India and the US: A Closer Strategic Relationship?

Author(s): Surjit Mansingh

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 22/23 (May 28 - Jun. 10, 2005), pp. 22212223+2225
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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neverthelessdidnotallowthedisqualified is superior. It is the people who are arithmeticalcompulsionsof incremental

membersto vote.A contemptpetitionwas supreme...."
numbersand the alleged tradabilityof
then moved against the speaker. The
In the Jharkhandcase it is only the certain legislative seats - won perhaps
SupremeCourtpassed anotherorderaf- restraininghand of the judiciary,which through means allegedly dubious and
- havemanya timecreated
firmingthat the authoritiesof the state hasrestoredthepeople'sconfidencein the undemocratic
includingthe governormust ensurethat supremacyof the rule of law. For those doubts about our democraticsystem in
the court's orderpermittingmembersto claiming omnipotent privilege for the the public eye." As it is, the current
participatein assembly proceedingsbe legislature,let me quote the memorable antics of theArjunMundagovernmentin
implemented.
Despitethis,thespeakerdid wordsof LordCoketo KingJamesI nearly Jharkhandis already turning to be a
not allow four membersto vote - rather 300 years back, when remindinghim of shoddy repetitionof the same wheeling
he announcedthattheconfidencevotehad the majestyof law "theKingoughtnot to and dealingas displayedby ShibuSoren.
been lost, andrecommendedpresident's be undera man,butunderGod andlaw". Itis thisamoralityof politiciansthatposes
rule under Article356. Both houses of
Politiciansneed to heed and act seri- the real dangerto democracy- not an
Parliamentapprovedthe same. The Su- ously on presidentA P J AbdulKalam's imaginedconfrontation
betweenjudiciary
the
to
"The
and
Court
statement
M1
parliamentarians
preme
quashed
proclamation
legislature.
observing"theunflattering
episodeshows
in unmistakableterms (not only) the
governor's unnecessaryanxietyto dismiss
the ministryand dissolve the assembly
(but)...alsohis failureas a constitutional
functionary to realise the binding
legalconsequences of and give effect
to the ordersof this Court".Thus to believe that it is settled law that whatever Recent
effortsby the Indiangovernmentand the Bush
happensinsidethe assemblyis sacrosanct
and is immunefrom the courts' scrutiny Administrationneed to be applaudedfor helping uplifta
is neither correct in principle nor in relationshiptowardsa more meaningfulstrategicpartnership.But
precedent.
determination,courage that is essential toface up to the risks that
throwntheSupremeCourt's
Anotherjibe
still remain(such as Pakistan's ties with the US) and a willingness
way is to pointto the fact thatthe court's
ordercouldhardlyhavebeenimplemented to shed oldframeworksof thinkingare needed to sustain the
if the executive(governor)hadrefusedto currentwillingness betweenthe two countries towardsforging a
implementit. As a refutation,I can do no closer
relationship.
betterthanto quotethe stingingobservation of the SupremeCourt."Itis a matter
of deep regret that the governor of SURJIT MANSINGH
'partnership',however, depends on the
did
think
it
his
constitunot
depthand spanof interactions,the actual
Meghalaya
hrases such as 'strategic partner- congruenceof interests and objectives,
tionaldutyto give effect to the ordersof
this court, not even after a specific
ship', 'strategicrelations', 'strategic and the amountof efforteach partycondirectionto thateffect. He couldnot have
dialogue', trip off the tongue these sistently devotes to accommodatingthe
beenunawareof theobligationcreatedby days so easily as to deprive them of signi- other'sconcernsandwinningsupportfor
Article144,viz, thedutyof all authorities, ficance. One or the other of these its own positions.
The US occupies a uniquepositionin
civil andjudicial,in the territoryof India fashionable phrases is used to describe diworldandevenitsoldest
to act in aid of the SupremeCourtand verse relationships, as between India and thecontemporary
its orders".
Iran, India and the European Union (EU), andclosestalliesfinditnecessarytoexpend
I feel thatunwiselythe Jharkhand
inci- India and China, the United States (US) effort and funds in maintaininggood redentis beingunnecessarilyprojectedas an and Russia, the US and Uzbekistan, and lations with it. The US is the main supintrusionby the judiciary in a domain most recently, the US and India. The porterof the existinginternational
system
reservedexclusively for the legislature. common threadappearsto be one of intent and possesses preponderant
militaryand
This is due to an incorrectunderstanding rather than of content. Two governments technologicalsuperiority.The US has a
of judicialreview and the power to ex- agree to raise the level of their regular dynamiceconomy and the largestsingle
ercisethis in the actionsof the legislature interactions to embrace levels from the marketto whichall othersseek access.Its
and executive. It is not as if the courts lowest to the highest, to deal with the great populationis largelyignorantof and inconsiderthemselvessuperiorto theexecu- variety of issues thatconcern each of them differentto other partsof the world but
tive or the legislature.But this has been in a cordial and holistic manner seeking is increasinglyof mixed background.Its
repudiated
by the SupremeCourtitself by cooperation or understanding,andto make political system has numerousdecisionsayingthat"theissueas to who amongthe long-termcommitmentsfor mutual benefit making sites. And the US has a deepthree wings of democracy- judiciary, and furthering their respective goals, but rootedsenseof its ownexceptionalismand
legislatureand executive- is superioris do not enter into alliance. The substance moral leadershipthat some have quesa futile exercise. Neitherthe legislature of any strategic relationship, and its pos- tionedbutno one hasdisplaced.Theseare
northe executive nor even the judiciary sible transformation from 'dialogue' to facts thatcannotbe ignored;approvalor

