26 30. Evidence

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26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 178196
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VS.
RUDY BUDUHAN y BULLAN and ROBERT BUDUHAN y BULLAN,
Defendants-Appellants
August 6, 2008
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 December 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01940, which affirmed
with modifications the Decision[2] dated 24 July 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Maddela, Quirino, Branch 38, in Criminal Case No.
38-18, finding accused-appellants Robert Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy
Buduhan y Bullan guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide with respect to the deceased Larry Erese, and of the crime of
homicide with respect to the deceased Romualde Almeron. The Court of
Appeals ordered the payment of moral damages to the heirs of said
victims, in addition to the award already given by the trial court.
On 26 August 1998, an Information[3] was filed against Robert
Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boy Guinhicna, Boyet Ginyang and 3 John Does
Page 1 of 56
before the RTC of Maddela, Quirino, for the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 3818, the accusatory portion of the information provides:
That on or about 10:40 oclock in the evening of
July 24, 1998 in Poblacion Norte, Municipality of
Maddela, Province of Quirino, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, four of them are armed and after first
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and with force and violence did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob ROMUALDE
ALMERON of his wallet and wrist watch and LARRY
ERESE of his wrist watch to the damage and prejudice of
the said ROMUALDE ALMERON and LARRY ERESE;
That on the occasion of the Robbery, the said
accused, armed with firearms of different caliber and
after first conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, shoot and fire upon
ROMUALDE ALMERON, LARRY ERESE and ORLANDO
PASCUA resulting to their instanteneous (sic) death and
the injuries to the persons of FERNANDO PERA and
GILBERT CORTEZ.
On 20 October 1998, the accused filed a Motion to Quash[4] the

above information, alleging that the court did not legally acquire
jurisdiction over their persons. The accused contended they were
neither caught in flagrante delicto, nor did the police have personal
knowledge of the commission of the offense at the time when their
warrantless arrests were effected.[5]
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In an Order dated 25 August 1999, the RTC denied the above

motion on the ground that the assertion of lack of personal knowledge
on the part of the arresting officers regarding the commission of the
crime is a matter of defense, which should be properly taken up during
the trial.[6]
Page 2 of 56
committed[13]; (3) Dr. Fernando T. Melegrito, the medical examiner who

conducted the autopsies on the bodies of the victims[14]; (4) Myrna
Almeron, the widow of the victim Romualde Almeron[15]; and (5)
Laurentino Erese, Sr., the father of the victim Larry Erese.[16]
When arraigned on 12 January 2000, the accused Rudy Buduhan,

Robert Buduhan and Boyet Ginyang, with the assistance of their counsel
de oficio, entered their pleas of Not Guilty to the crime charged.[7] With
respect to accused Boy Guinhicna, counsel for the accused informed the
trial court of his death and thus moved for the dismissal of the charges
against him.[8]
The defense, on the other hand, presented: (1) appellant Robert

Buduhan[17]; (2) accused Boyet Ginyang[18]; (3) Police Inspector Ma.
Leonora Chua-Camarao, a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City[19]; (4)
appellant Rudy Buduhan[20]; and (5) Reynaldo Gumiho, an eyewitness
who was allegedly present at the scene of the crime shortly before the
incident in question occurred.[21]
On the same date, the pre-trial conference was terminated and

both parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts, namely:
The Peoples version of the incident as narrated by its principal

witness, Cherry Rose Salazar (Cherry Rose), is as follows:
1.
That the incident transpired at about 10:40 in the

evening of July 24, 1998;
2.
That the incident happened at Poblacion Norte,

Maddela, Quirino;
3.
That no firearm has been confiscated from any of

the accused.[9]
Upon the submission of accused Boy Guinhicnas Certificate of

Death,[10] the RTC dismissed the case against him on 14 February
2000.[11] Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Cherry
Rose Salazar, an employee of the establishment where the crime was
committed[12]; (2) Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Leo Saquing, a police
officer at the Maddela Police Station who investigated the crime
On 24 July 1998, Cherry Rose was working as a guest relations

officer at the RML Canteen, a beerhouse and a videoke bar in Maddela,
Quirino.[22] At about9:00 to 10:00 p.m., there were only two groups of
men inside the beerhouse.[23] The group that went there first was that of
the appellants,[24] which was composed of Robert Buduhan, who was
wearing a white T-shirt marked Giordano,[25] Rudy Buduhan, who was
wearing a red T-shirt,[26] a man wearing a blue T-shirt,[27] and another
man wearing a blue T-shirt with a black jacket.[28] The second group was
composed of Larry Erese and his companions Gilbert Cortez (alias Abe)
and Fernando Pera (alias Nanding).
At 10:40 p.m., while Cherry Rose was entertaining the group of
Larry Erese, Robert approached them and poked a gun at
Larry.[29] Immediately, the man wearing a blue T-shirt likewise
approached Cherry Roses Manager Romualde Almeron (alias Eddie),
who was seated at the counter.[30] The man in blue poked a gun at
Romualde and announced a hold-up.[31] Larry then handed over his
wristwatch to Robert. Instantaneously, all four men from Roberts group
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fired their guns at Larry and Romualde, which caused them to fall
down.[32] Abe and Nanding ran out of the RML Canteen when the
shooting occurred, and Cherry Rose hid below the table.[33]
Saquing[34]
SPO1 Leo T.
testified that on 24 July 1998, at 11:00
p.m., he and SPO4 Alex M. Gumayagay were detailed as duty
investigators at the Maddela Police Station when Eddie Ancheta, a
fireman, reported to them a shooting incident at the RML Canteen in
Barangay Poblacion Norte, Maddela, Quirino. SPO1 Saquing and SPO4
Gumayagay then proceeded to the said place. About 50 meters from the
scene of the crime, they encountered four male individuals who were
running away therefrom.[35] The policemen immediately halted the men
and asked them where they came from. When they could not respond
properly and gave different answers, the policemen apprehended them
and brought them to the Maddela Police Station for questioning and
identification.[36] Afterwards, the policemen went back to the RML
Canteen to conduct an investigation therein.[37] Later that night, the
witnesses[38] of the shooting incident went to the police station and they
positively pointed to the four persons, later identified as Robert
Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boy Guinhicna and Boyet Ginyang, as the
assailants in the said incident.[39]
Dr. Fernando Melegrito,[40] the Chief of Hospital at
the Maddela Hospital, testified that he conducted the autopsies on the
bodies of the victims Romualde Almeron, Larry Erese and Orlando
Pascua.[41] With respect to Romualde, Dr. Melegrito found that the
former sustained a gunshot wound 1/2 x 1/2 centimeter in diameter,
one inch above the right nipple, perforating the fourth rib of the right
chest, penetrating the superior aspect of the right lung, the aorta of the
heart, the midportion of the left lung and exited through the back, two
inches below the lower portion of the left scapular region.[42] These
findings were also contained in Romualde Almerons Autopsy
Report.[43] From the nature of the wound, Dr. Melegrito concluded that
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the victim was near and was in front of the assailant when he was fatally
shot.
As regards Larry Erese, Dr. Melegrito testified that said victim
sustained a gunshot wound 1/2 x 1/2 centimeter in diameter in the
sternal region of the chest, between the third left and right rib,
perforating the arch of the aorta of the heart and penetrating the
subcutaneous tissue of the left lower back at the level of the seventh rib,
where a slug (bullet)[44] was extracted.[45] These findings were likewise
contained in Larry Ereses Autopsy Report.[46]
Concerning the victim Orlando Pascua, Dr. Melegrito testified
that the gunshot wound that the former sustained resulted into a
massive disruption of the lung.[47] As presented in Pascuas Autopsy
Report,[48] the gunshot wound was 1 x 1 inch in diameter, perforating the
midportion of the fourth rib of the left chest, macerating the three-fourth
(3/4) portion of the left lung, and penetrating the subcutaneous tissues
of the left back at the level of the third and fourth ribs, then the fourth
and fifth ribs where pellets were extracted therein.
Myrna Almeron[49] testified that as a result of the untimely death
of her husband Romualde Almeron, which fact was evidenced by a Death
Certificate,[50] she incurred expenses for funeral services in the amount
of P38,000.00 and expenses during her husbands wake in the amount
of P25,000.00. She also claimed that during the night of the shooting
incident, Romualde brought with him the amount of P50,000.00 in his
wallet, but the same was no longer recovered. Among these figures,
however, Myrna Almeron was only able to present a receipt for the
expenses for funeral services [51] and only in the amount of P26,000.00.
Laurentino Erese testified that during the wake of his deceased
son, whose death was evidenced by a Death Certificate,[52] he incurred
funeral expenses for Larry in the amount of P18,000.00.[53] From the
wake to the first death anniversary, the total expenses were claimed to
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be more or less P100,000.00.[54] However, only the receipt for the above
funeral services[55] was offered.
The prosecution did not present the other surviving victims in
the shooting incident, namely Gilbert Cortez and Fernando Pera. The
latter were fearful of reprisals from unknown individuals. No evidence
was likewise adduced on their behalf. Also, the other employees who
worked as guest relations officers in the RML Canteen and who likewise
witnessed the incident were said to have absconded already.[56]
For the defense, appellant Robert Buduhan[57] testified that on
the evening of 24 July 1998, he was at their boarding house in Poblacion,
Maddela, Quirino, together with Rudy Buduhan, Boyet Ginyang, and Boy
Guinhicna. The group drank one bottle of San Miguel Gin, and then went
to sleep. Unknown to him and Guinhicna, Rudy and Ginyang still went
out to continue their drinking sessions. While he was sleeping, Ginyang
arrived and woke him up. Ginyang told him that they had to go to the
beerhouse where he (Ginyang) and Rudy had been to because something
might have happened to Rudy, as there was a fight there. Robert,
Ginyang and Guinhicna then proceeded to look for Rudy. On their way
there, at the junction of the National Highway, they encountered some
policemen who asked them where they were headed. When Robert said
that they were looking for Rudy, the policemen told them to board the
police vehicle and the group was given a ride. As it turned out, Roberts
group was taken to the Municipal Jail of Maddela where they were
detained. The policemen went out to look for Rudy and they likewise
put him in jail. The following day, the policemen confiscated the shirts
worn by the group. They were also taken to Santiago City where paraffin
tests were conducted. On the evening of 26 July 1998, the policemen
went to the jail with three ladies who were asked to identify Roberts
group. The ladies, however, did not recognize Robert and his
companions.
Page 4 of 56
Boyet Ginyang[58] testified that on 24 July 1998, at 10:00 p.m., he

and Rudy went to a beerhouse in Maddela, Quirino. After ordering some
drinks and chatting, they suddenly heard gunshots from the
outside. Looking towards the direction of the sound, he saw somebody
fall to the ground and at that point, he and Rudy ran to get away from the
place. While running towards their boarding house, Rudy was stopped
by an unknown armed person in a white T-shirt. When Ginyang reached
the boarding house, he roused appellant Robert and Guinhicna from
their sleep and asked them to go with him and search for Rudy. Upon
reaching the junction at the National Highway, they were halted by a
man who asked where they were heading. After hearing their story, the
man said they should wait for a vehicle that would help them look for
Rudy. When the vehicle arrived, he and the others were brought to the
municipal jail. Thereafter, Rudy was likewise picked up by the police
and detained with the group. On the morning of 25 July 1998, three
ladies were brought to the municipal jail to identify his group, but the
former did not recognize them. On the morning of 26 July 1998, Ginyang
and his three companions were brought to Santiago City where they
were made to undergo paraffin testing. Afterwards, the group was
brought back to the municipal jail in Maddela, Quirino. Ginyang also
testified that the policemen took the shirts they wore on the night of24
July 1998, but he could not remember when they did.
Police Inspector Maria Leonora Chua-Camarao[59] testified that
she was the one who conducted the examination proper of the paraffin
casts taken from Robert Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boyet Ginyang and
Boy Guinhicna. She likewise brought before the trial court the original
Letter Request[60] of the Maddela Police Station for the conduct of
paraffin casting; the Letter of Request[61] addressed to the Officer-inCharge the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region 2 for the conduct of paraffin
examination; and the paraffin casts of subjects Rudy, Ginyang, Guinhicna
and Robert.[62] Police Inspector Chua-Camarao explained that the
purpose of conducting a paraffin test was to determine the presence of
gunpowder residue in the hands of a person through extraction using
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paraffin wax. The process involves two stages: first, the paraffin casting,
in which the hands of the subject are covered with paraffin wax to
extract gunpowder residue; and second, the paraffin examination per se,
which refers to the actual chemical examination to determine whether
or not gunpowder residue has indeed been extracted. For the second
stage, the method used is the diphenyl amine test, wherein the diphenyl
amine agent is poured on the paraffin casts of the subjects hands. In this
test, a positive result occurs when blue specks are produced in the
paraffin casts, which then indicates the presence of gunpowder
residue. When no such reaction takes place, the result is negative.
The findings and conclusion on the paraffin test that Police
Inspector Chua-Camarao conducted were contained in Physical Science
Report No. C-25-98[63]which yielded a negative result for all the four
accused. Nonetheless, the forensic chemist pointed out that the paraffin
test is merely a corroborative evidence, neither proving nor disproving
that a person did indeed fire a gun. The positive or negative results of
the test can be influenced by certain factors, such as the wearing of
gloves by the subject, perspiration of the hands, wind direction, wind
velocity, humidity, climate conditions, the length of the barrel of the
firearm or the open or closed trigger guard of the firearm.[64]
Appellant Rudy Buduhan testified that at past 10:00 p.m. of 24
July 1998, he and Ginyang went to a beerhouse. Shortly after ordering
their drinks, they heard gunshots, and a person seated near the door
fell. They then ran towards the road.[65] While running, an armed man
wearing a white T-shirt held him, while Ginyang was able to get
away.[66] After a while, the police arrived and they took him to the
Maddela police station where he was jailed along with Robert, Ginyang
and Guinhicna.[67] The rest of his testimony merely corroborated the
testimonies of Robert and Ginyang.
Reynaldo Gumiho (Reynaldo)[68] testified that on the evening
of 24 July 1998, he was in Poblacion, Maddela, Quirino, for a business
Page 5 of 56
transaction involving the sale of a 6x6 truck with a certain alias Boy. At
about 8:00 p.m., Reynaldo and Boy proceeded to a beerhouse in
Maddela. After settling with their drinks, Reynaldo heard a group of five
men near their table who were conversing and he recognized from the
accent of their voices that they were from Lagawe (Ifugao). One of the
men then told him that they should leave after finishing their drinks
because the former were looking for someone who killed their
relative. Reynaldo disclosed that he recognized one of the persons
whom he usually saw in Lagawe, and that the group was composed of
relatively tall people who were mostly wearing jackets. Not long after,
Reynaldo and Boy left the beerhouse so as not to get involved in any
trouble. Two days after he left Maddela, Reynaldo learned of the
shooting incident in the beerhouse.
In a Decision dated 24 July 2003, the trial court found appellants
guilty of the charges, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court
renders judgment as follows:
1) Finding accused Robert and Rudy, both
surnamed Buduhan, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide
(Par. 1 Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code) with
respect to the deceased Larry Erese and sentences each
of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2) As to the victim Romualde Almeron, the court
also finds them GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide (Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code) and
sentences each of them to the indeterminate penalty of
12 years of Prision Mayor as minimum to 20 years of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum;
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However, they shall be entitled to a deduction of

their preventive imprisonment from the term of their
sentences in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6127.
However, on 5 October 2005, we resolved to transfer the case to

the Court of Appeals in view of our ruling in People v. Mateo.[73] The case
was then docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01940.
On 29 December 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
3) To pay jointly the heirs of Larry Erese the

amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000 as
exemplary damages, P18,000 as actual expenses
and P5,000 as temperate damages; and the heirs of Mr.
Almeron: P50,000 as civil indemnity, P25,000 as
exemplary damages, P38,000.00 as actual expenses
and P5,000.00 as temperate damages.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 24,

2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maddela,
Quirino, Branch 38, in Civil Case No. 39-18, is
hereby MODIFIEDonly in that, in addition to the award
already given by the trial court, in consonance with
current jurisprudence, the heirs of ERESE are also
entitled to moral damages of P50,000 and in addition to
the award already given by the trial court, the heirs of
ALMERON are also entitled to moral damages
of P50,000.00.
With costs against them.

