"RULINGS IN AGRARIAN CASES"

BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
HOW TO ESTABLISH TENANCY
The fact that defendants did not at all question the plaintiff's tenancy over
their respective land in question for several years, there is an implied admission or
consent to the establishment of tenancy relationship between the parties. The
relationship may be considered established where the landowner knew of the
cultivation of the land by the farmer and he tolerated the same(PACHECO VS.
DESIDERIO, CA G.R. NOS. SP-06078-CAR, FEBRUARY 25, 1977).
For establishment of tenancy relationship, it is not essential that the
landowner has personal knowledge of the cultivation by another, in the concept of
tenant of his landholding. It is sufficient that he is chargeable with knowledge,
through his overseer or agent of such cultivation and he tolerates the
same (LONTOC VS. VDA. DE ASIS, CA-G.R. NO. 39331-12, JULY 13,
1968).
We emphasize that, it is not necessary that consent be given
wholeheartedly, as consent given out of pity is sufficient(POLIDARIO SR., VS.
BROGONIO, ET AL., CA-G.R. NO. 46702-R, MARCH 9, 1972).
Nor lack of written contract is an obstacle to the establishment of the
relation of landlord and tenant under the Tenancy Law. It is enough that there be
mutual consent for the tenant to cultivate for a consideration, in writing, expressly
or impliedly(JAMORA VS. DIAMCAY, CA-G.R. NO. 47379-R, APRIL 13,
1972).
As long as the legal possession of the land constitutes a person as a tenantfarmer by virtue of an express or implied lease, such an act is binding on the
owner of the property even if he himself may not have given his consent to such
arrangement. (CO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 162 SCRA
392).
The fact that complainant has a hut erected on the landholding shows he is a
tenant since only tenants are entitled to a homelot where he can built his house
thereon as an incident to his right as a tenant (CRUZ VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 129 SCRA 222).
AGRARIAN DISPUTE
Any controversy relating to terms, tenure or condition of employment, or
concerning an association or representation of persons in negotiating, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms on conditions to employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm employers and

employees (LAW OF AGRARIAN REFORM, BY RECAREDO P. BARTE,

1991 EDITION, P. 26).
ABANDONMENT/MORTGAGE/VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Herein respondent-appellant had voluntarily abandoned her landholdings in
litigation after she has sublet it without the consent and knowledge of the
landowner (COSCOS VS. ESTATE SIBUGON, ET AL., CA-G.R. NO. 05658,
FEBRUARY 28, 1977).
Persons therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered
tenants, and who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land,
ceases to hold and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant; and
ceases to enjoy the status, right and privileges of one (GABRIEL VS.
PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
The gauge in the determination of whether petitioner-appellant has
abandoned or surrendered the subject landholding, is the simultaneous and
subsequent acts indicative of her intention to do so. There is no such thing as
presumptive voluntary surrender of abandonment by implication, and most
certainly, not from vague and doubtful evidence. If there should be a waiver of a
right, public policy demand that the same be clearly and convincingly established
by competent and sufficient evidence (BARRAMEDA VS. OCA, ET AL., CAG.R. NO. 07164-SP; POLICARPIO NISNISAN, ET AL., VS. CA, ET AL.,
GR NO. 126425).
Abandonment has been invariably construed to include two essential
elements: (1) the intention to abandon, and (2) the physical act or acts of
abandonment. The primary elements of abandonment are the intention to abandon
and the external act by which intention is carried into effect. The intention to
abandon is considered the first and permanent inquiry (MONTEMAYOR, 1ST
EDITION 1964, P. 232).
TENANCY EMANCIPATION PATENT
Anyone who wishes to contest the rights of the farmer to land given to him
by the government in accordance with our agrarian laws has the burden of proving
that the farmer does not deserve the government grant.
The above findings notwithstanding and assuming that petitioner really
waived his tenancy rights in favor of private respondent, this case should still be
void for being made in violation of Presidential Decree No. 27 (TORRES VS.
VENTURA G.R. NO. 86044, July 2, 1990).
CLOA/CLT/EP
It being so, We rule that the EPs' previously issued to defendant-appellee
partakes the nature of a "public document which is entitled to full and credit in the
absence of competent evidence that its due execution was tainted with defects and

irregularities that could warrant declaration of its nullity (ANCHUELO VS. IAC,
147 SCRA 434).
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) does not vest
in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. It is only after
compliance with the conditions set forth in PD No. 27 which entitled him to an
Emancipation Patent (EP) that he acquires a vested right of absolute ownership in
the landholding (PAGTALUNAN VS. TAMAYO, 183 SCRA 252).
It must be emphasized that once a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) has
been issued to a tenant covering a property under the supervision of and in
compliance with the implementing rules and regulations of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, he is thereby deemed to be the owner of the agricultural land in
question. There is no more landlord and tenant relationship and all that remains is
for the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the valuation of the land in
accordance with existing rules and regulations for purpose of compensation to the
landowner (QUIBAN VS. BUTALID, 189 SCRA 106).
Nullification of a CLT maybe had only in a case directly attacking its
validity but never collaterally (MIRANDA VS. CA, GR NO. L-59730,
FEBRUARY 11, 1986).
An Emancipation Patent holder acquires the vested right of absolute
ownership in the landholding a right which has becomes fixed and established
and is no longer open to doubt or controversy (PAGTALUNAN VS. TAMAYO,
183 SCRA 253).
E.P. TORRENS TITLE
1. Certificate of Title cannot be altered, amended or cancelled except in
a DIRECT PROCEEDING in accordance with law (WIDOWS AND
ORPHANS ASSOCIATION ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 210
SCRA 165).
2. Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of ownership of the
land (CHING VS. CA, 181 SCRA 9).
3. When EP is issued then he acquires a vested right of absolute
ownership in the landholding (PAGTALUNAN VS. TAMAYO, 183 SCRA
252).
4. The government recognizing the worthy purpose of the TORRENS
SYSTEM, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder
once the condition laid down by the law are satisfied (REPUBLIC VS.
UMALI, 171 SCRA 647).
TORRENS
Lands under Torrens Title cannot be acquired by prescription (Sec. 39, Act
No. 196; Rosario vs. Auditor General, L-1187, April 30, 1958).

TENANCY PERSONAL CULTIVATION

For one to be considered a tenant, he must NECESSARILY WORK THE
LAND HIMSELF although he may avail of the labor of his immediate
farmhousehold (SABIDORIO, ET AL., VS. UGAY, C.A.-G.R. No. SP-01495,
July 25, 1973).
DCN 0808 = When he went to Saudi Arabia and left farmwork to his
wife, he was clearly no longer taking advantage of the assistance of his farm
household (ESTABILLO VS. RUIZ, CA-G.R. NO. 42019-20-R, January 12,
1972; CRUZ VS. MARCELO, CA-G.R. NO. SP-05933, May 30, 1977).
In
the
following
cases
involving
a
GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE (DIMANAWA VS. PLANA, ET AL., CA-G.R. NO. SP-02004,
January 7, 1975) a BUS CONDUCTOR (BALANAY VS. RAFAEL, C.A.-G.R.
NO. SP-01746-CAR, August 2, 1976) a FULL TIME MACHINE OPERATOR
(MAGALANG VS. YAP, C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-03163, April 14, 1977), and a
JEEPNEY DRIVER (ESCUETA VS. GERODIAS, ET AL., CA-G.R. NO. SP06963, March 30, 1978, the COURT of APPEALS found it hard to believe that
these people could still have the time to work the land personally.
IF THE LAW ABHORS ABSENTEE OWNERS, MORE SO WITH
ABSENTEE TENANTS (BUENO VS. BASCO, C.A.-G.R. NO. 07644-CAR,
May 31, 1978).
Failure to comply with one's obligation as a tenant is tantamount to
abandonment (LIMBO VS. BRAGADO, C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-05891, March 28,
1977).
TENANCY
The six (6) essential requisites for the establishment of tenancy relationship
are:
1.

The parties are the LANDOWNER and the TENANT;

2.

The SUBJECT is AGRICULTURAL LAND;

3.

There is CONSENT;

4.

The PURPOSE is AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION;

5.

There is PERSONAL CULTIVATION;

6.

There is SHARING OF HARVEST.

CABALLES VS. DAR - 168 SCRA 247

QUA VS. CA 198 SCRA 236; GRAZA VS. CA 163

SCRA 39
Unless a person has established his status as a DE JURE tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
government under existing tenancy laws (CASTILLO VS. COURT OF
APPEAL, 205 SCRA 529).
4

Tenant is defined as the "person who personally cultivates the same

(landholding) (Sec. 6, R.A. 3844)" Absent the element of personal cultivation, one
cannot be a tenant, (CASTILLO VS. CA) (REYES VS. ESPINELI, 30 SCRA
574) At most he can be considered a CIVIL LAW LESSEE because the civil law
lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased (GABRIEL VS.
PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
The fact of sharing alone, is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship; . . . (CABALLES VS. DAR 168 SCRA 247)
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and
lawful landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or
usurpation (HILARIO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 148
SCRA 573).
Consequently, the mere cultivation of the land by a usurper cannot confer
upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of
security of tenure of the law (HILARIO VS. IAC, SUPRA).
The caretaker of the land may be considered as the cultivator of the land
and, hence, a tenant (LATAG VS. BANOG, 16 SCRA 88).
The cultivator is necessarily tasked with duties that amount to
cultivation (COCOMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 568).
Cultivation is an important factor in determining the existence of tenancy
relationship. However, the mere fact that it was not the plaintiff who had actually
seeded the land does not mean that they are not tenants of the land. The definition
of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harvesting of the land.
It includes the promotion of growth and the case of the plants or husbanding the
ground to forward the products of earth by general industry (GUERRERO VS.
CA, 142 SCRA 136, May 30, 1986; COCOMA VS. CA, 164 SCRA 568).
Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
government under existing laws (PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. HON. FILEMON
GAPULTOS, ET AL., 181 SCRA 159).
INTRUDER
It is a settled rule that tenancy relationship can only be created with the
consent of the true and lawful owner and not by the imposition or usurpation by
any intruder or usurper (GRAZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 163 SCRA
41; BERENGUER VS. COURT OF APPEALS 164 SCRA 432).
Mere cultivation by a usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to
work on the land as a tenant and thereby involve the protective mantle of security
of tenure under the law (GONZALES VS. ALVAREZ, ET AL., G.R. NO.
77401, February 7, 1990).
Parenthetically, mere cultivation of the land by a usurper cannot confer
upon him any legal right to work on the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of
security of tenure of the land (ANTONIO VS. NATIVIDAD, G.R. NO. L-14631,
5

March 30, 1962; SPOUSES TIONGSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 130

SCRA 482 (1984) ).
Indeed, tenancy IS NOT A UNILATERAL RELATIONSHIP deriving
substance only from what an alleged tenant does upon the land. It is basically a
legal relationship of mutual accord by and between him and the owner of the
land (TUAZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 118 SCRA 484).
Tenancy is not purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship the intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and, in this case, their written
agreements, provided, these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are
even more important (TUAZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 118 SCRA 484).
There are no SQUATTERS in agricultural lands, squatters are only found in
URBAN COMMUNITIES, not in rural areas (onPD 772) (PEOPLE VS. HON.
VICENTE ECHAVES, 95 SCRA 663).
The court is aware of the practice of landowners, by way of evading the
provisions of tenancy laws to have their tenants sign contracts of agreements
intended to camouflage the real import of their relationship (CRUZ VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, 129 SCRA 224; VDA DE DONATO).
RES JUDICATA
For res judicata to set in, the following requisites should be clearly
established:
1.

There is a FINAL FORMER JUDGEMENT;

2.
That the former judgment was rendered by a COURT
HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
and THE PARTIES;
3.
The former judgment is a JUDGMENT ON THE
MERITS; and
4.
That there is between first and second action,
IDENTITY OF PARTIES, OF THE SUBJECT MATTER and
CAUSE OF ACTION.
Decisions of Administrative agencies has the force and effect of final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata (IPEKDJIAN
MERCHANDISING CO., VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, 9 SCRA
72; SAN LUIS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 174 SCRA 258; YSMAEL, JR.
AND CO., INC. VS. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 190 SCRA 672).
IDENTITY OF CAUSE OF ACTION
The TEST for determining whether or not there is IDENTITY OF THE
CAUSES OF ACTION between the first and second action is whether the same
evidence would support and establish both the present and former causes of
action (SANTOS VS. IAC G.R. NO. 66671, October 28, 1986).
6

The doctrine of RES JUDICATA is a rule pervading a well regulated

system of jurisprudence and is based upon two GROUNDS embodied in various
COMMON LAW MAXIMS = The first based on PUBLIC POLICY AND
NECESSITY which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end
to litigation Interest republicae ut sit finis litium; and the second, on the
hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause
nemo debet bix vexari pro una et eadem causa. (NABUS VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 91670, February 7, 1991).
Once a ruling or judgment has become final, all the issues therein or
implied thereto should be laid to rest (ZANSIBARIAN RESIDENTS
ASSOCIATION VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, 135 SCRA 235; DE
BORJA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. L-37944, JUNE 30, 1988).
FINAL JUDGEMENT
Final judgment are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed.
Otherwise, there would be a wavering of trust to the courts. In the absence of an
appeal from a trial court decision, the judgment becomes final and executory. It
becomes the law of the case. Having been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction acting within its authority, that judgment may no longer be altered
even at the risk of legal infirmities and errors it may contain. They cannot be
corrected by a special civil action of certiorari, filed long after the judgment had
become final and executory (SAN JUAN VS. RALLOS G.R. 45063, 15 April 83,
Third Div. Fernan, J.; INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL VS. MINISTER OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT G.R. 54243, 21 JULY 89, Second Div. Paras,
J.).
Once a decision has become final, the court can no longer amend or modify
the same, much less set it aside. To allow the court to amend the final judgment
will result in endless litigation. Every litigation must come to an end. Access to the
court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been
adjudicated in a valid judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an
unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be
harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be encouraged,
unscrupulous, litigants, will multiply in number to the detriment of the
administration of justice (MARQUEZ VS. CA G.R. 79743, 6 November 1989,
Second Div. Sarmiento, J.; NGO BUN TIONG VS. JUDGE SAYO, G.R.
45825, 30 JUNE 1988, Second Div. Paras, J.).
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the only jurisdiction left to
the trial court is to order its execution(BACLAYON VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 182 SCRA 761).
A decision no matter how erroneous becomes the law of the case between
the parties upon attaining finality (BALAIS VS. BALAIS, 159 SCRA 37).
An execution is the fruit and end of the suit, and is aptly called the life of
the law (GARCIA VS. ECHIVERI, 132 SCRA 631).

APPEAL
It is a settled rule that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege
which must be exercised only within the time and in accordance with the
procedure prescribed for it. It is also the established rule that the perfection of an
appeal within the period provided by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional
as well. So it has been held that, unless an appeal is timely taken, the appellate
court acquires no jurisdiction over the appealed case and has power only to
dismiss the appeal (VELASCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 51 SCRA 439;
RODRIGUEZ VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 47 SCRA 153).
The 30 day period to appeal from decision of Land Registration Court
should be counted from receipt by the Office of the Solicitor General of the
decision, NOT from receipt thereof by the special counsel or fiscal acting for the
O.S.G. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 135 SCRA
156).
ART. 13, NEW CIVIL CODE
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included.
The protection of an appeal within the reglementary period from the
decision is JURISDICTIONAL (ITALIAN VILLAGE RESTAURANT VS.
NATIONAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, 207 SCRA 04)
Beyond the period to appeal, a judgment is no longer within the scope of
the power of review of any court. (BORILLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 209
SCRA 130). The filing of appeal within the reglementary period is
MANDATORY (FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY OF THE
PHIL. VS. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY EMPLOYEES
UNION, 212 SCRA 39)
Finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. (ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 212 SCRA 823)
Public policy and sound practice demand that the risk of occasional errors
judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at same definite date
fixed by law; Litigation must end and terminate something and somewhere, and it
is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
deprive of the fruits of the verdict. Court must, therefore guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. (LI KIM
THO VS. GO SIY KAO, ET AL., L-2676, Jan. 31, 1949, 82 Phil. 776, 778;
MASAGANA TELAMART, INC. VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, L-69623, May 31, 1985) (COMPENDIUM OF PHIL.
JURISPRUDENCE, SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM 1845-1980).
Volume II, By Celso L. Magsino, page 33).

APPEAL PROCEDURE
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical
sense. The rules of procedure are used only to secure not override substantial
justice (GREGORIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 72 SCRA 120). Therefore,
we ruled inRepublic vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453 that a SIX DAY
DELAY in the perfection of the appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And again
in RAMOS VS. BAGASAO, 96 SCRA 395, this Court held that a delay of FOUR
(4) DAYS in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file a
record on appeal can be excused on the basis of equity (VELASCO VS.
GAYAPA, JR., 152 SCRA 440).
Moreover, rules of procedure are intended to promote, not defeat,
substantial justice, and therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense (ANGEL VS. INOPIQUEZ, 169 SCRA 129; CALASIAO
FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION VS. CA, 106
SCRA 630; DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. ROMAMBAN, ET AL., 131 SCRA
431 [1984]).
PROCEDURE
In the word of the Supreme Court, "The purpose of procedure is not to
thwart justice. It's proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of the contending parties (MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS. ATTORNEY
GENERAL, 20 PHIL. 523, 529).
Consequently, lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be
overlooked when they do not involve public policy, when they arose from an
honest mistake or unforseen accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse
party and have not deprived the court of its authority (CASE and NANTZ VS.
JUGO ET AL., 430 G. Mo. 11, p. 4620; ALIGARBES VS. AGUILAR, ET
AL., G.R. NO. L-5736, JAN. 30, 1954).
It is settled, jurisprudence than an issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the
first time an appeal (REPARATIONS COMMISSION VS. VISAYAN
PACKING CORPORATION, 193 SCRA 531; MATIENZO VS. SERVIDAD,
107 SCRA 276). In the word of Supreme Court Justice Isagani A. Cruz They
must choose one or the other and stand or fall by whatever choice they make.
Perfection of an appeal within the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional
so that the failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment
final and executory (ANDAYA VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, 188 SCRA 253).
SECURITY OF TENURE
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessee which they
value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to

deprivation of their only means of livelihood (BERNARDO VS. COURT OF

APPEALS, 168 SCRA 439).
The right to surrender possession of the tenanted land can only be exercised
by the tenant (SEE SEC. 27 (2) R.A. 3844;MANUEL VS. VALENTIN, C.A.
G.R. NO. 03982, MARCH 15, 1976).
Essence of the decision = DARAB
He pointed out that there is no question that he was then sickly even before
the first cropping season of 1987 and so it was natural for him as a tenant to get the
services of others to perform farm activities which he, as the tenant cannot do
during his temporary incapacity.
The right to security of tenure does not only apply to bona fide tenants. It
also applies to ACTUAL TILLERS of the land. Pursuant to Department
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform for
the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 27, security of tenure is likewise
available to actual tillers of the land (MEJORADA VS. OHAGAN, ET AL., CA
G.R. NO. SP-01665, July 7, 1975).
As long as the legal possessor of the land constitutes a person as a tenantfarmer by virtue of an express or implied lease, such act is binding on the owner of
the property even if he himself may not have given his consent to such an
agreement. This is a settled-jurisprudence. The purpose of the law is to protect the
tenant-farmer's security of tenure which could otherwise arbitrarily terminated by
an owner simply manifesting his non-conformity to the relationship (CO VS. IAC,
167 SCRA 392).
The agricultural tenant's security of tenure in holding has become one of his
most deserved rights under our tenancy legislation, guaranteed by both RA No.
1199 and RA No. 3844, as amended. For without it, a tenant becomes the easy
prey of the landowner's whims and caprices. Without it, he can be deprived of his
principal and sole means of livelihood for no cause at all(ADOLFO, ET AL., VS.
CABANSON, 8 CAR 2s 84; IBAN VS. PLANAS, CA-GR. NO. SP-01768).
The DAR has taken cognizance of certain methods employed by
landowners to defeat said policy, such as "forcing their tenants to sign documents
implying voluntary surrender to evade the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
which act was pronounced to be illegal. In PD No. 583, it is made a criminal
offense for any landowner who by any other act, scheme, or strategy shall eject,
exclude, remove or oust and/or cause the ouster, exclusion, removal or ejectment
of a tenant-farmer from his landholding in contravention of decrees, laws and
other orders on land reform (ALCALA VS. AMARANTE, CA-GR NOS. SP05669-95672, FEBRUARY 4, 1977).
Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, Republic Act 1199, as
amended, enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the tenant, such that it
prescribes that the relationship of landholder and tenant can only be terminated for
causes provided by law. The principle is epitomized by the axiom in the land
tenure that once a tenant, always a tenant. The law simply provide that the tenancy
relationship between the landholder and his tenant should be preserved in order to
10

insure the well-being of the tenant and protect him from being unjustly
dispossessed of the land (PINEDA VS. DE GUZMAN and PELICIANO, 21
SCRA 1450).
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessee which they
value as life itself, and the deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to the
deprivation of their only means of livelihood (BERNARDO VS. CA).
(O)nce a leasehold relations (tenancy) has been established, the agricultural
lessee (tenant) is entitle to security of tenure. He has a right to continue working
on the land and he may not be ejected therefrom except for causes as provided by
law (DE JESUS VS. IAC, 175 SCRA 559; DOLORFINO VS. CA, 191 SCRA
880).
The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in the possession of the
landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sell, alienates or transfer, the purchaser
or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the
obligations of the agricultural lessor (SECTION 10, RA NO. 3844).
A landholder-tenant relationship is preserved even in case of transfer of
legal possession of the subject property. The purpose of the law is to maintain the
tenants in peaceful possession and cultivation of the land and to afford them
protection against unjustified dismissal from their holdings by the transferee or
purchaser of the land (PRIMERO VS. CAR, 101 PHIL. 675).
A tenant can only be ejected by the Court for cause and such cause for
dispossession must be proven and justified(ANCHETA VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 200 SCRA 409).
P.D. 816 LAWFUL EJECTMENT
The appellant has these many years (from 1968 to the present) succeeded in
evading payment of rentals while at the same time holding on the land bespeaks
much louder than words his evident bad faith in trying to enrich himself at the
expense of another, a situation that is unjust when practiced by a landowner. We
are not unaware of the special concern that the state takes over agricultural tenant
and/or lessors, the tillers of the country's economy, for these protection should be
meant only to save the man from harassment and undue advantage; it was certainly
not meant to aid and abet wrongful inroads by the tenant into legitimate rights of
landowners/lessors who, too, deserve equal protection of the law. Otherwise, there
would be neither rhyme nor justification in all of the land reform measures of the
government, . . . (PABUSTAN VS. ANGELES C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-01632, OCT.
11, 1974).
It devolves upon agricultural lessee, as his legal obligation, to pay the lease
rental when it falls due. A lessee cannot be authorized to remain in possession and
cultivation of farmholding without giving the landowner his share in the produce,
for the law recognizes the basic right of the landowner to enjoy his legitimate
share of the produce of his property. Thus, PD 816 has been promulgated in
pursuance of the policy of the government to equalize the rights and obligation of
11

the landowners, agricultural lessor and agricultural lessee (VILLANUEVA VS.