India

and

the

US

A CloserStrategicRelationship?

Economic and Political Weekly

May 28-June 4, 2005

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2221

disapprovalis irrelevant,as is an observationthattheUS appearsto prefervassals

ratherthanpartnerswith impliedequality
in the international
system.Ourinterestis
in thereasonsfor andpossibilitiesof India
andtheUS forginga closerand 'strategic'
relationship,thatis, in thebroadspectrum
and long term.
Successiveprimeministerssince Indira
Gandhi's1982 visit to the US expressed
New Delhi'shopeof overcomingdecades
of 'estrangement',lespecially after the
end of the cold war andthe beginningof
economicreformsin 1991. PokhranII in
May 1998 focusedWashington'ssharply
negativeattention,andonly the following
18-monthdialoguebetweenspecialenvoy
JaswantSingh and deputy secretaryof
state StrobeTalbottproduced"someunderstandingof India's securityconcerns
forthefirsttime".2PresidentClintontook
an activerole in gettingPakistanto withdrawits troopsacrossthe Line of Control
(LoC) in Jammuand Kashmirafter the
Kargilconflictof 1999, and then madea
transformative
five-day visit to India in
February-March2000. Prime minister
Vajpayeerespondingto Clinton'saddress
in parliamentsaid, "yourvisit marksthe
beginning of a new voyage in a new
centuryby two countriesthathave all the
potentialtobecomenaturalallies."3Though
no Americantalkedof Indiaas a natural
ally, presidentGeorgeW Bush spoke of
'strategicpartnership'and his national
securityadviser,CondoleezzaRice, had
earlierwritten:"TheUS shouldpaycloser
attentionto India's role in the regional
balance...Indiais an element in China's
calculation,and should be in America's
too. India is not a great power yet, but
it has the potentialto emerge as one."4
Afterconsiderabledeliberationinsideand
outside officialdom, some public but
mainlysecret,the secondBush Administration has now gone much further,
announcinga new strategytowardsouth
Asia as a region"vitalto the futureof the
US". (Hitherto,the Indian subcontinent
was deemedto be only of peripheralor
episodic interest.)
The statedgoals of this strategyare to
help "Indiabecomea majorworldpower
in the 21st century,"to assist Pakistanto
move towarddemocracy,"feel secure",
and "thus [be at] at peace with its
neighbours",andto eliminatethe hyphen
in dealingwiththem.5Earlier,theNational
SecurityStrategyDocumentof 2002 had
highlightedthe growingeconomic, military,politicalandscientificsignificanceof
2222

Indiain the world.and was followed by

establishingjoint forumsfor cooperating
oncounter-terrorism,
hightechnology,and
variousregionaland global issues. Next
(NSSP)was
Stepsin StrategicPartnership
announcedby VajpayeeandBushin January 2004, reaffirmedby prime minister
ManmohanSinghandBushin September
2004, and is now movinginto its second
phase.The two men talk frequently,not
only when the tsunamistrikes,(the efficiency of India'sreactionimpressedthe
of visits
US) andtheirexpected.exchange
thisyearandnextwill consolidateparallel
and multifaceteddialogues on defence,
economics,energy,nuclearproliferation,
andstrategicissues.Keypolicyterrorism,
makers in Washingtonsee no intrinsic
conflicts betweenUS global intereststheseincludedefeatingterrorism,
preventing proliferationof weaponsof mass destruction, advancing democracy, and
preservinga stable balanceof power in

Asia - and India's nationalaspirations.

