing the penalty of death. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.32 Two
conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted.33
In the case at bar, it was proven that when AAA boarded the vehicle, she saw Sulpacio tied and blindfolded.
Later, when they reached the fishpond, Sulpacio, still tied and blindfolded, was led out of the vehicle by the group.
When the remains of Sulpacio was thereafter found by the authorities, the autopsy report indicated that a piece of
cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull and another cloth was also
found tied at the left wrist of the victim. There is no question therefore, that the victim's body, when found, still had
his hands tied and blindfolded. This situation of the victim when found shows without doubt that he was killed
while tied and blindfolded; hence, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery was present in the
commission of the crime. In People v. Osianas,34 the Court held that:
x x x In the case at bar, the means used by the accused-appellants to insure the execution of the killing of the
victims, so as to afford the victims no opportunity to defend themselves, was the act of tying the hands of the
victims. Teresita saw the accused-appellants hog-tie the victims and take them away with them. Later that night,
Dionisio Palmero saw the victims, still hog-tied, walking with the accused-appellants. The following day, the
victims were found dead, still hog-tied. Thus, no matter how the stab and hack wounds had been inflicted on the
victims in the case at bar, we are sure beyond a reasonable doubt that Jose, Ronilo and Reymundo Cuizon had
no opportunity to defend themselves because the accused-appellants had earlier tied their hands. The fact that

there were twelve persons who took and killed the Cuizons further assured the attainment of accused-appellants'
plans without risk to themselves.35
The aggravating circumstance of superior strength cannot be separately appreciated because it is absorbed by
treachery.36
The circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof showing: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act.37 The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.38 From the time the group met at the landing field at around 6:30 p.m. of May 6, 2002, and discussed
the possibility of killing anyone who stands on their way, up to the time they took Sulpacio away from the
Estrellas house and eventually killed him thereafter at around past 3:00 a.m., more than eight hours had elapsed
sufficient for the appellants to reflect on the consequences of their actions and desist from carrying out their evil
scheme, if they wished to. Instead, appellants evidently clung to their determination and went ahead with their
nefarious plan.
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with rape, defined in and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code39 are: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.40
The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Appellants Lando and Al, both
private individuals, forcibly took AAA, a female, away from the house of the Estrellas and held her captive against
her will. Thereafter, appellant Lando brought AAA to his house in San Miguel Tarlac, whereby she was deprived
of her liberty for almost one month. It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of
placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty.41 For
there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.42 Its essence is the actual
deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation.43 Although AAA was not confined in an enclosure, she was restrained and deprived of her liberty,
because every time appellant Lando and his wife went out of the house, they brought AAA with them. The
foregoing only shows that AAA was constantly guarded by appellant Lando and his family.
The crime of rape was also established by the prosecution. Appellant Lando succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of AAA through the use of threat and intimidation. AAA testified that on May 9, 2002, appellant Lando
brought her to a hotel to hide her from Fred and Bert, who intended to kill her. Appellant Lando told her to follow
his orders, otherwise, he will give her to Fred and Bert. While in the hotel, appellant Lando raped her.44 Clearly,
for fear of being delivered to Fred and Bert and of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to appellant
Lando's lustful assault. In rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost always the single most
important factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused's
conviction.45This is so because owing to the nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence that can be
given regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended party.46
The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed. In People v. Larraaga,47 this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. Thus, We hold
that appellant Lando is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape in Criminal Case No. 4481-R.
However, the Court does not agree with the CA and trial court's judgment finding appellant Al liable for Rape in
Criminal Case No. 4481-R. In People v. Suyu,48 We ruled that once conspiracy is established between several
accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape committed by
anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the
others from committing rape.49 Also, in People v. Canturia,50 the Court held that:
x x x For while the evidence does convincingly show a conspiracy among the accused, it also as convincingly
suggests that the agreement was to commit robbery only; and there is no evidence that the other members of the
band of robbers were aware of Canturia's lustful intent and his consummation thereof so that they could have
attempted to prevent the same. x x x
The foregoing principle is applicable in the present case because the crime of robbery with rape is a special
complex crime defined in and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and the crime
of kidnapping with rape in this case is likewise a special complex crime as held in the case of People v.
Larraaga.51 There is no evidence to prove that appellant Al was aware of the subsequent events that transpired
after the killing of Sulpacio and the kidnapping of AAA. Appellant Al could not have prevented appellant Lando
from raping AAA, because at the time of rape, he was no longer associated with appellant Lando. AAA even
testified that only Fred and appellant Lando brought her to Tarlac,52 and she never saw appellant Al again after
May 7, 2002, the day she was held captive. She only saw appellant Al once more during the trial of the
case.53Thus, appellant Al cannot be held liable for the subsequent rape of AAA.
The Penalties
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to murder. The penalty
for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged and proven, the imposable penalty upon the appellants is
death, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.54 In view, however, of the passage of
R.A. No. 9346,55 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion
perpetua,56 without eligibility for parole.57
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with rape is death. In view of R.A. No. 9346, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua,58 without
eligibility for parole.59 Accordingly, the imposable penalty for appellant Lando is reclusion perpetua.
As to appellant Al, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the commission of the
offense, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 6360 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The Damages
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.61 In People v. Quiachon,62 even if the penalty of
death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper,
because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As
explained in People v. Salome,63 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact
remains that the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous.
Accordingly, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is proper.
Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof other
than the death of the victim.64 However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the
imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the award of moral
damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.65
The award of exemplary damages is in order, because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation in the commission of the crime.66 The Court awards the amount
ofP30,000.00, as exemplary damages, in line with current jurisprudence on the matter.67
Actual damages is also warranted. Modesta Abad, the spouse of victim Sulpacio, incurred expenses in the
amount of P57,122.30, which was duly supported by receipts.68lawphil
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence that civil
indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of rape.69 Applying prevailing jurisprudence, AAA is entitled
toP75,000.00 as civil indemnity.70
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code,71 without the necessity
of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape.72 Moral damages is granted in recognition of the
victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.73 Such award is separate and distinct from the
civil indemnity.74 However, the amount of P100,000.00 awarded as moral damages is reduced to P75,000.00, in
line with current jurisprudence.75
The award of exemplary damages to AAA in the amount of P50,000 is hereby reduced to P30,000.00 in
accordance with recent jurisprudence.76

As to appellant Al. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the accused is individual and not collective.77
Since appellant Al is liable only for the crime of serious illegal detention, he is jointly and severally liable only to
pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. For serious illegal detention, the award of civil indemnity is in the
amount of P50,000.00, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.78
Along that line, appellant Al's liability for moral damages is limited only to the amount of P50,000.00.79 Pursuant
to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. This is
predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was detained for almost one (1)
month.80
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556 is AFFIRMED
withMODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando" and Alberto Cabillo
Anticamara alias "Al" are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Sulpacio Abad the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P57,122.30 as actual damages.
(b) In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, appellant Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando" is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay the offended party
AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages andP30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Appellant Alberto Cabillo Anticamara alias "Al" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is
also directed to pay, jointly and severally, with appellant Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando," the victim
AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity andP50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
People v Montanir
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187534
April 4, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA AND EDUARDO CHUA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For consideration of this Court is the Decision1 dated April 22, 2008 of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CRHC No. 00499, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 171, finding Appellants Dima Montanir, Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The records bear the following factual antecedents:
Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia "a.k.a. Alice" Buenaflor, together with appellants Ronald Norva and Eduardo
Chua, on December 17, 1997, concocted a plan to kidnap Rafael Mendoza, and after several days of conducting
surveillance on their intended victim, on January 5, 1998, they decided to kidnap Rafael in Ali Mall, Cubao,
Quezon City. However, the intended kidnapping failed, because Rafael did not show up at the said place. On
February 5, 1998, a second attempt was made, but they encountered an accident before they could even execute
their original plan.
Around 5:30 a.m. of February 17, 1998, Alicia called up Rosalina Reyes, a partner of Rafael, to tell her that she
wanted to meet her and Rafael at Jollibee, BBB, Valenzuela City to settle the former's loan of P350,000.00. She
requested Rosalina to bring the land title which she was given as collateral for the said loan.
Rosalina and Rafael arrived at Jollibee ahead of Alicia. Eventually, around 9:15 a.m. of the same date, Alicia
showed up outside the store aboard a car. She was with appellant Ronald Norva. Alicia motioned Rosalina and
Rafael to approach the car, which the two did as requested. While inside the vehicle, Alicia introduced appellant
Ronald as her cousin. Later on, Alicia informed Rosalina and Rafael that she would pay them at her place.
When the car passed by the street where Alicia's house was located, Rosalina asked the former where they were
going. Alicia answered that they had to drop by the house of her financier who agreed to redeem her title and
substitute as her creditor. Trusting Alicia, Rosalina and Rafael did not protest. They finally reached a house in
Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City.
Thereafter, appellant Ronald alighted from the vehicle and talked to a man inside a store, later identified as
Jonard Mangelin. The gate of the house was then opened by appellant Dima. The car proceeded to the garage
and Rosalina and Rafael were asked to go inside the house. Rosalina followed Alicia, while Rafael trailed
Rosalina as they entered through a kitchen door. They passed by a man (Jessie Doe) who was washing his
hands in the sink. While Rosalina was walking behind Alicia, she suddenly heard a dull moan coupled with the
sound of stomping feet. She looked back at the direction where the sounds came from and saw Rafael being
forcibly dragged inside a room. She decided to look for Rafael and on her way, she saw "Jessie Doe" place his
hand on Rafael's mouth and poke a gun at him. Rafael struggled to get free. Rosalina pleaded with "Jessie Doe"
to have pity on Rafael because of his existing heart ailment. Appellant Ronald rushed towards her, poked a gun at
her mouth, tied her to a bed and warned her not to make any noise. He told her that all they want is her money,
upon which, Rosalina said that if they really wanted money, they should untie Rafael, who then appeared to be on
the verge of having a heart attack. Rosalina was untied and she immediately rushed to Rafael and began
pumping his chest. She asked Jonard, who had just entered the room, to help her pump Rafael's chest while she
applied CPR on the latter. Jonard did as told. While CPR was being administered, appellant Dima started
removing all of Rafael's personal belongings, which include his ring, wallet, watch and other items inside his
pocket, and passed them on to appellant Ronald.
Afterwards, appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to take Rosalina to another room. While inside the room where
she was brought, Rosalina begged Jonard to help her escape. Jonard was moved by Rosalina's plea and agreed
to help her. During their conversation, Jonard told Rosalina that two women had tipped them off as the kidnap
victims. When asked who they were, Jonard refused to reveal their identities.
Rosalina was transferred to the master's bedroom around 12:00 noon because certain female visitors arrived.
After the visitors left, Rosalina was returned to the room where she was previously taken. Rosalina asked Jonard
about Rafael's condition, to which he replied that Rafael would be brought to the hospital. A little later, at around 1
p.m., Jonard went to check on Rafael and confirmed that he was still alive.
Around 2:00 p.m., Rosalina heard the sound of someone being pummelled. Feeling nervous, she asked Jonard
the whereabouts of Rafael and was told that he was brought to the hospital. But unknown to Rosalina, Rafael had
just died and his body was placed inside the trunk of a car.
Around 6:30 p.m., Rosalina was informed that she will be brought to another safe house. She was taken to a car
and placed at the back seat, together with Jonard and three other men, later identified as Larry, Jack and Boy.
The driver of the car was appellant Ronald. Appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to cover Rosalina's head with a
jacket which Jonard did. As they were about to leave, the man seated beside Ronald started to talk. Rosalina
recognized the voice of Robert. She then lifted the jacket covering her head and was able to confirm that the one
talking was Robert. Rosalina cried, "Robert, Robert, why did you do this, we did not do anything to you" and
Robert responded, "Pasensiyahan na lang tayo."
By 10:00 p.m., they arrived at a certain house in Pandi, Bulacan where there was no electricity. Thus, they lit
candles for illumination. Rosalina found the house familiar and concluded that it was Alicia's. Rosalina was
brought to a room on the second floor and while inside the room, she was told by one of the men guarding her
that one of the leaders wanted to talk to her. Per the leader's instruction, the guard put out the candle light. The
man then seated himself beside Rosalina and warned her against escaping as they were a large and armed
group. Rosalina recognized the voice as that of Robert's. Before he left the room, Robert gave instructions to
Jonard and the other men inside. Meanwhile, the group started digging a pit at the back of the same house near
the swimming pool.
Around 3:00 a.m. of the following day (February 18), the group buried Rafael's body in the pit. Thereafter, Robert
instructed appellant Ronald to tell Jonard that the latter should kill Rosalina, which Jonard refused to do.
Nonetheless, Robert instructed Jonard and the others to guard Rosalina well, as he himself would deal with her
upon his return.

Rosalina heard the car leave around 5:00 a.m. of the same day. Sensing that Jonard was sympathetic to her,
Rosalina begged him again to help her escape for the sake of her children.
When electricity was restored around 8 p.m., one of the men guarding Rosalina turned off the light inside the
room. The room was only illuminated by a light coming from the hallway. Rosalina saw a person wearing a wig
and sunglasses enter the room. Rosalina recognized him as Robert. Trying to mimic a woman by modulating his
voice, Robert told her that Rafael was in the hospital and that he could still sign a check. He asked Rosalina the
whereabouts of the other land titles and the identities of the other financiers whom she knew. Rosalina replied in
the negative. Robert angrily poked a gun at her and shouted, "That's impossible," and then left the room. He gave
instructions to his members and left.
At 9:00 p.m., Jonard went to Rosalina and told her about Robert's order to kill her, which caused the latter to
panic and cry. She then implored the help of Jonard for her escape. Afterwards, Jonard went to his companions
Larry, Jack and Boy and told them that he would help Rosalina escape. His companions immediately cocked their
guns and an argument ensued. Rosalina talked to them and begged them all to spare her life. One of Jonard's
companions told Rosalina that if they would allow her to escape, they too would get into trouble. Taking
advantage of the situation, Rosalina suggested that all of them should escape. They all agreed to escape in the
early morning.
Around 5:00 a.m., Rosalina, Jonard, Larry, Jack and Boy left the safe house. They walked through a rice field for
about 30 minutes and then boarded a jeepney bound for Balagtas, Bulacan. From Balagtas, they took a bus going
to Cubao and arrived at 7:30 a.m. Rosalina pawned her pieces of jewelry for P1,500.00 and gave the P1,000.00
to Larry, Jack and Boy. The three told Jonard to stay with Rosalina so that she would have a witness and, in case
Rosalina would further need their help, left their address with Jonard.
When the three left, Rosalina immediately called Rafael's brother Tito, and related what happened to her and his
brother. When Tito asked Jonard which hospital Rafael was brought to, Jonard revealed to Rosalina that Rafael
died at the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City. Rosalina called her lawyer, Atty. Teresita Agbi and
asked her to meet them at Farmer's, Cubao. When Atty. Agbi arrived, she accompanied them to the Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG) where an investigation was conducted.
The following day, at 4:00 a.m., two groups from the DILG were formed to arrest Alicia, Josie, the appellants, and
Robert. Alicia and Josie were not at their homes, while appellants Ronald and Dima were arrested at the
residence of Robert. While at the DILG office, Rosalina positively identified appellants Ronald and Dima as her
kidnappers. Meanwhile, Jonard accompanied the police authorities to the safe house in Pandi, Bulacan and
showed them where the body of Rafael was buried. The remains of Rafael was later on exhumed.
Thereafter, two Informations were filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City (Branch 171), with the following
allegations:
Criminal Case No. 123-V-98
That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then
private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one ROSALINA REYES against her
will and detained her, thereby depriving her of her liberty for a period of two days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 124-V-98
That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then a
private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one RAFAEL MENDOZA against his
will and detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim
resulted.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, Jonard and appellants Ronald, Dima and Eduardo, pleaded
"not guilty" to the crime charged. Robert Uy, Alice Buenaflor and Jessie Doe remained at-large during the trial of
the case. Jonard was later on discharged as a state witness. Afterwards, the trial on the merits ensued.
On October 28, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment against the appellants for the crime of kidnapping, the
dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA, and EDUARDO CHUA
are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and in accordance with Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on accused NORVA
and MONTANIR. As regards accused CHUA, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Further, accused Montanir, Norva and Chua are hereby held jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of
Mendoza the amount of Php 71,000.00 in actual damages and Php 50,000.00 as moral damages.
As for accused JOSIE HERRERA, the Court hereby ACQUITS her on reasonable doubt of the charge of
kidnapping. Consequently, The Jail Warden of Valenzuela City Jail is hereby ordered to cause the immediate
release of the said accused from detention unless she is otherwise being detained for some other legal and lawful
cause.
With regard to accused ALICE BUENAFLOR, ROBERT UY and one JESSIE DOE, let the cases against them be
ARCHIVED pending their apprehension. Meantime, let an alias warrant issue for their apprehension.
Considering the penalty imposed on accused MONTANIR, NORVA and CHUA, let the entire records of these
cases be elevated to the Court of Appeals for appropriate review of the judgment herein rendered.
SO ORDERED.
On automatic review, the CA affirmed the conviction with modification on the penalty imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the impugned Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty of death imposed on accused Montanir and Norva is hereby modified to reclusion perpetua to conform to
and in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346. Appellants Montanir, Norva and Chua are ordered to pay jointly
and severally the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victims.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present appeal.
In their respective Briefs, appellants raised the following assignment of errors:
DIMA MONTANIR:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT DIMA MONTANIR GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.
EDUARDO CHUA:
I.
THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT CHUA A CONSPIRATOR TO THE
COMMISSION OF KIDNAPPING.
RONALD NORVA:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT RONALD NORVA GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.
First of all, it must be emphasized that the crime committed by the appellants, as ruled by the trial court and
affirmed by the CA, is the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide. After the amendment of the
Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act No. 7659, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
now provides:
Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or
a public officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
As expounded in People v. Mercado:3
In People v. Ramos,4 the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and
murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found
the accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph
of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with
murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the
killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was
not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person
kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was
merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be
treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art.
267, as amended by RA No. 7659.
This Court further discussed the nature of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide in People v.
Larraaga,5 thus:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for
two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special
complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide,6 (2) robbery with rape,7(3)
kidnapping with serious physical injuries,8 (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide,9 and (5) rape with
homicide.10 In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses
with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier
mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision:
"When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the
victim Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent
thereto and on the occasion thereof." Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component
offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape. It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a "direct
relation, and intimate connection"11 between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be
considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the herein special
complex crime. It bears reiterating that in People vs. Ramos,12 and People vs. Mercado,13 interpreting Article
267, we ruled that "where the person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime
under the last paragraph of Article 267." The same principle applies here. The kidnapping and serious illegal
detention can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crime but shall be punished as
a special complex crime. At any rate, the technical designation of the crime is of no consequence in the imposition
of the penalty considering that kidnapping and serious illegal detention if complexed with either homicide or rape,
still, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed.
In this particular case, the Information specifically alleges that the appellants wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniouslykidnapped Rafael Mendoza against his will and detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and
on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted. The trial court, in its decision, particularly in the
dispositive portion, merely stated that the appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping, however, its mention of the phrase, in accordance with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on accused Norva and Montanir, clearly refers to the
crime committed as that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide. The appellants, therefore,
were correctly punished under the last paragraph of Article 267 as the evidence presented during the trial, in its
entirety, undoubtedly proves that the death of Rafael Mendoza, although of natural causes, occurred on the
occasion of the kidnapping.
Delving on the arguments presented by the appellants in this Court, their corresponding briefs pose a single
common argument the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
they committed the crime charged against them. In particular, they questioned the inconsistent testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution. According to them, the said inconsistent statements from the witnesses, tarnish
their credibility.
This Court finds otherwise.
The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.14 For this reason, its
observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal.15 This rule is variously stated thus: The trial
court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is conclusive and binding unless
shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence has not been considered.16 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge
acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by appellate courts.17
Appellants claim that Jonard, a witness for the prosecution, stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay that he was the
one who whispered to appellant Ronald to transfer Rosalina to another room so that the latter would have no idea
that Rafael was in a critical condition, but during trial, Jonard testified that it was Ronald who instructed him to
transfer Rosalina to a different room. Appellants also point out that in the same sworn statement, Jonard averred
that he resided in Taguig since October, 1987, which is contrary to what he testified in court that he resided in that
same place since 1997. In addition, appellants further argue that in her testimony, Rosalina declared that she was
with four men seated at the back of the car when she was brought to Pandi, Bulacan, however, Jonard, in his own
testimony, stated that there were four of them including Rosalina seated at the back of the car.
A close reading of the above inconsistencies asserted by the appellants show that the same refer only to minor
details and collateral matters and do not affect the veracity and weight of the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution. What really prevails is the consistency of the testimonies of the witnesses in relating the principal
occurrence and positive identification of the appellants. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed.18 They are thus safeguards
against memorized perjury.19
Anent the inconsistencies of the contents of the affidavits and that of the testimonies in court, this Court has
already ruled that testimonies in court are given more weight than affidavits, thus:
x x x x Affidavits are not entirely reliable evidence in court due to their incompleteness and the inaccuracies that
may have attended their formulation.20 In general, such affidavits are not prepared by the affiants themselves but
by another person (i.e., investigator) who may have used his own language in writing the statement or
misunderstood the affiant or omitted material facts in the hurry and impatience that usually attend the preparation
of such affidavits. As this Court has often said:
An affidavit, "being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestion, and sometimes from want of suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be
unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his
memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject."21
We have too much experience of the great infirmity of affidavit evidence. When the witness is illiterate and
ignorant, the language presented to the court is not his; it is; and must be, the language of the person who
prepares the affidavit; and it may be, and too often is, the expression of that person's erroneous inference as to
the meaning of the language used by the witness himself; and however carefully the affidavit may be read over to
the witness, he may not understand what is said in a language so different from that which he is accustomed to
use. Having expressed his meaning in his own language, and finding it translated by a person on whom he relies,
into language not his own, and which he does not perfectly understand, he is too apt to acquiesce; and testimony
not intended by him is brought before the court as his.' (2 Moore on Facts, sec. 952, p. 1105; People v. Timbang,
74 Phil. 295, 299).22
For this reason, affidavits have generally been considered inferior to testimony given in open court.23
Incidentally, the CA was correct in stating that Jonard was able to explain and reconcile the minor discrepancies
in his testimony by saying that he whispered to appellant Ronald that Rafael was in a bad condition and
afterwards, it was appellant Ronald who instructed him to transfer Rosalina to another room, thus:
Atty. Basco:
Referring to the same statement, Mr. Witness, on page 20 of the TSN dated February 24, 1999 referring to the
same statement, Mr. Witness, in your statement here when asked:

Q. Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when you answered in the manner? And your answer was:
A Ronald Norva told me, "Pare, the old man is in bad condition, you better transfer Mrs. Reyes to another room so
that she could not see the condition of the old man."
Q So which is which Mr. Witness? It was you who gave order or instruction to Mr. Ronald Norva or it was he who
gave instruction?
Atty. Gabi: Can we have the translation of that statement?
Atty. Basco: That is a very inconsistent statement of the witness?
A: This is like this, ma'am.
Atty. Basco: Just answer my question. Which is which, Mr. Witness? Which is the truth, your salaysay or your
testimony on February 24 in open court?
A: The two are true, ma'am, because when I whispered to him that the old man was in a bad condition he gave
me instruction to transfer Mrs. Reyes to another room.24
The same is true with his inconsistent statements regarding his time of residence in Taguig, thus:
Q Mr. Witness, you said in your Sinumpaang Salaysay of February 19, 1998 that you were residing in Taguig at
Maharlika Village sometime in October 1987? Do you confirm that?
Atty. Mendoza:
May we ask for the translations, Your Honor.
A No, sir, the actual year is 1997, not 1987.
Q So you are correcting your answer in your salaysay of February 19, 1998 under paragraph No. 13 wherein you
answered: "Ako po ay nakikitira sa kaibigan kong si Ting sa Muslim Area, Maharlika Village, Taguig, Metro Manila
nuong buwan ng Oktubre, 1987." You are changing the 1987 to 1997?
A The truth is 1997, sir.25
Apellant Dima, in his Brief, insists that the prosecution was not able to establish his participation in the
commission of the crime because he was merely the house helper of the safe house in Ciudad Grande,
Valenzuela, when the kidnappers and the victims arrived. In the same vein, appellant Ronald asserts that there
was no convincing evidence presented by the prosecution that will point to his clear participation in the crime
because he was just the driver of the car that brought the victims to the place where the latter were kept.
Appellant Eduardo also insists that he was not a participant in the offense charged in the Information. Basically,
the appellants deny any participation in the kidnapping.
In convicting the appellants, the trial court, based on the evidence presented, naturally found the existence of
conspiracy among the perpetrators. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.26 Verily, when conspiracy is established, the
responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, that render all of them equally liable regardless of the
extent of their respective participations, the act of one being deemed to be the act of the other or the others, in the
commission of the felony.27 Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which
follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even
though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended.28 Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts
and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in
contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result.29 Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of
another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to
commit.30As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck,31 "when a conspirator embarks upon a
criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall
within the common purposes as he understands them."
A scrutiny of the records show that the trial court did not err in finding conspiracy among the appellants, as they
each played a role in the commission of the crime. The trial court correctly found the denial of appellant Dima that
he had knowledge of the kidnapping, unbelievable. The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes
even weaker in the face of the prosecution witnesses positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater
weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense.32 The
trial court ruled:
As for accused Montanir, again, this Court finds the testimonies of prosecution witnesses more credible than his
testimony applying the same principle that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from a mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself, such that the common experience and observation of mankind can
show it as probable under the circumstances.
Certainly, this Court is not convinced by accused Montanir's claim that he was at Ciudad Grande because he was
a house boy of accused Chua after he admitted the circumstances under which he has to live there a few days
before the victims were brought there.
To begin with, this Court does not buy accused Montanir's explanation that he transferred to Chua because he
was looking for a permanent job is hardly credible because he himself admitted that when he was brought by
accused Uy to the residence of accused Chua at Ciudad Grande, it was the understanding that it would be
accused Uy who would be paying his salary. Why would accused Uy pay the salary of accused Montanir if he was
to work as a house boy of accused Chua? Evidently, the only plausible reason why accused Uy would pay the
salary of accused Montanir is because he was actually working for the former and only posted in the house of
accused Chua at Ciudad Grande to play his part in the execution of the planned kidnapping. This conclusion is
bolstered by accused Montanir's admission that he never even spoke with accused Chua during all those times
that he stayed at accused Chua's residence as in fact, he took orders from accused Uy.
Moreover, this Court finds it rather perplexing that accused Montanir would suddenly go back to the house of
accused Uy on 19 February 1998 on the shallow reason that he had no companion at Ciudad Grande when
precisely he said he was hired as a caretaker thereat while the regular boy was on vacation.33
The above conclusion was bolstered by the positive identification of the same appellant and his exact participation
in the execution of the crime, by the witnesses for the prosecution, thus:
WITNESS JONARD
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court what happened, Mr. Witness?
A When the four (4) entered after ten (10) minutes I heard like a commotion inside the house.
Q Then when you heard the commotion, Mr. Witness, what did you do?
A What I did was I went out of the store to peep thru the window near the lavatory.
Q And what did you see, Mr. Witness?
A I saw Jess and Dems poking a gun to (sic) Mr. Mendoza.
Q Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when they poked a gun?
A When they poked a gun and placed the hands of Mr. Mendoza at his back they forcibly entered the room.34
WITNESS ROSALINA
Q And then what happened, Ms. Witness?
A And suddenly Jonard Mangelin entered.
Q And what happened?
A I pleaded to him to help me in pumping.
Q What did he do?
A And he helped me.
Q After helping you pumping Mr. Mendoza (sic), what happened to Mr. Mendoza?
A While we were pumping Mr. Mendoza's chest, Dima Montanir was busy removing the things of Mr. Mendoza.
Q When you said things to which are you referring to?
A His wallet, watch, ring and all the things in his pocket and gave it to Ronald Norva.35
xxxx
A When we returned to the DILG, the persons arrested were already there and when I saw them I recognized
them that they were the ones.
Q Could you tell us the people whom you said were there?
A Dima Montanir.
Q Can you point to him?
(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom, whom when asked his name, answered: Dima Montanir).
Q And who else, Ms. Witness?
A Ronald Norva.
Q Can you point to him also?
(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom whom when asked his name, answered: Ronald Norva).
Q Then what happened, Ms. Witness, after you were able to recognize them?
A I told that they were the ones.36
In like manner, appellant Eduardo's denial that he participated in the offense charged does not outweigh the
testimonies of the witnesses positively identifying him as one of the culprits, thus:
WITNESS JONARD
Q Did you follow the instruction, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, ma'am.
Q Why did you follow the instruction?
A Because they are my Boss.
Q When you said they are my Boss, to whom, Mr. Witness, are you referring to?
A Ronald Norva, Robert Uy, Eduardo Chua, Alice Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.
Q You mentioned the name of Josie Herrera, was she there at the vicinity?
A She was not there when the incident happened on February 17, 1998.
Q Why did you include the name of Josie Herrera as one of your bosses, Mr. Witness?
A Because, ma'am. On December 19, 1997 at the middle of that month, Josie Herrera tipped to the group that Mr.
Rafael Mendoza is a good victim because he has lots of money and engaged in a lending business.
Q Were you there when she tipped the person of Mr. Mendoza?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Where was this, Mr. Witness?
A At the house of Robert Uy.
Q Where was the house of Mr. Robert Uy, Mr. Witness?
A Candido Homes Subdivision, West Fairview, Quezon City.
Q That was on (sic) the middle of December, 1997?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Mr. Witness, if this Josie Herrera whom you have referred as one of your Bosses is around this courtroom,
could you please point to her?
(Witness pointing to a lady inside the Courtroom whom when asked her name, answered: Josie Herrera).
Q You also mentioned the name of Eduardo Chua as one of your bosses, why do you say so that he was one of
your bosses?
A Because they were the ones planning how they could get Mr. Mendoza.
Q And who were these people planning, Mr. Witness?
A The five (5) of them, ma'am.
Q Who are these five (5), Mr. Witness?
A Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice, Josie Herrera and Eduardo Chua.
Q And where did this happen, Mr. Witness?
A When Josie Herrera tipped to the group on that December, the group made a surveillance to be familiarized
with the face of Mr. Mendoza and Mrs. Reyes.
Q And all the time, Mr. Witness, where was (sic) this happened when you said they were planning?
A At the house of Robert Uy.
Q Did the surveillance took (sic) place, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.37
xxxx
Q And where did you count the surveillance, Mr. Witness?
A Ali Mall, at Cubao, Quezon City.
Q And what was the result of your surveillance, Mr. Witness?
A They saw the victims Mr. Mendoza and Mrs. Reyes. Robert Uy pointed to the two (2) as our victims.
Q Aside from the planning and the surveillance, Mr. Witness, what else took place?
A On January 3, 1998 the first stage of the kidnapping will took (sic) place on January 5, 1998 because they want
to make it quick.
Q Was (sic) the kidnapping take place at that time, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q On January 5, 1998?
A No, ma'am, January 5, that was the first try to kidnap them when we went to Ali Mall but we were not able to
see them.
Q You said that there was a first try, was there another try, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q When was that, Mr. Witness?
A On February 5, 1998.
Q What happened? Was that agreed upon by the group, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Who were these people in the group, Mr. Witness?
A Alice Buenaflor, Robert Uy, Ronald Norva, Eduardo Chua and Josie Herrera.
Q And did the kidnapping take place on the second try, Mr. Witness?
A We were not able to take them, ma'am.
Q Then what happened, Mr. Witness?
A On February 5, 1998, on our second try to kidnap them, we were not able to get them because in Ali Mall the
car of Alice Buenaflor was bumped by a taxi.
Q Was there another try after the February 5 try, Mr. Witness?
A On that February 5, when we were not able to take them; they changed the plan.
Q And who participated in the plan, Mr. Witness?
A Eduardo Chua, Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.
Q Is she the same Josie Herrera whom you identified earlier, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Then what happened, Witness?
A After the second try, we were not able to take them, so the plan was changed.
Q What was the plan that was changed? What was the new plan?
A They were the ones who knew it. They were the ones planning and I was only being utilized by the syndicate.38
It must always be remembered that between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on
the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails.39
It is also not disputed that the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, where the victims were brought was
owned by appellant Eduardo. The trial court was also correct in dismissing the claim of appellant Eduardo that he
merely lent his car to Robert and allowed the latter to occupy his house because Robert had been so
accommodating to him and had facilitated his loan, thus:
Regarding the criminal liability of accused Chua, while it is conceded that the said accused was nowhere in the
actual scene of the incident, this Court nonetheless finds the said accused guilty of kidnapping as one of the
conspirators to the commission of the felony who participated by furnishing the vehicle used in abducting the
victims and the house where they were held captive and where Mendoza died.
Again, this Court applied the time-honored principle that evidence to be believed must come from the mouth of a
credible witness which accused Chua is not. Indeed, this Court finds no iota of truth on the protestation of
accused Chua that he knew nothing of accused Uy's plans. It is simply too good to be true that he allowed
Mangelin and accused Montanir to stay at his house to guard it and attend to his store while his caretakers were
having a vacation. Neither could this Court find cogent reason why accused Chua would allow accused Uy to use
his vehicle and house totally oblivious of any plan/design or purpose of accused Uy. Nor is it credible that
accused Chua would allow accused Uy to use his vehicle just to follow up his loan application and then after the
same had been released he (accused Chua) did not come home either to Santa Maria, Bulacan or to Ciudad
Grande, instead, he went straight to the residence of accused Uy, waited for him until the wee hours of the
morning of the following day, 18 February 1998, only to tell accused Uy he was going home.1avvphi1
It is also bewildering to this Court why immediately after receiving the money he borrowed, he would spend it in
going to Davao with his daughter on 18 February 1988, without any previous plan whatsoever and suspiciously,
upon invitation of accused Uy who had known by then that one of the victims, Mendoza, had died in the course of
the kidnapping.
Truly, all of the foregoing facts when taken together with the testimonies of Mangelin and Montanir unequivocally
indicate accused Chua's complicity with the criminal design of accused Uy and dissolves the said accused's plea
of innocence.40
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution
of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of
the original design.41 Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose
of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose
intended.42Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in
conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result that they are in contemplation of law,
charged with intending the result.43 Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator even
though such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit.44
Considering the above disquisitions, there is no doubt that conspiracy existed in the perpetration of the crime.
Thus, all of the appellants, having been proven that they each took part in the accomplishment of the original
design, are all equally liable for the crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.

Lastly, this Court finds no error in the CA's modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court. The penalty
imposed by the trial court, which is Death is now reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic Act
No. 9346.45
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the Court Appeals, affirming with modification the Decision
dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 171 is hereby
AFFIRMED,with further MODIFICATION that all the appellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the special
complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO*
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
De Carungcong V people
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181409
February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX
CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following
persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same
shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of
the crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the husband and the
blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the
death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial
application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix1 of petitioner intestate estate of her
deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against her
brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of Unit 1111, Prince
Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed
as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her
surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex "A" to
form an integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the Intestate Estate of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or properties as property belonging to the estate
but are presently in the possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children of my sister Zenaida
Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in
1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I
was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r]
about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure
the signature and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko
Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4)
valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX
"A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato
told her that the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was
completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of Wendy, my other niece
Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later became the second wife
of my sisters widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the belief that they were in
connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special Power of
Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the property and made
my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No.
41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68,
Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No.
65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the deeds of absolute sale were
not the true and actual considerations received by her father William Sato from the buyers of her grandmothers
properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually paid P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148 and
P7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were turned over to William
Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid P8,000,000.00 for the property
covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William
Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has actual
knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto
as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse her fathers
orders.

12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of attorney fraudulently secured
from my mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the same and never delivered the
proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of the sales to
me as Administratrix of my mothers estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs
which include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3
Wendy Mitsuko Satos supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by the deceased
Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint.4 On appeal,
however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87:6
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by
means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA.
DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney
dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that
said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko
C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all
located at Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No.
3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax Declaration
No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax Declaration
No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1735,
Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the possession of the said special
power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3)
Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149
forP250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds of
the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong
who died in 1994.
Contrary to law.7
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of
damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount
received by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his
relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an
exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Satos motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Satos motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal
case:
The Trial Prosecutors contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the relationship of affinity
between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the accused by the
relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of the
correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has
extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaidas mother,
herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law
even beyond the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal, but only civil
liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves family harmony and
obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a
stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal
liability is incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp.
63;Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is GRANTED and, as
prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecutions motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11
Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, however, in a decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It
ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity
between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the
exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or
existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the
relationship by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of
Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of petitioner
administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the criminal case for estafa against private
respondent Sato already created havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as private
respondents daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while
two (2) other children of private respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for
the crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as
son-in-law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article 332(1) of the same Code.
We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private respondent Sato is no longer
the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article
332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law
does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of law
where none is indicated. The courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that
the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the
lawgivers intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the
power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this
case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Codes simple language is most favorable to
Sato.14
The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court. It cites the
commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the
presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender and the offended party. Here, the properties subject
of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Satos wife), died on

January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three
parcels of land could have arisen only after her mothers death. Since Zenaidapredeceased her mother, Manolita,
no such right came about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of death of
the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her
marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaidas
mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal liability provided
under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioners claim that Zenaidas death dissolved
the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc
among the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article
332s provision exempting a family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability
and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In particular, it
calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by affinity created between a
surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief.
It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his
relationship to the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included in the exemptions
are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.17 By virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the
stepfather who commits malicious mischief against his stepson;18 by the stepmother who commits theft against
her stepson;19 by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson;20 by the grandson who steals from his
grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;22 and by the son who steals a ring
from his mother.23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a relationship by
marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the
institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of ones spouse, does the
extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case. That is why the
trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the matter. In
contrast, in the American legal system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views. There are some
who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are children or not in the marriage
(Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by most judicial authorities in
other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the
relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the
marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the
relationship by affinity is continued despite the death of one of the spouses where there are living issues or
children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of the parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity
was continued through the medium of the issue of the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the
marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties.26 Under this
view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its
duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so
long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the
surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse
when there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of
the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled.28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse
and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of
whether the marriage produced children or not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after
the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage.
This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of
affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death
of one of the married parties.30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second view is
more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and incest.31 On the other
hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives
or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by
affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is couched in
general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse of ones living child and the
surviving spouse of ones deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her
parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its
language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic autonomous social
institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.33
Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family.34
In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.35 The view that
relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in
accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of
the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.36 This is in consonance with the
constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established
beyond reasonable doubt.37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when the court is faced
with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is
favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of Article
332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of
Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more
favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity created
between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to
the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of
ones relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of grave offense committed against ones relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the
absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the
offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical
and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is
complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is determined by
the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense.40 What controls is not the title of the
Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the Information.41 In other words, it is
the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the
crime being charged in the Information.42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what

it is named.43 The determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an
opinion which is not binding on the court.44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple estafa but with
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. In particular, the Information states that
Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and induced her to sign and
thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes when it was in fact a
special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise
dispose of Manolitas properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Satos inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked the SPA in favor of
Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the proceeds to Manolita
nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and prejudice of the
estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to Manolita (who
participated in the execution of the document) statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolitas acts of
signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her specific intention
that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on
such intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read)
because of Satos representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the
document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document
was all about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to
Satos proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a
special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolitas
Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato
in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained
were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, [Sato] made
Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit" raise the presumption that Sato, as
the possessor of the falsified document and the one who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to
increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended Information would now state that,
while the total amount of consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only P1,150,000, Sato actually
received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolitas properties.45 This also meant that
the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the
amounts of consideration stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple estafa. Sato resorted
to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a
necessary means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article
332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The Complex Crime of Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the
absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal
liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document is
required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. That is
the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.46 It means that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the
falsification of a public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code and of the
nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa
by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely, the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not
affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332
of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the
existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332
to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of
estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider
the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the
single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the
simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property
committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil
liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore
inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public
documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation
but a paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.47 Thus, the action provided under
the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil
aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public
document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights
and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches
public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he
is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each other. While there may be
two component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one
and the same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.48 That is the concept of a complex
crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g., homicide which violates
the right to life, theft which violates the right to property),49 a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse
juridical rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself.50 Since only a
single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are considered as elements of a
single crime, the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where the same criminal
intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime for which there is only one criminal
liability.51 (The complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is
different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more crimes,
for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability.52 The latter category is covered neither by the concept of
complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus delictuorum or concurso de
delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a
single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently termed as
component crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)

In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the
eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the
case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only
one.54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires that the elements of
both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and
considered independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents
are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public
documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from the liability for
falsification of public document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the
letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal
plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes
to be punished individually.
Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing Estafa Even Under Article 315
(3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the document be
falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the document cannot be
considered as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the offense as a
"necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient
thereof.55 In People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to
facilitate and insure the commission of the other.57 In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the
SPA, was such a "necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively his
evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita
to unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two
crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The falsification of a public, official or
commercial document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually
utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause
damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document.59 In other
words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually
utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa.61 The damage to
another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.621avvphi1
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the falsification of public
document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a
statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the
execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so
particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or
prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the
property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said
document. That is why the falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a
necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita sign a deed of
sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been
caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime
committed would only have been the simple crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any inducement (such
as if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her
signature, but what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the
simple crime of falsification.64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the resolution dated
January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents
Talampas V People
By petition for review on certiorari, Virgilio Talampas y Matic (Talampas) seeks the review of the affirmance of his
conviction for homicide (for the killing of the late Ernesto Matic y Masinloc) by the Court of Appeals (CA) through
its decision promulgated on August 16, 2007.[1]
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Bian, Laguna (RTC) had rejected his pleas of self-defense and accident
and had declared him guilty of the felony under the judgment rendered on June 22, 2004.[2]
Antecedents
The information filed on November 17, 1995, to which Talampas pleaded not guilty, averred as follows:[3]
That on or about July 5, 1995, in the Municipality of Bian, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused VIRGILIO TALAMPAS, with intent to kill, while conveniently armed
with a short firearm and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one Ernesto Matic y Masinloc with the said firearm, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound
at the back of his body which directly caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his
surviving heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

The State presented as witnesses Jose Sevillo, Francisco Matic, Jerico Matic, Dr. Valentin Bernales, and
Josephine Matic. The CA summarized their testimonies thuswise:[4]
Prosecution witness Jose Sevillo (Jose) who allegedly witnessed the incident in question, testified that on
July 5, 1995 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, he together with Eduardo Matic (Eduardo) and Ernesto Matic
(Ernesto) were infront of his house, along the road in Zona Siete (7), Wawa, Malaban, Bian, Laguna, repairing
his tricycle when he noticed the appellant who was riding on a bicycle passed by and stopped. The latter alighted
at about three (3) meters away from him, walked a few steps and brought out a short gun, a revolver, and poked
the same to Eduardo and fired it hitting Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto. The appellant again fired his
gun three (3) times, one shot hitting Ernesto at the right portion of his back causing him (Ernesto) to fall on the
ground with his face down. Another shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on his back (patihaya).
Thereafter, the appellant ran away, while he (Jose) and his neighbors brought the victims to the hospital. On
June 6, 1995, Jose executed a Sworn Statement at the Bian Police Station.
Another witness, Francisco Matic, testified that prior to the death of his brother Ernesto who was then 44
years old, he (Ernesto) was driving a tricycle on a boundary system and earned P100.00 daily, although not on a
regular basis because sometimes Ernesto played in a band for P100.00 per night.
Jerico Matic, eldest son of Ernesto, alleged that he loves his father and his death was so painful to him that
he could not quantify his feelings in terms of money. The death of his father was a great loss to them as they
would not be able to pursue their studies and that nobody would support them financially considering that the
money being sent by their mother in the amount of P2,000.00 toP2,500.00 every three (3) months, would not be
enough.