MENDOZA, CA-G.R. NO. 06612-SP, JUNE 17, 1977).
The tenant who has been in possession and cultivation of litigated land must
be held liable for rentals which he failed to pay beginning the x x x to the present,
since this is a legal obligation which he cannot evade (Sec. 26, RA 3844 as
amended by RA 6389). Should he fail to pay the same he shall suffer the
consequences decreed by PD 816, Sec. 3. (CANJA VS. BANGOY CA-G.R. NO.
06433-R, MAY 31, 1977).
PD 816 - SEC. 36 (6) RA 3844
R.A. 3844 (Sec. 36 (6)) states does not pay the lease rental. It should not
be meant as does not pay in full the lease rental to justify dispossession.
To hold such view would sanction quasi-judicial legislation frowned upon
by our courts (LORENZO, ET AL., VS. PNB [DAVAO BRANCH] ET AL.,
VOL. 51 NO. 11, O.G. 5658, NO. 9555-R, MAY 11, 1955).
SEC. 36, RA 3844
An agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that valid
grounds exist for his ejectment therefrom.
Thus, the essential requirement for lawful dispossession are
a)
The court, body or tribunal acquires competent
jurisdiction;
b)

There must be hearing on the merits;

c)

The judgment must be final and executory; and

d)
The judgment must be based on valid and lawful ground
provided under agrarian laws.
PERSONAL CULTIVATION AS LEGAL GROUND FOR EJECTMENT
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Personal Cultivation by owner lessor, still
a valid ground for dispossession of a tenant; Reason: We are in full agreement
with the holding of the Court of Appeals upholding the Court a quo that insofar as
COCONUT LANDS are concerned, personal cultivation by the owner-lessor, a
ground for dispossession of the tenant-lessee under Section 50 of Republic Act
1199, is still a valid ground for dispossession of a tenant. This is so because
Section 35 of Republic Act 3844 expressly provides that with respect to lands
principally planted to CITRUS, COCONUTS, CACAO, DURIAN and other
similar PERMANENT TREES. The consideration, as well as the tenancy system
prevailing, shall be governed by the provision of Republic Act 1199, as
amended (FRANCISCO BALIGWAT VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
ALBINO ESTAVAS, NO. L-44678, APRIL 8, 1986, 142 SCRA 34).
12

NOTE:

Fishponds not included, Also take note of effectivity of CARL

FORUM - SHOPPING
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion [other than by appeal or certiorari] in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts
while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative
ruling. This is specially so as in this case, where the court in which the second suit
was brought, has no jurisdiction.
Forum shopping is condemnable and punishment therefore is the dismissal
of all actions pending in different courts(BUAN VS. LOPEZ, JR., 145 SCRA
38).
Pendency of an identical action between the same parties in another is a
ground for dismissal of the second suit (Ibid).
TECHNICALITIES OF LAW
May disregard technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits based
on evidence (RUIZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 201 SCRA 577).
Technicality when it deserts its proper office, as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts (ALONZO VS. VILLAMOR, ET AL., 16 PHIL. 315; CITED ON
YONG CHAN KIM VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., ET AL., 193 SCRA 344).
Following the stand of the S.C., the Board will not allow substantial justice
to be sacrificed at the altar of procedural law.
POINTS TO PONDER IN AGRARIAN CASES
1. Rules of Technicalities must yield to the broader interest of substantial
justice (LAMSAN TRADING INC. VS. LEOGARDO JR., 144 SCRA
571).
2. Technicalities in pleading must be avoided in order to attain substantial
justice (MUTUC VS. AGLORO, 105 SCRA 642).
3. Procedural technicality should not be made a bar to the vindication of
legitimate grievance (FUNTILA VS. CA, 93 SCRA 251).
4. Trial judges should refrain from procedural technicalities in deciding
cases and get down to the business of hearing and deciding cases on their
merits (GERIAN VS. BONCAROS, 93 SCRA 862).
5. Due process is only for the vigilant not those having right to be heard,
choose to be silent, only to complain later that they have not been
heard (BAUTISTA VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR &
EMPLOYMENT, 196 SCRA 470).
13

6. Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more

eloquently than a hundred witnesses (PEOPLE VS. SACABIN, 57 SCRA
707).
DUE PROCESS
The requirement of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit their respective position papers and submit any evidence
they may have in support of their defense (MUTUC VS. COURT OF APPEAL,
190 SCRA 43; ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. DE LA SERNA, 182 SCRA
472).
The failure of the courts to consider all issues raised in the complaint is a
violation of procedural due process; The issues raised by a party should not be left
undecided, especially, so when such issue have been raised on time and insisted
upon at all stages of the proceeding (GRACILLA VS. CIR, G.R. NO. L-24489,
SEPTEMBER 28, 1968).
EVIDENCE
AFFIDAVITS
Affidavits are often unsatisfactory at best. The affiant swears that what he
started is true, but he does not swear that it is the whole truth, nor has the adverse
party an opportunity to inquire whether it is so . . . . . . Affidavits on the same side
are sometimes uniform in appearance as eggs in the shell, but if one of them be
prodded with the point of cross-question or two, the yolk is at once
exposed SALONGA, PHILIPPINE LAW ON EVIDENCE, p. 373, 1965 ed.).
Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely
hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. It should not
have been given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence whether
objected to or not, has no probative value as the affiant could not have been crossexamined on the facts stated therein (SALONGA VS. PAO, ET AL., G.R. NO.
59524, Feb. 18, 1985; J. HUGO GUTIERREZ CITING PEOPLE VS.
LABINIA, 115 SCRA 223 and PEOPLE VS. VALERIO, 112 SCRA 661).
He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence (TOP-WELD MANUFACTURING INC., VS. ECED, S.A., 138
SCRA 118; LAGASCA VS. DE VERA, 79 PHIL. 376; RODRIGUEZ VS.
VALENCIA, 81 PHIL. 787).
Petitioner or anyone in his right mind for that matter, would not waste his
time, effort and money, especially if he is a poor, to prosecute an unworthy action.
If at all, petitioner is an example of a poor tenant farmer who, due to sheer
poverty, was constrained to mortgage his only land to somebody else a situation
which Presidential Decree No. 27 sought to prevent by providing an explicit
prohibition on transfer (TORRES VS. VENTURA, 187 SCRA 96).

14

Lastly, it is already settled that, this Board, unfettered by the technical rules
of evidence and procedure, can rule on unassigned errors as long as this will
enable it to arrive at a just solution of the conflict before the court (Board) (DE
LEON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 205 SCRA 612).
PARTIES IN A CASE
It is generally accepted that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger (ED. A. KELLER & CO. VS. EDLERMAN &
BUCKMALL STRATEMSHIP CO., 38 PHIL. 514, 520; GATCHALIAN VS.
ARLEGUI, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).
And strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the
court (BIEN VS. SUNGA, 117 SCRA 249 [1982]).
An EXECUTION case can be issued only against a party and not against
one who did not have his day in court (GALANG, ET AL. VS. UYTIEPO, 92
PHIL. 344; CASTANEDA VS. DE LEON, 55 O.G. 625; MARTINEZ, ET AL.
VS. VILLACETE, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-18695, AUGUST 31, 1962).
Notice to counsel of record is binding upon the client (DURAN VS.
PAGARIGAN, 106 PHIL. 90).
Recovery of real property is one of the actions that survive against the
decedents' representatives (BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS VS. HEIRS OF
KALAW, L-18805, AUGUST 14, 1967).
L. B. P.
LBP assumed the responsibility of financing the acquisition of agricultural
lands by LESSEES through PRE-EMPTION and REDEMPTION pursuant to Sec.
11-12, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389 (LBP CIRCULAR NO. 3, SERIES
OF 1980).
V. O. S.
Decisions of the PARAD and RARAD on preliminary determination of just
compensation for landholdings covered by the Agrarian Reform Program are NO
LONGER APPEALABLE to the Board as the remedy is to file an original
action with the Special Agrarian Court (ESTATE OF JUAN MIRANDA VS.
LBP DARAB CASE NO. 0585; LBP VS. DARAB, C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-30325).
LANDOWNERS' RIGHT
Landlords, especially small farmers, deserves protection; Tenants are not to
be solely protected by law (CALDERON VS. DE LA CRUZ, 138 SCRA 173).
The concept of "social justice" was not meant to perpetuate an injustice to
landowner - lessor (CABATAN VS. CA, 95 SCRA 323).

15

For what he has consented to, he cannot now set up as an injury, Justice
Edgardo Paras one who trifles with the law must suffer the fruits of his
scheme (ONG VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 209 SCRA 350).
Social justice is not for the tenant alone. (NILO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 128 SCRA 519)
The protective mantle of social justice cannot be utilized as an instrument to
hoodwinks court of justice and undermine the rights of landowners on the plea of
helplessness and heartless exploitation of the tenant by the landowner. False
pretenses cannot arouse the sentiment of charity in compassionate
society (DEQUITO VS. LLAMAS, 66 SCRA 505).
The landowners deserve as much consideration as the tenants themselves in
order not to create an economic dislocation where tenants are solely favored but
the landowners become impoverished (CALDERON VS. DE LA CRUZ, 138
SCRA 173).
VESTED RIGHT
Vested right is some right or interest in property that has become fixed and
established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. Rights are vested when
the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some
person as present interest (BALBOA VS. FARRALES, 51 PHIL. 498).
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
It is a fundamental rule, that what determined the jurisdiction over the
subject matter is the allegation made in the complaint. Jurisdiction cannot be made
to depend upon the pleas and defenses made by the defendant in his answer or
motion to dismiss" (CARDENAS VS. CAMUS, G.R. NO. L-17191, JULY 30,
1962, cited in the new Rules of Court by Martin, Second E.d., Vol. I;
MARTINEZ LEYBA VS. EFREN V. MENDOZA, NO. 43157-R, APRIL 30,
1971; 68, NO. 23, O.G. 4513, JUNE 5, 1972).
DARAB ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IS PURSUANT TO:
1.

Sec. 17, E.O. No. 229, dated July 22, 1987;

2.

Sec. 13, E.O. No. 129-A, dated July 26, 1987;

3.

Sec. 50, R.A. No. 6657, June 10, 1988, and

4.

Sec. 1-2, Rule II of the Revised Rules of the DARAB

CONTRACT
Well settled that to determine the nature of the contract, courts are not
bound by the name or title given to it by the contracting parties. Contracts are not
what the parties may see fit to call them but what they really are as determined by
the principle of law. (BALURAN VS. NAVARRO, 70 SCRA 309).
16

The Supreme Court, after construing a "Labor of Contract" as in fact a

tenancy agreement, took notice of some landlords of asking their tenants to sign
agreements that camouflage their real agreement by way of evading the provisions
of tenancy laws(CRUZ VS. CA, 129 SCRA 222).
We agree with petitioner that as a landholder he has full liberty to enter into
a civil lease contract covering his property. What we want to indelibly impress,
however, is that once a landholder enters into a contract lease whereby his land is
to be devoted to agricultural production and said landholding is susceptible of
personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with help of labor coming from his
immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold
agreement, and perforce comes under the direct coverage of tenancy laws.
Otherwise, it would be easy to subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract,
the intendment of law of protecting the under privilege and ordinary credulous
farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the landed
gentry (TEODORO VS. MACARAEG, 27 SCRA 7).
DEEMED OWNER
The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of
PD No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was deemed owner of the land in
question. As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of the
soil. As such he gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding
for himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted by the
government to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and
enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of
transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his
successors (TORRES VS. VENTURA, 187 SCRA 96).
HOMESTEAD
We hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to
uphold the right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally
the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy
relations (PATRICIO VS. BAYOG, 112 SCRA 41).
LEASEHOLD SYSTEM
While it is true that there have been no presidential proclamations to the
effect that measures have been adopted to insure efficient management of the
agricultural processing phases of crops covered by marketing allotments, it would
be nothing short of regressive to deny sugarland share tenants of their right to elect
the leasehold system. Considering the policy of the government as enunciated in
Section 4 of the Code as amended, which mandates the automatic conversion of
share tenants to leaseholders, individual sugarlands should not be discriminated
against. Hence, any share tenant in sugarlands may, in accordance with law,
exercise his option to change his relationship with the landowner into the leasehold
system. However, all sugarland tenants who do not avail of said option may still be
17

subject to existing lawful arrangements with the landowner in the absence of the
presidential proclamation adverted to in Section 4 (WILFREDO DAVID VS.
CA, ET AL., GR. NO. L-57719-21, MAY 6, 1988).
This Courts has time and time again sustained the constitutionality of
Section 14, holding that the contested section is a reasonable and valid exercise of
the police power of the State to alleviate the socio-economic situation then
prevailing in the fundamental constitutional mandates providing that "[T]he
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people should be the concern of the State" and that the State " shall regulate the
relations between landowner and tenant . . . in agriculture". We finds neither
cogent reason nor sufficient justification to heed the petitioner's proposition to
revised or later the view we have so far adhered to on the constitutionality of
section 14 (DE RAMAS VS. CAR, 1 SCRA 171;CAYETANO DE BORJA VS.
CAR, 79 SCRA 557).
CERTIORARI
NOTE:

1. Section 1, Rule XIV, DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure;

2. Section 54, RA 6657

From the above rule and provisions of law, the mode of view that the losing
party before this Board should avail of is not a Petition for Review but a special
civil action on Certiorari to the Court of Appeals (DCN 0218).
Under Section 54, RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, any decision of the DAR can be brought to this court "BY
CERTIORARI". In this case, what petitioner filed is not by certiorari but a petition
for review. It also appears that the docketing fees of P116.00 have not been
remitted as required under Section 2 (b) of Rule 6, Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals. For these reasons, petition for review is hereby
DISMISSED (ADRIANO JARDIEL VS. ROSARIO PLANAS, CA G.R. NO.
SP-UDK-94, JANUARY 30, 1990).
Basically, for certiorari to prosper, it must be shown in the petition that the
DAR has no JURISDICTION, or acted in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of
discretion. The function of certiorari is to keep an inferior court, Board, tribunal or
officer within its jurisdiction, to relieve persons from arbitrary acts that is, of
acts which they have no authority to perform and not to correct errors of procedure
or mistakes in their findings or conclusions. For certiorari to issue, it must not only
be shown that the board, tribunal or officer acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, but also that there is no appeal or
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary cause of law (ARCAYA
VS. TELERON, ETC., ET AL., L-37446, MARCH 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363,
367).
And, certainly, QUESTIONS OF FACT CAN NOT be reviewed by
certiorari.

18

Grave abuse of discretion MUST BE SHOWN (PALM AVENUE

REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, 153 SCRA 579).
On matters, where the trial courts are given discretion to grant or deny relief
to a party in an action pending before them, the policy of the Supreme Court is
NOT INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF SUCH DISCRETION UNLESS
IT IS CLEARLY SHOWN THAT IT WAS GRAVELY ABUSED (TRINIDAD,
ET AL., VS. HON. MOYA, ET AL., NO. L-16886, APRIL 30, 1965).
REDEMPTION
In an action for redemption, CONSIGNMENT OR TENDER OF
REDEMPTION AMOUNT is a jurisdictional requirement(BASBAS VS.
ENTENA, 28 SCRA 665).
Timely exercise of the right of legal redemption requires either tender of the
price or valid consignation thereof(CONEJERO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 16
SCRA 775).
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
A compromise is basically a CONTRACT perfected by mere consent (GO
VS. IAC, 183 SCRA 82; ART. 2037, NEW CIVIL CODE).
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution and by law (BACALSO
VS. RAMOLETE, ET AL., 21 SCRA 519).
Jurisdiction of the DARAB is centered by Sec. 14 of E.O. No. 129-A, in
relation to Sec. 17 of E.O. No. 229, and Section 50 of RA 6657.
It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language
of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it
says (INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES UNION
(IBAAEU) VS. INCIONG, 132 SCRA 663). where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation(SUCALDITO AND DE
GUZMAN VS. HON. MONTEJO, 193 SCRA 556), but only room for
application (CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT CO. VS. MUNICIPALITY OF
NAGA, 24 SCRA 708).
Between a general law and a special law, the special law
prevails (NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. PRESIDING JUDGE,
RTC, XXV, 190 SCRA 477).
Jurisdiction is the authority of the tribunal to try a case (HERRERA VS.
BARRETO, 25 PHIL. 245).
Jurisdiction is fixed by law (VICTORIA BISCUIT CO., INC. VS.
BENEDICTO, 7 SCRA 611).

19

Jurisdiction
may
be
challenged
at
proceeding (CRISOSTOMO VS. CA, 32 SCRA 54).

any

stage

of

the

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE

In the judicial review of decisions of administrative bodies or agencies, the
rule of evidence which means more than a merescintilla or relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise (LANSANG VS.
GARCIA, 42 SCRA 480) (1971).
Substantial evidence rule does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as
is required in an ordinary civil action but such kind of evidence relevant as is
reasonable and may be accepted as an adequate proof of a conclusion (SESARIA
VS. ROSALES, 17 SCRA 368). This is sufficient in agrarian cases (ULPIENDO
VS. CASE, 10 SCRA 825; VILLANUEVA VS. PANGANIBAN, 17 SCRA
368).
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion (ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, 69 PHIL. 642).
The settled rule is that the conclusions and findings of fact of a trial court
are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong
and cogent reasons (LEE VS. ROMILLO, 161 SCRA 589; ALBA VS.
SANTANDER, 160 SCRA 8; MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 156
SCRA 597). We find no such strong or cogent reason in the present case as would
warrant Our disturbance of the foregoing findings of the court a quo. On the
contrary, Our examination of the assailed rulings discloses that the same are
supported by substantial evidence (ROMEO PUJALTE VS. THE PROV'L
TREASURER OF PALAWAN, ET AL., CA G.R. CY NO. 18833-34).
EXECUTION
The Court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control
over its process of execution (Vda. de PAMAN VS. SENERIS, 115 SCRA 709).
CARP COVERAGE
As to whether the lands are CARP covered. The Supreme Court has this to
say:
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined
in this act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential commercial or industrial
land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
"Agricultural Lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable
20

agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential
lands.
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
The rule on the liberal construction of social legislation is applicable only
where there is no doubt or ambiguity in the law, and not when the law itself is
clear (TAMAYO VS. MANILA HOTEL CO., 101 PHIL. 810 [1957]).
It is not within the province of judiciary to legislate. It cannot, in the guise
of interpretation, enlarge the scope of the statute and include therein situations not
provided nor intended by the law makers. They should not revise even the most,
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative, nor rewrite the law to conform with
what they think should be the law.
It is noteworthy that the Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed by
Congress to establish owner-cultivatorship and family-size farm as the basis of
Philippine agricultural, to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers to be
more independent, self reliant and responsible citizens and a source of a genuine
strength in our democratic society (DE JESUS VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, 175 SCRA 559).
Those who are involved in the execution of agrarian laws that is the farmer
beneficiary's interest must be primarily served. This also hold the Agrarian Laws
are to be liberally construed in favor of farmer-beneficiary. Anyone who wishes to
contest the rights of the farmer to the land given to him by the government in
accordance with our agrarian laws has the burden of proving that the farmer does
not deserve the government grant (TORRES VS. VENTURA, 187 SCRA 97).
Land for the landless, is a slogan that underscore the acute imbalance in the
distribution of the precious resource among our people. But it is more than a
slogan. Through the broaden centuries, it has become a battle cry dramatizing the
increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as
their place in the sun. (ASSOCIATION OF SMALL FARMERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. DAR SECRETARY, GR. NO. 78742, JULY 14, 1989).
NON-PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS
In GARCHITORENA VS. PANGANIBAN (6 SCRA 339) The Supreme
Court ruled in issue that, the ejectment of tenants is justified if failure to pay
rentals is not attributed to any extraordinary event. Otherwise, said tenants would
hold the land for life; or at least, indefinitely, without giving the owner or
landowner any share in the produce, thus virtually depriving him of one of the
main attributes of ownership, which is the enjoyment of the possession and use of
the thing owned, as well as of the products thereof, in violation of the Constitution.
The principle of social justice cannot and should not be construed as to violate the
elementary principles of justice and bring about a patent injustice.
It devolves upon agricultural lessee, as his legal obligation, to pay the lease
rental when it falls due. A lessee cannot be authorized to remain in the possession
21

and cultivation of landholding without giving the landowner his share in the
produce, for the law recognizes the basic right of landowner to enjoy legitimate
share in the produce of his property. Thus, PD No. 816 has been promulgated in
pursuance of the policy of the Government to equalize the right and obligations of
the landowner, agricultural lessor and the agricultural lessees (VILLANUEVA
VS. MENDOZA, CA-G.R. NO. 06612-SP, JUNE 17, 1977).
Where person cultivate the land and did not receive salaries but a share in
the produce or cash equivalent thereof, the relationship created between them and
the landowner is one of tenancy and not employment (SINTOS VS. 246 SCRA
223).
The mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder's share does not
necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former where there is lack of
deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay (TANEDO VS. DE LA CRUZ, 1
SCRA 1106).
JURISDICTION; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
JURISDICTION; APPEAL; PERFECTION OF APPEAL; EXECUTION;
The rule is that once appeal is perfected; the trial court loses its jurisdiction over
the case and to issue the writ of execution; The rule does not apply to a tenancy
and/or agrarian case. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that once appeal is
perfected, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case and to issue writ of
execution (UNIVERSAL FAR EAST CORPORATION VS. CA. ET AL., 131
SCRA 642 [1984]); MONTELIBANO VS. BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING
CO., and C.A., 136 SCRA 294 [1985]). It should be pointed out , however, that
this ruling does not apply to the case at bar (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON.
PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, G.R. NO. 66712, JANUARY 13, 1989, 129
SCRA 169).
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Appeal; Perfection of appeal does not
necessarily mean that the lower court loses jurisdiction over the case since the
rules of procedure defined under P.D. 946 apply. This is a tenancy and/or
agrarian case. Hence, the perfection of the appeal does not necessarily mean that
the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the case, since the rules of procedure as
defined under Presidential Decree 946 apply (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON.
PONCIANO INOPIQUEZ, SUPRA).
SEC. 16 of PD 946 precludes the application of the Rules of Court to
agrarian cases while Section 18 thereof provides that appeal shall not stay the
decision in agrarian cases; The decision may be executed despite perfection of
appeal except where the appealed decision directs the ejectment of the tenant.
Section 16 and 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 are too clear and explicit in this
respect as to require interpretation or construction. Section 16. precludes the
application of the Rules of Court to agrarian cases which Section 18 provides that
appeal shall not stay the decision in agrarian cases. Consequently, said decision
may be executed notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal therefrom except
where the appealed decision directs the ejectment of the tenant. (ANGEL VS.
INOPIQUEZ, SUPRA)
22

PD 946 being a special law, it shall have precedence over the Rules of
Court which is of general applicability. Finally, Presidential Decree No. 946.
being a special law, the same shall have precedence over the Rules of Court which
is of general applicability (DE JOYA VS. LANTIN, 19 SCRA 893 [1967];
PAPA VS. MAGO, 22 SCRA 857 [1968]).
JUST COMPENSATION
I.

DEFINITION

Just Compensation in general has been defined as fair market value. It is the
price which a buyer will pay without coercion and seller will accept without
compulsion. Just compensation cannot be an absolute amount disregarding
particularities of productivity, distance to the trade center. Land valuation is not an
exact science but an exercise fraught with inexact estimates. What is important is
that the land value approximates as closely as possible, what is broadly considered
a just.
II.

JURISDICTION

Where the total amount of compensation being offered by the government

to the landowner does not exceed TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00), the
proceeding shall be conducted by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) concerned. Where the compensation so offered is TWO MILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000.00) BUT NOT MORE THAN FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P5,000,000.00), the proceedings shall be handled by the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). If the amount exceeds FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P5,000,000.00) the proceedings shall be deducted at the DARAB Adjudication
Board Central Office.
The decision of the PARAD, RARAD and DARAB on preliminary
determination of just compensation shall be final and executory if no original
action is filed by the party-in-interest to the Special Agrarian Court within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the decision pursuant to Section 16, paragraph "e", of
Republic Act No. 6657.
FORMULA: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657
DAR Adm. Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Adm. Order
No. 11, series of 1994, provides:
There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS
or CA regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the claim:
LV = (CNI X 0.6) + (CS X 0.3) + (MV X 0.1)
Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
23

CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant
and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present and CS and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (MV x 2)
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27
Under Executive Order 228
Riceland : LV = AGP x 2.5 x 35*
Cornland: LV = AGP + 2.5 x 31*
Government Support price 1972
Computed Land Value x 1.06 (N)
PAYMENT:
Under Voluntary Land Transfer, the landowner will be paid directly in cash
or in kind by the farmer-beneficiary under terms mutually agreed upon them
subject to DAR approval.
Under Compulsory Acquisition, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall
compensate the landowner in the following mode:
a.

Cash payment which shall vary according to land size;

b.

LBP bonds or other government financial instruments.

Under Voluntary Offer to Sell, the landowner will be paid under the same
mode as CA except that the cash portion is higher by five percent (5%).
Proportion of the total compensation is in cash:
The cash portion shall vary according to the size of the landholdings. The
larger the landholding, the smaller the cash portion. The underlying principle is
that small landowners are presumed to have greater need for cash to aid them in
their bid to shift their capital from agriculture to industry.
Payment shall be under the following terms and conditions.

24

a.

Lands above 50 has. 25% cash; 75% bonds

b.

Land above 24-50 has. 35% cash; 70% bonds

c.

Land 24 has. & below 35% cash; 65% bonds

Cash portion is increased by 5% for VOS.

The compensation package under CARP is already much approved
compared to the compensation schemes of past land reform programs. This is so,
precisely to make the program more acceptable to landowners and facilitate the
shift of their capital from agriculture to industry.
Full payment in cash in not feasible. This will tremendously increase the
current funding requirements for CARP which the government can ill afford at
present. Furthermore this will infuse a large amount of money into economy which
could result in inflation.
Compared with previous LBP bonds, the present bonds are definitely more
attractive.
a.
Past LBP bonds have a maturity of 25 years. This means, bond
holders can only get the principle at the end of 25 years. On the other hand, the
new LBP bonds matures every year from the date of issue until the tenth year.
b. The New LBP bonds also bear market rates of interest the same as
those of 91-day treasury bill Old LBP bonds have a fixed six percent (6%) interest
rate.
c.
Finally, these bonds have alternative uses. They may be used by the
landowners; his successors, or his assignees, for any of the following:
*
acquisition of land or other real properties of the
government, including assets under the Asset Privatization
Trust, and other assets foreclosed by governments financial
institutions;
*
acquisition of shares of stock of government owned or
controlled corporation, or share of stocks owned by the
government in private corporation.
JURISPRUDENCE ON JUST COMPENSATION
LAND BANK VS. CA, PEDRO YAP ET AL.
"the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within the reasonable
time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered as just for the
property owners is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprives of his land while
being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope
with his loss."
"the opening of "trust account" is not within the coverage of the term "deposit". . . . Thus,
recourse to any rule which allows the opening of a trust accounts as mode of deposit under section
16 (e) of RA 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible.

25

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NAVAL AND BENOSA

"While it is true that the determination of just compensation is an exclusive domain of the
court and that executive and legislative acts fixing just compensation are by no means conclusive or
binding upon the court, but rather at the very least, merely guiding principles as pointed out in the
case of Republic vs. CA, 159 SCRA 165, the court's discretion is not unlimited and its prerogative
uncanalized within its banks to keep it from overflowing. To place our imprimatur on respondents'
court ruling that the value of private respondent's land which was taken in 1972 should be based on
the current government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay, would be disregard existing
laws and jurisprudence on the matter. The value of the property at the time of the taking not at the
time of payment as respondent court would suggest, is what controls in this jurisdiction."