However, with respect to accused Boyet
Ginyang, the court ACQUITS him of the offense charged
since the prosecution had failed to overcome, with the
required quantum of evidence, the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Consequently, the Chief of
the BJMP, Cabarroguis, Quirino, is hereby ordered to
immediately release him from confinement unless being
held for some other lawful cause; and to make a report
hereon within three (3) days from receipt hereof.[69]
On 1 August 2003, the appellants

Appeal[70] raising questions of law and facts.
filed
Notice
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Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the 2000

Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 005-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became
effective on October 15, 2004, this judgment of the Court
of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court
of Appeals.[74]
of
On 7 June 2004, the Court initially resolved to accept the appeal,

docketed as G.R. No. 159843,[71] and required the appellants to file their
Brief.[72]
From the Court of Appeals, the case was then elevated to this
Court for automatic review. In a Resolution[75] dated 5 September 2007,
we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if
they so desired, within 30 days from notice.
In a Manifestation[76] filed on 30 October 2007, the People
informed the Court that it will no longer file a supplemental brief, as the
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arguments raised by appellants had already been discussed in the

brief[77] filed before the Court of Appeals.
Appellants, on the other hand, filed their supplemental brief
on 28 November 2007.
As a final plea for their innocence, appellants ask this Court
to consider the following assignment of errors:
Page 7 of 56
To state differently, appellants argue that their guilt was not

proven beyond reasonable doubt in view of the trial courts error in
the appreciation of the evidence for and against them. They fault the
trial courts over-reliance on the testimony of the prosecutions main
witness and its failure to consider the glaring inconsistencies in
Cherry Roses previous accounts of the shooting incident.
The appeal lacks merit.
I.
IN GIVING COMPLETE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF THE PRINCIPAL WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION
DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF FACTS TAINTING THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESS.
II.
IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE APPELLANTS,
WHICH WAS CORROBORATED BY THE FINDINGS OF
THE FORENSIC CHEMIST.
Appellants insist that Cherry Rose is not a credible witness in

view of the conflicting answers she gave in her sworn statement before
the police,[78] in the preliminary investigation of the case and in her
testimony in open court. They contend that the trial court failed to
scrutinize the entirety of the statements made by Cherry Rose vis-vis the shooting incident.
Appellants called attention to the fact that during the
preliminary investigation of the case, Cherry Rose stated that a man
wearing a white Giordano T-shirt shot Larry after Larry handed his
wristwatch.[79] Thereafter, when Cherry Rose was asked whom she saw
wearing a white Giordano T-shirt, she pointed to Boy Guinhicna.[80] With
respect to appellant Robert Buduhan, Cherry Rose identified him as the
one who shot Orlando Pascua.[81]
III.
IN FAILING TO MAKE A DIRECT RULING ON THE
MOTION OF THE ACCUSED TO QUASH THE
INFORMATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARREST OF
THE ACCUSED WITHOUT A WARRANT OF ARREST IS
ILLEGAL AS THERE WAS NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS REGARDING THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
In the testimony of Cherry Rose in open court, however, she

identified appellant Robert as the man who was wearing a white
Giordano T-shirt and who shot Larry Erese.[82]
Also, in Cherry Roses sworn statement before the police, she
narrated that the group of the appellants, consisting of five persons, was
already inside the RML Canteen before the shooting incident
occured.[83] However, in her direct examination, Cherry Rose stated that
appellant Robert had only three other companions.[84]
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Finally, in the preliminary investigation, appellants pointed out

that Cherry Rose unhesitatingly admitted that Larry Erese was her
intimate boyfriend and that was why she embraced him after the latter
was shot.[85]
In her cross-examination, however, Cherry Rose stated that
Larry was only a customer and not her boyfriend.[86] When questioned
about her prior statement about this fact given during the preliminary
investigation, Cherry Rose changed her answer and said that Larry was
indeed her boyfriend.[87]
Taking all these circumstances into account, appellants argue
that, judging from the conflicting statements of Cherry Rose, the
identification of the accused is highly doubtful.
We are not persuaded.
As between statements made during the preliminary
investigation of the case and the testimony of a witness in open court,
the latter deserves more credence. Preliminary investigations are
commonly fairly summary or truncated in nature, being designed simply
for the determination, not of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but of
probable cause prior to the filing of an information in court. It is the
statements of a witness in open court which deserve careful
consideration.[88]
Page 8 of 56
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the

statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the
witness before any question is put to him concerning
them.
The rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid

before introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a witness
is founded upon common sense and is essential to protect the
character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the necessary
inquiries, which enable him to explain the statements referred to
and to show that they were made by mistake, or that there was no
discrepancy between them and his testimony.[89]
In any event, Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on

Evidence, on the matter of inconsistent statements by a witness, is
revealing:
In the present case, the statements made by Cherry Rose

during the preliminary investigation with respect to the identities of
the accused were not related to her during the trial. Indeed, it is only
during the appeal of this case that appellants pointed out the
supposed inconsistencies in Cherry Roses identification of the
appellants in order to destroy her credibility as a witness. No
opportunity was ever afforded her to provide an
explanation. Without such explanation, whether plausible or not, we
are left with no basis to evaluate and assess her credibility, on the
rationale that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a
witness in reconciling her conflicting declarations that she should be
deemed impeached.[90]
Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence

of inconsistent statements. Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
In this regard, what the defense brought to Cherry Roses

attention during the trial were her contradictory statements about
her romantic relationship with Larry Erese. As a result of this
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confrontation, Cherry Rose changed her answer. We rule, however,

that this inconsistency relates only to an insignificant aspect of the
case and does not involve a material fact in dispute.
Inasmuch as the above-stated mandatory procedural
requirements were not complied with, the credibility of Cherry Rose
as a witness stands unimpeached. As found by the trial court, the
testimony of Cherry Rose was straightforward throughout. The
appellants were not able to adduce any reason or motive for her to
bear false witness against them. As a matter of fact, Cherry Rose
testified during cross-examination that she did not personally know
appellant Robert, and that she had first seen him only during the
night when the shooting incident took place.[91]
As the trial judge who penned the assailed decision did not
hear the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution,[92] the rule
granting finality to the factual findings of trial courts does not find
applicability to the instant case.[93]
After a careful review of the entire records of this case, the
Court finds no reason to disagree with the factual findings of the trial
court that all the elements of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
were present and proved in this case.
Robbery with Homicide is penalized under Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,[94] which provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons-Penalties. Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation
of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
Page 9 of 56
homicide shall have been committed, or when the

robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.
To warrant conviction for the crime of robbery with

homicide, one that is primarily classified as a crime against property
and not against persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property with the use
of violence or intimidation against the person; (2) the property thus
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to
gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) on the occasion of the robbery or by
reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a
generic sense, is committed.[95]
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the
felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere
accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide.[96]
The original design must have been robbery; and the
homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the robbery, must
have a direct relation to, or must be perpetrated with a view to
consummate, the robbery. The taking of the property should not be
merely an afterthought, which arose subsequently to the killing.[97]
With respect to the elements of the crime, the following
excerpts from the direct testimony of Cherry Rose clearly illustrates
the same, viz:
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Page 10 of 56
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR FERDINAND D. ORIAS

Q:
At that night of July 24, 1998 at around 10:40 in

the evening, what were you doing at RML
Canteen?
Q:
To whom did Larry Erese gave his wrist watch?
A:
To the Ifugao who poke a gun at him sir.

xxxx
A:
I was entertaining a costumer sir. (nakatable)

Q:
Will you please go around and see if he is inside

the courtroom and point at him?
A:
The witness is pointing to a man [seated] at the

back bench of the court and when asked about
his name he answered Robert Buduhan.
xxxx
Q:
Who was that person who requested you to

entertain him?
A:
Larry Erese sir.

xxxx
Q:
Do you recall if this Larry Erese have a

companions (sic) that time?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Name them?
A:
Abe at Nanding sir.
Q:
That night while you were entertaining them, this

three (3) what transpired next?
A:
An Ifugao approached us sir and he poke a gun at

Larry Erese sir.
Q:
And what did Larry Erese do when a gun was

poke at him?
Q:
What was the attire of Robert Buduhan at that

time?
A:
White T-shirt sir.
Q:
Can you name or can you recall any particular

description of that T-shirt worn by Robert
Buduhan at that time?
xxxx
A:
It was marked with Giordano sir.

xxxx
A:
He gave his wrist watch sir.
Q:
When Robert Buduhan approached Larry Erese

and Larry Erese gave his wrist watch, do you
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
recall if Robert Buduhan have a companions (sic)

at that time?
A:
Q:
A:
Page 11 of 56
A:
They were inside sir.
Q:
The first of the two (2) what is the attire?
A:
Color red sir.
Q:
What about the last one?
A:
He was in blue T-shirt and with black jacket sir.
There was sir.

How many of them?
Four (4) sir.
xxxx
xxxx
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Where are these companions of Robert Buduhan

at the time Robert Buduhan poke a gun at Larry
Erese?
The other one was there to my Manager
[Romualde] Eddie Almeron sir.
Q:
The person in red T-shirt whom you claim the

companion of Robert Buduhan, can you identify
him?
A:
Yes, sir.
What was the attire of this person who

approached Eddie Almeron, your Manager?
xxxx
Q:
Stand and point at him?
A:
Witness pointed one of the accused sitting infront

and when asked about his name he answered
Rudy Buduhan.
He was in blue sir.

xxxx
Q:
He wore blue T-shirt?
A:
Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q:
You mention about a person wearing blue T-shirt

who
approached your
Manager Eddie
Almeron. What did he do first before he
approached your Manager if [any]?
A:
He poke a gun at our Manager sir.
xxxx
Q:
What about the other two (2) companions of

Robert Buduhan where are they?
Law 126 Evidence
Q:
Prof. Avena
What did he tell to you (sic) Manager if any while

poking a gun?
Page 12 of 56
xxxx
Q:
You mentioned a while ago that Robert Buduhan

poke a gun at Larry Erese?
A:
Holdup sir.
Q:
Are they simultaneous in approaching Larry Erese

and Eddie Almeron, this person in blue T-shirt
and the accused Robert Buduhan?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Do you know the caliber of the gun?
A:
No, sir. Robert Buduhan approached first.
A:
It looks like a 38 but it is long sir.
Q:
And then the person in blue T-shirt likewise

approached Eddie Almeron?
Q:
You likewise mention that the person in blue Tshirt poke a gun at Eddie Almeron?
A:
Yes, sir.
A:
Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q:
What about the person in red?
What transpired first before Larry Erese gave his

wrist watch. The announcement of holdup or the
giving of his wrist watch?
A:
It looks like an armalite sir.
Q:
What about the person in blue T-shirt with black

jacket?
A:
Armalite sir.
When Larry Erese gave his watch to Robert

Buduhan with Robert Buduhan poking a gun at
Larry Erese, what transpired next?
Q:
When Rudy Buduhan fired his gun was there any

person who was hit?
A:
They fired sir.
A:
There was sir.
Q:
Who fired?
Q:
Name that person?
A:
All of them sir.
A:
Larry Erese sir.
Q:
A:
Q:
The announcement of the holdup comes first sir.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Page 13 of 56
xxxx
Q:
A:
When the person in blue T-shirt who was poking a

gun at Eddie Almeron fired his gun was there any
person who was hit?
Q:
Do you know what happened to Larry Erese?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Where is he now?
A:
He was dead already sir.
Q:
What about Eddie Almeron. Do you know what

happened to him?
A:
He was also dead sir.[98]
There was sir.
Q:
Who was that person who was hit?
A:
Eddie Almeron sir.

xxxx
Q:
How far is Robert Buduhan from Larry Erese

when Robert Buduhan fired his gun?
A:
He was arms like sir.
Q:
You mention also about a person in blue T-shirt

fired a gun at Eddie Almeron. How far was he
from Eddie Almeron when he fired his gun?
A:
The witness pointed to a place in the courtroom.

