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To cite this article: John Whittaker (1969): Neopythagoreanism and negative theology, Symbolae Osloenses, 44:1, 109-125
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00397676908590612
BY
JOHN
WHITTAKER
, , ,
.
2
3
4
In his paper ' Albinus and Plotinus on divine attributes' (Harvard Theological
Review 45 (1952), 115 ff.); see further his'Negative attributes in the Church
Fathers and the Gnostic Basilides' (Harvard Theological Review 50 (1957),
145 ff.), and 'Infinite and privative judgments in Aristotle, Averroes,
and Kant' (Philosophy and Phenomenalogkal Research 8 (1947), 173 ff.).
Didasc. 10, p. 165 Hermann.
Proclus: The Elements of Theology (2nd ed. Oxford, 1963), 312.
'Albinus and Plotinus on divine attributes' 118 f.
110
JOHN WHITTAKER
8
9
10
11
12
111
Introd. arithm. 2. 6. 4.
8. 25.
Haer. 4. 51, PG 16, col. 3119; 6. 23, PG 16, col. 3227.
p. 97 Hiller.
Theolog, arithm. p. 84 de Falco.
Phot. cod. 249, 439 a.
Plutarch, Plat, quaest. 1001 1002
,
,
,
'
' ' '
.
,
, ,
(). ,
' ,
.
Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. 10. 259 ff.
, '
.
' ix
, , a
,
. ,
' ,
( ,
, ,
),
vat ,
.
Cp. Nicomachus, Introd. arithm. 2. 6. 7.
112
JOHN WHITTAKER
21
22
.
For the progression from solid figure to mathematical unit see further
Metaph. 1028 b 16 ff. (se. the Pythagoreans)
, , ,
.
O n the see below.
See his Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik (Amsterdam, 1964), in particular
pp. 105 ff.
Strom. 5. 11, P G 9, cols. 108 f.
113
, ,
'
/ , [
, , '
, , , , , ,
' , ...
, ' , ,
, .
The question of the relationship between Clement's statement
and that of Albinus must first be considered. We have already
noted 23 that Wolfson seems to regard Albinus' illustration as his
own adaptation of the supposed Euclidean commentary. This
leads him to suggest that Clement's statement was borrowed
directly from Albinus (he speaks of Clement 'paraphrasing Albinus'2*). However, an examination of Clement's account shows
that Wolfson must be mistaken.
There are two main reasons why this must be so. (1) Clement's version introduces the term in place of Albinus'
and the fact that occurs in Celsus too 2 5
in the same connection shows that it was a current Middle
Platonic term for the procedure in question. (2) Clement includes
a final stage in the negative regression which has no counterpart
in Albinus: , ,
' , . (We
shall deal with this point immediately.) Clearly the presence
23
24
25
See n. 7 above.
'Negative attributes in the Church Fathers and the Gnostic Basilides'
(see n. 1 above), p. 147.
Cf. Origen, Contra Cels. 7. 42, PG 11, col. 1481 ; cf. H. J . Krmer, op. cit.
(see . 21 above), 105 n. 279. Plotinus, like Albinus, uses the term
: Em. 6. 7. 36
. Wolfson's assumption ('Albinus and Plotinus on divine attributes' (see n. 1 above), p. 119) that Plotinus was
directly dependent on Albinus is unnecessary. The term
in
this connection was commonplace in the Middle Platonic period; cf.
the latter half of this paper. Furthermore, there is no adequate evidence
that Plotinus was familiar with the writings of Albinus; cf. Les Sources
de Plotin, Entretiens sur l'Antiquit Classique V (Vandoeuvres-Genve,
I960), 422.
114
JOHN WHITTAKER
G C S vol. 15.
Hanard Theological Review 18 (1925), 75 . 114.
G C S vol. 5 2 .
115
, , ^
, , '
).
From this mass of evidence the following emerges. (1) Whether
or not, as Alexander's account suggests, the pertinent conception
of the relationship between the and the was
actually presented by Plato in his lecture on the Good, the
frequency with which this conception occurs in Aristotle suggests
29
that it might well have been current in the Old Academy .