SECURITY OF TENURE
Under Art. 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a
thing without other limitations than those established by law. As an incident of
ownership, therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his
naked title to the land. However, the new owner must respect the rights of the
tenant. Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines) gives the agricultural lessee the right to work on the landholding once
the leasehold relationship is established.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[S]ecurity of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they

value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to
deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Also, under Sec. 10 of the same Act,
the law explicitly provides that the leasehold relations is not extinguished by the
alienation or transfer of legal possession of the landholding.(TANPINGCO VS.
IAC, G.R. NO. 76225, 207 SCRA 652 [1992], CITED IN PNB VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 105760)
At this stage in the country's land reform program, the agricultural lessee's
right to security of tenure must be "firmed-up" and not negated by inferences from
facts not clearly established in the record nor litigated in the courts below. Hand in
hand with diffusion of ownership over agricultural lands, it is sound public policy
to encourage and endorse a diffusion of agricultural land use in favor of the actual
tillers and cultivators of the soil. It is one effective way the development of a
strong and independent middle-class in society (GRACIANO BERNAS VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD BITO-ON
DEITA, G.R. NO. 85041).
LEGAL POSSESSOR
Property; Agrarian Reform Law; Leases; A Legal possessor may lease the
property by way of agricultural leasehold. There is no dispute, as it is admitted
by the parties in this case, that Benigno Bito-on was granted possession of the
property in question by reason of the liberality of his sister, Natividad (the private
respondent). In short, he (Benigno) was the LEGAL POSSESSOR of the property
and, as such, he had the authority and capacity to enter into an agricultural
leasehold relation with Bernas. Consequently, there is no need to dwell on the
contentions of the private respondent that her brother Benigno was not a
26

usufructuary of the property but actually a bailee in commodatum. Whatever was

the true nature of his designation, he (Benigno) was the LEGAL POSSESSOR of
the property and the law expressly grants him, as legal possessor, authority and
capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he legally
possessed (GRACIANO BERNAS VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEAL and NATIVIDAD BITO-ON DEITA, G.R. NO. 85041, AUGUST 5,
1993).
APPEALS
Civil Actions; Parties may not change theories on appeal. The long
settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party is not allowed to change his theory of
the case or his cause of action on appeal. We have previously held that "courts of
justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue" and that a
judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon
which the parties were not heard is not merely irregular, but extrajudicial and
invalid. The rule is based on the fundamental tenets of fair play and, in the present
case, the Court is properly compelled not to go beyond the issue litigated in the
court a quo and in the Court of Appeals of whether or not the petitioner, Graciano
Bernas, is an agricultural leasehold lessee by virtue of his installation as such by
Benigno Bito-on, the legal possessor of the landholding at the time Bernas was so
installed and, consequently entitled to security of tenure on the land. Should
grounds for the dispossession of Bernas, as an agricultural leasehold lessee,
subsequently arise, then and only then can the private respondent (landowner)
initiate a separate action to dispossess the lessee, and in that separate action, she
must allege and prove compliance with Sec. 36 (1) of the Code which consist of
among others, a one year advance notice to the agricultural leasehold lessee (the
land involved being less than 5 hectares) and readiness to pay him the damages
required also by the Code.
Property; Agrarian Reform; Leases; Landowner who gives to another legal
possession of his land cannot complain that the latter's agricultural lessee used the
land for a purpose not agreed upon. There was, as admitted by all, no privity or
tie between Natividad and Bernas. Therefore, even if Bernas had improperly used
the lots as ricelands, it was Benigno who could have objected thereto since it was
his (the legal possessor's) landholding that was being "improperly" used. But he
(Benigno) did not. It is not for Natividad (as landowner) to now complain that
Bernas used the land "for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed
upon." Bernas had no agreement with her as to the purpose for which the land was
to be used. That they were converted into ricelands (also for agricultural
production) can only mean that the same (conversion) was approved by Benigno
(the undisputed agricultural lessor-legal possessor). It is thus clear that sec. 36, par
3 of the Code cannot be used to eject Bernas.
EJECTMENT
Same; Same; Agricultural lessee installed by legal possessor cannot be
ejected by landowner on the land's return to the latter. Clearly, the return of
27

legal possession from Benigno to Natividad cannot prejudice the rights of Bernas
as an agricultural leasehold lessee. The grounds for ejectment of an agricultural
leasehold lessee are provided for by law. The enumeration isexclusive and no other
grounds can justify termination of the lease. The policy and letter of the law are
clear on this point.
INTERVENTION
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Intervention; Intervention is not a matter
of right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which
satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. Intervention is not
a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicants shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention [Gibson
vs. Revilla, G.R. No. L-41432, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 219]. Under Section 2,
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his
possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so suited as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or an officer thereof. The Court has ruled that such interest must be actual,
direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant [Garcia v. David, 67
Phil. 279 (1939); Batama Farmer's Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
vs. Rosal, G.R. No. L-30526, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 408; Gibson vs.
Revilla, supra.]
CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER
SHARE TENANCY
Tenancy; When share tenancy exists. A share tenancy exists where, as
in this case, a person has physical possession of another's land for the purpose of
cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the crop. Where the contract entered
into by the parties provided that plaintiff would take care of the plants that are
planted and those still to be planted on the lands within a period of five years,
giving the defendant, as owner of the lands, a share in the crop, a tenancy
relationship was established between the parties (MARCELO VS. DE LEON, L12902, JULY 29, 1959; CITED IN SILVERIO LATAG VS. MARCELO
BANOG, 16 SCRA 88).
CARETAKER
Same; Caretaker of the land is considered a cultivator. A caretaker of an
agricultural land is also considered "cultivator" of the land (SILVERIO LATAG
VS. MARCELO BANOG, 16 SCRA 88).
DAMAGES
Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; Agrarian Court has jurisdiction over tenant's
claim for damages. Plaintiff-appellant's claim for damages was based on his
28

having been allegedly dispossessed unlawfully or unjustifiably by the defendantappellee of the two parcels of land under his care and management. The action,
therefore, relates to an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship
which existed before the filing of the complaint. Under the circumstances, the
Court of Agrarian Relations has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
case, even if the tenancy relationship no longer existed at the time of the filing of
the action (BASILIO VS. DE GUZMAN, L-12762, APRIL 22,
1959; MILITAR VS. TORCILLERO, L-15065, APRIL 28, 1961).
CONSENT
IS
RELATIONSHIP

AN

ESSENTIAL

ELEMENT

OF

TENANCY

Agrarian Reform; Agricultural Tenancy; Pres. Decree 27; Tenancy is a

legal relationship between the tenant and the landowner, it cannot be made to
depend upon what the alleged tenant does on the land, consent of the landowner is
necessary. It has been ruled that Tenancy cannot be created nor depend upon
what the alleged tenant does on the land. Consent of the landowner is necessary
and tenancy cannot be formed where the alleged tenant does not pay any rentals or
share of harvest to the landowners(Hilario v. IAC, 148 SCRA 573 [1987]). In the
case at bar, it will be observed that the consent of the landowner was not obtained.
As ruled by this Court, tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent
of the true and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or
usurpation (Hilario v. IAC, supra); so that mere cultivation of the land by a
usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and
enjoy the protection of security of tenure of the law (Spouses Tiongson vs. CA,
130 SCRA 482 [1984]; Hilario v. IAC, supra). Tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a
legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and their written agreements, which are complied with and are not
contrary to law, are even more important (TUAZON V. C.A., 118 SCRA 484
[1982]; SUZANO F. GONZALES, JR. VS. HON. HEHERSON T.
ALVAREZ, BONIFACIO FRANCISCO, EMETERIO REYES, GENEROSO
SALVADOR, ALBERTO LIWANAG, LEODEGARIO MADRIGAL and
FEDERICO SORIANO, G.R. NO. 77401, FEBRUARY 7, 1990).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondents not being bona fide tenantfarmers cannot avail of the benefits under PD 27. Moreover, the requirements
set by law for the existence of tenancy relationship have not been met by private
respondents in subject case, such as: 1) that the parties are the landholder and
tenant; 2) that subject land is agricultural land; 3) that there is consent; 3) that the
purpose is agricultural production; and 5) that there is consideration (Vda. de
Donato v. CA, supra; Hilario v. IAC, supra). Hence, PD No. 27 cannot apply to
private respondents. PD No. 27 and PD No. 316 apply and operate only to bona
fide tenant-farmers (Elena Vda. De Reyes v. CA, 146 SCRA 230
[1986]; Geronimo v. CA, 121 SCRA 859 [1983]; Jacinto v. CA, 87 SCRA 263
[1978]).

29

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Same; Evidence; In agrarian cases, all that is required is submission of
"substantial evidence," not preponderance of evidence. In the case
of Evangelista v. CA, 158 SCRA 141 [1988] this Court ruled that the finding that
petitioner was not a bona fide tenant-farmer on the land based on evidence is final
and conclusive. In addition, in agrarian cases, all that is required is submission of
"substantial evidence" not preponderance of evidence (Bagsican v. CA, 111
SCRA 226 [1986]). Administrative findings of facts are sufficient if supported by
substantial evidence in the record (Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA
737;Antonio v. Estrella, 156 SCRA 68 [1987]; Castillo v. Napolcom
Adjudication Board, 156 SCRA 274 [1987]). It is an elementary rule that the
findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect and
finality (SSS v. CA, 156 SCRA 383 [1987]; Rosario Bros Inc. v. Ople, 131
SCRA 74 [1984]; Special Events and Central Shipping Officer Workers
Union v. San Miguel, 122 SCRA 557 [1983] except when such findings and
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence or constitute grave abuse of
discretion (Franklin Baker Company of the Phil. v. Trajano, 157 SCRA 423
[1988]; Baby Bus Inc. v. Minister of Labor, 158 SCRA 225 [1988]. Such
circumstances are however not obtaining in the case at bar. Furthermore, the
concept of "Social Justice" was not meant to perpetuate an injustice to the
landowner-lessor (Cabatan v. CA, 95 SCRA 232 [1980]).
CULTIVATION
Same; Same; Cultivation is an important factor to determine the existence
of share tenancy. Cultivation, defined. Now well-settled is the rule that
cultivation is an important factor in determining the existence of a share tenancy
relationship. As to the meaning of cultivation, this Court has already held that: "x
x x. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or
harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion to growth and the care of the
plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general
industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike the
rice, the planting of coconuts seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing.
Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings
placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are
planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts
begins when the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by
smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees applying
fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact that
respondent Benitez, together with his family, handless all phases of farmwork
from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times with
the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not
a mere farm laborer (COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING
ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA
570).

30

Same; Same; Same; Sharing of harvests, if taken together with the other
factors characteristic of tenancy, strengthens respondents' claim that they are share
tenants of petitioners. Further supportive of the existence of a share tenancy
relationship between petitioner and respondents is their agreement to share the
produce or harvest on a 1/7 to 6/7 basis in favor of the petitioner COCOMA.
Though not a decisive indication per se of the existence of tenancy relationship,
such sharing of the harvests, taken together with the other factors characteristic of
tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of
respondents that, indeed, they are tenants (COCONUT COOPERATIVE
MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 164 SCRA 570).
TECHNICAL RULES NOT APPLICABLE TO CAR
Same; RA 3844; Procedure; Sec. 155 of RA No. 3844 provides that, except
expropriation cases, the Court of Agrarian Relations shall not be bound strictly by
technical rules. In Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, this Court ruled: "Significantly, the
Court of Agrarian Relations is not restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or
decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary and
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or preventing further disputes,
provided said matter for determination has been established by competent
evidence during the hearing.'" Further, RA 3844, Section 155, provides: "SEC.
155. Powers of the Court; Rules of Procedure. x x x The Courts of Agrarian
Relations shall be governed by the Rules of Court: Provided, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy pending before
them, the Courts without impairing substantial rights, shall not be bound strictly by
the technical rules of evidence and procedure, except in expropriation
cases"(COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC.
(COCOMA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 571).
LANDHOLDER
Same; Words and Phrases; Landholder, defined. Thus, assuming,
without conceding, that respondents Pedro and Hermogenes Cosico are considered
tenants of the land, petitioner COCOMA submits that, being only an agent of
defendants Fule and Escudero, it can not be held liable for the acts of its
principals. Petitioner's contention is not in accordance with applicable laws,
because "A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as
owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another the use or
cultivation of his land for a consideration either in shares under the share tenancy
system." In accordance with the above provision, petitioner COCOMA is the
landholder of the subject landholdings for (a) it is a "juridical person" being a
domestic corporation established under the laws of the Philippines; (b) it is the
"legal possessor" of the land for it has the sole management and administration
thereof; (c ) it has authorized or retained the private respondents to cultivate the
land; and (d) it has shared the harvest with the latter, albeit unlawfully, making it
31

appear that they are laborers instead of tenants (COCONUT COOPERATIVE

MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 164 SCRA 571).
Same; Same; Same; A landholder-tenant relationship is preserved even in
case of transfer of legal possession of the subject property. Further, in several
cases, this Court sustained the preservation if the landholder-tenant relationship, in
cases of transfer of legal possession: ". . . in case of transfer or in case of lease, as
in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between the landowner and his tenant
should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him
from being unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the land; in
other words, the purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in the
peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection against
unjustified dismissal from their holdings."(Primero vs. CAR, 101 Phil. 675); ". . .
that the tenant may proceed against the transferee of the land to enforce obligation
incurred by the former landholder in relation to said land, for the reason that such
obligation . . . falls upon the assignee or transferee of the land' pursuant to Sec. 9
abovementioned. Since respondents are in turn free to proceed against the former
landholder for reimbursement, it is not iniquitous to hold them responsible to the
tenant for said obligation. Moreover, it is the purposes of Republic Act 1199,
particularly Sec. 9 thereof, to insure that the right of the tenant to receive his
lawful share of the produce of the land us unhampered by the transfer of said land
from one landholder to another" (Almarinez v. Potenciano, 120 Phil.
1154). Therefore, petitioner, being a landholder, can be held liable to private
respondents for their shares in the coconuts harvested from the landholding in
question.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Same; Evidence; Substantial evidence is all that is required in agrarian
cases. As to the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private
respondents' thirty percent (30%) share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975, made by
the Court of Agrarian Relations and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is
erroneous, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from such computation,
as it is a part of the findings of facts and conclusions drawn therefrom by the
respondents appellate court. Such findings and conclusions should not be disturbed
on appeal, in the absence of proof that they are unfounded or were arbitrarily
arrived at or that the Court of Appeals had failed to consider important evidence to
the contrary. In Bagsican vs. Court of Appeals, it was held that: ". . . in agrarian
cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence COCONUT
COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 572).
Agrarian Law; Tenancy relationship; Jurisdiction. Private respondent, in
her original complaint before the lower court, alleged that petitioner violated the
Land Reform Code and could be ejected under P.D. 816. Petitioner answered that
he was a tenant of private respondent. There was, at that point in time, no need of
referral to the Department of Agrarian Reform as the landowner-tenant
32

relationship was admitted. However, when private respondent's amended

complaint where she alleged violation of a civil law lease agreement-was
admitted, the issue of actual tenancy-raised by petitioner in both his Answer and
Amended Answer-had to be referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform for
determination as this was now a genuine issue(OCIER VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 216 SCRA 510 G.R. NO. 105088, DECEMBER 11, 1992).
EXECUTIVE ORDER 229 VEST
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER TO DAR
Agrarian Law; Jurisdiction; Executive Order No. 229 vest in the
Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters. Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the
mechanism for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests in the
Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters (QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 201
SCRA 609).
Same; Same; Same; Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946
deemed repealed by Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229. The above quoted
provision should be deemed to have repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential
Decree No. 946 which invested the then courts of agrarian relations with original
exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and
obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the
agrarian reform program(QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 201
SCRA 610).
Same; Same; Same; Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the courts of agrarian
relations were integrated into the regional trial court and the jurisdiction of the
former was vested in the latter courts. In 1980, upon the passage of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the
courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the regional trial courts and the
jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts (QUISMUNDO VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 201 SCRA 610).
Same; Same; Same; Same; With the enactment of Executive Order No.
229, (QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 201 SCRA 610) the regional
trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform
matters. However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took
effect on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for publication in the
Official Gazette, the regional trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction
to try agrarian reform matters. The said jurisdiction is now vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 6657 contains
provisions which evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the
Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform
matters. The foregoing holding is further sustained by the passage of Republic
33

Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which took effect on
June 15, 1988. The said law contains provisions which evince and support the
intention of the legislature to vest in the Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive
jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters (QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF
APPEAL, 201 SCRA 610).
Evidence; Rule that factual conclusions by the Appellate Court not
reviewable by the Court admits exceptions. Ordinarily, the Appellate Court's
factual conclusions are not reviewable by this Court, and since here those
conclusions are decidedly adverse to Hernandez, the application of the rule should
result in a verdict against him. The rule admits of exceptions, however, as when
facts of substance were overlooked by the appellate court which, if correctly
considered, might have changed the outcome of the case (HERNANDEZ VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 160 SCRA 821).
LUNGSOD SILANGAN RESERVATION
Agrarian Reform Law; Coverage; Commercial, industrial and residential
lands not included. We now determine whether such lands are covered by the
CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted
to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitations. "Agricultural lands" are only those land
which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands." Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be
considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use.
They ceased to be agricultural land upon approval of their inclusion in the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continue to be
developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can
readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to
restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of the
resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion
but this does not detract from the fact that these land are still residential land and
outside the ambit of the CARL (NATALIA REALTY, INC. and ESTATE
DEVELOPERS and INVESTORS CORP., VS. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR.
WILFREDO LEANO, DAR REGION IV, G.R. NO. 103302, AUGUST 12,
1993).
SHARE TENANCY
Agrarian Reform; "Share tenancy" defined. The law defines "agricultural
tenancy" as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture,
belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through
the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in
34

consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to
pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in
both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural Tenancy Act, as
amended; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Same. With petitioner reference to this case, "share tenancy" exist
whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for a agricultural production
wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating
the land with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the
tenant in proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166
(25) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code;Guerrero vs. Court of
Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same, "Farmhand" or "Agricultural worker" defined. In contrast, a
farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any agricultural salary or piece worker but is
not limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code
expressly provides otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor
practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular
employment" (Sec. 166 (15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform
Code; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Statutes; Contracts; An agreement which states that the rights and
obligations of a person allowed by the landowner to cultivate and take care of his
coconut farm, shall be governed by R.A. 1199, is not abrogated by the subsequent
repeal of said law by R.A. 3844, which abolished share tenancy and which does
not include coconut lands, inasmuch as the vested rights of a share tenant to
security of tenure would be adversely affected thereby. On August 8, 1963,
Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the
agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act 6389
amending Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to
public policy. On the basis of this national policy, the petitioner asserts that no
cause of action exists in the case at bar and the lower court's committed grave error
in upholding the respondent's status as share tenant in the petitioners' landholding.
The petitioners' arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back the
advances in agrarian reform law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and
the Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the movement not only towards the
leasehold system but towards eventual ownership of land by its tillers. The phasing
out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into mere
farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever (Guerrero vs.
Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Same; Same; Same. It is important to note that the Agricultural
Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) have
not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) even if the
same have been substantially modified by the latter. However, even assuming such
an abrogation of the law, the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions
35

pending under the repealed statute is a mere general principle. Among the
established exceptions are when the vested rights are affected and obligations of
contract are impaired (Aisporna vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA
482; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Mere fact that a person was not the one who seeded the land with
coconuts does not mean that he could not be a tenant thereof. Cultivation is
another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. It is
admitted that it had been one Conrado Caruruan, with others, who had originally
cleared the land in question and planted the coconut trees, with respondent coming
to the landholding only after the same were already fruit bearing. The mere fact
that it was not respondent Benitez who had actually seeded the land does not mean
that he is not a tenant of the land. The definition of cultivation is not limited
merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion
of growth and the case of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the
products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique
agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconuts seedling does not need
harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth
and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by
soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The
major work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruitbearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking case
of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing
the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handless
all phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra,
although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows
that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142
SCRA 136).
Same; Added indication of share tenancy is sharing in the harvest.
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and
respondent is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis"
that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioners-landowners. Though not a
positive indication of the existence of tenancy relations per se, the sharing of
harvests, taken together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be
present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he is a
tenant (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Contracts; Use of the word "tenant" in the contract to cultivate a
coconut farm indicates that the cultivators is a "share tenant" and not a "farmhand"
or "worker". The petitioners, however, contend that the word "tenant" in the
aforequoted agreement was used to mean a hired laborer or farm employee as
understood and agreed upon by the parties. The fact that their relationship would
be guided by the provisions of Republic Act 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act
of the Philippines militates against such an assertion. It would be an absurdity for
Republic Act 1199 to govern an employer-employee relationship. If as the
petitioners insist a meaning other than its general acceptance had been given the
word "tenant", the instrument should have so stated. Aided by a lawyer, the
petitioners, nor the respondent could not be said to have misconstrued the same. In
36

clear and categorical terms, the private respondent appears to be nothing else but a
tenant (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Statutory abolition of share tenancy did not end the rights of share
tenants in coconut and sugar land even if leasehold tenancy in these types of lands
has not yet been installed. Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate
that the respondent's right as share tenant do not end with the abolition of share
tenancy. AS the law seeks to "uplift the farmers from poverty, ignorance and
stagnation to make them dignified, self-reliant, strong and responsible citizens . . .
active participants in nation-building", agricultural share tenants are given the right
to leasehold tenancy as a first step towards the ultimate status of owner-cultivator,
a goal sought to be achieved by the government program of land reform. It is true
that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been
implemented. The policy makers of government are still studying the feasibility of
its application and the consequences of its implementation. Legislation still has to
be enacted. Nonetheless, whenever it may be implemented, the eventual goal of
having strong and independent farmers working on the lands which they own
remains. The petitioners' arguments which would use the enactment of the
Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for setting back or eliminating the tenurial
rights of the tenant have no merit (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA
136).
UNLAWFUL POSSESSOR CANNOT INSTITUTE A TENANT
Same; An agricultural tenancy relationship cannot be created by one who is
not a true and lawful owner or legal possessor. A judgment by the court of
agrarian relations declaring that a person is a tenant is null and void where based
on a wrong premise because the one who constituted him as such tenant was
previously declared an unlawful possessor by the court (CFI). Happily for
private respondents whose initial action to recover the lot date to August 28,
1958 Paule, at the time he allegedly constituted Cunanan, petitioner herein, as
tenant, was not the landowner or lessee or usufructuary or legal possessor thereof,
and therefore, no tenure relationship was created between them. As a necessary
consequence, the declaration by the CAR that petitioner was the "tenant" which
findings was induced by Paule's confession of judgment and concealment of his
prior ejectment from the holding under the final and executory judgment of the
CFI and, therefore, was a fraudulent imposition upon the Court. was and should
be considered inficacious and unavailing insofar as petitioner's claim that he
became the tenant of the lot is concerned. For the jurisdiction of the CAR is
limited ". . . to cases or actions involving matters, controversies, disputes . . .
arising from agrarian relations . . ." and " . . . such agrarian relations can arise only
where the parties stand in the relation of landholder and tenant . . . and one of the
parties work the land (Cunanan vs. Aguilar, 85 SCRA 47).
Same; Same. Consequently where, as in this case, there was no tenure
relation because the alleged landholder, Paule, has precisely been ordered to
surrender the holding to its rightful owner by final and executory judgment at the
time he constituted petitioner as tenant, the declaration by the CAR to that effect
37

 in a judgment which it was misled to make by the very misrepresentations of

Paule must of necessity be null and void and of no legal effect. Otherwise
stated, the CAR cannot create or recognize a tenure relation between persons,
where none exists, because the alleged landholder is not the owner, lessee or
possessor or usufructuary of the holding (Cunanan vs. Aguilar, 85 SCRA 47).
Appeals; Execution of decision of agrarian court pending appeal; Republic
Act No. 5434 merely provides for uniform procedure for appeal and cannot upturn
fundamental substantive aspects of Republic Act No. 3844. Section 36 of
Republic Act No. 3844, created in favor of the agricultural lessee a substantive
right to "continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when
the dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory" and that Republic Act No. 5434, on the other hand, "as its title
indicates, is purely procedural in nature, in that it purports to do no more that
prescribe a uniform procedure for appeals from the bodies and entities enumerated
therein. It is easily comprehensible, then, considering the adjective nature of R.A.
5434, that section 12 of R.A. 1267, as amended, was explicitly and precisely
referred to as one of the procedural provisions to be superseded by R.A. 5434." . . .
"Within the context of the environmental legislative intention directly pertinent to
the issue at bar, this Court cannot construe R.A. 5434 an adjective law, in a
manner that will upturn one of the fundamental substantive aspects of R.A. 3844,
although the latter, in terms of end-results, would seemingly operate to constrict
the scope of the former (JESUS SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO L.
DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56 SCRA 612).
Same; Same; Tenant may not be ejected except by final judgment. Under the Land Reform Code the tenants are entitled to the enjoyment and
possession of their landholdings except when their dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory (JESUS
SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO L. DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56
SCRA 612).
CONSTITUTIONALITY
REFORM PROGRAM

OF

THE

COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,

ET AL. VS. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM (G.R.
No. 78742, July 14, 1989).
ARSENIO AL. ACUA, ET AL., VS. JOKER ARROYO, ET AL., (G.R. No.
79310, July 14, 1989).
INOCENTES PABICO VS. HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, ET AL., (G.R. No. 79744, July 14, 1989).