Dr. Valentin Bernales likewise, testified that he was the one who conducted the autopsy on the body of
Ernesto and found one gunshot in the body located at the back of the costal area, right side, sixteen (16)
centimeters from the spinal column. This shot was fatal as it involved the major organs such as the lungs, liver
and the spinal column which caused Ernestos death.
The last witness, Josephine Matic, wife of Ernesto, testified that her husband was laid to rest on July 18,
1995 and that his untimely death was so painful and that she could not provide her children with sustenance. She
asked for the amount of P200,000.00 for her to be able to send her children to school.

On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that his enemy had been Eduardo
Matic (Eduardo), not victim Ernesto Matic (Ernesto); that Eduardo, who was then with Ernesto at the time of the
incident, had had hit him with a monkey wrench, but he had parried the blow; that he and Eduardo had then
grappled for the monkey wrench; that while they had grappled, he had notice that Eduardo had held a revolver;
that he had thus struggled with Eduardo for control of the revolver, which had accidentally fired and hit Ernesto
during their struggling with each other; that the revolver had again fired, hitting Eduardo in the thigh; that he had
then seized the revolver and shot Eduardo in the head; and that he had then fled the scene when people had
started swarming around.
Ruling of the RTC
On June 22, 2004, the RTC, giving credence to the testimony of eyewitness Jose Sevilla, found Talampas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide,[5] and disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide, with one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of IMPRISONMENT ranging from TEN (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) years and EIGHT (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is likewise
ordered to pay the heirs of Ernesto Matic y Masinloc the following sums, to wit:
1.
P50,000.00 as and for death indemnity;
2.
P50,000.00 as and for moral damages;
3.
P25,000.00 as and for actual damages; and
4.
P30,000.00 as and for temperate damages.
Furnish Public Prosecutor Nofuente, Atty. Navarroza, the private complainant and accused with a copy of
this decision.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Ruling of the CA
Talampas appealed to the CA, contending that:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEATH OF ERNESTO MATIC WAS
MERELY ACCIDENTAL.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ACTED IN
DEFENSE OF HIMSELF WHEN HE GRAPPLED WITH EDUARDO MATIC.

Still, the CA affirmed the conviction based on the RTCs factual and legal conclusions, and ruled that
Talampas, having invoked self-defense, had in effect admitted killing Ernesto and had thereby assumed the
burden of proving the elements of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence, but had miserably
failed to discharge his burden.[7]
The CA deleted the award of temperate damages in view of the awarding of actual damages, pointing out that the
two kinds of damages were mutually exclusive.[8]
Issue
Hence, Talampas is now before the Court, continuing to insist that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and that the lower courts both erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and accidental death.
Ruling
The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.
Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused in defending himself.[9]
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. The established
circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was Talampas who had initiated the attack only
against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a target of Talampas attack, he having only
happened to be present at the scene of the attack. In reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any
unlawful aggression against Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the victim
(Ernesto), thereby rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.
Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense. Article
12(4) of the Revised Penal Code,[10] the legal provision pertinent to accident, contemplates a situation where a
person is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the
process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor an
accidental result flowing out of a legal act.[11] Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the sway of our
will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences.[12] In short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.
The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and poked his revolver at Eduardo
and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At that point, Talampas fired his
revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall face down to the
ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape, causing Eduardo to fall on his back. Certainly, Talampas acts
were by no means lawful, being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his
hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of Talampas
felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the
blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo
que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused).[13] Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,[14] criminal liability is incurred by any person committing
a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Nonetheless, the Court finds the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 14 years and eight months, as maximum, legally erroneous.
The penalty for homicide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Under Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[15] the court, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, is mandated to prescribe an indeterminate sentence the maximum term
of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of

the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. With the absence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years, eight months, and
one day to 17 years and four months. This is pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.[16] It is such
period that themaximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be reckoned from. Hence, limiting the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at only 14 years and eight months contravened the express
provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for such penalty was within the minimum period of reclusion
temporal. Accordingly, the Court must add one day to the maximum term fixed by the lower courts.
The Court finds to be unnecessary the increment of one day as part of the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence. It may be true that the increment did not constitute an error, because the minimum term thus fixed was
entirely within the parameters of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Yet, the addition of one day to the 10 years as
the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence of Talampas may occasion a degree of inconvenience when it
will be time for the penal administrators concerned to consider and determine whether Talampas is already
qualified to enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, in order to simplify the computation of
the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence, the Court deletes the one-day increment from the minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2007 finding VIRGILIO
TALAMPAS y MATIC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and IMPOSES the indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit

People V Maglain 646 scra 770

nd the buying and selling of cars and real estate. He and Atty. Mary Jay Rios (Mary Jay) were married on January
29, 1999. They had a son, Mateo Jay.3
On January 4, 2000, the accused and Mary Jay were having dinner at their home in Dasmarias, Cavite when
they got into an argument. The accused did not want Mary Jay to attend a party, causing them to fight. Incensed,
the accused collected the clothes that Mary Joy had given him for Christmas and told her he would burn them all
and started pouring kerosene on the clothes. Mary Jay tried to wrestle the can of kerosene from him and, at the
same time, warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wifes plea, the accused still poured gas on her, thus
setting both the clothes and his wife on fire.4
The accused brought Mary Jay to the De La Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias. After four days, she
was transferred by her aunt to the burn unit of the East Avenue Medical Center in Quezon City, where her
condition improved. Subsequently, however, the accused transferred her to St. Claire Hospital, which did not have
a burn unit. Since her condition deteriorated, Lourdes Rios, Mary Jays mother, had her transferred to the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) in Manila but she was no longer able to recover. Before she expired, she told
her mother what had happened to her, declaring, "Si Jay Mandy ang nagsunog sa akin. (Jay Mandy burned me.)"
She passed away on February 24, 2000.5
The accused, in his defense, said the burning incident was completely accidental. He said it was Mary Jay who
was being difficult while they were arguing. She threatened to throw away the clothes he had given her. To spite
her, he also took the clothes that she had given him and told her he would burn them all. He then got a match and
a gallon of kerosene. Mary Jay caught up with him at the dirty kitchen and took the match and kerosene from him.
In the process, they both got wet from the spilled kerosene. She got angry at how he was looking at her and
screamed, "Mandy, Mandy, wag yan, wag yan, ako na lang ang sunugin mo. (Mandy, dont burn that, burn me
instead.)"
Accused, trying to avoid further provoking his wife, left his wife and went upstairs to his son. While climbing the
stairs, he heard Mary Jay shouting, "Mandy, Mandy, nasusunog ako. (Mandy, Im burning.)" He ran down the
steps and saw the blaze had reached the ceiling of the kitchen. He embraced his wife and called out to his mother
to help them. He poured water on her when the fire could not be put out and brought her to the living room. He
then carried Mary Jay to the car while shouting for help from the neighbors. In the process, he sustained burns on
his legs and arms.6
While Mary Jay was still confined at the East Avenue Medical Center, the accused learned from a certain Judge
Tanguanco that using "red medicine" would help heal his wifes burn wounds. The hospital, however, did not allow
him to use the "red medicine" on Mary Jay. He thus had his wife transferred to PGH. When there was no space at
the hospital, she was transferred to St. Claire Hospital with the help of a certain Judge Espaol. The doctors at St.
Claire advised him to stop using the "red medicine" on his wife when her wounds started to get worse and began
emitting a foul odor.7
The accused asserted that his mother-in-law, Lourdes Rios, and their laundrywoman, Norma Saballero, accused
him of burning his wife since his wifes family had been angry with him ever since they got married. His mother-inlaw and Mary Jays siblings used to ask money from them and would get angry with him if they did not receive
any help.8
The accused likewise claimed that his late wife made a dying declaration in the presence of PO3 Celestino San
Jose and Atty. Rosemarie Perey-Duque. This allegation was corroborated by PO3 San Jose, who testified that
Mary Jay was a friend and he had visited her at East Avenue Medical Center on January 13, 2000. He was there
to take Mary Jays statement upon instructions of Chief Major Bulalacao.9 PO3 San Jose narrated the incident
during his direct examination by Atty. Bihasa:
Q What, if any, was the reply of Atty. [Mary Joy] Rios?
A She nodded her head.
Q And after that, what happened next:
A I told her that I will get her statement and she told me that she could give her statement.
Q And after Atty. Rios told you that she was capable of giving her statement, what if any transpired?
A I took her statement, which was in my handwriting.
Q Her statement was in your handwriting but who uttered those statements?
A It was Atty. Rios.10
Atty. Duque testified that the last time she spoke with Mary Jay was on January 13, 2000, when she visited her at
the hospital along with PO3 San Jose. The statements of Mary Jay were reduced into writing and Atty. Duque
helped in lifting the arm of the patient so that she could sign the document.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC rendered its Decision on May 8, 2006, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and so it hereby holds that the prosecution had established
the guilt of the accused JAY MANDY MAGLIAN y REYES beyond reasonable doubt and so it hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Inasmuch as the civil aspect of this case was prosecuted together with the criminal aspect, the accused is also
hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the following amounts of:
a. Php500,000 as actual damages
b. Php500,000 as moral damages,
c. Php200,000 as exemplary damages,
d. Php200,000 as attorneys fees; and
e. Cost of suit against the accused.
SO ORDERED.12
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for not giving credence to the dying declaration Mary Jay
made to her friends who became defense witnesses. He averred that the trial court erred in not admitting the
deposition by oral examination of Atty. Ma. Angelina Barcelo which would corroborate the testimonies of the
defense witnesses regarding the handwritten dying declaration of Mary Jay. The trial court was also questioned
for giving credence to the perjured and biased testimonies of prosecution witnesses Lourdes Rios and Norma
Saballero. Lastly, accused-appellant averred that the trial court erroneously disallowed the defense from
presenting Dr. Ma. Victoria Briguela, a qualified psychiatrist, who could testify that Mary Jays mental,
psychological, and emotional condition on February 24, 2000 was disoriented and she could not have made a
dying declaration on said date.
The CA upheld the ruling of the trial court. The dying declaration made by Mary Jay to her mother Lourdes and
laundrywoman Norma had all the essential requisites and could thus be used to convict accused-appellant. It
noted that while the testimonies of Lourdes and Norma on the dying declaration had some inconsistencies, these
were immaterial and did not affect their credibility. It observed that no ill motive was presented and proved as to
why the prosecutions witnesses would make false accusations against accused-appellant.

Hence, we have this appeal.

On December 14, 2009, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The
People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, manifested that it was adopting its previous arguments.
The Issue
In his Supplemental Brief, accused-appellant raises the following issue:
Whether the guilt of accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant contends that (1) he never or did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed or
so grave an offense as the felony charged against him; and (2) that he voluntarily, and of his own free will,
surrendered or yielded to the police or government authorities. He claims that the victims dying declaration
showed that what happened to her was an accident. He avers that this was corroborated by three witnesses. The
victims attending physician, he insists, also testified that he was told by the victim that what happened to her was
an accident.
If not acquitted, accused-appellant argues that, in the alternative, his sentence must be reduced due to mitigating
circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong and voluntary surrender. He claims he is entitled to the
latter since he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities before criminal proceedings were commenced against
him. The reduction of his sentence, he contends, must be by at least another degree or to prision mayor or lower.
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm accused-appellants conviction.
Dying declaration
While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own perception, a report in open court of a
dying persons declaration is recognized as an exception to the rule against hearsay if it is "made under the
consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case."13 It is considered as "evidence of
the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a
careless and false accusation."14
The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are
present: "(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) it is made
when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the
declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in
a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarants death."15 The question to be answered is which
dying declaration satisfies the aforementioned circumstances, the one made by Mary Jay to Lourdes and Norma,
or the one she made before Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose.
Accused-appellant contends that his late wifes dying declaration as told to the defense witnesses Atty. Duque
and PO3 San Jose effectively absolved him from any wrongdoing. However, it is the dying declaration presented
by the prosecution that satisfies all the requisites provided in the Rules. In contrast, the dying declaration for the
defense did not show that Mary Jays death at the time of said declaration appeared to be imminent and that she
was under a consciousness of impending death.
Moreover, We defer to the factual finding that the witnesses for the prosecution were more credible. Mary Jays
dying declaration to her mother Lourdes and to Norma showed that accused-appellant was the one who set her in
flames. Lourdes and the Maglians laundrywoman Norma both testified that Mary Jay, moments before her actual
death, told them that it was accused-appellant who was responsible for burning her. Lourdes and Norma both
testified that at the time of May Jays declaration, she was lucid and aware that she was soon going to expire.
Furthermore, the so-called dying declaration made by Mary Jay to defense witnesses Atty. Duque and PO3 San
Jose suffers from irregularities. The dying declaration allegedly made to Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose was
handwritten by the latter but he did not have it sworn under oath. We reiterate too that it was not clear that it was
executed with the knowledge of impending death since the statements were made more than a month before
Mary Jay died.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts that Lourdes and Norma were both credible witnesses and had no
motive to lie about Mary Jays dying declaration. The appellate court correctly pointed out that although Lourdes
was Mary Jays mother, this relationship did not automatically discredit Lourdes testimony. And while accusedappellant alleged that Lourdes as his mother-in-law did not approve of him, he could not give any improper motive
for Norma to falsely accuse him. Between the two competing statements of the two sets of witnesses, the one
presented by the prosecution should clearly be given more weight as it satisfies the requisites of an admissible
dying declaration.
No intent to commit so grave a wrong
The Revised Penal Code provides under Article 13(3) the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. We held, "This mitigating circumstance addresses itself
to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal
act."16We also held, "This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the
means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the
accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack
employed and the injury sustained by the victim."17
Aiming for this mitigating circumstance, accused-appellant once again relies on the statements of the defense
witnesses that Mary Jay told them what happened to her was an accident. However, as earlier discussed, Mary
Jays dying declaration contradicts the alleged exculpatory statement she earlier made to the defense witnesses.
Moreover, the prosecution took pains in court to demonstrate that fighting over the kerosene container would not
have caused Mary Jay to be drenched in kerosene. As aptly explained by the trial court:
The court is convinced that the deceased did not take possession of the gallon container with kerosene. The
accused had full control and possession of the same. He is a bulky and very muscular person while the deceased
was of light built, shorter, smaller and weaker. When a demonstration was made in open court about the struggle
for possession of the container, it was shown that the contents of the same did not spill owing to the little amount
of liquid and its narrow opening. To be able to wet 90 percent of the body surface the kerosene content of the
gallon container must have been poured over the head of the deceased. This explains why when she got ignited,
the flames rose up to the ceiling and burned her from head to toe.18
It is extremely far-fetched that accused-appellant could accidentally pour kerosene on his wife and likewise
accidentally light her up and cause third degree burns to 90% of her body. We, thus, agree with the trial courts
finding that accused-appellant knew the fatal injuries that he could cause when he poured kerosene all over his
wife and lit a match to ignite a fire. There was no disparity between the means he used in injuring his wife and the
resulting third degree burns on her body. He is, thus, not entitled to the mitigating circumstance under Art. 13(3) of
the Code.
Voluntary surrender
An accused may enjoy the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender if the following requisites are present:
"1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the
latters
agent;
and
3)
the
surrender
was
voluntary.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_172832_2009.html - fnt24"19 We explained, "The
essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself
to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and
expense that may be incurred for his search and capture."20
To avail himself of this mitigating circumstance, accused-appellant claims that he voluntarily yielded to the police
authorities on October 14, 2002, or before the commencement of the criminal proceedings against him. He avers
that this claim is backed by the records of the case and a certification made by the Dasmarias Police Station. He
contends that both the RTC and the CA inexplicably did not appreciate this mitigating circumstance in his favor.
A review of the records shows that accused-appellant on October 16, 2000 filed with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) a Petition for Review of the Resolution of the private prosecutor in the instant case. Subsequently, a
warrant of arrest for the parricide charge was issued against him on October 30, 2000.21 However, a Motion to
Defer Implementation of Warrant of Arrest was filed by accused on November 13, 200022 and was granted by the
RTC on December 12, 2000 in view of the petition for review he had filed before the DOJ.23 On September 11,
2002, the DOJ issued a Resolution24 denying the petition of accused-appellant. The defense later submitted a
Certification25 issued by the Philippine National Police-Dasmarias Municipal Police Station dated October 18
2002 stating the following:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the following are excerpts fom the entries on the Official Police Blotter of Dasmarias
Municipal Police Station, appearing on page 0331 and 0332, blotter entry nos. 1036 and 1047 respectively, dated
15 October 2002, quoted verbatim as follows:
150740H October 2002 "P/I Apolinar P. Reyes reported that one Jaymandy Maglian y Reyes, 30 years old,
resident of #24 Bucal, Sampalok II, Dasmarias, Cavite, with Warrant of Arrest issued by RTC Branch 21, Imus,
Cavite, in CC# 8393-00 for Parricide, voluntarily surrendered to him on October 14, 2002. Subject is turned over
to this station on this date".
151350H October 2002 "One Jaymandy Maglian was transferred to BJMP and escorted by P/I Apolinar Reyes".
(Entries written by SPO3 Ricardo V. Sayoto duty desk officer)

We find that in the case of accused-appellant, all the elements for a valid voluntary surrender were present.
Accused-appellant at the time of his surrender had not actually been arrested. He surrendered to the police
authorities. His surrender was voluntary, as borne by the certification issued by the police. There is, thus, merit to
the claim of accused-appellant that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
It bears noting that parricide, however, according to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by two
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death. The Code provides under Art. 63(3) that when a law prescribes
a penalty with two indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance
and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. But Section 3 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines) provides that "persons convicted
of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended." The proper sentence in the instant case would, thus, be reclusion perpetua which is
still the lesser penalty.
Anent an issue previously raised by accused-appellant and which was not discussed by the CA, while accusedappellant claims that the trial court erred in not admitting the deposition by oral examination of Atty. Ma. Angelina
Barcelo, We note that the records show that an Order26 was issued by Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr.
granting accused-appellants motion to take oral deposition of Atty. Barcelo.
Pecuniary liability
The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay PhP 500,000 as actual damages; PhP 500,000 as moral
damages; PhP 200,000 as exemplary damages; and PhP 200,000 as attorneys fees.
We modify the monetary awards, those being excessive. We award a civil indemnity ex delicto as this is
"mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of the accused for the death."27 As We
ruled, "When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5)
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases."28 Current jurisprudence pegs the
award of civil indemnity at PhP 50,000.29
Moral damages should also be awarded even absent allegation and proof of the emotional suffering by the
victims heirs. The amount should be decreased to PhP 50,000 in accordance with jurisprudence.30 Exemplary
damages in the lowered amount of PhP 30,000 are likewise in order in this case charging parricide, as the
qualifying circumstance of relationship is present.31
As to the attorneys fees awarded, these must be reasonable in accordance with Art. 2208 of the Civil
Code.32We, thus, reduce the attorneys fees to a more reasonable amount of PhP 50,000.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02541 affirming the RTC
Decision that found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.1wphi1 The fallo of the RTC Decision should be modified to read, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and so it hereby holds that the prosecution had established
the guilt of the accused JAY MANDY MAGLIAN y REYES beyond reasonable doubt and so it hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Inasmuch as the civil aspect of this case was prosecuted together with the criminal aspect, the accused is also
hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the following amounts of:
a. PhP 500,000 as actual damages;
b. PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity;
c. PhP 50,000 as moral damages;
d. PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages;
e. PhP 50,000 as attorneys fees; and
f. Cost of suit against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
People V Sales 658 scra 367
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,

G.R. No. 177218

Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

- versus -

NOEL T. SALES,
Promulgated:
Appellant.
October 3, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ sadistic
beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.
This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789, convicting
appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries, respectively. The
Information[3] for parricide contained the following allegations:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 oclock in the evening at Brgy.
San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with evident premeditation and [in] a fit of anger, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts of the body of his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year
old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more or less one meter in length and one [and] a half inches in
diameter, [thereby] inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the
damage and prejudice of the latters heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

On the other hand, the Information[5] in Criminal Case No. RTC03-789 alleges that appellant inflicted
slight physical injuries in the following manner:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 oclock in the evening, at Brgy.
San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece of wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his
second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which have required medical attendance for a
period of five (5) days to the damage and prejudice of the victims heirs in such amount as may be proven in
court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for the charges of parricide[7]
and slight physical injuries[8] respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon manifestation of the
prosecution which was not objected to by the defense.[9] During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to
stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at

the time of the incident, appellants family was living in the conjugal home located in Barangay San Vicente,
Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.[10]
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their
home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peafrancia without the permission of their parents. They did
not return home that night. When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found
them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their fathers rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to
return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 oclock in the
evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick
which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemars and Juniors hands and
feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria
stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting Noemar as
the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemars head and injuries in
his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly
thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained
motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead. However, appellant refused to
believe her. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that
they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the
junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack
doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their
house.
Noemars wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. His body was
never examined by a doctor.
The Version of the Defense
Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate occasions
without the permission of their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told them not to repeat the
misdeed since something untoward might happen to them. During those times, Noemar and Junior were never
physically harmed by their father.
However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents permission on September 16,
2002 and failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant received information that his sons stole a pedicab.
As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money so that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior. When his
sons finally arrived home at 8 oclock in the evening of September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a
piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they were side by side.
After whipping his sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and frothing. When
Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at
the crossroad which was seven kilometers away from their house.
Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in breathing. The
pupils of Noemars eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep and
saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in vain since a vehicle never came. It was then that
Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He claimed
that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him.
Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and
diagnosed with having a weak heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic
seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures
normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain.[11] Thereafter, appellant
surrendered voluntarily.[12]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In a Joint Decision,[13] the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to
prove that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner
described in the Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not consider the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill Noemar.
But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable
doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC03-782 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE
WITNESSES.[19]

Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
The Charge of Parricide
Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies battering
Noemar to death. He believes that no father could kill his own son. According to him, Noemar had a weak heart
that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of consciousness and froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was
conscious as they traveled to the junction where they would take a vehicle in going to a hospital. However,
Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at this moment that
Noemar died, not during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified
that Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on children of tender
years must always be with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise
restraint and caution in administering the proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their
parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from
being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family dwelling
without permission and that was already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was further aggravated
by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much
so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for the children and bring them home. From these, it is
therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds
but by an evil intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his
head, face and legs. It was only when Noemars body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost
consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most
likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an
act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the childs life. It bears stressing that a decent and
responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not
to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1.
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended.
xxxx

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is
indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct
consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.[20] Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son
Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating
suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellants claim that it was Noemars heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. This declaration is
self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal
Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardiopulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth
emphasizing that Noemars cadaver was never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to
lend credence to his contention, the latters testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with his
testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria
declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Marias testimony was also unsubstantiated by
evidence.
Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this case.
All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.

We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant committed the
crime of parricide.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical
injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor
in its medium period.
Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised Penal Code.
Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of
his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the
conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[14]

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[15] which was given due course in an Order[16] dated September 21, 2005.

Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is
the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant,
or the legitimate spouse of accused.[21]
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was
killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from
the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria,
they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after. Noemars Death Certificate[22] was
also presented in evidence.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The dispositive
portion of its Decision[17] reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated August 3, 2005 in
Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, is
AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal this case
to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED.[18]

Issues

There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the
deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria testified that on
September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their father, inside
their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a
coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while
tied to a tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much for
Noemars frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While Noemars birth certificate
was not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be considered.[23] As earlier stated, appellant
stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same
declaration while under oath.[24] Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her sons with appellant, her
husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.

Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:

There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong

A man cannot suffer more punishment than the law assigns, but he may suffer less. William Blackstone[1]
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of
appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the barangay captain reported
the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous
manner is a manifestation of his intent to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for
his search and capture[25] which is the essence of voluntary surrender.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their
wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as
possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. The mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated
where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the
death of the victim.[26]
The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide

We find proper the trial courts award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should be increased
to P30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[27] In addition, and in conformity with current policy,
we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid.[28]
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court
erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the
penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of said mitigating circumstance does not result to a different
penalty since the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating
circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:

For when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner. William
Shakespeare[2]

The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is one of the more complicated and confusing topics in
criminal law. It befuddles not a few students of law, legal scholars and members of the bench and of the bar.[3]
Fortunately, this case presents a great opportunity for the Court to resolve with finality a controversial aspect of
the application and interpretation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. It is an occasion for the Court to perform its
duty to formulate guiding and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines or rules.[4] In the process, the matter can
be clarified, the public may be educated and the Court can exercise its symbolic function of instructing bench and
bar on the extent of protection given by statutory and constitutional guarantees.[5]
The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal laws, including the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is
to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused. This is in
consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused ought to be presumed innocent until and unless
his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.[6]
Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. It is the doctrine that a court, in
construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the
ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.[7]
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness.[8] Since the goal of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is to look kindly on the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more
favorable to the accused.
It is on the basis of this basic principle of criminal law that I respectfully submit this opinion.

THE BONE OF CONTENTION

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxxx
3.
When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

The members of the Court are unanimous that accused-appellant Beth Temporada was correctly found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 33 and the Court of Appeals. However, opinions differ sharply on the penalty that should be imposed on
accused-appellant for estafa. In particular, there is a debate on how the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be
applied in a case like this where there is an incremental penalty when the amount embezzled exceedsP22,000
(by at least P10,000).
In this connection, the relevant portion of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:

xxxx

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating
circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.[29]
The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries
The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein
appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to
have been examined by a physician thereafter.[30] Maria corroborated her sons testimony.[31]
Juniors testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac
Community Hospital who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical Certificate for his findings and
testified on the same. His findings were (1) muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of Juniors face
just below the eye and on both legs, which could have been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such
as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation which could have
been sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked how long does he think
the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks.[32] But if applied with medication, the injuries
would heal in a week.[33]
We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was beaten by
his father and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves credence especially since the
same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother, Maria, and supported by medical examination. We thus find
that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.
Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries
We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries sustained by Junior
should heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under
paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

1st.
The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed twenty years.
In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor to reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the other hand, the relevant portion of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code
for the offense; x x x
Jurisprudence shows that there are two schools of thought on the incremental penalty in estafa vis--vis the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Under the first school of thought, the minimum term is fixed at prision correccional
while the maximum term can reach up toreclusion temporal. This is the general interpretation. It was resorted to in
People v. Pabalan,[9] People v. Benemerito,[10] People v. Gabres[11] and in a string of cases.[12]
On the other hand, under the second school of thought, the minimum term is one degree away from the maximum
term and therefore varies as the amount of the thing stolen or embezzled rises or falls. It is the line of
jurisprudence that follows People v. De la Cruz.[13] Among the cases of this genre are People v. Romero,[14]
People v. Dinglasan[15] and Salazar v. People.[16]
The Court is urged in this case to adopt a consistent position by categorically discarding one school of thought.
Hence, our dilemma: which of the two schools of thought should we affirm?

ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
1.
By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor from one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

THE FIRST SCHOOL OF THOUGHT IS

MORE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in imposing a sentence, the court must determine two penalties
composed of the maximum and minimum terms, instead of imposing a single fixed penalty.[17] Hence, the
indeterminate sentence is composed of a maximum term taken from the penalty imposable under the Revised
Penal Code and a minimum term taken from the penalty next lower to that fixed in the said Code.

xxxx

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty
shall be in its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty (20)
days of arresto menor in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in
Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight
physical injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is increased to
P30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED
People V Temporada GR. 173473
G.R. No. 173473 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus BETH TEMPORADA.
Promulgated: ________________
x------------------------------------------x

SEPARATE OPINION
CORONA, J.:

The maximum term corresponds to that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the [Revised Penal] Code. Thus, attending circumstances (such as mitigating, aggravating
and other relevant circumstances) that may modify the imposable penalty applying the rules of the Revised Penal
Code is considered in determining the maximum term. Stated otherwise, the maximum term is arrived at after
taking into consideration the effects of attendant modifying circumstances.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
[Revised Penal] Code for the offense. It is based on the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense without considering in the meantime the modifying circumstances.[18]
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code for the felony of estafa (except estafa under
Article 315(2)(d))[19] isprision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the
amount of the fraud is over P12,000 but does not exceed P22,000. If it exceeds P22,000, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period. Moreover, where the amount embezzled is more than
P22,000, an incremental penalty of one year shall be added for every additional P10,000.
Thus, the Revised Penal Code imposes prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period (or a period of four years, two months and one day to eight years) if the amount of the fraud is
more than P12,000 but not more than P22,000. If it exceeds P22,000, the penalty is imposed in its maximum
period (or a period of six years, 8 months and 21 days to eight years) with an incremental penalty of one year for
each additional P10,000 subject to the limitation that the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case
exceed 20 years.

Strictly speaking, the circumstance that the amount misappropriated by the offender is more than P22,000 is a
qualifying circumstance. In People v. Bayot,[20] this Court defined a qualifying circumstance as a circumstance
the effect of which is not only to give the crime committed its proper and exclusive name but also to place the
author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that especially prescribed for said crime.
Applying the definition to estafa where the amount embezzled is more than P22,000, the amount involved ipso
jure places the offender in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than the imposition of the penalty in its
maximum period plus incremental penalty, if warranted.[21] In other words, if the amount involved is more than
P22,000, then the offender shall be sentenced to suffer the maximum period of the prescribed penalty with an
incremental penalty of one year per additional P10,000.
However, People v. Gabres considered the circumstance that more than P22,000 was involved as a generic
modifying circumstance which is material only in the determination of the maximum term, not of the minimum
term:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. The penalty next lower should be
based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to
the periods into which into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial
determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying
circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the
law accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charged against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two months while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6) years and
one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year for each
additional P10,000.00. (emphasis supplied)

crimes carries with it the responsibility to impose a greater penalty for grave penalties is not only wrong but also
dangerous.
Nowhere does the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribe that the minimum term of the penalty be no farther than
one degree away from the maximum term. Thus, while it may be true that the minimum term of the penalty in an
indeterminate sentence is generally one degree away from the maximum term, the law does not mandate that its
application be rigorously and narrowly limited to that situation.
THE PROPER INDETERMINATE
PENALTIES IN THESE CASES
From the above disquisition, I respectfully submit that the prevailing rule, the so-called first school of thought, be
followed. With respect to the indeterminate sentence that may be imposed on the accused, I agree with the
position taken by Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
Accordingly, I vote that the decision of the Court of Appeals be AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
(1) in Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional as minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum;
(2)
in Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the accused be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and 21
days of prision mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa cases and
(3) in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional as minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

People V Enriquez 465 scra 407

If the circumstance that more than P22,000 was involved is considered as a qualifying circumstance, the penalty
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for it will be the maximum period of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period. This has a duration of six years, 8 months and 21 days to eight
years. The penalty next lower (which will correspond to the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence) is the
medium period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, which has a
duration of five years, five months and 11 days to six years, eight months and 20 days.[22]
If the circumstance is considered simply as a modifying circumstance (as in Gabres), it will be disregarded in
determining the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence. The starting point will be prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum and the penalty next lower will then be prision correccional in its minimum to
medium periods, which has a duration of six months and one day to four years and two months.

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,
Present:

- versus From the foregoing, it is more favorable to the accused if the circumstance (that more than P22,000 was involved)
is to be considered as a modifying circumstance, not as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, I submit that the
Gabres rule is preferable.
On the contrary, the second school of thought is invariably prejudicial to the accused. By fixing the minimum term
of the indeterminate sentence to one degree away from the maximum term, the minimum term will always be
longer than prision correccional in its minimum to medium periods.
Worse, the circumstance (that more than P22,000 was embezzled) is not a modifying circumstance but a part of
the penalty, if adopted, will mean that the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence will never be lower than
the medium period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, the
penalty next lower to the maximum period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period.
THE SECOND SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
The primary defect of the so-called second school of thought is that it contradicts the in dubio pro reo principle. It
also violates the lenity rule. Instead, it advocates a stricter interpretation with harsher effects on the accused. In
particular, compared to the first school of thought, it lengthens rather than shortens the penalty that may be
imposed on the accused. Seen in its proper context, the second school of thought is contrary to the avowed
purpose of the law that it purportedly seeks to promote, the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The second school of thought limits the concept of modifying circumstance to either a mitigating or aggravating
circumstance listed under Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. It contends that the respective
enumerations under the said provisions are exclusive and all other circumstances not included therein were
intentionally omitted by the legislature. It further asserts that, even assuming that the circumstance that more than
P22,000 was embezzled may be deemed as analogous to aggravating circumstances under Article 14, the said
circumstance cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance because it is only in mitigating circumstances
that analogous circumstances are allowed and recognized.[23] The second school of thought then insists that,
since the circumstance that more thanP22,000 was involved is not among those listed under Article 14, the said
circumstance is not a modifying circumstance for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The second school of thought therefore strictly construes the term attending circumstances against the accused.
It refuses to recognize anything that is not expressed, takes the language used in its exact meaning and admits
no equitable consideration.
To the point of being repetitive, however, where the accused is concerned, penal statutes should be interpreted
liberally, not strictly.
The fact that there are two schools of thought on the matter by itself shows that there is uncertainty as to the
concept of attending or modifying circumstances. Pursuant to the in dubio pro reo principle, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused and not against him.
Moreover, laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they are enacted.[24] The
meaning of a word or phrase used in a statute may be qualified by the purpose which induced the legislature to
enact the statute. The purpose may indicate whether to give a word or phrase a restricted or expansive
meaning.[25] In construing a word or phrase, the court should adopt the interpretation that best serves the
manifest purpose of the statute or promotes or realizes its object.[26] Where the language of the statute is fairly
susceptible to two or more constructions, that which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted should be adopted.[27] Taken in conjunction
with the lenity rule, a doubtful provision of a law that seeks to alleviate the effects of incarceration ought to be
given an interpretation that affords lenient treatment to the accused.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is intended to favor the accused, particularly to shorten his term of
imprisonment.[28] The reduction of his period of incarceration reasonably helps uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness. The law, being penal in character, must receive an interpretation that benefits the accused.[29] This
Court already ruled that in cases where the application of the law on indeterminate sentence would be
unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on indeterminate
sentence should not be applied.[30] In the same vein, if an interpretation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
unfavorable to the accused and will work to increase the term of his imprisonment, that interpretation should not
be adopted. It is also for this reason that the claim that the power of this Court to lighten the penalty of lesser

G.R. No. 158797

Puno, J.,
Chairman,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.

ELPIDIO ENRIQUEZ, JR. and

Promulgated:
EMILIANO ENRIQUEZ,
Appellants.
July 29, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez were convicted of kidnapping by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cavite City, Branch 16, and each was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetua as maximum.[1]
They appealed to the Court of Appeals which not only affirmed their convictions but imposed upon each of the
appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[2] The Court of Appeals refrained from entering judgment and
certified the case to us pursuant to the second paragraph of Sec. 13 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.[3]
On July 8, 1985, Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez were charged with kidnapping in the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite City, Branch 16. The Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of January 1985, in the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with the use of firearm (nickel plated revolver), motor vehicle (tricycle) and by simulating
public authority, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, forcibly kidnapped Alexander Pureza y
Mendoza by the point of [a] gun (revolver) and forcibly loaded said Alexander M. Pureza to (sic) a yellow colored
tricycle (Hazel) with Plate No. MTC H8242 and brought somewhere else and detained in an undisclosed place for
more than five (5) days since the kidnapping took place and up to the present time could not be located, with the
aggravating circumstances of the use of a firearm, force, motor vehicle and simulation of public authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Both pleaded not guilty to the charge during arraignment. Trial ensued.
The prosecution evidence shows that at about 6:50 p.m. of January 24, 1985, Rogelio Andico, Edwin Pugay,
Esmi Saquilayan, and twenty-one-year old Alexander Pureza were conversing in front of the Barangay Hall of
Silangan, Rosario, Cavite. Appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., alias Bonggo, who was dressed in military fatigue
pants, camouflage jacket, brown hat, and wearing dark glasses, arrived on board a tricycle driven by appellant
Emiliano Enriquez, alias Emil Tate. After Bonggo alighted, Emil parked the tricycle about ten (10) meters away
from the group. Bonggo then pulled out a .38 caliber revolver from his jacket and warned the group, Huwag
kayong tatakbo, awtoridad ako. He singled out Alexander Pureza, poked his gun at him and ordered him, Sama
ka sa kin. He dragged Alexander to the tricycle, and forced him to board the same. The tricycle sped off.
Alexander Pureza was never seen again or heard from since then.
Rogelio Andico, who was left behind after his companions scampered away, hurried to Alexanders house and
informed his parents about the incident. At about midnight of the same day, Rogelio gave his statement[5] to the
police upon the advice of his uncle, Atty. Ernesto Andico, the Vice-Mayor of Rosario, Cavite. Rogelio executed
two other statements on January 25 and 29, 1985. [6]
Feliciano Castro, a resident of Rosario, Cavite, corroborated Rogelios testimony. He testified that at about 6:30 to
7:00 p.m. of January 24, 1985, he was waiting for a ride when he saw Alexander Pureza being pushed by
appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. into a waiting tricycle driven by appellant Emiliano Enriquez.[7] Alexander was
struggling to free himself. Feliciano did not do anything to help or tell anyone what he witnessed. He feared for
his life because Bonggo was the grandson of then Mayor Calixto Enriquez of Rosario, Cavite. At that time, many
people just disappear or get killed in Rosario. It was only in July 1987 when Mayor Calixto Enriquez was no longer
mayor that he revealed the above information to P/Lt. Col. Rogelio Pureza, the victims father.

The two appellants had a different story to tell. They denied any involvement in the kidnapping and interposed the
defense of alibi. Appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. testified that he was in Bulan, Sorsogon from January 21 to 24,
1985 with his live-in partner visiting her sick father. He left Sorsogon in the morning of January 24 and arrived at
Rosario, Cavite at about 11:00 p.m. to midnight of the same day. He went to sleep immediately upon arrival, and
was awakened at 1:00 a.m. when the police picked him up for investigation.
Appellant Emiliano Enriquez claimed that he did not leave his house during the night in question as he was taking
care of his child. He also alleged that his tricycle had a broken shock absorber.
In addition, appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. ascribed improper motive on the part of prosecution witnesses
Andico and Castro. He alleged that Rogelio Andico testified against him because he caused the arrest of
Rogelios uncle, Antonio Andico, known as the king pusher of Rosario, Cavite. He also charged that Feliciano
Castro testified against him because Castro is a trusted employee and bodyguard of Jose Abutan, the uncle of
Col. Pureza. He further alleged that Col. Pureza filed the case at bar against him in retaliation for having been
implicated in the case involving the killing of his (Elpidios) father.
After trial, appellants were found guilty as charged and meted indeterminate prison terms, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. alias Bonggo and
Emiliano Enriquez alias Tate GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences them to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment consisting of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim P50,000.00.
(underlining supplied)[8]

Appellants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court. As aforestated, the appellate court did not apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law but imposed upon the
appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated May 28, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16 finding herein accused-appellants Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano
Enriquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping is herebyAFFIRMED with modification in that
We hereby sentence them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, let this case be certified and the entire records hereof elevated to the Supreme Court for
review pursuant to Sec. 13 (2), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.[9] (emphasis supplied)
Appellants state a lone assignment of error in their Appellants Brief, viz: that the lower court gravely erred
in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping despite the insufficiency of the
evidence. More specifically, appellants assail the credibility of prosecution witness Rogelio Andico because he did
not give his eyewitness account of the alleged kidnapping in one sworn statement only but executed two
supplemental statements as well. They allege that the execution of three statements to the police shows that
Andico was a coached witness. They argue that Andicos excuse for the piecemeal testimony, i.e., he was
nervous and confused at the time he gave his first statement to the police, is not worthy of belief considering that
he gave his statement to Col. Purezas men. Appellants likewise contend that prosecution witness Feliciano
Castro does not deserve credence because it took him two (2) years to report the incident which is counter to the
natural tendency of a person who witnessed a crime to report the same at the earliest possible opportunity.
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
We hold that the execution of not one but three statements to the police does not necessarily render prosecution
witness Andico incredible. Andico testified in court and was cross-examined by counsel for appellants. Andico
testified in a clear and straightforward manner detailing how Alexander Pureza was taken at gunpoint and spirited
away by appellants on the night of January 24, 1985, never to be seen or heard from again. His testimony was
given credence both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. We find no reason to disturb their calibration of
the credibility of Andicos testimony.
To be sure, the first statement, by itself, executed by Andico at midnight of January 24, 1985 sufficiently proved
the elements of the crime of kidnapping charged against the appellants. In this statement,[10] Andico categorically
narrated how his friend Alexander Pureza, a private citizen, was taken at gunpoint by appellant Elpidio Enriquez,
Jr., who did not have authority to do so, with the connivance and participation of a tricycle driver. The victim was
never seen or heard from again. In his second statement executed on January 25, 1985,[11] Andico merely
added that appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., aside from being dressed in military-like clothes, likewise introduced
himself to them as someone in authority. This addition is a superfluity for the purpose of proving the crime of
kidnapping against the appellant. It is undisputed that at the time the Information was filed on July 8, 1985,[12] the
victim had been missing for more than five (5) months, more than the five (5) days deprivation of liberty required
under the former Art. 267[13] of the Revised Penal Code. Alexander Pureza has not been seen again or heard
from since his abduction on January 24, 1985. The former Art. 267 mentioned four circumstances for the crime of
kidnapping to be committed,[14] but they need not be present simultaneously as the presence of just one
circumstance is enough to establish the crime.[15] Hence, the added circumstance of simulation of public
authority alleged in Andicos second sworn statement was unnecessary. Examining the third supplemental sworn
statement,[16] Andico merely supplied the name of the tricycle driver whom he saw but did not immediately
recognize. This is not fatal as there is the testimony of Feliciano Castro who identified appellant Emiliano
Enriquez as the tricycle driver to corroborate Andicos account. Although Castro reported the incident only two (2)
years after the incident, his reason for not reporting the same immediately,i.e., fear for his life, is reasonable
considering that one of the appellants is the grandson of the incumbent mayor. His initial reluctance is not unusual
and is a matter of judicial notice.[17]
Appellants attempt to discredit Andico by imputing improper motive upon him for testifying in the case, i.e., that
Andico testified to avenge his Uncle Antonio Andico who was apprehended by Narcom agents at the instigation
of appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., cannot succeed. For one, the exact relationship between Rogelio and Antonio
Andico was not proved. The uncle-nephew relationship was merely speculated from the fact that Rogelio called
Erning Andico, the brother of Antonio, as mama or uncle.[18] Appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., admitted that he
does not know the exact relationship between Rogelio and Antonio Andico.[19] But even if Antonio was Rogelios
uncle, their relationship is not enough reason for Rogelio to avenge Antonios apprehension. On the other hand,
there is reason to believe that the natural interest of Rogelio, who is a friend of the victim, in securing the
conviction of the guilty would deter him from implicating a person other than the true culprit.[20] Col. Purezas
alleged motive for filing this case against appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., i.e., Col. Pureza filed this case in
retaliation for having been implicated in the case involving the killing of Elpidios father, is equally tenuous. The
facts show that Col. Pureza had been cleared of any involvement in the killing of Elpidios father by the
Investigating Panel of the Judge Advocate Generals Office.[21] A contrario, it is Elpidio who may have the reason
to retaliate at Col. Pureza who walked away from the charge.
We join the lower courts in rejecting appellants alibi. In the case of Elpidio, we find it incredible that he did not
inform the police about his alibi when he was brought in for questioning just hours after he came back from Bulan,
Sorsogon. Neither did his mother, who followed him to the police station, nor his live-in partner, who was allegedly
his companion in Sorsogon, say anything to the police to defend him. Their silence was deafening. It was almost
a month later or only on February 20, 1985 that Elpidio foisted the defense of alibi in his counter-affidavit[22]
submitted during the preliminary investigation of the case. We have repeatedly ruled that alibi is an inherently
weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and is highly unreliable,[23] more so when corroborated only by
relatives and friends.[24] It cannot stand against the positive identification of appellant by a credible witness to the
crime.[25] On the other hand, appellant Emiliano alleged that he was in his house taking care of his child when
the kidnapping took place, and that his tricycle, which was allegedly used in the crime, had a broken shock
absorber. However, he admitted that his house was a mere ten (10) minutes away from the place of the
incident.[26] He also conceded that a vehicle can run even without a broken shock absorber, although he
qualified that his tricycles shock absorber was seriously broken.[27] We reiterate the age old rule that for alibi to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must
also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.[28] In the case at bar, appellant Emiliano failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to

have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission considering that his house was a mere ten (10)
minutes drive away from the barangay hall where the victim was abducted.
In sum, we find that the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. All the
elements of the crime of kidnapping, to wit: (1) the accused is a private individual; (2) the accused kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal;
and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code are present,[29] have been proven through the eyewitness account of Rogelio Andico, corroborated
by Feliciano Castro, who have not been shown to have any improver motive in testifying in this case.
Finally, we come to the correctness of the penalty. The 1987 Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it.[30] Republic Act No.
7659[31] which classified kidnapping as a heinous crime punishable by death took effect on December 31, 1993.
The crime at bar was committed in 1985. We have ruled that R.A. No. 7659 cannot be applied to a crime that
transpired prior to its effectivity under the principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws which are unfavorable to the
accused.[32] Consequently, reclusion perpetua is the only penalty that can be imposed against the appellants. As
correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
cannot be applied in the case of appellants considering the proscription in Sec. 2 thereof, viz:
This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment x x x x

Indeed, in People v. Asturias,[33] Serrano v. Court of Appeals,[34] People v.