xxxx
COURT
About 2 to 3 meters?
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR FERDINAND D. ORIAS
Yes, 2 to 3 meters.
Quite obvious from the foregoing testimony is that the act of

appellant Robert and his companion in blue T-shirt of poking their
guns towards Larry and Romualde, respectively, and the
announcement of a hold-up were what caused Larry to give his
watch to Robert. At this point, there already occurred the taking of
personal property that belonged to another person, which was
committed with violence or intimidation against persons.
Likewise, the intent to gain may already be presumed in this
case. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act, which can
be established through the overt acts of the offender.[99] The
unlawful act of the taking of Larrys watch at gunpoint after the
declaration of a hold-up already speaks well enough for itself. No
other intent may be gleaned from the acts of the appellants group at
that moment other than to divest Larry of his personal property.
The appellants acted in conspiracy in perpetrating the
crimes charged. As found by the trial court, conspiracy was proved
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
by the concurrence of the following facts: that the four men were
together when they entered the RML canteen; that they occupied the
same table; that they were all armed during that time; that while the
robbery was in progress, neither Rudy nor the one in blue T-shirt
with black jacket prevented the robbery or the killing of the victims;
that all four fired their firearms when the robbery was going on and
that they fled all together and were seen running by the police
before they were intercepted just a few meters from the scene of the
crime.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. The same degree of proof necessary to prove the crime is
required to support a finding of criminal conspiracy. Direct proof,
however, is not essential to show conspiracy.[100] Proof of concerted
action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their
unity of design and objective is sufficient.[101]
As the fatal shooting of both Larry Erese and Romualde
Almeron happened on the occasion of the robbery and was
subsequent thereto, both of the appellants must be held liable for the
crime of Robbery with Homicide on two counts.
The defense of appellants of alibi is at best weak when faced
with the positive identification of the appellants by the prosecutions
principal witness. It is elemental that for alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. This means
that the accused must not only prove his presence at another place
at the time of the commission of the offense but he must also
demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime at that time.[102] In the present case, there
was absolutely no claim of any fact that would show that it was well
nigh impossible for appellants to be present at the locus criminis. In
Page 14 of 56
fact, they all testified that they were going towards the vicinity of the
area of the shooting incident when the police apprehended them.
The testimonies of Robert Buduhan and Boyet Ginyang were
also markedly inconsistent on the material date as to when the
witnesses in the shooting incident identified them. Robert Buduhan
testified that the three lady witnesses came to identify them at the
municipal jail on the evening of 26 July 1998.[103] However, in the
direct examination of Boyet Ginyang, he testified that said witnesses
arrived on the morning of 25 July 1998.[104] This fact only tends to
lend suspicion to their already weak alibi.
Appellants likewise cannot rely on the negative findings of
Police Inspector Chua-Camarao on the paraffin tests conducted in
order to exculpate themselves. The said witness herself promptly
stated that paraffin test results are merely corroborative of the
major evidence offered by any party, and they are not conclusive
with respect to the issue of whether or not the subjects did indeed
fire a gun. As previously mentioned, the positive and negative
results of the paraffin test can also be influenced by certain factors
affecting the conditions surrounding the use of the firearm, namely:
the wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration of the hands, wind
direction, wind velocity, humidity, climate conditions, the length of
the barrel of the firearm or the open or closed trigger guard of the
firearm.
Lastly, the persistent claim of appellants of the illegality of
their warrantless arrest, due to the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of the arresting officers, deserves scant consideration. As
aptly stated in People v. Salazar,[105] granting arguendo that
appellants were illegally arrested, such arrest did not invest these
eyewitness accounts with constitutional infirmity as "fruits of the
poisonous tree." Considering that their conviction could be secured
on the strength of the testimonial evidence given in open court,
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
which are not inadmissible in evidence, the court finds no reason to

further belabor the matter.
A determination of the appropriate imposable penalties is
now in order.
The prescribed penalty for Robbery with Homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is reclusion
perpetua to death. In accordance with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, and there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals thus correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As regards the charge for the death of Orlando Pascua and
the injuries sustained by Fernando Pera and Gilbert Cortez, the trial
court aptly held that the prosecution failed to substantiate the
same. No witnesses were presented to testify as to the
circumstances leading to the said incidents, and neither were they
proved to be caused by the criminal actions of the appellants.
The two courts below committed a mistake, however, in
convicting the appellants separately of the crime of Homicide for the
death of Romualde Almeron. It bears stressing that in the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of
the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere
accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide.[106]
Page 15 of 56
As to the award of damages, we hold that the heirs of Larry

Erese and Romualde Almeron are each entitled to the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto. This award for civil
indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.[107]
We agree with the Court of Appeals grant of moral damages
in this case even in the absence of proof for the entitlement to the
same. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish
on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer
sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the
victim of a violent or brutal killing.[108] The heirs of Erese and
Almeron are thus entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 each.
On the award of actual damages, we hold that the heirs of
Larry Erese are entitled to the award of temperate damages
for P25,000.00, in lieu of the lower amount of P18,000 that was
substantiated by a receipt. In People v. Villanueva,[109] we have laid
down the rule that when actual damages proven by receipts during
the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, the award of temperate
damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a
lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven
exceeds P25,000.00, then temperate damages may no longer be
awarded. Actual damages based on the receipts presented during
trial should instead be granted.
However, with respect to the award of the amount
of P38,000.00 to the heirs of Romualde Almeron, the same is
incorrect since the receipt presented therefor covers only the
amount of P26,000.00. The award of actual damages should be
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
reduced accordingly. The grant of temperate damages to the heirs of

Almeron is thus deleted.
Page 16 of 56
5.
The award of exemplary damages is likewise deleted, as the

presence of any aggravating circumstance was neither alleged nor
proved in this case.[110]
Appellants are ordered to indemnify jointly and

severally the heirs of Romualde Almeron as follows:
(a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as
moral damages; and (c) P26,000.00 as actual damages.
6.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated 29

December 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01940
is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
For
reasons
herein
stated,
appellants
are ACQUITTED of the separate crime of Homicide for
the death of Romualde Almeron.
No costs.
1.
2.
3.
4.
For the death of Larry Erese, appellants Robert

Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy Buduhan y Bullan are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with
Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
For the death of Romualde Almeron, appellants Robert
Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy Buduhan y Bullan are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with
Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Appellants shall be entitled to a deduction of their
preventive imprisonment from the term of their
sentences in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6127.
Appellants are ordered to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of Larry Erese as follows:
(a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as
moral damages; and (c) P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena

[1]
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
[2]
[3]
ATTESTATION
[4]
[5]
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Page 17 of 56
Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with Associate

Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
concurring; rollo, pp. 3-13.
Penned by Judge Menrado V. Corpuz; CA rollo, pp. 27-41.
CA rollo, pp. 13-14.
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 73-74.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Section 5 provides the instances
when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 125.
TSN, 14 February 2000.
TSN, 12 April 2000.
Id.
TSN, 23 May 2002.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
TSN, 19 June 2002.

[19]
TSN, 9 July 2002.
[20]
TSN, 23 August 2002.
[21]
TSN, 10 January 2003.
[22]
TSN, 14 February 2000, p. 7.
[23]
Id. at 24.
[24]
Id. at 35.
[25]
Exhibit A for the prosecution.
[26]
[27]
Id. at 11.
[28]
Id. at 12.
[29]
Id. at 9.
[30]
Id. at 11, 39.
[31]
Id. at 14.
[32]
Id. at 17.
[33]
Id. at 17-18.
[34]
TSN, 12 April 2000, pp. 3-16.
[35]
Joint Affidavit of SPO3 Alex M. Gumayagay and SPO1 Leo T.
Saquing, Exhibit M for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 1, p. 15.
[36]
Id. at 4-5.
[37]
Id. at 16.
[38]
Cherry Rose Salazar, Maureen Pasion and Marveloza Lopez.
(TSN, 12 April 2000, p. 15.)
[39]
TSN, 12 April 2000, p. 5.
[40]
TSN, 15 February 2000, pp. 4-5.
[41]
The circumstances of Orlando Pascuas death were not
testified to by any of the witnesses for the prosecution during
the trial. It was during the preliminary investigation of the case
before the sala of the Municipal Circuit Trial Judge Moises M.
Pardo when Maureen Pasion, an employee of the RML Canteen,
narrated how the assailants shot Orlando Pascua. (Records, Vol.
1, pp. 46-49). The prosecution no longer presented said witness.
[42]
[43]
Exhibit D for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 1, p. 59.
[18]
Page 18 of 56
Exhibit F for the Prosecution.

[46]
Exhibit E for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 1, p. 60.
[47]
[48]
Exhibit G for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 1, p. 122.
[49]
[50]
Exhibit I for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 2, p. 339.
[51]
Exhibit J for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 2, p. 340.
[52]
Exhibit K, id. at 341.
[53]
[54]
Id. at 17.
[55]
Exhibit L for the Prosecution.
[56]
[57]
TSN, 23 May 2002, pp. 7-26.
[58]
TSN, 19 June 2002, pp. 8-20.
[59]
TSN, 9 July 2002, pp. 6-12.
[60]
Exhibit 2 for the Defense, CA rollo, p. 92.
[61]
Exhibit 2-A for the Defense, Records, Vol. 2, p. 312.
[62]
Exhibits 2-B, 2-C, 2-D, and 2-E, respectively, Records,
Vol. 2, pp. 313-327.
[63]
Exhibit 1 for the Defense, Records, Vol. 1, p. 310.
[64]
TSN, 9 July 2002, pp. 13-16.
[65]
TSN, 23 August 2002, p. 7.
[66]
TSN, 9 July 2002, pp. 8-9.
[67]
Id. at 10-11.
[68]
TSN, 10 January 2003, pp. 3-10.
[69]
[70]
Id. at 42.
[71]
Id. at 44.
[72]
Id. at 46.
[73]
In the said case, we ruled thus:
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review
by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere,
[44]
[45]
Law 126 Evidence
[74]
[75]
[76]
[77]
[78]
[79]
[80]
[81]
[82]
[83]
[84]
[85]
Prof. Avena
however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to

ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the
Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these
cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated
to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all
possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be
accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts
can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of
Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the
possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals
should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant,
refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire
records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final
disposition. (G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640,
656). (Emphasis ours).
Rollo, pp. 12-13.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19-21.
Exhibit C-C2 for the Prosecution, records, Vol. 1, pp. 10-12.
Minutes of the Preliminary Investigation, records, Vol. 1, p. 43.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
TSN, 14 February 2000, p. 9, 15.
Sworn Statement of Cherry Rose Salazar, Exhibit C-C2 for the
Prosecution, records, Vol. 1, p. 11.
Minutes of the Preliminary Investigation, records, Vol. 1, pp.
43-44.
[86]
[87]

Id. at 30-33.
Page 19 of 56
People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 96469, 21 October 1992, 215

SCRA 22, 28-29.
[89]
People v. de Guzman, 351 Phil. 587, 596 (1998).
[90]
Id. at 596-597.
[91]
TSN, 14 February 2000, pp. 35-36.
[92]
The Honorable Theresa Dela Torre-Yadao heard the
prosecution witnesses testimonies before the Honorable
Menrado V. Corpuz took over and eventually penned the
decision.
[93]
See People v. Navarro, 357 Phil. 1010, 1024 (1998).
[94]
As amended by paragraph 1 of Section 9 of Republic Act No.
7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous
Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, as
Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes).
[95]
People v. Lara, G.R. No. 171449, 23 October 2006, 505 SCRA
137, 154, citing People v. Del Rosario, 411 Phil. 676, 685 (2001).
[96]
People v. Cabbab, Jr., G.R. No. 173479, 12 July 2007, 527 SCRA
589, 604, citing People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 134815, 27 May 2004,
429 SCRA 384, 403.
[97]
People v. Lara, supra note 95, citing People v. Consejero, 404
Phil. 914, 932-933 (2001).
[98]
[99]
People v. Gavina, 332 Phil. 488, 495 (1996).
[100]
People v. Ponce, 395 Phil. 563, 571-572 (2000).
[101]
Id.
[102]
People v. Fuertes, 357 Phil. 603, 612-613 (1998).
[103]
TSN, 23 May 2002, p. 20.
[104]
TSN, 19 June 2002, p. 15.
[105]
342 Phil. 745 (1997).
[106]
People v. Jabiniao, G.R. No. 179499, 30 April 2008.
[107]
People v. Opuran, 469 Phil. 698, 720 (2004).
[108]
People v. Piedad, 441 Phil. 818, 839 (2002), cited in People v.
Rubiso, 447 Phil. 374, 383 (2003).
[109]
456 Phil. 14, 29 (2003).
[88]
Law 126 Evidence

[110]
Prof. Avena
Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as
a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to
the offended party.
Page 20 of 56
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
27. EXCLUSION/SEPARATION OF WITNESSES
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 193966
February 19, 2014
DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL INC. and KENNETH

SY, Petitioners,
vs.
LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Design Sources
International, Inc. and Kenneth Sy (petitioners) under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Petition assails the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision2dated 1 June 2010 and Resolution3 dated 30 September
2010 in CA G.R. SP No. 98763. The assailed Decision and Resolution
sustained the Orders dated 8 February 2006, 1 June 2006 and 26
February 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in
Civil Case No. 00-850.
Considering that there are no factual issues in this case, we adopt the
findings of fact of the CA, as follows:
Page 21 of 56
bought the said brand of flooring of the "Cherry Blocked" type from the
Petitioner Corporation. The flooring was installed in her house.
On February 24, 2000, the Private Respondent discovered that the Pergo
flooring installed had unsightly bulges at the joints and seams. The
Private Respondent informed the Petitioners of these defects and the
former insisted on the repair or replacement of the flooring at the
expense of the latter.
After several inspections of the alleged defective flooring, meetings
between the parties and exchanges of correspondence, the Petitioner
Corporation was given until May 31, 2000 to replace the installed
flooring. Nevertheless, on the deadline, the Petitioner Corporation did
not comply with the demand of the Private Respondent. A complaint for
damages, docketed as Civil Case No.00-850, was thus filed by the Private
Respondent before the RTC on July 13, 2000.
On February 8, 2006, Kenneth Sy, one of the Petitioners' witnesses,
testified in open court. Immediately after his testimony, the following
occurred as evidenced by the transcript of stenographic notes ("TSN"):
COURT : (To Atty. Posadas) Who will be your next witness?
ATTY. POSADAS : Your honor, my next witness will be Stephen Sy, also of
Design Source.
ATTY FORTUN : Your honor, may I know if Mr. Stephen Sy around [sic]
the courtroom?
ATTY. POSADAS : (Pointing to the said witness) He is here.
ATTY. FORTUN : So the witness is actually inside the Courtroom.
Design Sources International, Inc. ("Petitioner Corporation") is a

distributor of Pergo flooring. Sometime in 1998, the Private Respondent
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
ATTY. POSADAS : But, your honor, please, I was asking about it, nahiya
lang ako kay Atty. Fortun.
ATTY. FORTUN : But I was [sic] asked of the exclusion of the witness.
Page 22 of 56
said intended witness while Mr. Kenneth Sy was testifying. There being
no objection thereto on the part of Atty. Fortun, reset the continuation of
the presentation of defendant's evidence to April 5, 2006 at 8:30 o'clock
in the morning.
COURT : (To Atty. Posadas) You shall [sic] have to tell the Court of your
ready witness.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.4
ATTY. FORTUN : He already heard the whole testimony of his colleague.