38

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR. VS. HON. PHILIP

ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 79777, July 14, 1989).
Constitutional Law; Elements of judicial inquiry. In addition, the
Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations by judge-made
doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it
is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are
first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution
of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.
Same; Agrarian Law; Powers of the President; Power of the President
Aquino to promulgate Proclamation No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same
authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his
powers under martial law has already been sustained inGonzales vs. Estrella and
we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of the
President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 229, the same was
authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
quoted above.
Same; Same; Pres. Aquino's loss of legislative powers did not have the
effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when she possessed it;
Reasons. The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27,
1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over
legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactment intended to preempt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the
other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22,
1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she
lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless
modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute
does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the
legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative
power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when
and as long as she possessed it.
Same; Same; Same; Appropriation Law, defined; Proc. No. 131 is not an
appropriation measure; Reasons. That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being
questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is
not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund,
for that is not its principal purpose of which is to authorize the release of public
funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main
objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

39

Same; Same; Same; Section 6 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657) provides for retention limits. The argument of some of
the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because
they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4, of
the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does not provide for such
limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions. This section declares:Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided
in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or
private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the
landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15)
years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the
farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential
Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them
thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs
who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Same; Same; Same; Rule that the title of the bill does not have to be a
catalogue of its contents. The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the
constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed
in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does
not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied
in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.
Same; Same; Same; Mandamus; Rule that mandamus can issue to require
action only but not specific action. Finally, there is the contention of the public
respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel
the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the
government. That is true as general proposition but is subject to one important
qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie
to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to the discretion to
be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not
specific action. Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an
unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a
clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal
remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the
courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court,
public official, or board should refuse to great detriment of all parties concerned,
or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it
jurisdiction, mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the
second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause.
Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain; Police Power; Property condemned
under Police Power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose is not
compensable. There are traditional distinctions between the police power and
40

the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both
powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio vs.
NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal
waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent
value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because
the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose,
such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of
public morals. The confiscation of such property is not expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Cases at bar: The extent, retention limits, police
power, deprivation, excess of the maximum area under power of eminent domain.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution.
But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment
of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Classification defined;
Requisites of a valid classification. Classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to
the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The
Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged
as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of Equal Protection. Equal
protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of the
other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform
must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect
by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment
of the Bill of Rights.
41

Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; A statute may be sustained under the
police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and method. It is
worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police
power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method.
Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a
particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought
to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and
purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may
say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is
the validity of the method employed to achieve the Constitutional goal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain, defined. Eminent domain
is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under
terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may
be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or
cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of
eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State
over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the
irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in
the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements for a proper exercise of power of
eminent domain. But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of
expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The
limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically,
the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Concept of political question. A becoming
courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when
they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice
Concepcion in the of Taada v. Cuenco: The term "political question" connotes
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation, defined. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the
measure is not the take's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to
intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the

42

equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial,

full, ample.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements of compensable taking. As
held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi,there is compensable taking
when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry
must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted
to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5)
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these
requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Determination of Just Compensation, addressed
to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch. To be sure,
the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of
justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government. EPZA v. Dulay resolved a challenged to several decrees
promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for
property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by the
government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court declares that the content and manner
of the just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is not violative of the
Constitution. With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the
content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted
Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind
admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this
issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the
realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The
Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian
reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant
masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of
the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the
farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and
Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than
those granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention limits; Case at bar. In connection
with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal
filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved.
Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that
have yet to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the
petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural
lands than the subject of their petition. Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these
issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their
retention rights, if any under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to
the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the

43

whole more liberal than those granted by the decree PETITIONS to review the
decisions of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Sale; Agrarian Reform; Deed of Sale is valid where there is no indication
that it is simulated; Fairness and regularity in a private transaction is disputably
presumed; Presumption of regularity of notarial document overcome only by clear
and convincing evidence. Public respondents MAR Minister and the Office of
the President, both found in the evidence on record and the applicable laws, that
the deeds of sale in question are valid and legal , not tainted with fraud, and the
tenants have actual knowledge thereof. More importantly, Agrarian Reform Team
Leader, Atty. Amanda V. Cabigao who investigated the petition of herein private
respondents for cancellation of the subject certificates of land transfer, found from
the evidence presented that while the properties left by Clara and Teodora Zafra
(the previous registered owner) who both died after the promulgation of PD No.
27, are covered by Operation Land Transfer, the same is not true of the portions of
said land, transferred to other persons before the promulgation of said decree on
October 21, 1972 whose documents of sale are in accordance with the formalities
of law and the evidence of ownership presented. Specifically, the disputed deeds
of sale were executed on July 13, 1972, as established by the Certification of the
Acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and cannot therefore
be considered fraudulent transfers to circumvent the provisions of PD No. 27
which was still non-existent at the time. Thus, it has been held that a deed of sale
is valid where there is no indication that it is simulated. The disputable
presumption that the private transaction has been fair and regular has not been
rebutted. (Par. p. Sec. 5, Rule 131, Rules of Court; San Luis vs. Negrete, 98
SCRA 95 [1980]). To contradict the facts contained in a notarial document and the
presumption of regularity in its favor, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant (ENRIQUE ANTONIO, ET AL.,
VS. HON. CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, ET AL., 156 SCRA 68).
Same; Land Registration; Actual knowledge of the contract by third persons
is equivalent to registration. Petitioners point out that the deeds of sale were
registered only on December 7, 1972 in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, that is
after the date promulgation of said decree. It is however elementary that "while
under the Torrens System registration is the operative act that binds the land, and
in the absence of record there is only a contract that binds the parties thereto,
without affecting the rights of strangers to such contract, actual knowledge thereof
by third persons is equivalent to registration. In the case at bar the records show
that petitioners were notified by the Zafra sisters of the sale of the parcels of land
to private respondents as evidenced by the Joint Affidavit dated July 12, 1972
(Exhibit "A-6" for appellees) and that such fact was never controverted at any
stage of the proceedings by the petitioners. Petitioners insist before respondents
MAR and the Office of the President, that private respondents own other lands
planted to rice and corn in order obviously to bring this case within the coverage
of the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27. The former however failed to
adduce evidence to support their allegation. Accordingly, he who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence (ENRIQUE
44

ANTONIO, ET AL., VS. HON. CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, ET AL., 156

SCRA 68).
Same; Same; Factual findings of government agencies respected if
supported by substantial evidence. Finally, two agencies of the government,
MAR and Office of the President, examined the evidence and came up with the
same findings. It is therefore without question that such findings supported as they
are by substantial evidence, should be respected. In line with this view, the Court
has ruled: "x x x in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot
re-examined the sufficient of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and
receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency
concerned. The findings of fact must be respected, so long as they are supported
by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant."(Police
Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 757, 763 [1984]; ENRIQUE ANTONIO, ET
AL., VS. HON. CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, ET AL., 156 SCRA 68).
Same; Same; Generally, compromises are favored and cannot be set aside if
the parties acted in good faith and made reciprocal concessions to each other in
order to terminate a case. Compromise are generally to be favored and cannot
be set aside if the parties acted in good faith and made reciprocal concessions to
each other in order to terminate a case. This holds true even if all the gains appears
to be on one side and all the sacrifices on the other (MARIO V. AMARANTE
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 232 SCRA 104).
Remedial Law; Ejectment; Rent Control Law; Under the Rent Control Law,
the prohibition against the ejectment of a lessee by his lessor is not absolute.
Under the Rent Control Law, the prohibition against the ejectment of a lessee by
his lessor is not absolute. There are exceptions expressly provided by law, which
include the expiration of a lease for a definite period. In the instant case, it was
noted that the rentals were paid on a month-to-month basis. Thus, the lease could
be validly terminated at the end of any given month upon prior notice to that effect
on the lessee. After all, when the rentals are paid monthly, the lease is deemed to
be for a definite period, i.e., it expires at the end of every month (MARIO V.
AMARANTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 232 SCRA 104).
Same, Judgment; Appeal; Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact
upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. It
may be worth to note that the petitioners failed to appeal from the order of the then
City Court of Pasay City; instead, he filed a petition for certiorari with the then
Court of First Instance, which was however dismissed for late filing. As a
consequence, the order of the City Court which approved the compromise
agreement of the parties had become final and executory, hence, can no longer be
set aside. Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, and is conclusive as to the
issues actually determined and to every matter which the parties might have
litigated and have had decided as incident to or essentially connected with the
subject matter of the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate
purview of the original action both in respect to matters of claim and of

45

defense(MARIO V. AMARANTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 232

SCRA 104).
Court of Agrarian Relations; Appeals; Factual finding not reviewable. A
factual finding by the Court of Agrarian Relations, when supported by substantial
evidence, may no longer be reviewed by the Supreme Court (EUGENIO
CHAVEZ VS. THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., 9
SCRA 412).
Landlord and tenant; Agricultural Tenancy Act (Rep. Act No. 1199); Nonretroactivity of amendment by Rep. Act No. 2263as to succession to tenancy
relationship. - Since the law in force at the date when the tenant died was Rep. Act
No. 1199, under which the tenancy relationship between him and respondent
landowner was terminated by reason of such death, the subsequent enactment
of Rep. Act No. 2263 did not operate to confer upon petitioner, son of the
deceased, any successional right to continue as tenant. In case of Ulpiedo vs. CAR,
L-13891, October 31, 1960, it was held: "The amendment to Section 9, Republic
Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263, providing for the continuance of the
relationship in the event of the tenant's death or incapacity between the landholder
and one member of the tenant's immediate farm household who is related to the
tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land
himself personally x x x' which took on 19 June 1959, cannot be applied
retroactively." To hold otherwise would lay open this particular provision of the
law to the objection of unconstitutionality, on the ground that it impairs a
substantive right that has already become vested (EUGENIO CHAVEZ VS.
THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., 9 SCRA 412).
Same; Same; Right of succession to tenancy under Rep. Act No. 2263;
Exception. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 2263 provides an exception to the
right of succession by a relative of the tenant within the second degree, namely, if
the landholder "shall cultivate the land himself personally or through the
employment of mechanical farm implements" (EUGENIO CHAVEZ VS. THE
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., 9 SCRA 412).
Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Certiorari; Certiorari cannot be a
substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. Generally, an order of
dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of
appeal, not certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or successive. Accordingly, although the special civil action of
certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted
where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will
not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of,
or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a
substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is occassioned
by the petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies (Ms. EMILY
YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232
SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Instant action was resorted to as a substitute for
the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. The petitioners admit that they received a
46

copy of the trial court's order dismissing their complaints on 4 October 1991. The
instant petition was filed on 24 October 1991 or beyond the 15-day period to
appeal from the order. The petitioners have not even attempted to explain why
they were unable to appeal from the challenged order within the reglementary
period. This civil action then was resorted to as a substitute for the lost or lapsed
remedy of appeal, and since none of the exceptions to the rigid rule barring
substitution of remedies was alleged to exist in this petition, or even indicated by
the pleadings, this petition must be dismissed (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET
AL., VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Jurisdiction; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board; Trial Court
correctly ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Case Nos.
1683-91-C, 1684-91-C, 1685-91-C, 1686-91-C and 1688-91-C. Even if we
were to accept this petition in the broader interest of justice, it must still fail for the
trial court correctly ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil
Cases Nos. 1683-91-C, 1684-91-C, 1685-91-C,1686-91-C, and 1688-91-C.
Jurisdiction thereon was originally vested in the National Housing Authority
(NHA) under P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1344. Under E.O. No. 648 of
7 February 1981, this jurisdiction was transferred to the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) which, pursuant to E.O. No. 90 of 17 December
1986, was renamed as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (Ms. EMILY
YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232
SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court agrees that the complaints do involve
unsound real estate business practices on the part of the owners and developers of
the subdivision who entered into Contracts to Sell with the petitioners. We
agree with the trial court that the complaints do involve unsound real estate
business practices on the part of the owners and developers of the subdivision who
entered into Contracts to Sell with the petitioners. By virtue of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1344 and our decision in Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, the NHA, now
HLRB, has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. In addition to
involving unsound real estate business practices, the complaints also involve
specific performance of the contractual and statutory obligations of the owners or
developers of the subdivision. The claims for annulment of the "Kasulatan ng
Bilihan" in favor of HABACON and the certificates of title issued to him and for
damages are merely incidental (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON.
ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Incidental claims for damages may be resolved
by the HLRB. In CT Torres Enterprises, Inc. Vs. Hibionada, we further
declared that incidental claims for damages may be resolved by the HLRB (Ms.
EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL.,
232 SCRA 291).
Civil Law; Mortgage; Right of Redemption; In the foreclosure of real
property by banking institutions as well as in the extrajudicial foreclosure by any
other mortgagee, the mortgagor of the deed of sale in the appropriate Registry of
Deeds. When Presidential Decree No. 27, "Decreeing the Emancipation of
47

Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the Ownership of the
Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism therefor," was
enacted on 21 October 1972, the parcels of land in dispute were clearly still
subject to private respondent's right of redemption. In the foreclosure of real
property by banking institutions, as well as in the extrajudicial foreclosure by any
other mortgagee, the mortgagor could redeem the property within one year from
date of registration of the deed of sale in the appropriate Registry of Deeds (Santos
v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 38 SCRA 42; Reyes vs. Noblejas, 21 SCRA
1027). In Medida vs. Court of Appeals (208 SCRA 887), we ruled that the "title to
the land sold under a mortgage foreclosure remains with the mortgagor or his
grantee until the expiration of the redemption of the redemption period . . .
" (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. FILEMON REMIGIO, ET AL., 231
SCRA 302).
Constitutional Law; Non-impairment of Contracts; Police Power; The
Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligation of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the state; The reason being that public welfare
is superior to private rights. In passing, the Secretary of the Department of
Justice has himself opined thus: "I am aware that a ruling that lands covered by
P.D. No. 27 may not be the object of the foreclosure proceedings after the
promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972, would concede that P.D. No. 27
had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts
affecting said lands. There is no question, however, that the land reform program
of the government as accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and mandated by the
Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of the police
power of the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of obligation of contracts
is limited by the exercise of the police power of the state (citations omitted). One
limitation on the contract clause arises from the police power, the reason being that
public welfare is superior to private rights (citation omitted). The situation here, is
like that in eminent domain proceedings, where the state expropriates private
property for public use, and the only condition to be complied with is the payment
of just compensation. Technically the condemnation proceedings do not impair the
contract to destroy its obligations, but merely appropriate or take for public use
(citation omitted). As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured by
the mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without any compensation." (Opinion No.
92, Series of 1978; Rollo, pp. 88-89; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS.
FILEMON REMIGIO, ET AL., 231 SCRA 302).
Same; Same; Same; Police power subordinates the non-impairment clause
of the Constitution. The opinion deserves respect (42 Am. Jur. P. 421, Cagayan
Valley Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 218; Ramon Salaria vs.
Hon. Carlos R. Buenviaj, et al., 81 SCRA 722). This Court, likewise, in a number
of cases has expressed the dictum that police power subordinates the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati
Bank and Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority,
156 SCRA 623; Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA
494; Opinion No. 92, Series of 1978; Rollo, pp. 88-89; PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK VS. FILEMON REMIGIO, ET AL., 231 SCRA 302).
48

Civil Law; Mortgage; Right of Redemption; Right of redemption by the

mortgagor could be exercised by paying to the creditor bank all the amount owing
to the latter, "on the date of the sale, with interest on the total indebtedness at the
rate agreed upon in the obligation from said date. In Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Mirang, 66 SCRA 141, we have ruled that the right of redemption
by the mortgagor could be exercised by paying to the creditor bank all the amounts
owing to the latter "on the date of the sale, with interest on the total indebtedness
at the rate agreed upon in the obligation from said date" (PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK VS. FILEMON REMIGIO, ET AL., 231 SCRA 302).
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Personal Cultivation by owner-lessor, still a
valid ground for dispossession of a tenant; Reason. We are in full agreement
with the holding of the Court of Appeals upholding the Court a quo that insofar as
coconut lands are concerned, personal cultivation by the owner-lessor, a ground
for dispossession of the tenant-lessee under Section 50 of Republic Act 1199, is
still a valid ground for dispossession of a tenant. This is so because Section 35 of
Republic Act 3844 expressly provides that with respect to lands principally
planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, durian and other similar permanent trees " the
consideration, as well as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be governed by the
provisions of Republic Act 1199, as amended" (FRANCISCO BALIGWAT VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET. AL., 142 SCRA 34).
Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; Minute Resolution; Value of
decision of Court of Appeals in Arambulo vs. Conicon affirmed by minute
resolution of the Supreme Court, lost in Supreme Court's en banc decision of Nilo
vs. Court of Appeals. Petitioner invokes the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Arambulo vs, Conicon, CA-G.R. No. 46727-R dated January 6, 1972 which was
affirmed by this Court in a minute resolution dated March 14, 1972, G.R. No. L34816 in support of his contention that personal cultivation as a ground for
dispossessing the tenant had been repealed by Republic Act 6383. Aside from the
fact that said case refers to an agricultural riceland, this Court in Nilo vs. Court of
Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, 524, a decision by this Court en banc has in effect
reversed the decision in the Arambulo case when contrary to the ruling in said
Arambulo case, it held that Republic Act 6389 abrogating personal cultivation as a
ground for the dispossession of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect. The
value of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Arambulo case which was
affirmed by this Court in a minute resolution has, therefore, lost its force in view
of the en banc decision of this Court in Nilo vs. Court of Appeals,
supra(FRANCISCO BALIGWAT VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET. AL.,
142 SCRA 34).
Appeals; Execution of decision of agrarian court pending appeal; Republic
Act No. 5434 merely provides for uniform procedure for appeal and cannot upturn
fundamental substantive aspects of Republic Act No. 3844.- Section 36 of
Republic Act No. 3844, created in favor of the agricultural lessee a substantive
right to "continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when
the dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory" and that Republic Act No. 5434, on the other hand, "as its title
indicates, is purely procedural in nature, in that it purports to do no more that
49

prescribe a uniform procedure for appeals from the bodies and entities enumerated
therein. It is easily comprehensible, then, considering the adjective nature of R.A.
5434, that section 12 of R.A. 1267, as amended, was explicitly and precisely
referred to as one of the procedural provisions to be superseded by R.A. 5434." x x
x "Within the context of the environmental legislative intention directly pertinent
to the issue at bar, this Court cannot construe R.A. 5434 an adjective law, in a
manner that will upturn one of the fundamental substantive aspects of R.A. 3844,
although the latter, in terms of end-results, would seemingly operate to constrict
the scope of the former (JESUS SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO L.
DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56 SCRA 612).
Same; Same; Tenant may not be ejected except by final judgment. Under
the Land Reform Code the tenants are entitled to the enjoyment and possession of
their landholdings except when their dispossession has been authorized by the
Court in a judgment that is final and executory (JESUS SODSOD VS. HON.
JUDGE VALERIANO L. DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56 SCRA 612).
2.
ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE
PROCESS OF LAW. The Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable (Goseco vs. Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the
Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character (Ang TIBAY,
represented by TORIBIO TEODORO et al., vs. THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS et al., 69 SCRA 635).
3.
ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. There are
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings
of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing,
which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must
the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to
deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
simply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
50

law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations
should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance
of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it (Ang
TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO et al., vs. THE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS et al., 69 SCRA 635).
2.
ID.; ID.;ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient
to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the
Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon
which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of a new trial
prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest
of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such
other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under
which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by
the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the
same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it
re-open the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth in the
decision (Ang TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO et
al., vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS et al., 69
SCRA 635).
JURISDICTION, QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS OF DAR
Agrarian Reform Law; Court agrees with the DARAB's finding that
Obrique et. al, are not tenants. We agree with the DARAB's finding that
Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by
Obrique, et al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap
Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed
between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU
did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the
participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land use
participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the
participants by the CMU (CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et
al., 215 SCRA 86)

51

Same; Same; Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing

prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries
and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. A
person entering upon lands of another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so
by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or
with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a squatter. Squatters cannot
enter the land of another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of
the CARP, claim rights to said property as landless peasants. Under Section 73 of
R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal
detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the rights
and benefits of agrarian reform. Any such person who knowingly and wilfully
violates the above provision of the Act shall be punished with imprisonment or
fine at the discretion of the Court(CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et
al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be
landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP. In view of
the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless
peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP (CENTRAL
MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR.
LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657 it is
crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters
involving the implementation of the CARP. Under Section 4 and Section 10
of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only
to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is
restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the
coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are
actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such
purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations,
research and pilot production centers, etc (CENTRAL MINDANAO
UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A.
CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; DARAB has no power to try, head and adjudicate the
case pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site.
Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case
pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion
of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and
exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its purposes. The
CMU has constantly raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction and has
questioned the respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case at
bar(CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS
52

PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF

AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the DAR
quasi-judicial powers. Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the DAR quasijudicial powers as follows: The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform x x
x (CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no doubt that the DARAB has
jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the
CARP; Definition of agrarian dispute. Section 17 of Executive Order No .129A is merely a repetition of Section 50, R.A. 6657. There is no doubt that the
DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the
implementation of the CARP. An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as
any controversy relating to tenurial rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship
or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture (CENTRAL MINDANAO
UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A.
CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Agrarian Relations; Agricultural Land Reform Code; Prescription; Suit for
reinstatement as tenant of landholding, fixing of leasehold rentals and damages,
not barred, as the three-year period under the Code within which to enforce any
cause of action has not yet elapsed. Although Section 38 of Republic Act No.
3844, as amended, does provide that "an action to enforce any cause of action
under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such
cause of action accured", respondent Court had overlooked the fact that petitioner
had first filed a Complaint for reinstatement on January 9, 1980, but that the same
was dismissed for non-compliance with the requirments of Presidential Decree No.
1508. The prescriptive period, therefore, should be reckoned from the filing of that
first Complaint, in which event, only two (2) years and three (3) months from the
acrrual of the cause of action have elapsed (FILOMENA CATORCE, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS et al., 129 SCRA 210).
Same; Same; Same; Barangay; Courts; Jurisdiction; Dismissal of complaint
for reinstatement as tenant of landholding for not having passed the Lupon
Pambarangay Law under PD 1508, is procedural technicality; Better rule that
courts under the principle of equity should not be bound strictly by statue of
limitations or doctrine of laches when to do so manifest wrong and injustice result.
Clearly, petitioner had not slept on his rights, the dismissal of said Complaint
having been due to a procedural technicality. But even assuming that the
prescriptive period is correctly reckoned from the filing of the second Complaint
on November 20, 1980, this Court in Cristobal vs. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175, 185
(1977) held: "x x x In brief, it is indeed the better rule that courts under the
principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations
53

or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong and injustice would
result" (FILOMENA CATORCE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al., 129 SCRA
210).
Same; Same; Failure of respondent to controvert the fact that petitioner is a
bona fide tenant of the landholding; Security of tenure granted to tenants, meaning
of. Petitioner had been adjudged the bona fide tenant of the landholding in
question. Not only did respondent fail to controvert this fact, but he even impliedly
admitted the same in his Answer to petitioner's Complaint when he raised, as one
of his defenses, the alleged voluntary surrender of the landholding by petitioner.
Respondent Court should have taken this fact into consideration for tenants are
guaranteed security of tenure, meaning, the continued enjoyment and possession of
their landholding except when their dispossession had been authorized by virtue of
a final and executory judgement, which is not so in the case at bar (FILOMENA
CATORCE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al., 129 SCRA 210).
Same; Same; Purpose and nature of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.
The Agricultural Lnad Reform Code has been designed to promote economic and
social stability. Being a social legislation, it must be interpreted liberally to give
full force and effect to its clear intent, which is "to achieve independent, selfreliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic
society" (FILOMENA CATORCE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al., 129
SCRA 210).
The concept of "social justice" was not meant to perpetuate an injustice to
the landholder-lessor (Cabatan vs. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 323).
Certiorari, Indispensable elements of the indispensable elements of a
petition for certiorari are: (a) that it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions; (b) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Quite often, this Court has warned that for the extraordinary writ to
issue, it must be clearly established that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It, therefore, follows that
before a petition of or certiorari can be instituted, all remedies available in the trial
court must have first been exhausted(Domingo Gelindon, et al., vs. Honorable
Jose Dela Rama as Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati, Br. 139, et al., 228 SCA
322).
Same; Exceptional circumstances where petitions for certiorari entertained
even in the existence of he remedy of appeal. True, we have on certain
occasions entertained petitions for certiorari despite the existence of the remedy of
appeal; in those exceptional cases, however, either public welfare and the
advancement of public policy have dictated or the broader interests of justice have
demanded, or when the orders complained of are found to be patent nullities, or
that an appeal is considered clearly an inappropriate remedy (Domingo Gelindon,
et al., vs. Honorable Jose Dela Rama as Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati, Br.
139, et al., 228 SCA 322).