Lampaza[35] and People v. Tan,[36] to name a few cases, we in effect equated the penalty of reclusion perpetua
as synonymous to life-imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that the latter law
does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty. Consequently, we affirm the
Court of Appeals in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in imposing upon appellants the penalty of
reclusion perpetua instead.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23589 convicting
Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez of the crime of kidnapping.
SO ORDERED.

PeopleV Angeles 380 Scra 519

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132376. April 11, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAMINA ANGELES y CALMA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Samina Angeles y Calma was charged with four (4) counts of estafa and one (1) count of
illegal recruitment in the following informations:[1]
Criminal Case No. 94-140585 (Estafa)
That on or about September 8, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MARIA TOLOSA DE SARDEA Y TABLADA in the following manner
to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said
Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ her
as domestic helper in Paris, France, and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of P107,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations,
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did
obtain the amount of P107,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada in the aforesaid sum of
P107,000.00 Philippine Currency.
Criminal Case No. 94-140486 (Estafa)
That on or about September 8, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MARCELIANO T. TOLOSA in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said MARCELIANO
T. TOLOSA to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ him as contract worker in
Paris, France and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet
the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
Marceliano T. Tolosa accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to
obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P190,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with intent to
defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Marceliano T. Tolosa in the aforesaid sum of
P190,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Criminal Case No. 94-140487 (Estafa)
That on or about September 9, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud PRECILA P. OLPINDO in the following manner to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said Precila P.
Olpindo to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ her as contract worker in Canada
and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Precila P. Olpindo to give
and deliver, as in fact she delivered to said accused the amount of $2,550.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said Precila P. Olpindo accused well knowing that the same were false and
fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of $2,550.00 which amount once
in her possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Precila P. Olpindo
in the aforesaid sum of $2,550.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of P61,200.00.
Criminal Case No. 94-140488 (Estafa)
That on or about the first week of September 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud VILMA S. BRINA in the following manner to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said Vilma S. Brina
to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ her as contract worker in Canada and
could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Vilma S. Brina to give and
deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said accused the amount of $2,550.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were
made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of $2,550.00 which amount once in her possession,
with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to
her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Vilma S. Brina in the aforesaid sum of
$2,550.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of P61,200.00.
Criminal Case No. 94-140489 (Illegal Recruitment)
The undersigned accuses SAMINA ANGELES y CALMA of violation of Art. 38 (a) Pres. Decree No. 1412
amending certain provisions of Book 1, Pres. Decree No. 442 otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the
Philippines in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of said Code, as further amended in a large scale, as follows:
That sometime during the month of September 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad,
did then and there willfully and unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to the
following persons:
1. Marceliano T. Tolosa
2. Precila P. Olpindo
3. Vilma S. Brina
4. Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada
Without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
The five (5) cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50.

Maria Tolosa Sardea was working in Saudi Arabia when she received a call from her sister, Priscilla Agoncillo,
who was in Paris, France. Priscilla advised Maria to return to the Philippines and await the arrival of her friend,
accused-appellant Samina Angeles, who will assist in processing her travel and employment documents to Paris,
France. Heeding her sisters advice, Maria immediately returned to the Philippines.
Marceliano Tolosa who at that time was in the Philippines likewise received instructions from his sister Priscilla to
meet accused-appellant who will also assist in the processing of his documents for Paris, France.
Maria and Marceliano eventually met accused-appellant in September 1994 at Expert Travel Agency on Mabini
Street, Manila. During their meeting, accused-appellant asked if they had the money required for the processing
of their documents. On September 8, 1994, Maria gave P107,000.00 to accused-appellant at Expert Travel
Agency. Subsequently, she gave another P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 as additional payments to accusedappellant.
Marceliano, on the other hand, initially gave P100,000.00 to accused-appellant but on September 28, 1994, he
gave an additional P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 to accused-appellant at the United Coconut Planters Bank in
Makati.
Analyn Olpindo met accused-appellant in Belgium. At that time, Analyn was working in Canada but she went to
Belgium to visit her in-laws. After meeting accused-appellant, Analyn Olpindo called up her sister, Precila
Olpindo, in the Philippines and told her to meet accused-appellant upon the latters arrival in the Philippines
because accused-appellant can help process her documents for employment in Canada.
Precila Olpindo eventually met accused-appellant at the Expert Travel Agency on September 7, 1994. Accusedappellant asked for the amount of $4,500.00, but Precila was only able to give $2,500.00.
No evidence was adduced in relation to the complaint of Vilma Brina since she did not testify in court.
Accused-appellant told Precila Olpindo and Vilma Brina that it was easier to complete the processing of their
papers if they start from Jakarta, Indonesia rather than from Manila. Thus, on September 23, 1994, Precila
Olpindo, Vilma Brina and accused-appellant flew to Jakarta, Indonesia. However, accused-appellant returned to
the Philippines after two days, leaving behind Precila and Vilma. They waited for accused-appellant in Jakarta
but the latter never returned. Precila and Vilma eventually came home to the Philippines on November 25, 1994.
When she arrived in the Philippines, Precila tried to get in touch with accused-appellant at the Expert Travel
Agency, but she could not reach her. Meanwhile, Maria and Marceliano Tolosa also began looking for accusedappellant after she disappeared with their money.
Elisa Campanianos of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency presented a certification to the effect that
accused-appellant was not duly licensed to recruit workers here and abroad.
In her defense, accused-appellant averred that, contrary to the prosecutions allegations, she never represented
to the complainants that she can provide them with work abroad. She insisted that she was a marketing
consultant and an international trade fair organizer. In June 1994, she went to Paris, France to organize a trade
fair. There she met Priscilla Agoncillo, a domestic helper, and they became friends. Priscilla asked her to assist
her siblings, Maria and Marceliano, particularly in the processing of their travel documents for France. Accusedappellant told Priscilla that she can only help in the processing of travel documents and nothing more. It was
Priscilla who promised employment to Maria and Marceliano. She received money from complainants not in the
form of placement fees but for the cost of tickets, hotel accommodations and other travel requirements.
According to accused-appellant, she met Analyn Olpindo in Belgium while she was organizing a trade fair. They
also became friends and it was Analyn who asked her to help Precila. Just like in the case of Maria and
Marceliano, accused-appellant explained that her assistance shall only entail the processing of Precilas travel
documents to Canada.
After trial on the merits, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment and four (4) counts of
estafa and correspondingly sentenced her as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the aforementioned premises the accused SAMINA ANGELES is hereby declared:
In Criminal Case No. 94-140489 for the crime of Illegal Recruitment, GUILTY (Art. 38 Labor Code) and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 94-140485 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby declared GUILTY and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the
accused is ordered to reimburse the amount of One hundred seven thousand pesos (P107,000.00) to
complainant Maria Tolosa de Sardea. With costs.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140486 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby declared GUILTY and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the
accused is ordered to reimburse the amount of One hundred ninety thousand pesos (P190,000.00) to
complainant Marceliano T. Tolosa. With costs.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140487 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby declared GUILTY and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the
accused is ordered to reimburse the amount of Two thousand five hundred fifty dollars (US$2,550.00) or its
equivalent in Philippine currency of Sixty one thousand two hundred pesos (P61,200.00), to complainant Precila
P. Olpindo. With Costs.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140488 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby declared GUILTY and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the
accused is ordered to reimburse the amount of Two thousand five hundred fifty dollars (US$2,550.00) or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency of Sixty one thousand two hundred pesos (P61,200.00) to complainant Vilma S.
Brina. With costs.[2]
Accused-appellant is now before us on appeal, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt for estafa and
illegal recruitment by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant points out that not one of the complainants testified on what kind of jobs were promised to
them, how much they would receive as salaries, the length of their employment and even the names of their
employers, which are basic subjects a prospective employee would first determine.
In sum, accused-appellant posits that the prosecution did not present a single evidence to prove that she
promised or offered any of the complainants jobs abroad. Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements
concur: 1) that the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; and 2) that the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning
of recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34.[3]
Article 13(b), of the Labor Code provides, thus:
(b)
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused-appellant gave complainants the distinct
impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were
convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.[4] To be engaged in the practice of recruitment and
placement, it is plain that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a
recruiter whether locally or abroad.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant alleges that she never promised nor offered any job to the complainants.
We agree.
A perusal of the records reveals that not one of the complainants testified that accused-appellant lured them to
part with their hard-earned money with promises of jobs abroad. On the contrary, they were all consistent in
saying that their relatives abroad were the ones who contacted them and urged them to meet accused-appellant
who would assist them in processing their travel documents. Accused-appellant did not have to make promises
of employment abroad as these were already done by complainants relatives. Thus, in the cross-examination of
Maria Tolosa de Cardena:
Atty. Dinglasan:
Q: And you would likewise agree that Priscilla informed you that she can find an employment for you once you
entered Paris, is that correct?
A: Yes, because according to her that is what Samina Angeles said to her.
Q: But during that time you would agree that you do not know personally or met in person Samina Angeles?
A: Not yet sir.
Q: In fact, even when you arrived in the Philippines, and actually met in person Samina Angeles, you did not
know who is Samina Angeles and what her business was then that time?
A: I recognized because my sister sent me a picture of Samina Angeles.
Q:
So, it is clear that when you met Samina Angeles sometime on September 8, 1994, you were already
decided to go to Paris because you were then relying on the instruction from the advice of Priscilla?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was the reason why you even terminated your employment contract in Saudi?
A: Yes, sir.[5]

Precila Olpindo, on cross-examination, admitted thus:

Q: You would like to confirm that before you and Samina met in the Philippines sometime in September of 1995,
you were already decided to leave for Canada as per advice of your sister?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you likewise agree madam witness that even before you met the accused sometime in September of
1995, you were already directed and informed by your sister Ana as to how much and she will pay the accused
Samina for the facilitation of your travel in going to Canada, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.[6]
In the cross-examination of Marceliano Tolosa, thus:
Q: Now, would you agree that your sister is working in Paris?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And for how many years working in Paris?
A: Almost 5 years.
Q: And how much was she earning or receiving in Paris, France?
A: P20,000.00 or more, sir.
Q: And it was for this reason she advised your sister then in Saudi Arabia and you to also go to Paris because
she will be receiving more in Paris, correct?
A: She said when we follow to her office, sir.
Q:
So what your sister told you if youre also interested to go to Paris you can avail of the help of Samina
Angeles, so you can also leave for Paris and join her, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was the reason why your sister wrote you a letter and gave instruction to go to accused sometime
on September, 1994, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now you would agree with me Mr. Witness prior to that date September 8, 1994 you dont know personally
the person of Samina Angeles and do not know anything about the nature of her business or personal
circumstances, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.[7]
Plainly, there is no testimony that accused-appellant offered complainants jobs abroad. Hence, accusedappellant Samina Angeles cannot be lawfully convicted of illegal recruitment.
Anent the four charges of estafa, Samina Angeles argues that the element of deceit consisting in the false
statement or fraudulent representation of the accused made prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the
sums of money is lacking in the instant case. She claims that she never deceived complainants into believing that
she had the authority and capability to send them abroad for employment.
We are not persuaded.
Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of estafa are: (1) the accused has
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Clearly, these elements are present in this
case.[8]
Although Samina Angeles did not deceive complainants into believing that she could find employment for them
abroad, nonetheless, she made them believe that she was processing their travel documents for France and
Canada. They parted with their money believing that Samina Angeles would use it to pay for their plane tickets,
hotel accommodations and other travel requirements. Upon receiving various amounts from complainants,
Samina Angeles used it for other purposes and then conveniently disappeared.
Complainants trusted Samina Angeles because she was referred to them by their own relatives. She abused
their confidence when she led them to believe that she can process their travel documents abroad, thus inducing
them to part with their money. When they demanded from Samina their travel documents, she failed to produce
them. Likewise, she failed to return the amounts entrusted to her.
Clearly, Samina Angeles defrauded complainants by falsely pretending to possess the power and capacity to
process their travel documents.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed
P22,000.00; if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional P10,000.00. However, the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years.[9]
In People v. Ordono,[10] it was held:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. The penalty next lower should be
based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to
the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition
of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
Thus, in Criminal Case No. 94-140485, Maria Tolosa testified that she gave P107,000.00, P46,000.00 and
US$1,500.00 to Samina Angeles. The Information, however, alleged that Maria gave only P107,000.00. Samina
Angeles could therefore be held accountable for only that amount.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140486, Marceliano testified that he gave P100,000.00, P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 to
Samina Angeles. The Information however alleged that Marceliano gave only a total of P190,000.00; hence that
is the only amount that Samina Angeles could be held accountable for.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140487, Precila testified that she gave US$2,550.00 to Samina Angeles. The
Information alleged that the equivalent amount thereof in Philippine Currency is P61,200.00. Samina Angeles is
therefore criminally liable for P61,200.00.
Complainant Vilma Brina did not appear in court to testify. Thus, the damage in the amount of $2,550.00 alleged
in Criminal Case No. 94-140488 was not proved.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
(1)
In Criminal Case No. 94-140485, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and is ORDERED to
indemnify Maria Sardea the amount of P107,000.00.
(2)
In Criminal Case No. 94-140486, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and is ORDERED to
indemnify Marceliano Tolosa the amount of P190,000.00.
(3)
In Criminal Case No. 94-140487, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prision term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eleven (11) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify
Precila Olpindo the amount of P61,200.00.
(4) In Criminal Case No. 94-140488 for Estafa, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is ACQUITTED for failure of
the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(5) In Criminal Case No. 94-140489 for Illegal Recruitment, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is ACQUITTED
for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Marcelo V CA 348 scra 740
G.R. No. 106695 August 4, 1994
EDWARD T. MARCELO, DIONILO D. MARFIL, CELIA C. CABURNAY, and DANIEL T. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, in his capacity
as The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, and THE QUEZON CITY
PROSECUTOR, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioners.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The issue in this case is whether a pre-arraignment dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, which relied on
the reversal by the Review Committee of the Office of the City Prosecutor of the investigating prosecutor's
resolution to file the information, bars the filing of a new information for the same offense after the Secretary of
Justice reversed the resolution of the review committee.

This case was originally assigned to the Third Division but was referred to the Court en banc in view of the novelty
and importance of the issue.
The procedural antecedents of this case, as disclosed by the original records of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285
1and Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, which we required to be transmitted to this Court, as well as that of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27681, are herein set forth.
In a complaint-affidavit sworn to on 18 March 1991 and filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
Jose T. Marcelo charged the petitioners with falsification of public documents committed by forging the signature
of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. in six voting trust agreements (VTA's). 2 Submitted in support of the affidavit-complaint
were the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and of the PC/PNP Crime Laboratory that the
signature on the VTA's purporting to be that of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. and the specimen or standard signature of the
latter were not written by one and the same person. The VTA's 3 were purportedly executed in Quezon City and
acknowledged before petitioner Dionilo Marfil, a notary public.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Domingo Israel found "more than sufficient
evidence" of the forgery of the signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr., as "found and concluded by two (2) national
police agencies, the NBI and PCCL," and recommended the filing of the case in court. 4
On 30 May 1991, an information for falsification of public documents was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285, and raffled to Branch 96 5 thereof (hereinafter
Bersamin court).
On 6 June 1991, the petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City a Motion for Review
seeking the deferment of the filing of the information or if one had been filed, the suspension of the criminal
proceedings and the reversal of the Israel resolution. 6
On 10 June 1991, warrants for the arrest of the petitioners were issued, 7 and all of them except Edward Marcelo
posted bail. 8 Marcelo surrendered to the court and posted bail on 29 July 1991. 9
On 13 June 1991, the petitioners, in a Manifestation and Motion, informed the Bersamin court of the filing of their
Motion for Review and prayed that further proceedings in the case be suspended until the resolution of the Motion
for Review. 10
On 14 June 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico Bringas, the prosecutor assigned to the case, filed a motion to
defer the arraignment until the resolution of the Motion for Review, 11 which the Bersamin court granted in its
Order of 10 July 1991. The Bersamin court, however, reset the arraignment to 28 August 1991.
Then, on 27 August 1991, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to defer the arraignment on 28 August 1991 until
the resolution of their Motion for Review. 12 Acting thereon, and over the vigorous opposition of the private
prosecutor, Judge Bersamin issued an order on 28 August 1991 13 resetting the arraignment to 8 October 1991
and directing the City Prosecutor of Quezon City "to conclude the pending review of the resolution of the filing
Prosecutor Domingo Israel and to render a report of the results of the review on or before" 8 October 1991.
Believing that no resolution on the Motion for Review would be released before 8 October 1991 and considering
that petitioner Marcelo was abroad, the petitioners filed on 3 October 1991 a motion for the cancellation of the
arraignment on 8 October 1991 and for its resetting to "early November 1991." 14
There is no showing that this motion was acted upon. The records of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 were
thereafter destroyed by a fire on 16 October 1991 but were subsequently reconstituted on 9 December 1991. 15
On 15 November 1991, the Review Committee handed down a resolution, 16 approved by Acting City Prosecutor
Lydia Navarro on 29 November 1991, recommending the reversal of the Israel resolution and the withdrawal of
the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285. Then on 5 December 1991, the petitioners filed a Manifestation
and Motion informing the Bersamin court of the reversal and praying for the dismissal of the case. 17 This was
followed on 10 December 1991 by the motion of Assistant City Prosecutor Conrado M. Jamolin which prayed for
the withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 because of the resolution of the review
committee. 18 The private prosecutor opposed this motion. 19
In the meantime too, specifically on 10 December 1991, the private complainant filed with the Secretary of Justice
an appeal from the 15 November 1991 resolution of the Review Committee. 20
On 13 December 1991, Judge Bersamin, agreeing with the findings and conclusions of the Review Committee,
issued an order, 21 the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion to Dismiss of the accused and the Motion to Withdraw Information of the public
prosecutor are hereby granted and this case is hereby dismissed without costs.
On 27 January 1992, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre R. Bello III handed down a resolution granting the
complainant's appeal, reversing the 15 November 1991 Resolution of the Review Committee, and ordering the
filing of a new information. 22
The new information, 23 signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ralph Lee, was filed on 5 February 1992 pursuant to
the resolution of Secretary Bello, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, and then raffled to Branch 101
presided over by Judge Pedro Santiago (hereinafter Santiago court) of the RTC of Quezon City. The petitioners
posted bail. 24 Thereafter, the following incidents took place in the said case:
1. On 3 March 1992, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 was already final and that the appeal subsequently taken by the private
prosecutor to and the resolution thereon by the Secretary of Justice are null and void and cannot be a valid basis
for any authority to file the new information or for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. 25
2. On 20 March 1992, Judge Santiago issued an order denying the motion to quash on the principal ground that it
was not based on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 26
3. On 1 April 1992, the petitioners filed a motion to reconsider the 20 March 1992 Order alleging therein that their
motion to quash was based on the ground that the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so and
had acted pursuant to an order of the Secretary of Justice which is void for having been given without or in excess
of jurisdiction under the doctrine laid down in Crespo vs. Mogul 27 that the Secretary of Justice cannot interfere
with the trial court's disposition of a criminal case after it had taken cognizance thereof. 28
4. On 2 April 1992, Judge Santiago denied the motion to reconsider and reset the arraignment to 7 April 1992. 29
Thus, the petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals on 3 April 1992 a special civil action for certiorari to set aside
the order of the Santiago court denying the motion to quash, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27681.
They alleged therein that the "respondent Judge evaded his positive legal duty when he disregarded the
consistent rulings of the Honorable Supreme Court that once an information has already been filed in court, the
court acquires complete jurisdiction over the case and the Secretary of Justice may no longer interfere with the
court's disposition of the case." 30
In its decision of 11 June 1992, 31 the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition. It found it to be "devoid
of merit" because
certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies against an order denying a motion to quash. The defendant
should instead, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his
motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law. 32
In the meantime, however, the Santiago court, not having been enjoined by the Court of Appeals, continued with
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104. On 7 April 1992, it arraigned petitioners Caburnay, Pascual,
and Marfil, entered a plea of not guilty for them, and reset the arraignment of petitioner Edward T. Marcelo, who
was then abroad, to 28 April 1992. 33 On the latter date, Marcelo was arraigned and a plea of not guilty was
entered for him. 34 Subsequently, the court received the testimonies of the following witnesses for the
prosecution: Jose Marcelo, Jr., who testified on direct examination and cross-examination on 9 June 1992, 16
June 1992, and 14 July 1992; Emmanuel Guzman, who testified on 23 July 1992, 10 August 1992, and 20 August
1992; Aida Gaetos, who testified on 10 August 1992; and Francisco Cruz, Lita Wells, Evelyn M. Eugenio, and
Helier Penaranda, who testified on 13 August 1992.
On 31 August 1992, the Court of Appeals denied the petitioners' motion to reconsider the decision of 11 June
1992. 35
Hence, the instant petition which reiterates the grounds and the arguments raised before the Court of Appeals.
The petition is without merit.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioners' special civil action for certiorari not necessarily for the
reason it relied upon, i.e., "certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies against an order denying a
motion to quash," but because the Santiago court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash. It is settled that if a court, in denying the motion to quash (or a
motion to dismiss), acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, certiorari or
prohibition lies. 36
The denial by the Santiago court of the motion to quash suffers from no fatal infirmity. The petitioners' contention
that the prosecutor did not have the authority to file the information because he acted upon an order of the
Secretary of Justice which is void in the light of Crespo vs. Mogul 37 is untenable. In the Crespo case, this Court
ruled:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is

already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to
do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
In order therefor[e] to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the court. 38
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is
filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of
Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court.
Insofar as this case is concerned, the procedure on appeals from the resolution of the investigating prosecutor
(which was duly approved by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City) as well as that from the resolution
of the Review Committee was governed by Department Circular No. 7, dated 25 January 1990, of the Department
of Justice. This was superseded by Department Order No. 223, dated 30 June 1993. Pursuant to Section 1 of
Department Circular No. 7, only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor, the Regional State Prosecutor, and the
Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice, except
as otherwise provided in Section 4 thereof. Under the latter, a resolution of the aforesaid prosecutors finding
probable cause may be appealed only upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion; however,
even with such showing, the appeal shall not be entertained if the appellant had already been arraigned, and if
the arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the
Secretary of Justice.
In this case, the petitioners did not at once appeal to the Secretary of Justice from the resolution of Assistant
Prosecutor Israel. Instead, they initially filed the Motion for Review.
From the foregoing antecedents, it is clear that the Bersamin court knew and took cognizance of the Motion for
Review, deferred the arraignment of the accused until the resolution of the said motion, and even directed the
Office of the City Prosecutor "to conclude the pending review . . . and to render a report of the results of the
review on or before" 8 October 1991. In thus recognizing and allowing the Motion for Review, the Bersamin court
deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the government to resolve with finality the issue of whether or
not the information should have been filed. The Review Committee's resolution was of course not final because
under Department Circular No. 7 both the offended party and the petitioners could still appeal therefrom to the
Secretary of Justice under Section 1 and Section 4 thereof. The Bersamin court knew or was expected to know,
since it had to take judicial notice of Department Circular No. 7, that the resolution of the Review Committee was
not final. The offended party had, in fact, appealed from the said resolution to the Secretary of Justice on 10
December 1991.
Consequently, the 5 December 1991 Manifestation and Motion of the petitioners praying for the dismissal of the
case and the 10 December 1991 motion of Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin asking for the withdrawal of the
information were prematurely filed, because as to the first, the period of the offended party to appeal from the
resolution to the Secretary of Justice had not yet lapsed or even begun, there being no showing of the date the
offended party received a copy thereof; and, as to the second, an appeal had in fact been filed on 10 December
1991. Prudence, if not wisdom or at the very least respect for the authority of the prosecution agency to which the
Bersamin court deferred, dictated against a favorable action on the Review Committee's resolution until the denial
of the appeal or the affirmance of the resolution by the Secretary of Justice. The Bersamin court acted then with
precipitate or undue haste in issuing the 13 December 1991 Order granting the petitioners' motion to dismiss and
Prosecutor Jamolin's motion to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285.
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for
review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until
resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a
motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken
therefrom to the Department of Justice.
It may be observed that the granting of both motions is a serious contradiction in that upon withdrawal of the
information, which is the logical consequence of the grant of the motion to withdraw, there no longer remained
any case to dismiss. In fine, the withdrawal of the information rendered moot the motion to dismiss.
The withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91- 21285, or even the dismissal of the said case as
decreed by the Bersamin court, did not bar the filing of a new information as directed by the Secretary of Justice
in his Resolution of 27 January 1992. No jeopardy had attached as a result of the earlier termination of Criminal
Case No. Q-91-21285 because the petitioners therein had not been arraigned and had, in fact, asked for its
dismissal for a cause other than that which would constitute double jeopardy. On the contrary, the filing of the new
information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104 straightened the course of criminal justice which had earlier gone
awry due to the precipitate action of the Bersamin court. Nor may it be said that the prosecutor who filed the
information had no authority to do so.
The Santiago court, therefore, correctly denied the petitioners' motion to quash in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104
and the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 27681.
It must also be noted that the petitioners had already been arraigned in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104 and had
participated in the trial on the merits by attending the reception of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and even terminating the cross-examination of some of them.
Before we end, a few words are in order by way of comment on the emphasis placed by our brother, Mr. Justice
Jose A. R. Melo, in his dissenting opinion, on the filing with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal in July 1988
by Mrs. Lilia S. Wells, first cousin of Edward Marcelo and Jose Marcelo, Jr., of a criminal complaint for falsification
of public documents involving the same VTA's against petitioners Marcelo and Marfil, the dismissal thereof on 29
March 1989 by the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor for insufficiency of evidence, 39 and the resolution of the
Department of Justice of 27 August 1989 dismissing the petition for review of the dismissal. The clear suggestion
is that the filing of the second criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City is
persecutive and should not be countenanced by this Court.
Our reading of the petitioners' Position Paper in the criminal complaint filed against them by Jose Marcelo, Jr. with
the City Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City (I.S. No. 91-3069) 40, the motion for review, the motion to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 27681, and the petition in this case
does not disclose any claim by the petitioners that they are the victims of a vexatious or persecutive action. In the
first mentioned pleading, they simply stated that the "sole issue in this case [is] whether or not, on the basis of the
evidence submitted by the parties, there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that the crimes of
Falsification of Public Documents and Use thereof have been committed and that Respondents are probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial." 41 The first complaint was filed by Mrs. Wells alone who was unable to
present the findings of the questioned documents examiner of the NBI and of the PC/PNP Crime Laboratory on
the alleged forgery of the signatures of Jose Marcelo, Sr. on the questioned VTA's. The latter and the specimen or
standard signature of Jose Marcelo, Sr. were submitted to these agencies only in January and February 1991,
respectively. 42 The second complaint was filed by Jose Marcelo, Jr. who, by then, had already obtained the
findings of the said agencies.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 27681 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Brillante V CA 440 scra 541

[G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. October 19, 2004]
ROBERTO BRILLANTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Good name in man and woman, dear my Lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; tis
Something, nothing;
But he that filches from me my good name

Robs me of that which not enriches him,

And makes me poor indeed.
- Shakespeare: Othello, III, iii, 155.
Every man has a right to build, keep and be favored with a good name. This right is protected by law with the
recognition of slander and libel as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses or tortious conduct.
In these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari,[1] petitioner Roberto Brillante (Brillante), also known as
Bobby Brillante, questions his convictions for libel for writing and causing to be published in 1988 an open letter
addressed to then President of the Republic of the Philippines Corazon C. Aquino discussing the alleged
participation of Atty. Jejomar Binay (Binay), then the OIC Mayor[2] and a candidate for the position of Mayor in
the Municipality (now City) of Makati, and Dr. Nemesio Prudente (Prudente), then President of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, in an assassination plot against Augusto Syjuco (Syjuco), another candidate for
Mayor of Makati at that time.
On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati, held a press conference at
the Makati Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the course of the press conference,
Brillante accused Binay of plotting the assassination of Syjuco. He further accused Binay of terrorism,
intimidation and harassment of the Makati electorate. Brillante also circulated among the journalists copies of an
open letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail his charges against Binay.[3]
Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news articles about the same. Angel Gonong, a
writer for the Peoples Journal, wrote a news article entitled Binay Accused of Plotting Slays of Rivals. It was
cleared for publication by Max Buan, Jr. (Buan), and Luis Camino (Camino), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor,
respectively, of thePeoples Journal. Gloria Hernandez (Hernandez) wrote a similar article entitled Binay Slay
Plan on Syjuco which was cleared for publication by Augusto Villanueva (Villanueva) and Virgilio Manuel
(Manuel), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the News Today.[4]
The open letter was subsequently published under the title Plea to Cory--Save Makati in newspapers such as
the Peoples Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer.[5] The pertinent portions of the open letter read:
4. We have received reports that Atty. Binay and his group are plotting the assassination of Mr. Augusto Bobby
Syjuco, now frontrunner in the Makati mayoralty race.
These reports are:
1. On December 14, 1987, Atty. Binay and Dr. Nemesio Prudente, president of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines (PUP), met at Puerto Azul in Cavite with, among others, a Commander Luming, a Major Rafael Nieva,
and a commander Francis Baloloy. Subject of the meeting was Winning the Election at all Costs.
xxx xxx xxx
3. On December 17, 1987, Dr. Prudente, Atty. Binay and others including some unidentified government officials
discussed operation Dirty Fingers after the ASEAN Summit Meeting. The operation involves terrorism, the use
of public school teachers, the threat to kill or hurt political ward and precinct leaders not supporting or opposed to
Atty. Binay, and to use these as samples to show rivals that his group is capable of doing so, the planting of his
squads in places close to potential targets, the mobilization of marshals who will bring firearms and to ferry
hitmen to target points. The marshals will also be used as pointers and to shelter the hitmen after
accomplishing or performing their missions.
xxx xxx
xxx
4. On December 8, 1987, a certain Emilio Anecito, tagged as a hitman in the group of Dr. Prudente, has been
specifically assigned to assassinate Mr. Syjuco, Aniceto has been described as Iranian mestizo looking, about
five (5) feet in height, fair complexioned curly haired, sporting a mustache, and fairly built bodily. He is said to be
a silent person and supposedly has a perfect score in hit missions assigned to him.
xxx xxx
xxx
5. On December 10, 1987, it was reported that Major Rafael Nieva had been assigned to work with Mr. Aniceto,
Nievas background report is that he:
xxx
xxx
xxx
c. Was hired by Dr. Prudente as security officer and personal bodyguard.
d. Is a notorious killer used by the PUP forces and only his employer can control or stop him.[6]
As a result of the publication of the open letter, Binay filed with the Makati fiscals office four complaints for libel
against Brillante, as the author of the letter; Gonong, Buan and Camino for writing and publishing the news article
on Brillantes accusations against him in the Peoples Journal;[7] Hernandez, Villanueva and Manuel for writing
and publishing a similar news article in the News Today;[8] and for publishing the open letter, Buan and Camino
of the Peoples Journal;[9] and Arcadio A. Sison (Sison) as President of A. Sison and Associates, an advertising
agency.[10]
Francisco Baloloy (Baloloy), who was identified in the open letter as among the persons who attended the
meeting organized by Binay and Prudente to plan the assassination of Syjuco, likewise filed a criminal complaint
for libel against Brillante, Domingo Quimlat (Quimlat), Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Balita, and Sison as
President of A. Sison and Associates.[11]
Subsequently, five Informations for libel against Brillante were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Similarly, on January 15, 1988, Prudente filed four complaints for libel against Brillante and the editors and
publishers of the newspapers where the open letter was published. On January 16, 1989, four Informations for
libel were filed against Brillante and several co-accused with the RTC of Manila. Brillantes co-accused in these
cases were: (i) Buan, Editor-in-Chief of the Peoples Journal;[12] (ii) Amado P. Macasaet (Macasaet), Publisher,
and Noel Albano (Albano), Editor, of the Malaya;[13] (iii) Sison, Public Relations Officer and Federico D. Pascual
(Pascual), Publisher and Executive Editor of the Philippine Daily Inquirer;[14] and (iv) Sison, Public Relations
Officer and Quimlat, Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Balita.[15]
Buan was not included in the trial of the cases in the RTC-Manila because he eluded arrest and was not
arraigned. The charges against Pascual and Quimlat were dropped upon motion of the Assistant Prosecutor.
The charges against Macasaet and Albano were also eventually dismissed upon motion of the prosecution. Only
Brillante and Sison remained as accused.[16] Both pleaded not guilty to the charges against them.
On January 25, 1993, the RTC-Manila acquitted Sison but found Brillante guilty of libel on four counts. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision in the consolidated cases reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing accused Bobby Brillante, also known as Roberto Brillante,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt on four (4) counts, as author or writer, of LIBEL defined under Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code and penalized under Article 355 of the same code, and sentencing him in each count to the
indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to pay a fine of P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of
ONE (1) DAY for every P8.00 that he is unable to pay, but which subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed EIGHT
(8) months.
Accused Bobby Brillante is ordered to pay the private offended party, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, the total sum of
P1,000,000.00 in these four (4) cases for moral damages which the latter suffered.
Accused Arcadio Sison is acquitted in the two cases against him, his guilt of the charges against him not having
been established beyond reasonable [doubt].
Two-third (2/3) of the costs is assessed against accused Bobby Brillante while the remaining one-third (1/3) is
charged de oficio.[17]
Subsequently, Brillante appealed the Decision of the RTC-Manila to the Court of Appeals.[18] Brillante contended
that when the Informations in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614 to 17 were filed by the prosecutor on January 16,
1989, the offense had already prescribed because more than one year had elapsed since the publication of the
open letter on January 10, 11 and 12, 1988. He also averred that the open letter which he wrote and caused to
be published was not defamatory and was without malice. Brillante also claimed that the publication is considered
privileged communication. Finally, he argued that he is entitled to equal protection of the laws and should be
acquitted of the offenses charged like his co-accused.[19]
On September 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. No. 14475 affirming the
decision of the RTC-Manila. The appellate court held that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed because the
one-year prescription period should be reckoned from the time that the private complainant Prudente filed his
complaint with the fiscals office on January 15, 1988 and not when the Informations were filed by the prosecutor
on January 16, 1989. The Court of Appeals added that under Section 1, Rule 110, which took effect during the
pendency of the cases against Brillante, the institution of the complaint before the fiscals office or the courts for
preliminary investigation interrupts the prescriptive period of the offense charged. It held that being a procedural
rule, Section 1, Rule 110, applies to the cases against Brillante.[20]
The Court of Appeals further held that the RTC-Manila did not err in finding that Brillante had committed libel
against Prudente. It explained that the open letter, when read in its entirety, gives the impression that Prudente is
part of a purported criminal conspiracy to kill Syjuco. According to the appellate court, the open letter is a
malicious defamation which produced in the minds of the readers Brillantes intent and purpose to injure the
reputation of Prudente, thereby exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.[21] The Court of Appeals
rejected Brillantes argument that the open letter may be considered privileged communication because the
evidence does not show that Brillante wrote and published it out of a legal, moral or social duty.[22]

