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the contrary, the US Army considered it its greatest technological advantage against
the insurgents (Laqueur, 1998, p. 275). Such unrestrained use of force characterised
by outrageous airpower shooting and heavy attacks on the hamlets severely damaged
their credibility with the rural population (Ong, 2007, p. 16). Moreover, in the case of
Afghanistan, heavy airstrikes and substantial US support to war lords did managed to
topple the Taliban regime, but did not extinguish the insurgency. The Taliban crossed
the border into Pakistan and so southern Afghanistan returned to a civil war-like state
in which tribes fought for power (International Crisis Group, 2011, p.5). In the words
of John Nagl, their differing organisational cultures lies behind the fact that the
British army was a learning institution and the American army was not (2005, p.
xiv).
Population security is indeed one of the most important aspects of COIN, but it
is definitely not synonymous with fighting the insurgents. In fact, the roles of the
police and the intelligence are highly relevant for waging successful counterinsurgencies (Thompson, 1966, pp. ,88). The police ensures the applicability of law
and security, thus reinforcing the confidence of people. Since major operations are
rarely useful for defeating insurgents, good intelligence leads to minor operations
which slowly add up. These two aspects of counter-insurgencies help prevent
political subversion and instil credibility among the population. Only a high degree of
cooperation between the military and the political organisations can lead to a
competent balance of forces.
In the case of Malaya, the two roles of the army were to support the
government in its process to regain control of the population and to attack the areas
infiltrated by the insurgents(Thompson, 1966, p. 105). But in neither of the USs
counter-insurgency operations did the army emulate the Britons and stick to such
basic procedures. Ultimately, the inability of the army to restrain from interfering in
the political realm leads to loss of credibility and, essentially, loss of political
legitimacy. Although the US army has obviously learnt from past experiences the
limits of military intervention, the role of the army as providers of social welfare in
Afghanistan is equally detrimental to consistent counter-insurgent efforts. Marine
soldiers in Afghanistan build schools, establish health clinics, create the local
government centre, train and reform the police, assist people in conflict resolutions
and cultivate gender equality (Eikenberry, 2013). Apart from the high cost apparently it takes $1 million per year per soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, the
greatest disadvantage of such an expansive role of the military is that it hinders the
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(Thompson, 1966, p. 66). Considering that the Constitution is the ultimate source of
authority and the foundation of human rights within a state, its abrogation meant the
elimination of both aspects mentioned above. As such, distrust replaced legitimacy
and the lack of state authority created a power vacuum which would slowly be filled
through the astute propaganda of VietCong.
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government, the population of South Vietnam felt insecure and lacked any credibility
towards any official authority structures.
The situation in Afghanistan resembles South Vietnam at its best and is in
complete opposition to Malaya. As previously mentioned, the Afghan governments
inability to cater for its people has severely affected the populations levels of
confidence. When deeds fail to meet the expectations, words can rarely help regain
credibility. For instance, the government broke its promises of amnesty and failed to
ensure the security of defected insurgents. Unlike the surrender policy successfully
implemented during the Malayan Emergency, in Afghanistan the government would
engage in false agreements in order to arrest, torture or murder ex-Taliban members.
Also, the governments crafts amnesty deals which include property and land
ownership only to later back down due to bureaucratic or tribal misunderstandings
(International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 11). It is obvious that members of the Taliban
who are disenchanted with the group lack any real incentive of returning into the
community. Risking deceit, severe punishment or even death, they lose all credibility
in the government and refocus on the Taliban.
Similarly to the VietCong, the Taliban take advantage of the deplorable
situation of the government and craft a propaganda which emphasises their
inevitability and invincibility (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 33). The
psychological element of the insurgency is splendidly illustrated in a statement the
Taliban issued in response to the USs deployment of additional 3000 soldiers in
2008: We will never forgive those people who brought the Americans to our
territory and those who entered Kabul supported by American warplanes, because the
nation will never forgive them: they have sold their Afghan identity and freedom
(International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 22). Such powerful rhetorics point out the
necessity of fighting insurgencies with words. Because, essentially, insurgencies are
credibility wars (Ong, 2007, p. 3).
Paraphrasing Sir Thompsons principles and understanding the
foundation of which they rest become paramount when discussing their universality.
It would be inappropriate to claim they are universally applicable, but there are
several conceptual aspects of counter-insurgencies which seem general due to the
ontological nature of insurgencies. When fighting insurgents, the most important
thing is to avoid the political subversion of the neutral majority of the population.
This happens by gaining their confidence and not by using unrestrained force. The
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limited role of the military must be complemented with a greater role played by
efficient governments. By securing the population and catering their short term and
long term needs, the populations confidence in the government will increase to the
detriment of the insurgents. Also relevant, the government must show determination
to win and must use a vivid rhetoric which would gain the credibility of the people.
Using the right words could help instil confidence in the people and psychological
warfare against the insurgents is very important. The government will gain credibility
by staying truthful and being indiscriminate. Such general guidelines help
accommodate the varying circumstances. Nevertheless, by means of conceptual
identification, insurgencies are different but the same everywhere.
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