Do We Have Special Moral Duties To Our Fellow Countrymen?

Fabian Rosen, Nationalism Today, Final Essay
Do we have special moral duties to our fellow countrymen?

In this paper, I will analyse whether we have special moral duties to our fellow
countrymen. To this end I will examine two justifications of moral partiality to
our fellow nationals and launch some criticisms against both views. First I will
assess David Millers defence of national partiality. Miller identifies three features
of a relationship, which may, if all three of them are fulfilled, justify special moral
obligations. He argues that the relationship needs to be intrinsically valuable;
that the idea of special obligations has to be integral to the relationship and that
the relationship in question is not inherently unjust. I will show that while the
relations between fellow nationals are not inherently unjust, they are also not
intrinsically valuable and further I will argue that the idea of special obligations
is not integral to the concept of national identity. Having shown that Millers
account fails, I will next analyse Thomas Hurkas defence of national partiality.
Hurka attempts to show that national partiality can be justified, by analysing the
conditions that justify special obligations emerging from familiar relationships.
He claims that the basis for special obligations are one an intimate or close
historical relationship and the production of benefits by this relationship. He
then claims that, while national relations are less intimate than family relations,
they are sufficiently similar in the production of benefits. This then justifies
moral partiality to ones compatriots, even though this partiality is not as strong
as it would be towards ones family members. I will argue that Hurkas defence of
national partiality is also not successful. First I will show that Hurka ignores the
motivations of family members and fellow nationals for their relations,
equivocates between two conceptions of nationality and finally that benefits
resulting from a relationship in fact have no bearing on the special duties
justified by that relationship.
Before discussing Millers account of national partiality, it is important to outline
and clarify some of the concepts used in this paper. First we need to briefly
clarify what we mean by a national group. Two conceptions come to mind. The
first is that of a nation state, many examples of which can be found in the current
international political landscape. I will call this the broad conception of

nationalism. The other, narrow conception, views national groups as groups who
share a common history, culture and language, even though they may not
necessarily be organised in an independent state or have political autonomy,
although they may. For the purpose of this essay I will conceive of national
groups in the second, narrower sense. The second distinction that needs to be
drawn is the distinction between general and special duties. General duties are
owed in virtue of nothing but our status as persons; special duties are owed only
to some subset of humanity, in virtue of some interaction or relationship.
Arguably two central features of morality are its universality and impartiality.1
The reasons for the moral controversy that nationalism tends to generate arise
from the character of nationalism as a form of partiality. This is because
nationalists place more weight on the wellbeing of their own nation and its
members than the wellbeing of other nations and their members. This, then,
raises the moral issue whether this national partiality can be morally justified or
whether human morality should be impartial qua the national backgrounds of
other individuals. The issue is intensified as most people do hold the intuition
that we do have some special (partial) moral obligations, for example to family
members and friends. An example that can illustrate this is the following.
Imagine your mother is currently dining at her home with a public benefactor,
when her house catches fire. You are in the position to only save one of the two
people in the house, who are you morally obliged to save?2 Most people will
concede that one has a special obligation to save ones mother, even though, in
purely consequentialist terms, one may argue that saving the public benefactor is
more desirable. Hence, according to common sense morality one not only can
but also should care more about ones family members than a stranger. Of course
not all forms of partiality are morally acceptable. Racial partiality, the
preferential moral treatment of members of the same race, for example is widely
disapproved of and rightly so.3 A philosophical discussion of whether we have
special obligations towards our fellow countrymen then has to examine the
R. E. Goodin, Whats so special about our fellow countrymen, Ethics, Vol. 98, No. 4. (1988), p.
664
2 Ibid, p. 665
3 T. Hurka, The Justification of National Partiality, in The Morality of Nationalism, ed. R. McKim
and J. McMahan, Oxford University Press (1997), p. 139
1