The appellate court also debunked Brillantes allegation that he was denied the equal protection of the laws
because while the charges against his co-accused were dropped, those against him were not. According to the
appellate court, he and his co-accused are not similarly situated because he was convicted of libel upon a finding
that there existed evidence beyond reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction. In contrast, the charges against
his co-accused were dismissed and their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.[23]
Brillantes contention that his conviction for libel on four counts gave rise to double jeopardy because under our
jurisdiction protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses was
also overruled by the appellate court. It held that each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a
separate distinct offense and the charge for one instance of publication shall not bar a charge for subsequent and
separate publications.[24]
Brillante filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, but the motion was denied in a
Resolution dated January 19, 1995.[25]
In the meantime, Brillante was likewise convicted for libel on five counts by the RTC-Makati in Criminal Cases
Nos. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412, 88-3060 and 89-721. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated March 22,
1993 of the RTC-Makati reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412, 88-3060 and 89-721, finding accused Bobby Brillante,
also known as Roberto Brillante, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of libel charged in each of
these five (5) cases, and sentencing him in each of the cases to suffer imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS prision correccional,as maximum, and to pay fine, likewise in
each of these (5) cases, of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency pursuant to Article 39, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
2.
As to moral damages, said accused is also ordered to pay complainant, Jejomar C. Binay, the sum of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, in all the four (4) charges (Crim. Cases Nos. 88-410, 881411, 88-1412 and 89-721), considering the latters professional and political standing in society, he being a
lawyer and former Governor of the Metro Manila Commission as well as director of various government agencies.
3.
As to moral damages, said accused is also ordered to pay complainant, Francisco Baloloy, the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, in Criminal Case No. 88-3060.
4.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410 and 88-1412, ACQUITTING accused Max Buan, Jr., Angel Gonong and
Louie Camino, of the two charges against them on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
5.
In Criminal Case No. 88-1411 (except for accused Brillante) ordering the same ARCHIVED on the ground
that the other accused herein, Gloria Hernandez, Augusto Villanueva and Virgilio Manuel, have not been brought
to the jurisdiction of this Court; let alias warrant issue for their arrest.
6.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-3060 and 89-721, likewise ordering the same ARCHIVED ONLY WITH
RESPECT TO accused Arcadio Sison, who has not been brought to the jurisdiction of this Court; let alias warrant
issue for his arrest.
7.
In all these cases, ordering accused Bobby Brillante, also known as Roberto Brillante, to pay the
proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]
Brillante appealed the Decision of the RTC-Makati to the Court of Appeals,[27] raising essentially the same
arguments in his appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 14475.
On February 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 15174 affirming the
decision of the RTC-Makati. It held that the filing of the complaint before the fiscals office interrupts the period of
prescription because Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code did not make any distinction whether the complaint is
filed in court for preliminary investigation or for trial on the merits, because the filing of the complaint for
preliminary investigation is the initial step of criminal proceedings. It added that it would be unfair to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays which are not within his control.[28]
The appellate court also ruled that the open letter cannot be considered privileged communication because it
contains libelous matter and was circulated to the public. CitingU.S. v. Galeza,[29] it held that while it is the right
and duty of a citizen to file a complaint regarding a misconduct on the part of a public official, such complaint must
be addressed solely to the officials having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges.[30]
Lastly, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts observation that unlike Brillante, his co-accused editors and
publishers could not be held liable for libel because the news reports regarding the January 7, 1988 press
conference which were published in their respective newspapers sufficiently informed the readers that the
reference to Binays involvement in the assassination plot were allegations made by Brillante during the press
conference and that said allegations were reported for the sole purpose of informing the public of the news
regarding the candidates adverted to in the report.[31]
Brillante filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, but the motion was denied in a
Resolution dated August 17, 1995.[32]
Thereafter, Brillante filed the present Petitions for Review on March 13, 1995 in G.R. No. 118757 and on October
10, 1995 in G.R. No. 121571. In G.R. No. 118757, he raises the following arguments:
I
THE OFFENSE OF LIBEL CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION (sic) HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED WHEN THE
SAID INFORMATION (sic) WAS FILED.
II
HE IS NOT GUILTY OF LIBEL HE IS CHARGED WITH, BECAUSE THE LETTER HE CAUSED TO BE
PUBLISHED WAS WRITTEN AND PUBLISHED WITHOUT ANY MALICE [N]OR MALICIOUS INTENT TO
MALIGN THE PERSON, HONOR AND REPUTATION OF THE COMPLAINANT [PRUDENTE/BINAY] BUT
SOLELY FOR THE JUSTIFIED AND HONEST PURPOSE OF BRINGING TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL
AUTHORITIES CONCERNED THE REPORTS THEREIN MENTIONED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. WHERE
THERE IS NO MALICE, THERE IS NO LIBEL.
III
IN TRUTH, PUBLICLY KNOWN PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES OF COMPLAINANT, DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE,
ALREADY IN OPERATION LONG BEFORE JANUARY 12, 1988, INDICATE THAT HE WAS NOT INCAPABLE
OF NOURISHING VIOLENT INTENTIONS AGAINST THE POLITICAL OPPONENTS OF MAYOR BINAY.
IV
MOREOVER, CONSIDERING THAT THE MATTER REFERRED TO IN THE LETTER INDUBITABLY RELATES
TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN THEN GOING ON AS WELL AS THE PARTICIPATION OF PETITIONER AND
COMPLAINANT THEREIN, WHATEVER IS CONTAINED IN SAID LETTER CAN AT MOST BE NO MORE THAN
A POLITICAL LIBEL, WHICH IS NOT PUNISHABLE.
WE EARNESTLY URGE THAT THIS PROPOSITION BE ENUNCIATED AS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN
THE LAW ON LIBEL.
V
IN THE REMOTE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY PERCEIVE ANY CRIMINAL LIBEL IN
THIS CASE, THE PENALTY IMPOSED UPON PETITIONER IS CRUEL AND EXCESSIVE, PARTICULARLY, AS
TO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED TO COMPLAINANT.[33]
In G.R. No. 121571, he makes the following assignments of error:
I
THE OFFENSE HAD PRESCRIBED
II
THE PUBLICATION WAS A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
III
THE PUBLICATION WAS MADE WITHOUT MALICE
IV
IT MAY, AT MOST, ALSO BE CONSIDERED A POLITICAL LIBEL WHICH IS NOT PUNISHABLE
V
THE DECISION VIOLATES PETITIONERS RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
VI
THE PENALTY IS CRUEL AND EXCESSIVE[34]
With respect to the issue of prescription, Brillante anchors his claim on the Courts ruling in People v. Tayco[35]
that the prescriptive period of a crime is interrupted only upon the filing of the complaint in court and not the filing
thereof with the fiscals office. According to Brillante, the ruling in People v. Olarte[36] did not modify the doctrine
in Tayco because inOlarte, the Court referred to a complaint filed in court, not in the fiscals office. The ruling
in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[37] that a complaint filed with the fiscals office also interrupts the prescriptive
period of a criminal offense allegedly cannot overturn the ruling in Olarte because the latter was decided by the
Court En Banc while Francisco was decided by a mere division of the Court.[38]
It is further asserted by Brillante that the rule in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure that the filing of the criminal
complaint with the fiscals office interrupts the prescriptive period, cannot be applied retroactively to the cases

against him because it impairs his vested right to have the cases against him dismissed on the ground of
prescription.[39] In addition, he claims that Section 6(b), Rule 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
states that [t]he pendency of a petition for suspension of the criminal action still undergoing preliminary
investigation in the fiscals office shall interrupt the prescriptive period for filing the corresponding complaint of
information supports his position that prior to the amendment of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in 1985, the
prevailing rule was that only the filing of the complaint or information in court tolls the prescriptive period for a
criminal offense.[40]
Brillante denies that he is liable for libel for causing to be published his open letter implicating Binay, Prudente
and their associates in a planned assassination of Syjuco as well as election-related terrorism, and in uttering
remarks against Binay and his associates during the January 7, 1988 press conference. According to Brillante, his
statements and utterances were privileged communication because he made them public out of a legal, moral
and social duty to safeguard the sanctity of the elections to be held on January 18, 1988, and to avoid the
unnecessary loss of life.[41] Since his statements were privileged communication, malice cannot be presumed
from them.[42] Brillante adds that at the time he made the statements, he honestly believed that they were true.
Citing an American case, Bays v. Hunt,[43] he contends that where there is an honest belief in the truth of the
charges made, and the publication is in good faith, one is not responsible even for publishing an untruth.[44]
It is further asserted by Brillante that since Binay, the subject of the allegedly defamatory statements is a public
figure, his (Brillantes) comments affecting Binays reputation is constitutionally protected speech.[45]
Brillante also urges the Court to reverse his convictions, reasoning that at most, what he may have committed is
political libel which should exempt him form criminal liability, considering that election campaigns can become
very heated and candidates from rival camps often make charges and countercharges which are offensive to the
name, honor and prestige of their opponents. He contends that statements made by a candidate against his
rivals, although derogatory, are for the purpose of convincing the electorate to prevent suspicious characters from
holding public office. In essence, he posits the view that political libel should be deemed constitutionally
protected speech.[46]
Brillante likewise argues that the multiple publication rule, i.e., that each publication constitutes one offense of
libel, should not have been applied to him, considering the factual background of the open letter and the
statements uttered by him during the press conference.[47]
Anent the issue of equal protection, Brillante contends that he should have been acquitted like his co-accused
Angel Gonong who wrote the news article in the Peoples Journalregarding the January 7, 1988 press conference
and Buan and Camino who were the editors of that publication.[48]
The Solicitor General filed a Comment on each of the petitions.
The Solicitor General insists that the one-year prescriptive period for libel should be reckoned from the date of
filing of the complaints with the office of the prosecutor as clarified by the Court in Olarte and Francisco and as
stated in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which applies to the complaints filed
against Brillante as of October 1988.[49]
On the issue of libel, the Solicitor General insists that Brillantes statements in the open letter clearly impute upon
Prudente and Binay a criminal conspiracy to assassinate Syjuco.[50] The Solicitor General also maintains that
contrary to Brillantes claims, the open letter cannot be considered privileged communication because it was
published without justifiable motives and it was circulated for the information of the general public instead of
addressing the letter solely to the authorities who had the power to curb the dangers alleged by Brillante in the
letter.[51]
The Solicitor General disagrees with Brillantes contention that his statements are constitutionally protected
because they are criticisms of official conduct and deal with public figures. According to the Solicitor General, the
record shows that Brillante did not have enough basis to pass off his accusations as true considering that he
admitted to relying on unnamed intelligence sources.[52]
It is also argued by the Solicitor General that Brillantes statements cannot be exempt from criminal liability on the
ground that such statements were political libel. Brillantes claim, the Solicitor General asserts, has no basis in
law or jurisprudence.[53]
With respect to the issue of equal protection, the Solicitor General avers that Brillante cannot be acquitted like his
co-accused publishers, editors and writers because their alleged participation in the commission of the libel are
different from Brillante who is the author of the libelous statements. The writers of the news reports were only
narrating what took place during the January 7, 1988 press conference, and wrote the news articles to inform the
public of Brillantes statements. In the case of the editors and publishers who published the open letter, they
indicated in their respective publications that the open letter was a paid advertisement. The publication of the
news reports in the newspapers was also done to inform the public of what transpired during the January 7, 1988
press conference.[54]
The Solicitor General further argues that the penalty imposed upon Brillante is not excessive but is in accordance
with law, which considers one publication of a libelous statement as a distinct offense from another publication of
the same statement.[55]
Thus, the Solicitor General prays that Brillantes petitions be denied.[56]
Brillante thereafter filed a Reply to each of the Solicitor Generals Comments. The replies reiterate Brillantes
arguments in his petitions.[57]
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) whether the offense of libel had already prescribed when
the Informations were filed with the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati; (2) whether Brillante is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of libel; (3) whether Brillante was denied the equal protection of the laws; and (4) whether the
penalty imposed upon him is excessive.
Save for the issue on the amount of moral damages, there is no merit in the petitions.
With respect to the issue of prescription, the fourth paragraph of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that the crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. In determining when the one-year
prescriptive period should be reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of the same code which sets forth
the rule on the computation of prescriptive periods of offenses:
Computation of prescription of offenses.The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The aforequoted provision expressly states that prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information. The meaning of the phrase shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information in Article 91 has been settled in the landmark case of People v. Olarte,[58] where the Court settled
divergent views as to the effect of filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary
investigation on the prescriptive period of the offense. The Court therein held that the filing of the complaint for
purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility. It explained
thus:
the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination
or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this
conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in
the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already
represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the
right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may
do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, thereby indicating that the
court in which the complaint or information is filed must have the power to convict or acquit the accused.
Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court
conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the
court should discharge the accused because no prima faciecase had been shown.[59]
Thereafter, the Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[60] clarified that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals
office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a crime:
As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a preliminary investigation, a proceeding in
the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:
To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal force, for the express overruling also of the doctrine in
People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or denuncia by the offended party with the City
Fiscal's Office which is required by law to conduct the preliminary investigation does not interrupt the period of
prescription. In chartered cities, criminal prosecution is generally initiated by the filing of the complaint or denuncia
with the city fiscal for preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals, besides being empowered like

municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of municipal judges with
respect to charges triable by Courts of First instance . . ..[61]
There is no conflict in the pronouncements of the Court in Olarte and Francisco as Brillante erroneously suggests.
Olarte laid down the doctrine that a complaint filed for purposes of preliminary investigation tolls the running of the
prescriptive period of a criminal offense. The criminal complaint for libel in that case was filed, for the purpose of
preliminary investigation, with the Justice of the Peace Court in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. Hence, in setting the
doctrine, the Court referred to the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court.[62] The question of whether the
doctrine laid down in Olarte also applies to criminal complaints filed with the prosecutors office was settled in
Francisco. Specifically, the Court in Francisco amplified the Olarte doctrine when it categorically ruled that the
filing of a complaint with the fiscals office suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in ruling that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed
when the informations against Brillante and his co-accused were filed in the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati.
Neither did the appellate court err in sustaining Brillantes conviction for libel.
Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence
of malice.[63]
There could be no dispute as to the existence of the first three elements of libel in the cases at bar.
An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to the latter the
commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or imaginary; or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.[64] Brillantes statements during the January 7, 1988 press conference
and in the open letter explicitly referred to reprehensible acts allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and their
associates, such as the use of goons to threaten Binays opponents in the election and the plotting of Syjucos
assassination.
The element of publication was likewise established. There is publication if the defamatory material is
communicated to a third person, i.e., a person other than the person to whom the defamatory statement
refers.[65] In the cases at bar, it was proven that Brillante uttered defamatory statements during the press
conference attended by some fifty journalists and caused the open letter to be published in several newspapers,
namely, News Today, Peoples Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Further, Brillante himself admitted that he named Binay, Prudente and their associates as the persons who
participated in the planning of the election-related terrorism and the assassination of Syjuco not only in his open
letter but also during the press conference.
Thus, the determination of Brillantes culpability for libel hinges on the question of whether his statements were
made with malice.
Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed; it implies an intention to do ulterior
and unjustifiable harm.[66] It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such
remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.[67]
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code states, as a general rule, that every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown.[68]
As an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation
qualifies as privileged communication.[69]
Privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged or conditionally privileged. The Court in Orfanel v.
People of the Philippines[70] differentiated absolutely privileged communication from conditionally privileged
communication in this manner:
A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author acted in bad
faith. This class includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their functions as such,
official communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties, and allegations or statements
made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as
well as the answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them, in the course of said
proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are
responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other hand, conditionally or
qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although containing defamatory imputations, would not be
actionable unless made with malice or bad faith.[71] (Emphasis supplied.)
Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those mentioned in, Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
1. A private communication made by a person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty;
and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.[72]
Brillante claims that he wrote the open letter and uttered the statement complained of during the January 7, 1988
press conference out of a social duty to disclose to all concerned the dangers to which he and his fellow
candidate Syjuco were exposed in view of the concerted actions of Binay and Prudente.[73] In effect, he argues
that his defamatory statements and utterances fall under Article 354, No. 1 and are in the nature of privileged
communication; hence, malice cannot be presumed but must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court is not convinced.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualifiedly privileged communication under Article
354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral,
or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his
own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior,
having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the
statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.[74]
With respect to the first requisite, the Court in U.S. v. Caete[75] clarified that the interest sought to be protected
by the person making the communication need not be his own, but may refer to an interest shared by the other
members of society.
It may therefore be argued that Brillantes statements, which according to him were made in order to protect
himself and Syjuco as Binays rivals in the 1988 elections, as well as to protect the electorate from possible acts
of terrorism by Binay, Prudente and their associates and from casting their votes for undeserving candidates,
satisfy the first requisite.
However, as the Solicitor General noted, Brillantes statements were based merely on unconfirmed intelligence
reports. His belief in such intelligence reports hardly justifies the publication of such serious imputations against
his political rivals. As a journalist and as a candidate for public office, Brillante should have known that it is
necessary to further verify the truth or at least the reliability of the intelligence reports before making them public.
His hasty publication thereof negates the existence of good faith and justifiable motives.
The pronouncement of the Court in U.S. v. Galeza[76] is enlightening:
Every communication is privileged which is made in good faith with a view to obtain redress for some injury
received or to prevent or punish some public abuse. The privilege should not be abused. If such communication
be made maliciously and without probable cause, the pretense under which it is made, instead of furnishing a
defense, will aggravate the case of the defendant. And a party will be taken to have acted maliciously if he
eagerly seizes on some slight and frivolous matter, and without any inquiry into the merits, without even satisfying
himself that the account of the matter that has reached him is correct, hastily concludes that a great public
scandal has been brought to light which calls for the immediate intervention of the people. (Citations
omitted.)[77]
It is, however, the absence of the second element of a privileged communication that unequivocally negates the
characterization of Brillantes statements as privileged communication. The law requires that for a defamatory
imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such statement must be communicated only
to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish
the protection sought by the author of the statement.
In the cases at bar, although the open letter was primarily addressed to then President Aquino, the
communication thereof was not limited to her alone. It was also published in several newspapers of general
circulation and was thus made known to the general public. Even if the interest sought to be protected belongs
not just to Brillante but to the public in general, certainly, the general public does not have the power to remedy
the alleged dangers sought to be prevented by Brillante in publishing the open letter or in uttering similar

statements during the January 7, 1988 press conference. Brillante employed the shotgun approach to
disseminate the information which essentially destroyed the reputations of the complainants. His lack of
selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication.
In Daez v. Court of Appeals,[78] Daez was charged with libel for publishing a letter which accused the Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan of corruption. The letter addressed to the Mayor was sent not only to him but also to the
Municipal Court, Municipal Council and Chief of Police of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Daez contended therein that he
was not guilty of libel because he was not motivated by malice or ill-will in publishing the letter, but rather, he did it
out of good intentions and a social duty to bring about reforms in the administration of the municipal government
of Meycauayan, Bulacan. The Court affirmed his conviction for libel and held:
The goodness of the intention is not always sufficient by itself to justify the publication of an injurious fact; thus
the goodness of the end is not a sufficient motive to warrant the employment of illicit means to obtain it. The
existence of justifiable motives is a question which has to be decided by taking into consideration not only the
intention of the author of the publication but all the other circumstances of each particular case. A
communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
However, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and
circulated among the public.As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct
on the part of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision over them. Such a
communication is qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on privilege, however,
imposes an additional requirement. Such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having
jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has some duty to perform or interest
in connection therewith. In the instant case, none of the persons to whom the letter was sent, was vested with the
power of supervision over the mayor or the authority to investigate the charges made against the latter. (Citations
omitted.)[79]
Thus, the Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the statements made by Brillante during the
press conference and in the open letter do not qualify as privileged communication.
Indeed, the purpose of affording protection to privileged communication is to permit all interested persons or
citizens with grievances to freely communicate, with immunity, to the persons who could furnish the protection
asked for. However, to shield such privilege from abuse, the law itself requires at all times that such petitions or
communications shall be made in good faith or with justifiable motives. If it is established that the communication
was made maliciously or to persons who could not furnish the protection sought, then the author thereof cannot
seek protection under the law.[80] As was explained by the Court in Caete:
The plainest principles of natural right and sound public policy require that the utmost possible freedom should be
accorded every citizen to complain to the supervising, removing and appointing authorities of the misconduct of
the public officials with whom he comes into contact, and like considerations make it equally proper that members
of a religious organization should enjoy equal freedom in bringing to the attention of the church authorities the
misbehavior of their spiritual leaders or of fellow-members. Manifestly, the right must be exercised in good faith,
and may not with impunity be made the occasion for the venting of private spite. It is subject to the limitation and
restriction that such complaints must be made to a functionary having authority to redress the evils complained of;
that they must be made in good faith and that they must not be actuated by malice.[81]
The Court in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui[82] clarified that the fact that a communication is privileged does not
mean that it is not actionable; the privileged character of the communication simply does away with the
presumption of malice, and the plaintiff has to prove the fact of malice in such case.
However, since the open letter and the statements uttered by Brillante during the January 7, 1988 press
conference are defamatory and do not qualify as conditionally privileged communication, malice is presumed and
need not be proven separately from the existence of the defamatory statement.[83]
Considering that all the elements of libel are present in the cases against Brillante, the Court finds that no
reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in affirming his convictions by the RTC-Manila and RTCMakati.
Neither does the Court find any basis in law to uphold Brillantes proposition that his statements made during the
January 7, 1988 press conference and those in his open letter constitute political libel and should thus be
exempt from liability. Unfounded and malicious statements made by one against another in the course of an
election campaign, or by reason of differences in political views are not per se constitutionally protected speech.
Our laws on defamation[84] provide for sanctions against unjustified and malicious injury to a persons reputation
and honor. Although wider latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or
relevant to their performance of official duties,[85] or against public figures in relation to matters of public interest
involving them,[86] such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally
protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers performance of his
duties, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.
With respect to the third issue, the Court agrees with the appellate court that Brillantes right to equal protection of
the laws was not violated when he was convicted of libel while his co-accused were acquitted.
The equal protection clause is not absolute; rather, it permits of reasonable classification. If the classification is
characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated differently from another.[87] It is
sufficient that the law operates equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and
the liabilities imposed.[88]
As mentioned earlier, the cases against some of some of Brillantes co-accused were dismissed during the
pendency of the cases before the trial courts.[89] Still, some of his co-accused remained at large,[90] leaving the
trial courts with no option but to archive the case as against them. Brillantes other co-accused were acquitted
since, unlike Brillante, their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.[91]
The foregoing clearly shows that Brillante was in a situation different from his co-accused. The prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt his liability for libel, as the author of the open letter and the source of the
defamatory statements uttered against Binay, et al. during the January 7, 1988 press conference.
As such, his conviction for libel was not violative of the equal protection clause.
The Court likewise finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the penalties imposed upon him
by the trial courts of Manila and Makati.
The penalty for libel by means of writing or similar means is prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by
the offended party.[92] It is likewise settled that a single defamatory statement, if published several times, gives
rise to as many offenses as there are publications. This is the multiple publication rule which is followed in our
jurisdiction, as explained in Soriano v. Intermediate Appellate Court:[93]
We follow the "multiple publication" rule in the Philippines. Thus, in the cases of Montinola D. Montalvo (34 Phil.
662, [1916]) and United States v. Sotto (36 Phil. 389 [1917]), this Court ruled that each and every publication of
the same libel constitutes a distinct offense. Stated more succinctly for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under
Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, every time the same written matter is communicated such
communication is considered a distinct and separate publication of the libel.
We explained this as follows:
"The common law as to causes of action for tort arising out of a single publication was to the effect that each
communication of a written or printed matter was a distinct and separate publication of a libel contained therein,
giving rise to a separate cause of action. This rule ('multiple publication' rule) is still followed in several American
jurisdictions, and seems to be favored by the American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions have adopted the 'single
publication' rule which originated in New York, under which any single integrated publication, such as one edition
of a newspaper, book, or magazine, or one broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one cause of action,
regardless of the number of times it is exposed to different people. . .(50 Am. Jur. 2d 659 cited in Time, Inc. v.
Reyes)" (39 SCRA 301, 313 [1971]).[94]
There is therefore no legal basis for Brillantes claim that the penalties imposed upon him are excessive.
The Court however agrees with Brillante that the awards of moral damages in the two cases to private
complainants Binay, Prudente and Baloloy are excessive considering the circumstances surrounding the making
and the publication of the defamatory statements. Accordingly, the award of moral damages in favor of private
complainant Prudente is reduced to a total of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in Criminal Cases
No. 89-69614, 89-69615, 89-69616 and 89-69617; and the award of moral damages to private complainant Binay
is reduced to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in Criminal Cases No. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412
and 89-721. The award of moral damages to private complainant Baloloy in Criminal Case No. 88-3060 is
likewise reduced to Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions are GRANTED in part.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14475 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
award of moral damages to private complainant Dr. Nemesio Prudente in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614, 8969615, 89-69616 is reduced to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 15174 is likewise AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages to private complainants Atty. Jejomar Binay and Francisco Baloloy is reduced to Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in Criminal Cases No. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412 and 89-721, and Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) in Criminal Case No. 88-3060, respectively.
SO ORDERED.

People V Pacana 345 scra 72

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 97472-73
November 20, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE PACAA y SENARLO, BERNARDO PACAA, VIRGILIO PACAA and VICTORIANO
PACAA,accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For the death and near death of Raul Leyson and Felizardo del Solo, respectively, accused-appellants were
charged with murder and frustrated murder, based on the following facts:
At around 5:30 p.m. on January 28, 1979, after playing basketball, Edwin Sormillon passed by a store along V.
Rama Avenue, Cebu City. Accused-appellant Vicente Pacaa was at the store drinking with friends. He invited
Edwin for a drink but the latter begged off as he had to go home to take a bath. When he got home, Edwin was
told by his sister that Vicente maligned her and challenged their father to a fight. Edwin immediately went out to
talk to Vicente. Their confrontation led to a fistfight.
Later, a friend of Edwin, Felizardo del Solo, accompanied by his cousin, Raul Leyson, tried to talk to Vicente to
settle his dispute with Edwin. Vicente brought Felizardo and Raul upstairs to accused-appellant Victoriano
Pacaas house. At the balcony, Felizardo was met by Victoriano, Virgilio and Bernardo Pacaa. Felizardo asked
Vicente what was the cause of his quarrel with Edwin. Vicente suddenly hit Felizardo in the face. Felizardo hit him
back. While the two were fighting, Bernardo stabbed Felizardo but he was able to parry it, and was injured on the
right wrist. Bernardo again tried to stab Felizardo, this time hitting him on the chest. Meanwhile, Raul tried to stop
the fight and was struck at the back of the neck with a lead pipe by Victoriano. This caused Raul to stagger
forward. Bernardo, Vicente and Virgilio ganged up on him and stabbed him. He then fell backwards, and
Victoriano also stabbed him at the back. Suddenly, the lights went off. Felizardo slowly went downstairs and met
Edwin Sormillon at the yard. Together, they boarded a jeepney to the Cebu City Medical Center. He was later
transferred to another hospital where he was treated for several days and later released.
Raul was rushed to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
On September 10, 1979, accused-appellant Vicente was charged with homicide for the killing of Raul Leyson. The
Information was later amended, wherein the three other accused-appellants were included and the crime charged
was elevated to murder. The Amended Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. CU-4170, reads:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 1979, at about 6:30 oclock in the afternoon in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused armed with knives, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Raul
Leyson by stabbing said Raul Leyson hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him the
following injuries: x x x and as a consequence of which said Raul Leyson died a few hours later.
That the crime was committed with the attendance of the aggravating circumstances of the accused taking
advantage of superior strength the deceased unarmed at the time.1
Another Information was filed on the same date against the four accused-appellants for the frustrated murder of
Felizardo Del Solo. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. CU-4908, reads:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 1979, at about 6:30 oclock in the afternoon in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused armed with knives, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly attack, assault and use personal violence upon one
Felizardo del Solo, by stabbing him on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries:
x x x which injuries under ordinary circumstances would cause the death of the victim, thus performing all the acts
of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but which, nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the herein accused, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Felizardo del Solo, which prevented his death.2
Accused-appellant Vicente appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty.1wphi1 The other accused had
not yet been apprehended. Invoking his right to speedy trial, Vicente moved for a separate trial, which the trial
court granted. Later, accused-appellants Bernardo and Virgilio were arrested. They pleaded not guilty at their
arraignment. Victoriano posted bail and was granted provisional liberty.3 He, too, pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, rendered judgment as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the accused VICENTE PACAA, BERNARDO PACAA,
VICTORIANO PACAA AND VIRGILIO PACAA are all found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER and hereby sentences each to a penalty of imprisonment of
RECLUSION PERPETUA for the murder and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Raul Leyson, the
sum of P30,000.00. In the case of the Frustrated Murder, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of
the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum
and 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, Felizardo del Solo the
sum of P10,000.00 in the form of damages.
No pronouncement as to costs."4
All the accused appealed.
During the pendency of their appeal, appellants Vicente, Bernardo and Virgilio, who are confined at the National
Bilibid Prison, filed a motion to withdraw their appeal. In a Resolution dated August 30, 1999, the Court, after
confirming the voluntariness of their withdrawal of appeal, granted the motion insofar as Vicente and Virgilio were
concerned.5 Accused-appellant Bernardo, on the other hand, was required to confirm the voluntariness of his
motion to withdraw appeal. However, a return from the Bureau of Corrections shows that he died on April 5,
1999.6
The death of an accused extinguishes his criminal liability even if his death should occur during the pendency of
his appeal.7 Accused-appellant Bernardos death not only extinguished his criminal liability concerning the
personal penalties but also whatever pecuniary penalties have been imposed on him, considering that he died
before final judgment, as provided in Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. --- Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx
xxx
xxx
Both Bernardos civil and criminal liability were extinguished by his death.8
Where a person is charged with homicide, for instance, the civil liability for indemnity is based solely on the finding
of guilt. If he is acquitted because of self-defense, the heirs of the deceased have no right to indemnity. Should
the offender die before final judgment, their right to indemnity is likewise extinguished as there is no basis for the
civil liability. Civil liability exists only when the accused is convicted by final judgment.9
Therefore, the appeal of accused-appellant Bernardo Pacaa should be dismissed. Only the appeal of Victoriano
Pacaa is left for adjudication.
At the outset, the Court has noted that this case contains no record of Victoriano Pacaas commitment in the
National Penitentiary. It appears that said accused-appellant is not confined therein.10 The records reveal that
accused-appellant Victoriano posted bail before the trial court. However, it does not appear that after his and his
co-appellants conviction, his bail was cancelled. The Rules prevailing at the time of appellants conviction in 1990
provides that, "an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong."11 In consonance therewith, this
Court issued Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992, which explicitly states:
xxx
xxx
xxx
3) When an accused charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after
trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be
placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.

As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal before this Court
where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from notice to the court of
origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of
the bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine
National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his bond shall be
forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be
dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his
bail. (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should have ordered the commitment of accused-appellant Victoriano to the New Bilibid Prisons
during the pendency of his appeal.
The appeal is based on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY STATING IN THE ASSAILED DECISION/JUDGMENT THAT
"TAKING THE ENTIRE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY, THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION, AND SO HOLDS,
THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE FOUR ACCUSED IN THE KILLING OF RAUL LEYSON AND
THE INFLICTING OF THE SERIOUS INJURIES SUFFERED BY FELIZARDO DEL SOLO," CONSIDERING
THAT THERE IS ABUNDANCE OF PROOF ON RECORD TO THE CONTRARY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ALL THE FOUR (4) ACCUSED GUILTY "BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT" OF THE CRIME OF "MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER," AND IN IMPOSING ON ALL OF THEM
THE PENALTIES AND INDEMNITIES STATED IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED
JUDGMENT/DECISION OF OCTOBER 26, 1990.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SAYING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF ONE ANTONINA HERASMEO FOR THE
DEFENSE (SHE BEING THE SISTER OF BIENVENIDA, WIFE OF ACCUSED VICTORIANO PACAA),
"SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH SOME MISGIVING AS SHE IS AN INTERESTED WITNESS OUT TO PROTECT
HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW VICTORIANO," CONSIDERING THAT FELIZARDO DEL SOLO IS AN ADMITTED
"FIRST COUSIN" OF RAUL LEYSON AND THAT THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ALSO TAKEN INTO
CONSIDERATION THAT IT SHOULD HAVE ALSO TAKEN CAUTION OF HIS TESTIMONY DUE TO DIRECT
BLOOD RELATIONSHIP AS DISTINGUISHED FROM AFFINITY ONLY IN THE CASE OF ANTONINA
HERASMEO.
Victoriano Pacaas conviction must stand. The killing of a person with the attendant qualifying circumstances,
such as treachery, constitutes murder in its consummated stage. In cases where the victim did not die for causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator, the murder is considered frustrated. The gravamen of the two charges
herein murder and frustrated murder were proven against the remaining appellant Victoriano. He threw the
first blow on the deceased Raul by striking the latter at the back of the neck with a lead pipe, without warning.
Raul staggered forward and was rendered defenseless. In that position, he became vulnerable to the other three
accused-appellants, who proceeded to stab him. As found by the medico-legal officer, Raul sustained fatal
wounds on the right chest and the left part of his back. The other wounds sustained by Raul though not fatal
contributed to the hemorrhage that caused his death.12 With respect to Felizardo, the penetrating stab wound on
the chest was fatal and could have caused his death had it not been for the timely medical attention.13
The suddenness and severity of the attack on Raul and Felizardo constitute treachery.14 Moreover, the
congruence of these acts show that appellants acted in conspiracy. Proof of previous agreement to commit the
crime is not essential, it being sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective.15Due to conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.16
Against the strong evidence of the prosecution, appellants could only offer denial and alibi. Settled is the rule,
however, that such defenses which are inherently weak in nature cannot be given credence in the light of positive
identification,17 which in this case was made by no less than one of the surviving victims, Felizardo:
Q When did you first when I come to know that Victoriano had a pipe with him?
A After I was already hit was leaning I saw Victoriano had a pipe because the distance was very near.
Q And at that very moment that was the time Victoriano hit Raul at his neck?
A Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And Virgilio and Bernardo were directly in front of you?
A Yes.
Q And this is only about 2 meters by 2 meters?
A Yes, it was only small.
Q Is it not a fact that you were most concerned of your safety?
A Yes, I kept on pressing my chest.
Q And since, according to you, it was Bernardo who stabbed you three times, your attention was more focused on
Bernardo that Bernardo might stab you again?
A When Bernardo stabbed me I parried and I was wounded on my wrist and so Bernardo made another thrust
and I was hit on my chest. That was the time when I was able to move back and faced Raul and that was the time
when Victoriano hit Raul with a pipe.
Q Did you actually see Victoriano or you just saw Raul just leaning forward?
A Yes, I saw Victoriano hit Raul and Raul seemed to fall so I went down.18 (Italics supplied).
If the accused was positively identified by the victim himself who harbored no ill motive against the former, the
defense of alibi must fail.19 No ill motive can be attributed to the prosecution witnesses. In any event, proof of
motive is not indispensable for conviction when there is positive identification.20 Motive assumes significance
only when there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime might be.21 Bare denial is a negative
declaration, which deserves no consideration and cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of the victim,
which is corroborated by evidence.22 It cannot survive positive identification by the victim. Affirmative testimony is
far stronger than a negative one, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.23 Denial is
inherently weak, can easily be fabricated and, to warrant acquittal, must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. The trial court has a valuable advantage of observing the witness deportment and manner of testifying,
their "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant
or full realization of an oath," all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and
sincerity.24
At the time of the commission of these crimes in 1979, murder carried a penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death; for frustrated murder, the penalty one degree lower should be imposed, which is
prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium.25 In such complex penalty comprising of three distinct
penalties, each of these penalties shall form a period in accordance with Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code.
There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period pursuant to Article 64(1), which in this case is reclusion perpetua. The Indeterminate Sentence
Law is not applicable when the penalty actually imposed is reclusion perpetua.26
The trial court erred in imposing the penalty for frustrated murder.1wphi1 There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, the medium period of the penalty shall be imposed, namely, reclusion temporal
minimum. The maximum term of seventeen years fixed by the trial court is within reclusion temporal medium.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty should be that which, "in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed;" and the minimum term which shall be "within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." Thus, the indeterminate penalty imposed
on accused-appellant for frustrated murder should be from six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum to
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as
the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.27 Hence the reduction of the
indeterminate penalty for the frustrated murder case shall affect not only the remaining appellant but also the
others who withdrew their appeal.
With respect to the civil liability, the trial court held accused-appellants solidarily liable for civil indemnity of
P30,000.00 to the heirs of Raul Leyson, and P10,000.00, to Felizardo del Solo. The civil indemnity for the
deceased victim should be increased to P50,000.00 in line with latest jurisprudence.28 As for the civil indemnity in
the frustrated murder case, the same is increased to P30,000.00. Both awards are given without need of proof
other than the commission of the crime and the culprits liability therefor. Although, the higher indemnities granted
herein appears not favorable to those who withdrew their appeal, they shall all be held solidarily liable for the
higher amounts since they are not in the form of penalty. The medical and hospital expenses in the amount of
P4,000.00 incurred by Felizardo del Solo was duly established by evidence on record. However, lost earnings
cannot be awarded for lack of factual basis.

WHEREFORE, the trial courts decision convicting accused-appellant Victoriano Pacaa is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS. Accused Victoriano Pacaa, Vicente Pacaa and Virgilio Pacaa are found guilty of
the murder of Raul Leyson in Criminal Case No. CV-4170, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Likewise, said accused are found guilty of the frustrated murder of Felizardo del Solo in Criminal Case
No. CV-4908, and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They are also ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay the heirs of Raul Leyson, civil indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), and
to pay Felizardo del Solo civil indemnity in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00), and actual damages
in the amount of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 2-92, let a Warrant of Arrest be issued against Victoriano Pacaa. His bail
is ordered FORFEITED.
The appeal with respect to the deceased appellant Bernardo Pacaa is DISMISSED, his liabilities having been
extinguished by his death.
SO ORDERED.
People V Pacificaodor ( conspiracy )
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Accused S/Sgt. Domingo Dalmacio, C2C Reynaldo Alipala, PFC Vicente Vegafria, PCpl. Hector Fullon and Pat.
Lorenzo Mingote, appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, San Jose, Antique finding
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of multiple murder committed against Clemente Samulde, Rhium Sanchez,
Plaridel Sanchez IV, Aldrick Sanchez, Mamerto Zaldivar, Jr., Armelito Tamboong and Abner Varon and frustrated
murder committed against Luna Sanchez, and sentencing each to seven (7)reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of the seven (7) victims jointly and solidarily in the amounts of P350,000.00, P37,000.00,[2]
P20,000.00,[3] P39,000.00,[4] P35,000.00,[5]P22,510.00,[6] and P70,000.00,[7] and to an indeterminate prison
term of nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify, jointly and severally the
victim Luna Sanchez in the amount of P60,000.00 for medical and hospitalization costs.[8]
On April 16, 1986, senior state prosecutor Tirso C. Velasco filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antique, San Jose,
Branch 11 an amended information for multiple murder and frustrated murder against Arturo F. Pacificador, S/Sgt.
Domingo Dalmacio PC, Sgt. Enrico Cabaero PC, C2C Reynaldo Aliupala PC, Pfc Vicente Vegafria PA, Cpl.
Hector Fullon INP, and Pat. Lorenzo Mingote INP, which reads:
That on or about May 13, 1984 in the evening, at the Municipality of Sibalom, Province of Antique, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Assemblyman ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, his
military security men: S/SGT. DOMINGO DALMACIO PC, SGT. ENRICO CABAERO PC, C2C REYNALDO
ALIPALA PC, PFC VICENTE VEGAFRIA PA, CPL. HECTOR FULLON INP and PAT LORENZO MINGOTE INP,
whose military jurisdiction over their case had been waived by the President of the Philippines pursuant to P. D.
1952 in favor of the civil court, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, treachery, and evident premeditation, attack, assault and
shoot Rhium Sanchez, Plaridel Sanchez IV, Aldrick Sanchez, Mamerto Zaldivar, Jr., Clemente Samulde, Abner
Varon and Pat. Armelito Tamboong with the use of armalite rifles and explosives thus inflicting gunshot wounds
on vital parts of their bodies which caused their death as a consequence, and the wounding of Luna Sanchez on
vital parts of his body which ordinarily would cause his death thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
cause independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Luna Sanchez which
prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW with aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by a band, with evident premeditation or
treachery, superior strength and by means of motor vehicle.
In 1986, accused Arturo F. Pacificador fled and turned fugitive from justice.
On April 21, 1986, accused Domingo Dalmacio, Enrico Cabaero, Reynaldo Alipala, Vicente Vegafria, Hector
Fullon and Lorenzo Mingote, assisted by their counsels Atty. Avelino T. Javellana, Atty. Anecito J. Baluyot, and
Atty. Francisco Cabaluna Jr., pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The other accused Arturo F. Pacificador was
not arraigned because he was at large. Thereafter, trial ensued.
May 14, 1984 was the day set for election of members of the Batasang Pambansa. Arturo F. Pacificador,
incumbent Assemblyman representing the lone district of Antique, was running for reelection under the banner of
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). Pacificadors reelection bid was threatened by the all-out support given by
Antique Governor Enrique Zaldivar to Pacificadors opponent, Evelio Javier, a young charismatic leader, who was
a candidate for assemblyman of the Nationalista Party, Roy Wing.[10]
On May 13, 1987, the NP Chairman of Antique, Col. Rhium Sanchez, and his companions, namely: Luna
Sanchez, his son Aidrick Sanchez, Plaridel Sanchez, his nephew Mamerto Zaldivar, his cousin Clemente
Samulde, Armelito Tamboong and Abner Varon were busy campaigning for candidate Javier in every town of
Antique which they passed coming from the town of Pandan en route to San Jose, Antique. They rode on
Governor Zaldivars Toyota tamaraw jeep.[11]
While passing Lindero, Lawauan, Antique, Luna Sanchez noticed the pick-up vehicle of Pacificador, loaded with
armed men. It overtook their vehicle. Upon reaching Brgy. Guisijan, Luna saw the same pick-up by the roadside.
When they passed by, one of the armed men on board the pick-up pointed his rifle at them.[12] Upon reaching
Bugasong, Antique, Pacificadors pick-up overtook their vehicle once again. As the pick-up was overtaking them,
Luna saw a person in the front seat of the vehicle using a two-way radio.[13]Thereafter, they proceeded to San
Jose, Antique.
While halfway traversing Pangpang Bridge, in Sibalom, Antique, Luna saw a vehicle coming from the opposite
direction enter the south end of the bridge. Rhium Sanchez, who was then seated beside Luna in the front seat of
the Tamaraw, instructed Aidrick Sanchez who was driving to stop and signal the oncoming vehicle not to proceed.
The oncoming vehicle moved back from the bridge, but Lunas vehicle had to stop as three (3) vehicles parked in
the middle of the road past the bridge blocked the road. Shortly, two (2) armed men in fatigue uniform approached
their vehicle. One of the men shouted inspection. One proceeded to the left side of the Tamaraw jeep; the other
armed men went to the right side. The two (2) armed men peeped inside the Tamaraw jeep after which they
returned to their respective vehicle. Luna identified the two men in fatigue uniform as accused Vegafria and
Alipala.[14]
As soon as Vegafria and Alipala reached their vehicle, successive rounds of gunfire coming from both sides of the
road rained on the Tamaraw jeep, which lasted for about ten (10) minutes. Two (2) big explosions were also
heard. When the firing stopped, two to three men approached the Tamaraw jeep. Luna, who was hit in the right
arm kept quiet and still. He heard three (3) men approach their vehicle, one of whom uttered Patay silang
lahat.[15] Thereafter, the men returned to their vehicle and sped away onboard their vehicles headed towards
San Jose, Antique.[16]
After the assailants had left, Luna Sanchez found his son, Aldrick still alive but seriously wounded. Rhium, who
was seated at the front between him and Aldrick, was dead. His companions who were seated at the back of the
Tamaraw jeep were all dead. He told Aldrick to get out of the vehicle and flee, but the latter told his father that his
legs were badly hit. Nonetheless, Aldrick slid out of the vehicle while Luna went out through the window of the
Tamaraw jeep. Luna stood by the road. He shouted for his companions at the back of the jeep but no one
answered. He crossed to the other side of the vehicle where Aldrick was lying. He told his son that they must go
to a safer place. Aldrick answered that he could not walk. After taking a few steps, Luna fell to the ground. He
tried in vain to stand up but failed. He was too weak. He crawled to where his son was lying under a kapok tree.
There they waited for about thirty (30) minutes.[17]
Shortly, a firetruck, with its flashing lights, arrived, followed by a Balaraw jeep. The headlights of the firetruck
illuminated the place. Two (2) men with flashlights scanned the vicinity, one of whom said dalawa dito patay (two
persons here dead).[18] One of them came near where they -lay. Luna called for help. The man introduced
himself as a policeman from Sibalom and told him not to be afraid. The man tried to assist him, but out of
nowhere, a shot suddenly rang out. The man released his hold on Luna and ran towards the road and left.[19]
Meanwhile, Aldrick told his father to escape; otherwise, both of them would die. Luna at first did not agree, but left
after Aldrick insisted that he should go. Luna had just moved about ten (10) meters from his son when he heard
bursts of gunfire. He heard his son groan signaling that the latter was mortally hit and a voice saying, Dalawa yan
kanina. Again, shots were fired in his direction but he was not hit. The men tied Aldrick and dragged him towards
the road.[20]
The men on board the fire truck saw Luna when searchlights were beamed on the spot where he laid. Someone
shouted in tagalog, may isa dyan patay (there is someone there dead). One of the men went down to get him,
tied his right ankle and dragged him towards the road. Luna managed to tell the man that he was still alive and
asked that he be brought to a hospital. Another man wearing a fatigue uniform advised the men not to harm him.
Thereafter, Luna was brought to Angel Salazar Memorial General Hospital for medical attention. It was about 2:00