They assess Indiato be a likely asset as
a partnerandpossibleburdensharer,and
want to make sure that all independent
locationsof economic,military,andtechnologicaldynamism,includingnuclearand
space proficiency,such as India,are inregimes.
tegratedintoexistinginternational
Indiais not categorisedas a 'rogue'state
to be confrontedand coerced.
Indian Concerns
New DelhiwelcomestheBushinitiative
andcan be said to have long soughtsuch
anapproachby theUS as beingin keeping
withIndia'sself-imageas anindependent,
'responsible,'powerwitha claimto great
power statusas a permanentmemberof
the United Nations Security Council.
HoweverdissatisfiedIndiamightbe with
the prevailingworldorder,or disorder,it
has not soughtrevolutionary
change.The

42nd ANNUALCONFERENCEOF
THE INDIANECONOMETRIC
SOCIETY(TIES)
ANNOUNCEMENT AND CALL FOR PAPERS
The 42nd Annual Conference of the IndianEconometric Society is scheduled to
be held at Guru Nanak Dev University,Amritsarfrom 5th to 7th January, 2006.
Allthose who are interested in submittingpapers for the Conference should send
the full paper and the abstract of the paper (300 words) along with a diskette
containing the abstract and paper to the Convener, Programme Committee at
the following address:
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(Convener, Programme Committee, TIES)
Madras School of Economics
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Phone : 044 2230 0304 (0); 2495 6935(R)
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Fax
and 1 copy to the President of the society: Dr. Atul Sarma, Vice Chancellor,
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obtained at http://www.tiesindia.net.(Authors can submit papers through the
website also.)
The last date forsubmission of papers is 15th October2005. Communicationabout
the acceptance of papers will be conveyed to the authors in the first week of
November 2005.
Membersare requested to communicatechange of address, ifany, to the Secretary,
TIES, at the earliest.
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Secretary, (TIES)
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May 28-June 4, 2005

Indianprimeministergave only a muted

anddignifiedreactionof 'disappointment'
to the March25 announcementthatBush
had authorisedthe resumedsale of F-16
fighter planes to Pakistan, which had
capturedpress reportsin all threecountries,to overshadowfuller statementson
India.Formerambassadorto the US Lalit
Mansinghpointedoutthatcomparedwith
a few F-16s, India was being offered a
"boxof chocolates"in the form of more
multi-purposecombat aircraftwith coproductionrights,nuclearreactors,and a
broadrangeof otherdesirables.6Officials
arebusy with the NSSP andpreparations
forManmohanSingh'sstatevisit, andnot
airingdoubtsaboutstrategicpartnership
or attendantrisks.7Yet doubtsexist becausethereareclearrisksthatthe process
of achievingstrategicpartnershipcan be
derailed,orstalled,or provetoo costlyfor
one side or the otherin termsof compromisingsovereigntyor contradictingother
nationalobjectives.
Pakistanposes the mostpotentthreatto
the evolving Indo-US strategicrelationandmuch
ship.The BushAdministration
of theUS media(withnotableexceptions)
has chosen to overlook documented
involvementof the Pakistanarmy in the
verytargetsof US fearandretaliation,that
is, terrorism, nuclear proliferation,
Islamisation,and stifling of democracy.
for
WashingtonvaluesGeneralMusharraf
what it believes he can do and has done
to help in the US 'waron terrorism'and
rewardshimhandsomelywithmilitaryand
economicassistance.Indiahasacquiesced.
If theserewardsdo indeedmakePakistan
'feel secure'enoughto adoptmoderation
and realismso thatit eradicatesterrorist
networks, participatessincerely in the
withIndia
'peaceprocess'of normalisation
and agreesto a permanentsettlementon
Kashmirwithoutterritorial
changes,much
goodwouldfollow.Butif US publicpraise
of its"majornon-NATOally"8andmilitary
assistance again encourages Pakistan's
asitdidinthe1960sand1980s,
adventurism
boththe Indo-Pakistan
peace processand
the opportunityof transformingthe USwouldbederailed.WashIndiarelationship
to dropthe hyphenbut
want
may
ington
Islamabadcouldpreventit fromdoingso.
Practicalriskslie in tryingto marrykey
ingredientsof theNSSPandnewUS offers
toIndia- suchasensuringenergysecurity,
of advanceddefenceequipco-production
ment,sales of civilian nuclearand space
materialsand high technology, and cooperation in missile defence - with
Economic and Political Weekly