ATTY. POSADAS : I'm sorry, your honor.
COURT : All right. When were [sic] you present him, today or next time.
ATTY. POSADAS : Next time, your honor.
COURT : All right. Next time, Atty. Posadas, if you have other witnesses
present in Court inform us.
ATTY. FORTUN : No, your honor, in fact I will object to the presentation
of Mr. Stephen Sy, because his [sic] here all the time when the witness
was in [sic] cross-examined.
On 22 March 2006, petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order,

but their motion was denied by the RTC on 1 June 2006 on the ground
that "the Court deems it no longer necessary to allow Stephen Sy from
testifying [sic] when a different witness could testify on matters similar
to the intended testimony of the former."5 The Order also stated that "to
allow Stephen Sy from testifying [sic] would work to the disadvantage of
the plaintiff as he already heard the testimony of witness Kenneth Sy."6
Petitioners filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration (with Leave of
Court) dated 19 June 2006, which was likewise denied by the RTC in the
assailed Order dated 26 February 2007.7
ATTY. POSADAS : Your honor, I will just preserve [sic] my right to

present another witness on the technical aspect of this case.
Petitioners sought recourse before the CA by way of a Petition for

Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They raised the sole issue
of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused
to allow architect Stephen Sy (Stephen) to testify as to material matters.8
COURT : Okay. All right. Order. After the completion of the testimony of
defendant's second witness in the person of Mr. Kenneth Sy, [A]tty.
Benjamin Posadas, counsel for the defendants, moved for continuance
considering that he is not feeling well and that he needs time to secure
another witness to testify on the technical aspect, because of the
objection on the part of plaintiff's counsel Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun on
his plan of presenting of Mr. Stephen Sy as their next witness due to his
failure to inform the Court and the said counsel of the presence of the
At the outset, the CA found no sufficient basis that herein respondent

previously asked for the exclusion of other witnesses. It was the duty of
respondents counsel to ask for the exclusion of other witnesses, without
which, there was nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the testimony
of petitioners other witnesses. Nevertheless, following the doctrine laid
down in People v. Sandal (Sandal),9 the appellate court ruled that the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Orders considering that petitioners failed to show that Stephens
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Prof. Avena
testimony would bolster their position. Moreover, from the

Manifestation of petitioners counsel, it appears that petitioners had
another witness who could give a testimony similar to Stephens.
Petitioners elevated the case before us assailing the Decision of the CA.
In the meantime, trial proceeded in the lower court. On 11 February
2014, they filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order either to allow
the presentation of Stephen as a witness or to suspend the trial
proceedings pending the ruling in the instant Petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Petitioners raise the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:
Finding that the preclusion of Stephen Sy from testifying as a witness in
the trial of the case did not amount to grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Judge Pozon.
Applying the case of People vs. Sandal in justifying the order of exclusion
issued by Judge Pozon, precluding Stephen Sy from testifying as witness.
Concluding that the petitioners had another witness that could have
given a similar testimony as that of Stephen Sy.10
THE COURTS RULING
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit.
The principal issue is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Orders disallowing petitioners from
presenting Stephen as their witness.
Page 23 of 56
The controversy arose from the objection of respondents counsel to the

presentation of Stephen as petitioners witness considering that Stephen
was already inside the courtroom during the presentation of witness
Kenneth Sy (Kenneth). However, as aptly found by the CA, respondent
failed to substantiate her claim that there was a prior request for the
exclusion of other witnesses during the presentation of Kenneth.
Respondent did not even allege in her Comment11 that there was any
such request.
Section 15, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On any trial or hearing,
the judge may exclude from the court any witness not at the time under
examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses.
The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be
prevented from conversing with one another until all shall have been
examined.
Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time another
witness is testifying, or ordering that these witnesses be kept separate
from one another, is primarily to prevent them from conversing with
one another. The purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify to the
truth by preventing them from being influenced by the testimonies of
the others. In other words, this measure is meant to prevent connivance
or collusion among witnesses. The efficacy of excluding or separating
witnesses has long been recognized as a means of discouraging
fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. However, without any motion
from the opposing party or order from the court, there is nothing in the
rules that prohibits a witness from hearing the testimonies of other
witnesses.
There is nothing in the records of this case that would show that there
was an order of exclusion from the RTC, or that there was any motion
from respondents counsel to exclude other witnesses from the
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Prof. Avena
courtroom prior to or even during the presentation of the testimony of

Kenneth. We are one with the CA in finding that under such
circumstances, there was nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the
testimony of Kenneth. Therefore, the RTC should have allowed Stephen
to testify for petitioners.
The RTC and the CA, however, moved on to determine the materiality of
the testimony of Stephen, which became their basis for not allowing the
latter to testify.1wphi1 Applying Sandal, the CA ruled that the absence
of a showing of how his testimony would bolster the position of
petitioners saved the judgment of the RTC in issuing the order of
exclusion.
We agree with petitioners that the application of Sandal is misplaced.
Contrary to the present case, in Sandal there was a court order for
exclusion which was disregarded by the witness. The defiance of the
order led to the exercise by the court of its discretion to admit or reject
the testimony of the witness who had defied its order. Again, in this case,
there was no order or motion for exclusion that was defied by
petitioners and their witnesses. Thus, the determination of the
materiality of Stephen's testimony in relation to the strengthening of
petitioners' defense was uncalled for.
Page 24 of 56
Respondent is bound by the acts of her counsel, including mistakes in

the realm of procedural techniques.12 The exception to the said rule does
not apply herein, considering that there is no showing that she was
thereby deprived of due process. At any rate, respondent is not without
recourse even if the court allows the presentation of the testimony of
Stephen, considering the availability of remedies during or after the
presentation of witnesses, including but not limited to the impeachment
of testimonies.
Therefore, this Court finds that the R TC committed grave abuse of
discretion in not allowing Stephen to testify notwithstanding the
absence of any order for exclusion of other witnesses during the
presentation of Kenneth's testimony.
In view thereof, the RTC is hereby ordered to allow the presentation of
Stephen Sy as witness for petitioners. Accordingly, petitioners' Motion
for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order is now rendered moot.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of
the parties, a court cannot simply allow or disallow the presentation of a
witness solely on the ground that the latter heard the testimony of
another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's counsel to
protect the interest of his client during the presentation of other
witnesses. If respondent actually believed that the testimony of Kenneth
would greatly affect that of Stephen's, then respondent's counsel was
clearly remiss in his duty to protect the interest of his client when he did
not raise the issue of the exclusion of the witness in a timely manner.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
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Prof. Avena
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
Id. at 87-102.
54 Phil. 883 (1930).
Page 25 of 56
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 2-22.
Id. at 27-34; penned by Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino and

concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
2
Id. at 35.
Rollo, pp. 27-29; CA Decision.
Id. at 78; RTC Order dated 1 June 2006.
Id.
Id. at 86; RTC Order dated 26 February 2007.
10
Rollo, p. 9.
11
Id. at 140-152.
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court c!/Appeals, 430

Phil. 812 (2002).
12
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Prof. Avena
28. REFERENCE TO MEMORANDUM

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 28208
September 3, 1928
GREGORIO FIGUERAS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMEON SERRANO, as administrator of the Estate of Leandro
Serrano, defendant-appellant.
Abad Santos, Camus, Delgado and Recto, Jesus O. Serrano and Bernardino
Quitoriano for appellant.
Julio Borbon for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This is an action to collect the balance of professional fees, for medical
services amounting to P52,229, with P7,310 interest, plus P5,000
damages, and the costs of the action.
Besides filing a general denial and a special defense, the defendant sets
up two counterclaims: One for P10,000 damages on account of the
plaintiff's having prevented the partition of the estate of the deceased
Leandro Serrano among his heirs, by means of a groundless,
unreasonable claim of fees; and another for P200,000 damages also, on
the ground that Primitiva Serrano lost her eyesight completely, due to
lack of diligence and precaution on the plaintiff's part in not having given
Page 26 of 56
her proper treatment, in consequence of which the patient suffered

hardships and moral depression.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur which tried the
case, reads as follows:
The plaintiff acquiesced in this decision, but not so the defendant, who
appeals assigning the following errors as committed by the trial court:
1. In not dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, there
being no evidence that the appellee's appeal from the decision of
the committee of claims of the testate proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Leandro Serrano, was
taken within the legal period.
2. In admitting as evidence for the appellee, Exhibits C, H, I, J, K
and N, and in not finding that these exhibits are false and
apocryphal.
3. In holding that the appellee and the deceased Leandro Serrano
agreed that said appellee would be entitled to charge P4 for each
of the 27 kilometers between Vigan and Cabugao, for the services
he would render Primitiva Serrano.
4. In admitting as evidence Exhibits Q and R, A, B, E, F, G, L, M, O,
P, S, T, U, W, W-1, W-2, X, Y, Z, Z-1, Z-2, CC, DD, and EE, presented
by the appellee.
5. In finding that the appellee made 134 medical visits to
Primitiva Serrano in Cabugao, and 195 in Vigan, and that during
these 195 visits the appellee gave Primitiva Serrano 161
electrical treatments, 120 intramuscular injections, 132
treatments and 192 treatments of both eyes.
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Prof. Avena
6. In not finding that the appellee made no more than 26 medical

visits in Cabugao and 90 visits in Vigan, and that on commencing
the treatment of Primitiva Serrano, said appellee agreed to
charge P20 for each visit in Cabugao and P2 for each visit in
Vigan when the patient was brought to the latter municipality.
Page 27 of 56
7. In holding that, besides the medical service rendered to

Primitiva Serrano by the appellee, he treated Leandro Serrano
also, having made 126 visits in Cabugao.
Leandro Serrano. The defendant assails the authenticity of this letter and
the signature at the bottom thereof. Indeed, we notice as to the context
that the typewritten characters therein are very similar to those of
Exhibit 2. (p. 184 of the record) which is a letter written by the plaintiff's
brother. The difference we observe in the typewriting of these
documents consists in that in Exhibit C the type is more worn, thus
suggesting the fact that it was written later. The prior date appearing in
it does not preclude this conclusion, for any date, past or future, may at a
given time be written on any document.
8. In holding that the reasonable price of the electrical

treatments, injections and eye treatments is P15 for each
treatment, P5 for each injection, and P2 for each eye treatment.
A careful examination of Exhibit C reveals some details which bear out

the presumption that it was written on the same typewriter as document
Exhibit 2.
9. In ordering appellant to pay appellee P19,144 with interest

and the costs of the action when it should have held the
appellee's fee are already fully paid.
And the changes and erasures which have not been satisfactory
explained, likewise argue against the admissibility of this exhibit.
10. In not holding upholding appellant's counterclaim and in not

ordering the appellee to pay the sum claimed therein.
According to the complaint, the services for which compensation is here
claimed consist in medical attendance during the years 1919, 1920, and
1921, on Primitiva Serrano as well as on her father Leandro Serrano, for
which purpose the plaintiff, who at that time lived in Vigan, had to make
many trips to the town of Cabugao, 27 kilometers distant from where
said patients lived. Leandro Serrano is now dead, and the complaint here
is directed against his estate, represented by the defendant
administrator. It is also alleged therein that Leandro Serrano promised
to pay for plaintiff's trip to the town of Cabugao at the rate of P4 per
kilometer.
The principal evidence adduced to prove this promise is the letter
Exhibit C which is alleged to be addressed to the plaintiff and signed by
The remarkable resemblance almost identical, in point of size and

contour, between the signature in Exhibit C and the one in Exhibit J, as
may be clearly seen by placing one upon the other, casts serious doubts
on its genuineness. It seems hardly probable that Leandro Serrano
should have been able to write two signatures so exactly alike, not only
in the curvature at the base of the letters, and in the form of the small as
well as the capital letters, but also in the distance between them, the
space they occupy, and the slant of the strokes of the whole signature as
well as of each letter thereof, and even in the length, contour, and other
details of the paraph.
As these details strongly indicate that Exhibit C is not genuine, we cannot
consider it as reliable proof in this case. The burden of proof was on
plaintiff to show, at least by a preponderance of evidence, that this
document was admissible evidence of record, and, in this case the
preponderance militates against the document.
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Prof. Avena
It cannot be held proven, therefore, that Leandro Serrano promised to

pay the plaintiff P4 for every kilometer of his trips to Cabugao on his
medical visits.
The preponderance of admissible evidence of record is to the effect that
the cost of each of such visits to Cabugao is about P25. Considering
plaintiff's social standing, he was entitled to use an automobile as the
most adequate mode of transportation.
Exhibits Q and R are objected to by the defendant as not duly identified
and as incompetent evidence. It is true that the witnesses Parto and
Florendo testified that they recognized the writing in said notebooks as
plaintiff's, but there is no proof that the notes in these exhibits were
written with the knowledge and consent, or even in the presence, of
Leandro Serrano. Neither does it appear that such notes were made at
the time of the visits and professional services referred to therein, or
that they were written about that time. And the appearance of the
writing in these books (Exhibit Q and R ) does not show that such notes
were made therein on different occasions and at different periods of
time, considering the noticeable uniformity of the handwriting and of the
color of the ink used (in Exhibit Q), in almost all the entries,
notwithstanding the fact that these entries cover a period of over one
year.
It is absolutely necessary for the admission of such entries to prove that
they were made at or about the time of the transaction to which they
relate. Once this is proven they may be admitted to corroborate the
testimony of the person who made them.
Written memoranda made at or about the time of the transaction
to which they relate are sometimes admitted in evidence to
corroborate the testimony of the person by whom they were
made. (22 C.J., 869.)
Page 28 of 56
But the fact is that Exhibits Q and R not only do not meet the
requirement as to being contemporaneous, but it appears that the
plaintiff who made the memoranda noted therein did not even testify
concerning them.
These exhibits cannot, therefore, be taken into consideration to
determine the number of visits made by the plaintiff nor that of the
times he rendered professional services.
The appellee alleges that said entries are corroborated by the witness
Florendo, Formoso, Figueras and Arcebal, the first three of whom,
chauffeurs who successively took the plaintiff to Cabugao, among
themselves fixed the total number of trips to Cabugao at about one
hundred, and Arcebal testified that at the time in question, he saw the
plaintiff stop in front of the municipal building of Cabugao two or three
times a week, going in the direction of Leandro Serrano's house. The
number of times testified to by these witnesses, is, as it could not
otherwise be as inferred from their own testimony, mere conjecture,
without sufficient assurance of approximation, much less exactness.
What these witnesses definitely established and wherein they
corroborate the notebooks Exhibits Q and R, is that the plaintiff made
trips to Cabugao, a fact admitted by the defendant. But as to the number
of said trips, which is the point in question, the testimony of these
witnesses, with all its uncertainty on this point, cannot be considered as
either direct or corroborative evidence.
We therefore find that the plaintiff's evidence does not supply data
legally competent to ascertain the number of times he was in Cabugao to
render professional services to Primitiva Serrano.
According to the defendant's evidence consisting of Exhibits 6, 7, 9 and
10, identified by Pedro Suero and Simeon Serrano, the plaintiff made
twenty-six medical visits to Primitiva Serrano in Cabugao, and ninety in
Vigan. Not only are these Exhibits 6, 7, 9 and 10, identified, but it appears
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Prof. Avena
Page 29 of 56
from the testimony of Pedro Suero, that he, as former clerk to Leandro
Serrano, was enjoined to note down in Exhibits 6 and 7, which are
Bristol Almanacs for the years 1919 and 1920, the name of Gregorio
Figueras, whenever said physician paid a professional visit to Primitiva
Serrano in Cabugao that he used to record plaintiff's medical visits to
witness' sister, Primitiva Serrano, in Vigan, in the almanacs Exhibits 9
and 10 with the initial G and the letters "a.m." or "p.m." according as they
were made in the morning or afternoon.
proceeded to hear this case on appeal from the committee on claims, it