(2) The evidence of Nicomachus of Gerasa, of Iamblichus and
of the Pythagorean Anon. Photii, and in particular Proclus'
statement that the relevant definition of the is Pythagorean clearly indicate that in later antiquity the conception
in question was current first and foremost among Neopythagoreans. Consequently the probability is that we are here faced
not with a continuity of Academic tradition but rather with an
instance of the Neopythagorean revival of doctrines current in
the Early Academy. If this is the case, then the presence in
Clement's account of this conception of the and the
may be regarded as suggestive of Neopythagorean influence thereon.
There is a further indication of Neopythagorean influence
in Maximus of Tyre's brief mention of the via negationis30 :
, , ,
, '
, ,
} '
, , , . T h e sequence ,
, , is informative.
Festugire31 compares the Hermetic Exc. Stob. 6. 19 ( I I I . 39
N - F ) 3 2 : , ,
29
30
31
32
116
JOHN WHITTAKER
33
34
35
De opific. 120.
T h e same list occurs in a Pythagorean context at Lydus, De mens. 2. 12,
p. 3 5 . 2 ff. Wnsch and with Anatolius as source at Iamblichus, Theolog,
arithm. 7, p . 5 5 . 9 f. de Falco (this latter reference is not noticed by Wnsch
in the case of Lydus nor by Cohn and Wendland in the case of Philo).
Didasc. 1 0 , p . 1 6 4 H e r m a n n
,
,
, ,
,
. However, unlike Maximus, Justin (see . 36 below),
Clem. Alex, (see p. 113 above), and Celsus, who criticizes the Christians
for attributing , and to God (cf. Origen, Contra Cels.
6. 64, P G 11, col. 1396), Albinus does not deny to his first principle
but states (loc. cit.) ,
. Politicus 275 8 f. ( ',
,
, . . . ) might provide
Platonic authority for Albinus' viewpoint but cf. below on Phaedrus
247
6 f. I t is doubtful whether Celsus in criticizing the Christians had
the Neopythagorean list in mind. T h e combination , is
quite common: cf. Aristotle, De part. anim. 640 b 32 ff. = D - K 68
, xa ) ;
6, Theaetetus 163
117
perhaps just possible that Clement had this same list in mind
when he wrote at the close of the passage quoted above
, , , ,
, ,
' , 7.
But whatever the value of these slight indications of Neopythagorean influence, it has been adequately demonstrated
36
36a
37
10; Aristotle, Eth. Nie. 1118 a 4 and Meteor. 372 a 30 ff., cf. further
Bonitz, Index s.v. ; consecutive sections of the Planta of Aetius are
labelled and (Diels, Doxogr. pp. 312 f.).
Furthermore, Festugire (op. cit. (see n. 8 above), 226 n. 4) has rightlystressed the influence of Plato, Phaedrus 247
6 f.
xa (cf. also, as Festugire (loe.
cit.) notes, Symp. 211 A 5 ff.). The Phaedrus passage was a popular Platonic
commonplace, quoted, e.g., by Origen (Contra Cels. 6. 19, PG 11, col.
1320) and Clem. Alex. (Strom. 5 . 3 , PG 9, cols. 32 f.). Festugire (loe.
cit.) is however clearly mistaken in referring to the passage of Albinus
quoted at the head of this footnote as a paraphrase of Phaedrus 247 6 f.
The Phaedrus text was indeed, as Festugire remarks, frequently paraphrased; cf. Iamblichus, De myst. I. 18 (54. 11 ff.), the Hermetic Exc.
Stob. 2 A. 15 (III. 7 N-F) and 8. 2. 2(111. 47 N-F), C.H. 13. 6 (II. 202.
14 ff. N-F.) Nevertheless Albinus is clearly drawing upon a different
source.
Dial,
Tryph. 4, PG 6, col. 484 . . . . . .,
, , , ,
(cf. Philo, De opific. 120
, Iamblichus,
Theolog, arithm. 7, p. 55. 9 de Falco , Lydus, De mens.
2.12, p. 35.4f. W.
).
De prineip. I. 1. 6, PG 11, col. 125 Non ergo aut corpus aliquod, aut.in
corpore esse putandus est Deus, sed intellectualis natura simplex, . . .