54

Same; Courts; As a matter of policy, direct recourse to the Supreme Court

should not be allowed where relief available form lower courts. Let is also be
emphasized that while this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals, as well as with the Regional Trial Courts (for writs enforceable within
their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari, the
litigants are well advised, however, not to disregard the policy that has heretofore
been set by us. In Veragra, Sr. vs. Suelto, the Court, speaking through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Andres R. Narvasa, said: "We now turn ***
to the propriety of a direct resort to this Court for the remedy of mandamus or
other extraordinary writ against a municipal court, instead of an attempt to initially
obtain that relief from the Regional Trial Court of the district or the Court of
appeals, both of which tribunals share this Court's jurisdiction to issue the writ. As
a matter of policy such a direct recourse of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental character and
immemorial tradition(Domingo Gelindon, et al., vs. Honorable Jose Dela Rama
as Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati, Br. 139, et al., 228 SCA 322).
POSITION PAPER/AFFIDAVITS
COMPLY WITH DUE PROCESS
Labor Law; Due Process; The requirements of due process are satisfied
when the parties are given opportunity to submit position papers. The petitioner
was not denied due process for several hearings were in fact conducted by the
hearing officer of the Regional Office of the DOLE and the parties submitted
position papers upon which the Regional Director based his decision in the case.
There is abundant jurisprudence to the effect that the requirements of due process
are satisfied when the parties are given an opportunity to submit position papers
(Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phil., Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 78787, December 18, 1989;
Asiaworld Publishing House vs. Ople, 152 SCRA 224; Manila Doctors Hospital
vs. NLRC, 135 SCRA 262). What the fundamental law abhors is not the absence
of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Antipolo
Realty Copr. Vs. National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399). There is no denial
of due process where a party is given an opportunity to be heard and present his
case (Ong, Sr. vs. Parel, 156 SCRA 768; Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores,
152 SCRA 237). Since petitioners herein participated in the hearings, submitted a
position paper, and filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 23, 1988
decision of the Labor Undersecretary, it was not denied due process (ODIN
SECURITY AGENCY VS. HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA, ET AL., 182
SCRA 472).
Same; Same; Regional Directors; Jurisdiction by Estoppel; A party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent,
and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. The petitioner is estopped from questioning the alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the Regional Director over the private respondent's claims.
Petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Director by taking part in
55

the hearing before him and submitting a position paper. When the Regional
Director issued his March 20, 1987 order requiring petitioner to pay the private
respondents the benefits they were claiming, petitioner was silent. Only the private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. It was only after the
Undersecretary modified the order of the Regional Director on March 23, 1988
that the petitioner moved for reconsideration and questioned the jurisdiction of the
public respondents to hear and decide the case. The principle of jurisdiction by
estoppel bars it from doing this. In Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36,
we held: "It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136
Or. 694, 86 S.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rules, it was
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order
of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such
a practice can not be tolerated - obviously for reasons of public policy.
"Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbunjones, etc., 243
U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127,
35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo, 58, the Court said that it is
not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty. "Sibonghanoy was reiterated in Crisostomo vs.
C.A., 32 SCRA 54; Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17; Carculitan vs. De la Cruz, 65
SCRA 7061; and PNB vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 299 (ODIN SECURITY AGENCY
VS. HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA, ET AL., 182 SCRA 472).
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction once vested continues until
the entire controversy is decided. The fact is, the Regional Director and the
Undersecretary did have jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint which
was originally for violation of labor standards (Art. 128[b], Labor Code). Only
later did the guards ask for backwages on account of their alleged "constructive
dismissal" (p. 32, Rollo). Once vested, that jurisdiction continued until the entire
controversy was decided (Lee vs. MTC, 145 SCRA 408; Abadilla vs. Ramos,
156 SCRA 92; and Pucan vs. Bengzon, 155 SCRA 692; ODIN SECURITY
AGENCY VS. HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA, ET AL., 182 SCRA 472).
Actions; Ejectment; The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is the
question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises
or possession de facto. In ejectment cases, the only issue to be resolved therein
is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
premises or possession de facto (De Luna vs. CA, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]). It has
for its purpose the restoration to the aggrieved party the possession of the premises
from which he had been forcibly ejected or which had been detained from him.
This relief is available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee or any party after the
detainer's right to hold possession of the subject property, by virtue of a contract
56

express or implied, has expired or has been otherwise terminated (Lim Kieh
Tong, Inc., vs. CA, 195 SCRA 398 [1991]; UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS
SERVICES, INC., ET AL., VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233
SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Damages; Litis Pendentia; Private respondent cannot deny
that the complaint for damages was meant to prevent petitioners from ejecting her.
Private respondent cannot deny that the complaint for damages, taken in its full
context, was meant to prevent petitioners from ejecting her from Unit No. 1166 of
the Victoria Apartment. Indeed, a careful examination of the complaint reveals
that it demanded, as private respondent's main relief, that petitioners be
permanently enjoined from doing any act to force out and/or cause her ejectment
from said apartment unit. Private respondent's complaint for damages bears
unmistakable earmarks that show off its true nature and character touching as it
does, on her alleged right to continued possession of the premises (UNIVERSITY
PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., ET AL., VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 233 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the issue is the right of the lessee to
occupy the subject apartment unit, the same should be properly threshed out in an
ejectment suit and not in an action for damages where the question of possession is
likewise the primary issue to be resolved, even if the unlawful detainer suit was
filed later than the one for damages. The issue of whether private respondent
had the right to occupy subject apartment unit should therefore be properly
threshed out in an ejectment suit and not in action for damages where the question
of possession is likewise the primary issue to be resolved. We cannot simply
ignore the fact that private respondent, after her unjustified refusal to vacate the
premises, was aware that an ejectment case against her was forthcoming. It is
therefore evident that the filing of the complaint for damages and preliminary
injunction was but a canny and preemptive maneuver intended to block the action
for ejectment which petitioner was to take against private respondent. The matter
raised in the Regional Trial Court of Manila may be properly determined in the
ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court, in consonance with the rule
prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer suit
was filed later than the one for damages does not change the situation of the
parties (Rosales vs. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; UNIVERSITY PHYSICIAN
SERVICES, INC., ET AL., VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233
SCRA 86).
Civil Law; Contracts; Contract to Sell; Contract of Sale; In a contract of
sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in a
contract to sell, by agreement the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to
pass until the full payment of the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost
and cannot recover ownership until and unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the full
payment of the price. In view of the extended disquisition thereon by
respondent court, it would be worthwhile at this juncture to briefly discourse in the
rationale behind our treatment of the alleged option contract as a contract to sell,
rather than a contract of sale. The distinction between the two is important for in a
57

contract of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold;
whereas in a contract to sell, by agreement the ownership is reserved in the vendor
and is not to pass until the full payment of the price. In a contract of sale, the
vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the contract is
resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor
until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive
condition and failure of which is not a breach but an even that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective. Thus, a deed of
sale is considered absolute in nature where there is neither a stipulation in the deed
that title to the property sold is reserved in the seller until the full payment of the
price, nor one giving the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the
moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period (ADELFA PROPERTIES,
INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; An implied agreement that ownership shall not pass to
the purchaser until he had fully paid the price is valid and therefore, binding and
enforceable between the parties. A contract which contains this kind of stipulation
is considered a contract to sell. In effect, there was an implied agreement that
ownership shall not pass to the purchaser until he had fully paid the price. Article
1478 of the Civil Code does not require that such a stipulation be expressly made.
Consequently, an implied stipulation to that effect is considered valid and,
therefore, binding and enforceable between the parties. It should be noted that
under the law and jurisprudence, a contract which contains this kind of stipulation
is considered a contract to sell (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Irrefragably, the controverted document should legally
be considered as a perfected contract to sell. Irrefragably, the controverted
document should legally be considered as a perfected contract to sell. On this
particular point, therefore, we reject the position and ratiocination of respondent
Court of Appeals which, while awarding the correct relief to private respondents,
categorized the instruments as "strictly an option contract" (ADELFA
PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; The important task in contract interpretation is always
the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties. The important task
in contract interpretation is always the ascertainment of the intention of the
contracting parties and that task is, of course, to be discharged by looking to the
words they used to project that intention in their contract, all the words not just
particular word or two, and words in context not words standing alone. Moreover,
judging from the subsequent acts of the parties which will hereinafter be
discussed, it is undeniable that the intention of the parties was to enter into a
contract to sell. In addition, the title of a contract does not necessarily determine its
true nature. Hence, the fact that the document under discussion is entitled
"Exclusive Option to Purchase" is not controlling where the text thereof shows that
it is a contract to sell(ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).

58

Same; Same; Option Contract; Sales; An option is not a sale of property but
a sale of the right to purchase. It is simply a contract by which the owner of
property agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy his property
at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he does not then
agree to sell it; but he does sell something, that is, the right or privilege to buy at
the election or option of the other party. An option, as used in the law on sales,
is a continuing offer or contract by which the owner stipulates with another that
the latter shall have the right to buy the property at a fixed price within a certain
time, or under, or in compliance with, certain terms and conditions, or which gives
to the owner of the property the right to sell or demand a sale. It is also sometimes
called an "unaccepted offer". An option is not of itself a purchase, but merely
secures the privilege to buy. It is not a sale of property but a sale of the right to
purchase. It is simply a contract by which the owner of property agrees with
another person that he shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price
within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he does not then agree to sell it;
but he does sell something, that is, the right or privilege to buy at the election or
option of the other property. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it imposes no
binding obligation on the person holding the option, aside from the consideration
for the offer. Until acceptance, it is not, properly speaking, a contract, and does not
vest, transfer, or agree to transfer, any title to, or any interest or right in the subject
matter, but is merely a contract by which the owner of property gives the optionee
the right to or privilege of accepting the offer and buying the property on certain
terms (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Same; An option is an unaccepted offer. It states the
terms and conditions on which the owner is willing to sell his land, if the holder
elects to accept them within the time limited. A contract of sale, on the other hand,
fixes definitely the relative rights and obligations of both parties at the time of its
execution. The offer and the acceptance are concurrent. The distinction
between an "option" and a contract of sale is that an option is an unaccepted offer.
It states the terms and conditions on which the owner is willing to sell his land, if
the holder elects to accept them within the time limited. If the holder does so elect,
he must give notice to the other party, and the accepted offer thereupon becomes a
valid and binding contract. If an acceptance is not made within the time fixed, the
owner is no longer bound by his offer, and the option is at an end. A contract of
sale, on the other hand, fixes definitely the relative rights and obligations of both
parties at the time of its execution. The offer and the acceptance are concurrent,
since the minds of the contracting parties meet in the terms of the
agreement (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Except where a formal acceptance is so
required, it may be made either in a formal or an informal manner, and may be
shown by acts, conduct, or words of the accepting party that clearly manifest a
present intention or determination to accept the offer to buy or sell. A perusal of
the contract in this case, as well as the oral and documentary evidence presented
by the parties, readily shows that there is indeed a concurrence of petitioner's offer
59

to buy and private respondent's acceptance thereof. The rule is that except where a
formal acceptance is so required, although the acceptance must be affirmatively
and clearly made and must be evidenced by some acts or conduct communicated
to the offeror, it may be made either in a formal or an informal manner, and may
be shown by acts, conduct, or words of the accepting party that clearly manifest a
present intention or determination to accept the offer to buy or sell. Thus,
acceptance may be shown by the acts, conduct, or words of a party recognizing the
existence of the contract of sale (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The test in determining whether a contract is a
"contract of sale or purchase" or a mere "option" is whether or not the agreement
could be specifically enforced. The test in determining whether a contract is a
"contract of sale or purchase" or a mere "option" is whether or not the agreement
could be specifically enforced. There is no doubt that the obligation of petitioner to
pay the purchase price is specific, definite and certain, and consequently binding
and enforceable. Had private respondents chosen to enforce the contract, they
could have specifically compelled petitioner to pay the balance of P 2,806,150.00.
This is distinctly made manifest in the contract itself as an integral stipulation,
compliance with which could legally and definitely be demanded from petitioner
as a consequence (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Same; An agreement is only an "option" when no
obligation rests on the party to make any payment except such as may be agreed
on between the parties as consideration to support the option until he has made up
his mind within the time specified. This is not a case where no right is as yet
created nor an obligation declared, as where something further remains to be done
before the buyer and seller obligate themselves. An agreement is only a "option"
when no obligation rests on the party to make any payment except such as may be
agreed on between the parties as consideration to support the option until he has
made up his mind within the time specified. An option, and not a contract to
purchase, is effected by an agreement to sell real estate for payments to be made
within a specified time and providing for forfeiture of money paid upon failure to
make payment, where the purchaser does not agree to purchase, to make payment,
or to bind himself in any way other than the forfeiture of the payments made. As
hereinbefore discussed, this is not the situation obtaining in the case at
bar (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240
SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Earnest Money; It is a statutory rule that
whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as part
of the price and as proof of the perfection of the contract. It constitutes an advance
payment and must, therefore be deducted from the total price. In other words,
the alleged option money of P50,000.00 was actually earnest money which was
intended to form part of the purchase price. The amount of P50,000.00 was not
distinct from the cause or consideration for the sale of the property, but was itself a
part thereof. It is a statutory rule that whenever earnest money is given in a
contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price and as proof of the
60

perfection of the contract. It constitutes an advance payment and must, therefore,

be deducted from the total price. Also, earnest money is given by the buyer to the
seller to bind the bargain(ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Earnest Money; Option Money; Distinction Between Earnest
Money and Option Money. There are clear distinctions between earnest money
and option money, viz. (a) earnest money is part of the purchase price, while
option money is the money given as a distinct consideration for an option contract;
(b) earnest money is given only where there is already a sale, while option money
applies to a sale not yet perfected; and (c ) when earnest money is given, the buyer
is bound to pay the balance, while when the would-be buyer gives option money,
he is not required to buy (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; In a perfected contract to sell, Article 1590 would
properly apply. To justify its failure to pay the purchase price within the agreed
period, petitioner invokes Article 1590 of the Civil Code which provides: "ART
1590. Should the vendee be disturbed in the possession or ownership of the thing
acquired, or should he have reasonable grounds to fear such disturbance, by a
vindicatory action or a foreclosure of mortgage, he may suspend the payment of
the price until the vendor has caused the disturbance or danger to cease, unless the
latter gives security for the return of the price in a proper case, or it has been
stipulated that, notwithstanding any such contingency, the vendee shall be bound
to make the payment. A mere act of trespass shall authorize the suspension of the
payment of the price." Respondent court refused to apply the aforequoted
provision of law on the erroneous assumption that the true agreement between the
parties was a contract of option. As we have herein before discussed, it was not an
option contract but perfected contract to sell. Verily, therefore, Article 1590 would
properly apply (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Sales; In Article 1590, the vendor is bound to make payment
even with the existence of a vindicatory action if the vendee should give a security
for the return of the price. Petitioner was justified in suspending payment of the
balance of the purchase price by reason of the aforesaid vindicatory action filed
against it. The assurance made by private respondents that petitioner did not have
to worry about the case because it was pure and simple harassment is not the kind
of guaranty contemplated under the exceptive clause in Article 1590 wherein the
vendor is bound to make payment even with the existence of a vindicatory action
if the vendee should give a security for the return of the price (ADELFA
PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; It is consignation which is essential in order to
extinguish petitioner's obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price. A
contract to sell involves the performance of an obligation, not merely the exercise
of a privilege or a right. Consequently, performance of payment may be affected
not by tender of payment alone but by both tender and consignation. The mere
sending of a letter by the vendee expressing the intention to pay, without the
61

accompanying payment, is not considered a valid tender of payment. Besides, a

mere tender of payment is not sufficient to compel private respondents to deliver
the property and execute the deed of absolute sale. It is consignation which is
essential in order to extinguish petitioner petitioner's obligation to pay the balance
of the purchase price. The rule is different in case of an option contract or in legal
redemption or in a sale with right to repurchase, wherein consignation is not
necessary because these cases involve an exercise of a right or privilege (to buy,
redeem or repurchase) rather than the discharge of an obligation, hence tender of
payment would be sufficient to preserve the right or privilege. This is because the
provisions on consignation are not applicable when there is no obligation pay. A
contract to sell, as in the case before us, involves the performance of an obligation,
not merely the exercise of a privilege or a right. Consequently, perfomance or
payment may be affected not by tender of payment alone but by both tender and
consignation (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Judicial action for rescission of a contract is not
necessary where the contract provides for automatic rescission in case of breach.
By reason of petitioner's failure to comply with its obligation, private
respondents elected to resort to and did announce the rescission of the contract
through its letter to petitioner dated July 27, 1990. That written notice of rescission
is deemed sufficient under the circumstances. Article 1592 of the Civil Code
which requires rescission either by judicial action or notarial act is not applicable
to a contract to sell. Furthermore, judicial action for rescission of a contract is not
necessary where the contract provides for automatic rescission in case of breach,
as in the contract involved in the present controversy (ADELFA PROPERTIES,
INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Resolution of reciprocal contracts may be made
extrajudicially unless successfully impugned in court. If the debtor impugns the
declaration, it shall be subject to judicial determination. Otherwise, if said party
does not oppose it, the extrajudicial rescission shall have legal effect. We are
not unaware of the ruling in University of the Philippines vs. De los Angeles, etc.
that the right to rescind is not absolute, being ever subject to scrutiny and review
by the proper court. It is our considered view, however, that this rule applies to a
situation where the extrajudicial rescission is contested by the defaulting party. In
other words, resolution of reciprocal contracts may be made extrajudicially unless
successfully impugned in court. If the debtor impugns the declaration, it shall be
subject to judicial determination. Otherwise, if said party does not oppose it, the
extrajudicial rescission shall have legal effect (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC.,
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Squatting; Presidential Decrees; Pres. Decree 772 on squatting; Decree does
not apply to pasture lands but to squatting in urban communities. We hold that
the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands
because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by
well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural
62

areas (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., VS. HON. VICENTE

B. ECHAVES, ET AL., 95 SCRA 663).
Same; Same; Same; Squatting on public agricultural lands punishable by
Rep. Act. 947. On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public
agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by
Republic Act. No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or
association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands (THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., VS. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, ET
AL., 95 SCRA 663).
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Rule of ejusdem generis
merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is
uncertain; Rule does not apply to Pres. Decree 772 where intent of decree is
unmistakable. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked
by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is
unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to
illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory
construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato
Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615, 618; 28 C.J.S.
1049-50; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., VS. HON.
VICENTE B. ECHAVES, ET AL., 95 SCRA 663).
Civil Law; Obligation and Contracts; The various stipulations of a contract
shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may
result from all them taken jointly. As in statutes, the provisions of a contract
should not be read in isolation from the rest of the instrument but, on the contrary,
interpreted in the light of the other related provisions. It is a canon of construction
that "the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole". This is
also the injunction in Article 1374 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken
jointly" (SPOUSES VICENTE and SALOME DE LEON VS. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 612).
Same; Same; Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Power of review of the
Supreme Court on issues not raised in the lower court; The Supreme court may
review an issue in the interest of substantial justice even if it has not been properly
raised. The private respondents also contend that the matter of the correct
computation of the consideration for the sale cannot now be raised because it was
not assigned as an error in the Court of Appeals. The petitioners deny this and
insist that the matter was properly raised and argued at length in their appellants'
brief, which they have quoted in their Reply. The issue is not that crucial.
Whatever the merits of their respective contentions, we have held that, in any case,
we may review an issue in the interest of substantial justice even if it has not been
properly raised in the lower court. Thus: And although this issue may not have
been squarely raised below, in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not
prevented from considering such pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked
63

by the Courts below. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review
palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary
in arriving at a just decision. At any rate, the Court is clothed with ample authority
to review matters, even of they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, and
We find it unfair and unjust to deprive the petitioner of the rentals on her property
due to a mere technicality (SPOUSES VICENTE and SALOME DE LEON VS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 612).
Remedial Law; Evidence; Parol Evidence; Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform
language. As for the testimony of De Leon earlier quoted, it is appropriated to
recall the observation in Air France v. Carrascoso that spoken words could be
"notoriously unreliable" as against "a written document (that) speaks a uniform
language." The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the
terms of a written contract, the purpose being to give it stability and to remove the
temptation or occasion for possible perjury to falsify the intention of the parties.
Considering the factual circumstances attending this case, we are disposed to
dismiss the said declaration as an unguarded and honest mistake that was not
really intended to modify the written agreement (SPOUSES VICENTE and
SALOME DE LEON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA
612).
Civil Law; Obligations & Contracts; Contract; The interpretation of obscure
words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the
obscurity. It is significant that, as the trial court noted, it was the private
respondents' lawyer who prepared the Contract to Sell which Manuel Franco and
Vicente de Leon signed at the hospital. According to Article 1377 of the Civil
Code, "the interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not
favor the party who caused the obscurity." Any ambiguity in the contract prepared
at the instance of the private respondents and by their lawyer should therefore be
interpreted to the prejudice not of the vendors but of the vendees, who were
responsible for such ambiguity (SPOUSES VICENTE and SALOME DE
LEON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 612).
Administrative Law; Agrarian Law; Judgments; Where land certificates
ordered distributed were marked "Under Protest" the order does not become final.
The first and fourth grounds of the petition for review are not well-taken. The
orders for the issuance of Certificates of Land Transfer to the petitioners had not
become final and executory because the certificates had been marked "under
protest" on orders of Secretary Estrella (THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF
DR. JOSE SISON, represented by FERNANDO CAYABYAB VS. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 210 SCRA 545).
Agrarian Law; An heirs does not have to cultivate personally the 7-hectare
retention area. There is no merit in the petitioners' contention that the Heirs of
Dr. Sison are disqualified to retain their shares of the agricultural lands of the
estate for failure to comply with the requirement that "such landowner is
cultivating such area, or will now cultivate it" (p. 23, Rollo). The Secretary
64

interpreted that provision to mean "that the tenants in the exempted and retained
riceland areas of the concerned Heirs of Sison, the petitioners-tenant, as
agricultural lessees, shall remain as such and cultivate the same. The concerned
Heirs of Sison therefore, do not have to cultivate the retained and exempted areas,
unless the petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily relinquish the task
of cultivation and vacate and surrender the said areas to the Heirs" (p. 23, Rollo;
Italics ours) (THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON,
represented by FERNANDO CAYABYAB VS. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 210 SCRA 545).
Same; Secretary of Agrarian Reform may recall Certificates of Land
Transfer which violate the law on retention scheme. Petitioners' contention that
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no more authority or jurisdiction to cancel
the Certificates of Land Transfer after they had been issued to the tenantsbeneficiaries, is not correct. The issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of
land transfer fall within the Secretary's administrative jurisdiction as implementor
of P.D. 27. Having found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled to retain their
ricelands (which did not exceed seven [7] hectares) and had been illegally denied
that right, Secretary Juico properly ordered the cancellation of the Certificates of
Land Transfer which had been erroneously issued to the petitioners (THE
TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, represented by
FERNANDO CAYABYAB VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
210 SCRA 545).
Civil law; Lease; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Civil law lease distinguished
from agricultural tenancy. There are important differences between a leasehold
tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As
to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally
attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, where as the civil law lessee need not
personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in
leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose
may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease
is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special
laws (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Agricultural Tenancy Act; A fishpond is an agricultural land. There is no
doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically
mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus
Section 46 (c ) of said Act provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar
lands, fishponds saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be
governed by stipulation between the parties." This Court has already ruled that
"land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land" (TRINIDAD
GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Same; Words and phrases; Meaning of phrase "immediate farm household."
Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other persons,
whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and
65

who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term
"immediate farm household" (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO
PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Same; To fall under the Agricultural Tenancy Act, land must be worked by
tenant or immediate farm household. The law is explicit in requiring
the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a)
of Republic Act 1199, as amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes
of production sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both,
under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act limits the relations
of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land and to the person
who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his
immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires for the
existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm household
work the land (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58
SCRA 590).
Same; A person who hires others to do work ceases to be a tenant. A
person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself with the aid available from
his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not
actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others
whom he pays for doing cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered
as abandoned, the land as tenant within the meaning of section 5 and 8 of Republic
Act 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one (TRINIDAD
GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Agrarian relations: Agricultural lease; In determination of annual lease
rental, if direct evidence on normal harvest of one of three preceding agricultural
years prior to establishment of leasehold not available, circumstantial evidence
may be considered; Case at bar. While is true as a general rule that it is
incumbent on the lessee challenging the reasonableness of the rentals to prove that
the same are excessive, in the peculiar circumstance of the case, it is believed that
the lessee has sufficiently discharged such burden by showing by evidence which
may be considered circumstantial, the improbability that the normal harvest for the
agricultural year 1959-1960 could have exceeded 100 cavans. It would have been
pointless for the agrarian court to require the lessee to prove the normal harvest of
that agricultural year, since it is a fact found by both the agrarian court and the
Court of Appeals, that respondent lessee only commenced working on the land
during the agricultural year 1959-1960 at the commencement of the leasehold, as
prior thereto the land was cultivated by other tenants. There is no question that
proof of collateral facts and circumstances may be allowed provided the existence
of the main fact may be reasonably inferred therefrom according to reason and
common experience (INECETA ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53
SCRA 76).