existing US obligations to domestic nonproliferationandexportcontrol laws, multilateralnuclear supplier groups (NSG), and
upholding an un-amended Nuclear NonProliferationTreaty(NPT) presently under
review at the United Nations. The Bush
Administration,which encouragesresearch
into new nuclear weapons for US defence
if not yet testing them, seems willing to
'welcome India into the nuclear club',9
but has not yet found a way of doing so
despite lifting all sanctions imposed in
1998. There is some intellectual ferment
on the subject. Former US ambassador to
India Robert Blackwill suggests: "The US
should integrate India into the evolving
global nonproliferationregime as a friendly
nuclear weapons state...We should end
constraints(on assistanceandcooperation),
changing laws and policy when necessary."10 Both the NDA and UPA governments in India have done more than
emphasise India's excellent record in nonproliferation and the minimum nature of
its nuclear deterrent. They have engaged
in sustained dialogues with the US and the
EU over the last few years in order to
harmonise classifications of dual-use
materialsandtechnologies andhave passed
laws to tighten India's own export control
regime. Implementingrulesandregulations
fairly presents difficulties for all countries,
including the US and India,especially with
a multiplication of private firms in the
market,and can cause much publicised but
unnecessary friction. The larger difficulty
in terms of cementing US-India

is thatintra-bureaucratic
wranpartnership
gling in each country,the continuinginfluenceof thosetermed'non-proliferation
ayatollahs'in theUS governingestablishment, and the constantIndiansensitivity
to westernslights,intrusions,or erosions
of sovereignty,could retardthe whole
process.Forexample,Blackwill'ssuggestion of membershipin the US-sponsored
ProliferationSecurityInitiative(PSI)that
includescallingfor spot check andinterdictionof suspiciousshipson thehighseas
mayor maynotattractIndiaas yet;verbal
Indianassuranceson safeguardingor not
producingfurtherfissilematerialsmaynot
satisfytheUS withoutexplicitlegalagreement on the subject.We shoulddemand
skilled navigationtowardacknowledged
commongoalsbetweenextremepositions
on either side. In any case, a mutually
acceptableandinternationally
recognised
agreementon the nuclearissue is a prerequisitefor progressto be madeon the
substantialproposalsmade at the state
department
briefingonMarch25, thisyear.
Impediments
Bureaucratic,cultural,perceptual,and
psychologicalfactors could stall movement toward partnership.They create
impedimentseven in the two most successfulandfastestgrowingareasof IndoUS interaction,
economicandmilitary,but
spacepermitsonly briefmentionof these.
For example, most Americans have a
conceptualblankwithrespectto India;old

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Write or contact us for a free copy of CNA Newsletter
giving a comprehensive list of new books and backlist.

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P - 23, Connaught Circus, New Delhi 110 001
Tel: 2336 4448, 2336 4478 Fax: 2362 6036

E-mail:info@cna-india.com

May 28-June 4, 2005

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2223

images of a 'closed economy' persist

despite acclamationsof openness from
leadingAmericancompanies;newimages
of Indians'takingawayjobs' fromskilled
Americanworkersthroughbusinessprocesses outsourcing(BPO)have been created,;neitherthe Indian Ocean nor the
arefeaturedasa whole
Indiansubcontinent
on standard
Americanmapsorin divisions
of bureaucratic
or militaryresponsibility.
Thus,the US PacificCommandhas gone
much furtherin joint exercises with the
IndianArmedForces,beginningwith the
Navy in the early 1990s,thanhas the US
CentralCommanddealingwith Pakistan
and the westernIndianOceanand reluctantto includeIndiain policy-makingon
the PersianGulf.Lackof clarityon world
visions and India's role, added to misperceptions and unequal expectations,
createdpointsof frictionin earlymilitary
interaction.
1 Thesemightdisappearwith
increasedand diversifiedIndo-US militarycooperation;
provided,of course,that
'babus'intheministryof defencepermitit!
OntheeconomicsideIndo-UStradehas
grown,but less impressivelythanIndia's
tradewiththeEU or China,andexporters
in both India and the US complain of
barriersof one bureaucratickind or anothertogainingaccesstotheother'smarket.
AirIndia'srecentdecisionto purchase50
Boeing aircraftwill swell tradefigures,
and leading US producersof military
aircraftare determinedto prove 'reliable
suppliersover30 years'12as theycompete
for contractsto augmentthe IndianAir
Force.Indianexportsof Information
Technology (IT) productsand services command enormousrespect in the US, but
would-be exportersof consumergoods
face stiff competitionfrom other countries,especiallyChina.TheUS is thelargest
singlesourceof DirectForeignInvestment
(DFI)in Indiawhenfundsroutedthrough
Mauritiusandin portfolioinvestmentare
counted.Americansnaturallycomplain,
as othersdo, of the difficultiesof doing
businessin Indiaandpushfor morerapid
liberalisationand infrastructure
developmentthanIndianpoliticalrealitiespermit.
But whathas been accomplished,including passageof the PatentsAct, is appreciated. Once the benefits of economic
reformsbecome widely distributedand
visible in India and nationalself-confidencegrows,perhapsoutdatedcomplexes
with respectto globalisationwill disappear.The same applies to the realmsof
energysecurityanddefencecooperation;
US verbalpromisesshouldbe translated