features of nationalism as one form of partiality amongst others.4 The question
then isnt whether moral partiality in general can be accepted, but rather,
assuming that moral partiality is justified in some instances (such as the family),
whether national partiality is one of these cases?
To examine this issue, it is important to analyse what features generally justify
attitudes of partiality. From our example above, it seems that caring more about
certain people, such as ones mother, is appropriate only when one stands in a
special relationship to those individuals. Can we identify precisely what these
relations are and to what degree they hold among members of the same nation? 5
How then can we justify moral partiality towards our fellow nationals? The first
and most straightforward way in which this can be done actually consists in
denying a lot of the claims made in the paragraph above. While the imperialist
view of morality claims that morality is universal and, as the name suggests,
impartial, we can also support a communitarian notion of morality. According to
such a communitarian or partialist conception, morality arises only within
particular communities and hence has to differentiate between members of that
community and those who are not members, demanding certain preferential
treatment of ones kin. David Miller formulated one such view I want to analyse,
in his book National Responsibility and Global Justice. As we have already
outlined, some relationships, such as family bonds for example, do generate
special duties. The question then is, whether shared nationality is the sort of
relationship that can legitimately generate such duties. Three features are
identified as essential features of such special duty legitimizing relationships.
Firstly, they arise only from relationships that are intrinsically valuable.
Secondly, these special duties have to be integral to the relationship, so that the
relationship in question could not exist without the acknowledgement of special
duties between the parties involved. And thirdly the very nature of the
attachments or relationships that generate special duties cannot be inherently
unjust. A detailed analysis of how Miller derives these three principles goes
T. Hurka, The Justification of National Partiality, in The Morality of Nationalism, ed. R. McKim
4

beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore all I will do here is simply concede that
this is indeed what is required of a relationship to ground special duties and
analyze whether national bonds actually adhere to these features.
First lets discuss whether the bond of nationality is intrinsically valuable. To
claim that nationality is intrinsically valuable seems to be very counterintuitive
at first and many people have argued that nationality is mainly of instrumental
value, for example in helping us achieve a stable democracy. But Miller views the
instrumental value of nationality as being parasitic on its intrinsically valuable
features.6 This is because fellow nationals first need to believe in the intrinsic
value of their relationship, and the importance of preserving it over time, in
order to achieve all the instrumental benefits that follow from a shared
nationality. A purely instrumental political association could operate in the way a
national community does. This claim is backed up by peoples actual evaluations,
which do seem to value nationality intrinsically. Of course even Miller
acknowledges that there is no logical connection between peoples valuations of
national bonds as intrinsically valued and their actually being intrinsically
valuable. However, he claims the only evidence that something is desirable is
that people do in fact desire it, and therefore places the burden of proof on those
who claim that national bonds are not intrinsically valuable and that peoples
intuitions in this case are misguided. I see two ways in which this can, however,
be shown or at least argued. The first is to claim that our valuation of national
bonds has an evolutionary origin and that they are simply an extension of our
familiar bonds. An excellent defence of such a view was given by Frank Salter in
his A Defence and an Extension of Pierre van den Berghes Theory of Ethnic
Nepotism.7 The Argument would then be formulated along the following lines.
Since our current nationalist valuations arise from the early, more familiar bonds
of hunter-gatherer tribes, we still intuitively judge them to be intrinsically
valuable, even though modern national groups share no common features (such
as common family ties and genetic links) with those early tribal groups.
Therefore, while these early bonds were real, modern national bonds are not, as
D. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford University Press (2007), p. 38
F. Salter, A Defence and an Extension of Pierre van den Berghes Theory of Ethnic Nepotism, in
Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Conflict, ed. P. James and D. Goetze, Praeger (2001), p. 39 - 69
6
7

most members dont even know 99.9% of their fellow nationals. Thus while
these early bonds were real, involving direct interaction and personal
attachment, modern national bonds are not real, and rather an imaginary
extension of these early ties. Miller is aware of this, in my opinion most severe,
criticism of his view and counters that this critique would apply to many kinds of
attachments, such as religious groups, professional associations and football fan
clubs.8 However, this reply fails and rather underlines the point I have argued
above, as I dont believe there to be any intrinsic value to any of these kinds of
attachments. In fact it seems to be a very strange claim to argue that professional
associations and football fan clubs should have intrinsic value. His basis for this
claim is that in all those cases, members share an understanding of what it is
they are members of and what distinguishes them from outsiders, which in his
opinion is a strong enough link to create a relationship of genuine value. 9 But is
sharing the same pro attitude towards some metaphysical opinion or sport team
and being able to distinguish oneself from outsiders really enough to create a
relationship of genuine and intrinsic value? This would mean that virtually every
human association has intrinsic value, from biker gangs to cults and sects such as
the Ku Klux Klan. These implications show that simply having a similar pro
attitude on a given topic and understanding what one is a member of and what
distinguishes one from outsiders is not sufficient to create relationships of
genuine intrinsic value.
The second claim I want to scrutinize is that these special duties have to be
integral to the relationship, so that the relationship in question could not exist
without the acknowledgement of special duties between the parties involved.
Alternatively, one could argue that people value national identity through
participation in cultural events and activities and appreciation of the culture that
one shares with ones nationals, without thinking that this gives us any particular
moral reasons to give preferential treatment to those people. Miller draws the
comparison of fans of blues music, which he says enjoy listening to the same
music and mingling with fans, but dont feel like they have special
8
9
Ibid., p. 38 - 39

