Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III

Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is
not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond
what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory
Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect
to Art 11 of the Intl Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS),
a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The
WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding
should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health
claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH
issued the assailed RIRR.
Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intl agreements entered into by the Phil are
part of the law of the land and may be implemented by DOH through the
RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with intl agreements
MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in
violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.
Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intl law can become domestic law by
transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or
incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and
WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3
of all members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the
ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation
such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of
ICBMS.
No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that
the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary intl law that may
be deemed part of the law of the land. For an intl rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by
states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules
(opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the
member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of
member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the
provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically
providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to
24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have
not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as
well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as
they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW non-binding
norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not
part of intl law.
Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code
such as Sec. 4(f) ->advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for
infants and young children uo to 24 months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .
These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are
prohibited from implementing said provisions.
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:

The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business).
Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from
having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed
to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical
persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of
term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this
Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and
industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged
in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare
it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
them of their liberty and property without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the
aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive
and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully
justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class
are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by
alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the
legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the
alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit
of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and
makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and
the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the
needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the
State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the
people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of

pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic

control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times
of crisis and emergency.
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take
advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in
the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen
enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the
purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail
business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the
ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund
servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business
here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or
generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle.
In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted
principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does
not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would
be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it
represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could
not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in
the Pasay city market.
Ichong vs. Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995, 31 May 1957
En Banc, Labrador (J), 8 concur
FACTS: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national
security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate
the Retail Business." The main provisions of the Act, among others, are: (1)
a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade; and (2) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of
retail business. Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act,
brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under
him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law; (2) the
subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
and (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic
of the Philippines.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to
remedy really or actually exist; (2) Whether the law was enacted in interest
of national economic survival and security; (3) Does the law deny the equal
protection of the laws and the due process of law?; (4) Do the facts and
circumstances justify the enactment?; (5) Whether there was a defect in

the title of the law; (6) Whether there was a violation of international
treaties and obligations.
HELD: The Court held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance
and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from
dominance and control. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future. The law does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to be
plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere. The provisions of the
law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and
has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected.
Lastly, it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject
and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or
any other conventional agreement. Hence, the petition was denied, with
costs against petitioner.
AGUSTIN vs EDU
88 SCRA 195
FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for
prohibition.Petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen beetle car,model
13035 already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines
with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device in case of
the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended,
as well as the Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order
No 1 issued by Land transportation Commission.Respondent Land
Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no
32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the
use of early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged
that the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing rules and
regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction were considered valid and
constitutional?
HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended
as well as the implementing rules and regulations were valid and
constitutional as a valid measure of police power. The Vienna Convention
on Road signs and signals and the United Nations Organization was ratified
by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety signs
and devices.It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle
found in the Constitution possesses relevance,between the International
law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law prevails.
Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195
Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of
Letter of Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO
Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not
want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device
installed on a vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and
parked cars.

The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of
the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street
or highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power,
equal protection, and due process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers
millionaires at the expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard
to the unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such
acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on
road signs as a regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful
delegation of police power.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese
Army and commanding general of the Japanese forces during the
occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine
Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against
military and civilians. The military commission was establish under
Executive Order 68.

Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case
hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal

jurisdiction is valid

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is
nothing more or less than the power of government inherent in every
sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general
welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the
people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not
also intend to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of
measures calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in
the absence of factual record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation in overthrowing the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims
that the statute was oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were
not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose
of the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because its
installed when parked for 30 minutes and placed from 400 meters from the
car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesnt
violate any constitutional provision.
LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from
the LTO. It only prescribes rge requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended
enforcement for installation of ewds. Bother possess relevance in applying
rules with the decvlaration of principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no
settled legal doctrines.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and

hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on
the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War
Crimes)

HELD:
1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda.
EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art.
2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy.
Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international
law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other
international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle
that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war
of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war.
The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time
but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2
belligerent nations (US and Japan)
2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a
party of interest because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by
the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.
3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and
rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of
court but the provision of this special law.
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese

Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was
charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He
questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National
War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war
criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague
Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.
II. THE ISSUES
Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?
III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality
of E.O. No. 68.]

3.Whether or not Atty. Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port is allowed to

practice law profession in the philippines.

part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to
the conventions.

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Ruling

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the nation.

The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National
War Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war
criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of the
Constitution which states that The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally
accepted principles of international law includes those formed during the
Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international
jurisprudence established by United Nations. These include the principle
that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning,
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes
and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held
accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by
these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such
crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its citizens. It
abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the
mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution.

Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly

committed in the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United
States and thus were equally bound together with the United States and
with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the
belligerent countries. This rights and obligations were not erased by the
assumption of full sovereignty.
Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by special law
and not by the rules of court. There is nothing in the said executive order
which requires that counsel appearing before the said commission must be
attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of

the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention
and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the
United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of
planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable
therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution
Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with
the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of
the our Constitution.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction
to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention
and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to
the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the
rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of
and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international
law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent
nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two
Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our
nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and
extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni 83 Phil 171 (1949)
Facts
Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial
Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war
crimes. As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he
was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal
atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of
of the laws and customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid
court because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is
unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague
Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war
crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a
signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the
United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US
prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issue
1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional
2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case

The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people
have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which
the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the
Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to
parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by
the very provisions of this special law.
On the 3rd issue, the court ruled that the appointment of the two American
attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and
proper that the U.S. which has submitted the vindication of crimes against
her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be
allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. The lest that we
could do in the spirit of comity is to allow this representation in said trial.
SHIGENORI KURODA vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI (83 Phil 171)
Case Digest
Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines is
charged before the military commission with war crimes. The petitioner
tenders that National War Crimes Office established by Executive Order 68
has no jurisdiction over his case since the Philippines is not a signatory of
the Hague Convention. He also claimed that Melville Hussey and Robert
Port are not attorneys authorized to practice law in the Philippines and that
they do not have personality as prosecution since the United Stated is not a
pary in interest in the case.
Issue:
Is Executive Order No. 68 illegal on the ground that the Philippines is not a
signatory of the Hague Convention?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the order is valid and constitutional in
pursuant to Section 3 Article 2 of the Constitution.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part and are wholly based on generally accepted
principles of international law. Such rules and procedures therefore form

CO KIM CHAM vs. ESEBEUIO VALDEZ TAN KEH

75 phil. 113, September 27, 1945
FACTS:
Co Kim Cham had a pending case that was filed during the period
of Japanese occupation. He filed a petition of Mandamus, in which he is
requesting for the judge of the lower court to continue the proceedings in
the Court of First Instance in Manila. But Judge Arsenio P. Dizon refused to
take cognizance of and continue the proceedings of the said case since the
proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas MacArthur
invalidating and nullifying the judicial proceedings and judgments of the
court of the Philippines, in the absence of an enabling law, the lower courts
have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts while the government is under the occupation of the
Japanese.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing
in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines were good and valid.
2.
Whether or not the proclamation issued by General Douglas
MacArthur in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of
any of the government in the Philippines are null and void has invalidated
all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts.
RULLING:
1.
YES. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and
valid. The government, during the Japanese occupation being de facto
government, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of
the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative
acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, are
remain valid after reoccupation of a territory.
2.
NO. The proclamation does not invalidate the judgement and judicial
proceedings. And applying the principles for the exercise of military
authority in an occupied territory, President McKinley, in his executive
order to the Secretary of War of May 19,1898, said in part: "Though the
powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the
municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of
person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the
new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the
occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but
are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This
enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the
administration of justice may, if they accept the authority of the United

States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man
and man under the supervision of the American Commander in Chief."
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to
continue the proceedings in petitioners case on the ground that the
proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas MacArthur
had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of court
during the Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower
courts have no jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings and
that the government established during the Japanese occupation was no de
facto government.
ISSUE:
1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese
occupation remain good and valid?
2.
Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments and
judicial acts and proceedings of said court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said
courts?
HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil
government established by military forces and thus a de facto government
of the second kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto
governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after
reoccupation. It is presumed that the proclamation of General MacArthur
did not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all
the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime.
The existence of the courts depend upon the laws which create and confer
upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in nature, are not
abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed
by legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have
jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases not of political complexion.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the
respondent judge be ordered to continue the proceeding which was
initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation. It is based on the
proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
courts of the Philippines. Furthermore, it was contended that the lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence of
enabling law.
ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese
occupation is in fact a de facto government.
Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the
Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid
even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US
Forces.
HELD: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the
legislative, executive and judicial department of a de facto government is
valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control,
when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during
the continuance and control of said government remain good.

All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion
were good and valid before and remained as such even after the occupied
territory had come again into the power of true and original sovereign.
Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil
case (3012) and continue the proceedings.
Gonzales vs. Hechanova
9 SCRA 230
FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of
67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources.
Thereupon, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed the petition
herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of
foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents are acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act No. 2207,
explicitly, prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts.
HELD: The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled in the
affirmative by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the
Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law
or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
law, ordinance, or executive order, or regulation is in question. In other
words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only
when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also, when it runs counter
to an act of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam
and Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207
enjoins our government not from entering into contracts for the purchase
of rice, but from entering rice, except under the conditions prescribed in
said Act.
A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not
compel our Government to default in the performance of such obligations
as it may have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside
from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the
said commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still be
legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.
9 SCRA 230 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaty vs Executive
Agreements Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice
without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the
National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or
rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized
the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our
local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred
that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because
Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice
and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements
entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the

performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise

of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have
acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an
executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a
statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not
applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists
that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be
given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous
legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in
our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international
agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as
the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In
other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not
only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.
FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said
implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends
RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and
Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be
authorized by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and
Corn administration and any other government agency from importing rice
and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may import
rice under its provisions. They contended that the government has already
constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in
case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and
the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged
executive agreements has been sufficiently established. Even assuming that
said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same
are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said
agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous
legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a
transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce
laws enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the
legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He
may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law,
by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing
for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.