El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No.

L-11390, March 26, 1918

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result
either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law,
or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the
court over the property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that
while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of
its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with
knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco
Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning
again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a nonresident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the
summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk
complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause
proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by
public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the
court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as
administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the
order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this
application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the
authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may
refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and
thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may
grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of
legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized
and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may
never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in
attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of
its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction

over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land.
Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person
claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the
petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by
which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and
is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to
certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or
obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the
circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole
object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other
form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action
becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition
that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with
reference to the principles governing actions in rem.

Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al.

G.R. No. 93891, 11 March 1991
Third Division, Feliciano (J), 4 concur
FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles
with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River.
Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a
particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory
provisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar.
Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into
the river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing
its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar, however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to
the Regional Trial Court on petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and
not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and
that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order of dismissal of
the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals
declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari was a proper remedy
since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case
might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner
Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and were not
violative of the requirements of due process; and the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper
subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner asked the Supreme
Court to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition,
petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to
suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is
discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set
by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent
discharges of Solar into the River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982
Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte
order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare,
or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made
no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been
denied due process by the Board.

HELD: The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner
Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like here. The relevant
pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that
pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as
the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err
when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court
to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of
Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to
contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the
Board.
US vs Toribio
license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit
for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and
was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one
should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property for public use,
within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to
regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of
the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the
equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.

Concepcion Bautista vs juinio et al

Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra
Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am
Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista
claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum
consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption. Further, the law restricts
their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is
no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for
precisely those owned by them fall within such category.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.
HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The classification on cars on
its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal situation is for the laws benefits to be available
to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and
the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of
law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law
susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that the
general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they
can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices
then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons
must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If
law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.

YNOT vs IAC
Police Power Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law,
Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was
then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter
of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption
based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Lupangco vs CA Case Digest
Lupangco vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988
Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying
for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a
complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent
PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional.
Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review
classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination?
Ruling: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve
the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its
constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot
even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip
from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official
or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions.
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any
ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the
three days before the examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted
to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be
issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful
steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to
make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors

White Light Corporation vs City of Manila

Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short
timeadmission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the
said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the
Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that
the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in
favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure.
The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are
really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up.
Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group
of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. and Court of Industrial Relations
(1973)
Facts
Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (PBM) were dismissed for allegedly violating the no strike-no
lockout provision of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) after staging a mass demonstration at Malacaang. PBMEO
was set to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 against abuses of the Pasig police, where
employees on the first, regular, and third shifts will participate. PBMEO informed company two days before the said
demonstration and asked to excuse all the workers participating. But a day before the demonstration, PBM said the rally
should not prejudice normal office operations, thus employees without prior filing of a leave of absence who fail to report
for the first and regular shifts on March 4 shall be dismissed for violating their CBA. However, union officers said there was
no violation because the demonstration was against the Pasig police and not the company. They added that the rally was an
exercise of their freedom of speech. In a decision penned by Judge Joaquin Salvador of the Court of Industrial Relations,
eight of the Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization (PBMEO) officers were found guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and were thus removed as employees of PBM. PBMEO filed a motion for reconsideration, which CIR dismissed the
motion for passing two days late from the 10-day deadline the court allowed.
Issue
Whether or not CIR and PBM Co. Inc. violated PBMEOs freedom of expression and assembly on the grounds that PBM Co.
illegally dismissed its employees for participating in a mass demonstration.
Held
VIOLATED. The rally was not against the company and therefore there is no violation of the no strike-no lockout
provision of their CBA. To charge PBMEO of bargaining in bad faith extends the jurisdiction of the CBA and inhibits freedom
ofspeech. The company failed to protect its employees from the Pasig polices abuse ofpower, went to the extent of
dismissing their employees, and instead prioritized material losses. Moreover, CIR could have easily accepted the motion
for reconsideration. Procedural rules do not supersede the Constitution and may be overruled in a bid to achieve justice,
especially in cases of free speech.

Concepts and Terminologies CBA

 collective bargaining agreement; a contract between a company and its employees that lays out work hours, wages, and
other terms and conditions of employment Strike
right of employees to refuse to go to work; cessation of work Lockout
right of employers to suspend work and to refuse to hire workers

Diosdado Guzman vs. National University

Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University,
have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow
them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in
peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners failure to enroll for the first semester of the
school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human
rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That
Guzman is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with
the destruction of properties of respondent University. The petitioners have failures in their records, and are not of good
scholastic standing.

Held:

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never
conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in
activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or
disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other
acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages
and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for
his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly
published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are,
that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Case Digest: People vs Nazario

Facts:
Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to Php
362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a
resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries
Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because
he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto
Held:
1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes with the
term Manager. He was the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so despite only leasing it
from the national government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment
are also clearly stated Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it cant be that the amendment under Ordinance
12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it
means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty
The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

People vs Cayat
Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor
outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in
violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of

insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among
others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat
them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their
instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC
emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from
others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with
are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark
the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the
promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before
the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to
raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view
of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

Tanada vs Tuvera
Publication Presidential Proclamations etc What unless otherwise provided means in Article 2 of the Civil
Code
With the Supreme Courts decision that ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect, Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere as long as the people
were sufficiently informed.
HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if it finds the same as
impractical. That is not its function for such is the function of the legislature. The task of the Supreme Court is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government
in accordance with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall immediately upon their
approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only
after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of
the Civil Code. The clause unless otherwise provided pertains to the date of publication and not the requirement
of publication.

Ormoc Sugar Company

Equal Protection
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax
equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.
Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export ofcentrifugal sugar
produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax
applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that
the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power
of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the
municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon suchgoods in the guise
of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is
violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar
mill is found in the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been
repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise
carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is

discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and
none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only
sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a
similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Taxicab Operators
Police Power
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed
of taxicaboperators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of
Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which
reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify
MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years
of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of
registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by
Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential
Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the
petitioners constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the
safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the
exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may
also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

Himagan vs People
Equal Protection Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin
Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA
6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where
the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring
that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He
claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would
be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no
other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where
the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be
lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from
within which the trial should be finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally
or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen
carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as
succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is
pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed
to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for
over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be
lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be terminated within
ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be
lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the
period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the
facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such
that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the
case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

Central bank Employees

GR No 148208

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Puno, J.
Facts:
RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively replacing the earlier
Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner
Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a petition against the Executive Secretary of the Office
of the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which
pertains to establishment of a Human resource management system and a compensation structure as part of the
authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below shall be in accordance
with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable,
arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and
file BSP employees. Respondent on the other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause, provided that it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal
and administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor
General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of employees is based
on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and
excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence
unconstitutional.
Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it
distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit
above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive higher wages
that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the salary standardization act as
provided by the proviso.
- See more at: http://polnix.com/?p=86#sthash.xwPCrbxs.dpuf
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it
repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article
VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in
Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in
a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane
to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

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The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof
which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of
Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer
considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in
public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand,
Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso
facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment
into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which
provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not
have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House
who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the
filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.

ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.

HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed
as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in
its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set
forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said
repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content.

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The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006,
which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the one
subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may
contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination
that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the
President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government
may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy
matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political
branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and
the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is
not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of
the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time,
Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and
the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of
Congress is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effect
immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Taada
v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteenperiod shall be shortened or extended.
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding
its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts
do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of
the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds,
the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of
legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case.

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