must be presumed that in doing so, taking judicial notice of the legality
of the appeal, it acted in the performance of its duty, and within the
scope of its jurisdiction. (Sec. 334, Nos. 14 and 15, Code of Civil
Procedure.) And this presumption not having been rebutted by evidence
to the contrary, it sufficiently proves the allegation in the first paragraph
of the complaint relative to the perfection of the present appeal from the
committee on claims.
Unlike the entries in Exhibits Q and R, those of Exhibits 6, 7, 9 and 10, are
competent evidence, because, in addition to being sufficiently identified
by the persons who made them at the time of the visits, their
appearance, details, and the fact that they were made at the time of the
visits so recorded, render them competent corroborative evidence under
the rule above quoted from Corpus Juris (22 C.J., 896) and in accordance
with the provision of section 279 of our present Code of Civil Procedure.
We agree with the court a quo that the defendant's counterclaims have
been sufficiently proven.
Consequently we conclude that the number of visits proven in these

proceedings is 26 in Cabugao and 90 in Vigan, and that the evidence
shows that the plaintiff is entitled to receive P25 for each visit to
Primitiva Serrano in Cabugao and P2 for each visit to her in Vigan, or a
sum total of P830, as professional fees. It has not been sufficiently
proven that these amounts do not include the fees for the treatment
given on such visits, nor that the reasonable price of electrical
treatments, injections and eye treatments (which in themselves are not
sufficiently established) is P15 for each electrical treatment, P5 for each
injection, and P2 for each eye treatment.
It does not appear sufficiently established that the plaintiff rendered
medical service to Leandro Serrano.
With regard to the appellant's allegation of lack of jurisdiction, the lower
court could take judicial notice of the administration proceedings in
which the estate was represented by the defendant and when that court
Having rendered our decision on the determining points of the case, we

deem it unnecessary for the purposes of this decision to take up the
other assignments of error in detail.
It appearing that the plaintiff admitted, and that the trial judge so held
without any objection from said plaintiff, that the latter has already been
paid the sum of P1,025 on account of the fees here in question, and as
the sum of P830 as above stated to which he is thus entitled is less than
that, said fees have already been amply satisfied.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, and defendant is
absolved from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
The issue in this case is the reasonable value of the professional services
performed by Dr. Gregorio Figueras for Leandro Serrano. The issue is
not as to whether Dr. Gregorio Figueras is criminally guilty of fabricating
the much discussed Exhibit C. With or without Exhibit C, there is
sufficient evidence, including the physician's book of account, which
establishes satisfactory the approximate number of visits made by
Doctor Figueras to Mr. Serrano and the proper amount for each visit. (30
Cyc., 1603.) The total demanded by Doctor Figueras of the estate of Mr.
Serrano coming to over P60,000 is grossly exaggerated. Even the sum of
P19,144 granted by trial judge is too high. Yet there is no need to be so
carried away by an enthusiastic desire to condemn unethical and
unprofessional practices in making evidence to establish claims when no
such evidence is necessary, as to throw out the action entirely and
concede nothing to Doctor Figueras. Figuring on a basis of
approximately two hundred visits to Cabugao, the home of the deceased,
at P20 a visit and nearly the same number of consultation at the office of
the physician at P2 a consultation, and adding a reasonable sum for
special service and treatments, and taking into consideration the
professional standing of Doctor Figueras, it is my opinion that the
physician should be allowed P5,000 for his services. That is my vote and
to that extent I dissent.
Page 30 of 56
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Prof. Avena

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
Page 31 of 56
near a coconut tree around six brazas away. Then, she heard another
volley of shots. She saw Florencio Odencio (Poren), also holding a gun
near another coconut tree around ten meters away in the yard of the
house of her neighbor, Daongan Karaing. She noticed that Kadir Oranen,
who was nearby, had fallen to the ground around three arms' length
from Daongan's house. Kadir died instantly.
G.R. No. L-31961 January 9, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO ODENCIO and GUIAMELON MAMA, accused-appellants.
Manuel P. Calanog for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
Florencio Odencio and Guiamelon Mama appealed from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of North Cotabato, finding them guilty of two
separate crimes of murder, sentencing each of them to two reclusion
perpetuas, and ordering them to pay P12,000 to the heirs of Prowa Talib
and P12,000 to the heirs of Kadir Oranen (Criminal Case No. 5276).
According to the prosecution, at about seven o'clock in the evening of
June 29, 1968, while Prowa Talib (Palua Talib), a forty-year old farmer,
was in the yard of his house located at Barrio Simsiman, Pigcawayan,
North Cotabato, handing a pot of rice to his wife, Setie Mamalintao, who
was near the stairs, he was felled down by a volley of shots.
Setie rushed to the aid of her husband. When she looked in the direction
where the gunshots emanated, she saw Guiamelon Mama holding a gun
Setie had known for a long time Florencio and Guiamelon who were
friends and neighbors also residing in Barrio Simsiman. Setie and
Guiamelon had cultivated adjacent farmlands.
While Setie was comforting her husband, he allegedly told her that he
was going to die. He directed her to remember what had happened to
him and that they had seen Guiamelon Mama and Poren armed with
guns. Prior to that shooting incident, Prowa Talib had reported to the
barrio captain that Florencio Odencio had stolen his lumber.
The two assailants fled westward. At the time the incident occurred,
Japal Rongot was on his way to Talib's house. He encountered Guiamelon
and Joseph Odencio with both of whom he was well acquainted. He
asked Guiamelon why there were gunshots but the latter did not make
any reply. Upon reaching Talib's house, Rongot saw Setie crying and
holding Talib on her lap. Setie told him that Talib was shot by Guiamelon
and she pointed to him Oranen's corpse which was about two arms'
length from Talib.
Ngelam Towa (Nilan Tuwa), another neighbor and the uncle of Setie
heard, the gunshots on the occasion in question. He hastened to Talib's
house. Setie told him that Guiamelon Mama had shot Talib. She advised
her uncle not to use his flashlight because Guiamelon was still in the
vicinity. Setie also told Towa that Florencio Odencio had shot Oranen.
Towa left Talib's house in order to get assistance from his father-in-law.
While crossing the trail his flashlight focussed on Florencio Odencio with
two companions leaving the scene of the crime.
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Prof. Avena
Policemen arrived at Talib's house. Setie informed them that Guiamelon

was the gunwielder. They brought Talib to a medical clinic where he was
interrogated by Patrolman Joaquin Saada Talib told Saada that his
assailants were Guiamelon, Florencio Odencio and Florencio's father,
Joseph Odencio. Due to the critical condition of Talib(nagaagonto), he
was not able to sign his dying declaration (Exh. B) as taken down by
Patrolman Saada Talib was brought to the hospital. He died on the
following day.
In that unsigned antemortem declaration, Talib revealed that Florencio
Odencio suspected that he and Oranen had masterminded the theft of
Joseph Odencio's two carabaos, and that, on the other hand, Guiamelon
suspected Talib of having stolen the carabao of Damiog, the father-in-law
of Guiamelon. It was stated further in the same dying declaration that
Talib had told Patrolman Saada that he wanted to sign it but that he
could not do so because of the wound in his arm. Talib also articulated
his belief that he was going to die because he could hardly breathe and
his wound was painful.
On July 1, 1968 or within forty-eight hours after taking Talib's unsigned
antemortem statement, Saada executed an affidavit reciting the
circumstances surrounding the taking thereof. Saada testified in court
on Talib's dying declaration.
The autopsy disclosed that Talib sustained eight gunshot wounds in the
back or posterior chest wall. No autopsy was performed on the body of
Oranen who, as noted above, died at the scene of the crime.
On July 1, 1968, a complaint for double murder was filed in the
municipal court against Guiamelon, Florencio Odencio, Joseph Odencio
and Angelico Aposaga, Poren's father-in-law. They waived the second
stage of the preliminary investigation. On September 19, 1968, an
information was filed in the Court of First Instance against Guiamelon
Page 32 of 56
Florencio Odencio and Joseph Odencio, The trial court acquitted Joseph
and convicted only Florencio and Guiamelon.
In his defense, Florencio, a thirty-two year-old farmer, denied that he
shot Talib and that he had a misunderstanding with Oranen and Talib
with both of whom he was acquainted. Florencio testified that he was in
his house when the shooting occurred. He was arrested on the following
day, June 30, 1968. He surmised that he was implicated in the case
because he did not support Mayor Doruelo, the incumbent mayor, and,
instead, he voted for Estaol, the candidate of the Liberal Party.
Florencio's alibi was corroborated by his wife and his brother-in-law,
Antonio Cesar.
The other accused, Guiamelon Mama, a thirty-year-old farmer, adopted
the same line of defense. He declared that he was also in his house when
Talib was shot; that he had no misunderstanding with Talib, who is his
father's brother-in-law, being the brother of his stepmother, his father's
second wife; that he was arrested while he was attending Talib's funeral,
and that he came to know his co-accused Florencio Odencio only in jail.
The accused presented Samuel Jubilan, a Constabularly Sergeant, who
testified that he was present when Patrolman Saada interrogated Talib
and that the latter declared that he was not able to recognize his
assailant because it was dark. Saada said he did not know of that
interrogation made by Jubilan.
In disbelieving the alibis of Florencio and Guiamelon, the trial court
observed that the accused were indubitably Identified as the assailants
in Talib's dying declarations to his wife and Patrolman Saada. Setie
Mamalintao in her statement to the police declared that she was able to
recognize Florencio and Guiamelon because there was a "big torch" in
front of her house and Karaing's house (No. 19, Exh. 1, p. 11, Record).
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
The trial court noted that there "was a good amount of lighting in the
yard of Prowa Talib because he was preparing" supper when he was
shot and that Setie was able to recognize the accused because she had
been acquainted with them for a long time. As stated above, two
witnesses saw the accused in the vicinity of Talib's house shortly after
the shooting. Therefore, the contention of appellants' counsel de oficio
that they had not been sufficiently Identified as the killers cannot be
sustained.
Another contention of counsel de oficio is that the trial court erred in
finding that Guiamelon and Odencio conspired to kill Talib and Oranen.
That contention is belied by the evidence. Guiamelon and Odencio were
seen pacing back and forth near Talib's house on the day of the incident
(No. 27, Exh. 1). They shot the two victims in the same place and almost
simultaneously, thus showing a coordination of efforts and community
of design.
On leaving the scene of the crime, they proceeded in the same direction
(westward). They were animated by the same motive, which was to
liquidate the victims because the latter allegedly stole the carabaos of
the relatives of the accused. The record does not disclose any reason
why Setie Mamalintao and Patrolman Saada would frame up the
appellants.
The manner in which they shot the victims shows treachery. The
shooting was not the product of momentary impulse. There
was alevosia because the two malefactors, taking advantage of the cover
of night, stationed themselves in a place where they could shoot the
victims with impunity without any risk to themselves or without
exposing themselves to any retaliation since the victims did not expect
to be assaulted at that time and place.
Appellants' counsel further contends that they were convicted on the
basis of the wife's uncorroborated testimony "which is open to suspicion
Page 33 of 56
due to inherent improbabilities'' and "motives to falsify the truth". That

contention is not correct. Talib's antemortem statement fortifies the
testimony of his widow, an eyewitness. We have stressed that two other
witnesses saw the appellants leaving the scene of the crime.
Moreover, Talib's dying declaration was sufficiently proven. The rule is
that a dying declaration may be oral or written If oral, the witness, who
heard it, may testify thereto without the necessity, of course, of
reproducing exactly the words of the decedent, if he is able to give the
substance thereof. An unsigned dying declaration may be used as a
memorandum by the witness who took it down. (See 5 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 315-316.)
We are satisfied that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. As they were co-conspirators, they are each liable for
the two murders. There being no modifying circumstances concomitant
with the commission of the two assassinations, the trial court properly
penalized each murder with reclusion perpetua(Arts. 64[1] and 248,
Revised Penal Code).
The trial court's judgment is affirmed with the sole modification that the
two appellants should be held solidarityliable for the two indemnities of
P12,000 each. In the service of the two reclusion perpetuas, the fortyyear limit fixed in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be
observed. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ.,
concur.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
29. PART OF TRANSACTION
Page 34 of 56
The pertinent facts are as follows:5

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC), and sureties

Marcelo N. Naval (Naval) and Crispin I. Oben (Oben) are the defendants
in a collection suit initiated by Export and Industry Bank (EIB) through a
Complaint6dated February 9, 2005, and currently pending proceedings
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Makati City7.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204700
April 10, 2013
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL

and CRISPIN I. OBEN, Petitioners,
vs.
CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
All documents mentioned in a Deed of Assignment transferring the
credit of the plaintiff in a pending litigation should be accessible to the
defendant through a Motion for Production or Inspection of Documents
under Rule 27 o(the Rules of Court. Litigation is not a game of skills and
stratagems. It is a social process that should allow both parties to fully
and fairly access the truth of the matters in litigation.
Before this Court is a Petition under Rule 45, seeking to review the
August 29, 20121 and November 27, 20122Resolutions of the Third
Division of the Court of Appeals. The Resolutions dismissed petitioners'
Rule 65 Petition and affirmed the Resolutions dated March 28,
20123 and May 28, 20124 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati
City denying petitioners' motion for production/inspection.
By virtue of a Deed of Assignment8 dated August 9, 2006, EIB transferred

EDC's outstanding loan obligations ofP10,232,998.00 to respondent
Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (Cameron), a special
purpose vehicle, thus:
For value received and pursuant to the (a) Loan Sale and Purchase
Agreement dated as of 7 April 2006 (the "LSPA"), made and executed by
Export and Industry Bank, as Seller ("Seller"), and by Cameron Granville
Asset Management (SPV-AMC), Inc. (the "Purchaser"), and (b) the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated 9 August 2006 (the "Deed") made and executed
by and between Seller and Purchaser, Seller hereby absolutely sells,
assigns and conveys to Purchaser, on a "without recourse" basis, all of its
rights, title and interests in the following Loan:
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION with an outstanding loan
obligation of Php 10,232,998.00 covered by an unregistered Deed of
Assignment of Receivables.
xxx xxx xxx
Defined terms used but not otherwise defined herein have the meaning
given to them in the LSPA.9
Thereafter, Cameron filed its Motion to Substitute/Join EIB dated
November 24, 2006, which was granted by the trial court.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
On February 22, 2012, petitioners filed a Motion for

Production/Inspection10 of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement
(LSPA) dated April 7, 2006 referred to in the Deed of Assignment.
Respondent Cameron filed its Comment11 dated March 14, 2012 alleging
that petitioners have not shown "good cause" for the production of the
LSPA and that the same is allegedly irrelevant to the case a quo.
In response, petitioners filed on March 26, 2012 their
Reply.12 Petitioners explained that the production of the LSPA was for
"good cause". They pointed out that the claim of Cameron is based on an
obligation purchased after litigation had already been instituted in
relation to it. They claimed that pursuant to Article 1634 of the New Civil
Code13 on assignment of credit, the obligation subject of the case a quo is
a credit in litigation, which may be extinguished by reimbursing the
assignee of the price paid therefor, the judicial costs incurred and the
interest of the price from the day on which the same was paid. Article
1634 provides:
When a credit or other incorporeal right in litigation is sold, the debtor
shall have a right to extinguish it by reimbursing the assignee for the
price the latter paid therefor, the judicial costs incurred by him, and the
interest on the price from the day on which the same was paid.
As petitioners' alleged loan obligations may be reimbursed up to the
extent of the amount paid by Cameron in the acquisition thereof, it
becomes necessary to verify the amount of the consideration from the
LSPA, considering that the Deed of Assignment was silent on this matter.
In its Resolution14 dated March 28, 2012, the trial court denied
petitioners' motion for production for being utterly devoid of merit. It
ruled that there was failure to show "good cause" for the production of
the LSPA and failure to show that the LSPA is material or contains
evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action.
Page 35 of 56
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on April 25, 2012, their Motion for