66

Constitutional law; Republic Act 1199, as amended, enacted to improve lot

of sharecropper; Social justice defined. It must be observed that Republic Act
1199, as amended, has been enacted by Congress pursuant to the constitutional
mandate that the "promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and
economic security of all the people shall be the concern of the state" and of the
obligation of the state to accord protection to labor and to regulate the relations
between landowner and tenant. Social justice, in the words of Justice Laurel in
Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) means the "humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in the
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated." The
statute was, therefore, designed to improve the lot of the sharecropper by granting
to him a more equitable participation in the produce of the land which he
cultivates (INECETA ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53 SCRA
76).
Same; Under New Constitution, property ownership impressed with social
function. Under the new Constitution,property ownership has been impressed
with social function. This implies that the owner has the obligation to use his
property not only to benefit himself but society as well. Hence, it provides under
section 6 of Article II thereof, that in the promotion of social justice, the State
"shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of
private property, and equity diffuse property ownership and profits." The
Constitution also ensures that the workers shall have a just and living wage which
should assure for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity and
give him opportunities for a better life (section 7 and 9, Article II) (INECETA
ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53 SCRA 76).
Statutory construction; In interpretation of tenancy and labor
legislation, doubts resolved in favor of tenant and worker. Viewed within the
context of the constitutional mandate and obvious legislative intent, the provisions
of the law should be construed to further their purpose of redeeming the tenant
from his bondage of misery, want and oppression arising from the onerous terms
of his tenancy and to uplift his social and financial status. Under the established
jurisprudence of this Court, in the interpretation of tenancy and labor legislation,
"it will be guided by more than just an inquiry into the letter of the law as against
its spirit and will ultimately resolve grave doubts in favor of the tenant and
worker (INECETA ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53 SCRA 76).
Court of Agrarian relations; In hearing and determination of cases, court not
bound strictly by technical rules of evidence. Section 10 of Republic Act 1267,
as amended by Republic Act 1409, creating the Court of Agrarian Relations,
provides that "in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising any duty and power under this Act, the Court shall,
in the hearing and determination of cases pending before it, not be bound strictly
by the technical rules of evidence." Complementary to this provision is section 155
of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, which provides that "in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy pending before
them, the Courts without impairing substantial rights, shall not be bound strictly by
67

the technical rules of evidence and procedure, except in expropriation

cases" (INECETA ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53 SCRA 76).
Moot and academic; Dismissal of case as moot and academic; When a
decision on the merits in a case is rendered and the same has become final and
executory, action on procedural matters or issues is rendered moot and academic.
This Court ruled in Muoz vs. Bagasao, et al., (44 SCRA 526 [1972]) that
"where a decision on the merits in a case at bar, the action on procedural matters or
issues is thereby rendered moot and academic." Therefore, an adjudication of the
procedural issue presented for resolution (similar to this case with respect to the
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal) would be futile exercise in
exegesis (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET
AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Legal Issues; The nature and importance of the legal question
raised in the petition makes it necessary to discuss and resolve the same with
finality. Considering, however, the nature and importance of the legal question
raised in this petition, it is necessary to discuss and resolve the same with
finality (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 [1971]; Salonga v. Pano, 134
SCRA 438 [1985]; Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer, 135
SCRA 25 [1985]; CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C.
INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeal; Perfection of appeal; Execution;
The rule is that once appeal is perfected, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over
the case and to issue the writ of execution; The rule does not apply to a tenancy
and/or agrarian case. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that once appeal is
perfected, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case and to issue writ of
execution (Universal Far East Corporation v. C.A., et al., 131 SCRA 642 [1984];
Montelibano v. Bacolod-Murcia Willing Co., and C.A., 136 SCRA 294 [1985]. It
should be pointed out, however, that this ruling does not apply to the case at
bar(CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169
SCRA 129).
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Appeal; Perfection of appeal does not
necessarily mean that the lower court loses jurisdiction over the case since the
rules of procedure defined under P.D. 946 apply.
This is a tenancy and/or agrarian case. Hence, the perfection of the appeal
does not necessarily mean that the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the case,
since the rules of procedures as defined under Presidential Decree 946
apply (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL.,
169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Same; Sec. 16 of PD 946 precludes the application of the
Rules of Court to agrarian cases while Sec. 18 thereof provides that appeal shall
not stay the decision in agrarian cases; The decision may be executed despite
perfection of appeal except where the appealed decision directs the ejectment of
the tenant. Section 16 and 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 are too clear and
explicit in this respect as to require interpretation or construction. Section 16
68

precludes the application of the Rules of Court to agrarian cases while Section 18
provides that appeal shall not stay the decision in agrarian cases. Consequently,
said decision may be executed notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal
therefrom except where the appealed decision directs the ejectment of the
tenant (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL.,
169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Same; Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very
rigid technical sense. Moreover, "rules of procedure are intended to promote,
not to defeat substantial justice, and therefore, they should not be applied in a very
rigid and technical sense" (Calasiao Farmers Cooperative Marketing
Association v. C.A. 106 SCRA 630 [1981]; Director of Lands v. Romamban, et
al., 131 SCRA 431 [1984]; CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C.
INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Same; PD 946 being a special law, it shall have precedence
over the Rules of Court which is of general applicability. Finally, Presidential
Decree No. 946 being a special law, the same shall have precedence over the Rules
of Court which is of general applicability (De Joya v. Lantin, 19 SCRA 893
[1967]; Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 [1968]; CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON.
PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).
COMPROMISE
Action; Suit between members of the same family; Requisite before suit is
filed; Article 222, New Civil Code construed. Article 222 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines requires that before a suit between members of the same family
this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, appear that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made. The only way to make it so appear
is by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit
being filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing
that such efforts had been exerted is a condition precedent to the existence of the
cause of action. Hence, the failure of the complaint to plead that the plaintiff
previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable
for lack of cause of action. It may be so attacked at any stage of the case on
appeal(CECILIO MENDOZA VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 19 SCRA 756).
Same; Compromise; Support; Validity of marriage; Article 222 is not
applicable to a suit to claim future support or to the validity of a marriage. A
claim for future support cannot be subject of a valid compromise. It is, therefore,
outside the sphere of application of Article 222. The validity of a marriage is also a
non-compromisable issue. Since no valid compromise is possible on these issues, a
showing of previous efforts to compromise them would be superfluous (CECILIO
MENDOZA VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 19
SCRA 756).
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
69

Labor Law; Agrarian Relations; Tenancy Relationship; Jurisdiction;

Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over both agrarian and non-agrarian litigation.
The jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioner has no merit. Nowhere in the
decision of the agrarian court did it rule that it had no jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, a finding by a Court of Agrarian Relations that no tenancy relationship
is involved does not bring a case beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
In truth, the appellate court has jurisdiction over both agrarian and non-agrarian
litigation. To sustain the petitioner's first arguments would result in most agrarian
decisions favoring landowners brought out of the reach of the Court of Appeals. It
is precisely these appeals, where the agrarian courts have ruled that no tenancy
relationship exists, which deserve full and careful consideration from the Court of
Appeals (LEA PAZ TUAZON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH
DIVISION, ET AL., 118 SCRA 484).
Same; Same; Same; Concept of tenancy. Tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a
legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and, as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important (LEA PAZ
TUAZON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DIVISION, ET AL., 118
SCRA 484).
Same; Same; Same; Intention of agrarian reform program; Farmer and
spouse who themselves cultivated a riceland they inherited cannot be forced to
enter into a permanent tenancy relationship with a person who worked temporarily
over the land for 3 crop years. And finally, it was never the intent of the
agrarian reform program that a poor farmer and his wife who inherited a small
farm of one and a half hectares of riceland which they cultivated themselves must
be forced to enter into a permanent tenancy relationship with another man whom
he hired temporarily simply because a major operation forced the farmer to rest for
three crop years (LEA PAZ TUAZON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
SIXTH DIVISION, ET AL., 118 SCRA 484).
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Agrarian Law; Contracts; Court of Appeals; Finding of the Court of
Appeals on a question of fact whether or not petitioner voluntarily surrendered
his landholding by means of a document entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagsasauli ng
Karapatan will not generally be disturbed. We are in accord with the finding
of the Court of Appeals that the document designated as "Kasulatan ng Pagsasauli
ng Karapatan" was voluntarily executed by the petitioner. It is supported by the
evidence. The issue as to whether petitioner voluntarily surrendered the
landholding is clearly factual. Being a question of fact, it is for the Court of
Appeals to decide and its findings will not be disturbed by this Court unless clearly
baseless or irrational (ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; Voluntary surrender of landholding is one of the recognized grounds
for severance of tenancy relationship. The fact that petitioner could have
70

exercised his option as provided but did not do so is a potent Circumstance to

show the intent of petitioner to surrender the landholding. This notwithstanding, if
petitioner had not exercised his option, under the Code, their share tenancy relation
would eventually have ceased to be operative and become converted into
leasehold, by virtue of the afore-quoted statutory provision. There is no question
that one of the means of the extinguishment or severance of tenancy relationship is
the voluntary surrender of the landholding by the tenant. Thus, Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 1199 permits voluntary surrender of the landholding by a share
tenant. And even in Cases of leasehold, Section 8 of Republic Act 3844 provides
as one of the causes of the extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relation the
"voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee * * *." Pursuant
to Section 28 of the same law, the agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold
during the agricultural year by voluntarily surrendering the landholding due to
circumstances more advantageous to, him and his family (ROMAN JACINTO
VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; Extinguishment of tenancy relationship by means of voluntary
surrender of the landholding does not require court approval. This mode of
extinguishment or severance of the tenancy relation does not require the
authorization of the Court of Agrarian Relations, since it proceeds either from
causes outside the control of the parties or arises from the volition of the tenant,
and is distinct from dispossession or ejectment of a tenant (ROMAN JACINTO
VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; The Tenancy Act 1199 prohibited surrender of his landholding by
the tenant to take effect in the future. Neither can he invoke the provisions of
Section 49, in relation to Section 50, of Republic Act No. 1199. What Section 49
prohibits is the stipulation by the agricultural tenant and the landowner on the date
of the tenant should leave or surrender the land in the future. Thus, it has been held
that an agreement between a tenant and a landholder whereby the former shall
return his landholding to the latter after one crop year cannot justify the tenant's
dispossession because said agreement is expressly prohibited by law. But as
explained by this Court in Datu, et al., v. Cabangon, supra, it is different if the
tenant voluntarily surrenders his landholding because the voluntary surrender of
his landholding by a tenant is a ground sanctioned by law for terminating the
tenancy relationship(ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; Fact that tenant did not immediately vacate portion of his
landholding does not make the surrender thereof by means of contract less
voluntary. The fact that petitioner did not at once vacate the other one-half
portion of the landholding after the execution of the contract does not make the
stipulations thereof any less voluntary. His continued possession of one-half of the
property (until the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in
1967) became possible only because he was entitled, under the terms of the
contract, to harvest the "extra" crop as part of the consideration, and once said
harvest was completed, his possession became that of a mere squatter (ROMAN
JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
71

Same; P.D. 27 does not apply retroactively. In the case at bar the Court of
Appeals already rendered judgment finding that tenancy relationship between
petitioner and respondent was extinguished and said judgment was rendered prior
to the effectivity of P.D. 27 on October 21, 1972. Neither can We find merit in
petitioner's claims that with the advent of Presidential Decree No. 27, he has
become the owner of the land. Firstly, said decree applies only in favor of bona
fide tenants. It cannot be denied, however, that at the time of the promulgation of
Presidential Decree No. 27 (October 21, 1972), the Appellate Court had already
rendered its judgment finding that the tenancy relationship between petitioner and
private respondent had been extinguished. Secondly, the decree cannot operate
retroactively in favor of petitioner who had surrendered one-half of the land in
July 1966 and, by virtue of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued by
the Court of Agrarian Relations, was dispossessed of the other half in February
1967 (ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87
SCRA 263).
Same; P.D. 316 in relation to P.D. 583 prohibiting and penalizing the
ejectment of agricultural tenants do not apply to the petitioner who was no longer
in possession of the land when said Decrees took effect. Nor does Presidential
Decree No. 316, prohibiting the ejectment of tenant-tillers from their
farmholdings, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 583, prescribing penalties for
the unlawful ejectment, exclusion, removal or ouster of tenant-farmer, apply to
petitioner's case. In the first place, at the time the aforesaid decrees were
promulgated, petitioner was no longer in possession of the land. If at all, the said
decrees must operate in favor of the present tenant (ROMAN JACINTO VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
ABANDONMENT
Tenancy; Tenancy relationship is extinguished by tenant's abandonment of
the land; Findings of Agrarian Court, supported by substantial evidence, will not
be disturbed. A tenancy relationship is extinguished by the "abandonment of
the land by the tenant" (Sec. 9 Rep. Act 1199). Because a tenant has possession of
the land only through personal cultivation, his leaving the land amounts to his
abandonment thereof. Where the tenancy relationship was terminated by the
tenant, through his own voluntary act, he cannot invoke the protection of the
principle of security of tenure. The finding of the Court of Agrarian Relations, that
the tenant abandoned the land, will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial
evidence (SEVERINO
GAGOLA VS.
COURT OF
AGRARIAN
RELATIONS, ET AL., 18 SCRA 992).
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
Remedial Law; Action; An action must be brought against the real party-ininterest or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be reversed
therein. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must
be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. A corollary proposition to
this rule is that an action must be brought against the real-party-interest, or against
72

a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein (Salonga v.

Warner Barnes and Co., Ltd. Supra citing Salmon and Pacific Commercial Co., v.
Tan Cuenco, 36 Phil. 556 [1917]). The real party-in-interest is one who stands to
be benefited or be injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800 [1989] citing Samahan ng
mga Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga Textile Market, Inc., et al., v. Court of
Appeals, 165 SCRA 598 [1988]). If the suit is not brought against the real-partyinterest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states
no cause of action (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports as the party defendant. We agree with the
contentions of the private respondent. The petitioner should have impleaded the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the party-defendant for as stated in
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 300
[1991], a donation, as a mode of acquiring ownerhip, results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation
is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property
donated (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Civil Law; Ownership; The owner has the right to dispose of a thing
without other limitations than those established by law. Under Article 428 of
the New Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership therefore,
there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to the
land (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Tenancy Law; The law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation
is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. As elucidated in the case of Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (168
SCRA 439 [1988]), security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees
which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount
to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the
same Act, the law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not extinguished
by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. The only
instances when the agricultural leasehold relationship is extinguished are found in
Section 8, 28 and 36 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The
donation of the land did not terminate the tenancy relationship. However, the
donation itself is valid (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports as the new owner cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland and
build a public high school thereon until after there is payment of the disturbance
compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended.
Considering that the tenant in the case at bar is willing to accept payment of
73

disturbance compensation in exchange for his right to cultivate the landholding in

question, the real issue is who should pay the compensation. We rule that the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner cannot oust the
petitioner from the subject riceland and build a public high school thereon until
after there is payment of the disturbance compensation in accordance with Section
36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court is of the opinion and so hold that the trial
court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation
because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. In view of the
foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the trial court correctly dismissed
the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation because the private
respondent is not the real party-in-interest. And having arrived at this conclusion,
we do not deem it necessary to pass upon the other errors assigned by the
petitioner for as stated in Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals (190
SCRA 485 [1990]), a person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be
bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a
proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy then of the petitioner is to claim
his disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local or
national, is in a position to for it (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Actions; Res Judicata; Justice and Equity of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of
the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the
Supreme Court is empowered to suspend its operation. Petitioners raised before
the respondent court that inasmuch as the judgment award in favor of the La Torre
spouses had already been fully satisfied when the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 21846 was sold to them as the highest bidder in the execution sale, the La
Torre spouses no longer have any right to levy upon TCT No. 60152 registered in
the name of the Buan spouses. Regrettably, respondent court did not pass upon this
issue. It implied, however, that the issue is no longer a tenable subject for
resolution inasmuch as the Court of Appeals' decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 14768
from which the order of execution stemmed had already become final and
executory, and as such, is already beyond question. . . . Taken in this light, the
respondent court apparently did not err in leaving the issue unresolved, a final
decision being unreviewable and conclusive. But judging from the facts presented
by the present case, it beyond doubt that serious injustice will be committed if
strict adherence to procedural rules were to be followed. It should be remembered
that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, such that when rigid application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial injustice, this Court is empowered to suspend its
operation. . . . . In the present appeal, rather than dismissing the issue of
overpayment as not within the scope of the power to review, this Court deems it
best to decide the same on the merits (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and
AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).

74

Same; Writs of Execution; A writ of execution should conform to the

dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. It is axiomatic that a
writ of execution in any case should conform to the dispositive portion of the
decision sought to be executed (Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 156 SCRA 740 [1987]), such that where the
judgment is for a sum of money, the writ of must state the exact amount
thereof (Zamora vs. Medran, 90 Phil. 339 [1951]; SPOUSES LORENZITO
BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA
424).
Same; Same; Where two parcels of land are levied upon pursuant to a writ
of execution and the proceeds from the sale of one satisfies in parcel of land
should be cancelled. In the civil action for a sum of money between the La
Torre spouses and G.L. Mejia Enterprises, Inc., the judgment award in favor of the
former amounted to a total sum of P20,729.00 exclusive of legal interest. It is
undisputed that pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the court, two parcels
of land then registered in the name of the judgment debtor were levied upon, the
first one covered by TCT No. 21846 having been sold at the auction sale to the La
Torre spouses themselves for P33,958.54. It is therefore mathematically
conclusive that by reason of this sale, the judgment award in favor of the La Torre
spouses in the total sum of P20,729.00 had already been satisfied in full.
Correspondingly, the notice of levy annotated on the other parcel of land now
covered by TCT No. 60152 should have been cancelled (SPOUSES
LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; The levy and execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond
the original judgment award. However, instead of cancelling the annotation, the
La Torre spouses pursued the execution of the remaining property levied upon
despite the apparent satisfaction of the judgment debt. This property was by then
already registered in the name of the Buan spouses who resisted the attempted
execution. It is beyond question that as per the applicable laws and jurisprudence
on the matter, the levy and attempted execution of the second parcel of land is void
for being in excess and beyond the original judgment award granted in favor of the
La Torre spouses. For, as this Court held in the case of Mutual Security of
Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (153 SCRA 678 [1987], "where the
writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it
life, the writ has pro tanto no validity" (italics supplied). Stated categorically, an
execution has been regarded as void when issued for a greater sum than is
warranted by the judgment (Windor Steel Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 102 SCRA 275 [1981]; SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and
AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Writs of execution cannot be equated with judgments which
are final and conclusive. At this point, it is proper to emphasize that writs of
execution cannot be equated with judgments which are final and conclusive
(Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 28 SCRA 1033 [1969], such
that although the decision of the lower court in the action for a sum of money is
conclusive, the part of the writ issued which went beyond the money award is not
75

valid at all (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS.

COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; The judgment creditors having received
what is due them, should not seek nor be granted anything more, not even by a
final and executory judgment, for to do so would be to sanction unjust enrichment.
On the basis of the foregoing, it is quite clear that the levy on TCT No. 60152 is
invalid and should be cancelled accordingly. Not only is it the legal and moral
direction that should be taken, but the just and equitable solution as well to this
long-standing controversy. If the La Torre spouses were allowed to take the
property covered by TCT No. 60152 on the basis of an excessive levy, they would
be unjustly enriched at the expense of the Buan spouses. That the La Torre spouses
were able to sell the property which they bought at the auction sale for
P280,000.00 to the David spouses, which fact is undisputed, is already beside the
point. What matters is that the judicial award of P20,729.00 has already been fully
satisfied. The La Torre spouses having received what is due them, should not seek
nor be granted anything more, not even by a final and executory judgment. To do
so would be to sanction unjust enrichment and cause unlawful deprivation to the
Buan spouses (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Courts; Injunction; Trial courts have no power to interfere by
injunction with the orders or judgment issued by another court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. With respect to the preliminary injunction set aside by
the respondent court, the statute books are replete with jurisprudence to the effect
that trial courts have no power to interfere by injunction with the orders or
judgments issued by another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
(Republic vs. Reyes, 155 SCRA 313 [1987]; Mariano vs. Court of Appeals, 174
SCRA 59 [1989]; Prudential Bank vs. Gapultos, 181 SCRA 159 [1990]). As
applied to the present case, it would appear that Branch 56 of the RTC of Angeles
City has no power nor authority to enjoin the order of execution issued by Branch
58 of the same court (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Where the Court of Appeals set aside only
the preliminary injunction, missing the fact that a permanent injunction was also
issued by the lower court, logic dictates that the Court of Appeals' decision also
intended the inclusion of the permanent injunction; A judgment is not so confined
to what appears on the face of the decision but also those necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto. It appears however that the respondent court
missed altogether the fact that a permanent injunction was issued by the lower
court (Branch 56) in its decision dated August 8, 1990 such that it set aside only
the preliminary injunction earlier issued. Logic dictates however that owing to the
nature of the order being set aside, it is a necessary consequence that the Court of
Appeals' decision also intended the inclusion of the permanent injunction in its
questioned resolution. For if not, the appellate court would be rendering for naught
its own reversal of the May 8, 1990 Order. Besides, although the decision of the
respondent court did not so state explicit terms, it is beyond cavil that a judgment
is not so confined to what appears on the face of the decision but also those
76

necessarily included therein or necessary thereto (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals,

212 SCRA 595 [1992]; SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
RES JUDICATA TO A NON-PARTY TO A CASE
Civil Procedure; Res Judicata. The case at bench presents an exceptional
instance where an inflexible application of the doctrine of res juridicata will not
serve ours constitutional policy favoring fairness, the heart of due process.
Petitioner was not a party in Civil Case No. 3022 and was not given any chance to
contest the claim of Guerero. Her children, then in the United States, were the ones
sued. They failed to answer, and were declared in default. Thus, the late Clemente
Guerrero, husband of private respondent, obtained a favorable judgment by default
from the trial court pursuant to which he was given the right of preemption over
the contested lots. Petitioner attempted to intervene in the case but unfortunately,
her motion for intervention was denied. The late Guerero, therefore, prevailed
primarily because his claim was not disputed. In contrast was the result in Civil
Case No. 3023 where Guerero claimed the same right of preemption against the
other children of petitioner. In this case, however, one of the children of petitioner
sued by Guerero, was in the Philippines and he answered the Complaint. The case
was tried on its merits and the trial court dismissed the Complaint of Guerrero. It
found that the right of preemption of Guerrero was not yet in esse(ISIDORA
SALUD VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 384).
Same; Same; Doctrine of res judicata is a rule of justice and cannot be
rigidly applied where it will result in injustice. The difference in the results of
Civil Case No. 3022 and 3023 accentuates the necessity not to give res judicata
effect to the default judgment in Civil Case No. 3022 where petitioner was a nonparty. The demands of due process present a weightier consideration than the need
to bring an end to the parties' litigation. For more important than the need to
write finis to litigation is to finish it justly, and there can be not justice that
satisfies unless the litigants are given the opportunity to be heard. The
constitutional right to due process of petitioner cannot be defeated by the argument
that petitioner is a privy of her children in Civil Case No. 3022, and hence is
bound by its judgment. x x x Petitioner does not fall in any of the above categories.
She is not a successor-in-interest of her children in Civil Case No. 3022.
Petitioner's children were not sued in Civil Case No. 3022 in a representative
capacity. It is also clear that petitioner did not control or participate in Civil Case
No. 3022 for her motion to intervene was denied. Petitioner's interest, therefore,
was not at all represented in Civil Case No. 3022 where judgment was obtained by
default. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule of justice and cannot be rigidly
applied where it will result in injustice(ISIDORA SALUD VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 384).
Actions; Ejectment; Judgments in ejectment cases are immediately
executory; Requisites to stay the execution of judgments in ejectment cases.
Judgments in ejectment cases which are favorable to the plaintiff are immediately
executory. They can be stayed by the defendant only by: a) perfecting an appeal;
77

b) filing a supersedeas bond; and c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property during the
pendency of the appeal. These requisites must concur. Thus, even if the defendant
had appealed and filed a supersedeas bond but failed to pay the accruing rentals,
the appellate court could, upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the defendant,
and upon proof of such failure, order the immediate execution of the appealed
decision without prejudice to the appeal taking its course. Such deposit, like the
supersedeas bond, is a mandatory requirement; hence, if is not complied with,
execution will issue as a matter of right. The only exceptions are the existence of
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the defendant
from making the monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events which
have brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and would
make the execution inequitable (CATALINO SAN PEDRO, ET AL., VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 145).
Same; Same; Pendency of an action questioning the ownership of property
will not abate ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgments therein.
Firmly settled is the rule that the pendency of an action questioning the ownership
of property will not abate ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgment suit
involves only the issue of material possession or possession de facto while an
action for annulment of title, such as the case at bar, involves the question of
ownership. There may be identity of parties and subject matter but not of the cause
of action or the relief prayed for (CATALINO SAN PEDRO, ET AL., VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 145).
Same; Same; Certiorari; In a petition for certiorari, the court must confine
itself to the issue of whether or not the respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. The instant petition being
one for certiorari, this Court must confine itself to the issue of whether or not the
respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City
authorizing the execution of the decision in the ejectment suit is still pending with
the Regional Trial Court. The question of whether or not the action for unlawful
detainer was the proper remedy of the private respondent should be addressed in
that appeal, not in this certiorari proceeding (CATALINO SAN PEDRO, ET
AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 145).
VOID CONTRACTS CANNOT BE RATIFIED
Civil Law; Contracts; Void contracts cannot be ratified. In this light, the
reliance of the petitioners on the sketch of July 9, 1961 signed by private
respondent Jose Seradilla allegedly confirming the Consolidation and Partition
Agreement dated November 6, 1959 is hardly of any moment. As Article 1409 of
the Civil Code, op. Cit., expressly states that void contracts cannot be ratified.
Needless to state, the July 5, 1963 Agreement of the heirs of Patricio Seradilla
revoking the void Consolidation and Partition Agreement dated November 6, 1959
cannot be faulted (HEIRS OF LEANDRO OLIVER, REPRESENTED BY