responsibilities to one another or to keep blues music alive. However he claims
national identity is very different from love of blues music, because it can
underpin political beliefs and values and locate people as part of a project to
preserve the national culture. These functions then presuppose that nations are
ethical communities whose members have special responsibilities both to
support one another and preserve the community. 10 Millers argument, in
premise conclusion form then is:
P1: National identity can underpin shared political beliefs and ethical values.
P2: National identity can locate people in an intergenerational project
C: These functions presuppose nations are ethical communities whose members
have special responsibilities to support another and preserve the community.
First I want to criticize and question the connection between premise one and
the conclusion. Why does it follow from the fact that nations are ethical
communities who share moral values and beliefs that we have special
responsibilities to our fellow nationals? One can be a moral relativist, holding
that moral principles are part of human cultures and nations and hence also
differ amongst them, while still believing that we have no special moral duties to
our compatriots. We may have a more similar conception of morality or the
common good, but this does not entail that I have stronger moral responsibilities
toward people with more similar conceptions of morality, i.e. my fellow
nationals. Imagine the following example, where two people are drowning in a
pond, one of them is a fellow national of mine, and one is a member of a different
national community. I can only save one before they drown. Do I really have a
weightier moral reason to save my fellow national, in the same or even just
similar way I would have if one of the two people were a close family member or
friend? The greater similarity of our moral ideals does not provide sufficient
justification for special moral duties amongst us, unlike family ties, which would
create genuine special responsibilities. Therefore the fact that nations are ethical
communities does not mean members have special duties to one another.
Next I want to criticize Millers second premise. He claims that because national
10
Ibid., p. 40

identity can locate people in an intergenerational project to preserve their
culture, this motivates special moral responsibilities to preserve that culture. He
makes the comparison that lovers of music cannot feel part of such an
intergenerational project. But why can they not also feel part of a project to
preserve something they value in their lives for future generations, just as some
people want to preserve the culture or nation they value. This solely depends on
the level of attachment or value one attributes to his national identity or music.
And just as there will be members of a national community who feel a strong
moral imperative to preserve their culture and some who wont, there will be
some lovers of music who will feel a moral imperative to preserve their valued
kind of music and some who wont. This is not a distinctive feature of nationality,
but rather the common human impulse to preserve the things we value, weather
this is music, moral or cultural beliefs or even political opinions. This, however,
does in no way imply that I have special moral duties to any of the many other
people who value a similar culture or set of values and beliefs as me and want to
preserve it for future generations. Therefore, because their national identity is
not the only thing people value and want to preserve through generations, and
since we dont believe special moral duties exist amongst the other groups of
people that take part in such efforts of preservation, this also does not provide
sufficient justification for special moral duties amongst fellow nationals.
The third claim I want to analyse is whether or not national attachments are
inherently unjust, as one cannot have any special moral duties to any group or
organization that is inherently unjust. Therefor Miller mentions this as the third
necessary condition for the grounding of special duties. 11 Why may we think
that special duties to ones fellow nationals may be inherently unjust? Because
through the formation of an in group with members who give preferential
treatment to one another, there will be inevitably some people who get left out,
receiving no such extra benefits. An example may illustrate the point. Take the
case of Tim, Tom and John, who initially all have equal responsibilities to one
another. One day, Tim and Tom decide to form an in group, assigning special
moral weight and hence duties to their relationship, while John gets left out. Tim
11Ibid.,
p. 36