Reconsideration.15 They argued that the application of Article 1634 of
the Civil Code is sanctioned by Section 12, Article III of Republic Act No.
9182, otherwise known as the Special Purpose Vehicle Law (SPV Law).
Section 12 provides:
SECTION 12. Notice and Manner of Transfer of Assets. (a) No transfer
of NPLs to an SPV shall take effect unless the FI concerned shall give
prior notice, pursuant to the Rules of Court, thereof to the borrowers of
the NPLs and all persons holding prior encumbrances upon the assets
mortgaged or pledged. Such notice shall be in writing to the borrower by
registered mail at their last known address on file with the FI. The
borrower and the FI shall be given a period of at most ninety (90) days
upon receipt of notice, pursuant to the Rules of Court, to restructure or
renegotiate the loan under such terms and conditions as may be agreed
upon by the borrower and the FIs concerned.
(b) The transfer of NPAs from an FI to an SPV shall be subject to prior
certification of eligibility as NPA by the appropriate regulatory authority
having jurisdiction over its operations which shall issue its ruling within
forty-five (45) days from the date of application by the FI for eligibility.
(c) After the sale or transfer of the NPLs, the transferring FI shall inform
the borrower in writing at the last known address of the fact of the sale
or transfer of the NPLs.
They alleged that the production of the LSPA which would inform them
of the consideration for the assignment of their loan obligation is
relevant to the disposition of the case.
Respondent Cameron filed its Comment/Opposition16 dated April 30,
2012 reiterating that the production of the LSPA was immaterial, to
which, petitioners filed, on May 14, 2012, their Reply.17 Petitioners
insisted the materiality of inquiring about the contents of the LSPA, as
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Prof. Avena
the consideration for any transfer of the loan obligation of petitioner

EDC should be the basis for the claim against them.
The trial court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution dated May 28, 2012.
On July 27, 2012, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA), to nullify and/or set aside the RTC's Resolutions
dated March 28, 2012 and May 28, 2012.
In its Resolution dated August 29, 2012, the CA (Third Division)
dismissed the petition for lack of petitioner Oben's verification and
certification against forum shopping and failure to attach a copy of the
complaint.
Petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration18 dated September
20, 2012, was likewise denied in the CA's November 27, 2012
Resolution.
Hence this instant petition.
The resolution of this case revolves around the following issues: (1)
whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition on technicality, i.e. on a
defective verification and certification against forum shopping and the
attachment to the petition of a mere machine copy of the complaint; and
(2) whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the
production and/or inspection of the LSPA.
We agree with petitioner, that the appellate court erred in ruling that
Oben's Verification and Certification was defective for lack of a Board
Resolution authorizing Oben to sign on behalf of petitioner EDC. Oben
executed and signed the Verification and Certification in his personal
capacity as an impleaded party in the case, and not as a representative of
EDC. We note that an earlier Verification and Certification signed by
Page 36 of 56
Naval, for himself and as a representative of EDC, and a Secretary

Certificate containing his authority to sign on behalf of EDC, were
already filed with the appellate court together with the petition for
certiorari.19 As such, what was only lacking was Oben's Verification and
Certification as pointed out in the August 29, 2012 Resolution of the CA.
On the other hand, contrary to petitioners' assertion, a reading of the CA
Resolution dated November 27, 2012 shows that the appellate court
merely noted the belated attachment of a machine copy, not a certified
true copy, of the complaint to petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Although not expressly stated, the machine copy of the complaint is in
fact acceptable, as Rule 65 provides that one may attach to the petition
mere machine copies of other relevant documents and pleadings.20 More
importantly, the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari was
anchored on its finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC in denying the production of the LSPA, that the errors
committed by Judge Ruiz were, if at all, mere errors of judgment
correctible not by the extraordinary writ of certiorari and an ordinary
appeal would still be available in the action below for sum of money.21
An appeal would not have adequately remedied the situation because, in
that case, the court would have rendered its decision without giving the
petitioners the opportunity to make use of the information that the LSPA
would have supplied as a result of the court allowing the production of
the LSPA. If, on appeal, public respondent reversed its decision, the
reversal would result in the case being retried in the lower court, which
would unnecessarily delay the resolution of the case and burden the
parties with additional litigation expense.
Having resolved the issue on the supposed technical defects, we go on to
discuss the second issue.
Section 1, Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Court, states:
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of

any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is
pending may a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection
and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute
or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody or control; xxx
The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the
modes of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable
not only the parties, but also the court to discover all the relevant and
material facts in connection with the case pending before it.22
Generally, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to
provide the litigants with information essential to the fair and amicable
settlement or expeditious trial of the case.23 All the parties are required
to lay their cards on the table so that justice can be rendered on the
merits of the case.24
Page 37 of 56
Assignment has been produced by Cameron showing that it has acquired

the account of the petitioners pursuant to the SPV Law.27
We find the Petition impressed with merit.
The question was whether respondent had acquired a valid title to the
credit, i.e., EDCs outstanding loan obligation, and whether it had a right
to claim from petitioners. In fact, petitioners had maintained in their
motions before the trial court the nullity or non-existence of the
assignment of credit purportedly made between respondent and EIB
(the original creditor).
As respondent Camerons claim against the petitioners relies entirely on
the validity of the Deed of Assignment, it is incumbent upon respondent
Cameron to allow petitioners to inspect all documents relevant to the
Deed, especially those documents which, by express terms, were
referred to and identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which pertains to
the same subject matter the transfer of the credit to respondent is
manifestly useful to petitioners defense.
The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of

documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of
reasonableness and practicability.26
Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
when part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the
whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a
detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or
record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
Since the Deed of Assignment was produced in court by respondent and
marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a
part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its
understanding may also be inevitably inquired into by petitioners.
According to the trial court, there is no need for the production of the
LSPA in order to apprise the petitioners of the amount of consideration
paid by respondent in favor of EIB and that it is enough that the Deed of
In this light, the relevance of the LSPA sought by petitioners is readily

apparent. Fair play demands that petitioners must be given the chance
to examine the LSPA. Besides, we find no great practical difficulty, and
Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly

discretionary on the part of the trial court judge, nevertheless, it cannot
be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied because to do so would bar access
to relevant evidence that may be used by a party-litigant and hence,
impair his fundamental right to due process.25
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
respondent did not allege any, in presenting the document for inspection
and copying of the petitioners.
Incidentally, the legal incidents of the case a quo necessitates the
production of said LSPA.
Section 13 of the SPV Law clearly provides that "in the transfer of the
Non-Performing Loans (NPLs), the provisions on subrogation and
assignment of credits under the New Civil Code shall apply." The law
does not exclude the application of Article 1634 of the New Civil Code to
transfers of NPLs by a financial institution to a special purpose vehicle.
Settled is the rule in statutory construction that "when the law is clear,
the function of the courts is simple application." Besides, it is within the
power of an SPV to restructure, condone, and enter into other forms of
debt settlement involving NPLs.
Also, Section 19 of the SPV Law expressly states that redemption periods
allowed to borrowers under the banking law, the rules of court and/or
other laws are applicable. Hence, the equitable right of redemption
allowed to a debtor under Article 1634 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Therefore, as petitioners correctly pointed out, they have the right of
legal redemption by paying Cameron the transfer price plus the cost of
money up to the time of redemption and the judicial costs.
Certainly, it is necessary for the petitioners to be informed of the actual
consideration paid by the SPV in its acquisition of the loan, because it
would be the starting point for them to negotiate for the extinguishment
of their obligation. As pointed out by the petitioners, since the Deed of
Assignment merely states "For value received", the appropriate
information may be supplied by the LSPA. It is self-evident that in order
to be able to intelligently match the price paid by respondent for the
acquisition of the loan, petitioner must be provided with the necessary
Page 38 of 56
information to enable it to make a reasonably informed proposal.

Because of the virtual refusal and denial of the production of the LSPA,
petitioners were never accorded the chance to reimburse respondent of
the consideration the latter has paid.
Consequently, this Court finds and so holds that the denial of the Motion
for Production despite the existence of "good cause," relevancy and
materiality for the production of the LSPA was unreasonable and
arbitrary constituting grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court. Hence, certiorari properly lies as a remedy in the present case.
Discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal
has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory
order does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may
reasonably cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings
for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a
clear or serious abuse of discretion.28 The exercise of discretion
pertaining to discovery will be set aside where there is abuse, or the trial
courts disposition of matters of discovery was improvident and affected
adversely the substantial rights of a party.29 After all, the discretion
conferred upon trial courts is a sound discretion which should be
exercised with due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of
equity and justice.30
Indeed, the insistent refusal of respondent to produce the LSPA is
perplexing and unacceptable to this Court. Respondent even asserts that
if petitioner EDC thinks that the LSPA will bolster its defense, then it
should secure a copy of the document from the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas and not from respondent, because allegedly the document was
not marked by respondent as one of its exhibits.31
In light of the general philosophy of full discovery of relevant facts, the
unreceptive and negative attitude by the respondent is abominable. The
rules on discovery are accorded broad and liberal interpretation
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
precisely to enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of

the issues and facts, including those known only to their adversaries, in
order that trials may not be carried on in the dark.32
Undoubtedly, the trial court had effectively placed petitioners at a great
disadvantage inasmuch as respondent effectively suppressed relevant
documents related to the transaction involved in the case a quo.
Furthermore, the remedies of discovery encouraged and provided for
under the Rules of Court to be able to compel the production of relevant
documents had been put to naught by the arbitrary act of the trial court.
It must be remembered that "litigation is essentially an abiding quest for
truth undertaken not by the judge alone, but jointly with the parties.
Litigants, therefore, must welcome every opportunity to achieve this
goal; they must act in good faith to reveal documents, papers and other
pieces of evidence material to the controversy."33 Courts, as arbiters and
guardians of truth and justice, must not countenance any technical ploy
to the detriment of an expeditious settlement of the case or to a fair, full
and complete determination on its merits.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The August 29, 2012 and
November 27, 2012 resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and respondents are ORDERED to produce the Loan Sale
and Purchase Agreement dated April 7, 2006, including its annexes
and/or attachments, if any, in order that petitioners may inspect and/or
photocopy the same.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Page 39 of 56
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
Footnotes
Law 126 Evidence

1
Prof. Avena
Rollo, p. 59.
Id. at 61-65. Resolution penned by Associate Justice Apolinario

D. Bruselas. Jr. with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador
and Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring.
2
15
Supra note 1 at 166-18.
16
Id. at 182-193.
17
Id. at 194-204.
Id. at 109-111.
18
Id. at 206-226.
Id. at 112-122.
19
Id. at 66-108.
Id. at 3-57. Petition for Review on Certiorari dated December

20, 2012.
5
Id. at 227-232.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 05-213.
Page 40 of 56
Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,

G.R. No. 175049, 572 SCRA 185, 203, November 27, 2008. Garcia,
Jr. V. CA, G.R. No. 171098, 546 SCRA 595, 604, February 26,
2008.; OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc. V. NLRC, G.R. No. 138193,
446 Phil. 793, 803, March 5, 2003.
20
Section 1, Rule 65. Petition for Certiorari. xxx

8
Supra note 1 at 134.

Id.
10
Id. at 123-133.
11
Id. at 136-143.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the

judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46 (emphasis supplied).
21
12
Id. at 144-165.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, November 21,

1991, 204 SCRA 212.
22
A credit or other incorporeal right shall be considered in

litigation from the time the complaint concerning the same is
answered. The debtor may exercise his right within thirty days
from the date the assignee demands payment from him.
13
14
By Acting Presiding Judge J. Cedrick O. Ruiz.
Fortune Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108119,

January 19, 1994, 229 SCRA 355, 373. Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA
212.
23
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Prof. Avena
24
Koh v. IAC, 228 Phil. 258, 263 (1986).
25
Alberto v. COMELEC, 370 Phil. 230, 237-238 (1999).
Lime Corporation of the Philippines v. Moran, 59 Phil. 175, 180

(1933).
26
27
28
Fortune Corporation v. Hon. Court of Appeals, supra at 370.
See Producers Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 349 Phil. 310

(1998).
29
30
Santos v. Phil. National Bank, 431 Phil. 368 (2002).
31
Security Bank Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 135874, January 25,

2000, 323 SCRA 330.
32
33
Id. at 341.
Page 41 of 56
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Prof. Avena
30. PROOF OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190375
Page 42 of 56
contained the annotation "pd" on the total amount of the purchase price,
it meant that the crop delivered had already been paid for by petitioner.2
Guillermo Maulawin (Guillermo), respondent in this case, is a farmerbusinessman engaged in the buying and selling of copra and corn. On 10
July 1997, Tan Shuy extended a loan to Guillermo in the amount
of P 420,000. In consideration thereof, Guillermo obligated himself to
pay the loan and to sell lucad or copra to petitioner. Below is a
reproduction of the contract:3
February 8, 2012
TAN SHUY, Petitioner,

vs.
Spouses GUILLERMO MAULAWIN and PARING CARIOMAULAWIN, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 31 July 2009 Decision and 13
November 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).1
No2567
Lopez, Quezon July 10, 1997
Tinanggap ko kay G. TAN SHUY ang halagang