78

PURITA OLIVER and PEDRO REMOQUILLO VS. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 234 SCRA 367).
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Petition for Review; Jurisprudence forbids
entertaining questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Obviously, petitioners are grasping on questions of fact in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule
finds stronger application in the petition at bench considering that it involves facts
established in administrative proceedings and confirmed by both trial court and the
respondent court (HEIRS OF LEANDRO OLIVER, REPRESENTED BY
PURITA OLIVER and PEDRO REMOQUILLO VS. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 234 SCRA 367).
NATURAL RESOURCES; LAND REGISTRATION; CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE
Natural Resources; Land Registration; Confirmation of Imperfect Title; It
matters not whether the vendee/application has been in possession of the subject
property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied by his predecessor-in-interest, the said
period being tacked to his possession. It must be noted that with respect to
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest." Thus, it matters not whether the
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so
long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been
complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his
possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only
since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except
that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to
be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As
aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents
through their predecessor-in-interest, who in turn, have been in open, continued
possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their
predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights
necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect
title(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; Occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by
an applicant and his predecessor-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Subsequent cases have hewed
to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive possession
for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jureconverts the same to private
property (Director of Land v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183
SCRA 602 [1990]. This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years by an applicant and his predecessor-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so
79

as to segregate the land from the mass of public land (National Power
Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993];REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; Torrens System; When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued; The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of
title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. The
Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable
public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act
(Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by
law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a
right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued (National Power Corporation c. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases
to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of. In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a
means for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA,
149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution allows natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship to acquire private lands; BP 185 governs the
disposition of private lands in favor of natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship. But what should not be missed in the disposition of
this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to
register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Section 7 and 8 of Article XII
of the Constitution contain the pertinent provisions. Section 8 is similar to Section
15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution. Pursuant thereto, B.P. 185 was
passed into law. From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no
other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what
governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen
who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185 (REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA
567).
Same; Same; Same; A foreign national may apply for registration of title
over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the
Philippines from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration
under the law. Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at
the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties
as discussed above were already private lands; consequently there could be no
legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form
part of the public domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945
80

or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his maximum area of 1,000 sq. m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185). It is undisputed that
private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential
land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino
citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question.
What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens
of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the
Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite
period and character of possession of their predecessor-in-interest over the subject
lots, their application for registration of title must be approved(REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA
567).
Same; Same; Same; The requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 are primarily
directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be
submitted. The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185
do not apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to
the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted.
Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements
must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval
of an application for registration of title. An application for registration of title
before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a
certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land
registration court approving the application for registration has become final that a
decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec.
6 BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants.
This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register
of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the
issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in
the approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration
is yet to be issued(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).
TITLE VENUE
Actions; Civil Procedure; Venue; Where the language used in the contract
clearly evinces the parties' intent to limit the venue of all suits between them, this
means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided for in Rule
4, sec. 2(b). In the case at bar it is clear from the parties' contract that the venue
of any action which they might bring are the courts of competent jurisdiction in
Pasay City, whether the action is for "breach [of the lease agreement] or damages
or any other cause between the LESSOR and LESSEE and persons claiming under
each." The language used leaves no room for interpretation. It clearly evinces the
parties' intent to limit to the "courts of appropriate jurisdiction of Pasay City" the
venue of all suits between the lessor and lessee and those between parties claiming
81

under them. This means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts
provided for in Rule 4, sec 2(b) (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB
REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; By laying in Pasay City the venue for all suits, the
parties made it plain that in no other place may they bring suit against each other.
This case, therefore, differs from the cases cited by petitioner. It is true that in
Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, a stipulation that "The parties agree to sue and be
sued in the City of Manila" was held to merely provide an additional forum in the
absence of any qualifying or restrictive words. But here, by laying in Pasay City
the venue for all suits, the parties made it plain that in no other place may they
bring suit against each other for "breach [of their lease contract] or damages or any
other cause between [them] and persons claiming under each [of
them]" (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY
CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; It is irrelevant that neither party resides in Pasay City
since parties do stipulate concerning the venue of an action without regard to their
residence. Petitioners contend that neither they nor the private respondent Jaime
Blanco reside in Pasay City. This fact is, however, irrelevant to the resolution of
the issue in this case since parties do stipulate concerning the venue of an action
shall be in the City of Manila. It was held that it was reasonable to infer that the
parties intended to fix the venue of their action, in connection with the contract
sued upon, in the proper court of the City of Manila only, notwithstanding that
neither one was a resident of Manila (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS.
JRB REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Inclusion of the spouses of lessee and the
President of the lessor is not necessary in action based on an alleged breach of
lease contract. It is nonetheless contended that the stipulation as to venue is
inapplicable because (1) only one of the petitioners (Virgilio B. Gesmundo) and
only one of the private respondents (JRB Realty) are parties to the lease contract
and (2) their cause of action is not based on the lease contract. The contention is
without merit. Petitioner Edna C. Gesmundo is the wife of the lessee Virgilio B.
Gesmundo, while Jaime R. Blanco is the president of the lessor JRB Realty
Corporation. Their inclusion in this case is not necessary. What is more, as already
noted, by its terms the stipulation applies not only to the parties to the contract but
to "any persons claiming under each" (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL.,
VS. JRB REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; Technicalities and Procedural Rules; Procedural rules
are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights since, like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they
be relaxed. Nor is there any warrant for petitioners' view that a motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue is based on a "mere technicality" which
"does not even pretend to invoke justice " and, therefore, must not be sustained. As
we have in other cases held, "procedural rules are not be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's
82

substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for
the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed." Here what is involved is no less than
the parties' agreement to limit the venue of any action between them and those
claiming under them the contract. Petitioners must abide by that
agreement (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY
CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Civil Procedure; Default; Affidavit of Merit; Grounds for a motion for new
trial. We agree that the verified motion of petitioner could be considered as a
motion for new trial. The grounds alleged by petitioner in his motion are the same
as the grounds for a motion for new trial under Rule 37, which are (1) that
petitioner's failure to file his answer was due to fraud, mistake, accident or
excusable negligence; and (2) that he has a meritorious defense. Petitioner
explained that upon receiving the summons, he immediately saw private
respondent and confronted him with the receipt evidencing his payment.
Thereupon, private respondent assured him that he would instruct his lawyer to
withdraw the complaint. The prior payment of the loan sought to be collected by
private respondent is good defense to the complaint to collect the same loan again.
The only reason why respondent court did not consider the motion of petitioner as
a motion for new trial was because the said motion did not include an affidavit of
merit. The allegations contained in an affidavit of merit required to be attached to
a motion to lift an order of default or for a new trial need not be embodied in a
separate document but may be incorporated in the petitioner itself. As held in
Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975): "Stated otherwise, when a motion to lift
an order of default contains the reasons for the failure to answer as well as the
facts constituting the prospective defense of the defendant and it is sworn to by
said defendant, neither a formal verification or a separate affidavit of merit is
necessary" (AUGUSTO CAPUZ VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
233 SCRA 471).
Same; Same; Same; Appeal; Remedy against an order of default.
Speaking for the Court in Circle Financial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 196
SCRA 166 (1991), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa opined that the affidavit of
merit may either be drawn up as a separate document and appended to the motion
for new trial or the facts which should otherwise be set out in said separate
document may, with equal effect, be alleged in the verified motion itself.
Respondent court erred when it held that petitioner should have appealed from the
decision, instead of filing the motion to lift the order of default, because he still
had two days left within which to appeal when he filed the said motion. Said court
must have in mind paragraph 3 of Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that: "a party who has been declared in default may likewise
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to
the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him in accordance with Rule 38". Petitioner property availed of the
remedy provided for in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court because
the appeal under Section 2, Rule 41 was not, under the circumstances, a "plain,
83

speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In an appeal under
Section 2, Rule 41, the party in default can only question in the light of the
evidence on record. In other words, he cannot adduce his own evidence, like the
receipt to prove payment by petitioner herein of his obligation to private
respondent (AUGUSTO CAPUZ VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
233 SCRA 471).
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
considered final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme
Court; Exception in the present case since the findings of the Court of Appeals is
contrary to that of the trial court. The question in the case at bench is one of
fact: whether or not, based on the evidence submitted, respondent appellate court
erred in concluding that both decedent's Last Will and Testament, and it is Codicil
were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses in separate occasions. As a general
rule, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are considered final and conclusive,
and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this court. In the present instance, however,
there is reason to make an exception to that rule, since the finding of the
respondent court is contrary to that of the trial court, viz: ". . . (Private
respondents) pointed out however, that the assertions of the petitioner's witnesses
are rife with contradictions, particularly the fact that the latter's signatures on the
documents in issue appear to have been written in ballpens of different colors
contrary to the statements of said witnesses that all of them signed with only one
ballpen. The implication is that the subscribing witnesses to the Will and Codicil,
and the testatrix did not simultaneously sign each of the documents in one sitting
but did it piecemeal a violation of Art. 805 of the Code. This conclusion of the
(private respondents) is purely circumstantial. From instance, considering the time
interval that elapsed between the making of the Will and Codicil, and up to the
filing of the petition for probate, the possibility is not remote that one or two of the
attesting witnesses may have forgotten certain details that transpired when they
attested the documents in question. . . . " (Rollo, pp. 36-37.) A review of the facts
and circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals based its impugned
finding, however, fails to convince us that the testamentary documents in question
were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single
occasion (CLEMENTE CALDE VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
233 SCRA 376).
Civil Law; Succession; Forms of Wills; Evidence; Contradiction between
the autoptic preference and the testimonial evidence. As sharply noted by
respondent appellate court, the signatures of some attesting witnesses in decedent's
will and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were in black. This
discrepancy was not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6) witnesses
testified that two pens were used by the signatories on the two documents. In fact,
two (2) of petitioner's witnesses even testified that only one (1) ballpen was used
in signing the two testamentary documents. It is accepted that there are three
sources from which a tribunal may properly acquire knowledge for making its
decision, namely: circumstantial evidence, testimonial evidence, and real evidence
or autoptic proference. . . . In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts
the testimonial evidence produced by petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon
84

inspection by the respondent court, show in black and white or more accurately,
in black and blue that more than one pen was used by the signatories thereto.
Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve
petitioner's claim that both testamentary documents in question were subscribed to
in accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Neither did
respondent court err when it did not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge
Tomas A. Tolete. It is true that his testimony contains a narration of how the two
testamentary documents were subscribed and attested to, starting from decedent's
thumbmark thereof, to the alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in
consecutive order. Nonetheless, nowhere in Judge Tolete's testimony is there any
kind of explanation for the different-colored signatures on the
testaments (CLEMENTE CALDE VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
233 SCRA 376).
Ejectment; Damages; Forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property and not the
damages which may have been suffered but which have no direct relation to the
loss of material possession. The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The
reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that
of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those
which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by
the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which the
he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material
possession (TEODORO ARAOS, ET AL., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 232 SCRA 770).
Same; Same; Although the Rent Control Law allows unilateral increases in
rentals by the lessor within the period and the maximum rates provided therein,
still the demand for such increase must be made upon the lessee himself since the
courts have no authority to fix the same for the parties where no valid demand for
an increased rent has been made by the lessor. It should be borne in mind that
although the rent control laws allow unilateral increases in rentals by the lessor
within the period and the maximum rates provided therein, still the demand for
such increase must be made upon the lessee himself. The courts have authority to
fix the same for the parties where no valid demand for an increased rent has been
by the lessor. Hence, in the case of Orlino vs. Court of Appeals, we reversed the
MTC's award of increase in rental in accordance with Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 877,
after finding that the award was merely based on the prayer in the complaint,
although no previous demand was made on the defendant-lessee. In the present
case, the demand letters to vacate sent to the petitioners only mentioned the
purchase of the apartment units by the private respondent. Nothing in the record
shows that there were prior disputes on the rentals or that there was a demand for
increased rentals made by the private respondent or its predecessor on the
petitioners. Hence, the MeTC did not have the authority to decree the increase in

85

rental rates (TEODORO ARAOS, ET AL., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

ET AL., 232 SCRA770).
Agrarian Reform; Tenancy Relationship; Evidence Required in Agrarian
Cases; "Substantial evidence" Defined; In agrarian cases, all that is required is
mere substantial evidence; Substantial evidence does not necessarily import
preponderant evidence, it refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable man
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case of Bagsican v. Court
of Appeals (141 SCRA 226, 229-230, January 30, 1986), we hold in no uncertain
terms that: ". . . in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence'.
That has been the consistent ruling of this Court in a long line of cases (Ulpiendo
v. CAR, L-13891, Oct. 31, 1960; Villaviza v. Panganiban, 10 SCRA 824; Gagola
v. CAR, 18 SCRA 992; Beltran v. Cruz, 25 SCRA 607). This substantial evidence
rule was later incorporated in P.D. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 and has
been expressly made applicable to agrarian cases. . . . Substantial evidence does
not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil
case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by
stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the
appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial
court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is
entitled to belief (Picardal v. Lladas, supra; ANTONIO J. CASTRO VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 169 SCRA 383).
Agrarian Law; Tenant, defined; Agricultural tenancy, defined. Under
Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 1199, a tenant is "a person who by himself, or with the
aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the land belonging
to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder or for a price certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system" (Matienzo vs.
Servidad, 107 SCRA 276). Agricultural tenancy is defined as "the physical
possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally
possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former
and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which
the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable; whether in produce or in money, or both" (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 1199;
50 O.G. 4655-56; Miguel Carag vs. CA, et al., 151 SCRA 44;VICTORIANO
ZAMORAS VS. ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA SU HORTELLANO and
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 189 SCRA 248).
Same; Same; Same; Requisites of tenancy relationship. The essential
requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landholder and the
tenant; (2) the subject is the agricultural holding; (3) there is consent between the
parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation
by the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of harvests between landholder and
tenant (Antonio Castro vs. CA and De la Cruz, G.R. L-34613, January 26,
1989; Tiongson vs. CA, 130 SCRA 482; Guerrero vs. CA, SCRA
138; VICTORIANO ZAMORAS VS. ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA SU
86

HORTELLANO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,

189 SCRA 248).
Same; Same; Same; Elements of personal cultivation. The element of
personal cultivation of the land, or with the aid of his farm household, essential in
establishing a landlord-tenant or lessor-lessee relationship, is absent in the
relationship between Su and Zamoras (Co vs. IAC, 162 SCRA 390; Graza vs. CA,
163 SCRA 39), for Zamoras did not cultivate any part of Su's plantation either by
himself or with the help of his household (VICTORIANO ZAMORAS VS.
ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA SU HORTELLANO and NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, 189 SCRA 248).
Same; NLRC, Jurisdiction; It is the NLRC, not the Court of Agrarian
Relations, that has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamoras' complaint for illegal
dismissal. Since Zamoras was an employee, not a tenant of Su, it is the NLRC,
not the Court of Agrarian Relations, that has jurisdiction to try and decide
Zamoras' complaint for illegal dismissal (Art. 217, Labor Code; Manila
Mandarin Employees Union vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 368; Jacqueline Industries
Dunhill Bags Industries, et al., vs. NLRC, et al., 69 SCRA
242; VICTORIANO ZAMORAS VS. ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA SU
HORTELLANO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
189 SCRA 248).
Civil law; Lease; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Civil law lease distinguished
from agricultural tenancy. There are important differences between a leasehold
tenancy and civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As
to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally
attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not
personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in
leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose
may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease
is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special
laws (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA 391).
Agricultural Tenancy Act; A fishpond is an agricultural land. There is no
doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically
mentions fishpond and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus
Section 46 ( c) of said Act provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar
lands, fishponds, saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be
governed by stipulation between the parties." This Court has already ruled that
"land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land" (TRINIDAD
GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA 391).
Same; Words and phrases; Meaning of phrase "immediate farm household."
Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether
related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who
usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term

87

"immediate farm household" (TRINIDAD

PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA 391).

GABRIEL

VS.

EUSEBIO

Same; To fall under the Agricultural Tenancy Act, land must be worked by
tenant or immediate farm household. The law is explicit in requiring the tenant
and his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of Republic Act
1199, as amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging
to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying
to the landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both, under the
leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act limit the relation of
landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land and to the person who
actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his
immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires for the
existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm household
work the land (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 38
SCRA 391).
Same; A person who hires others to do work ceases to be a tenant. A
person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available
from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do
not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others
whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is
considered as having abandoned, the land as tenant within the meaning of sections
5 and 8 of Republic Act 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges
of one (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA 391).
NOTARIAL LAW
Evidence; Notarial Law; When the evidence as to the validity or nullity of a
notarial document is conflicting, the document should be upheld in the absence of
a clear, strong and convincing evidence showing such falsity. We are in full
conformity with appellate court's reversal of the trial court's decision. The disputed
deeds of sale, namely: (a) "Bilihang Tuluyan" dated 29 July 1963 between
petitioner Erlinda and respondent Eusebio; (b) "Bilihang ng Lupa na Walang
Titulo" dated 26 October 1966 between respondents Eusebio and Renato; and (c )
"Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" dated 17 July 1967 between respondents Renato
and spouses de Guzman, were all duly notarized. In this connection, we have held
that when the evidence as to the validity or nullity of a notarial document is
conflicting, in the absence of a clear, strong and convincing evidence showing
such falsity, the document should be upheld (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET
AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Contracts; Rescission; The remedy of rescission only applies to
contracts validly agreed upon by the parties in the cases established by law.
Petitioners sought rescission of those documents on two grounds: first, Erlinda
"never executed nor signed any document or any deed of sale whatsoever
transferring or selling her share on the real property . . . to defendants or to any
88

person for that matter," second, she was still a minor at the time she allegedly
executed the deed of sale in favor of respondent Eusebio. It should be pointed out
that petitioners' prayer for rescission is erroneous because this remedy only applies
to contracts validly agreed upon by the parties in the cases established by law.
Anyway, the error appears to concern terminology only because petitioners are
actually assailing the validity of said documents (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET
AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Forgeries; An accurate examination to determine forgery
should dwell on both the differences and similarities in the questioned signatures.
The trial court resolved the first ground in this wise: ". . . on close observation,
the signature of Erlinda appearing on the alleged Deed of Sale to Eusebio, which
of course denied, is very different from her signature appearing in the verification
of her complaint in the instant case, and even in the Deed of Sale from Alberto
Causapin to the de Guzmans which Erlinda signed as Administratrix." This is a
loose end which the lower court failed to settle. An accurate examination to
determine forgery should dwell on both the differences and similarities in the
questioned signatures (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Same; The passage of time and a person's increase in age may
have decisive influences in his writing characteristics, thus, in order to bring about
an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close
as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. A comparison of
Erlinda's signature in the "Bilihang Tuluyan" with her signatures on the other
documents reveals that the slight differences in strokes are overshadowed by the
significant similarities. These similarities suffice to convince us that the signature
of petitioner Erlinda on the deed of sale between her and respondent Eusebio in
genuine; a fortiori, the deed of sale between them is valid. Moreover, it is highly
noticeable that the signatures of Erlinda that were analyzed by the trial court are on
documents executed several years apart, to wit, 29 July 1963, 17 August 1967 and
20 June 1986. The passage of time and a person's increase in age may have
decisive influences in his writing characteristics. Thus, authorities are of the
opinion that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the
standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to be
suspected signature (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Contracts; Action for Annulment of Contracts; Prescription; An action for
annulment of a contract entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons shall
be brought within four years from the time the guardianship ceases. As regards
the second ground, Art. 1391 of the Civil Code is specific that the action for
annulment of a contract entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons shall
be brought within four years from the time the guardianship ceases. Conformably
with this provision, Erlinda should have filed a complaint for annulment within
four (4) years from 1966 when she turned 21. Her claim of minority has
undoubtedly prescribed when the complaint was filed in 1986 (ERLINDA B.
CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
89

Same; Same; Land Titles; Public Lands; Homestead; Sec. 101 of the Public
Land Act vests in the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead the
authority to institute the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of title
and for reversion of the homestead to the Government. Furthermore,
petitioners' action for the cancellation of OCT No. P-1796 was not property was a
public land. We have held in a multitude of cases, among which are Lopez v.
Padilla and Maximo v. CFI of Capiz, that Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act vests
only in the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead the authority to
institute the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of title and for
reversion of the homestead to the Government. A recognized exception is that
situation where plaintiff-claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant public
land unlawfully and in breach of trust titled by him, on the principle of
enforcement of a constructive trust, but such principle is in no way applicable nor
even invoked in this case (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An original certificate of title issued on
the strength of a homestead patent is equivalent to a certificate issued in a judicial
proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after one year from the
date of issuance thereof. In addition, an original certificate of title issued on the
strength of a homestead patent is equivalent to a certificate issued in a judicial
proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after one (1) year from
the date of issuance thereof; in this case, one year from 28 April 1977. The
exception is where an action for the cancellation of a patent and the certificate of
title pursuant thereto is instituted on the ground that they are void because the
Bureau of Land had no jurisdiction to issue them at all, the land in question having
been withdrawn from the public domain prior to the subsequent award of the
patent and the grant of a certificate of title to another person, which does not
obtain in this case (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Equity; Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality,"
is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules
of procedure. As aforestated, the trial court granted relief to petitioner Erlinda
based on equity since it found that respondent-spouses de Guzman acted in bad
faith when they acquired the land. Equity, which has been aptly described as "a
justice outside legality," is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. The pertinent positive rules being
present here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based
only on equity. Besides, respondent-spouses de Guzman did not act in bad faith
because there was no evidence of impropriety in the sale made by respondent
Renato Manalo to them (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Remedial Law; Entry of Judgment; In civil and criminal cases, unless a
motion for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court,
judgments and final resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the
expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to the parties. Rule 11 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provides guidelines to be observed by the
90

Division Clerks of Court and the Archives Section in entry of judgments and
remand of the records. Section 5 thereof provides that after promulgation of the
decision or final resolution, it shall be the study of the Division Clerks of Court to
see to it that the entry of judgment is made in due time without undue delay. As to
when final judgments and resolutions should be entered, Sec. 1 provides the
general rule that in civil and criminal cases, unless a motion for reconsideration is
filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court, judgments and final resolutions
of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days
after notice to the parties (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 128).
Same; Same; Same; The Division Clerks of Court shall determine the
finality of the decision by making allowance for delay of the mails. However,
Sec. 6 requires that in making entries of judgments, the Division Clerks of Court
shall determine the finality of the decision by making allowance for delay of the
mails, computed from the last day of the period of appeal from the decision or
final resolution, as follows: forty five days, if the addressee is from Luzon, except
Metro Manila; and ten days if the addressee is from Metro Manila (ERLINDA B.
CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 128).
APPEAL DISMISSED BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF APPELLANT BRIEF
Remedial Law; Appeals; Appeal correctly dismissed when no appellant's
brief was filed. As Navarro filed only a notice of appeal and not an appellant's
brief, her appeal was correctly dismissed for lack of interest in prosecuting
it (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
234 SCRA 639).
Same; Same; The dismissal of an appeal becomes a final judgment of the
appellate court after the lapse of 15 days from service of a copy thereof upon the
accused or his counsel. In the present case, the motion for new trial was filed
with the Court of Appeals after the dismissal of the appeal for non-filing of the
appellant's brief. The dismissal of an appeal becomes a final judgment of the
appellate court after the lapse of 15 days from service of a copy thereof upon the
accused or his counsel unless the period is suspended by a motion for new
trial (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
234 SCRA 639).
Same; Same; A lost appeal could not be retrieved by a motion for new trial.
Neither did she move to have her appeal reinstated after it was dismissed, nor
did she offer any explanation for her failure to file her brief. It was only on March
1, 1993, or more than 60 days after the lapse of the 90-days extension granted by
the appellate court, the she filed her motion for new trial. The petitioner probably
hoped that her lost appeal could be retrieved by a motion for new trial. It was
not (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
234 SCRA 639).
Criminal Law; BP 22; Evidence; Elements of the offense punished in BP
22.
91

