Searle's Causal Powers

Author(s): Ted A. Warfield

Source: Analysis, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 29-32
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee
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THE COMPLETENESS OF 'PHYSICS'

29

References
Crane, T. 1991. Why indeed? Analysis 51: 32-37.
Crane, T. 1995. The mental causation debate. Aristotelian Society Supplementary
Volume69: 211-36.
Papineau,D. 1991. The reason why: response to Crane. Analysis 51: 37-40.
Papineau,D. 1993. Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Papineau, D. Forthcoming. Mind the gap. In Philosophical Perspectives 12 ed. J.
Tomberlin.Oxford: Blackwell.
Woolhouse, R. 1985. Leibniz's reaction to Cartesian interaction. Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 86: 69-82.

Searle'scausal powers
TED A. WARFIELD

In his importantarticle 'Minds, brainsand programs'(Searle1980) and

again in the second chapterof his widely influentialbook Minds, Brains
and Science, John Searle (1984) defends several controversial claims
includingmost famously:
(1) Programsare not minds and are not by themselvessufficientfor
havingminds.
The 'ChineseRoom' argumentfor (1) has beenwidely discussedand I will
not add to this voluminousliteraturehere.1
Among the other claims that Searle argues for in the works just
mentionedis
(2) Anything with (or that causes or that has) a mind must have
causal powers at least equivalentto those of the brain.
Surprisingly,this claim of Searle'shas, so far as I am aware, gone unchallenged for over a decade. This is all the more shockingwhen we see that
Searleis willing to inferfrom conclusionsmarkedlylike (1) and (2) that
(3) Any attemptliterallyto createintentionalityartificiallycould not
succeedjust by designingprogramsbut would have to duplicate
the causalpowers of the humanbrain.2

1Elsewhere(Warfieldforthcoming)I arguethatwhile (1) is trueit does not threaten

anyprominentresearchprogramin mainstream
philosophyof mind.
2 Emphasisadded.Foroneexampleof this,seeSearle1980:417. Inother
placesSearle
is morecarefulandinsteadof 'humanbrains'says'humanor animalbrains'andthis
is how we shouldunderstand
him.
ANALYSIS
59.1, January1999, pp. 29-32. ? TedA. Warfield

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30

TED A. WARFIELD

thatseemsto rule
rolein anargument
(2)is thusseento playanimportant
out the possibilityof 'simple'mindedrobotsand othersortsof artificial
creatures.Buildinga genuinelymindedartifact,Searleseemsto be telling
us, requiresthat we produceartifactspossessingcausalpowersat least
equivalentto human(oranimal,seenote2) brains.
I will examineSearle'sargumentfor (2). Thereis a trivialreadingon
which(2) is truebutdoesnot (andcannotbe usedto) ruleout the possibilityof genuinelymindedrobotswithfarlesscausalpowerthanthatof
brains.Thereis a strongreadingof (2) strongenoughto ruleout 'simple'
mindedrobotsbut Searlehasprovidedno argumentat all for (2) understoodin thisway.
Searleclaimsthat(2) followsdirectlyfromjustonepremiss,thepremiss
that brainscauseminds.Let'sgrantthis premissand see whereit leads.
Brainscauseminds,let us assume(Searlethinkswe knowthisandso will
let us assumeit) byvirtueof thepresenceof certain(wearen'tsurewhich)
structures
andtheexerciseof certain(weknownotwhich)
neurobiological
A
certain
minimalamountof poweris, of course,
biologicalcapacities.
to
cause
or
a
mind.
Wedo notknowwhatthisminimal
necessary
produce
amountis, but we know that brainsat leastmeetthis minimum.It is a trivial fact that for any objectother than a brainto cause a mind it too would
haveto meet or exceedthe thresholdof minimallynecessarycausalpower.
On this trivialreadingI am happyto grant (2).
Searle seems to have more in mind than this trivial reading of (2),
however,for when he applies (2) he seemsto adopt a much strongerinterpretation. Specifically,Searle seems to, when wielding (2) against his
philosophicalopponents,forgetthe part about the minimalthreshold.On
this, the strong reading of (2), I will show, Searle makes the unargued
assumptionthat the full causalpower of the brainis the minimalthreshold
necessaryfor causinga mind.
Considerone of Searle'sanalogiesused in supportof this argument.He
writes: 'if my petrol engine drivesmy car at 75 miles an hour, then any
diesel engine capable of doing that would have to have power output at
least equivalentto that of my petrol engine' (1984: 40-41). This claim
assumesthat the full causalpowerof my petrolengineis necessaryfor driving the car at 75 m.p.h. After all, it is consistentwith my petrol engine's
drivingmy car at 75 m.p.h. that it has causal power sufficientfor going
even faster (say,95 m.p.h.). If the maximumpower of my petrol engineis
not necessaryfor drivingmy car at 75 m.p.h. it is false that any diesel
enginecapableof drivingmy car at 75 m.p.h. has at least as much causal
power as my petrol engine;the petrol enginemay be more powerful.Let's
applythis lesson to the brainand Searle'sclaimthat causalpowers at least
equal to the brain are needed for causing a mind. The corresponding neces-