Mens vero ut moveatur vel operetur, non indget loco corporeo ( =
?), eque sensibili magnitudine ( = ), vel corporali
habitu ( = ) aut colore ( = ), neque alio ullo prorsus indiget
horum quae corporis vel materiae propria sunt. Cp. ibid. I. 2. 2, PG
11, col. 130 Si ergo semel recte receptum est, unigenitum Filium Dei,
sapientiam eius esse substantialiter subsistentem, nescio si iam ultra evagari sensus noster debeat ad suspicandum, ne forte ipsa , id
est substantia eius corporeum aliquid habeat, cum omne quod corporeum
est, vel habitu, vel colore, vel magnitudine designetur. Ibid. I. 2. 4, PG 11,
col. 133 Quia hae omnes appellationes ex operibus eius (se. Filii Dei)
virtutibus nominatae sunt, et in nulla harum vel levi opinione intelligi
corporale aliquid potest, quod vel magnitudinem designare videatur, vel habitum,
vel colorent.
Seep. 113 above.
118
JOHN WHITTAKER
39
119
' ,
,
, '
*0), and such statements of Plotinus as <5
' (Enn. 6. 9. 3) in mind, Wolfson claims 41
that 'both Albinus and Plotinus use the term aphairesis in the
technical sense of Aristotle's apophasis'. , Wolfson explains42, 'refers to a proposition which is negative in quality,
and in such a proposition the negation of the predicate is possible
even of a subject of which that predicate never could be affirmed,
as, for instance, the proposition "the wall is not seeing".' This
is, of course, perfectly true, but when Wolfson gives the impression
in his discussion43 that it is only this latter type of proposition
(e.g., 'the wall is not seeing') to which the term correctly refers he is introducing a limitation of the concept of
for which .there is no Aristotelian basis, is
Aristotle's general term for negation (cf. De interpr. 17 a 25 f.
), and or,
more correctly perhaps, (Metaph. 1056 a 24)
is a subdivision thereof; as Aristotle puts it (Metaph. 1011 b
40
41
42
43
120
JOHN WHITTAKER
19 f.) .
I t is not true as Wolfson claims 4 4 that 'in Aristotle, " n e g a t i o n "
in its strictly technical sense of a logical negation is contrasted
with the term "privation".' Strictly speaking is contrasted with and with as at Cat. l i b
17 ff. ,
, , rj ,
. When however is used to denote a type of
proposition (namely, privative), then it is not contrasted with
but subordinated to it. Nor does the account of Alexander of Aphrodisias to which Wolfson refers45 give any indication
that he regarded otherwise than as a subdivision of
16 :
,
.
' ,
,
' (
, '
), '
. ,
, , ,
, . ,
,
. It may be added that there is no
specific Aristotelian term to cover the type of proposition which
Wolfson has in mind, i.e., 'the wall is not seeing'.
On the subject of it may be noted that Aristotle
seems on occasion to admit the use of this term simply as an
equivalent of . At Metaph. 1022 b 22 f. we read
44
45
46
121
iva ,
f , .
Ross, ad lac, claims that the words indicate
that in this sense is not identical with negation, since
there are some attributes 'which cannot be possessed by anything, e.g., (according to Aristotle's doctrine) "actually infinite".'
Ross's interpretation is difficult to maintain in view of Metaph.
1046 a 31 ff.
], ., and (contra Ross, loe. cit.) Metaph.
1055 b 3 ff.
, ,
. The phrase v surely covers both
is not- actually infinite' (which, according to Ross's interpretation, the definition of at Metaph. 1022 b 22 ff.
was intended to exclude!) and, e.g., 'the wall is not seeing'.
It is noteworthy that whenever Aristotle lists the meanings of
it is this broad meaning of the term which appears
first. It may be noted further that in the Prior Analytics
occurs frequently as the equivalent of ; cf., e.g., .
Anal. pr. 25 a 6.
Chrysippus, too, who devoted an entire work to the subject
of " and whose treatment of the subject appears to have
been more detailed than that of Aristotle, emphasizes the ambiguity of the term and admits the priority of the more
general usage of the term. After distinguishing and
he continues 1 8 :
f ,
,
.
f , ,
,
.