. (P420,000.00) salaping Filipino.
Inaako ko na isusulit sa kanya ang aking LUCAD at babayaran ko ang
nasabing halaga. Kung hindi ako makasulit ng LUCAD o makabayad bago
sumapit ang ., 19 maaari niya akong ibigay sa may
kapangyarihan. Kung ang pagsisingilan ay makakarating sa Juzgado ay
sinasagutan ko ang lahat ng kaniyang gugol.
P................
[Sgd. by respondent]
.
Lagda
Facts
Petitioner Tan Shuy is engaged in the business of buying copra and corn
in the Fourth District of Quezon Province. According to Vicente Tan
(Vicente), son of petitioner, whenever they would buy copra or corn
from crop sellers, they would prepare and issue a pesada in their favor.
A pesada is a document containing details of the transaction, including
the date of sale, the weight of the crop delivered, the trucking cost, and
the net price of the crop. He then explained that when a pesada
Most of the transactions involving Tan Shuy and Guillermo were coursed
through Elena Tan, daughter of petitioner. She served as cashier in the
business of Tan Shuy, who primarily prepared and issued the pesada. In
case of her absence, Vicente would issue the pesada. He also helped his
father in buying copra and granting loans to customers (copra sellers).
According to Vicente, part of their agreement with Guillermo was that
they would put the annotation "sulong" on the pesada when partial
payment for the loan was made.
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Prof. Avena
Petitioner alleged that despite repeated demands, Guillermo remitted

only P 23,000 in August 1998 and P 5,500 in October 1998, or a total
of P 28,500.4 He claimed that respondent had an outstanding balance
of P 391,500. Thus, convinced that Guillermo no longer had the intention
to pay the loan, petitioner brought the controversy to the Lupon
Tagapamayapa. When no settlement was reached, petitioner filed a
Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Respondent Guillermo countered that he had already paid the subject
loan in full. According to him, he continuously delivered and sold copra
to petitioner from April 1998 to April 1999. Respondent said they had an
oral arrangement that the net proceeds thereof shall be applied as
installment payments for the loan. He alleged that his deliveries
amounted to P 420,537.68 worth of copra. To bolster his claim, he
presented copies of pesadas issued by Elena and Vicente. He pointed out
that the pesadas did not contain the notation "pd," which meant that
actual payment of the net proceeds from copra deliveries was not given
to him, but was instead applied as loan payment. He averred that Tan
Shuy filed a case against him, because petitioner got mad at him for
selling copra to other copra buyers.
On 27 July 2007, the trial court issued a Decision, ruling that the net
proceeds from Guillermos copra deliveries represented in the pesadas,
which did not bear the notation "pd" should be applied as installment
payments for the loan. It gave weight and credence to the pesadas, as
their due execution and authenticity was established by Elena and
Vicente, children of petitioner.5 However, the court did not credit the net
proceeds from 12 pesadas, as they were deliveries for corn and not
copra. According to the RTC, Guillermo himself testified that it was the
net proceeds from the copra deliveries that were to be applied as
installment payments for the loan. Thus, it ruled that the total amount
of P 41,585.25, which corresponded to the net proceeds from corn
deliveries, should be deducted from the amount of P 420,537.68 claimed
by Guillermo to be the total value of his copra deliveries. Accordingly,
Page 43 of 56
the trial court found that respondent had not made a full payment for
the loan, as the total creditable copra deliveries merely amounted
to P 378,952.43, leaving a balance of P 41,047.57 in his loan.6
On 31 July 2009, the CA issued its assailed Decision, which affirmed the
finding of the trial court. According to the appellate court, petitioner
could have easily belied the existence of the pesadas and the purpose for
which they were offered in evidence by presenting his daughter Elena as
witness; however, he failed to do so. Thus, it gave credence to the
testimony of respondent Guillermo in that the net proceeds from the
copra deliveries were applied as installment payments for the loan.7 On
13 November 2009, the CA issued its assailed Resolution, which denied
the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
Petitioner now assails before this Court the aforementioned Decision
and Resolution of the CA and presents the following issues:
Issues
1. Whether the pesadas require authentication before they can
be admitted in evidence, and
2. Whether the delivery of copra amounted to installment
payments for the loan obtained by respondents from petitioner.
Discussion
As regards the first issue, petitioner asserts that the pesadas should not
have been admitted in evidence, since they were private documents that
were not duly authenticated.8 He further contends that the pesadas were
fabricated in order to show that the goods delivered were copra and not
corn. Finally, he argues that five of the pesadas mentioned in the Formal
Offer of Evidence of respondent were not actually offered.9
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Prof. Avena
With regard to the second issue, petitioner argues that respondent

undertook two separate obligations (1) to pay for the loan in cash and
(2) to sell the latters lucad or copra. Since their written agreement did
not specifically provide for the application of the net proceeds from the
deliveries of copra for the loan, petitioner contends that he cannot be
compelled to accept copra as payment for the loan. He emphasizes that
the pesadas did not specifically indicate that the net proceeds from the
copra deliveries were to be used as installment payments for the loan.
He also claims that respondents copra deliveries were duly paid for in
cash, and that the pesadas were in fact documentary receipts for those
payments.
We reiterate our ruling in a line of cases that the jurisdiction of this
Court, in cases brought before it from the CA, is limited to reviewing or
revising errors of law.10 Factual findings of courts, when adopted and
confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on this Court except if
unsupported by the evidence on record.11 There is a question of fact
when doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts; or when there is a
need to calibrate the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility
of the witnesses and the probative weight thereof, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation
to one another and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.12
Here, a finding of fact is required in the ascertainment of the due
execution and authenticity of the pesadas, as well as the determination
of the true intention behind the parties oral agreement on the
application of the net proceeds from the copra deliveries as installment
payments for the loan.13 This function was already exercised by the trial
court and affirmed by the CA. Below is a reproduction of the relevant
portion of the trial courts Decision:
x x x The defendant further averred that if in the receipts or "pesadas"
issued by the plaintiff to those who delivered copras to them there is a
notation "pd" on the total amount of purchase price of the copras, it
Page 44 of 56
means that said amount was actually paid or given by the plaintiff or his
daughter Elena Tan Shuy to the seller of the copras. To prove his
averments the defendant presented as evidence two (2) receipts or
pesadas issued by the plaintiff to a certain "Cario" (Exhibits "1" and "2"
defendant) showing the notation "pd" on the total amount of the
purchase price for the copras. Such claim of the defendant was further
bolstered by the testimony of Apolinario Cario which affirmed that he
also sell copras to the plaintiff Tan Shuy. He also added that he incurred
indebtedness to the plaintiff and whenever he delivered copras the
amount of the copras sold were applied as payments to his loan. The
witness also pointed out that the plaintiff did not give any official
receipts to those who transact business with him (plaintiff). This Court
gave weight and credence to the documents receipts (pesadas) (Exhibits
"3" to "64") offered as evidence by the defendant which does not bear
the notation "pd" or paid on the total amount of the purchase price of
copras appearing therein. Although said "pesadas" were private
instrument their execution and authenticity were established by the
plaintiffs daughter Elena Tan and sometimes by plaintiffs son Vicente
Tan. x x x.14 (Emphasis supplied)
In affirming the finding of the RTC, the CA reasoned thus:
In his last assigned error, plaintiff-appellant herein impugns the
conclusion arrived at by the trial court, particularly with respect to the
giving of evidentiary value to Exhs. "3" to "64" by the latter in order to
prove the claim of defendant-appellee Guillermo that he had fully paid
the subject loan already.
The foregoing deserves scant consideration.
Here, plaintiff-appellant could have easily belied the existence of Exhs.
"3" to "64", the pesadas or receipts, and the purposes for which they
were offered in evidence by simply presenting his daughter, Elena Tan
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Prof. Avena
Shuy, but no effort to do so was actually done by the former given that
scenario.15 (Emphasis supplied)
We found no clear showing that the trial court and the CA committed
reversible errors of law in giving credence and according weight to the
pesadas presented by respondents. According to Rule 132, Section 20 of
the Rules of Court, there are two ways of proving the due execution and
authenticity of a private document, to wit:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be. (21a)
As reproduced above, the trial court found that the due execution and
authenticity of the pesadas were "established by the plaintiffs daughter
Elena Tan and sometimes by plaintiffs son Vicente Tan."16 The RTC said:
On cross-examination, [Vicente] reiterated that he and her [sic] sister
Elena Tan who acted as their cashier are helping their father in their
business of buying copras and mais. That witness agreed that in the
business of buying copra and mais of their father, if a seller is selling
copra, a pesada is being issued by his sister. The pesada that she is
preparing consists of the date when the copra is being sold to the seller.
Being familiar with the penmanship of Elena Tan, the witness was shown
a sample of the pesada issued by his sister Elena Tan. x x x
Page 45 of 56
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x. He clarified that in the "pesada" (Exh. "1") prepared by Elena and

also in Exh "2", there appears on the lower right hand portion of the said
pesadas the letter "pd", the meaning of which is to the effect that the
seller of the copra has already been paid during that day. He also
confirmed the penmanship and handwriting of his sister Ate Elena who
acted as a cashier in the pesada being shown to him. He was even made
to compare the xerox copies of the pesadas with the original copies
presented to him and affirmed that they are faithful reproduction of the
originals.17 (Emphasis supplied)
In any event, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the due
execution and authenticity of the pesadas.1wphi1As found by the CA,
Tan Shuy "could have easily belied the existence of x x x the pesadas or
receipts, and the purposes for which they were offered in evidence by
simply presenting his daughter, Elena Tan Shuy, but no effort to do so
was actually done by the former given that scenario." The pesadas
having been admitted in evidence, with petitioner failing to timely object
thereto, these documents are already deemed sufficient proof of the
facts contained therein.18 We hereby uphold the factual findings of the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in that the pesadas served as proof that the
net proceeds from the copra deliveries were used as installment
payments for the debts of respondents.19
Indeed, pursuant to Article 1232 of the Civil Code, an obligation is
extinguished by payment or performance. There is payment when there
is delivery of money or performance of an obligation.20 Article 1245 of
the Civil Code provides for a special mode of payment called dation in
payment (dacin en pago). There is dation in payment when property is
alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money.21 Here, the
debtor delivers and transmits to the creditor the formers ownership
over a thing as an accepted equivalent of the payment or performance of
an outstanding debt.22 In such cases, Article 1245 provides that the law
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Prof. Avena
on sales shall apply, since the undertaking really partakes in one sense
of the nature of sale; that is, the creditor is really buying the thing or
property of the debtor, the payment for which is to be charged against
the debtors obligation.23 Dation in payment extinguishes the obligation
to the extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by
the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement
express or implied, or by their silence consider the thing as equivalent
to the obligation, in which case the obligation is totally extinguished.24
Page 46 of 56
from the proceeds of the copras he delivered to the plaintiff as shown in

the "pesadas" (Exhibits "3" to "64"). Defendant claimed that based on the
said "pesadas" he has paid the total amount of P420,537.68 to the
plaintiff. However, this Court keenly noted that some of the "pesadas"
offered in evidence by the defendant were not for copras that he
delivered to the plaintiff but for "mais" (corn). The said pesadas for mais
or corn were the following, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The trial court found thus:

x x x [T]he preponderance of evidence is on the side of the defendant. x x
x The defendant explained that for the receipts (pesadas) from April
1998 to April 1999 he only gets the payments for trucking while the total
amount which represent the total purchase price for the copras that he
delivered to the plaintiff were all given to Elena Tan Shuy as installments
for the loan he owed to plaintiff. The defendant further averred that if in
the receipts or "pesadas" issued by the plaintiff to those who delivered
copras to them there is a notation "pd" on the total amount of purchase
price of the copras, it means that said amount was actually paid or given
by the plaintiff or his daughter Elena Tan Shuy to the seller of the copras.
To prove his averments the defendant presented as evidence two (2)
receipts or pesadas issued by the plaintiff to a certain "Cario" (Exhibits
"1" and "2" defendant) showing the notation "pd" on the total amount
of the purchase price for the copras. Such claim of the defendant was
further bolstered by the testimony of Apolinario Cario which affirmed
that he also sell [sic] copras to the plaintiff Tan Shuy. He also added that
he incurred indebtedness to the plaintiff and whenever he delivered
copras the amount of the copras sold were applied as payments to his
loan. The witness also pointed out that the plaintiff did not give any
official receipts to those who transact business with him (plaintiff). x x x
Be that it may, this Court cannot however subscribe to the averments of
the defendant that he has fully paid the amount of his loan to the plaintiff
To the mind of this Court the aforestated amount (P41,585.25) which

the above listed pesadas show as payment for mais or corn delivered by
the defendant to the plaintiff cannot be claimed by the defendant to have
been applied also as payment to his loan with the plaintiff because he
does not testify on such fact. He even stressed during his testimony that
it was the proceeds from the copras that he delivered to the plaintiff
which will be applied as payments to his loan. x x x Thus, equity dictates
that the total amount of P41,585.25 which corresponds to the payment
for "mais" (corn) delivered by the plaintiff shall be deducted from the
total amount of P420,537.68 which according to the defendant based on
the pesadas (Exhibits "3" to "64") that he presented as evidence, is the
total amount of the payment that he made for his loan to the plaintiff. x x
x
xxx
xxx
xxx
Clearly from the foregoing, since the total amount of defendants loan to
the plaintiff is P420,000.00 and the evidence on record shows that the
actual amount of payment made by the defendant from the proceeds of
the copras he delivered to the plaintiff is P378,952.43, the defendant is
still indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of P41,047.53 (sic)
(P420,000.00-P378,952.43).25 (Emphasis supplied)
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Prof. Avena
In affirming this finding of fact by the trial court, the CA cited the abovequoted portion of the RTCs Decision and stated the following:
In fact, as borne by the records on hand, herein defendant-appellee
Guillermo was able to describe and spell out the contents of Exhs. "3" to
"64" which were then prepared by Elena Tan Shuy or sometimes by
witness Vicente Tan. Herein defendant-appellee Guillermo professed
that since the release of the subject loan was subject to the condition
that he shall sell his copras to the plaintiff-appellant, the former did not
already receive any money for the copras he delivered to the latter
starting April 1998 to April 1999. Hence, this Court can only express its
approval to the apt observation of the trial court on this matter[.]
xxx
xxx
xxx
Notwithstanding the above, however, this Court fully agrees with the
pronouncement of the trial court that not all amounts indicated in Exhs.
"3" to "64" should be applied as payments to the subject loan since
several of which clearly indicated "mais" deliveries on the part of
defendant-appellee Guillermo instead of "copras"[.]26 (Emphasis
supplied)
The subsequent arrangement between Tan Shuy and Guillermo can thus
be considered as one in the nature of dation in payment. There was
partial payment every time Guillermo delivered copra to petitioner,
chose not to collect the net proceeds of his copra deliveries, and instead
applied the collectible as installment payments for his loan from Tan
Shuy. We therefore uphold the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by
the CA, that the net proceeds from Guillermos copra deliveries
amounted to P 378,952.43. With this partial payment, respondent
remains liable for the balance totaling P 41,047.57.27
Page 47 of 56
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED. The 31 July 2009 Decision and 13

November 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
90070 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of
the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
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Prof. Avena
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Page 48 of 56
Petitioner refers to Exhibits "5," "7," "25," "30," "32," "32-A,"

"33," "34," "38," "43," "45," and "47." See Tan Shuys Petition for
Review on Certiorari, p. 6; rollo, p. 9.
8
Petitioner refers to Exhibits "65" to "69." See Tan Shuys

Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 6; rollo, p. 9.
9
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Republic v. Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 172931, 18 June

2009, 589 SCRA 552.
10
11
Id.
Footnotes
Guy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165849, 10 December 2007,
539 SCRA 584; Obando v. People, G.R. No. 138696, 7 July 2010,
624 SCRA 299.
12
Both the Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 90070 were

penned by Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by
Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
1
13
See Bernaldez v. Francia, 446 Phil. 643 (2003)
14
RTC Decision, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 60-61.
15
CA Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 26-27.
16
RTC Decision, p. 17; rollo, p. 61.
17