and Tom have become better off through the formation of their special
relationship, while John is comparatively worse off. 12 Numerous replies and
adaptations of this so called distributive objection to special duties are possible,
however I believe Millers reply is sufficient to show that special duties to
compatriots are not inherently unjust. Miller points out that the example
depends on the assumption that all people have equal responsibilities to one
anther by default. The example relies on the assumption that our general duties
to all humans are universal. Rather than assuming that morality is universally
applicable to all humans, Miller proposes that under a Sufficientarian view, one
may hold that our general duties to all humans are to be defined using some
minimal threshold notion, such as the human rights, which have to be upheld
and defended everywhere. But then we can consistently have special moral
duties on top of this, to provide higher levels of welfare to our fellow nationals.13
Therefor the example and claim that special duties to our fellow nationals are
inherently unjust depends upon a particular conception of the general duties
that obtain beforehand. This notion, however, can be defined in a variety of ways,
which can be contested. Therefore I will concede that Millers reply to the
distributive objection is successful, and I have not been able to show that special
duties to our fellow nationals are inherently unjust. However, I have shown that
the bond between fellow nationals is not intrinsically valuable, and that the idea
of special duties is not inherent in the relationship that maintains between fellow
nationals. As all three conditions have to be fulfilled in order to meet the
necessary and sufficient requirements for the emergence of special duties,
Millers account is unsuccessful in establishing that we have special moral duties
to our compatriots.
The next account that tries to justify special duties to our fellow nationals, I want
to analyse, was proposed by Thomas Hurka.14 Hurkas starting point for his
justification is the recognition that partiality towards ones family, is morally
permissible or even required, while other forms of partiality, such as racial
Ibid., p. 42
and J. McMahan, Oxford University Press (1997), p. 139 - 155
12
13

partiality, are widely condemned. Hurka then assumes that the necessary
conditions for moral partiality are met by familiar relationships, and analyses
what it is about familiar relations that warrants special duties, and whether
nationalism shares these features. Hurka identifies two such features, the first is
a history of intimate interaction, the second is that this historical interaction has
produced good results. He concludes that national interaction is naturally less
intimate than familiar relations, as we have already pointed out that one rarely
even knows the very vast majority of ones conationals. But he argues that along
the second dimension, that of producing good outcomes from the interaction,
national relations fare similarly well as familiar relations. Therefore he
concludes that our national bonds justify partiality, even though this partiality is
less than the one justified by our familiar bonds. The first of these claims seems
indisputable and doesnt require further analysis as conationals certainly have
less intimate relationships than families.
But Hurka argues that both
relationships produce good or result in good outcomes. He compares the mutual

benefits that the cooperation between spouses brings to those that ones
relationship with ones conationals brings, such as a shared health and social
security system. From these observations he generalizes a principle that justifies
partiality where some activities and states of people, most notably their doing
good or suffering evil, call for a positive, caring, or associative response. Others,
such as their doing evil, call for a negative or dissociative response. Partiality
between people is appropriate when they have shared in the past in the first
kind of activity or state.15 He further adds that the greater the intimacy of the
relationship between two people, or the greater the good that is produced by
their relationship, the more justified moral partiality is.
Having sketched Hurkas account of special duties between fellow nationals, I will
now critically assess whether this account provides sufficient justification for
preferential treatment of ones conationals. In my first critique I will first focus on
the kinds of beneficial relationships that exist between fellow family members
and fellow nationals. It is important to note that the benefits created by national
15

relations are very different from those produced by familiar relations. National
Health and Retirement Insurance are examples mentioned by Hurka, but these
benefits differ to the benefits produced by a family, as they are motivated by selfinterest. While familiar relationships are largely altruistic and often require
sacrifice on behalf of the individual for the good of ones family, these national
benefits Hurka describes are motivated by self-interest. It seems that benefits
that emerge from actions motivated by the self-interest, do not justify special
duties in the same way as benefits emerging from actions that are motivated by
altruistic considerations. Imagine a family with three children, two of them
brothers, for example. The two Brothers always help their parents, but do so
only in the hope that this will lead to them being awarded a higher inheritance
than their sister. Would we say that a family like this, where members only
cooperate out of self-interest, would justify special duties amongst its members?
It doesnt appear so, which means that the motivation for an interaction matters
and has an impact on the special duties that can be generated by that interaction.
Further more it is important to note that Hurka equivocates between two
conceptions of nationalism in his defence of special duties amongst conationals.
The first, broader conception, is that of the nation state, a political entity in
which members make joint contributions to some social security or joint
insurance system, vote, have a judiciary system and so on. The other, narrower
definition describes the nation roughly as a cultural element, comprised of
members who share a common language, history and culture. The two are not
necessarily the same, as a nation state (in the first broad sense) can be
comprised of several national communities (in the second narrow sense). I
outlined this distinction in the beginning of this paper. The problem is that
Hurkas defence of nationalism is really a defence of special duties amongst
citizens of the same nation state. If the benefits produced are healthcare and
other social goods, this provides no particular defence of special duties amongst
fellow nationals, at least in the narrow sense. To see this, conceive of a state
comprised of two national groups, say German and Turkish nationals. These two
groups could jointly contribute to the same social security program and produce
the benefits of national interaction that Hurka describes. This, however, provides
no justification of special duties towards ones fellow nationals; if we define