.
Furthermore, it may be doubted whether is used,
as Wolfson argues, by Albinus as an equivalent of ,
47
48
122
JOHN WHITTAKER
whether in the broad Aristotelian sense or the narrower Wolfsonian. With reference to Albinus' mathematical illustration
of the via negationis Wolfson readily admits49, 'The passage as
it stands would seem to deal not with the manner in which we
can speak of God, but rather with the method by which we can
arrive at a conception of God.' Wolfson seeks to avoid this
major difficulty by claiming that 5 0 'what he (sc. Albinus) means
to explain is not only how we can form a conception of God
but also how we can describe God, and, with regard to the latter,
his explanation is that we can describe God negatively, in the
same way as Euclid defines a point negatively.' Now it is no
doubt a corollary to Albinus' statement that we can form a
conception of God by 'abstracting' from Him, that we can
describe Him by means of negative statements. But this in no way
alters the fact that Albinus is here dealing only with the problem
of forming a conception of God. The corollary remains unstated.
Moreover, this same usage of and its cognates
(i.e., to describe an act of thought) is already obvious in Aristotle.
Cf., e.g., Metaph. 1061 a 2 8 ff. ( '
(
,
,
, ,
' " ' , .)) ; Metaph. 1029
a 16 ff. {
^,
) ; Metaph. 1036 b I ff., where Aristotle is dealing with
the difficulty of conceiving form without matter, (
o '
).
It is evident from the above examples that Aristotle's use of
the relevant terms has exercised influence upon the formulations
of the via negationis which we have been considering. It is equally
evident that in Aristotle these terms refer to mental acts rather
than to negative statements. Plutarch in the passage quoted
49
50
123
in footnote 19 (
) is clearly influenced by Aristotelian terminology.
The use of the verbs and (cf. Metaph. 1061
a 28 ff., cited on p. 122 above) in the context of Clement's version
of the via negationis (see p. 112 above) corresponds precisely to
their Aristotelian usage. Similarly in the version of Maximus
of Tyre (see p. 115 above) can refer only to an act
of thought (cf. . . . ) .
There is thus no good reason to suppose that in Albums the
phrase has anything to do with negation as such.
In the passage in question Albinus is concerned purely with
the.problem of forming a conception of God. The matter of
negative statements lies outside the scope of his exposition.
In the case of Plotinus the situation is perhaps slightly different. At Enn. 6. 7. 36 (
) the term is clearly
used in the same sense as in Albinus and Plutarch 51 . Plotinus
is referring briefly to current and familiar methods of conceiving
the deity, and in this context, as we have seen, has
nothing to do with negation52. It should also be noted that
is used frequently by Plotinus in statements dealing
with the via negationis. That what Plotinus had in mind in such
passages was not negation but a mental process of abstraction
is obvious from the following (Enn. 6. 8. 21) : (ofh>y ,
, ,
Here the meaning of
is decided by the contrasted verb ; this latter
term, borrowed from mathematics, cannot mean 'assert' and
consequently in the same context cannot mean 'deny'.
51
52
53
I t is by no means as evident as Wolfson claims (op. cit., 119 f.) that Enn.
5. 3. 14 ("H,
r , , '
, , , ,
, .) is intended as an explanation of .
Neither this latter term nor any of its cognates appear in the passage
in question or in its immediate context.
See pp. 121 f. above.
See further Enn. 5. 3.17 ( ) and Enn. 5 . 5 . 1 3 ( ).
Em. 6. 9.. 9 (
) .
124
JOHN WHITTAKER
55
56
47
'Albinus and Plotinus on divine attributes', 129 f., and 'Negative attributes
in the Church Fathers a n d the Gnostic Basilides', 148 ff.
Cf. abo De anim. 429 b 18 and 431 b 12.
Cf. n. 54 above.
There are further instances of this type of definition in a passage of
Gregory of Nyssa (De anima et resurrectione, PG 46, col. 40) to which
125
, ,
.
and
are quite clearly intended as equivalents.