into tangibleresultssoon andIndianpsychologicalinhibitionswith respectto the

US overcome.As thatoccursand Indian
capabilityand confidencegrows, it will
find it easierto cooperatewith the US as
well as withotherpartnerssuchas theEU,
Iran,JapanandChina,andtheywithIndia.
Afterall, a commonobjectiveamongall
of them is finding honourableways of
avoidingconflict. In short,Indiacan act
as a 'strategic'player,coordinatingand
employingdifferentfacetsof its own and
others' resourcestowardmaximumadvancementof its consideredobjective:to
becomeandbe recognisedas a developed
countryin the nearfuture.
Finally, the UPA governmentand the
BushAdministration
needto be applauded
for theirreadinessto upgradea strategic
dialogueto a meaningfulstrategicpartnership.They andtheirsuccessorswill need
to display courage, determination,and
patiencein the comingyearsto actualise
goals and overcome the risks outlined
above. Given political will and, importantly,extensivepublicrelationson both
sides, this can and should be done.[13
Email:surjitmh@earthlink.net

Notes
1 Word used by Dennis Kux to describe USIndia relations, Estranged Democracies, the

United States and India 1947-1991, National

Defence University Press, Washington,DC,
1993.
2 StrobeTalbottattheIndiaInternationalCentre,
New Delhi, January31, 1999. See also his
Engaging India, Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC, 2004 (italics mine.)
3 Talbott op cit, p 200.
4 Condoleezza Rice, 'Promoting the National
Interest', Foreign Affairs, vol 79, JanuaryFebruary2000, pp 45-63.
5 See background briefing given by senior
administrativeofficial to reportersat the State
Department,Washington,DC, March25,2005.
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html
6 At the IndiaInternationalCentre,New Delhi,
April 2, 2005.
7 Ashley Tellis surveys some risks in 'South
Asian Seesaw: A New US Policy on the
Subcontinent', Policy Brief, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, DC, No 38, May 2005.
8 Pakistanwas so designated by US Secretary
of State Colin Powell in March 2004.
9 Michael Pillsbury said this was the message
conveyed by one of the first high level visits
to Indiain 2000. Meeting in Washington,DC,
April 26, 2004.
10 Robert D Blackwill, 'A New Deal for New
Delhi', The Wall Street Journal, March 21,
2005.
11 This topic was explored well by Julie A
MacDonaldin Indo-USMilitaryRelationship:
Expectations and Perceptions, Washington;
DC, Bruce Allen Hamilton for Office of the
Secretary of Defence, October 2002.
12 Representative of Raytheon Corporationin
New Delhi, ORF-CSIS Dialogue, March 17,
2005.

Centre-State
Relations
A Returnof Old Suspicions
The recent conclave of districtmagistratesin the capital, organised
at the centre's behest, was summonedto ostensiblydiscuss issues of
developmentadministrationand optimisingthe deliverysystem.
However, by its careless bypassingof state governments,the
centre's gesture has given vent to old suspicions,first aired two
decades ago, to raise their heads once again.
ASHOKMITRA

he imperialstyle was integralto

Indira Gandhi's functioning as
primeminister.Duringthedaysshe
was at the zenithof herpower,one of her
pet irritantswas the StateList underthe
SeventhScheduleof the Constitution;it
stoppedherfrommakingthe statesputty
clay in her hands.If only the stateswere
notthere,she didnothavetheleastdoubt,

Indiacouldhavebeengovernedmuchmore
effectively. She had actuallycirculated,
sometimein theearly1970s,aprivatenote
among her confidantesabouthow to redraw the country'sadministrativestructure:if the stateswere allowedto wither
away;thecountrycouldbe slicedinto400,
district-sizedunits,andthese unitswould
be directlyresponsibleto the centrewhich
wouldin turnensuretheflow of resources
to take care of their needs.

Economicand PoliticalWeekly May 28-June4, 2005

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2225