in the morning when Luna was brought to the hospital. The ambush took place between 11:00 and 12:00
midnight.[21]
At about 10:00 in the evening of May 13, 1984, while prosecution witness Rodelo Aleries, a resident of Alangan,
Sibalom, Antique, was on duty as watchman of the Hanaber Construction Firm stationed at the southern end
portion of the Pangpang Bridge, Sibalom Antique, from a distance of twenty (20) meters, he saw three (3)
vehicles[22] parked at the southern end portion of the single-lane Pangpang Bridge. Rodelo recognized the three
(3) vehicles as the vehicles of Arturo Pacificador, which he used whenever he went on his political campaigns.[23]
About twelve persons, some of who were familiar to him alighted from the vehicles.[24] As the moon was bright
and the light coming from the compound of Hanaber Construction Firm further illuminated the place,[25] he
recognized S/Sgt. Domingo Dalmacio, Sgt. Enrico Cabaero, Pat. Lorenzo Mingote, C2C Reynaldo Alipala, Pfc.
Vicente Vegafria and Cpl. Hector Fullon. He was able to identify them because they were the security men of
Assemblyman Arturo F. Pacificador during political meetings. They were carrying armalite rifles. Thereafter, they
went towards the canal and took cover.[26]
Minutes later, Rodelo saw the headlights of a vehicle coming from the other side of the bridge. When the vehicle
was midway the bridge, the white Nissan vehicle, one of the vehicles parked at the southern end drove and
entered the single-lane bridge. But it did not proceed; instead, it moved backed and stopped at about ten (10)
meters from the foot of the bridge. Meanwhile, the vehicle coming from the northern end of the bridge, moved
forward. By this time, the distance between the two (2) vehicles was approximately five (5)meters.[27]
Suddenly, gunshots rained from the nearby canal, directed against the vehicle which came from the northern part
of the bridge which lasted for about ten (10) minutes. While lying prone Rodelo heard the engine of the vehicles
moved towards the direction of San Jose, Antique. Seized with fear, Rodelo went home.[28] The following
morning, Rodelo reported the incident to his office. When the military conducted an investigation at the scene
where the shooting took place, empty gun shells were found near the canal.[29]
Prosecution witness Efren Rangos, whose house was about forty (40) meters from the bridge of Sibalom, Antique
testified that at about 10 oclock in the evening of May 13, 1984, he was on his way home after fishing in the river
along Pangpang Bridge, Sibalom, Antique. He took the footpath between Palmares Compound and the national
highway. Upon reaching the southern end of Pangpang Bridge, Efren saw two (2) jeeps parked on both sides of
the highway. There, Efren met and greeted Assemblyman Arturo F. Pacificador. Pacificador told him, Boy or To,
whatever you see and whatever you know, just keep silent (hipos lang ikaw).[30] Assemblyman Pacificador had
a two-way radio handset and an armalite rifle slung on his shoulder. The men inside the jeeps were carrying rifles
while other armed men positioned themselves by the roadside. Thereafter, Efren went home and took supper.[31]
After taking his supper, Efren went out. Along the way, he saw a vehicle coming from the north pass the bridge.
At the same time, Efren saw a jeep traveling from the opposite direction towards the bridge. The jeep coming from
the south stopped and moved back. The vehicle coming from the north moved on. Momentarily, Efren heard
bursts of gunfire coming from the right shoulder of the road facing the municipality of San Jose, Antique. He was
about 80 meters away. He observed that the gunshots were all directed against the vehicle that came from the
north. No gunshots came from the vehicle that came from the north.[32] The firing lasted for about ten (10)
minutes. Thereafter, the three vehicles left and headed towards San Jose, Antique.[33] Efren recognized the
three (3) vehicles as the same vehicles which Arturo F. Pacificador used in during his election campaign.[
The trial court found the testimonies of prosecution witnesses clear and profuse with details, heir combined
narration showed how the accused planned and perpetrated the ambush against the group of Luna Sanchez in
the evening of May 13, 1984 at Pangpang Bridge, Sibalom, Antique causing the death of seven (7) people from
the group of Luna Sanchez, and two (2) from the group of the accused. The prosecution was able to substantiate
and prove that it was the group of the accused who staged the ambush and started the shooting at Pangpang
Bridge.
On May 17, 1996, accused Hector Fullon, Lorenzo Mingote, Reynaldo Alipala, Vicente Vegafria and Domingo
Dalmacio filed a joint notice of appeal.[59] The case against accused Arturo F. Pacificador was tried separately.
At the time of the promulgation of the decision on March 7, 1996, accused Enrico Cabaero was dead. He died
while in detention in San Jose, Antique.[60] Both his criminal and civil liability arising from the crime were
extinguished by reason of his death.[61]
On March 6, 2000, accused-appellants filed their brief. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in
ruling that: (1) murder has been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution; (2) sufficient evidence
existed to establish conspiracy; (3) the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were
present. They reiterated that the group of Luna Sanchez was the first to fire against them and they merely fired
back as an act of retaliation and in self-defense. Hence, they claim that it was erroneous for the trial court to find
all of them guilty of multiple murder and frustrated murder and sentencing them accordingly.[62]
Accused-appellants anchor their defense on the theory that the group of the victims staged the ambush, and that
they merely retaliated and fired back as an act of self-defense. In support of such theory, they presented evidence
that all the deceased on the side of the prosecution were found positive for nitrates indicating that they fired guns,
some of which are armalite rifles, others revolvers or pistols.
We find the submission untenable in light of the evidence extant on the record.
Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Having invoked self-defense as a justifying circumstance, however, accused-appellants are deemed to have
admitted having killed the victims, and the burden of evidence is shifted on them to establish and prove their
claim. To escape liability, they must show the concurrent presence of all the elements of self-defense, namely: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[63]
Accused-appellants theory was demolished by prosecutions evidence clearly showing that it was the group of
accused-appellants that ambushed the group of Luna Sanchez at the south end portion of the single-lane
Pangpang Bridge. Rodelo Aleries and Efren Rangos, both of whom had no reason to testify falsely against
accused-appellants, categorically and positively stated in court that accused-appellants positioned themselves at
the southern portion of the bridge, deployed themselves along the canal where they took cover, and waited for the
arrival of the vehicle ridden by the victims. Except for the lone survivor of the attack, victim Luna Sanchez, all the
other passengers died on the spot due to multiple gunshot wounds. Based on the number of bullet holes that
pierced the Ford Tamaraw ridden by victims on the eve of May 13, 1984, which amounts to around 217 bullet
holes,[64] it was highly improbable that the attack could have been initiated by the group of the victims, especially
in light of the fact that the white Nissan vehicle used by accused-appellants merely had about 32 bullet holes.[65]
This materially jibes with the way prosecution witnesses Rodelo Aleries and Efren Hangos described what
happened on the night of the crimethat the group led by accused-appellants rained bullets on the Ford
Tamaraw ridden by the victims.
Contrary to accused-appellants claim, only three (3) of the victims were armed with armalite rifles, namely:
Clemente Samulde, Pat. Armelito Tamboong and Mamerto Zaldivar, Jr. Clemente and Armelito were armed
because they were policemen of Pandan, Antique. The fact that some of the victims were found positive for
nitrates does not conclusively show that they fired a gun. It is well settled in forensic evidence that nitrates are
also found in substances other than gunpowder.[66] We noted that scientific experts concur in the view that the
result of a paraffin test is not conclusive. While it can establish the presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it
does not always indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of firearm. The
person tested may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction
for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as
peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since
these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco. The presence of nitrates, therefore,
should be taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that the person tested has fired a
gun.[67]
Accused-appellant further questioned the trial courts finding that the multiple killing was attended by the
aggravating circumstances of conspiracy, treachery and evident premeditation.
Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused,
before, during, and after the commission of the crime, which, if all taken together, would reasonably be strong
enough to show a community of criminal design.[68]
Prosecution witness Luna Sanchez, was present at the scene of the crime, he being one of the victims. He stated
that during the election campaign trails on May 13, 1984, the group of Pacificador, escorted by the accusedappellants overtook their Ford Tamaraw vehicle several times, and the latter pointed their guns against them,
making it very apparent that accused-appellants were tailing the group of Luna Sanchez. And ultimately, accusedappellants perpetrated their unlawful design against the group of Luna Sanchez when they strategically positioned
themselves at the southern end of the single-lane Pangpang Bridge in Sibalom, Antique, parked their vehicle near
the foot of the bridge making sure that the group of Luna Sanchez would not be able pass through and took cover
in the nearby canal and waited for the arrival of their prey. The simultaneous acts of leaving, waiting for their
victims to come out, tailing and firing at them continuously at close range, and escaping from the crime scene
clearly establish a conspiracy among the malefactors.[69]

Hence, the trial court did not err when it ruled that conspiracy exists. Where the acts of the accused collectively
and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.[70]
With regard to the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, it is a basic precept that treachery must
be proven as indubitably as the killing itself and it cannot be deduced from mere presumption or sheer
speculation.[71]
The manner by which accused-appellants positioned themselves prior to the ambush demonstrated treachery.
Not only were they armed with high-powered guns and greater in number than the group of Luna Sanchez; they
took advantage of the stillness of the night and took cover at the nearby canal where they could not be seen,
ensuring their own safety in case the group of Luna Sanchez acted in retaliation and fired back. Under Article 14,
paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specifically to
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.[72] The
treacherous manner by which accused-appellants perpetrated the crime was shown not only by the sudden and
unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victims but also by the deliberate manner in which the attack was
perpetrated.[73]
Furthermore, the trial court correctly ruled that the attack against the group of Luna Sanchez was evidently
premeditated. From the evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellants knew beforehand the victims activities
during the day .of May 13, 1984, such that on several occasion that day, accused-appellants seemed to be tailing
the vehicle of the victims, at times overtaking them. At one instance, one of the men on board the accusedappellants vehicle pointed an armalite rifle in a threatening manner against the victims. The manner the victims
were attacked at about 11:00 in the evening of the same day was evidently well planned and coordinated. Despite
the lapse of several hours from the time accused-appellants became aware of the victims presence until the latter
passed through the single-laned bridge, accused-appellants did not abandon their resolve to carry out their
unlawful design. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceeded by
cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive
at a calm judgment.[74]
As regards the claim that the testimony of prosecution witness Luna Sanchez was replete with inconsistencies
and contradictions, hence should not be believed, we rule that minor inconsistencies, far from detracting from the
veracity of the testimony, enhance the credibility of the witness, for they remove any suspicion that his testimony
was contrived or rehearsed.[75] Moreover, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of testimony are
generally not disturbed on appeal since significant focus is held to lie on the deportment of, as well as the
peculiar manner in which the declaration is made by the witness in open court.[76]
Lastly, accused-appellants question the imposition against them of multiple murder and frustrated murder
considering that only one information has been filed. Invoking Article 48 of the Revised Penal, accused appellants
claim that they should have been sentenced to suffer only one penalty for the graver offense, the same to be
imposed in its maximum period.
This position is manifestly mistaken because of the inapplicability of Article 48, Revised Penal Code. As the
multiple murder and frustrated murder resulted from the firing of several shots against the eight (8) victims, the
crimes are not complex.[77] The injuries sustained by the victims were the consequences of volleys of
gunshots.[78]
The conclusion is inescapable here, that each act of murder and frustrated murder should have been charged in
separate informations because they are not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellants
may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging several separate
offenses in one information, to wit: (1) seven (7) separate acts of murder; and (2) frustrated murder. This defect
was deemed waived by their failure to raise it in a motion to quash before they pleaded to the information.[79]
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many
offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.[80] Furthermore, Section 1,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states that the accused may move to quash the information at any time before
entering his plea.
Accused-appellants did not, within the prescribed period, file such motion on the ground of duplicity. They are
deemed to have waived the defect in the information. It is axiomatic that when the accused fails, before
arraignment, to move for the quashal of such information and goes to trial thereunder, he thereby waives the
objection, and may be found guilty of as many offenses as those charged in the information and proved during the
trial.[81] Through accused-appellants failure to object to the duplicitous charges, they effectively waived their
right against multiple offenses in a single information.
As the prosecution ably established the elements of murder in each of the seven (7) killings, as well as the
elements of frustrated murder against Luna Sanchez, the trial court did not err in convicting accused appellants of
seven (7) counts of murder and one (1) frustrated murder.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS in toto the March 7, 1996 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11, San Jose, Antique in Criminal Case No. 3174.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
People V Ramos 427 scra 299
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135204. April 14, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NARCISO RAMOS y MATIAS, RAMON SAN ROQUE y DELA
CRUZ, EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO y DELA CRUZ alias LALING, WILLIAM RAMOS alias
WILFREDO RAMOS, (provisionally dismissed), and three (3) other John Does, accused.
EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO y DELA CRUZ alias LALING, appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Appeal by Eulalia San Roque de Francisco y dela Cruz from the Decision[1] dated April 24, 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-46010, declaring her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. She was also
adjudged to pay the heirs of the victim, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Information[2] dated December 14, 1993 filed against appellant and her co-accused Narciso Ramos y Matias
alias Narcing, Ramon San Roque y dela Cruz, Wilfredo Ramos and three (3) other John Does is quoted as
follows:
That on or about the 11th day of February 1993 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie up on a santol tree, stab, shoot and burn one WILLIAM LOMIDA, resulting
to the death of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on December 15, 1994, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.
The case against Wilfredo Ramos was provisionally dismissed. The other accused, Narciso Ramos and Ramon
San Roque, have remained at large.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Bernie Ambal, Saturnino Rivera, Mariano
Lomida and NBI Special Investigator Laurence M. Nidera. Their testimonies, woven together, established the
following facts:
On February 11, 1993 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, Bernie Ambal was standing outside his store at 168
De Paro St., Caloocan City. Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque and three (3) others passed by. They
proceeded to the house of William Lomida and appellant, who were then live-in partners. Narciso and Ramon
stood by the door, while one of their companions, holding an armalite, positioned himself behind Narciso. Their
other companion, armed with a pistol, stayed on the street, and the third one, also armed with a pistol, went to the
backyard. At a distance of ten (10) meters away, Ambal saw Narciso pulling out his .45 caliber pistol and
knocking at the door. Appellant then opened the door and Ramon went inside.
Soon thereafter, William and appellant, accompanied by Narciso, Ramon, and three (3) others left the house. As
they were passing by the store, Ramon stopped and borrowed Ambals jacket. At that instance, William suddenly
held his arm and whispered, Samahan mo naman ako, baka kung ano ang gawin sa akin ng mga ito, tutal
barkada mo naman si Ramon. But Ambal was scared and hesitant. William then requested him to look for
Saturnino Rivera.
The group headed to Narcisos house, about kilometer away from Ambals store. Unknown to them, Ambal
trailed behind. Hiding himself behind a tree fifteen meters away, Ambal saw one of their companions poking his
armalite at William. Then, they tied William to a santol tree. He was pleading to appellant, but she simply turned

her back. Ramon stabbed William twice at the stomach with a 29 bladed knife. Then Narciso shot William five to
seven times with his .45 caliber pistol. When William was already dead, Ramon and Wilfredo Ramos untied his
body and brought it to a dumpsite (of used tires) twenty five meters away. There they placed Williams body atop
a pile of rubber tires. Ramon poured gasoline on his body and set it on fire. Appellant and the others were
closely watching. After thirty minutes, appellant and the men left. Ambal immediately reported the incident to
Saturnino Rivera. They proceeded to the dumpsite where they saw the charred body. According to Ambal,
Ramon, appellant and Narcisos sister are brother and sisters.
Saturnino Rivera declared on the witness stand that he considered William his best friend. William and appellant
frequently quarreled and sometimes, he maltreated her. Saturnino corroborated Ambals testimony that they went
to the scene of the crime and saw the charred body of William; and that they reported the gruesome incident to
the NBI.
Mariano Lomida testified that on February 19, 1993, or eight days after the incident, appellant suddenly arrived in
Atimonan, Quezon looking for William. She told Mariano that William left their house on February 9, 1993 without
her knowledge. She borrowed P3,000.00 from him (Mariano) with a promise to pay on March 27, 1993. But
since then, he never saw her again. Mariano further testified that due to the death of his son, he suffered
wounded feelings.
Special Investigator Laurence M. Nidera of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division conducted the investigation.
He took the statements of Bernie Ambal, Saturnino Rivera and Mariano Lomida. Upon the arrest of appellant and
Narciso Ramos by the Capital Command (CAPCOM) of the Philippine National Police, they were turned over to
the NBI.
After the prosecution rested its case, appellant filed a demurrer to evidence but was denied. Meanwhile,
appellant jumped bail. On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the case was submitted for
decision.
On April 24, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused Eulalia San Roque de Francisco y dela Cruz
alias Laling GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged in the Information and hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with accessory penalties as provided by the law and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Appellant appeared during the promulgation of the Decision.
In her brief, appellant raised the following assignments of error:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO Y
DELA CRUZ alias LALING CONSPIRED AND CONFEDERATED WITH HER CO-ACCUSED IN
PERPETRATING THE CRIME OF MURDER, WHEN THE FACT OF SUCH CONSPIRACY HAS NOT BEEN
SATISFACTORILY PROVEN TO EXIST BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DURING THE TRIAL OF THE CASE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
WEAK EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION, CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO
PROVE ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME AND THE CORPUS DELICTI.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER BY THE
MERE FACT THAT SHE FAILED TO APPEAR AFTER THE CASE WAS REVIVED SUCH FAILURE HAVING
BEEN APPRECIATED BY THE TRIAL COURT AS A CLEAR INDICATION OF HER GUILT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER ON THE BASIS ALONE OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS IN THIS CASE, WITHOUT
BEING SUPPORTED THEREBY BY CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
We shall discuss the above assignments of error jointly.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal,[4] in its maximum period to death, if committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.
With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aim of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2.
In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3.
By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin.
4.
On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption
of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5.
With evident premeditation.
6.
With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing
at his person or corpse.
In convicting the appellant of murder, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of prosecution
lone eyewitness, Bernie Ambal. An extract from his testimony is quoted hereunder:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY PROS. MANAQUIL:
xxx
Q And in the evening of that date, could you recall at about 7:00 in the evening of February 11, 1993, if there
was any unusual incident that happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please tell us what was that unusual incident all about that you observed and noticed?
A
Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque and three men of Narciso Ramos got the victim and Eulalia San Roque
was also with the group.
Court:
Q Who was taken?
A The victim, your Honor.
Q What is the name of the victim?
A William Lomida was taken by these people.
Pros. Mananquil:
Q From where the accused picked up by these people?
A Lomida was taken from the house where Eulalia San Roque and William Lomida were living.
Q William Lomida is the victim in this case. Now, how is he related to Eulalia San Roque?
A They are not married. They are live-in partners.
Q Now, how far from the store where this house of William Lomida and Eulalia San Roque is located?
A More or less, ten meters away.
Q Is it located in front of the store, on the left side or at the back of the store?
A The house of Eulalia is alongside of our house.
Q What part of your store where you were at the time you saw these people picked up Lomida?
A I was outside the store standing.
Q After the accused picked up the victim, what happened or where did they go?
A William Lomida, the victim, was brought to the house of Narciso Ramos.
xxx
Court:
xxx
Q So the persons whom you saw got Lomida were Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque, William Ramos alias
Wilfredo Ramos and three men of Narciso Ramos and Eulalia San Roque?
A Yes, your Honor.
xxx
Pros. Mananquil:
Q
Now, you said that the accused brought William Lomida to the house of Narciso Ramos. How far is this
house of Narciso Ramos located in relation to the store, your store?
A About half kilometer away.
xxx
Q Now, when the victim was brought to the house of Narciso Ramos, what happened next?
A The victim was tied to a santol tree.
Q
Where is this santol tree where the victim Lomida was tied? How far is this from the house of Narciso
Ramos?
Court:

Q Who tied the victim?

A Ramon San Roque, Wilfredo Ramos and the three others unidentified men.
Pros. Mananquil:
Q After the accused tied William Lomida on a santol tree, what happened next?
A Ramon San Roque stabbed William Lomida.
Q And with what kind of weapon was used by Ramon San Roque?
A A bladed 29.
Q How long?
A I cannot say how long, sir.
Q How many times did you see Ramon San Roque stabbed the victim with the 29?
A About two times, sir.
Q And did you see if Lomida was hit with that two stab thrust?
A He was stabbed on the stomach.
Pros. Mananquil:
Q What happened after Ramon San Roque stabbed the victim?
A The victim, William Lomida nangisay and then Narciso Ramos came near the victim and shot him.
Q How many times?
A About 5 to 7 shots.
Q And did you see if the victim was hit?
A It seems that the shots were directed to his face because he was bloodied all over his face.
Q With what kind of firearm, if you remember?
A When the investigator showed me some guns, I noticed that the one gun that Narciso Ramos used was a .45
caliber.
Q Was it magazine or revolver?
A Magazine type.
Q After Narciso Ramos shot the victim 7 times on the head, what happened next?
A
When the group made sure that the victim was dead already, they untied him and brought the body where
there was a pile of tires, piles of pieces of rubber tires.
Q
By the way, at the time when the victim was shot by Narciso Ramos and stabbed by Ramon San Roque,
where was Willy Ramos, Narciso Ramos and Eulalia San Roque?
A They were just there standing and afterwards, turned their back around.
xxx
Prosecutor:
Q
How far was Eulalia San Roque from Lomida when Lomida was shot by Narciso Ramos and stabbed by
Ramon San Roque?
A This place up to that wall. Distance of about 8 meters.
Q And what was Eulalia doing at the time when the victim was stabbed and shot?
A She turned her back and face the kitchen of the house of Narciso Ramos.
Q Did she not try to intervene, this Eulalia, being the live-in partner of William Lomida or did not exert effort to
pacify?
xxx
Prosecutor:
Q Just turning her back, what else that she did, being live-in partner of William Lomida?
A She did not do anything anymore.
Q After the victim was stabbed and shot, he was untied from the santol tree. Who untied him?
A It was Ramon San Roque, Willy Ramos and the three others.
Q Willy refers to Wilfredo Ramos?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was Eulalia at the time?
A She was still there standing.
Q Now, you said after the victim was untied from the santol tree, he was brought to where pieces of rubber tires
were piled, recycled, how far is this from the santol tree where the victim was tied?
A About 25 meters.
Q Now, after the accused brought the victim to the piles of recycled tires, what happened next?
A Ramos San Roque got a can and poured something on the body of the victim and then, lighted it up.
Q What happened to the body of the victim, William Lomida?
A The body was burned.
Q At the time when this Ramon San Roque poured something on the body of the victim and then lighted the
same, where were Wilfredo Ramos, Eulalia San Roque and Narciso Ramos and the other unidentified persons?
A There were They were there in front of the burning body.
Q How long did the fire last?
A It took a long time, about more than one hour.
Q After one hour, what happened next?
A They left the place. The group left the place.
Court:
Q What happened to the tires?
A The tires also burned.
Q And where was the body of Lomida in relation to the tires?
A The body of the victim was almost burned and when we went back to the place, the shape of the charred was
still there. The same of human body.[5]
The foregoing testimony clearly shows that Ambal, being then present at the locus of the crime, was able to
identify the appellant and the other accused as the persons who killed William. Ambal narrated the incidents
leading to the victim's death with clarity and lucidity that they could not have been fabricated or concocted. The
records show that throughout the trial, he remained steadfast in his testimony. There is thus no doubt in our
minds that this lone eyewitness is credible. While his testimony is uncorroborated, still it sustains the conviction of
appellant. In People vs. Toyco,[6] we held:
It is axiomatic that truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. The
testimony of a single witness if positive and credible is sufficient to support a conviction even in charge of
murder.
We are not persuaded by appellants contention that the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of conspiracy among the accused. She vigorously contends that she did not participate in
the killing of the victim.
In determining the existence of conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and
killed the victim.[7] The presence of conspiracy among the accused can be proven by their conduct before, during
or after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other, evincing a common
purpose or design. There must be a showing that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense, either
morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through external acts indicating a manifest
intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. In such case, the act of one
becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.[8]
The series of events in this case convincingly show that appellant and her co-accused acted in unison and
cooperated with each other in killing William Lomida. Appellant was the one who opened the door and allowed
the other accused to enter the house. She joined them in bringing the victim to the residence of Narciso Ramos,
her brother-in-law. While her co-accused dragged the helpless victim, tied him to a santol tree, stabbed him twice
by a bladed knife, and shot him 5 to 7 times, appellant merely watched intensely. She even turned her back as
the lifeless body of the victim was being burned. And after attaining their purpose, she fled with the other
accused.
The above circumstances clearly show the common purpose and concerted efforts on the part of appellant and
her co-accused. We agree with the trial court in concluding that their acts were indications of a criminal
conspiracy to commit the crime of murder.
The only remaining question is whether the crime was attended by aggravating circumstances.
The killing of the victim was attended by treachery. Treachery exists when the offender commits a crime against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense or retaliatory act which the victim might
make.[9] Here, appellant and her co-accused tied William to a santol tree before they stabbed and shot him to
death, thus, insuring the execution of the crime without risk to themselves. Obviously, he could not retaliate. This
aggravating circumstance qualifies the crime to murder.
However, we cannot sustain the trial courts appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of superior strength as
this is absorbed in treachery.[10]

It bears stressing that this crime of murder was committed on February 11, 1993.[11] The law applicable is Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code then penalizing murder withreclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Under Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, in cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three
periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, and there are neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, the penalty prescribed by
law in its medium period shall be imposed.
The range of the imposable penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, is 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the maximum period is the medium of the imposable
penalty, which isreclusion perpetua. The minimum period is one degree lower, or prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, the range of which is 10 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months. The minimum period of the penalty imposable is anywhere within this range, or 10 years and 1 day.
Hence, appellant should be sentenced to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion
perpetua, as maximum.
Regarding damages, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the victims heirs. When
death occurs as a result of a crime, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, without need of any evidence or proof of damages.[12]
We likewise award temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages. Here, the prosecution failed to present any
proof of the expenses incurred by the victims heirs. However, as they actually incurred funeral expenses, we
award P25,000.00 by way of temperate damages.[13]
Anent moral damages, we award the victims heirs the amount of P50,000.00.[14] For verily, moral damages are
not intended to enrich the victims heirs; rather they are awarded to allow them to obtain means for diversion that
could serve to alleviate their moral and psychological sufferings.[15] Mariano Lomida, victims father, equivocally
described how he suffered untold wounded feelings for the loss of his son.
We also award the victims heirs P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. This is pursuant to our ruling in People vs.
Catubig[16] that if a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated April 24, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan
City, in Criminal Case No. C-46010, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that appellant
EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO is sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, toreclusion perpetua, as maximum. She is ordered to pay the victims heirs (a) P50,000.00
as civil indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages and (d) P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
People V Dagani 499 scra 64
Republic of the Philippines
For review before the Court is the Decision dated June 20, 2002[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, Branch 12 (RTC), dated February 18, 1993, in
Criminal Case No. 89-77467, finding the accused-appellants Otello Santiano y Leonida (Santiano) and Rolando
Dagani y Reyes (Dagani) guilty of the crime of Murder.

the danger to the life of the accused ceased to be imminent; that in grappling for the weapon, Dagani controlled
the hands of Javier and pushed them away from his body; that the appellants failed to produce the two empty
shells as physical evidence of the gunfire allegedly caused by Javier; that no points of entry or bullet markings on
the walls of the canteen were shown; that, in light of these findings, no unlawful aggression was present on the
part of the victim; that the appellants failed to prove that they were on official duty at the time of the incidence;
that, since it was not established that Javier actually fired his gun, the injury inflicted upon him cannot be regarded
as a necessary consequence of the due performance of an official duty; that the appellants were acting in
conspiracy; that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing, considering that Javier had been
shot while his hands were being held by Dagani and as his body was out of balance and about to fall; and that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of the appellants.
The appellants appealed to the CA and assigned the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING SELF DEFENSE ON THE PART OF THE
ACCUSED.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS WERE IN LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF AN OFFICIAL DUTY.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF MURDER.[4]

The CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is MODIFIED. Appellants are hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The award for attorneys fees and appearance fees for counsel are hereby deleted. In all the other
aspects, the appealed decision is maintained.
Let the entire records of the case be elevated to the Supreme Court for the mandated review.
SO ORDERED.[5]

The CA affirmed the findings of fact as well as the salient portions of the RTC Decision, but deleted the
award of attorneys fees and the per appearance fees of counsel since, the
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about September 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and use of personal violence upon one
ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX by then and there shooting him with a .38 caliber revolver, thereby inflicting upon the
said ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.

CA reasoned, the instant case is criminal in nature which is under the control of the public prosecutor, and,
additionally, the RTC failed to justify this award in the body of its Decision. And last, the CA found that the RTC
erroneously applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law since the penalty for Murder, at the time of the incident, was
reclusion perpetua which is an indivisible penalty to be imposed in its entirety, regardless of the attending
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Appellants are now before this Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the CA.
Through their Manifestation datedFebruary 11, 2003,[6] appellants prayed to dispense with the filing of additional
briefs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
As of date, the records show that despite the efforts exerted by the surety and the responsible law officers to
locate the appellants, the latter could not be found and have jumped bail.[7]
Upon arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty.
evidence to establish the following:

Trial ensued where the prosecution adduced

At about 4:45 in the afternoon of September 11, 1989, a group composed of Ernesto Javier (Javier), Lincoln
Miran (Miran), and two other individuals had been drinking at the canteen located inside the compound of the
Philippine National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto Avenue, Tondo, Manila. All of a sudden, appellants, who
were security officers of the PNR and covered by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, entered the canteen
and approached the group. Appellant Dagani shoved Miran, causing the latter to fall from his chair. Dagani then
held Javier while Santiano shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter.
The defense proceeded to prove their version of the facts:

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Appellants argue that the courts a quo misappreciated the facts and erred in finding that there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. They insist that the victim, Javier, had been armed with a revolver
at the time he was struggling with appellant Dagani; that the former could have easily killed the latter; that, given
the fact that Javier had been drinking, it is quite probable for Javier to act harshly and aggressively towards

peace officers such as the accused;[8] and that Javier actually fired three shots from his .22 caliber gun.[9]
We are not convinced.

Appellants testified that they were ordered by their desk officer to investigate a commotion at the canteen.
Upon reaching the place, Santiano ordered his co-accused, Dagani, to enter, while the former waited outside.
Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle of beer on the table. Javier then pulled out a .22
caliber revolver and attempted to fire at Dagani, but the gun failed to go off. Then suddenly, while outside the
canteen, Santiano heard gunfire and, from his vantage point, he saw Javier and Dagani grappling for a .22 caliber
gun which belonged to Javier. During the course of the struggle, the gun went off, forcing Santiano to fire a
warning shot. He heard Javiers gun fire again, so he decided to rush into the canteen. Santiano then shot Javier
from a distance of less than four meters.
Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of official duty as
PNR security officers. They also argued that the prosecution failed to establish treachery and conspiracy.

When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally
justified. Having owned the killing of the victim, the accused should be able to prove to the satisfaction of the
Court the elements of self-defense in order to avail of this extenuating circumstance. He must discharge this
burden by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be excused,
mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused. Self-defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful
aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. All these conditions must concur.[10]
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude[11]
but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor.[12] To invoke selfdefense successfully, there must have been an

The RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding both accused Otello Santiano y Leonida and Rolando Dagani y Reyes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and punished under Art. 248, RPC, with the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and granting them the benefit of [the] Indeterminate Sentence Law,
both accused are hereby sentenced to each suffer an Indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as minimum, to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal x x x.

unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe
wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.[13]
In the instant case, the assertions that it was quite probable that Javier, during the course of the struggle for the
firearm, could have easily killed the appellants are uncertain and speculative. There is aggression in
contemplation of the law only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative.[14]
To sum up the matter, we quote the findings of the CA:

Both accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, the sum of P31,845.00 as funeral and burial expenses, the sum of
P30,000.00 as and for [sic] attorneys fees and the further sum of P1,000.00 per appearance of counsel.
Both accused shall be credited with the full extent of their preventive imprisonment. Both accused are
hereby committed to the Director, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila for service of Sentence.
SO ORDERED.[3]

In brief, the RTC held that appellants failed to prove that Javier attempted to squeeze the trigger of the .22 caliber
gun when he pointed it at Dagani; that during the course of the struggle for the possession of the .22 caliber gun,

The defense was unable to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Javier. They were unable to
present evidence that the victim actually fired his gun. No spent shells from the .22 caliber pistol were found and
no bullets were recovered from the scene of the incident. Javier also tested negative for gunpowder residue.
Moreover, the trial court found appellant Daganis account of the incident to be incredible and self-serving. In
sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-defense without any proof of the existence of its requisites.[15]
Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the appellants so insist, the imminence of the danger
to their lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held down the victim and grappled for the gun with the latter.
After the victim had been thrown off-balance, there was no longer any unlawful aggression

that would have necessitated the act of killing.[16] When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer
exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor.[17] When
Javier had been caught in the struggle for the possession of the gun with appellant Dagani, the grave peril
envisaged by appellant Santiano, which impelled him to fire at the victim, had then ceased to a reasonable
extent,[18] and undoubtedly, Santiano went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict the
excessive and fatal injuries on Javier, even when the alleged unlawful aggression had already ceased.[19]
The second element of self-defense demands that the means employed to neutralize the unlawful
aggression are reasonable and necessary. It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does
not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence.[20] The circumstances in their entirety which surround the grappling of the firearm by Dagani and
Javier, such as the nature and number of gunshot wounds sustained by the victim[21] which amounted to two
fatal wounds,[22] that Dagani was able to restrain the hands of Javier and push

them away from his body,[23] that Dagani was larger than Javier and had finished Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) hand-tohand combat training,[24] and Javier, as admitted by the appellants, was inebriated at the time of the incident,[25]
do not justify appellant Santianos act of fatally shooting the victim twice.[26]

as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.[40] Thus, even assuming that Javier was
simultaneously attacked, this does not prove conspiracy. No evidence was presented to show that the appellants
planned to kill Javier or that Daganis overt acts facilitated that alleged plan. The prosecution did not establish that
the act of Dagani in trying to wrestle the gun from Javier and in the process, held the latters hands, was for the
purpose of enabling Santiano to shoot at Javier. The prosecution had the burden to show Daganis intentional
participation to the furtherance of a common design and purpose[41] or that his action was all part of a scheme to
kill Javier. That Dagani did not expect Santiano to shoot the victim is established when Santiano testified that
Dagani seem[ed] to be shocked, he was standing and looking at the victim as Javier gradually fell to the
ground.[42] And since Daganis conviction can only be sustained if the crime had been carried out through a
conspiracy duly proven, in view of the failure of the prosecution to discharge that burden, this Court is constrained
to acquit him.
And this Court cannot say that treachery attended the attack. The RTC declared:
[T]he Court believes that Javier was shot while his body was out-balanced and about to fall to the right side and
while his hands were being held by Dagani. Javier, therefore, was shot at when he has no means to defend
himself, hence, the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.[43]

All things considered, the appellants plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of
self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent
evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.[27] Whether the accused acted in self-defense is a question of fact.
Like alibi, the affirmative defense of self-defense is inherently weak because, as experience has demonstrated, it
is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.[28] This Court, therefore, finds no reversible error on the part of the
courts a quo in rejecting the claim of self-defense.

which the CA affirmed as follows:

Appellants set up the defense that they were in the lawful performance of their official duties. They specifically
aver that they had been ordered by their desk officer to proceed to the canteen in response to a telephone call
stating that there was a group creating trouble; that they were in the call of duty and exercising their functions
and responsibilities as members of the PNR Civil Security Office to preserve peace and order and

It has been held that when an assault is made with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and unsuspecting
victim who [was] given no immediate provocation for the attack and under conditions which made it impossible for
him to evade the attack, flee or make [a] defense, the act is properly qualified as treachery, and the homicide
resulting therefrom is classified as murder.[44] x x x

protect the lives and property in the PNR Compound;[29] and that, invoking jurisprudence, as security officers in
the performance of duty, like the police, they must stand their ground and overcome the opponent, and the force
that may be exerted must differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in self-defense.[30]
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. Two requisites must concur before this defense
can prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary consequence of such
lawful exercise.[31] These requisites are absent in the instant case.

The findings of the court a quo clearly showed that Javier was being held down and could not effectively
use his weapon. As such, the trial court held that Javier could not be considered to be an armed man as he was
being held down and was virtually helpless.

Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate employment of
means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise.
Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and forms of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means,
methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
person.[45]
This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the victim, the
vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made, or the fact that the victim was unarmed, do
not by themselves render the

As found by the CA:

The defense failed to prove that the security officers were in fact on duty at the time they were at the canteen.
The trial court gave weight to the fact that the appellants were unable to submit their daily time records to show
that they were on duty at the time. Appellants assertion that they were ordered to go on 24-hour duty was belied
by PNR Security Investigator Rolando Marinays testimony that PNR security officers work in two 12-hour shifts,
from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
Moreover, since it was not established that Javier fired his gun, the injury inflicted upon him cannot be regarded
as a necessary consequence of appellants due performance of an official duty.[32]

As stated, considering that the imminent or actual danger to the life of the appellants had been neutralized when
Dagani grappled with Javier and restrained his hands; that Javier had been thrown off-balance; that Dagani had
been specially trained for these purposes; and that Javier had been drinking immediately prior to the scuffle, this
Court holds that the fatal injuries that appellant Santiano inflicted on the victim cannot be deemed to be necessary
consequences of the performance of his duty as a PNR security officer.[33] While it is recognized that police
officers if indeed the appellants can be likened to them must stand their ground and overwhelm their
opponents, in People v. Ulep,[34] this Court counseled:
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under circumstances
indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers
with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves
in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed.
However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties
must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear
and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within
the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who
indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear in
mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these
criminals are also human beings with human rights.[35]

But this Court cannot agree with the findings of the courts a quo that the appellants were in conspiracy.

attack as treacherous.[46] This is of particular significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the
accused whereby he gained an advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and was
rendered defenseless.[47] The means employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be
shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the
crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended victim.[48] For the rules
on treachery to apply, the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim,
and without provocation on the part of the latter.[49] Treachery is never presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy,
it is required that the manner of attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the
crime itself.[50]
The prosecution failed to convincingly prove that the assault by the appellants had been deliberately adopted
as a mode of attack intended to insure the killing of Javier and without the latter having the opportunity to defend
himself. Other than the bare fact that Santiano shot Javier while the latter had been struggling with Dagani over
the possession of the .22 caliber gun, no other fact had been adduced to show that the appellants consciously
planned or predetermined the methods to insure the commission of the crime, nor had the risk of the victim
to
retaliate been eliminated during the course of the struggle over the weapon, as the latter, though struggling,
had not been
completely subdued. As already stated, this Court must emphasize that the mere suddenness of the attack,
or the vulnerable position of the victim at the time of the attack, or yet even the fact that the victim was unarmed,
do not by themselves make the attack treacherous.[51] It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the
means employed gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and that such means had been
deliberately or consciously adopted without danger to the life of the accused.[52]
For these reasons, the Court is inclined to look upon the helpless position of Javier as merely incidental to
the attack, and that the decision to shoot Javier was made in an instant.[53]
Considering the rule that treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully and convincingly as the
crime itself, any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of Santiano. Accordingly, for failure of the
prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the killing to Murder, appellant Santiano may only be convicted of
Homicide.[54] The penalty, therefore, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, isreclusion
temporal.
The Office of the Solicitor General is correct in that the courts a quo failed to consider the aggravating
circumstance of

The RTC simply held:

The Information cited conspiracy of the accused. Since it can also be committed thru simultaneous/concerted
action and considering that Javier was shot by Santiano while being held by Dagani, under jurisprudence,
conspiracy is present.[36]

taking advantage of official position under Article 14 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, since the accused, a PNR
security officer
covered by the Civil Service, committed the crime with the aid of a gun he had been authorized to carry
as such.[55] Considering that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as duly appreciated by the
courts a quo, shall be offset against the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position, the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period, pursuant to Article 64 (4) of the aforesaid Code.

The tenor of the factual findings of the CA is equally unsatisfactory:

Moreover, the facts show that Javier was shot by appellant Santiano as he was being subdued by appellant
Dagani. The trial court held that the manner of the attack was indicative of a joint purpose and design by the
appellants.[37]

Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures,
presumptions, or suspicions.[38] Other than the plain fact that the victim had been shot by one of the accused
while being held by a co-accused, there is no other evidence that the appellants were animated by the same
purpose or were moved by a previous common accord. It follows that the liability of the accused must be
determined on an individual basis. While no formal agreement is necessary to establish conspiracy because
conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, yet, conspiracy must
be established by clear and convincing evidence.[39]
This Court has held that even if all the malefactors joined in the killing, such
satisfy the requirement of conspiracy because the rule is that
neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof
shown to exist

circumstance alone does not

of conspiracy. Conspiracy must

be

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the sentence of appellant Santiano will consist of a minimum that is
anywhere within the full range of prision mayor, and a maximum which is anywhere within reclusion temporal in its
medium period. This Court hereby fixes it to be from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As to the award of damages, prevailing jurisprudence entitles the heirs of the deceased to the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof of damages.[56]
The CA erred in deleting the attorneys fees and per appearance fees for lack of factual basis. Although the CA is
correct in noting that the RTC failed to justify these awards in the body of its Decision, this appeal opens the
entire case for review and, accordingly, the records show that the foregoing
amounts had been stipulated by the parties,[57] thereby dispensing with the need to prove the same.[58]
As to moral damages, however, the widow of the victim, Erlinda Javier, is not entitled to the same. She did not
testify on any mental anguish or emotional distress which she suffered as a result of her husbands death. No
other heirs of Javier testified in the same manner.[59]

Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position attended the killing, the Court
awards exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in accordance with Articles 2230 and 2234 of the Civil
Code and prevailing jurisprudence.[60]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15304 dated June 20, 2002 is
MODIFIED. Appellant Otello Santiano y Leonida is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of an indeterminate sentence from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporalas maximum.
Appellant Santiano is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P31,845.00 as funeral and burial expenses, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorneys fees
and P1,000.00
per appearance of counsel.
imprisonment.