 The elements of the offense punished in B.P. 22 are: (1) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 234 SCRA 639).
Same; Same; Same; Payment of the value of the check either by the drawer
or by the drawee bank within five banking days from notice of the dishonor given
to the drawer is a complete defense. Payment of the value of the check either by
the drawer or by the drawee bank within five banking days from notice of the
dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense. The prima facie presumption
that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds or credit at the
time of the issuance and on its presentment for payment is rebutted by such
payment. This defense lies regardless of the strength of the evidence offered by the
prosecution to prove the elements of the offense (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO
VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 234 SCRA 639).
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Remedial Law; Unlawful Detainer; The rule is that the one year period
provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a complaint
for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the last letter of demand
to vacate. Petitioners correctly cite our ruling in Sy Oh v. Garcia upholding the
established rule that the one (1) year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed
should be counted from theLAST letter of demand to vacate, the reason being that
the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and
let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises (SPOUSES NAZARIO P.
PENAS, JR., represented by ELPIDIO R. VIERNES, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 744).
Same; Same; Notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the
increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by
the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. "The notice giving the lessee the
alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the
demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. When
after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new
rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5( c), P.D. 902-A specifically provides
SEC original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning the election or
appointment of officers of a corporation. In intra-corporate matters concerning
the election or appointment of officers of a corporation, Section 5, PD 902-A
specifically provides: "SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative
functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations,
92

partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted

under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving: . . . (c ) Controversies in the election or
appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations,
partnerships or associations" (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Generally speaking, the relationship of a person
to a corporation, whether as officer or as agent or employee, is not determined by
the nature of the services performed, but by the incidents of the relationship as
they actually exist. The matter of petitioner's not being elected to the office of
Executive Vice-President Chief Operating Officer thus falls squarely within the
purview of Section 5, par. (c ) of P.D. 902-A. In the case of PSBA v. Leano,
supra, which involved an Executive Vice-President who was not re-elected to the
said position during the election of officers on September 5, 1981 by the PSBA's
newly elected Board of Directors, the Court emphatically stated: "This is not a
case of dismissal. The situation is that of a corporate office having been declared
vacant, and that of TAN's not having been elected thereafter. The matter of whom
to elect is a prerogative that belongs to the Board, and involves the exercise of
deliberate choice and the faculty of discriminative selection. Generally speaking,
the relationship of a person to a corporation, whether as officer or as agent or
employee, is not determined by the nature of the services performed, but by the
incidents of the relationship as they actually exist." (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240
SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; A corporate officer's dismissal is always a
corporate act. A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act and/or an
intra-corporate controversy and that nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom
which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action. Furthermore, it must
be noted that the reason behind the non-election of petitioner to the position
Executive Vice President-Chief Operating Officer arose from, or is closely
connected with, his involvement in the alleged irregularities in the aforementioned
cases which, upon investigation and recommendation, were resolved by the PAL
Board of Directors against him and other senior officers. Evidently, this intracorporate ruling places the instant case under the specialized competence and
expertise of the SEC (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The principal function of the SEC is the
supervision and control over corporation, partnership and associations with the end
in view that investment in these entities may be encouraged and protected, and
their activities pursued for the promotion of economic development. The
jurisdiction of the SEC has likewise been clarified by this Court in the case of
Union Glass and Container Corporation, et al., thus: "This grant of jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the nature and function of the SEC under the law.
Section 3 of PD No. 902-A confers upon the latter absolute jurisdiction,
supervision, and control over all corporations, partnerships or associations, who
are grantees of primary franchise and/or license or permit issued by the
93

government to operate in the Philippines x x x.' The principal function of the SEC
is the supervision and control over corporations, partnerships and associations with
the end view that investment in these entities may be encouraged and protected,
and their activities pursued for the promotion of economic development (LESLIE
W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order that SEC can take
cognizance of a case. It is in aid of this office that the adjudicative power of the
SEC must be exercised. Thus the law explicitly specified and delimited its
jurisdiction to matters intrinsically connected with the regulation of corporations,
partnerships and associations and those dealing with the internal affairs of such
corporations, partnerships or associations. Otherwise stated, in order that the SEC
can take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following
relationships: (a) between the corporation, partnership or association and the
public; (b) between the corporation, partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members, or officers; (c ) between he corporation,
partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise, permit or license
to operate is concerned, and (d) among the stockholders, partners or associates
themselves (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The affirmative reliefs and monetary claims
sought by petitioner in his complaint reveal that they are actually part of the
perquisites of his elective position; hence, intimately linked with his relations with
the corporation. The fact that petitioner sought payment of his backwages, other
benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in his
complaint for illegal dismissal will not operate to prevent the SEC from exercising
its jurisdiction under PD 902-A. While the affirmative reliefs and monetary claims
sought by petitioner in his complaint may, at first glance, mislead one into placing
the case under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, a closer examination reveals
that they are actually part of the perquisites of his elective position; hence,
intimately linked with his relations with the corporation. In Dy v. NLRC, et al., the
Court, confronted with the same issue ruled, thus: The question of remuneration,
involving as it does, a person who is not a mere employee but a stockholder and
officer, an integral part, it might be said, of the corporation, is not a simple labor
problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and
management, and is in fact a corporate controversy in contemplation of the
Corporation Code"(LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is still within the competence of and expertise
of the SEC to resolve all matters arising from or closely related with all intracorporate disputes. The Court has likewise ruled in the case of Andaya v.
Abadia that in intra-corporate matters, such as those affecting the corporation, its
directors, trustees , officers and share-holders, the issue of consequential damages
may just as well be resolved and adjudicated by the SEC. Undoubtedly, it is still
within the competence and expertise of the SEC to resolve all matters arising from
or closely connected with all intra-corporate disputes (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS.
94

HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240

SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because
estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction upon a tribunal that has none over
the cause of action. It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law and the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime
even on appeal. The principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent this Court
from taking up the question of jurisdiction, which has been apparent on the face of
the pleadings since the start of the litigation before the Labor Arbiter. In the case
of Dy v. NLRC, supra, the Court, citing the case of Calimlim v. Remirezreiterated
that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and
void. Again, the Court in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development CenterAquaculture Department v. NLRC reiterated the rule that the invocation of
estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction upon a tribunal that has none over
the cause of action. The instant case does not provide an exception to the said
rule (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Labor Law; Agrarian Reform; Homestead; Right of homesteader or his
heirs to own a piece of land for their residence and livelihood prevail over the right
of tenants to security of tenure over the landholding; Reason; Intention of Code of
Agrarian Reform. This is a case where two competing interests have to be
weighed against each other: the tenant's right to security of tenure as against the
right of the homesteader or his heirs to own a piece of land for their residence and
livelihood. We hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is
to uphold the right of homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally
the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations.
This holding is consistent with the intention of the Code of Agrarian Reform to
abolish agricultural share tenancy, "to establish owner-cultivatorship and the
economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture" and "to achieve a
dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional
restraints and practices" (LUCRECIO PATRICIO, ET AL., VS. ISABELO
BAYOG, ET AL., 112 SCRA 42).
Same; Same; Homestead Act, purpose of enactment of. The Homestead
Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a
needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and
family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's
other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for
their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a
certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after
the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction
of this vital right (LUCRECIO PATRICIO, ET AL., VS. ISABELO BAYOG,
ET AL., 112 SCRA 42).
Certiorari; Appeals; Proper mode of appeal from judgments of the Regional
Trial Court on pure questions of law is a petition for review on certiorari to the
Supreme Court in the form and manner provided for in Rule 45 of the Revised
95

Rules of Court. Petitioner is correct that the proper mode of appeal from
judgments of the Regional Trial Court on pure questions of law is a petition for
review on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the form and manner provided for in
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court, in Atlas Consolidated Mining
and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 51 (1991) had
occasion to pass upon the issue at hand, as follows: "Under Section 5,
subparagraph (2) (e), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is
vested with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. A
similar provision is contained in Section 17, fourth paragraph, subparagraph (4) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act No. 5440. And, in such
cases where only questions of law are involved, Section 25 of the Interim Rules
and Guidelines implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in conjunction with
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5440, provides that the appeal to the Supreme Court
shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the
trial court on questions of law have to be through the filing of a petition for review
on certiorari. . . . By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law,
this Court issued on March 9, 1990, Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of which
provides: 2 Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. Except
in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court
only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being
the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the
Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.' "(SOUTHERN NEGROS DEVELOPMENT
BANK, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 460).
Same; Same; Same; An erroneous application of the law or rules is not an
excusable error. It is incumbent upon private respondent qua appellants to
utilize the correct mode of appeal of the decision of trial courts to the appellate
courts. In the mistaken choice of their remedy, they can blame no one but
themselves (Jocson v. Baguio, 179 SCRA 550 [1989]; Yucuanseh Drug Co. v.
National Labor Union, 101 Phil. 409 [1957]; SOUTHERN NEGROS
DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233
SCRA 460).
APPEAL FEE
Civil Procedure; Appeal, Perfection of; Mere fact that one party has already
filed his notice of appeal does not mean that the appeal has already been perfected;
The perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal
by any party. The mere fact that one party has already filed his notice of appeal
does not mean that the appeal has already been perfected because the adverse party
still has the reglementary period within which to perfect his appeal. There can be
several reasons for this, but one will suffice for purposes of this case, namely, the
96

latter party since presumably, they received the decision also on October 5, 1985,
(the same date it was received by petitioner herein), respondents still had fifteen
(15) days within which to appeal. They filed a motion for execution pending
appeal on October 11, 1985, (note that they had up to October 20, 1985 within
which they could still appeal, before the judgment as to them would be final)
therefor before the appeal is deemed perfected as to themselves. (See Universal
Far East Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 642). Note that under the law
(Sec. 23 of the Interim Rules, See Batas Pambansa Bilang 129) The perfection
of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any
party (ALEJANDRO MAGTIBAY VS. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 168 SCRA 177).
APPEAL FEE
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Rule that date of mailing is date of filing, not
applicable in the instant case, as the records reveal that the petition for review was
filed, not by mail but by personal service. The procedural aspect of this case is
the issue of the timeless of the petition for review. Petitioner claimed that on July
14, 1986, he posted with the Central Post Office of Manila his petition, under
Registry Receipt No. 1608, which was received by respondent Court of Appeals,
through its authorized representative Dever Catindig, on July 17, 1986. In support
thereof, he submitted Registry Receipt No. 1608 and a certification of Postmaster
Wilfredo R. Ulibarri (Rollo, p. 68). He therefore avers that as held in the case of
NAWASA v. Secretary of Public Work and Communications, 16 SCRA 536
[1966], that the date of mailing by registered mail is considered the date of filing
of any petition to pleading, therefore he filed his petition on time. The contrary is
however, shown by the record which reveals that petitioner filed his petition for
review with the Court of Appeals not by mail but by personal service on July 15,
1986 at 3: 25 p.m. as stamped on the front page of the petition (Annex "3", Rollo,
p. 101). As against the certification of the postmaster which is not conclusive to
prove that the registered letter alluded to is the subject petition for review, coupled
with the lack of registry return card that would have shown the receipt thereof by
the authorized representative of the Court of Appeals, the evidence of receipt by
personal delivery is more persuasive as it tallied with the records of said
court (RICARDO MEDINA, SR., VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEAL, ET AL., 181 SCRA 837).
Same; Same; Failure to perfect appeal in the manner and with the period
provided for by law rendered the judgment final and executory. Hence, the
Court of Appeal did not err when it ruled that it is bereft of jurisdiction to pass
upon the assailed decision of the trial court which has become final and executory
as of July 14, 1986 (Rollo, p. 99). This Court has invariably ruled that perfection
of an appeal the manner and within the period laid down by law is not or
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal required by the
rules has the effect of rendering judgment final and executory (Quiqui v.
Boncaros, 151 SCRA 417 [1987]; RICARDO MEDINA, SR., VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL, ET AL., 181 SCRA 837).

97

Same; Unlawful Detainer; Courts; Jurisdiction; An ejectment suit filed

within one year from termination of the right of possession is one of unlawful
detainer, hence, it falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Petitioner would have this Court. Petitioner would
have this Court consider, the instant case as an accion publiciana, cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court and not by the Metropolitan Trial Court. An action of
unlawful detainer is defined as "witholding by person from another for not more
than one year, of the possession of a land or building to which the latter is entitled
after the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession by virtue
of a contract express or implied." (Spouses Medina and Bernal v. Valdellon, 63
SCRA 282 [1975]). However, should the action be filed more than one year after
such deprivation or unlawful witholding of possession, even if the plaintiff decides
to raise the question of illegal possession only, the case is accion publiciana or
recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary proceeding
in the Court of First Instance (Banayos v. Susana Realty Inc., 71 SCRA 558
[1976]; Bernabe v. Dayrit, 125 SCRA 423, 425 [1983]). In the case at bar, the
ejectment suit having been filed within the one (1) year period, the proper action is
one of Unlawful Detainer which necessarily falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the lower court (Bernabe v. Luna, 148 SCRA 114 [1987]), or the
Metropolitan Trial Court (RICARDO MEDINA, SR., VS. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEAL, ET AL., 181 SCRA 837).
DUE PROCESS
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Right to be heard; Due process is not
violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever reason,
not to be heard; If he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later
complain that he was unduly silenced. The Court cannot agree. The argument
assumes that the right to a hearing is absolute and may not be waived in any case
under the due process clause. This is not correct. As a matter of fact, the right to be
heard is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly as long as the party is given
an opportunity to be heard on his behalf. The circumstance that the chance to be
heard is not availed of does not disparage that opportunity and deprive the person
of the right to due process. This Court has consistently held in cases too numerous
to mention that due process is not violated where a person is not heard because he
has chosen, for whatever reason, not to be heard. It should be obvious that if he
opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard to complain
that he was unduly silenced (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 605).

Labor Law; Surety Bond; It is too late now for the petitioner to challenge
the stipulation. If it believed then that it was onerous and illegal what it should
have done was object when its conclusion as a condition in the surety bond was
required by the POEA. At any rate, it is too late now for the petitioner to
challenge the stipulation. If it believed then that it was onerous and illegal, what it
should have done was object when its inclusion as a condition in the surety bond
was required by the POEA. Even of the POEA had insisted on the condition, as
now claimed, there was still nothing to prevent the petitioner from refusing
altogether to issue the surety bond. The petitioner did neither of these. The fact is
98

that, whether or not the petitioner objected, it in the end filed the surety bond with
the suggested condition. The consequence of its submission is that is cannot now
argue that it is not bound by that condition because it was coerced into accepting
it (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 605).
Same; Same; Purpose of surety bond; The purpose of the surety bond is to
insure that if the rights of overseas workers are violated by their employers,
recourse would still be available to them against the local companies that recruited
them for the foreign principal. The surety bond required of recruitment
agencies is intended for the protection of our citizens who are engaged for
overseas employment by foreign companies. The purpose is to insure that if the
rights of these overseas workers are violated by their employers, recourse would
still be available to them against the local companies that recruited them for the
foreign principal. The foreign principal is outside the jurisdiction of our courts and
would probably have no properties in this country against which an adverse
judgment can be enforced. This difficulty is corrected by the bond, which can be
proceeded against to satisfy that judgment (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA
605).
Same; Same; Same; Social Justice; The technicalities raised by petitioner
do not impair the rudiments of due process or the requirements of the law and
must be rejected in deference to the constitutional imperative of justice for the
worker. Give this purpose, and guided by the benign policy of social justice, we
reject the technicalities raised by the petitioner against its established legal and
even moral liability to the private respondent. These technicalities do not impair
the rudiments of due process or the requirements of the law and must be rejected
in deference to the constitutional imperative of justice for the
worker(STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., VS. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 605).
P.D. 772
Land Titles; Anti-Squatting Law; P.D. 772; Purpose for which the land is
intended and not the place where it is located that is material. We find the
Solicitor General's contention well taken. That it is the purpose for which the land
is intended and not the place where it is located that is material is clear from the
text of the statute. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 772 provides: Section 1. Any person who,
with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of
the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall
be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of
not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of
the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency (ALEX
JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS. HON. DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234
SCRA 524).

99

Same; Same; Same; So long as it is for residential, commercial or any other

purposes, comes within the purview of the Decree. Thus, a piece of land may
be found in a barangay. So long as it is for residential, commercial, or any other
purposes, it comes within the purview of the Decree, and any person, who, with
the use of force, intimidation or threat or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner, occupies or takes possession of such property against
the will of the latter is guilty of squatting (ALEX JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS.
HON. DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).
Same; Same; Same; Squatting on public agricultural land is punishable
under another statute, R.A. 947. It is true that inPeople v. Echavez it was stated
that the Decree was intended to apply to squatting in "urban communities or more
particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals." The statement, however, is only a dictum, because the lands in that
case were pasture lands. As this Court noted, squatting on public agricultural lands
is punishable under another statute, Republic Act No. 947 (ALEX JUMAWAN,
ET AL., VS. HON. DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).
Same; Same; Same; P.D. 772 is not limited to squatting in urban
communities. Indeed, the preamble of P.D. No. 772, on which this Court relied
for its dictum in the two cases, does not support the view that the law is limited to
squatting in urban communities. The preamble reads: WHEREAS, it came to my
knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October
2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Works and
Communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC
General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation
Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers,
to remove all illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and
river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public
and private property, squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all
over the country; WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been
unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this
illegal and nefarious practice (ALEX JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS. HON.
DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).
Same; Same; Same; Elements of squatting. Indeed, the function of a
preamble is to state the reason or occasion for making a law or to explain in
general terms the policy of the enactment. It may, therefore, be resorted to only
when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation. In the case at
bar the Decree is unambiguous. It requires as element of squatting (1) that there be
occupation or a taking of possession of property for residential, commercial or any
other purposes, and (2) that in occupying or taking possession of the property, the
offender did so by force, intimidation or threat or by taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of its owner and against his will. To require that the land be
in an urban community or center of population would, therefore, be not to clarify
but to add to the elements of the crime as these are enumerated in the
Decree (ALEX JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS. HON. DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA,
ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).
100

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Party in Interest; The real
party in interest is the party who stands to benefit or be injured by the judgement
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The Court has defined the real
party-in-interest in the recent case of Samahan ng mga Nangungupahan sa
Azcarraga Textile Market, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 68357, Sept.
26, 1988), as follows: The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgement or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
`Interest' within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. . . . (Francisco, The Revised Rules
of Court in the Phil., Vol. I, p. 126 cited in House International Building Tenants
Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 705). Furthermore,
the Court in Walter Ascona Lee, et al. v. Hon. Manuel Romillo, Jr., et al. (G.R.
No. 60937, May 28, 1988) said; . . . ". . . A real party in interest plaintiff is one
who has a legal right while a real party in interest defendant is one who has a
correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates the legal rights of the
former"(CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL.,VS. HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons; The dissolved Pepsi-Cola
is the real party in interest for purposes of valid service of summons. For
purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in interest
defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners not only because it is the
registered owner of the truck involved but also because, when the cause of action
accrued, Pepsi Cola still existed as a corporation and was the party involved in the
acts violative of the legal right of another (CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET
AL., VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
Same; Same; Same; Cause of Action; A cause of action is an act or
omission of one party in violation of the legal rights of the other. The
petitioners had a valid cause of action for damages against Pepsi Cola. A cause of
action is defined as "an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right
or rights of the other; and its essential elements are a legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendants and an act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right" (Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA
248 [1986] citing Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. v. Barrios, et al., 79 Phil. 666 [1947];
See also Republic Planters Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 131 SCRA 631
[1984]; CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS. HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
Same; Same; Service of Summons; Corporation Law; Dissolved
Corporations, Liabilities of; A defendant corporation is subject to suit and service
of process even though dissolved. On the second and main issue of whether or
not the service of summons through Ms. Nenette C. Sison, upon Pepsi Cola
operates to vest jurisdiction upon private respondent, it is important to know the
circumstances surrounding the service. At the time of the issuance and receipt of
101

the summons, Pepsi Cola was already dissolved. The Court is of the opinion that
service is allowed in such a situation. In the American case of Crawford v.
Refiners Co-operative Association, Incorporation (71 NM 1, 375 P 2d 212 [1962],
it was held that a "defendant corporation is subject to suit and service of process
even though dissolved (CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It has been held in some cases that there
is substantial compliance with the rules on service of summons when it appears
that the summons and complaint are actually received by the corporation through
its clerk, though the latter is not authorized to receive the same. A liberal
interpretation of Section 13, Rule 14 has been adopted in the case of G & G
Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 466 [1988]: Although it may
be true that the service of summons was made on a person not authorized to
receive the same . . ., nevertheless since it appears that the summons and complaint
were in fact received by the corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that
there was substantial compliance, with the rule on service of summons. Indeed the
purpose of said rule as above stated to assure service of summons on the
corporation had thereby been attained. The need for speedy justice must prevail
over a technicality" (CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
Corporation Law; Dissolution of Corporation; Assumption of Liabilities;
By virtue of the assumption of debts, liabilities, and obligations of Pepsi Cola by
PEPSICO, Inc., any judgement rendered against the former after its dissolution is a
liability of the PEPSICO, INC. it is clear that private respondent is aware that
the liabilities of Pepsi Cola are enforceable against it upon the dissolution of Pepsi
Cola. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, by virtue of the assumption of
the debts, liabilities and obligations of Pepsi Cola, "any judgement rendered
against Pepsi Cola after its dissolution is a 'liability' of PEPSICO, Inc., within the
contemplation of the undertaking". Hence it was incumbent upon respondent
PEPSICO, Inc., to have defended the civil suit against the corporation whose
liabilities it had assumed. Failure to do so after it received the notice by way of
summons amounts to gross negligence and bad faith. The private respondent
cannot now invoke a technical defect involving improper service upon Pepsi Cola
and alleged absence of service of summons upon it. There is the substantive right
of the petitioners to be considered over and above the attempt of the private
respondent to avoid the jurisdiction of the lower court (CRISOSTOMO
REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.,
170 SCRA 800).
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Agrarian Relations; tenancy; Judgements; General rule that the findings of
facts of the Court of Agrarian Relations, are accorded respect; Substantial
evidence, concept of. This Court has consistently held that the findings of facts
of the Court of Agrarian Relations will not be disturbed on appeal where there is
substantial evidence to support them and all that this Court is called upon to do
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insofar as the evidence is concerned, in agrarian cases, is to find out if the

conclusion of the lower court is supported by "substantial evidence" (Bagsican vs.
Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226).
Substantial evidence in support of the findings of the Court of Agrarian
Relations does not necessarily import preponderant evidence as is required in
ordinary civil cases. Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record,
"direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment
or criterion for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of
evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief. (Picardal vs. Lladas, 21 SCRA
1483).
Same; Same; Same; Leasehold Tenancy; Finding that private respondents
are considered leasehold tenants of petitioner over the riceland portion of her
hacienda, are supported by substantial evidence. It cannot be said therefore that
the finding of the Court of Agrarian Relations that Cresenciano Prado and Orlando
de la Guison are leasehold tenants of petitioners Maria Luisa Vda. de Donato over
the riceland portion of the hacienda Mercedes which finding was affirmed by
respondent Court of Appeals in its now assailed decision, is not supported by
substantial evidence (MARIA LUISA VDA. DE DONATO VS. COURT OF
APPEAL 154 SCRA 119).
Agrarian Relations; Certificate of Land Transfer, Tenancy; Court of
Agrarian Relations; Jurisdiction Actions for forfeiture of certificates of land
transfer for failure to pay lease rentals for more than two (2) years fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. There is
no question that an action for forfeiture falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the CAR as provided for by Section 5 of P.D. 816. . . . The related
Section 2 of P.D. 816 has been quoted previously. A subsequent law, P.D. 946,
which took effect on 17 June 1976, similarly vested the CAR with exclusive and
original jurisdiction over violations of P.D. Nos. 815 and 816 (ARTURO CURSO
ET. AL., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET. AL.,128 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; Sanctions of forfeiture of certificates of land transfer,
not imposable, where agricultural lessees did not deliberately refuse to pay the
lease rentals but acted in accordance with circular of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform and in good faith. Presidential Decree No. 816 imposes the sanction of
forfeiture where the "agricultural lessee x x x deliberatelyrefuses and/or continues
to refuse to pay the rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a
period of two (2) year". Petitioners cannot be said to have deliberately refused to
pay the lease rentals. They acted in accordance with the MAR Circular, which
implements P.D. 816, and in good faith. Forfeiture of their Certificates of Land
Transfer and of their farmholdings as decreed by the CAR and affirmed by the
Appellate Court is thus unwarranted (ARTURO CURSO ET. AL., VS. HON.
COURTS APPEALS ET. AL.,128 SCRA 567).
Administrative Law; Status; R.A. No. 6758; Allowances; Under R.A. 6758,
incumbents who were receiving RATA as of July 1, 1989 are entitled to continue
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receiving the same. Under the second sentences of the aforementioned

provision, such other compensation includes the RATA. Hence, RATA being
received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 are entitled to continue to receive the
same. Republic Act No. 6758 has therefore, to this extent, amended LOI No. 97.
By limiting the benefit of the RATA granted by LOI No. 97 to incumbents,
Congress has manifested its intent to gradually phase out this RATA privilege
under LOI No. 97 without upsetting its policy of non-diminution of pay
(Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit, 214 SCRA 653
[1992]; MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT
AUTHORITY
vs
COMMISSION ON AUDIT 238 SCRA 714).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The date July 1, 1989 does not serve as a cut-off
date with respect to the amount of RATA but becomes crucial only to determine
those who may be entitled to its continued grant. With regard to the question as
to what is the basis of the RATA to be given to incumbents after July 1, 1989,
petitioners contend that according to LOI No. 97 they are entitled to RATA
equivalent to 40% of their basic salary. With the effectivity of R.A. No. 6758, the
40% must be adjusted based on the standardized salary. Respondent COA,
however, alleges that starting July 1, 1989, the RATA is no longer based on 40%
of the basic salary but on the highest amount of RATA received by the incumbents
as of June 30, 1989. The issue has been answered in Philippine Ports Authority v.
Commission on Audit, 214 SCRA 653 (1992), where we held: "* * * The date July
1, 1989 does not serve as a cut-off date with respect to the amount of RATA. The
date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to determine that as of said date, the officer
was an incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling him to
its continued grant. The given date should not be interpreted as fixing the
maximum
amount
of
RATA
to
be
received
by
the
official" MANILAINTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT
AUTHORITY
VS.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT 238 SCRA 714).
Courts; Judgements by Default; Courts can only award in a judgement by
default the relief specially prayed for in the complaint. A court is bereft of
jurisdiction to award, in a judgement by default, a relief other than that specifically
prayed for in the complaint. Observe that this Court's decision of 29 November
1988 accords with the prayer of private respondent in it complaint (LUMEN
POLICARPIO VS. RTC ET AL., 235 SCRA 314).
Same; It is settled that final decisions are no longer open to amendments or
modifications. The decision has long since become final and executory. It is
settled that final decisions are no longer open to amendments or modifications;
otherwise, we will see no end to litigations (LUMEN POLICARPIO VS RTC
ET AL., 235 SCRA 314).
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
Civil Law; Compromise; Court gives its sanction to the compromise
agreement found to be in order. We find the compromise agreement of be in
order. In consonance with the policy of encouraging the settlement of disputes
amicably and finding the compromise not be contrary to law, morals, good
104

customs, public order and public policy, the Court gives its sanction to the
agreement. (HEIRS OF GABRIEL CAPILI VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS
AND HON. GUALBERTO J. DE LA LANA ET. AL., 234 SCRA 110).
Same; Same; Same; The compromise agreement entered into by and
between the parties is approved. WHEREFORE, the compromise agreement
entered into by and between the parties is hereby APPROVED. The parties are
ENJOINED to faithfully comply with the covenants, terms and conditions therein
expressed (THE HEIRS OF GABRIEL CAPILI VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. GUALBERTO J. DE LA LANA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 110).

105