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SEARLE'S CAUSAL POWERS

31

sary assumptionfor making the nontrivialstrong claim is that the brain

requiresits full causalpowersin orderto causethe mind.This is the hidden
assumptionthat Searleseems to make when he wields his conclusionthat
power equal to that of the brain is necessaryfor causing a mind against
various opponents. Without this additional assumption, for example,
Searleis simple not entitledto claim that 'Any attemptliterallyto create
intentionalityartificially... would have to duplicatethe causal powers of
the human brain'(1984: 417). Searlewould be entitledto this claim only
if he providedan argumentfor the claimthat the full power of the brainis
necessaryfor intentionality.This, however,simply does not follow from
the fact that brainshave sufficientcausalpower for intentionality.
Here'sa differentexample in which Searlehas used the strong reading
of (2) to argue against a philosophicalopponent. In his recent review of
David Chalmers'sbook The ConsciousMind, Searle(1997) arguesagainst
panpsychismas follows:
Searleagainst the panpsychists
P1. Panpsychismimpliesthat thermostatshave minds (beliefsabout
the temperaturefor example).
P2. Having a mind requireshaving causal powers equivalentto the
humanbrain.
P3. Brainshave (much)greatercausalpower than thermostats.
C1. So, thermostatsdo not have minds
C2. So, panpsychismis false.
(P2) is clearlythe key premissof this argument.The premissis ambiguous
betweenthe trivialand strongreadingsidentifiedabove.
On the trivialreading,Searle'sargumentis invalid.(C1) does not follow
from the premissesof the argumenton the trivialreadingof (P2). The fact
that thermostatshave much less causalpower than brainsonly shows that
thermostatsdon't cause minds if we assumethat the greaterpower of the
brainis requiredto cause a mind. But this assumptiongoes far beyondthe
trivialreadingof (P2).
On the strong readingof (P2), however,while the argumentis certainly
valid, Searlehas given us no reasonfor believing(P2). He has not offered
a reason for thinking that the full causal of the brain is identical to the
minimalthresholdof causal power necessaryfor causingminds.3
A final illustration of the strong and weak understandingsof (2) is
Searle'sdiscussion of Martians (1984: 41). Suppose, Searletells us, that
Martiansarrive and we become firmlyconvinced (and are correct) that
3 Like Searle I think that panpsychism is obviously false. I discuss Searle's argument
against panpsychism not to suggest a revival of panpsychism but only to illustrate
Searle'sstrong understandingof (2).

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32

TED A. WARFIELD

theseMartianshavementalstates.Ifwe openeduptheirheadsanddiscoveredthattheycontainednot brainslikeoursbutrathergreenslimeinstead,

Searleclaimsthatwe couldconcludethatbecausethe greenslimeis causinga mindit hascausalpowersat leastequalto thepowerof the brain.
Thisclaimagainadmitsboththetrivialandstrongreadings.Onthetrivial readingtheclaimis true,butuninteresting.
Sincetheslimeis producing
a mindit mustof coursehavethe minimalcausalpowersnecessaryfor
doingso. If Searleintendsthestrongreading,however(onwhichwe could
concludethatthe slimeis at leastas causallypowerfulas brains),he needs
to showthatthefullpowerof thebrainis necessary
forcausinga mindand
he hasnot donethis.Indeed,he hasnot evenattemptedto do this.
To conclude,Searleseems,withclaimssuchas (3) andin his discussion
of Martians,to thinkthathehasruledoutthepossibilityof creatures
with
mindscausedbyandrealizedin objectswithlesscausalpowerthanthatof
brains.But rulingout this possibilityrequiresthe strongreadingof the
claimthatcausalpowersequivalent
to the brainarenecessaryfor having
a mind.AsI haveemphasized,
Searlehasprovidedno supportat allforthis
strongclaim.
Thegoalof producingsuchartificialmindsis one importantgoalof AI
research,andfor all Searlehasshown,thegoalis attainable.4
The University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN 46556
warfield.3@nd.edu

References
Chalmers,D. 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
Searle, J. 1980. Minds, brains, and programs. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:
417-57.
Searle,J. 1984. Minds, Brainsand Science. Harvard.
Searle, J. 1997. Consciousness and the philosophers. New York Review of Books,
March 6.
Warfield, T. Forthcoming. The Chinese Room, the Language of Thought, and the
psychosemanticprogram'.

4 Afterthis paperwas acceptedSearle'sThe Mysteryof Consciousnessappeared.In

this bookSearlemaintainsthathe intendsonlythe weakreadingof (2). Searledoes
not, however,explainhowthisweakreadingof (2) is supposedto supportthestrong
claimshe basesuponit.

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