Petitioners Complaint, Annex E; rollo, p.71.
Petitioners Complaint, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 67-68.
The RTC found that respondents remained indebted to

petitioner for the total balance of P 41,047.53. However, after a
re-computation, this Court finds that a simple mathematical
error was committed. Respondents balance should be reflected
as P 41,047.57.
6
See Obando v. People, supra note 12; Sy v. Court of Appeals,

386 Phil. 760 (2000), citing Son v. Son, 321 Phil. 951 (1995),
Tison v. CA, 342 Phil. 550 (1997), and Quebral v. CA, 322 Phil.
387 (1996).
18
RTC Decision, pp. 16-18; rollo, pp. 60-62; CA Decision, pp. 1013; rollo, pp. 26-29.
19
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Prof. Avena
20
Civil Code, Art. 1232.
21
Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil. 150 (1982), (citing

Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, Vol. IV, 276-277 (1962); D. Jos Castn Tobeas,
Derecho Civil Espaol, Comn y Foral, Vol. II 525 (6th ed. 1943);
D. Jos Mara Manresa y Navarro, Comentarios al Cdigo Civil
Espaol, Vol. VIII 324 (1932)); Aquintey v. Tibong, G.R. No.
166704, 20 December 2006, 511 SCRA 414, citing Jayme v. Court
of Appeals, 439 Phil. 192 (2002).
22
Aquintey v. Tibong, G.R. No. 166704, 20 December 2006, 511

SCRA 414, citing Jayme v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 192 (2002);
23
Lopez v. Court of Appeals, L-33157, 29 June 1982, 114 SCRA

671, citing Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV 276-277 (1962); D. Jos Mara
Manresa y Navarro, Comentarios al Cdigo Civil Espaol, Vol. VIII
324 (1932); Calixto Valverde y Valverde, Tratado de Derecho
Civil Espaol, Vol. II 174(1935)).
24
25
26
27
RTC Decision, p. 18; rollo, p. 62; CA Decision, p. 14, rollo, p. 30.
Page 49 of 56
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Prof. Avena

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193531
December 14, 2011
ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION, represented
by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR.,Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Petitioner Ellery March G. Torres seeks to annul and set aside the
Decision1 dated April 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 110302, which dismissed his petition seeking reversal of the
Resolutions dated June 23, 20082 and July 28, 20093 of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). Also assailed is the CA Resolution4dated July 30,
2010 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR).
On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit
Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila,
then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot machine
and internal security personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and in
connivance with slot machine customers, respondent PAGCOR's
Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation
to verify the veracity of such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of
CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after the first digit of
Page 50 of 56
the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the first digit of
the actual CMR, e.g., a slot machine with an actual CMR of P5,000.00 will
be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of eitherP50,000.00
or P35,000.00.5 Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts
and slot machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of
February and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the
syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding, which included
herein petitioner.6
On May 4, 2007, the CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of
Charges7 for dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud and violation of office
rules and regulations which were considered grave offenses where the
penalty imposable is dismissal. The summary description of the charges
stated:
Sometime between November 2006 and March 2007, you facilitated and
actively participated in the fraudulent scheme with respect to irregular
manipulation of Credit Meter Reading (CMR) which, in turn, led to the
misappropriation of money earmarked for the slot machine jackpot at CF
Hyatt Manila. These anomalous transactions were consummated
through your direct participation and active cooperation of your coemployees and customers. With malice afterthought, you embezzled and
stole monies from PAGCOR, thereby resulting in substantial losses to the
proprietary interest of PAGCOR.8
On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges9 signed by Rogelio Y.
Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was issued to
petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty (padding of
anomalous SM jackpot receipts). Petitioner was then required to explain
in writing within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof why he
should not be sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner was placed under
preventive suspension effective immediately until further orders.
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Prof. Avena
On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter

explanation/refutation10 of the charges against him. He denied any
involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR
or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a formal
investigation of the accusations against him.
On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter11 dated August 2, 2007
from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR's Human
Resource and Development Department, dismissing him from the
service. The letter reads in part, to wit:
Please be informed that the Board of Directors, in its meeting on July 31,
2007, approved the recommendation of the Adjudication Committee to
dismiss you from the service effective upon approval due to the
following offense:
Dishonesty, gross misconduct, serious violations of office rules and
regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the company and
loss of trust and confidence, committed as follows: For actively and
directly participating in a scheme to defraud the company in conspiracy
with co-employees and SM customers by padding slot machine Credit
Meter Reading (CMR) receipts in favor of co-conspirator customers who
had said (sic) CMR receipts paid at the teller's booth on numerous
occasions which caused substantial losses to the proprietary interests of
PAGCOR.12
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a
Complaint13 against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. The complaint
alleged among others: (1) that he denied all the charges against him; (2)
that he did ask for a formal investigation of the accusations against him
and for PAGCOR to produce evidence and proofs to substantiate the
charges, but respondent PAGCOR did not call for any formal
administrative hearing; (3) that he tried to persuade respondent
Page 51 of 56
PAGCOR to review and reverse its decision in a letter of reconsideration

dated August 13, 2007 addressed to the Chairman, the members of the
Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board; and (4) that
no resolution was issued on his letter reconsideration, thus, the filing of
the complaint. Petitioner claimed that as a result of his unlawful,
unjustified and illegal termination/dismissal, he was compelled to hire
the services of a counsel in order to protect his rights.
Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged, among
others, that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal within the period and
manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service Law.
On June 23, 2008, the CSC, treating petitioner's complaint as an appeal
from the PAGCOR's decision dismissing petitioner from the service,
issued Resolution No. 081204 denying petitioner's appeal. The
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of Ellery March G. Torres is hereby
DENIED. Accordingly, the decision contained in a letter dated August 2,
2007 of Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head, Human Resource and
Development Department (HRDD), PAGCOR, finding him guilty of
Dishonesty, Gross Misconduct, Serious Violation of Office Rules and
Regulations, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
Loss of Trust and Confidence and imposing upon him the penalty of
dismissal from the service, is hereby AFFIRMED. The penalty of
dismissal carries with it the accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in the government service, and bar from taking
future Civil Service Examination.14
In so ruling, the CSC found that the issue for resolution was whether
petitioner's appeal had already prescribed which the former answered
in the positive. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he
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Prof. Avena
Page 52 of 56
sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the

period prescribed by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service. It found PAGCOR's denial of having received petitioner's
letter more credible as it was supported by certifications issued by its
employees. It found that a verification of one of the telephone numbers
where petitioner allegedly sent his letter reconsideration disclosed that
such number did not belong to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of
Directors; and that petitioner should have mentioned about the alleged
facsimile transmission at the first instance when he filed his complaint
and not only when respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of prescription
in its Comment.
Board of Directors. The CA found baseless and conjectural petitioner's

claim that PAGCOR can easily deny having received the letter by giving
orders to their employees to execute an affidavit of denial under pain
and threat of administrative sanction or termination from service.
Petitioner's motion for a reconsideration was denied in CSC Resolution

No. 09-1105 dated July 28, 2009.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated

July 30, 2010.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the twin resolutions issued by the
CSC.
Hence, this petition where petitioner states the errors committed by the
CA in this wise:
The CA then concluded that PAGCOR's decision which was contained in a

letter dated August 4, 2007 dismissing petitioner from the service had
already attained finality since there was no motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner in the manner and within the period provided for
under the Revised Uniform Rules on the Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.
The first issue that should be resolved is:

On April 22, 2010, the CA issued its assailed decision dismissing the
petition for lack of merit.
In dismissing the petition, the CA found that petitioner failed to adduce
clear and convincing evidence that he had filed a motion for
reconsideration. It found insufficient to merit consideration petitioner's
claim that he had sent through a facsimile transmission a
letter/reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to PAGCOR's
Chairman, members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems
Protection Board; that assuming arguendo that a letter reconsideration
was indeed sent through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile
transmission is inadmissible as electronic evidence under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000; and that a review of the CSC assailed resolution
revealed that the telephone numbers where petitioner claimed to be the
recipient of the faxed document sent was not that of PAGCOR's Office of
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the

dismissal of petitioner based merely on technicality without considering
the allegations on summary and arbitrary dismissal based on fabricated
and unfounded accusations.
Next to be raised were the issues propounded in petitioner's
Memorandum dated 29 January 2010 but were not tackled upon by the
Court of Appeals, thus:
A. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in ruling
that there was no valid letter/motion for reconsideration
submitted to reconsider petitioner's dismissal from the service;
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Prof. Avena
Page 53 of 56
B. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in giving

more weight to PAGCOR's denial of having received petitioner's
letter of reconsideration;
Sections 37, 38, 39, and 43 of the Revised Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which are applicable to this
case, respectively provide, to wit:
C. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in not

acting/resolving the Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Subpoena Duces
Tecum;
Section 37. Finality of Decisions - A decision rendered by heads of

agencies whereby a penalty of suspension for not more than thirty days
or a fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary is imposed,
shall be final and executory. However, if the penalty imposed is
suspension exceeding thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary, the same shall be final and executory after the lapse of the
reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal
and no such pleading has been filed.
D. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in ruling

that petitioner's failure to send his letter reconsideration
through mail or by personal service as set forth in the Rules of
Court, he forfeited his right to appeal; and
E. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in favoring
PAGCOR"s dismissal of petitioner from employment based on
hearsay, imaginary and non-existent evidence.15
The threshold issue for resolution is whether the CA erred when it
affirmed the CSC's dismissal of the appeal for being filed beyond the
reglementary period.
Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of his
dismissal16 on August 13, 2007, which was within the 15-day period for
filing the same; and that he did so by means of a facsimile transmission
sent to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors. He claims that the
sending of documents thru electronic data message, which includes
facsimile, is sanctioned under Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000. Petitioner further contends that since his letter
reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then filed his
complaint before the CSC.
We are not persuaded.
Section 38. Filing of motion for reconsideration. - The party adversely

affected by the decision may file a motion for reconsideration with the
disciplining authority who rendered the same within fifteen days from
receipt thereof.
Section 39. When deemed filed. - A motion for reconsideration sent by
mail shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the
envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case and in case of
personal delivery, the date stamped thereon by the proper office.
Section 43. Filing of Appeals. - Decisions of heads of departments,
agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities
imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary, maybe appealed to the
Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
Clearly, a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or
personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail,
the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on
the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
other hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on

the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15
days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4,
2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been submitted
either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007.
However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for
reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of
petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by certifications
issued by PAGCOR employees.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter
reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile
transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to
appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not
sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed
only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr.,17 we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of
pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission
and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original
copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of
each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is
transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave
relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental
area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is
equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on
paper referred to as a facsimile.
Page 54 of 56
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an

exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original,
there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading
is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x181avvphi1
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic
evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation,19 We determined the question of
whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data
messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic
Commerce Act, and We said:
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and
"electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is
not admissible as electronic evidence. (Italics ours.)20
We, therefore, found no reversible error committed by the CA when it
affirmed the CSC in dismissing petitioner's appeal. Petitioner filed with
the CSC a complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits on September
14, 2007. The CSC treated the complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR's
dismissal of petitioner. Under Section 43 which we earlier quoted,
petitioner had 15 days from receipt of the letter of dismissal to file his
appeal. However, at the time petitioner filed his complaint with the CSC,
which was considered as petitioner's appeal, 41 days had already
elapsed from the time he received his letter of dismissal on August 4,
2007; hence, the CSC correctly found that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal since petitioner's dismissal had already attained
finality. Petitioner's dismissal from the service became final and
executory after he failed to file his motion for reconsideration or appeal
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
in the manner and within the period provided for under the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
In Pea v. Government Service and Insurance System,21 We said:
Noteworthy is that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process, except where it is granted by statute in which case it
should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not of
constitutional origin. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding
appeal will render the judgment final and executory and, hence,
unappealable, for it is more important that a case be settled than it be
settled right. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that final and executory
judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be
modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. Just
as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 22, 2010
and the Resolution dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Page 55 of 56
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
On official leave
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATION
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Page 56 of 56
12
Id.
13
Id. at 84-90.
14
Id. at 73.
15
Id. at 10-11.
16
Id. at 96-100.
17
G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 767.
18
Id. at 779. (Citations omitted.)
19
G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 408.
20
Id. at 455.
21
G.R. No. 159520, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 383.
22
Id. at 396-397. (Italics supplied.)
Footnotes
*
On official leave.
Penned by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate

Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring;
rollo, pp. 33-44.
1
Penned by Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza; id.

at 62-73.
2
Id. at 75-83.
Penned by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate

Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring; id.
at 129-131;
4
CA rollo, p. 84.
Id. at 85-86.
Rollo, p. 91.
Id.
Id. at 92.
10
Id. at 93-94.
11
Id. at 95.

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Law 126 Evidence

26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

On 20 October 1998, the accused filed a Motion to Quash[4] the

Law 126 Evidence

26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

In an Order dated 25 August 1999, the RTC denied the above

committed[13]; (3) Dr. Fernando T. Melegrito, the medical examiner who

When arraigned on 12 January 2000, the accused Rudy Buduhan,

The defense, on the other hand, presented: (1) appellant Robert

On the same date, the pre-trial conference was terminated and

The Peoples version of the incident as narrated by its principal

That the incident transpired at about 10:40 in the

That the incident happened at Poblacion Norte,

That no firearm has been confiscated from any of

Upon the submission of accused Boy Guinhicnas Certificate of

On 24 July 1998, Cherry Rose was working as a guest relations

Law 126 Evidence

26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

Law 126 Evidence

26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

Boyet Ginyang[58] testified that on 24 July 1998, at 10:00 p.m., he

Law 126 Evidence

26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

Law 126 Evidence

26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

However, they shall be entitled to a deduction of

However, on 5 October 2005, we resolved to transfer the case to

3) To pay jointly the heirs of Larry Erese the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 24,

With costs against them.

On 1 August 2003, the appellants

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the 2000

On 7 June 2004, the Court initially resolved to accept the appeal,

Law 126 Evidence

26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

arguments raised by appellants had already been discussed in the

To state differently, appellants argue that their guilt was not

Appellants insist that Cherry Rose is not a credible witness in

In the testimony of Cherry Rose in open court, however, she

Law 126 Evidence

26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

Finally, in the preliminary investigation, appellants pointed out

statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the

The rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid

In any event, Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on

In the present case, the statements made by Cherry Rose

Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence

In this regard, what the defense brought to Cherry Roses

Law 126 Evidence

26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

confrontation, Cherry Rose changed her answer. We rule, however,

homicide shall have been committed, or when the

To warrant conviction for the crime of robbery with

Law 126 Evidence

26. LAYING THE PREDICATE

PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR FERDINAND D. ORIAS

At that night of July 24, 1998 at around 10:40 in

To whom did Larry Erese gave his wrist watch?

To the Ifugao who poke a gun at him sir.

I was entertaining a costumer sir. (nakatable)

Will you please go around and see if he is inside

The witness is pointing to a man [seated] at the