nationality in its second, more narrow sense, as according to Hurkas own
justification, I would have special duties not just to my fellow, lets say German,
nationals, but also to the Turkish nationals who also partake in the benefit
producing relationship. Therefore I have shown that the motivation for an action
is important in evaluating whether special duties emerge from a benefit
producing relationship, assuming that benefit production really is a necessary
condition for the emergence of special duties. The self-interested motivations for
the production of benefits on the national level do not suffice to justify special
duties. Further I have shown, that Hurkas defence, because it commits the
fallacy of equivocation between two conceptions of nationality, is weakened and
at best only provides justification for special duties amongst fellow citizens, not
necessarily fellow nationals, in the narrower sense in which I have defined
nationality.
Above I have argued that if partiality requires that the relationship between the
parties involved produces some good, then motivation for the actions those
parties take matter. Now, however, I want to challenge whether it is really
required that the relation that justifies partiality has to produce some good at all.
Hurka claims that The degree of partiality a history justifies depends partly on
the quantity of goodness it produces or embodies.16 For the sake of analysis, lets
compare two fictional families, each with three children. One family takes great
pleasure in spending time together, regularly eating family meals and helping
each other, thereby producing many benefits. The other is lethargic; its members
live more or less past each other, and produce no benefits. The question is
whether the siblings in one family have greater moral justification for the special
duties they owe to one another? I would argue that they do not. This is not to say
that the siblings in the happy family, dont have more reason to acknowledge
each others special duties, but they do not have greater moral justification for
preferentially treating their family members, than the members of the unhappy
family, The members of the unhappy family would still be morally justified in
preferentially treating their fellow family members, if they wish or choose to do
and J. McMahan, Oxford University Press (1997), p 152, p. 153
16

so, despite the smaller amount of good produced by their familiar relations.
Therefor familiar relationships dont have to produce some good to justify
preferential treatment between its members. A related problem of Hurkas
account can be shown by another example. Assume two plumbers get married,
producing benefits out of the happy relationship they engage in. Now assume
two billionaires and public beneficiaries getting married. Surely the benefits
produced by the latter marriage are greater than those of the former. But do
they, because of that, have greater moral justification for preferential treatment
of one another? Hurkas quote in the beginning of this paragraph would suggest
so, but again the answer appears to be no. These examples then show, that the
benefits produced by a relationship have no bearing on the existence or strength
of the special duties that hold between some individuals. Therefore Hurkas basic
premise, that special duties rely on a historic relationship that has produced
good in the past, and that the degree of partiality permitted depends partly on
the quantity of goodness produced is false.
As we have seen, neither Millers nor Hurkas defence of national partiality is
successful. I have argued that national relations fail to satisfy Millers first two
conditions. They are not intrinsically valuable as his condition that members of a
group need to share an understanding of what it is they are members of and
what distinguishes them from outsiders, is not a strong enough link to create
relationships of genuine moral value. Further, the idea of special obligations is
not integral to relationships between compatriots. While I conceded that nations
are ethical communities who share similar values, I do not believe that it follows
from this that we should be partial to our fellow nationals. Simply having a
similar conception of morality or the common good does not entail that I have
stronger moral responsibilities toward people with more similar conceptions of
morality. As Hurkas arguments fail to show that national relationships satisfy
these three conditions that are required for the emergence of special obligations,
I analysed Thomas Hurkas defence of national partiality. He argues that the only
relationships that justify special obligations are those that have an intimate
history and that produce benefits. I have argued that this is not satisfactory, for
several reasons. First I have shown that, even if we accept that relationships

have to produce benefits to provide a basis for special obligations, motivations
for entering those relationships matter and here familiar and national relations
differ distinctly. Further I have shown that his argument equivocates between
two conceptions of nationality, thereby supporting special duties between
citizens, but not particularly between fellow nationals. Lastly I contested, using
an example, that the creation of benefits is necessary at all to justify the
emergence of special duties. Therefore neither account succeeds at showing that
we have special moral obligations to our fellow countrymen.
(Word Count: 4900)
Bibliography
R. E. Goodin, Whats so special about our fellow countrymen, Ethics, Vol. 98, No.
4. (1988)
T. Hurka, The Justification of National Partiality, in The Morality of Nationalism,
ed. R. McKim and J. McMahan, Oxford University Press (1997)
D. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford University Press
(2007)
F. Salter, A Defence and an Extension of Pierre van den Berghes Theory of
Ethnic Nepotism, in Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Conflict, ed. P. James and D.
Goetze, Praeger (2001)

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Fabian Rosen, Nationalism Today, Final Essay