Appellant Santiano shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive

Appellant Rolando Dagani y Reyes is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

PeopleV Cajurao 420 scra 207

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122767. January 20, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOSEPH CAJURAO, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of South Cotabato, Branch 26, convicting the
appellant Joseph Cajurao of murder; sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him
to pay the heirs of the victim Santiago Betita P50,000 as civil indemnity and P20,000 as actual damages.
On December 22, 1993, an Information was filed charging the appellant of murder, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1993 at Poblacion, Municipality of Surallah, Province of South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to
kill and with treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab SANTIAGO
BETITA with a sharp pointed-bladed instrument hitting and wounding him on the breast which caused his death
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On January 21, 1994, the appellant was arraigned with the assistance of his counsel and pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.[3] Trial thereafter ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution[4]
On November 29, 1993, the residents of Poblacion, Surallah, South Cotabato were in a festive mood. There was
carnival in the municipal plaza. The Sangguniang Kabataanhad also sponsored a disco that evening to be held in
the Poblacions Civic Cultural Center gymnasium. Pacita Pordios put up a stall in front of the gym for the sale of
candies, soft drinks and other assorted items. She filled a flat bottle of Tanduay with kerosene and placed a wick
thereon. She used the makeshift lamp to light up her stall.[5]
The appellant Joseph Cajurao and his friend Allan Daosos went to the dance hall. Felix Teruel and Nena
Carmelo were then manning the gate and the ticket booth. Since Cajurao and Daosos had no tickets, they were
not allowed to enter. The appellant and Daosos tarried within the vicinity and repeatedly tried to enter the hall
without tickets, to no avail.[6]
At about 10:30 p.m., Pordios was surprised when Santiago Betita suddenly arrived at her stall. When he took the
lamp that illuminated her wares, she got angry and confronted him. Pordios asked him why he took the lamp,
but Betita ignored her and held on to the lamp in a defensive stance. Betita appeared perturbed. Shortly
thereafter, someone threw a stone, prompting people to scamper away. Still holding on to the lamp, Betita moved
over to the stall beside Pordios. Suddenly, the appellant sped towards Betita and stabbed him on the right nipple.
Betita fell to the ground. The appellant then threw his knife away and fled.[7]
Domingo Tecson, a civilian volunteer assigned to take charge of the peace and order situation in the area, was
then on patrol. He saw the appellant pass by, running. He looked towards the direction where the appellant had
come from and saw Betita slumped on the ground, mortally wounded. Tecson rushed to where Betita was and
shouted for help. He instructed his fellow volunteers to run after the appellant and collar him. After a brief chase,
the appellant was caught by a volunteer in the carnival ground and was thereafter turned over to the police
authorities.[8]
Tecson went back to the crime scene to look for the weapon the appellant used to kill Betita. With the aid of the
light from a nearby fire truck, he found the knife and its scabbard. Tecson turned the weapon over to the police.[9]
Pordios and Tecson gave their respective statements to PO3 Lino D. Antonino.[10]
Dr. Rolando P. Arrojo, the Municipal Health Officer, signed the Certification of Death showing that Betita died due
to:
Severe internal hemorrhage resulting to shock then cardiac arrest.
Stab wound, right chest.[11]
Valentina Betita, the victims mother, spent P20,000 for the wake and burial of her son.
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant admitted stabbing and killing Betita but claimed that he did so to defend himself. He testified that at
9:00 a.m. on November 29, 1993, he and his friend Allan Daosos went to the dance at the Civic Cultural Center
gymnasium. The appellant saw Betita enter the gymnasium. He was nonplussed when Betita shouted at him,
Putang ina ka, ari pa na, nakit-an na ta! Betita also accused him of being a braggart and a liar. The appellant
asked Betita what his gripe was against him.
At about 10:00 p.m., the appellant went out of the gym and seated himself on a concrete bench nearby, beside
the trunk of a mango tree. Betita followed and shouted at him saying, When you are in a group you are a
braggart. Now, we are here outside. The appellant remonstrated, saying, Boy, what is this? Betita retorted,
You came here just to look for trouble! The appellant stood up and was about to leave, but Betita slapped him
on the face. Betita then fled to the stall of Pordios and took hold of the makeshift lamp. As he was about to throw
the lighted lamp at the appellant who was about four meters away, the latter walked slowly to Betita and asked,
Why did you slap me, Boy? The appellant pushed Betitas hand aside, the hand that held the lamp, and pulled
out a knife from his waist. The appellant then stabbed Betita on his right nipple. He threw his knife in a grassy
area and fled from the scene.
Nanette Evangelista testified that on that fateful evening, she and Pacita Pordios put up their stalls within the
periphery of the gymnasium where the dance was being held. Her wares included assorted items like candies,
biscuits, soft drinks and cigarettes. Her stall was about four meters away from that of Pordios. Before 10:00 p.m.,
Nanette, Melinda Rojas and their friends, decided to join the disco in the gymnasium. Nanette asked someone to
man the stall in the meantime. She then saw Santiago Boy Betita, the appellant and Allan Daosos dancing
inside the gymnasium. The two had an argument. By about 10:30 p.m., Nanette left the gymnasium, went
outside and proceeded to the mango tree, about seven meters away from the gymnasium. She then talked to a
friend, Arlene Mendoza.
After about half an hour, the appellant and Allan Daosos emerged from the gymnasium and went to the
concrete bench near the trunk of the mango tree, about two meters from where Nanette and Arlene Mendoza had
seated themselves. Betita arrived and approached the appellant, pointing at the latter. The appellant stood up.
Betita then slapped the appellant on the face. The appellant was about to retaliate but Betita fled towards the stall
of Pordios, about three meters away from the concrete bench. He took hold of the Tanduay lamp and was
about to throw it at the appellant but the latter, armed with a knife, ran towards Betita and stabbed him on the
chest.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment on January 19, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds the accused Joseph Cajurao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and hereby sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim
Santiago Betita the sum of P50,000.00 for the victims death and P20,000.00 actual expenses in relation to said
death of the victim.
SO ORDERED.[12]

The trial court rejected the appellants defense and concluded that he failed to present clear and convincing
evidence to prove that he killed Betita in self-defense. It gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony
of the witnesses for the prosecution, that the appellant stabbed the defenseless victim. It also appreciated the
presence of treachery, qualifying the crime to murder.
The appellant appealed the decision with the lone assignment of error, to wit:
1. The Honorable Court a quo gravely committed error in finding the accused guilty of the crime of MURDER.[13]
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence and full probative weight to the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses, more particularly to those of Tecson and Pordios, and in ignoring his testimony and
that of Evangelista. The appellant contends that he stabbed Betita because the latter took hold of the Tanduay
lamp on the stall of Pordios and was about to throw it at him. This impelled the appellant to rush to where Betita
was. Before the lamp could be thrown at him, he stabbed Betita. According to the appellant, the victims act of
slapping him and attempting to throw the lighted lamp at him constituted unlawful aggression on the part of the
latter. Thus, there was no provocation on his part; the means he used to repel the unlawful aggression of Betita
was reasonable.
We do not agree with the contention of the appellant.
First. Like alibi, self-defense is a weak defense because it is easy to fabricate.[14] When the accused interposes
self-defense, he thereby admits having killed the victim. The burden of proof is shifted on him to prove with clear
and convincing evidence the confluence of the essential requisites of a complete self-defense, namely: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[15] The accused must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution; because even if the
prosecutions evidence is weak, the same can no longer be disbelieved.[16] The appellant failed to discharge his
burden.
Second. The trial court found the collective testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be credible, while
those of the appellant and Evangelista, incredible and barren of probative weight. The legal aphorism is that the
factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of their
probative weight is given high respect if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued,
misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which if considered will alter the
outcome of the case. We have meticulously reviewed the records and found no reason to deviate from the factual
findings of the trial court.
Third. The natural reaction of one who witnesses the commission of a crime is to report the same immediately to
the police authorities so that the culprit could be arrested and forthwith prosecuted; and if convicted, to be meted
the appropriate penalty therefor. In this case, Pordios and Tecson gave their respective statements to the public
investigator on November 30, 1993, barely a day after the stabbing. In contrast, the appellant and Evangelista did
not report the stabbing to the police authorities and even failed to give any statement thereon.
Fourth. The flight of the appellant, his throwing away the knife used to stab the victim, his failure to report the
stabbing and to surrender himself to the police authorities and to thereafter claim that he killed Betita in selfdefense, all these belie his claim that he killed the victim in self-defense.[17]
Fifth. Evangelista put up her stall in the periphery of the gym to sell biscuits, cigarettes and soft drinks and other
assorted items. It is incredible that she would leave her stall and join the dance and after an hour or so, proceed
to the nearby mango tree and converse with a friend.
Sixth. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless there is clear and convincing proof of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The unlawful aggression, a constitutive element of self-defense,
must be real or at least imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked is not
sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. Unlawful aggression presupposes
an actual or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an intimidating or threatening attitude
of the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression.[18] Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually
broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a
threatening stance or posture.[19] The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying
circumstance.[20] Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the
necessity for the person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases. If he persists in attacking his
adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense.[21] Self-defense does not justify
the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray.[22]
In this case, Pordios testified that the appellant stabbed Betita even as the latter moved over to the next stall, still
holding the lamp with the lighted wick which he took from her stall to defend himself from the appellant. Betita
had anticipated that the appellant would assault him. Betitas fears proved to be well-founded, as the appellant
rushed to where he was and stabbed him on the right nipple. Pordios did not testify that before the stabbing,
Betita was about to throw the bottle at the appellant. She testified as follows:
Q At about 10:30 oclock in the evening of November 29, 1993, could you recall of any unusual incident that
happened?
A There was.
Q What was that unusual incident all about?
A
At about 10:30 Santiago approached my table and took my torch. Then a stone was thrown. I do not know
who threw the stone. So this Santiago Betita transferred to another table where he brought my torch with him,
and he was followed by a man thereat.
Q Were you able to identify that man who followed him? I am referring to Santiago Betita.
A Yes.
Q Who is that person?
A Joseph.
Q Are you referring to the accused in this case?
A Yes.
Q What did this Joseph do when he followed Santiago Betita?
A He went near the table and [in] a short while later I saw Santiago was already stabbed.
Q Who stabbed Santiago Betita?
A Joseph.
Q About how many meters were you from the place where Santiago Betita was stabbed by Joseph Cajurao?
A About four (4) meters.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court whether this Santiago Betita was hit when he was stabbed?
A Yes.
Q Could you tell in (sic) what portion of his body was hit by the accused?
A On the right nipple.
Q How many times was the victim Santiago Betita stabbed by the accused?
A Once only.
Q After he stabbed Santiago Betita what happened next?
A He left.
Q How about Santiago Betita what happened to him if you know?
A He fell on the ground.[23]
On cross-examination by defense counsel, Pordios testified that before the appellant stabbed Betita, the latter
was merely holding the bottle in his right hand, on the level of the right shoulder, with his elbow by the side of the
body.
ATTY. MONTEFRIO:
Q Betita was standing when Cajurao was stabbing, is that right?
A Yes, he was standing and he was holding the torch.
Q He was holding the torch. Will you please demonstrate how was he holding the torch at the time when he
was stabbed by Cajurao?
A This was the position of Betita. (Witness held the gavel with right hand, with clenched fist on the level of the
right shoulder, and her elbow by the side of her body. Witness is standing erect.)[24]
In fine, Betita was in a defensive position when he was stabbed. If, as claimed by the appellant, Betita was about
to throw the bottle at him, surely Betitas right hand would have been raised above his head, his body and right
hand arched backward, ready to throw the bottle at the appellant. This was not the case.
Assuming that Betita did slap the appellant on the face, the appellants evidence shows, however, that Betita
anticipated that the appellant would retaliate and forthwith ran away to the stall of Pacita and took hold of the
knife. From that moment, the inceptive unlawful aggression on the part of Betita had ceased to exist; there was
no longer a need for the appellant to still pursue the victim and kill him. In fine, when the appellant stabbed the
victim, he did so to retaliate.
We agree with the contention of the appellant that there was no factual basis for the ruling of the trial court that he
killed Betita with treachery. Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, reads:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Treachery requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the employment of means, methods or
manner of execution that would insure the offenders safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended
party, who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of such
means, methods or manner of execution.[25]
In this case, there is no evidence that the appellant deliberately and consciously adopted a method of attack that
insured the death of the victim. For one thing, Pordios did not see how the incident between the appellant and
Betita commenced and developed before the latter suddenly appeared from the direction of the plaza, and took
hold of the lamp from her stall. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present at the inception of the
attack.[26] Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot be
merely supposed.[27] Moreover, it could not be said that the attack was without risk to the appellant, because
Betita was holding a lighted wick lamp which he could have used as a weapon to fend off the appellants assault.
To be considered treacherous, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, must be proven
to have been a mode of attack deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to
either fight or retreat.[28] In People v. Domingo Albao[29] we held, thus:
The qualifying circumstance of treachery can not logically be appreciated because the accused did not make any
preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime or to make it
impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. This circumstance can only be applied,
according to the tenor of Article 13, subsection 16 of the Revised Penal Code, when the culprit employs means,
methods or forms of execution which tend directly and specially to insure the commission of the crime and at the
same time to eliminate or diminish the risk to his own person from a defense which the other party might offer. In
United States vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926, it was held that the circumstance that an attack was sudden and
unexpected to the person assaulted did not constitute the element of alevosia necessary to raise a homicide to
murder, where it did not appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate
the perpetration of the homicide without risk to himself.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal in its full range. The
maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being
no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime. The minimum period of the indeterminate penalty should be
taken from the full range of prision mayor which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
We affirm the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, which is granted without need of proof other than the
commission of a crime.[30] Likewise, the trial court correctly awarded the sum of P20,000 as actual damages,
which was admitted by the appellant.[31] We cannot award moral damages in the absence of proof of mental or
physical suffering on the part of the heirs of the victim.[32]
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the appellant Joseph Cajurao
is convicted of HOMICIDE under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[8]

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended
party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and
violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[9]

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended
party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and
violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[10]

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52

That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old
offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

People V Bulagao 658 scra 746

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[11]
Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00560, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the accusedappellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7)
counts of rape against the private complainant AAA.[3]

On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged[4] with eight (8) counts of rape in separate
informations, the accusatory portions of which state:

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46

That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the offended party, actuated by
lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said
[AAA], who was then only eight (8) years old, without her consent and against her will.

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47

That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old
offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[12] (Emphases ours.)

During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2000, he entered a plea of not guilty.[13] On
March 13, 2001, the pre-trial conference of the cases was conducted and the parties stipulated on the identity of
the accused-appellant in all the cases, the minority of the victim and the fact that the accused appellant is the
uncle of the victim.[14]

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[5]
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed by the accused and his counsel. The cases
were then heard on consolidated trial.
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended
party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and
violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[6]

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48

That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended
party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and
violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[7]

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended
party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and
violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges against the accused-appellant. AAA
testified that she was born on November 1, 1987.[15] In one afternoon when she was only eight years old, she
stated that the accused-appellant raped her inside their house. She could not remember, though, the exact
month and date of the incident. The accused-appellant stripped off her shorts, panties and shirt and went on top
of her. He had his clothes on and only pulled down his zipper. He then pulled out his organ, put it in her vagina
and did the pumping motion. AAA felt pain but she did not know if his organ penetrated her vagina. When he
pulled out his organ, she did not see any blood. She did so only when she urinated.[16]

AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for five times on different nights. The
accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAAs neighbor.
He came to AAAs house, took off her panty and went on top of her. She could not see what he was wearing as it
was nighttime. He made her hold his penis then he left. When asked again how the accused-appellant raped her
for five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty, went on top of her and
pumped. She felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain.
AAA said that she recognized the accused-appellant as her assailant since it was a moonlit night and their
window was only covered by cloth. He entered through the kitchen as the door therein was detached.[17]

AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999 at nighttime. He kissed her
and then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her chest
because he was heavy. She did not know if his penis penetrated her vagina. She related that the accusedappellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said that she did not tell anybody about the
rapes because the accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint when he
proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD.[18]

After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence, consisting of: (1) Exhibit A
- the Medico-Legal Report,[19] which contained the results of the medical examination conducted on AAA by Dr.
Rommel Capungcol and Dr. Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit B - the Social Case Study
Report[20] pertaining to AAAs case, which was issued by the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office
of the Province of Leyte.

The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:

P. E. Findings:

Surg. Findings:

- (-) Physical injuries.

categorical and candid testimony that she was raped eight times by the accused-appellant. The Court of
Appeals also agreed with the ruling of the RTC that AAAs charges of rape conformed with the physical evidence
and the accused-appellants uncorroborated defense of alibi could not stand against the positive identification
made by AAA.

OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of rape since 8 year old for so many times. last act was March 1999.

O:

Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia grossly normal.

Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9 oclock position

As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled that the relationship of the accused-appellant
to AAA was both alleged in the informations and admitted by the accused-appellant. The appellate court,
however, differed in appreciating against the accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of AAAs minority.
The lone testimony of AAA on the said circumstance was held to be an insufficient proof therefor. The
aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also ruled to be inapplicable as it was not shown that the same was
purposely sought by the accused-appellant or that it facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape. In view of
the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages in
favor of AAA.

Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.

Internal Exam:

The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[32] of the above decision and the same was given due course by
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[33] dated May 27, 2008.

Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE[21]

On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice.[34] Thereafter, in a Manifestation and
Motion[35] filed on December 24, 2008, the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed
that it be excused from filing a supplemental brief. On February 3, 2009, the accused-appellant submitted a
Supplemental Brief.[36]
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the witness stand to deny the informations filed
against him and to refute the testimony of AAA. He testified that when the first incident of rape allegedly
happened in 1995, he was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he worked in
Sagkahan, Tacloban City as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he stayed there up to 1996. He stated
that he was working in Tacloban City when the alleged rapes happened in the municipality of XXX. When he
would go home from Tacloban, he would stay at the house of a certain Fred Antoni. He did not go to the house of
AAA as the latters parents were his enemies. He said that he had a quarrel with AAAs parents because he did
not work with them in the ricefields. He further recounted that in July 1999, he was also living in Tacloban City
and worked there as a dishwasher at a restaurant. He worked there from 1998 up to September 1999. The
accused-appellant likewise stated that in August 1999, he was still working at the same restaurant in Tacloban
City. While working there, he did not go home to XXX as he was busy with work. He denied that he would have
drinking sprees with AAAs stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies.[22]

On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of AAA was his sister and they were close
to each other. He said that his parents were still alive in 1995 up to October 1999 and the latter then resided at
Calaasan, Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated that his parents house was about two kilometers away from the
house of AAA. While he was working at the restaurant in Tacloban City, he would visit his parents once every
month, mainly on Sundays.[23]

The Issues

In the accused-appellants brief, the following issues were invoked:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

II
The Judgment of the RTC
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7, rendered a Decision convicting the accusedappellant as follows:
III
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended,
and further amended by R.A. 8353 (Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) the Court found
accused HENRY ARPON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ONE COUNT OF STATUTORY RAPE and
SEVEN COUNTS OF RAPE charged under the informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of
DEATH, and to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each count of
Rape and pay moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and pay the cost.[24]
(Emphases in the original.)

The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The fact that AAA was in tears when she testified
convinced the trial court of the truthfulness of her rape charges against the accused-appellant. If there were
inconsistencies in AAAs testimony, the trial court deemed the same understandable considering that AAA was
pitted against a learned opposing counsel. The delay in the reporting of the rape incidents was not also an
indication that the charges were fabricated. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the findings of the medico-legal
officer confirmed that she was indeed raped. The accused-appellants defense of alibi was likewise disregarded
by the trial court, declaring that it was not physically impossible for him to be present in XXX at any time of the
day after working hours while he was working in Tacloban City. The trial court stated that the accused-appellant
was positively identified by AAA as the person who sexually abused her and she held no grudge against him.
The trial court imposed the penalty of death as it found that AAA was less than 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the rape incidents and the accused-appellant was her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the
third civil degree. The trial court also appreciated against the accused-appellant the aggravating circumstances of
abuse of confidence and nighttime.

The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] of the RTC Decision, asserting that the trial court
failed to consider his minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in his direct examination, the
accused-appellant claimed that he was born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17 years old
when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999, respectively. In a Resolution[26] dated
November 6, 2002, the trial court denied the accused-appellants motion, holding that the latter failed to
substantiate with clear and convincing evidence his allegation of minority.

The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were docketed as G.R. Nos. 165201-08.[27] The
parties then filed their respective briefs.[28] On February 7, 2006, we resolved[29] to transfer the cases to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[30] The cases were docketed in the appellate court
as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.[37]

The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give weight to the incredible testimony of
AAA. He alleges that AAA could not state with consistency the exact date when she was first supposedly raped,
as well as her age at that time. The accused-appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the dates of the
other incidents of rape charged, all of which were allegedly described in a uniform manner. Contrary to the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that the above inconsistencies cannot merely be
discounted as insignificant. He further insists that the qualifying circumstances of AAAs minority and her
relationship to the accused-appellant were not duly proven by the prosecution. The accused-appellant, thus,
prays for a judgment of acquittal.

The Ruling of the Court

After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to deny the appeal, but with a
modification of the penalties and the amount of indemnities awarded.

To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape
and seven (7) counts of qualified rape.

Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in
1995 when AAA was only eight years old. However, the accused-appellant points out that the prosecution failed
to substantiate the said fact as AAAs testimony thereon was too inconsistent and incredible to be worthy of any
belief. He explains that AAA initially claimed that she was raped for the first time when she was eight years old.
Nonetheless, during her testimony regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in July 1999, she said that the
accused did the same thing that he did to her when she was only seven years old. On her redirect examination,
AAA then stated that she was first raped in 1998 when she was eleven (11) years old.

Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape by sexual intercourse as follows:
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed decision, decreeing thus:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in
Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53 is AFFIRMED with modification awarding exemplary damages to
[AAA] in the amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos for each count of rape and clarification that
the separate award of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to each count of
rape. The death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.[31]

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant in the testimony of
AAA were not sufficient to discredit her. The appellate court held that the exact age of AAA when the incidents of
rape occurred no longer mattered, as she was still a minor at the time. More significant was her straightforward,

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of rape. She made no reference whatsoever
to the other four instances of rape that were likewise supposedly committed in the month of July 1999.
In particular, Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements of which are:
(1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented.[38]

The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in August 1999. AAA narrated only one
incident of rape in this manner:

The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act No. 8353,[39] or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
which took effect on October 22, 1997.[40] Prior to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code,[41] which provides:

ART. 335.
When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:

1.

By using force or intimidation;

2.

When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3.

When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

In People v. Macafe,[42] we explained the concept of statutory rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
in this wise:

Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing
rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Hence,
force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account
of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from
good.[43] (Emphasis ours.)

Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned provisions of law are essentially the same.
Thus, whether the first incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before the amendment of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the
prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the age of AAA at the time of the
commission of the rape.

Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.[44]
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for
acquittal.[45]

As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAAs testimony. On this
matter, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Condes[46] that:

Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their
respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often
accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying.
Her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant
or full realization of an oath" are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity.
The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to
weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even
more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the [Court of Appeals].[47]

It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that the law requires to be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the law
demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant's presumption of innocence.[52] Thus, including the
first incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when the accused-appellant
had carnal knowledge of her.

The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA described the incidents of rape in a uniform
manner does not convince this Court. To our mind, AAAs narration of the sexual abuses committed by the
accused-appellant contained an adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of rape, i.e., that
he placed his organ in her private part.[53] Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim of a savage
crime cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of every lurid detail of a
frightening experience a verity born[e] out of human nature and experience.[54]

We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellants defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. Alibi
is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the
accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the
time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime when it was committed.[55] [S]ince alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail
over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated
the crime.[56]

In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial court that:

The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers and can be negotiated by passenger bus in less
than one (1) hour, hence, it is not impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX] at any time of the day after
working hours while working in Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day off every Sunday, which according to
him he spent in [XXX], Leyte.

The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person who sexually molested her beginning that
afternoon of 1995, and subsequently thereafter in the coming years up to August 1999. She can not be mistaken
on the identity of the accused, because the first sexual molestation happened during the daytime, besides, she is
familiar with him being her uncle, the brother of her mother.[57]

Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-appellant that AAA may have been prompted
to falsely testify against him (accused-appellant) in view of the latters quarrel with AAAs parents when he refused
to work with them in the rice fields.[58] Aside from being uncorroborated, we find the same specious and
implausible. Where the charges against the appellant involve a heinous offense, a minor disagreement, even if
true, does not amount to a sufficient justification for dragging a young girl's honor to a merciless public scrutiny
that a rape trial brings in its wake.[59]

As to the accused-appellants objection that there was no proof of the age of the victim, we affirm the trial
courts finding that the prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA when the incidents of rape were
committed. The testimony of AAA that she was born on November 1, 1987,[60] the voluntary stipulation of the
accused, with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority of the victim during pre-trial and his testimony
regarding his recollection of the age of the victim,[61] his own niece, all militate against accused-appellants
theory. In People v. Pruna,[62] the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of
live birth of such party.
In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and we found no cogent reason to
disturb the finding of the RTC that the accused-appellant indeed committed the first incident of rape charged.
AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes. With tears in her eyes,
she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as follows:

[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]

The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol and Dr.
Gagala, who found old, healed, incomplete hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA. [W]hen the
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there
has been carnal knowledge.[49]

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;
Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July 1999, the Court disagrees with
the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. The testimony of AAA on the said
incidents is as follows:

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.

xxxx

ATTY. SABARRE:

Q:

You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights how did he rape you?

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or
relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. (Emphases ours.)

Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the witness stand (when she was 14
years old), the victim, as to her body and facial features, was indeed a minor.[63]

That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or intimidation need no longer
be belabored upon. [I]n rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, step-father, uncle, or the
common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.[64]

objection to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary evidence to dispute the same.
Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the accused-appellants minority in ascertaining
the appropriate penalty.

Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20,
2006, the said law is still applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:

SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons who have been convicted
and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18)
years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall
likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions
provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if
they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.

Penalties

On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
punishes the crime of rape with reclusion perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides that:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law-spouse of the parent
of the victim. (Emphases ours.)

People v. Sarcia[73] further stressed that [w]ith more reason, the Act should apply to [a] case wherein the
conviction by the lower court is still under review.

Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in
providing that:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case,
such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code relevantly recites:

ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall
be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphases ours.)

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility
in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,[74] i.e., from under nine years of age and
above nine years of age and under fifteen (who acted without discernment) - to fifteen years old or under and
above fifteen but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability.[75]

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent
of the victim. (Emphases ours.)

The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the three (3) counts of rape
committed by the accused-appellant. As a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence
of the victims minority and her relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[65] In the instant case, the informations alleged that AAA was less than eighteen (18) years of age when
the incidents of rape occurred and the accused-appellant is her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third
civil degree. The said circumstances were also admitted by the accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference
of the case and again admitted by him during his testimony.[66]

In People v. Pepito,[67] the Court explained that [t]he purpose of entering into a stipulation or admission of facts
is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be
disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These admissions during the
pre-trial conference are worthy of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the admissions made by appellant therein
must be given weight. Consequently, for the first incident of rape, regardless of whether the same occurred in
1995 or in 1998, the imposition of the death penalty is warranted. For the second and third counts of rape, the
imposable penalty is also death.

Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the accused-appellant the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority. Although this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, we
still take cognizance of the same in accordance with the settled rule that [i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws
open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that
may be found in the appealed judgment.[68]

Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a child in conflict with the
law,[69] viz:

SEC. 7. Determination of Age. The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority.
He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years
of age or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In
case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,[70] we clarified that, in the past, the Court deemed sufficient the
testimonial evidence regarding the minority and age of the accused provided the following conditions concur,
namely: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or
similar documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused
and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without any
objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused's and/or
his relatives' testimonies are untrue.[71]

In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on February 23, 1982 and that he was
only 13 years old when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995.[72] Other than his testimony, no
other evidence was presented to prove the date of his birth. However, the records of this case show neither any

Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was
allegedly committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he was only 13
years old at that time. In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident
of rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt therein should be
resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.[76] The Court, thus, exempts the accusedappellant from criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.

For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the accused-appellant was
already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted with discernment.
In Madali v. People,[77] the Court had the occasion to reiterate that [d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a
minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In
this case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by the
testimony of AAA, which we had already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not tell
anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant because the latter told her
that he would kill her mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal
his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well that what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the
consequences thereof.

Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in
conformity with our ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes
of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of
death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty
imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.

Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the circumstance of his minority,
the latter would have been entitled to a suspension of sentence for the second and third counts of rape under
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which reads:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing
the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be supplied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose
the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.

Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the instant case given that the
accused-appellant is now about 29 years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to the
application of a suspended sentence, namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of 21. The said provision
states:

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence,
or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years. (Emphasis ours.)

Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the
accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and
seven (7) counts of rape against the private complainant AAA.3[3]
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged4[4] with eight (8) counts of rape in
separate informations, the accusatory portions of which state:
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46

Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344 is warranted in the instant case,
to wit:

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in
conflict with the law may after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of Corrections], in coordination with the
[Department of Social Welfare and Development].

Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second and third incidents of rape shall not be
affected by the above disposition and the same shall be enforced in accordance with law and the
pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence.

That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX],

Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the offended party, actuated by lust,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], who was then only eight (8) years old, without her
consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.5[5]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended
party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.6[6]

Civil Liability
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.[78] that [c]ivil indemnity is mandatory when rape is
found to have been committed. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of P75,000.00 to the rape
victim as civil indemnity for each count. We also explained in Sarcia that [t]he litmus test x x x in the
determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted
the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.[79] The trial courts award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is therefore
increased to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape committed in the instant case.

Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified without need of proof other than the fact of rape
because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries [from the experience she underwent].[80] We
also increase the trial courts award of P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape herein
established in keeping with the recent case law.[81]

Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages. As held in People v. Llanas, Jr.,[82]
[t]he award of exemplary damages is also proper not only to deter outrageous conduct, but also in view of the
aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship surrounding the commission of the offense, both of which
were alleged in the information and proved during the trial. The appellate courts award of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is raised to P30,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape in keeping with the current
jurisprudence on the matter.[83]

That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of

[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended
party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.7[7]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended
party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.8[8]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 8, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1)
For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla is hereby
EXEMPTED from criminal liability.

(2)
For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each count.

(3)
As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA for each of the three (3) counts of
rape P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus
legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision.

(4)
The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with
Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

People v Arpon 662 scra 506

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed before Us is the Decision1[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00560, which affirmed with modification the Decision2[2] dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of

[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended
party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.9[9]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended
party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.10[10]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality
of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-yearold offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

eight years old, she stated that the accused-appellant raped her inside their house. She could not remember,
though, the exact month and date of the incident. The accused-appellant stripped off her shorts, panties and shirt
and went on top of her. He had his clothes on and only pulled down his zipper. He then pulled out his organ, put
it in her vagina and did the pumping motion. AAA felt pain but she did not know if his organ penetrated her
vagina. When he pulled out his organ, she did not see any blood. She did so only when she urinated.16[16]
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for five times on
different nights. The accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house
of AAAs neighbor. He came to AAAs house, took off her panty and went on top of her. She could not see what
he was wearing as it was nighttime. He made her hold his penis then he left. When asked again how the
accused-appellant raped her for five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty,
went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated,
thereafter, she felt pain. AAA said that she recognized the accused-appellant as her assailant since it was a
moonlit night and their window was only covered by cloth. He entered through the kitchen as the door therein
was detached.17[17]
AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999 at nighttime.
He kissed her and then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in
her chest because he was heavy. She did not know if his penis penetrated her vagina. She related that the
accused-appellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said that she did not tell anybody
about the rapes because the accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint
when he proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD.18[18]
After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence, consisting
of: (1) Exhibit A - the Medico-Legal Report,19[19] which contained the results of the medical examination
conducted on AAA by Dr. Rommel Capungcol and Dr. Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit
B - the Social Case Study Report20[20] pertaining to AAAs case, which was issued by the Municipal Social
Welfare and Development Office of the Province of Leyte.
The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:
P. E. Findings:

Surg. Findings:

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47

- (-) Physical
injuries.
OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of
rape since 8 year old for so
many times. last act was March
1999.

That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality

of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-yearold offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

O:
Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia grossly normal.
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete
laceration at 3 & 9 oclock
position
Speculum Exam: not done due

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim

is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.11[11]

to resistance.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.12[12] (Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2000, he entered a plea of not
guilty.13[13] On March 13, 2001, the pre-trial conference of the cases was conducted and the parties stipulated
on the identity of the accused-appellant in all the cases, the minority of the victim and the fact that the accused
appellant is the uncle of the victim.14[14]
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed by the accused and his
counsel. The cases were then heard on consolidated trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges against the accusedappellant. AAA testified that she was born on November 1, 1987.15[15] In one afternoon when she was only

Internal Exam:
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa:
= NEGATIVE21[21]
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the witness stand to deny the
informations filed against him and to refute the testimony of AAA. He testified that when the first incident of rape
allegedly happened in 1995, he was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he worked
in Sagkahan, Tacloban City as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he stayed there up to 1996. He
stated that he was working in Tacloban City when the alleged rapes happened in the municipality of XXX. When
he would go home from Tacloban, he would stay at the house of a certain Fred Antoni. He did not go to the
house of AAA as the latters parents were his enemies. He said that he had a quarrel with AAAs parents
because he did not work with them in the ricefields. He further recounted that in July 1999, he was also living in
Tacloban City and worked there as a dishwasher at a restaurant. He worked there from 1998 up to September
1999. The accused-appellant likewise stated that in August 1999, he was still working at the same restaurant in
Tacloban City. While working there, he did not go home to XXX as he was busy with work. He denied that he
would have drinking sprees with AAAs stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies.22[22]

On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of AAA was his sister and
they were close to each other. He said that his parents were still alive in 1995 up to October 1999 and the latter
then resided at Calaasan, Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated that his parents house was about two kilometers
away from the house of AAA. While he was working at the restaurant in Tacloban City, he would visit his parents
once every month, mainly on Sundays.23[23]

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed decision, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46
to 2001-01-53 is AFFIRMED with modification awarding exemplary damages to
[AAA] in the amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos for each
count of rape and clarification that the separate award of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to each count of rape.
The death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in accord with Rep.
Act No. 9346.31[31]

The Judgment of the RTC

On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7, rendered a Decision convicting the
accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and
266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and further amended by R.A.
8353 (Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) the Court found
accused HENRY ARPON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ONE COUNT
OF STATUTORY RAPE and SEVEN COUNTS OF RAPE charged under the
informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and to
indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for
each count of Rape and pay moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos and pay the cost.24[24] (Emphases in the original.)

The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The fact that AAA was in tears when
she testified convinced the trial court of the truthfulness of her rape charges against the accused-appellant. If
there were inconsistencies in AAAs testimony, the trial court deemed the same understandable considering that
AAA was pitted against a learned opposing counsel. The delay in the reporting of the rape incidents was not also
an indication that the charges were fabricated. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the findings of the medico-legal
officer confirmed that she was indeed raped. The accused-appellants defense of alibi was likewise disregarded
by the trial court, declaring that it was not physically impossible for him to be present in XXX at any time of the
day after working hours while he was working in Tacloban City. The trial court stated that the accused-appellant
was positively identified by AAA as the person who sexually abused her and she held no grudge against him.
The trial court imposed the penalty of death as it found that AAA was less than 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the rape incidents and the accused-appellant was her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the
third civil degree. The trial court also appreciated against the accused-appellant the aggravating circumstances of
abuse of confidence and nighttime.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration25[25] of the RTC Decision, asserting
that the trial court failed to consider his minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in his direct
examination, the accused-appellant claimed that he was born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13
and 17 years old when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999, respectively. In a
Resolution26[26] dated November 6, 2002, the trial court denied the accused-appellants motion, holding that the
latter failed to substantiate with clear and convincing evidence his allegation of minority.

The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant in
the testimony of AAA were not sufficient to discredit her. The appellate court held that the exact age of AAA when
the incidents of rape occurred no longer mattered, as she was still a minor at the time. More significant was her
straightforward, categorical and candid testimony that she was raped eight times by the accused-appellant. The
Court of Appeals also agreed with the ruling of the RTC that AAAs charges of rape conformed with the physical
evidence and the accused-appellants uncorroborated defense of alibi could not stand against the positive
identification made by AAA.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled that the relationship of the
accused-appellant to AAA was both alleged in the informations and admitted by the accused-appellant. The
appellate court, however, differed in appreciating against the accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of
AAAs minority. The lone testimony of AAA on the said circumstance was held to be an insufficient proof therefor.
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also ruled to be inapplicable as it was not shown that the same
was purposely sought by the accused-appellant or that it facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape. In view
of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages
in favor of AAA.
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal32[32] of the above decision and the same was
given due course by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution33[33] dated May 27, 2008.
On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and required the parties to file
their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice.34[34] Thereafter, in a
Manifestation and Motion35[35] filed on December 24, 2008, the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, prayed that it be excused from filing a supplemental brief. On February 3, 2009, the accusedappellant submitted a Supplemental Brief.36[36]
The Issues
In the accused-appellants brief, the following issues were invoked:

The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were docketed as G.R. Nos.
165201-08.27[27] The parties then filed their respective briefs.28[28] On February 7, 2006, we resolved29[29] to
transfer the cases to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.30[30] The cases were
docketed in the appellate court as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560.

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH.37[37]

of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed
incapacity to discern evil from good.43[43] (Emphasis ours.)
The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give weight to the
incredible testimony of AAA. He alleges that AAA could not state with consistency the exact date when she was
first supposedly raped, as well as her age at that time. The accused-appellant also avers that AAA could not
remember the dates of the other incidents of rape charged, all of which were allegedly described in a uniform
manner. Contrary to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that the above
inconsistencies cannot merely be discounted as insignificant. He further insists that the qualifying circumstances
of AAAs minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant were not duly proven by the prosecution. The
accused-appellant, thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to deny the appeal, but
with a modification of the penalties and the amount of indemnities awarded.
To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant guilty of one (1) count
of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of qualified rape.
Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first incident of rape was alleged to
have occurred in 1995 when AAA was only eight years old. However, the accused-appellant points out that the
prosecution failed to substantiate the said fact as AAAs testimony thereon was too inconsistent and incredible to
be worthy of any belief. He explains that AAA initially claimed that she was raped for the first time when she was
eight years old. Nonetheless, during her testimony regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in July 1999, she
said that the accused did the same thing that he did to her when she was only seven years old. On her redirect
examination, AAA then stated that she was first raped in 1998 when she was eleven (11) years old.
Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape by sexual
intercourse as follows:
ART.

266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.

Rape is

committed

Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned provisions of law are
essentially the same. Thus, whether the first incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before
the amendment of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of
1997, the prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the age of AAA at the time of
the commission of the rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, the date of the commission of the rape is not
an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman.44[44] Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are
not grounds for acquittal.45[45]
As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAAs
testimony. On this matter, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Condes46[46] that:
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision
hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial
court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often
accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness'
deportment and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of conscious
shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full
realization of an oath" are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if
witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which,
if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be
respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even
more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the [Court of
Appeals].47[47]

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under

any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise

In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and we found no
cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that the accused-appellant indeed committed the first incident of
rape charged. AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes. With
tears in her eyes, she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as follows:

unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of

[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]

authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
In particular, Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the
elements of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is
under twelve (12) years of age or is demented.38[38]
The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act No. 8353,39[39] or the AntiRape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997.40[40] Prior to this date, the crime of rape was
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,41[41] which provides:
ART. 335.
When and how rape is committed. Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1.
2.
otherwise unconscious; and
3.
or is demented.

By using force or intimidation;

When the woman is deprived of reason or
When the woman is under twelve years of age

In People v. Macafe,42[42] we explained the concept of statutory rape under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code in this wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape
as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes
in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old.
Hence, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is
the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law
presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account

The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol
and Dr. Gagala, who found old, healed, incomplete hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA. [W]hen the
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there
has been carnal knowledge.48[49]
Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July 1999, the Court
disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. The testimony of
AAA on the said incidents is as follows:

From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of rape. She made no
reference whatsoever to the other four instances of rape that were likewise supposedly committed in the month of
July 1999.
The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in August 1999. AAA
narrated only one incident of rape in this manner:
A:

That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked his

name answered Henry Arpon).49[51]

It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that the law
requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the exacting test of moral
certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant's presumption of
innocence.50[52] Thus, including the first incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three
instances when the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her.

As to the accused-appellants objection that there was no proof of the age of the victim, we affirm
the trial courts finding that the prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA when the incidents of rape
were committed. The testimony of AAA that she was born on November 1, 1987,58[60] the voluntary stipulation
of the accused, with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority of the victim during pre-trial and his testimony
regarding his recollection of the age of the victim,59[61] his own niece, all militate against accused-appellants
theory. In People v. Pruna,60[62] the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:

The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA described the incidents of rape
in a uniform manner does not convince this Court. To our mind, AAAs narration of the sexual abuses committed
by the accused-appellant contained an adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of rape, i.e.,
that he placed his organ in her private part.51[53] Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim of a
savage crime cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of every lurid detail of
a frightening experience a verity born[e] out of human nature and experience.52[54]

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is

an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellants defense of alibi deserves scant
consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit
approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs
criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime when it was committed.53[55] [S]ince alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it
cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused
perpetrated the crime.54[56]

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown

to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear
and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic

documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the
date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial court that:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what

is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers

and can be negotiated by passenger bus in less than one (1) hour, hence, it is
not impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX] at any time of the day after
working hours while working in Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day off
every Sunday, which according to him he spent in [XXX], Leyte.

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what

is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what
is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person

who sexually molested her beginning that afternoon of 1995, and subsequently
thereafter in the coming years up to August 1999. She can not be mistaken on
the identity of the accused, because the first sexual molestation happened during
the daytime, besides, she is familiar with him being her uncle, the brother of her
mother.55[57]

Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-appellant that AAA may have been
prompted to falsely testify against him (accused-appellant) in view of the latters quarrel with AAAs parents when
he refused to work with them in the rice fields.56[58] Aside from being uncorroborated, we find the same
specious and implausible. Where the charges against the appellant involve a heinous offense, a minor
disagreement, even if true, does not amount to a sufficient justification for dragging a young girl's honor to a
merciless public scrutiny that a rape trial brings in its wake.57[59]

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic

document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning
the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it
is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age
of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. (Emphases ours.)

Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the witness stand (when
she was 14 years old), the victim, as to her body and facial features, was indeed a minor.61[63]
That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or intimidation need
no longer be belabored upon. [I]n rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, step-father, uncle, or
the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.62[64]
Penalties
On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, punishes the crime of rape with reclusion perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides
that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common lawspouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code relevantly recites:
preceding

ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next

article
shall
be
punished
by
reclusion
perpetua.

xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the three (3) counts of
rape committed by the accused-appellant. As a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the
concurrence of the victims minority and her relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven beyond
reasonable doubt.63[65] In the instant case, the informations alleged that AAA was less than eighteen (18)
years of age when the incidents of rape occurred and the accused-appellant is her uncle, a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree. The said circumstances were also admitted by the accused-appellant
during the pre-trial conference of the case and again admitted by him during his testimony.64[66]
In People v. Pepito,65[67] the Court explained that [t]he purpose of entering into a stipulation or
admission of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts
which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These
admissions during the pre-trial conference are worthy of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the admissions made
by appellant therein must be given weight. Consequently, for the first incident of rape, regardless of whether the
same occurred in 1995 or in 1998, the imposition of the death penalty is warranted. For the second and third
counts of rape, the imposable penalty is also death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the accused-appellant the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Although this matter was not among the issues raised before the
Court, we still take cognizance of the same in accordance with the settled rule that [i]n a criminal case, an appeal
throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned,
that may be found in the appealed judgment.66[68]
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a child in conflict
with the law,67[69] viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. The child in conflict with the law
shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a
child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years of
age or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the
absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the
child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it
shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,68[70] we clarified that, in the past, the Court deemed sufficient
the testimonial evidence regarding the minority and age of the accused provided the following conditions concur,
namely: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or
similar documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused
and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without any
objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused's and/or
his relatives' testimonies are untrue.69[71]
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on February 23, 1982 and
that he was only 13 years old when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995.70[72] Other than his

testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the date of his birth. However, the records of this case
show neither any objection to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary evidence to
dispute the same. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the accused-appellants
minority in ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic Act No. 9344 took effect
on May 20, 2006, the said law is still applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen
(18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided
under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be
immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable
law.
People v. Sarcia71[73] further stressed that [w]ith more reason, the Act should apply to [a] case
wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is
explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to
an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years
of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case,
such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with
this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age limit of criminal
irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,72[74] i.e., from under nine years
of age and above nine years of age and under fifteen (who acted without discernment) - to fifteen years old or
under and above fifteen but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from criminal
liability.73[75]
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46
was allegedly committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he was only
13 years old at that time. In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first
incident of rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt therein
should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.74[76] The Court, thus, exempts
the accused-appellant from criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6
of Republic Act No. 9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the accusedappellant was already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted with
discernment. In Madali v. People,75[77] the Court had the occasion to reiterate that [d]iscernment is that mental
capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case. In this case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by
the testimony of AAA, which we had already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not tell
anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant because the latter told her
that he would kill her mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal
his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well that what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the
consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
in conformity with our ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes
of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of
death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty
imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.

Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the circumstance of his
minority, the latter would have been entitled to a suspension of sentence for the second and third counts of rape
under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child
who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be
supplied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with the
Law.
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the instant case given
that the accused-appellant is now about 29 years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to
the application of a suspended sentence, namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of 21. The said
provision states:

P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is raised to P30,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape in keeping
with the current jurisprudence on the matter.81[83]
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 8,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1)

For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla is hereby
EXEMPTED from criminal liability.

(2)

For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count.

(3)

As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA for each of the three (3) counts
of rape P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the
date of finality of this Decision.

(4)

The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with
Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.
If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the
child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with
the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before
the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether
to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence,
or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until
the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. (Emphasis
ours.)

Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344 is warranted in
the instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu
of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled
by the [Bureau of Corrections], in coordination with the [Department of Social
Welfare and Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second and third incidents of rape
shall not be affected by the above disposition and the same shall be enforced in accordance with law and the
pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence.
Civil Liability
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.76[78] that [c]ivil indemnity is mandatory when
rape is found to have been committed. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of P75,000.00 to
the rape victim as civil indemnity for each count. We also explained in Sarcia that [t]he litmus test x x x in the
determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted
the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.77[79] The trial courts award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is therefore
increased to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape committed in the instant case.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified without need of proof other than the
fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries [from the experience she
underwent].78[80] We also increase the trial courts award of P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3)
counts of rape herein established in keeping with the recent case law.79[81]
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages. As held in People v.
Llanas, Jr.,80[82] [t]he award of exemplary damages is also proper not only to deter outrageous conduct, but
also in view of the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship surrounding the commission of the
offense, both of which were alleged in the information and proved during the trial. The appellate courts award of

People v dijan 383 scra 15

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142682. June 5, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISPULO DIJAN y MACAJIYA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Accused Crispulo Dijan y Macajiya was indicted on 15 April 1998, along with Romualdo Paglinawan and Oliver
Lizardo, for the crime of murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272, of Marikina. The information read:
That on or about the 11th day of April, 1998 in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, while armed with a knife and an ice-pick with intent to kill and by means of treachery and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
ALVARO HILARIO, thereby inflicting upon the latter moral wounds which directly caused his death.i[1]
Upon arraignment, the three accused separately and independently entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged; trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
On the evening of 11 April 1998, about ten oclock, Roderick Silvestre and Alvaro Hilario were at a store located
around the corner of Paraiso and Sumulong Streets in Parang, Marikina City, to buy some cigarettes when they
saw the group of Crispulo Dijan, Romualdo Paglinawan and Oliver Lizardo, passing by the store. The two groups
came to an encounter when Romualdo Paglinawan suddenly confronted Alvaro Hilario for purportedly giving him
a bad stare. Silvestre apologized to the group and, offering them some cigarettes, explained that it was the
natural way Hilario gazed at people. Dijan, Paglinawan and Lizardo then left the place while Silvestre and Hilario
who lived in the same house proceeded home. While Silvestre and Hilario were walking, the three accused, who
apparently were waiting for the duo, suddenly ganged up on, and took turns in stabbing, Hilario. At that point,
Hilario, who was walking slightly ahead of Silvestre, cried out and told the latter to flee. Silvestre ran away until
he was able to cling to a passing passenger jeepney.
Responding policemen, soon informed of the stabbing incident through radio communication, proceeded to the
crime scene and there found the lifeless body of Hilario sprawled on the ground. After receiving a report on the
identity and the whereabouts of the assailants, the policemen proceeded to a place about 200 meters away from
the site of the stabbing incident. Barangay tanods assisted the police in arresting the suspected assailants. The
following day, 12 April 1998, Dr. Ma. Cristina B. Freyra, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), conducted an autopsy on the victims cadaver. Hilario was found to have sustained several stab wounds,
punctured and incised wounds, and abrasion in various parts of the body which caused his death. The medicolegal officer concluded that the wounds could have been inflicted by two assailants with the use of two singlebladed weapons and an icepick.
The version of the Defense The defense claimed that on the night of the incident, Crispulo Dijan and his two companions, Romualdo
Paglinawan and Oliver Lizardo, were walking on their way home when they dropped by a store to buy some
cigarettes. There, they met two persons, later identified to be Alvaro Hilario and Roderick Silvestre. who were
partaking of drinks. Paglinawan accosted one of the duo for allegedly sharply staring at him but the other
apologized to their group and explained that his companion was already drunk. Paglinawan himself then also
made an apology, and everybody shook hands. Dijan and his friends started to walk along Paraiso Street. When
Dijan happened to look behind, he was surprised to see Paglinawan being stabbed with a knife by Alvaro Hilario.
He saw that when Paglinawan was hit on the left arm, the two grappled for the knifes possession. Seeing
Roderick Silvestre to have pulled out an icepick himself, Dijan promptly held his hand. After disarming Silvestre,
Dijan saw Paglinawan still grappling with Hilario for the knifes possession. Realizing that Paglinawan was no
match for Hilario, the latter being much taller than Paglinawan, Dijan helped his friend and stabbed Hilario with
the icepick he wrestled away from Silvestre. He assisted Paglinawan in getting home which was only about 20
meters away from the scene of the crime.
Dijans two co-accused, Oliver Morales Lizardo and Romualdo Paglinawan, gave a similar account. Lizardo
claimed that he ran away when Silvestre, holding an icepick, rushed towards them. Romualdo Paglinawan said
that, when their group was already at the corner of Paraiso and Sumulong streets, he heard rushing steps of
slippers and, turning his head around, Hilario suddenly stabbed him with a knife. He was able to evade the thrust
directed on his chest, wounding him instead on his left forearm. The two grappled for the knifes possession for
about five minutes until he was weakened by the bleeding of his wound. Dijan was able to timely pull away
Hilario. Dijan then stabbed Hilario. Paglinawan stood up and walked home followed by Dijan. He requested
Dijan to bring him to the hospital for treatment but it was the policemen, who meanwhile arrived, who brought him
to the hospital. After his wounds were treated, he was taken to the police headquarters.
The defense also presented Lani Sarmiento and Dr. Alfredo Garcia to the stand. Sarmiento claimed that when
she and a companion passed by Lindas Bakery on the night of the incident, they noticed two male persons, a tall
fellow and the other of average height, overtake them causing her to exclaim Fe, tingnan mo yan, parang
nagmamadali, parang galit sa mundo.ii[2] Nearing Sumulong Street, they saw the two men approach three other
male persons who were walking towards Paraiso Street. Suddenly, the tall guy pulled out a knife and gave a
stabbing thrust to one of the three men. When they reached home, they learned that it was their Kuya Jojo or
Romualdo Paglinawan who had been stabbed. Dr. Garcia testified having treated Romualdo Paglinawan on 11
April 1998 at the Amang Rodriguez Medical Centre for a stab wound at the right forearm.
The Judgment of the Trial Court. The trial court saw the case for the prosecution insofar as accused-appellant Crispulo M. Dijan was concerned
whom the court found guilty of the crime of murder, acquitting thereby Dijans two co-accused, Romualdo
Paglinawan and Oliver Lizardo, based on reasonable doubt; viz:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, accused CRISPULO DIJAN y MACAJIYA is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery as charged against him and is
ordered to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Alvaro Hilario the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos; to pay the said heirs the amount of Thirty Four Thousand Two
Hundred (P34,200.00) Pesos as funeral expenses; and the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as
moral and exemplary damages. The accused ROMUALDO PAGLINAWAN y RICAMORA and OLIVER LIZARDO
y MORALES are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged against them for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Jail Warden of the Marikina City Jail is ordered to immediately release
the persons of Romualdo Paglinawan and Oliver Lizardo unless validly held for some other offense.iii[3]
Appealing his conviction to this Court, accused-appellant would argue that I.
The trial court erred in finding accused-appellant Crispulo Dijan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder.
II.
Assuming for the sake of argument that accused-appellant is guilty, the trial court erred in
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.iv[4]
A party who invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger has the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence the exculpatory cause that can save him from conviction.v[5] In order to successfully put up

this defense an accused must show (1) the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) that the accused has not been
induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.vi[6] The unlawful aggression must be a continuing
circumstance or must have been existing at the time the defense is made. Once unlawful aggression is found to
have ceased, the one making the defense of a stranger would likewise cease to have any justification for killing,
or even just wounding, the former aggressor.vii[7]
From the defense account, it would appear that Hilario was already disarmed and the unlawful aggression by
Hilario (if indeed he was the aggressor) to have by then been abated, when accused-appellant still delivered the
fatal thrusts on the victim. Paglinawan himself testified:
Q.
And because Crispulo Dijan was already able to take possession of the weapon from Roderick
Silvestre, you yourself was able to take possession of the weapon from Hilario there was no more danger to you
as well as to Crispulo Dijan?
A.
Yes, sir.viii[8]
The number of wounds sustained by the victim would itself likewise negate accused-appellants claim of defense
of a stranger. The autopsy conducted on the corpse would show that the deceased sustained fourteen injuries
consisting of nine stab wounds, three punctured wounds, an incised wound and an abrasion.ix[9] Certainly, the
nature and number of wounds inflicted by an accused on the victim should be significant indicia in determining the
plausibility of the defense plea.x[10]
The Court, however, finds the evidence of the prosecution to be wanting in respect to the qualifying circumstance
of treachery. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting
victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defense himself and thereby ensuring its commission with no risk
to the aggressor.xi[11] The conditions that must concur in order that treachery may be appreciated are: (a) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and (b) that the means of execution are deliberately and consciously adopted.xii[12] These elements must be
proven as indubitably as the killing itself and cannot be deduced from conjecture.xiii[13]
Here, it was not satisfactorily established that the victim was unarmed at the time of the stabbing incident. On the
contrary, the stab wound on the person of Romualdo Paglinawan, a companion and co-accused of herein
appellant, could indicate that the victim might have also been armed. Neither was it made clear that there was no
provocation on the part of the victim.
Accused-appellant can thus only be convicted of the crime of homicide, the penalty for which, under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal that, absent any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should thus be
penalized by an indeterminate sentence of anywhere within the range of prision mayor, or from six years and one
day to 12 years, by way of minimum, and anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period of
from fourteen years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months, by way of maximum.xiv[14]
The award of damages made by the court a quo should be affirmed insofar as the civil indemnity of P50,000.00
and actual damages of P34,200.00 are concerned, the latter being amply supported by receipts.xv[15] The
additional award of moral and exemplary damages should be deleted for lack of factual and legal grounds.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
accused-appellant is only found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years and eleven (11) months and three (3)
days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Alvaro Hilario civil indemnity
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos and actual damages of Thirty-four Thousand Two Hundred (P34,200.00)
Pesos. The award by the trial court of moral and exemplary damages are deleted. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

physical injuries in the following manner:

th

That on or about the 20 day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00

oclock in the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece of
wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon
him physical injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of five (5) days to the
damage and prejudice of the victims heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.87[6]

When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for the charges of parricide88[7] and
slight physical injuries89[8] respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected
to by the defense.90[9] During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar
Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellants family was living in the conjugal home located in
Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.91[10]
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home to
attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peafrancia without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When
their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their
fathers rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home
at around 8 oclock in the evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick
which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemars and Juniors hands and feet tied to a coconut tree,
appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do anything as
she feared for her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting Noemar as the latter was
staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemars head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right
portion of the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive
him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead. However, appellant
refused to believe her. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring
Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a
hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead,

People v sales 658 scra 367

appellant brought his son back to their house.

Noemars wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. His body was never
examined by a doctor.

DECI SIO N
The Version of the Defense

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and
inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.

Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate occasions without the
permission of their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told them not to repeat the misdeed since something untoward
might happen to them. During those times, Noemar and Junior were never physically harmed by their father.

This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision82[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision83[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga,
Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of
parricide and slight physical injuries, respectively. The Information84[3] for parricide contained the following allegations:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00
oclock in the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation and [in] a
fit of anger, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times, the different
parts of the body of his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a [piece of]
wood, measuring more or less one meter in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter,
[thereby] inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the
damage and prejudice of the latters heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.85[4]
On the other hand, the Information86[5] in Criminal Case No. RTC03-789 alleges that appellant inflicted slight

However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents permission on September 16, 2002 and failed
to return for several days. Worse, appellant received information that his sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow
money so that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at 8 oclock in the evening of September
20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since
they were side by side. After whipping his sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and frothing. When

Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which was

Decision98[17] reads as follows:

seven kilometers away from their house.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed
decision dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789 for Parricide
and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.

Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in breathing. The pupils of
Noemars eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed
before this Court.

pain. However, they waited in vain since a vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring
Noemar back to their house.

SO ORDERED.99[18]
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar
died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar

Issues

was brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.
Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures,
Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

hungry or when scolded.

II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES
OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.100[19]

The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain.92[11] Thereafter, appellant surrendered
voluntarily.93[12]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Our Ruling

In a Joint Decision,94[13] the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove that

The appeal is without merit.

appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in the Informations. In the
crime of parricide, the trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since there is no

The Charge of Parricide

proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:

Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to
death. He believes that no father could kill his own son. According to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the

guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No.
RTC03-782 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to
pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

loss of consciousness and froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction where they would
take a vehicle in going to a hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at
this moment that Noemar died, not during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that
Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.

Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC03-789 and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.

The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on children of tender years must
always be with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering

Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided

under the Revised Penal Code. Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive
imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone
preventive imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code.

the proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon
them to remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly
result in sadism.
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family dwelling without

SO ORDERED.95[14]

permission and that was already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a
pedicab thereby putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal96[15] which was given due course in an Order97[16] dated September 21, 2005.

for the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the
children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

head, face and legs. It was only when Noemars body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost consciousness that
appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion of its

subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the childs life. It bears
stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.

Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill
him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1.
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
xxxx

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is
indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime
committed by the perpetrator.101[20] Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical

injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability for the

and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture106[25] which is the essence of voluntary surrender.

death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.

However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Appellants claim that it was Noemars heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. This declaration is self-

Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their

serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac,

escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that

Camarines Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove

immediately caused his death. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated

that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemars cadaver was never examined. Also, even if

cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death

appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his contention, the latters testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with

of the victim.107[26]

his testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar
was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Marias testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.

Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this case.
All the Elements of
Parricide
are
present in the case
at bench.

The Award of
Damages
and
Penalty
for
Parricide
We find proper the trial courts award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.108[27] In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary
awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.109[28]

We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant committed the crime of
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court imposed the penalty of

parricide.

reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

grave a wrong. However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of said mitigating circumstance does not result

Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

to a different penalty since the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating
circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides
in part as follows:

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

accused.102[21]
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. Maria
xxxx

testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a
quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him

3.
When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

the day after. Noemars Death Certificate103[22] was also presented in evidence.

xxxx
There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the deceased. Same is
sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating

younger brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but

circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua

this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part, Junior

and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.110[29]

testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much for
Noemars frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.

The

Charge

Slight
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While Noemars birth certificate was

of

Physical

Injuries

not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be considered.104[23] As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the
father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while under oath.105[24] Maria also testified

The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein

that Noemar and Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the relationship between

appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by

appellant and Noemar.

a physician thereafter.111[30] Maria corroborated her sons testimony.112[31]

Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.
There is Mitigating
Circumstance of
Voluntary
Surrender but not
Lack of Intention to
Commit so Grave
a Wrong

The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the
evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the barangay captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by
appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent to save the authorities the trouble

Juniors testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac Community
Hospital who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings
were (1) muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of Juniors face just below the eye and on both legs, which could have been
caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling both wrist with crust
formation which could have been sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked how long does he
think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks.113[32] But if applied with medication, the injuries would heal in a
week.114[33]

We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was beaten by his father and
that by reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves credence especially since the same is corroborated by the testimony
of his mother, Maria, and supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries.
Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries

We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries sustained by Junior should
heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:
1.
By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries
which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days or shall require medical
attendance during the same period.
xxxx

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be in
its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium
period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that
affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and
RTC03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the
award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Romera V people 434 scra 467
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004]
ARTURO ROMERA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision115[1] dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR. No.
23753, affirming the August 16, 1999 Order116[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24,
in Criminal Case No. 98-1089. The RTC convicted petitioner Arturo Romera of frustrated homicide and
sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to
pay private offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages and P10,000 as attorneys fee.
The Information against petitioner reads:
On October 4, 1998, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, at Sitio Puntod, Barangay Balagnan, Balingasag,
Misamis Oriental, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Roy Mangaya-ay with the use of
a bolo, thus, inflicting a mortal wound on the abdomen of the latter; accused thereby performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the felony of Homicide which was not produced because of the timely and
effective medical attendance administered on the said victim.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249, in relation with Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.117[3]

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial thereafter ensued.
The facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and borne by the records, are as follows:
In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner Arturo Romera was with the victim, Roy Mangaya-ay, and five
other men namely, Eligario Beboy Acenas, Dennis Bobong Mangaya-ay, Ric Mangaya-ay, Bebing Zulueta and
Franklin Generol. They were all headed for Biasong to play volleyball. When they reached Biasong, it was
raining, so they decided to while away time at the house of Ciriaca Capil. Franklin Generol hung a string made of
cigarette foil on Bebing Zuluetas pants and said, Theres a monkey among us. Everybody laughed except Roy
Mangaya-ay, who got angry and chided Franklin Generol to stop lest he make enemies. Bebing Zulueta also got
angry and pointed a finger at Franklin Generol and said, Even if you are stronger and older, if you will be hit by
my fist, you will crawl. Petitioner then stood up and warned everyone, You all watch out in Balaguan. He pulled
Franklin Generol to join him and said, Lets go, there are many boastful people here. Thereafter, petitioner and
Franklin left the group.
At six oclock in the evening, Roy and his companions arrived in Balaguan. On their way home, they passed by
the house of one Antonio Mangaya-ay. In said house, which is about one kilometer away from petitioners own,
they saw petitioner already carrying a bolo waiting for them.
Suddenly, raising the bolo with his right hand, petitioner uttered, Here are the brave ones. Roy and his
companions ran away but Roy slipped on the muddy ground. Petitioner approached Roy and said, Come here,
brave one. He held Roy up by the collar and stabbed him in the stomach. Roy fell unconscious. When he woke
up, he found himself at the provincial hospital where he underwent surgery and stayed for more than three weeks.
After the stabbing incident, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to a certain Tibo Ramoso of the Citizens Armed
Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU). Ramoso accompanied petitioner to the Balingasay police station.
For his part, petitioner testified on what happened as follows:
Petitioner and his family were having dinner in their house at around seven oclock in the evening. Thereafter,
they went to bed. While lying in bed, they heard Roy call petitioner and his wife, asking if they had beer and a
fighter for sale. He did not answer Roy because he knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for petitioner
but when the latters wife told him that petitioner was already asleep, he told her to wake her husband up.
Petitioner went down the house and asked who was at the door. Just as he opened the door for Roy, Roy thrust
his bolo at him. He successfully parried the bolo and asked Roy what it was all about. Roy answered he would
kill petitioner. Petitioner tried to prevent Roy from entering, so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was hacking at
the wall, petitioners wife held the door to allow petitioner to exit in another door to face Roy. He hurled a stone at
Roy, who dodged it. Roy rushed to him and hacked him, but he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo
and stabbed Roy in the stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. According to petitioner, he
ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill him.
The trial court discounted petitioners story of self-defense. It found that when petitioner got hold of the bolo,
there was no more danger to his life. Petitioner was convicted of frustrated homicide. The dispositive part of its
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused ARTURO ROMERA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the offense charged. Consequently, taking into consideration the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the provisions of the [I]ndeterminate Sentence Law, he is
hereby sentenced to a penalty ranging from One (1) year Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay the private
offended party as actual damages, P19,361.15 and another sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fee without,
however, subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.118[4]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning to the trial court the following assignments of error:
1.
FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE THEORY OF SELF DEFENSE.
2.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPRECIATE SPECIAL PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF DEFENSE, ARTICLE 69, REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH LOWER
THE PENALTY BY TWO DEGREES.
3.
FURTHER ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPLY ARTICLE 62 (5) REVISED PENAL CODE,
WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY ONE DEGREE LOWER WITH THE PRESENCE OF TWO OR MORE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.119[5]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment. It pointed out that assuming arguendo that it was the
victim who was the aggressor at the start, the unlawful aggression ceased to exist when petitioner took
possession of the bolo from the victim. Absent unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense
becomes unavailing.
The appellate court also ruled that Article 69120[6] of the Revised Penal Code finds no application in this case. It
explained that there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful
aggression against the person defending himself. It held, however, that petitioner is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender as it was established during trial that after the incident he surrendered
himself to the CAFGU and later on to the police authorities.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals erroneously failed to apply Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, which lowers the imposable penalty
by one degree when two or more mitigating circumstances are present.
Petitioner contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger when the latter woke him up and thrust a bolo at
him without warning as petitioner opened the door. Moreover, by hacking and destroying the bamboo wall of his
house, and endangering the lives of his children, the victim also obfuscated his thinking and reasoning processes,
says the petitioner.
For public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the mitigating circumstances of
provocation and passion or obfuscation are unavailing to petitioner since it was he who initiated the attack. The
OSG insists that it was not the victim who went to petitioners house, but petitioner who went to where the victim
was resting.
We note that while both the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not categorically state who started the attack, it can
be reasonably gleaned from their decisions that it was the victim who initiated the aggressive encounter. This
finding of fact is amply supported by the evidence on record.
Are the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation present in this case?
Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our
view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives
of his wife and children are in danger. Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while
petitioner was still in a fit of rage. In our view, there was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of passion or
obfuscation attended the commission of the offense.
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances.
Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated
together as one mitigating circumstance.121[7] From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both

circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two
separate mitigating circumstances.
Nonetheless, we hold that since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also present, Article 64 (5)
of the Revised Penal Code should be applied, to wit:
ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.
...
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court
shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according
to the number and nature of such circumstances.
...
The penalty for frustrated homicide, pursuant to Article 50122[8] of the Revised Penal Code, is the penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed by law for consummated homicide. The penalty for consummated homicide
is reclusion temporal, hence the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor. There being two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the next
lower penalty, prision correccional, is the next statutory penalty. But following the Indeterminate Sentence Law
herein applicable, the minimum term of the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner for frustrated homicide
should be within the range of arresto mayor in any of its periods or from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months, while the maximum term should be within the range of prision correccional in its medium period or two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, is MODIFIED as far as the penalty imposed is concerned.
Petitioner ARTURO ROMERA is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. He is also
ORDERED to pay the private offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages, and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

premeditation, with treachery and nightime (sic) having been purposely sought
and inside a dwelling, did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
shoot WARLITO RAGUIRAG with an illegally possessed firearm of yet unknown
calibre, inflicting upon the latter fatal gunshot wounds which caused the death of
said WARLITO RAGUIRAG immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

People V Nimuan 645 scra 739

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

NO BAIL RECOMMENDED.

G.R. No. 182458

March 21, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
REX NIMUAN y CACHO, Appellant.

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The trial court found that on 4 May 2000, at about nine oclock in the evening while the victim
Warlito Raguirag was having dinner at home, herein accused Arnold Agcanas entered the former's house through
DECISION

the kitchen door. The accused pointed a gun at the back of the left ear of the victim and shot him point-blank.
Beatriz Raguirag, the victims wife, shouted, We were invaded [sinerrek] by Arnold Agcanas.125[3] Under the

BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal filed by appellant Rex Nimuan y Cacho from the August 16, 2007 decision of the Court of
1
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00844.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
2
3
On August 23, 2004, the appellant was accused of murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo,
La Union.4 The appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment.5 In the trial that followed, an eyewitness Alfredo
Ruiz, the brother of the victim (Jun Ruiz) and the appellants first cousin testified on the details of the crime.
In the afternoon of July 22, 2004, while Alfredo was talking with friends, he saw the victim, the appellant and a
certain Boy Nieva drinking in a neighborhood store in Barangay San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union.6 Later that
afternoon, as Alfredo was walking home along a path inside a mango plantation in the barangay, he spotted the
appellant and the victim about 30 meters ahead of him, walking in the same trail leading to their respective
houses.7 Unaware of his presence, the appellant who was walking a meter behind the victim suddenly hacked
the latter with a bolo.8 Alfredo ran away to seek help when he saw the victim fall to the ground after the attack.9
The postmortem report revealed that the victim died from massive loss of blood due to multiple hack wounds on
his right forearm, face and head.10
The appellant, interposing alibi, claimed that between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. of July 22, 2004, he was watching
television at the house of his uncle, Manuel Dulay, at San Benito Sur when a certain Barangay Captain Cario,
along with a barangay kagawad, arrived and informed him that he was a suspect in the death of the victim. The
appellant and his mother went with the barangay officials to the police station of Aringay, La Union, where he was
detained.11
THE RTC RULING
In its December 29, 2004 Decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty of murder. It gave credence to Alfredos
positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the killing, as supported by the postmortem
examination of the victim. The RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the appellant
hacked the victim by surprise, leaving the latter no opportunity to defend himself. However, it appreciated in the
appellants favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the
RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of 20 years of reclusion temporal maximum to 40 years of
reclusion perpetua imprisonment, and to pay the heirs of the victim the lump sum of P100,000 as civil indemnity
12
and damages.
THE CA RULING
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTCs judgment, giving full respect to the RTC's
assessment of the testimony and the credibility of the eyewitnesses. It rejected the appellants alibi because the
distance between San Benito Sur and the mango plantation where the victim was hacked, was merely 2
kilometers; this distance was not too far away to preclude the possibility of the appellants presence at the locus
criminis. The appellate court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance because the victim was unarmed
and defenseless when the appellant, without warning, attacked him from behind with a bolo. The CA also noted
the number, location and severity of the hack wounds inflicted on the victim, one of which even cut through his
brain and almost severed his head.
The appellate court found that the RTC erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
because the appellant went with the barangay officials not to admit the alleged crime or to voluntarily surrender to
the authorities, but only for verification purposes. Thus, the CA sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua. It
clarified that the lump sum of P100,000 represented P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages. It
also awarded P25,000 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages
due to the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.13
We now rule on the final review of the case.
OUR RULING
We affirm the appellants conviction.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.1wphi1 The records are replete with
evidence establishing the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Alfredos eyewitness account was
corroborated by the postmortem report on the location and severity of the wounds sustained by the victim. Both
the RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the attack was
deliberate, sudden and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to
resist or to defend himself.14 The appellant was correctly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor; the records indicate
that the appellant did not intend to assume responsibility for the death of the victim when he and his mother went
15
with the barangay officials to the police station.
While we affirm the CAs factual findings and the imprisonment imposed, we find it necessary to increase to
P30,000 the amount of exemplary damages, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.16
WHEREFORE, the August 16, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00844 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Rex Nimuan y Cacho is found guilty of murder as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Jun Ruiz P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as
moral damages, P25,000 as temperate damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
People V agcanas 658 scra 842

50-watt light bulb and with only a meter between them, the wife was able to identify the accused, who was the son

DECISION

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSEDAPPELLANT WAS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.

of her cousin.
Around 9:15 in the evening, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Jessie Malvar, SPO4 Bonifacio
Valenciano, SPO1 Marlon Juni and Police Officer (PO) 2 Ramil P. Belong arrived at the scene of the crime and
were informed by Beatriz Raguirag that Arnold Agcanas was the assailant. The police were also informed by
several people that the accused had a relative in Barangay Naiporta, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Thereafter, around ten
oclock in the evening, the police found the accused in the house of his brother, Alejandro Agcanas, who was
actually residing in Barangay San Miguel, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. The accused then went willingly with the police
officers to the police station.
The trial court further found that the crime was aggravated by the qualifying circumstance of
dwelling, given that the crime was committed in the kitchen of the house of the victim. Finally, it held that the
accused shot the victim with an illegally possessed firearm, although it was not presented as evidence. It did not,
however, find the crime attended by the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nighttime, there
being no evidence presented to prove these two.
Thus, on 30 September 2004, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder, qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and the
use of an illegally possessed firearm. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the prosecution was
able to prove the guilt of the accused ARNOLD AGCANAS beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. With the same quantum of
evidence, the aggravating circumstance (sic) of dwelling and the use of an
illegally possessed firearm were duly established. No mitigating circumstance is
accorded to the accused. Hence, the maximum penalty of DEATH is hereby
imposed upon him with all its accessory penalties. Likewise, he is ordered to pay
the widow of the victim WARLITO RAGUIRAG Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages and the costs.
SO ORDERED.126[4]

On intermediate appellate review by the Court of Appeals, the conviction was affirmed. However,
the award of damages was modified based on prevailing jurisprudence. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision

finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS as to damages.
The accused-appellant is ordered to pay the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), as moral damages, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00), as exemplary damages.
In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on
October 15, 2004, amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, let the entire records of this case be elevated to the
Supreme Court for review.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant assigns the following errors for this Court's automatic review:
I.

SERENO, J.:

II.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS LIABLE FOR
THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING HIM GUILTY OF MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE ONLY.
For the automatic review of this Court is the Decision123[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
III.

CR.-H.C. No. 00845 convicting the accused of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME WAS
AGGRAVATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF DWELLING AND ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARM.

pay damages.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 8 May 2000, the provincial prosecutor of Laoag City charged the accused with murder in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Laoag City, under the following Information:124[2]
That on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening of May 4, 2000 at
Brgy. Root, Dingras, Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with evident

After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the findings
of the trial court.

This Court has held in a number of cases that denial and alibi are weak defenses, which cannot
prevail against positive identification.127[5] People v. Caisip128[6] thus held:

Positive identification where categorical and consistent and

without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

Beatriz Raguirag positively identified the accused as the one who had shot her husband. She was
firm and consistent throughout her testimony. This Court does not see any ill motive on her part in testifying
against her own relative regarding the death of her husband. Thus, there is no reason to question her credibility
as a witness.

Fiscal Molina:
Q: You said Madam Witness in the last hearing that (that) was
the time Arnold Agcanas entered(.) (W)hat portion of your house did Arnold
Agcanas enter?
A: In (sic) the kitchen, sir.
Q: In what part (sic) of the kitchen did Arnold Agcanas enter?
A: At (sic) the door, sir.
Q: When you saw Arnold Agcanas enter, what happened next?
A: He immediately shoot (sic) Warlito Raguirag, sir.
Q: What was the place where Arnold Agcanas placed himself
when he shoot (sic) your husband in relation to your husband?
A: At the back of my husband, sir.
...
Q: From the time you saw Arnold Agcanas enter the door of the
kitchen up to the time he actually shoot (sic) your husband how long was it?
A: When he entered the kitchen he immediately shoot (sic) my
husband and left hurriedly, sir.
Q: What part of your house did he exit?
A: (Through) [t]he door of the kitchen, where he entered,
sir.131[9]

On the other hand, the accused miserably failed to satisfy the requirements for an alibi to be
considered plausible. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was likewise impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis at the time of the alleged crime.129[7]

Moreover, the accused was the nephew of the victims wife; thus, an attack from a relative right in
their own home was unexpected. Since the accused was not a stranger to the spouses, the wife did not
immediately demand that he leave as soon as she saw him enter the kitchen.

The accused testified that he was attending the birthday celebration of his brother, Alejandro

The trial court was also correct in ruling that dwelling was an aggravating circumstance. It has

Agcanas, at the time of the incident. However, the trial court pointed out several inconsistencies in the testimony

been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law

of the accused.

accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who
offends him elsewhere.132[10]
First, while he testified that the birthday celebration of Alejandro was on 4 May 2000, the latter

was actually born on 22 July 1950. The accused also testified that the celebration ended around midnight, but
Alejandro testified that the former left the house between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. after the party. Meanwhile, the

The aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of firearm was likewise properly appreciated,

arresting officers said that upon reaching the house of Alejandro Agcanas, the lights were off and there was no

even though the firearm used was not recovered. As this Court held in People v. Taguba,133[11] the actual

celebration going on. The trial court further reasoned that the house of Alejandro Agcanas was only 45 minutes

firearm itself need not be presented if its existence can be proved by the testimonies of witnesses or by other

away from the scene of the crime; therefore, it was not physically impossible for him to travel from the victims

evidence presented. In the case at bar, Beatriz Raguirag testified that she saw the accused holding a gun and

house to Alejandro Agcanas house where he was arrested by the police officers. Finally, another witness, Liwliwa

then heard a gunshot. The post-mortem examination also showed that the accused died of a gunshot wound.

Agcanas, a relative of the accused by affinity, likewise testified that her house was twenty (20) meters away from

Thus, the presentation of the actual firearm was not indispensible to prove its existence and use.

the victims house. On the night of the shooting incident, around nine oclock, she saw the accused drinking with
some others five meters from where she stood in front of her house.

Second, during pre-trial the accused admitted that he was not a licensed firearm holder. As this
Court stated in Del Rosario v. People of the Philippines:134[12]

Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the alibi of the accused deserved scant consideration.
The accused additionally alleges that his right to counsel was violated when, on the morning of 5
May 2000, he made an admission without his lawyer that he had shot the victim. While it is true that an admission
made by the accused without counsel is violative of due process and is therefore inadmissible, it must be noted
that the findings of the trial court in this case were not based on the 5 May 2000 admission. The issue, therefore,
is irrelevant to this case, since the trial court did not take the admission as evidence against the accused.

Anent the second assigned error, the Court likewise finds that there was treachery in the
commission of the crime.

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution

has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the
subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed
it does not have the license or permit to possess the same. The essence of
the crime of illegal possession is the possession, whether actual or
nstructive, of the subject firearm, without which there can be
no conviction for illegal possession. After possession is established by the
prosecution, it would only be a matter of course to determine whether the
accused has a license to possess the firearm. Possession of any firearm
becomes unlawful only if the necessary permit or license therefor is not
first obtained. The absence of license and legal authority constitutes an
essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm and
every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the
prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt... (Emphasis supplied.)

In People v. Dela Cruz,130[8] this Court reiterated:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two
elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the
persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
The victim was then eating his dinner, seated with his back to the kitchen door. Suddenly,

The judgment of the trial court must, however, be modified. On 24 June 2006, Republic Act No.
9346 (RA 9346) abolished the death penalty. Thus, pursuant to Section 2(a) of RA 9346, the accused shall
instead suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00845 finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is hereby
AFFIRMED. By virtue of RA 9346, the penalty is MODIFIED, and the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the

without provocation or reason, the accused entered through that door and shot the victim in the head, causing the

penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

latter's instantaneous death. With the suddenness of the attack, the victim could not do anything, except turn his

damages is likewise MODIFIED. The accused is ordered to pay P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral

Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the award of

head towards the accused. The testimony of Beatriz Raguirag is revealing:

damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Warlito Raguirag.

People v paling 645 scra 627

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 185390
March 16, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALEX PALING, ERNIE VILBAR @ "DODONG" (at large), and ROY VILBAR, Accused,
ALEX PALING, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the April 28, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00189,
which affirmed the March 10, 2003 Decision in Criminal Case No. 10-97 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 17 in Kidapawan City, Cotabato. The RTC found accused Alex Paling (Paling) and Roy Vilbar (Vilbar)
guilty of murder.
The Facts
Accused Paling and Vilbar, as well as accused Ernie Vilbar (Ernie), were charged with the crime of murder in an
Information which reads as follows:
That on or about July 1, 1996, in the Municipality of Pres. Roxas, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the abovenamed accused in company with ERNIE VILBAR Alias "DODONG", who is still at large, with intent to kill,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with knives, with treachery, evident
premeditation, taking advantage of superiority, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack,
assault, stab and use physical violence to the person of WALTER NOLASCO, thereby hitting and inflicting upon
him multiple [stab] wounds on the different parts of his body, which is the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Kidapawan, Cotabato, Philippines, February 10, 1997.1
When arraigned on April 3, 1997, Paling and Vilbar, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty."2
However, Ernie remained at large.3 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.4
During trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: Richard Nolasco (Richard), Francisco Perez
(Francisco), and Agustin Nolasco. On the other hand, the defense presented Leonida Mondejar, as well as Paling
5
and Vilbar.
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
In the evening of July 1, 1996, Richard, Jojo Paling (Jojo), and Rolly Talagtag (Rolly) were in the house of Paling
in Sitio Mahayag, Pres. Roxas, Cotabato watching television. At around 9:15 p.m., the group left the said house
and decided to proceed to the other house of Paling situated in the latters farm at Brgy. Greenhills. This is where
the three usually sleep at night. En route, Jojo and Rolly, along with the victim, Walter Nolasco (Walter), were
invited by Paling, Ernie, and Barangay Kagawad Rene Mondejar to a drinking spree at the house of the latter.
Jojo, Rolly, and Walter accepted the invitation, while Richard just waited for them outside the house of Paling. 6
About 15 minutes later, Richard went back to his companions and told them that they had to go home since they
still have to go to school the following morning. The three acceded, but Ernie convinced Walter to stay with them
7
a little longer. Thus, Richard, Jojo, and Rolly went ahead, while Walter stayed behind.
8
At around 10:00 p.m., Francisco, the uncle-in-law of Walter, was roused from his sleep by the barking of his
dogs. When he went out to find out why the dogs were barking, he saw Vilbar and Ernie walking beside Walter.
They were heading towards Brgy. Greenhills where Palings farmhouse was located. 9
At around 10:30 p.m. that same night, Richard, who was already asleep in the farmhouse of Paling, was
awakened when he heard Jeniline Paling-Bernesto, the daughter of Paling, shout, "Kill him in a distance. Dont kill
him here, kill him away from here."10
When Richard went outside to find out what was happening, he saw Paling, Vilbar, and Ernie assaulting Walter.
Vilbar was holding Walter, while Paling and Ernie were stabbing him.11
After Walter was killed, the three accused warned Richard not to speak about it to anyone; otherwise, they would
also kill him. Thereafter, the three left, bringing with them the cadaver of Walter. 12
Incidentally, Francisco also recounted that about 30 minutes after he first saw Walter in the company of Vilbar and
Ernie heading towards Brgy. Greenhills, he was awakened again by the barking of the dogs. When he checked
13
again, he saw Vilbar and Ernie running. But this time, he did not see Walter with them.
The following day, July 2, 1996, at 10:00 a.m., Walters cadaver was found in the farm of one Jonathan
14
Policarpio.
Version of the Defense
Paling and Vilbar interposed the defense of denial. Paling testified that on July 1, 1996, he worked in his farm at
Sitio Mahayag, Pres. Roxas, Cotabato. He stated that when he learned of the death of Walter, he even helped in
15
bringing his cadaver to the house of the latters grandfather in the presence of policemen and Richard, a first
cousin of the victim.16
For his part, Vilbar testified that on July 1, 1996, he worked in the drier of the Sta. Catalina Cooperative from 7:30
a.m. to 4:30 p.m. He, therefore, had no opportunity to leave his house since he was already tired from working the
entire day.17
Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted Paling and Vilbar. The dispositive portion of its March 10, 2003 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds and so holds that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of accused Alex Paling and Roy Vilbar. Accused Alex Paling and Roy Vilbar are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. Accused Alex Paling and Roy Vilbar are directed to serve the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with its
accessory penalties. The detention of Alex Paling from October 13, 1996 up to May 13, 1998 and Roy Vilbar from
July 22, 1996 up to May 13, 1998 are counted in full in their favor. They are directed to pay cost. Accused Alex
Paling and Roy Vilbar are directed to indemnify the heirs of Walter Nolasco the sum of P50,000.00.
The property bonds posted by the accused for their provisional liberty are cancelled and released. The Register of
Deeds of Cotabato is hereby directed to cancel the annotation in OCT No. P-42589 and TCT No. T-64391.
The Warden of the Office of the Provincial Jail of Cotabato is directed to take accused Alex Paling and Roy Vilbar
into custody.
Let Alias Warrant of Arrest be issued against accused Ernie Vilbar with no amount of bail fixed.
SO ORDERED.18
The records of this case were forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal 19 dated March 24, 2003 filed
by Paling and Vilbar, which this Court accepted in its Resolution20 dated May 24, 2004. On June 17, 2004, the
21
Court required the two accused to submit their appellants brief.
22
On September 2, 2004, both accused filed their Appellants Brief dated August 9, 2004. On the other hand, the
23
Brief for the Appellee dated December 8, 2004 was filed on December 13, 2004. Thereafter, the Court issued a
24
Resolution dated March 14, 2005, transferring the case to the CA for intermediate review conformably with the
ruling in People v. Mateo.25
Essentially, both accused contended that the decision of the RTC is erroneous because the testimony of Richard
was misappreciated as the judge who rendered the decision was not the same judge who received the evidence
during trial. Also, they claimed that the corroborative witness, Francisco, did not even mention Paling in his open
court testimony, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the credibility of the other witness, Richard.26
Ruling of the Appellate Court
27
On April 28, 2006, the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court in toto. It ruled that contrary to the contention
of accused-appellants, the fact that the judge who tried the case was different from the judge who penned the
decision does not in any way taint the decision, especially in the instant case where there is scarcity of evidence
to doubt the credibility of Richard, the prosecutions principal witness.28
The CA further held that it did not find any error or abuse of discretion in the lower courts calibration of the
witnesses credibility, and that even granting in ex gratia argumenti that minor contradictions exist in the
statements of the prosecution witnesses, these would have no effect on the probative value of their statements as
their declarations are consistent in pointing to the accused as participis criminis in the killing of the victim. 29
In its Resolution dated July 30, 2008, 30 the CA treated accused-appellant Palings letter dated May 18, 2006 as a
notice of appeal, in the interest of justice. With respect to accused-appellant Vilbar, the CA Decision became final.
In Our Resolution dated February 25, 2009, We notified the parties that they may file their respective
supplemental briefs if they so desired. Both the People and accused-appellant Paling manifested that they are no
longer filing a supplemental brief and they are adopting their respective briefs before the CA. Thus, we have this
appeal.
The Issues
Paling contends in his Brief 31 that:
THE COURT A QUO RENDERED JUDGMENT SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE (EYE) WITNESS
RICHARD NOLASCO WHICH WAS MISAPPRECIATED BY THE JUDGE WHO INHERITED THIS CASE FROM
THE FORMER PRESIDING JUDGE WHO TRIED AND HEARD THIS CASE FROM ITS INCEPTION TO ITS
TERMINATION.
FRANCISCO PEREZ, THE CORROBORATIVE WITNESS, DID NOT EVEN MENTION ACCUSED-APPELLANT
ALEX PALING IN HIS OPEN COURT TESTIMONY.
Our Ruling
We sustain Palings conviction.
The fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses does not
adversely affect the validity of conviction
Paling alleges that since the judge who penned the appealed decision is different from the judge who heard the
testimonies of the witnesses, the former was in no position to observe their demeanor diligently. 32

We disagree. The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render
the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.33 Citing
People v. Competente,34 this Court held in People v. Alfredo:35
The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses,
does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal of the Decision would
show that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that it was carefully studied, with testimonies
on direct and cross examination as well as questions from the Court carefully passed upon. (Emphasis in the
original.)
Further, "it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its entirety to decide it on the basis of the records
on hand."36 This is because the judge "can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and calibrate the
testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation
of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law."37 Considering
that, in the instant case, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were extant and complete,
there was no impediment for the judge to decide the case.
Moreover, as correctly found by the CA, there is scarcity of evidence to doubt the credibility of the prosecutions
principal witness, Richard.38 Even if the said witness failed to immediately disclose or identify the accused as the
culprits when he was initially interviewed by the police on July 8, 1996, he cannot be faulted for such omission, as
it is not uncommon for witnesses "to delay or vacillate in disclosing the identity of the offender after the startling
occurrence for fear of reprisal,"39 more so, when he was warned by the three accused not to disclose to anyone
the killing he had witnessed.
Also, Paling did not present any evidence which would show that Richard was driven by any improper motive in
testifying against him and the other accused. Significantly, the absence of such improper motive on the part of the
witness for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that
his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.40 Indeed, there is no reason to deviate from the factual findings of
the trial court.
Nonetheless, it is the contention of Paling that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Richard and
Francisco are conflicting in that while the former stated that he saw Paling and the two other accused help one
another in assaulting the victim, Francisco only saw Ernie and Vilbar walking beside the victim, and not Paling.41
Contrarily, there is nothing conflicting in the testimonies of Richard and Francisco. As a matter of fact, their
statements are even consistent in pointing to Paling,
Ernie, and Vilbar as the perpetrators of the killing of Walter.42 In the farmhouse of Paling where he was staying,
Richard witnessed the killing of Walter by the three accused, who even warned him immediately afterwards not to
speak about it. On the other hand, Francisco, after being awakened by the barkings of his dogs, merely chanced
seeing Walter in the company of Ernie and Vilbar walking by his house towards the direction of Palings place at
around 10:00 p.m. Francisco was again awakened approximately 30 minutes later by the barking of his dogs and
saw Ernie and Vilbar running in the opposite direction. Thus, Franciscos testimony was consistent with the fact
that after Walter was killed, Ernie and Vilbar rushed away from the crime scene. And the fact that Paling was not
in the company of Walter, Ernie, and Vilbar neither shows that Paling could not have been in his house nor that
he did not participate in the killing of Walter.
Besides, the issue posed is one of credibility of witnesses, a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial
court. 43 Absent a clear showing that the findings of the trial court are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness, or
44
palpable error, We generally defer to its assessment.
Alibi is an inherently weak defense
Paling denies participation in the killing of Walter and, as mentioned earlier, asserts that on July 1, 1996, he
worked in his farm at Sitio Mahayag, Pres. Roxas, Cotabato. To bolster his claim of innocence, he also testified
that when he learned of the victims death, he even helped in bringing his cadaver to the house of the latters
grandfather in the presence of policemen and Richard.45
In this regard, it bears stressing that "for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in
another place when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to
be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission."46
Significantly, the place where Paling claimed to be was just within the immediate vicinity, if not within the vicinity
itself, of the crime scene. Verily, it was not physically impossible for Paling to be present at the locus criminis at
the time the crime was committed.
Moreover, this Court has repeatedly held that "alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of
positive identification by truthful witnesses."47 Notably, "it is evidence negative in nature and self-serving and
cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive
evidence."48 There being no strong evidence adduced to overcome the testimony of the eye witness, Richard, no
weight can be given to the alibi of Paling.
The killing of Walter is qualified by abuse of superior strength, not by treachery or evident premeditation
In convicting Paling, the trial and appellate courts appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In
addition, the RTC appreciated the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
We disagree. The killing of Walter was neither attended by treachery nor evident premeditation. In this regard, it is
worth noting that "qualifying circumstances cannot be presumed, but must be established by clear and convincing
evidence as conclusively as the killing itself."49
To prove treachery, the following must be clearly established: (1) the employment of such means of execution as
would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense and retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and
conscious adoption of the means of execution.50 The essence of treachery is "the sudden and unexpected attack
by the aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend oneself, ensuring
the attack without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim."51
Pertinently, it should be noted that the eyewitness account of Richard does not establish that the perpetrators
suddenly and unexpectedly attacked the victim, since at the time he went outside to check the commotion, Vilbar
was already holding the victim, while Paling and Ernie were already stabbing him. Noticeably, the events
immediately preceding the attack had not been disclosed. Richard, therefore, had no way of knowing whether the
attack was indeed sudden and unexpected so as to prevent the victim from defending himself and whether there
was indeed not the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Hence, treachery cannot be appreciated in the
instant case.
Similarly, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation cannot also be considered since there was neither
proof that Paling and the other accused indeed planned or determined to kill Walter nor was there any proof that
the perpetrators had sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow them to reflect.
In People v. Dadivo, this Court enumerated the requirements to prove evident premeditation, to wit:
x x x The requirements to prove evident premeditation are the following: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination;
and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.52
Evidently, the above-mentioned elements are not present in the case at bar.1avvphi1 Consequently, the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation cannot also be appreciated.
Despite the foregoing disquisition, the crime committed by Paling is still murder and not homicide, since the killing
of Walter is qualified by taking advantage of superior strength.
The aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength is considered whenever there is notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressors that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the
53
aggressors and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. It is taken
into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force that is "out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked."54 The victim need not be completely defenseless in order for the said
aggravating circumstance to be appreciated.55 As this Court held in People v. Amodia:56
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked. Taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim
was completely defenseless.
In People v. Ventura, we opined that there are no fixed and invariable rules in considering abuse of superior
strength or employing means to weaken the defense of the victim. Superiority does not always mean numerical
superiority. Abuse of superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis--vis the victim. Abuse of
superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressors natural strength over that of the victim, considering the
position of both, and the employment of the means to weaken the defense, although not annulling it. The
aggressor must have advantage of his natural strength to ensure the commission of the crime. (Citations omitted.)
In the present case, the victim, Walter, while being restrained by Vilbar, was simultaneously stabbed by Paling
and Ernie. Plainly, not only did the perpetrators outnumber their victim, more importantly, they secured advantage
of their combined strength to perpetrate the crime with impunity. Under these circumstances, it is undeniable that
there was gross inequality of forces between the victim and the three accused.
Penalty Imposed
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. Without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime,
the medium penalty is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.57
In the instant case, while Paling was charged with three aggravating circumstances in the Information, only one
was proved, thereby qualifying the killing as murder. Consequently, the imposable penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua.
Award of Damages
Art. 100 of the Code states that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Hence, when death
occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.58
In cases of murder and homicide, civil indemnity of PhP 50,000 and moral damages of PhP 50,000 are awarded
59
automatically. To be sure, such awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death
of the victim60 owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.61
This Court, however, additionally grants exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000, in line with current
jurisprudence,62 since the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength was firmly established.

Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, if an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, 63 accompanies the
crime, the award of exemplary damages is justified.
Interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment shall likewise be imposed on the award of
damages.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00189 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Alex Paling is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim civil indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (PhP 50,000), moral damages of fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000), and exemplary damages of
thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000), with 6% interest per annum on said damages from finality of judgment. Since
Roy Vilbar did not appeal the CA Decision, he shall indemnify the heirs of Walter Nolasco in the sum of PhP
50,000.
SO ORDERED.
People v yanson 658 scra 385

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54,
Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES, P/INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y
FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS,
CHARLES DUMANCAS, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R.
FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO,
respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
At issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether it is the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City or
the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the two criminal cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder
wherein some of the accused implicated as principals are members of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On 13 January 1994, two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed with the RTC of Bacolod
City against fourteen persons, five of whom are members of the PNP, namely, P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, P/Insp.
Adonis C. Abeto, Police Officers Mario Lamis, Jose Pahayupan, and Vicente Canuday, Jr.; the other nine are
civilians. The informations, later docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in Branch 47 of the said
court, are similarly worded, except as to the names of the victims, who are Rufino Gargar, Jr. in the first case and
Danilo Lumangyao in the second, thus:
The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS,
CHARLES DUMANCAS (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION), POLICE
COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY
DIRECTION AND/OR INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION), POLICE
INSPECTOR ADONIS C. ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y
FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR
GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ,
EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY
PARTICIPATION, CESAR PECHA AND EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS
ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER,
committed as follows:
That during the period beginning in the late afternoon of August 6, 1992 and
ending the late evening of the following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijis,
Bacolod City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and concurring in a common
criminal intent and execution thereof with one another, save for the accessories
for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353, 000.00, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously to wit:
Acting upon the inducement of spouses
Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Charles
Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and
undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M.
Torres, taking advantage of his position as
Station Commander of the Philippine National
Police, Bacolod City Station, with the direct
participation and cooperation of Police Inspector
Adonis C. Abeto, other police officers Vicente
Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario Lamis,
civilian (police) agents Rolando R. Fernandez,
Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime
Gargallano, also taking advantage of their
respective positions, and Dominador Geroche,
concurring and affirming in the said criminal
design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct,
kidnap and detain one RUFINO GARGAR, JR.
(Criminal Case No. 94-15562 and DANILO
LUMANGYAO (Criminal Case No. 94-15563),
shortly thereafter at around 11:00 o'clock in the
evening of August 7, 1992, failing in their
aforesaid common purpose to extort money and
in furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident
premeditation and treachery nocturnity and the
use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot
and kill the said victims, while being handcuffed
and blindfolded; that accused Cesar Pecha and
Edgar Hilado, with knowledge that the said
Gargar [and Lumangyao, in Crim. Case No. 9415563 were victims] of violence, did then and
there secretly bury the corpses in a makeshift
shallow grave for the purpose of concealing the
crime of murder in order to prevent its discovery
for a fee of P500.00 each; aforesaid act or acts
has caused damage and prejudice to the heirs
of said victims, to wit:
P 50,000.00

as indemnity for death;

50,000.00

actual damages;

300,000.00

compensatory damages

100,000.00

50,000.00

(Lost income);
moral damages;

exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW (Articles 268 and 248 in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code). 1
These cases were consolidated.
Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Later, they filed their respective motions for bail. At the
hearings thereof, the prosecution presented state witness Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and coconspirator in the commission of the complex crimes. After the completion of his testimony, the trial court, per
Judge Edgar G. Garvilles, granted bail in favor of only six of the accused, namely, P/Insp. Adonis Abeto, Police
Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr., Charles Dumancas, Edgar Hilado, and Cesar Pecha. The
other eight accused who were denied bail are now detained at the City Jail of Bacolod City. 2
Through the testimony of Grandeza, the prosecution established that in response to the complaint of spouses
Charles and Jeanette Dumancas, P/Col. Nicolas Torres instructed his men to look for Rufino Gargar and Danilo
Lumangyao who were allegedly members of the group that had swindled the Dumancas spouses. On 6 August
1992, Police Officer Mario Lamis, together with civilian agents, namely, Teody Delgado, Edwin Divinagracia,
Jaime Gargallano, Rolando Fernandez, and Moises Grandeza, arrested and abducted the two swindling
suspects. Conformably with Torres's order, the two suspects were brought to Dragon Lodge Motel. There, they

were investigated by Police Inspector Adonis Abeto and Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday,
Jr.. They were then taken to the Ceres Compound, where Jeanette Dumancas identified Lumangyao as a
member of the group that had swindled her. She then asked about the money that the group had received from
her. Upon being told by Lumangyao that the money had already been divided among his partners long time ago,
she said to the accused, specifically to Dominador Geroche: "Doming, bring these two to the PC or police and I
will call Atty. Geocadin so that proper cases could be filed against them." Thereafter, the two suspects were
transferred to D' Hacienda Motel, then to Moonlit Inn, then to Casa Mel Lodge, and back to D' Hacienda Motel,
where the two were shot and killed. The team forthwith went to the office of P/Col. Torres and reported that the
killing had been done. The latter told them: "You who are here inside, nobody knows what you have done, but you
have to hide because the NBI's are after you." 3
Thereafter, the prosecution rested its case and the trial court started to receive the evidence for the accused.
Accused Torres and Abeto presented their respective evidence. Presentation of evidence by the other accused
was, however, suspended because of the motions of several accused for the inhibition of Judge Garvilles. Despite
opposition by the prosecution, Judge Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing both cases, which
were thereafter re-raffled to Branch 54, presided by herein public respondent Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes.
On 24 June 1994, the private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the records of the cases to the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that, pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994 in Republic of the Philippines vs.
Asuncion, 4 the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged were committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. In his Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Transmit Records, the
State Prosecutor adopted the motion of the private prosecutors. 5
In its order of 15 August 1994, 6 the trial court, thru respondent Judge, ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not
have jurisdiction over the subject cases because the informations do not state that the offenses were committed
7
in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. Citing People vs. Montilla, it held that the allegation in the
informations that the accused PNP officers took advantage of their office in the commission of the offense
charged is merely an allegation of an aggravating circumstance. It further stated that a public office is not a
constituent element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said offense intimately connected with the
office. It then denied the motion for transfer of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the
case should continue.
Relying on People vs. Montejo, 8 the prosecution moved to reconsider the said order. 9
10
On 7 September 1994, the trial court issued an order denying the motion because People vs. Montejo is not
applicable, since in that case there was (a) an intimate connection between the offense charged and the public
position of the accused and (b) a total absence of personal motive; whereas, in these cases, no such intimate
connection exists and the informations emphasize that the accused were moved by selfish motives of ransom and
extortion.
The respondent Judge then resumed the reception of the evidence for the other accused. Accused Gargallano,
Fernandez, Lamis, Delgado, and Geroche, as well as his three witnesses, had already completed their respective
testimonies when, upon motion of the prosecution, the respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited himself on 15
September 1994. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of the RTC of Bacolod City.
On 5 December 1994, the prosecution, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with us a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order challenging the refusal of
the respondent Judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan.
On 12 December 1994, we required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the public respondent or his successor to desist from proceeding with the trial of the
subject cases. 11
On 27 February 1995, after considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the petition as well as
in the comments of the private respondents, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda. Most of them submitted their memoranda, while the petitioner and some of the
private respondents adopted their initiatory pleadings as their memoranda.
On 22 March 1995, private respondent Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas filed an urgent motion for the grant of bail, 12
which we noted on 15 May 1995. 13
Deliberating on the arguments adduced by the parties, we are convinced that public respondent Judge
Magallanes committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that it is his court and not the Sandiganbayan
which has jurisdiction over the two cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder.
At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which pertinently provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in governmentowned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by Law is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of 16,000.00: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned
in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed
by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of
P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts
in cases originally decided by them in their
respective territorial jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final
judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, in their
respective jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees.
Applying this section, we held in Aguinaldo vs. Domagas 14 that for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original
jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or employees under Section 4(a) (2) above, it is
not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years,
or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary that the offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their office.
15
16
We reiterated this pronouncement in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, Natividad vs. Felix, and Republic vs. Asuncion,
17
18
In Sanchez, we restated the principle laid down in Montilla vs. Hilario that an offense may be considered as
committed in relation to the office if it cannot exist without the office, or if the office is a constituent element of the
crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title
Seven, of the Revised Penal Code. We also reiterated the principle in People vs. Montejo 19 that the offense must
be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and we further intimated that the fact that the offense was
committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information. 20
There is no dispute that the prescribed penalties for the offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and
15563 before the court below are higher than prision correcional or imprisonment for more than six years. The
only question that remains to be resolved then is whether the said offenses were committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers.
Relying on its evidence and on the Montejo case, the petitioner submits that the crimes charged in the subject
cases were connected with public office because the accused PNP officers, together with the civilian agents,
arrested the two swindling suspects in the course of the performance of their duty and not out of personal motive,
and if they demanded from the two suspects the production of the money of the Dumancas spouses and later
killed the two; they did so in the course of the investigation conducted by them as policemen. The petitioner
further asserts that the allegations in the informations reading "taking advantage of his position as Station
Commander of the Philippine National Police" and "taking advantage of their respective positions" presuppose the
exercise of the functions attached to the office of the accused PNP officers and are sufficient to show that the
offenses charged were committed in relation to their office. The petitioner then concludes that the cases below fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, 21 and not
22
by the result of evidence after trial.
23
In Montejo where the amended information alleged:
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of
police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and . . .
special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power

guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo, which is under his command .
. . supervision and control, where his codefendants were stationed, entertained
criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as
assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law
and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up
established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders,
his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in
consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions and would not have peen committed had they not held their office; besides, the accused
had no personal motive in committing the crime; thus, there was an intimate connection between
the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate
that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation.
The informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of
P353,000.00, abducted, kidnapped, and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot
and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and
not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of their respective positions" incorporated
in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of "offenses committed in relation to
public office." In Montilla vs. Hilario, 24 such an allegation was considered merely as an allegation of an
25
aggravating circumstance, and not as one that qualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to public
office, It says:
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and
even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the
allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials
but from the manner of the commission of the crime.
Also, in Bartolome vs. People of the Philippines, 26 despite the allegation that the accused public officers
committed the crime of falsification of official document by "taking advantage of their official positions," this Court
held that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because "[t]he information [did] not allege that
there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense."
Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office
of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the
27
subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not of the Sandiganbayan as insisted
by the petitioner.
In Dumancas's and Torres's motions for the early resolution of this case and in Abeto's Supplement to Comment
with Motion to Dismiss all filed in July 1995, it is contended that even assuming that the informations do charge
the accused PNP officers with crimes committed in relation to their office, still the Regional Trial Court would have
jurisdiction over the subject cases in view of the amendments to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
introduced by R.A. No. 7975, which was approved on 30 March 1995, whose Section 2 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sanggunian panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying
the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(a) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers
of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or -controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or
their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals
from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the
accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered
by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over them. (emphasis supplied).
As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases
involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, 28 as amended; R.A. No. 1379; 29 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
30
Revised Penal Code; it retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4
above and, generally, national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758). Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed
penalty, viz., that which is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00; it
is enough that they are committed by those public officials and employees enumerated in subsection a, Section 4
above. However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in
connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 31 2, 32 14, 33 and 14-A. 34
The respondents maintain that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563
because none of the five PNP officers involved therein occupy the rank of chief superintendent or higher, or are
classified as Grade "27" or higher under R.A. No. 6758 and of the five, P/Col. Nicolas Torres has the highest rank,
viz., Senior Superintendent whose salary grade under the said Act is Grade "18."
Assuming then for the sake of argument that the informations in the said cases allege that the crimes charged
were committed by the five PNP officers in relation to their office, it would appear indubitable that the cases would
fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No.
7975:

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent 35 or higher,
or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
However, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the
36
action. Under the above assumption then, the cases should have been filed with the Sandiganbayan since at
the time the informations were filed, the governing law was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No.
1861. But, would that jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan be affected by R.A. No. 7975?
Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in
another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated. 37 Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the
courts, as the case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A. No.
7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as the
informations were filed not before it but before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing
assumption that the informations in the subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses
committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming
further that the informations had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet,
the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of R.A.
No. 7975. That section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet
begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the
courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing
thereon has not yet been commenced in the Sandiganbayan.
It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan because the same would
anyway be transferred again to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section
2 thereof.
As regards the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette Dumancas and Nicolas Torres, the same must
fail. Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 17 Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the
court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge
thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case
is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if
no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
(b) Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to
be released on recognizance, the application therefor may be filed only in the
particular court where the case is pending, whether for preliminary investigation,
trial, on appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held.
In the instant case, the motions for bail filed by the said accused-respondents with the Regional Trial Court where
the cases against them are pending were denied sometime in February, 1994
38
39
In Enrile vs. Salazar, as reiterated in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, this Court said: "Only after that remedy
[petition to be admitted to bail] was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court [be]
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available
there."
There is no showing that the said accused-respondents have questioned the denial of their applications for bail in
a petition for certiorari either before the Court of Appeals or this Court. It was only on 26 December 1994, when
they filed their respective comments on the instant petition, that they challenged the denial premised on the
ground that the evidence of guilt against them was not strong. Even if their respective Comment and Reiteration
of Motion for Bail 40 and respondent Dumancas's Motion for Bail 41 filed on 22 March 1995, were treated as
petitions for certiorari, still the same would not prosper for not having been seasonably filed. While the Rules of
Court does not fix a time-frame for the filing of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, existing jurisprudence requires that the same be filed within a reasonable period of time from receipt of the
42
43
questioned judgment or order. And, in Philec Workers' Union vs. Hon. Romeo A. Young it was held that a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should be filed within a reasonable period of three
months from notice of the decision or order. Here, about nine to ten months had already elapsed before the
respondents assailed the denial of their motions for bail. In any event, the private respondents who were denied
bail are not precluded from reiterating before the trial court their plea for admission to bail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged orders are AFFIRMED, and the motions for bail of
accused-respondents Jeanette Dumancas and Nicolas Torres are DENIED.
The temporary restraining order issued on 12 December 1994 is LIFTED, and the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
City is directed to immediately resume the hearings of Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 and to thereafter
resolve them with reasonable and purposeful dispatch.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED

PEOPLE V FRAGANTE 642 SCRA 566

While lying beside her, Ernesto was talking to her about a lot of things, and as he talked he
started to fondle her breast and suck her nipples.
xxxx

The Case
On appeal is the 28 September 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01980, affirming
with modification the 4 July 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Paraaque City, Branch 260, convicting
appellant Ernesto Fragante y Ayuda of nine (9) counts of acts of lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape, all
committed against his minor daughter, AAA.3
The Facts

In ten (10) Informations filed on 14 July 1998, appellant was charged with nine (9) counts of acts of lasciviousness
and one (1) count of rape all committed against his own minor daughter AAA. The Informations4 read:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-651 for Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That in between the period of April-May 1993, in Paraaque, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, by taking advantage of his then ten
(10) year old biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fondled (sic) the breast of [AAA].
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 652 for Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in May 1993, in Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, by taking advantage of his then ten (10) year old
biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
fondled (sic) the breasts of [AAA], touched (sic) and inserted (sic) his finger into the vagina of said
minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 653 for Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in between the period commencing in June 1993 until August 1993, in Paraaque,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, by taking
advantage of his then ten (10) year old biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did
then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fondled (sic) the breasts of [AAA], touched (sic) and
inserted (sic) his finger into the vagina of said minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 654 for Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in between the period of October to December 1993 at Shaolin Chinese
Restaurant located at Sucat Road, Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, by taking advantage of his then eleven (11) year old
biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
fondled (sic) and sucked the breasts of [AAA], and thereafter touched the vagina of said minorvictim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 655 for Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in December 1993 at Shaolin Chinese Restaurant located at Sucat Road,
Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his then eleven (11) year old biological daughter, [AAA], and
with lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fondled (sic) and sucked the
breasts of [AAA], and thereafter touched the vagina of said minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 656 for Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in between the period commencing in January 1994 to August 1994, in
Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his then eleven (11) year old biological daughter, [AAA], and
with lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched (sic) and sucked the
breasts of [AAA], licked (sic) her vagina and inserted (sic) his finger into the private part of said
minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 657 for Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in between the period commencing in August 1994 until September 1995, in
Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his then twelve (12) year old biological daughter, [AAA], and with
lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched (sic) and sucked (sic) the
breasts of [AAA], licked (sic) her vagina and inserted (sic) his finger into the private part of said
minor-victim.

The incident was repeated sometime between June 1993 and August 1993. Ernesto told [AAA] to
get inside his room, then he would lock the door. Once inside the room, he would scold [AAA] for
reasons unknown to her. When she would start to cry, her father would start to touch her breast,
then he would suck her nipples while he was rubbing her vagina.
On two occasions, between October 1993 and December 1993, at Shaolin Chinese Restaurant
located in Sucat, Paraaque, which the Fragante family owned, there was a small back room
used as an office which later was converted into a room where they could rest. [AAA] was told by
her father to rest in that room and once inside, while talking to her, he covered the windows with
manila paper. He lay down beside her in the folding bed. He fondled her breast, squeezed them
and then later inserted his hand under her shirt as he pull it up and put his mouth on her breast to
suck it alternately. He started stroking her genitals with her shorts on. She did not do anything as
she was in shock at that time.
In December 1993, [AAA] and her father bought food from Jollibee. She was instructed to eat it at
the back room of their Shaolin Chinese Restaurant so that other employees would not see it.
After eating, Ernesto asked her to lie down in the folding bed and he again lay down beside her
and massaged her breast and sucked her nipples while continuously rubbing her vagina by
inserting his hand inside her shorts.
Sometime in January 1994, around 10 o'clock in the evening, while [AAA] was sleeping in
another room, Ernesto entered her room. He lay beside her, and started sucking her breast. He
removed her shorts and then touched her vagina. He then inserted his finger inside her vagina.
In August-September 1994, she was around twelve (12) years old, Ernesto molested her again
inside his room, by massaging her private parts and sucking her nipples while continuously
rubbing her vagina and afterwards inserting his finger inside it.
In September 1995, at the age of thirteen (13), [AAA] was raped by her father Ernesto. She was
told to get inside his room and was scolded by him before she was made to lie down in his bed.
Her shirt was removed, and her breast and vagina were fondled by him. Thereafter, he sucked
her nipples while continuously touching her vagina. He removed her shorts and panty, then
spreaded her legs and inserted his penis in her vagina. She struggled and begged him to remove
his penis. She said she could not recall the exact details of what her father was doing. He stayed
on top of her despite her pleas. x x x
Ernesto was not able to find time to molest [AAA] in September 1995-1996, because he was
hardly home and was busy with his bookstore business in Visayas and Mindanao.
xxxx
In the evening of October 25, 1997, Irma, together with their brother Marco accompanied their
mother Gaudencia to a wake of their mother's friend. [AAA] wanted to go with them but she was
left home alone with Ernesto who refused to allow [AAA] to go with them. x x x
xxxx
Her father started massaging her breast and [AAA] removed his hands and stood up but she was
bitten and pushed towards the bed. Her father strangled her and asked whether she preferred to
be strangled first and she answered no. He started touching her private parts again and this time
she continued warding off his hands and when she heard their car entering their garage, she told
her father that her mother had arrive. That was the only time she was allowed to leave but was
stopped by her father and warned not tell her mother what happened.

x x x They later proceeded to the NBI, Taft Ave. Manila to report the incidents and where [AAA]
6
executed her complaint-affidavit. Her mother and siblings also executed their affidavits.
xxxx
During arraignment on April 26, 1999, the accused entered separate pleas of Not Guilty to all
the crimes charged.
Joint trial ensued thereafter.
Prosecution presented the following witnesses: [AAA], BBB, CCC, and Dr. Bernadette Madrid.
7
The defense presented Ernesto Fragante as the sole witness.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 4 July 2003, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting appellant for the crimes charged. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after careful perusal of the evidence presented, this Court finds as follows: for
(sic)

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 658 for Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:

Criminal Case No. 98-651 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to Section
5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion temporal
of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS SIX
(6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.

That sometime in September 1997, in Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, by taking advantage of his then fifteen (15) year old
biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
touched (sic) and sucked (sic) the breasts of [AAA], licked (sic) her vagina and inserted (sic) his
finger into the private part of said minor-victim.

Criminal Case No. 98-652 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to Section
5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion temporal
of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS SIX
(6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 659 for Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in (sic) October 25, 1997, in Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, by taking advantage of his then fifteen (15) year
old biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
touched (sic) and sucked (sic) the breasts of [AAA], licked (sic) her vagina and inserted (sic) his
finger into the private part of said minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 660 for Violation of Article 335 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in September 1995, in Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above named accused, by taking advantage of his then thirteen (13) year old
biological daughter [AAA], and with lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lie
and had carnal knowledge with the said minor victim, against her will.5

The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows:

Ernesto A. Fragante (Ernesto hereafter) married CCC on October 6, 1975, in Sta. Cruz Manila,
and such marriage was ratified on December 7, 1995 celebrated in San Sebastian Parish Church.
That union, produced three offsprings. [AAA], the victim herein, is their third child. She was born
on August 23, 1982. x x x
Sometime in April 1993 to May 1993, three or four months before her eleventh (11) birthday,
[AAA] woke up one early morning to prepare for the driving lessons which her father Ernesto,
promised to teach them that day. [AAA] was the first to wake up. She was in her room when her
father entered and lay on her bed. He then asked [AAA] to lie beside him to which [AAA] obeyed.

Criminal Case No. 98-653 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to Section
5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion temporal
of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS SIX
(6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.
Criminal Case No. 98-654 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to Section
5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion temporal
of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS SIX
(6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.
Criminal Case No. 98-655 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to Section
5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion temporal
of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS SIX
(6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.
Criminal Case No. 98-656 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to Section
5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion temporal
of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS SIX
(6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.
Criminal Case No. 98-657 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to Section
5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion temporal
of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS SIX
(6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.

Criminal Case No. 98-658 for Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda
Fragante GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS.
Criminal Case No. 98-659 for Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda
Fragante GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS.
Criminal Case No. 98-660 for RAPE this court finds the accused ERNESTO AYUDA FRAGANTE
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to DEATH. He is ordered to
pay the complainant P50,000.00 as civil liability and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.8

fear is magnified because the victim usually lives under the same roof as the perpetrator or is at any rate subject
to his dominance because of their blood relationship.22
We also find appellant's imputation of ill-motive on the part of the victim, including his wife and AAA's sister, in
filing the criminal charges devoid of merit. Suffice it to state that the resentment angle, even if true, does not prove
any ill motive on AAAs part to falsely accuse appellant of rape or necessarily detract from her credibility as
witness.23 Motives, such as those arising from family feuds, resentment, or revenge, have not prevented the Court
from giving, if proper, full credence to the testimony of minor complainants who remained consistent throughout
24
their direct and cross-examinations.
For appellant's guilt for the crime of rape committed against his own minor daughter AAA, we sustain the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant. While the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the penalty of death25 to
reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals failed to indicate that the reduction of the penalty to reclusion perpetua is
26
without eligibility for parole in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.
As regards appellant's civil liability, we affirm the award of moral damages and civil indemnity, which are
automatically granted without need of proof or pleading,27 each in the sum of P75,000. However, we increase the
award of exemplary damages from P25,000 to P30,000 consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.28

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Criminal Case Nos. 98-651, 98-652, 98-653, 98-654,
98-655, 98-656, 98-657, 98-658,
and 98-659 for Acts of Lasciviousness

The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged. In upholding
appellant's conviction, the Court of Appeals gave credence to AAA's testimony narrating how appellant sexually
abused her repeatedly. The Court of Appeals junked appellant's contentions that (1) AAA's testimony lacked
specific details such as the actual date of commission of the acts of lasciviousness, and was inconsistent with
respect to the charge of rape; (2) AAA was ill motivated in filing the criminal complaints; (3) the charge of rape
was unsubstantiated by medical findings; and (4) the delay in reporting the incidents to the proper authorities
renders the charges dubious.

Appellant argues that the Court of Appeals erred in convicting him for nine counts of acts of lasciviousness since
the prosecution failed to establish with particularity the date of the commission of the offense. Appellant contends
that AAA's testimony was a sweeping generalization of the crimes committed.29 According to appellant, AAA's
statement that the said acts were allegedly committed so many times on certain occasions is clearly inadequate
and grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction.30

On 28 September 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

We are not convinced.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, of Paraaque City, Branch 260, dated
July 4, 2003 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
1.

2.

In Criminal Cases Nos. 98-651, 98-652, 98-653, 98-654, 98-655, 98-656, 98-657, accusedappellant Ernesto A. Fragante is hereby sentenced to suffer Indeterminate Penalty, the minimum
of which is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal minimum and the
maximum of which is seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, for
acts of lasciviousness under Article III, Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, and is also
ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of acts of
lasciviousness;
In pursuant with Section 31(f), Article XII, of Republic Act No. 7610, a FINE in the amount of
Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00) Pesos for each count of the nine (9) counts of lascivious
conduct is hereby imposed;

3.

The penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 98-658 and Criminal Case No. 98-659 by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED without modification;

4.

In Criminal Case No. 98-660, the penalty imposed is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua by virtue
of R.A. No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of death penalty.
In view of the jurisprudential trend, the amount of moral damages for Criminal Case No. 98-660 is
hereby INCREASED to Seventy Five Thousand (Php 75,000.00) Pesos and the civil indemnity is
likewise increased to Seventy Five Thousand (Php 75,000.00) and an additional amount of
Twenty Five Thousand (Php 25,000.00) as exemplary damages.

5.

Appellant was charged with violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Section
5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. These provisions state:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon
other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article,
shall be punished by prision correccional.
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct,
as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 are as follows:
1.

SO ORDERED.9
2.
3.

The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse.
The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.31

The Issue
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA
7610 are present here.
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellant's conviction for nine (9)
counts of acts of lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape.
The Ruling of this Court

We sustain appellant's conviction for seven (7) counts of acts of lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape. We
acquit appellant for two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Criminal Case No. 98-660 for Rape
Appellant contends that the Court of Appeals erred in convicting him for the crime of rape since the prosecution
failed to overthrow the presumption of innocence. Appellant alleges that (1) AAA's testimony was full of
inconsistencies and improbabilities which cast serious doubts on the truthfulness of her account; (2) the medical
findings do not support the charge of rape; (3) AAA's delayed reporting of the incident renders the charges
dubious; and (4) AAA and her mother harbored a grudge against appellant.10
We are not persuaded. The prosecution sufficiently established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of rape.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code11 provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the essential elements of rape are present in this case. The
evidence on record clearly proves that appellant had carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter AAA.
We reject appellant's contention that AAA's testimony was full of inconsistencies. On the contrary, AAA's
testimony that she was raped by appellant was very consistent and straightforward. Notably, appellant did not
point out the supposed inconsistencies, and proceeded in arguing that his moral ascendancy over his daughter
was insufficient to intimidate AAA.
It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without consent.12 In
People v. Orillosa,13 we held that actual force or intimidation need not be employed in incestuous rape of a minor
because the moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly
desires.14 When a father commits the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy or
15
influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. The absence of violence or offer of resistance
would not affect the outcome of the case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father
over his daughter takes the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an
accused who did not have blood relationship with the victim.16
In this case, AAA's testimony clearly showed how appellant took advantage of his relationship with and his moral
ascendancy over his minor daughter when he had carnal knowledge of her. As found by the Court of Appeals,
appellant instilled fear on AAA's mind every time he sexually molested her, thus:
[AAA] also admitted that after accused-appellant has started sexually molesting her until she was
raped, she was so frightened of him. In fact she could not tell her mother of her ordeal, mindful of
the serious threats on her life and of the chaos it would cause their family.17
We likewise find appellant's claim that the medical findings do not support the charge of rape untenable. Aside
from AAA's positive, straightforward, and credible testimony, the prosecution presented the medical certificate
18
issued by Dr. Bernadette Madrid and the latter's testimony which corroborate AAA's claim that appellant raped
her.

First, appellant's repeated touching, fondling, and sucking of AAA's breasts and inserting his finger into AAA's
vagina with lewd designs undoubtedly constitute lascivious conduct under Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610, to wit:
(h) Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area
of a person.
Second, appellant, as a father having moral ascendancy over his daughter, coerced AAA to engage in lascivious
conduct, which is within the purview of sexual abuse. In People v. Larin,32 we held:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group.
Third, AAA is below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, based on her testimony which was
corroborated by her Birth Certificate33 presented during the trial. Section 3(a), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610
provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. (a) Children refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care
of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition;
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of appellant for acts of lasciviousness was
proper.
As to the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish with particularity the date of the commission of the acts of
lasciviousness, suffice it to state that the date and time of the commission of the offense are not material
ingredients of such crime. Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material
ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as to
the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.
In People v. Losano,34 the Court held:
Thus, as early as 1903, this Court has ruled that while the complaint must allege a specific time
and place when and where the offense was committed, the proof need not correspond to this
allegation, unless the time and place is material and of the essence of the offense as necessary
ingredient in its description. Evidence so presented is admissible and sufficient if it shows 1) that
the crime was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations; and 2) before
or after the time stated in the complaint or indictment and before the action is commenced.

We agree with the Court of Appeals in debunking appellant's claim that AAA's testimony was overly generalized
and lacked specific details on when appellant sexually abused the victim. The records are replete with details on
when and how appellant sexually abused her. AAA testified that appellant habitually molested her whenever he
had the opportunity to do so, to wit:
Atty. Rosanna Elepao-Balauag:
How many times[,] because the witness answered that his father was sexually abusing her.
Court:

The Court is not impressed with appellant's claim that AAAs failure to immediately report the incidents to the
proper authorities affected her credibility.19 Delay could be attributed to the victim's tender age and the appellant's
threats.20 A rape victim's actions are oftentimes influenced by fear, rather than reason.21 In incestuous rape, this

Witness may answer.

Atty. Rosanna Elepao-Balauag:

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

How many times if you remember?

A: Many times.
xxxx
Q: When was (sic) [did] the incident happened?
A: Sa bahay po namin at madaling araw po iyon dahil nagpapaturo kami ng driving at ako po
iyong unang nagising at sabi ko nga po magdriving na turuan niya akong magmaneho at tapos po
pinahiga niya ako sa tabi nya at tapos po kinausap po niya ako at habang kinakausap niya ako,
he started touching my private parts and later on he sucked my nipple, mam.

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Q: What else did he do?

A: That's all mam.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

Q: And what happened after that?

A: He did you (sic) it again, mam.
xxxx
Q: What she did you to? [sic]
A: Ganoon pa rin po, he sucked my breast at tapos po niyon, papasukin niya ako sa kanyang
room at ila-lock niya iyong pinto; minsan po naman, pagagalitan niya ako na walang kabagay
bagay at hindi ko naman po alam kung ano iyon; ganoon po lagi, hinawakan niya iyong breast,
papagalitan ako, iyon paulit ulit na lang po, mam.
Q: After he scolded you what happened next?
A: Iyon pag umiiyak na po ako, uumpisahan po niyang hawakan muli iyong mga private parts.
xxxx
Q: And after that incident what transpired next?
A: Paulit ulit po niyang ginagawa, lagi po niya akong hinhahawakan ang breast ko at vagina and
then nira-rub po nang kamay niya.35

However, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-652 and 98-658, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General,
representing the People, that the prosecution failed to prove appellant's guilt for acts of lasciviousness beyond
reasonable doubt. While AAA testified that appellant habitually molested her, there was no specific evidence
supporting the charge that appellant committed acts of lasciviousness in May 1993 and September 1997, or on or
about those dates. Hence, we find appellant not guilty for two counts of acts of lasciviousness (Criminal Case
Nos. 98-652 and 98-658) on the ground of reasonable doubt.
As regards the other criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness, where appellant's guilt was proved beyond
reasonable doubt, we affirm appellant's conviction. In these cases, the alternative circumstance of relationship
36
37
under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code should be considered against appellant. In People v. Fetalino, the
Court held that, in crimes against chastity, like acts of lasciviousness, relationship is considered aggravating. In
that case, the Court considered relationship as an aggravating circumstance since the informations mentioned,
and the accused admitted, that the complainant is his daughter.
In the instant case, the informations expressly state that AAA is appellants daughter, and appellant openly
admitted this fact.38 Accordingly, we modify the penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 98-657 and 98-659.
Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
39
reclusion perpetua. Since there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty
shall be applied in its maximum period reclusion perpetua.40 Besides, Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610
expressly provides that The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the
perpetrator is [a] x x x parent, x x x. In People v. Montinola41 and People v. Sumingwa,42 where the accused is the
biological father of the minor victim,43 the Court appreciated the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
relationship and accordingly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, appellant herein is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. 98-657 and 98-659.
44

45

46

47

48

In Criminal Case Nos. 98-651, 98-653, 98-654, 98-655, and 98-656, where AAA was still below 12 years
old at the time of the commission of the acts of lasciviousness, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its
medium period in accordance with Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. This provision specifically
states [t]hat the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
49
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
50
relationship, as explained, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. In People v. Velasquez, which
involved a two year old child sexually abused by her grandfather, the Court imposed the indeterminate sentence
of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accordingly, appellant herein is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Also, we modify the amount of moral damages and fine awarded by the Court of Appeals. We reduce the amount
of moral damages from P50,000 to P15,000 and the amount of fine from P30,000 to P15,000 for each of the
seven (7) counts of acts of lasciviousness.51 In addition, we award civil indemnity in the amount of P20,000, and
exemplary damages in the sum of P15,000, in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
relationship,52 for each of the seven (7) counts of acts of lasciviousness.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 28 September 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01980 with MODIFICATIONS. We find appellant Ernesto Fragante y Ayuda:
1.

GUILTY of RAPE in Criminal Case No. 98-660. He is sentenced to

suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole and ordered to pay AAA P75,000 as civil indemnity,
P75,000 as moral damages, and P30,000 as exemplary
damages.

2.

GUILTY of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in Criminal Case Nos.

98-657 and 98-659, with relationship as an aggravating
circumstance. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay AAA (1) moral damages of
P15,000; (2) a fine of P15,000; (3) civil indemnity of P20,000;
and (4) exemplary damages of P15,000 for each count.

3.

GUILTY of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in Criminal Case Nos.

98-651, 98-653, 98-654, 98-655, and 98-656, with relationship as
an aggravating circumstance. He is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and ordered to pay AAA (1) moral damages of
P15,000; (2) a fine of P15,000; (3) civil indemnity of P20,000;
and (4) exemplary damages of P15,000 for each count.

4.

NOT GUILTY of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in Criminal Case

Nos. 98-652 and 98-658 on the ground of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice