G.R. No.

L-25350 October 4, 1988

WILLIAM A. CHITTICK, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LAURENCE F. DE PRIDA PATRICIA
CHITTICK, LANE, WILLIAM A. CHITTICK, JR., DAGMAR CHITTICK
GILDERSLEEVE and MARY CHITTICK LYMAN, as alleged substituted
parties for MURIEL M. CHITTICK original party plaintiff, respondents.
Gonzalo W. Gonzales & Associates for petitioner.
David Guevarra for respondent Laurence F. de Prida.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated on July 31, 1965 in CA-G.R. No. 31327-R, affirming in all
respect the decision ** of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch II in Civil
Case No. 6405 entitled Muriel M. Chittick vs. William A. Chittick.
The dispositive portion of the decision which was affirmed by respondent Court,
reads as follows:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant by way of support in
arrears for the sum of P21,145.42 or its present equivalent in
dollar at the option of the plaintiff, with interest at the legal rate
from January 12, 1951; and under the second cause of action
for the sum of P9,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% from
April 29, 1940, plus attorney's fees in the amount of P900.00,
and the costs of the suit. (R.A. p. 110)
The facts of the case, taken from the decision of the trial court is as follows:
The plaintiff and the defendant, both American citizens, were
married in Washington, U.S.A. on February 12, 1923. They
came to the Philippines in 1924 and made the City of Manila
their permanent residence. Four children were born of the
marriage, namely, Patricia, who was born, on September 12,
1924; William, Jr., on January 8, 1926; Dagmar, on October 6,
1931, and Mary, on January 12, 1933. According to the
defendant, due to plaintiffs infidelity, their marital relation
became strained and they entered into an agreement of
separation, Exhibit A, on May 8, 1937. The document, Exhibit A,
was drawn by Atty. Benjamin S. Ohmick, an American lawyer,
and was duly acknowledged before a notary public. The

pertinent stipulations which are the bases of plaintiffs two

causes of action are found in paragraphs 2 and 3, and read as
follows:
2. The husband agrees that he will pay or
cause to be paid to said wife monthly the sum
of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P550.00),
Philippine Currency, or its present equivalent in
United States Currency, at the election of the
wife, for the care, maintainance and support of
the said wife and the said minor children. Said
payment shall continue until such time as the
youngest of said minor children arrives at the
age of eighteen (18) years, provided however,
that the said wife in the meantime does not
remarry. Should such marriage take place, it is
understood and agreed that payments
aforesaid shall be reduced by twenty percent
(20%).
3. It is mutually agreed that the community or
conjugal assets of the parties, consisting of
share of stock in various corporations, together
with cash, have a net realizable value of
P22,500.00 which the husband agrees to
divide equally with the wife and deliver same to
her whenever the said wife secures a final
decree of divorce as is contemplated by her it
being understood that the husband, at his
option, may deliver to the wife the sum of
P11,250.00 in full and complete discharge.
The plaintiff thereafter went to Nevada, U.S.A., and alleging
desertion on the part of her husband, the defendant herein, the
plaintiff obtained a divorce, Exhibit B, on August 30, 1937.
Plaintiff stayed in the United States until December 1937, after
which she returned to the Philippines. The defendant complied
faithfully with the payment of the monthly support of P550.00
until the war broke out in December 1941. With the outbreak of
the war, the spouses and their children were interred in the Sto.
Tomas University concentration camp by the Japanese from
January 1942 to March 3, 1944. Nevertheless, the defendant
during the period of interment, paid to the plaintiff a total of
P4,716.00 which according to the defendant, was extended as a
loan to the plaintiff and which was obtained by borrowing from
his friends. After the liberation in March 1945, plaintiff and
defendant and their children were among the first to be sent
back to the United States for medical treatment, arriving in San

Francisco on May 9, 1945. From the arrival of the parties in San

Francisco in May 9, 1945 to January 12, 1951 when Mary, the
youngest, reached the age of 18, and when according to
paragraph 2 of Exhibit A, the payment of support should cease,
the defendant paid a total of $8,145.00. The total amount due to
the plaintiff by way of support, in accordance with paragraph 2
of Exhibit A, from May 9, 1945 to January 12, 1951 is
$18,717.71, thereby, leaving a balance in favor of the plaintiff in
the amount of $10,572.7l. (Record on Appeal, pp. 84-88).
On October 2, 1948, private respondent commenced an action to recover from
petitioner support in arrears and her share in the conjugal partnership, in Civil
Case No. 6405 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch II, praying that
judgment be rendered in her favor and against defendant, under the first cause of
action, for the sum of $3,442.90, United States currency, or P6,885.80, Philippine
Currency, and the further sum of $110.00 or P220.00 per month from March 1,
1948, both with legal interest from the date of filing of the complaint until paid
and, under the second cause of action, for the sum of P11,250.00, with legal
interest from the date of the filing of this complaint, until paid, plus the sum of
P1,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costs against defendant. (Record on Appeal,
pp. 1-11).
As aforesaid, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff.
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals on July 31, 1965, affirmed the decision
of the trial court in all respects (Rollo, pp. 82-116). August 5, 1965, counsel for
plaintiff-appellee, private respondent herein, filed a motion with respondent court
for substitution of party plaintiff-appellee, who died in Los Angeles, California,
United States of America on April 25, 1964, by her heirs, her surviving spouse,
Laurence F. de Prida and the legitimate children of the parties (Rollo, p. 143).
The motion was opposed by petitioner herein on the ground that since the
relation between attorney and client ceased with the death of plaintiff-appellee,
counsel cannot present any motion for and in behalf of the children of the
deceased client, unless authorized by the said children and/or heirs. (Rollo, p.
144). On November 3, 1965, the respondent Court issued its resolution granting
the motion for substitution (Rollo, p. 209).
A motion for reconsideration of the decision of respondent court dated July 31,
1965 was filed by petitioner on August 20, 1965 (Rollo, pp. 154-199.) It was
denied by respondent court in another resolution also dated November 3, 1965
(Rollo, p. 210.)
Hence, this petition filed with this Court on November 26, 1965 (Rollo, p.1.) In a
resolution dated January 7, 1966, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for
lack of merit (Rollo, p. 215-A.)

On January 27, 1966, petitioner tiled a motion for reconsideration of the Court's
resolution of January 7, 1966 (Rollo, p. 217) in view of which the Court required
respondents to answer within ten days from notice, in its resolution of February
17, 1966 (Rollo, p. 242.) Private respondent Laurence F. de Prida filed his
answer on April 4,1966 (Rollo, p. 247.)
On April 18, 1966, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p.
276.) The brief for the petitioner was filed on June 14, 1966 (Reno, p. 279); the
brief for the respondent was filed on August 25, 1966 (Rollo, p. 288.) The reply
brief was filed on November 3, 1966 (Rollo, p. 308.)
On January 18, 1967, petitioner filed a manifestation that the Court take
cognizance of two letters of his son William, Jr. stating that the case will filed by
Larry de Prida (his mother's alleged second husband), without his consent and
expressing a desire not to be made a party to the case against his father (Rollo,
p. 309.). Acting on the manifestation the Court required private respondent to
comment thereon, (Rollo, p. 315) which was filed on February 16, 1967 (Rollo, p.
316). A counter manifestation with reference to the comment of private
respondent was filed by petitioner on February 2&, 1967 (Rollo, p. 318.)
Petitioner raised several assignments of errors but the principal conflict in this
case centers on whether or not the decision of respondent Court was rendered
nugatory by the death of plaintiff-appellee Muziel M. Chittick (private respondent
herein) more than one year before its issuance and before a substitution of heirs
could be effected.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states:
Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of
party.Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes
incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney
to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or
incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his
executor, administrator, guardian on other legal representative.
Section 17 of the same Rule likewise, states:
Death of a party.After a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice,
the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days,
or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by

the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for

and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges
involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.
Private respondent Muriel M. Chittick died in Los Angeles, California, United
States of America, on April 25,1964 while the case was pending with respondent
Court of Appeals. It was only on August 5, 1965, however, that counsel for private
respondent filed a motion for substitution of party plaintiff-appellee (Rollo, p. 143)
five days after respondent court promulgated its decision of July 31, 1965,
despite Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which clearly provides for a
prompt notice of such death to be given to the Court by the attorney of the
deceased. In fact said counsel himself admitted his lapse in memory, alleging
however, that he thought all the while that he had already complied with the
aforementioned sections of Rule 3 and that he discovered his neglect when he
went over the records of the case upon receipt of the decision promulgated by
the Court of Appeals (Rollo, p. 148). There is no question that this duty applies in
this case where a party dies after filing of the complaint and during the pendency
of the case (Doel v. Teves, 136 SCRA 196 [1985], nor is there any argument
against the rule that counsel's inexcusable negligence is binding on his client.
(Llantero v. Court of Appeals, 105 SCRA 609 [1981], Pulido v. Court of Appeals,
122 SCRA 63 [1983]).
More than that, apart from the fact that there appears to be no compliance with
the procedure laid down in Rule 3, Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court, in
order that a valid substitution maybe effected, all of the Chittick children who
claim that they have no knowledge of such substitution, expressly and
vehemently objected to their being included as plaintiffs against petitioner, their
father (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 33-36).
Consequently, it is evident that the motion for substitution filed by the counsel for
the deceased and which was subsequently approved by the Court of Appeals is
null and void because the party in whose name it was presented was dead, and
therefore, the authority of the attorney to represent her had ceased (Moran, Vol.
I, p. 218,1979 ed.). Furthermore, the said motion was unauthorized by the
plaintiffs in question (private respondents herein) with the exception of Laurence
F. de Prida, the alleged second husband of the deceased, whose heirship is
however also in question. As correctly stated by petitioner, there should first be a
prior determination as to whether or not de Prida is an heir of the deceased
before he can be properly substituted as such (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 3640).
Under similar circumstances, this Court ruled as follows:

In the present case, there had been no court order for the legal
representative of the deceased to appear, nor had any such
legal representative ever appeared in court to be substituted for
the deceased; neither had the complainant ever procured the
appointment of such legal representative of the deceased, nor
had the heirs of the deceased, including appellant, ever asked
to be allowed to be substituted for the deceased. As a result, no
valid substitution was effected, consequently, the court never
acquired jurisdiction over appellant for the purpose of making
her a party to the case and making the decision binding upon
her, either personally or as legal representative of the estate of
her deceased mother. (Ferreria, et al. v. Vda. de Gonzales, et
al., 104 Phil. 143).
Going back to the case at bar, it is without question that there was no valid
substitution made and as a consequence, the Court of Appeals never acquired
jurisdiction over the Chittick children nor over the alleged second husband whose
status as heir has still to be determined.
Still further, on November 29, 1977, counsel for petitioner filed with this Court a
Notice of Death of the latter on April 13, 1977 in Makati, Metro Manila (Rollo, p.
322). Accordingly, even assuming that there was a valid substitution still this case
as a money claim against the defendant petitioner cannot survive under Sec. 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court and should have been filed against the decedent's
estate which is mandatory (De Bautista v. De Guzman, 125 SCRA 682 [1983]).
Nevertheless, since the Chittick children as heirs of respondent-creditor are also
the heirs of petitioner-debtor, the obligation sued upon had been extinguished by
the merger in their persons of the character of creditor and debtor of the same
obligation (Art. 1275, Civil Code).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
Reversed and Set Aside and the complaint filed against defendant-petitioner is
Dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ERNESTO SALIGUMBA, and

HEIRS OF SPOUSES VALERIA
SALIGUMBA AND ELISEO
SALIGUMBA, SR.,
143365
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
Petitioners,

Present:
GENEROSO SALIGUMBA,

G.R. No.

CARPIO,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
TINGA,* JJ.

- versus -

MONICA PALANOG,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
December 4, 2008
x------------------------- -------------------------x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

question. Rizalino Go, Deputy Sheriff of Aklan, was appointed commissioner and
was directed to submit his report and sketch within 30 days.[1] Present during the
delimitation were spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas, and Ernesto Saligumba,
son of spouses Saligumbas.[2]
After submission of the Commissioners Report, spouses Palanogs, upon
motion, were granted 10 days to amend their complaint to conform with the items
mentioned in the report.[3]
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. At the hearing on 1 June 1984, only the
counsel for spouses Palanogs appeared. The trial court issued an order resetting the
hearing to 15 August 1984 and likewise directed spouses Saligumbas to secure the
services of another counsel who should be ready on that date.[4] The order sent
to Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was returned to the court unserved with the notation Party
Deceased while the order sent to defendant Valeria Saligumba was returned with the
notation Party inManila.[5]
At the hearing on 15 August 1984, spouses Palanogs direct examination was
suspended and the continuation of the hearing was set on 25 October 1984. The trial
court stated that Atty. Miralles, who had not withdrawn as counsel for
spouses Saligumbas despite his appointment as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge,
would be held responsible for the case of spouses Saligumbas until he formally
withdrew as counsel. The trial court reminded Atty. Miralles to secure the consent of
spouses Saligumbas for his withdrawal.[6] A copy of this order was sent to
Valeria Saligumba but the same was returned unserved with the notation Party
in Manila.[7]

The Case
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 24 May 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 5) in Civil Case No. 5288 for
Revival of Judgment. The case is an offshoot of the action for Quieting of Title with
Damages in Civil Case No. 2570.

The Facts
Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog (spouses Palanogs),
filed a complaint dated 28 February 1977 for Quieting of Title with Damages against
defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr.
(spouses Saligumbas), before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
3, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 3). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2570. In
the complaint, spouses Palanogs alleged that they have been in actual, open,
adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of
land located in Solido, Nabas, Aklan. The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented
them from entering and residing on the subject premises and had destroyed the
barbed wires enclosing the land. Spouses Palanogs prayed that they be declared the
true and rightful owners of the land in question.
When the case was called for pre-trial on 22 September 1977,
Atty. Edilberto Miralles (Atty. Miralles), counsel for spouses Saligumbas, verbally
moved for the appointment of a commissioner to delimit the land in

The hearing set on 25 October 1984 was reset to 25 January 1985 and the trial
court directed that a copy of this order be sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. at COA,
PNB, Manila.[8]
The presentation of evidence for spouses Palanogs resumed on 25 January
1985 despite the motion of Atty. Miralles for postponement on the ground that his
client was sick. The exhibits were admitted and plaintiffs spouses Palanogs rested
their case. Reception of evidence for the defendants spouses Saligumbas was
scheduled on 3, 4, and 5 June 1985.[9]
On 3 June 1985, only spouses Palanogs and counsel appeared. Upon motion of
the spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas were deemed to have waived the
presentation of their evidence.
On 3 August 1987, after a lapse of more than two years, the trial court
considered the case submitted for decision.
On 7 August 1987, RTC-Branch 3 rendered a judgment in Civil Case No. 2570
declaring spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of the subject land and ordering
spousesSaligumbas, their agents, representatives and all persons acting
in privity with them to vacate the premises and restore possession to
spouses Palanogs.

The trial court, in a separate Order dated 7 August 1987, directed that a copy of
the courts decision be furnished plaintiff Monica Palanog and defendant
ValeriaSaligumba.
Thereafter, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision
was filed but the trial court, in its Order dated 8 May 1997, ruled that since more than
five years had elapsed after the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be
executed by mere motion.
Thus, on 9 May 1997, Monica Palanog (respondent), now a widow, filed a
Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil
Case No. 2570 which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of limitations.
She impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs
and children of the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 5288 before the RTC-Branch 5.
Petitioner Generoso Saligumba, for himself and in representation
of his
brother Ernesto who was out of the country working as a seaman, engaged the
services of the Public Attorneys Office, Kalibo, Aklan
which filed a motion for time
to allow them to file a responsive pleading. Petitioner Generoso Saligumba filed his
Answer[10]alleging that:
(1) respondent had no cause of action; (2) the
spouses Saligumbas died while Civil Case No. 2570 was pending and no order of
substitution was issued and hence, the trial was null and void; and (3) the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the heirs of the spouses Saligumbas and therefore, the
judgment was not binding on them.
Meanwhile, on 19 December 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion
to implead additional defendants namely, Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and
Eduardo Saligumba, who are also the heirs and children of spouses Saligumbas.
[11]
They were, however, declared in default on 1 October 1999 for failure to file any
responsive pleading.[12]

The Courts Ruling

The instant case is an action for revival of judgment and the judgment sought
to be revived in this case is the decision in the action for quieting of title with damages
in Civil Case No. 2570. This is not one for annulment of judgment.
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of
securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the
passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It
is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtors case
nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.[13] An action for revival of
judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct from either the
recovery of property case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is
the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to
be enforced is rendered.[14] Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that
the decision to be revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final
and executory.[15]
The RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case
No. 2570 had
been rendered final and executory by the lapse of time with no motion for
reconsideration nor appeal having been filed. While it may be true that the judgment
in Civil Case No. 2570 may be revived and its execution may be had, the issue now
before us is whether or not execution of judgment can be issued against petitioners
who claim that they are not bound by the RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 August
1987 in Civil Case No. 2570.
Petitioners contend that the RTC-Branch 3 Decision of 7 August 1987 in Civil
Case No. 2570 is null and void since there was no proper substitution of the
deceased spousesSaligumbas despite the trial courts knowledge that the deceased
spouses Saligumbas were no longer represented by counsel. They argue that they
were deprived of due process and justice was not duly served on them.

The Trial Courts Ruling

On 24 May 2000, the RTC-Branch 5 rendered a decision in favor of respondent
ordering the revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. The trial court ruled that the
non-substitution of the deceased spouses did not have any legal significance. The
land subject of Civil Case No. 2570 was the exclusive property of defendant
Valeria Saligumba who inherited the same from her deceased parents. The death of
her husband, Eliseo Saligumba, Sr., did not change the complexion of the ownership
of the property that would require his substitution. The spouses Saligumbas children,
who are the petitioners in this case, had no right to the property while
Valeria Saligumba was still alive. The trial court further found that when defendant
Valeria Saligumba died, her lawyer, Atty. Miralles, did not inform the court of the death
of his client. The trial court thus ruled that the non-substitution of the deceased
defendant was solely due to the negligence of counsel. Moreover, petitioner
Ernesto Saligumba could not feign ignorance of Civil Case
No. 2570 as he was
present during the delimitation of the subject land. The trial court likewise held that
the decision in Civil Case No. 2570 could not be the subject of a collateral attack.
There must be a direct action for the annulment of the said decision.
Petitioners elevated the matter directly to this Court. Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners argue that the trial court even acknowledged the fact of death of
spouses Saligumbas but justified the validity of the decision rendered in that case
despite lack of substitution because of the negligence or fault of their counsel.
Petitioners contend that the duty of counsel for the deceased spouses Saligumbas to
inform the court of the death of his clients and to furnish the name and address of the
executor, administrator, heir
or legal representative of the decedent under Rule 3
presupposes adequate
or active representation by counsel. However, the relation
of attorney
and client was already terminated by the appointment of counsel on
record, Atty. Miralles, as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge even before the deaths of
the spouses Saligumbas were known. Petitioners invoke the Order of 1 June
1984 directing the spouses Saligumbas to secure the services of another lawyer to
replace Atty. Miralles. The registered mail containing that order was returned to the
trial court with the notation that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was deceased. Petitioners
thus question the decision in Civil Case
No. 2570 as being void and of no legal
effect because their parents were not duly represented by counsel of record.
Petitioners further argue that they have never taken part in the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 2570 nor did they voluntarily appear or participate in the case. It is unfair to
bind them in a decision rendered against their deceased parents. Therefore, being a
void judgment, it has no legal nor binding effect on petitioners.

Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court likewise expressly provides:
Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an
action involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule
87[16]as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in
an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court[17] provides for the procedure, thus:
Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails
to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by
the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party. Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity
or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal representative.
It is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the death of his client.
The failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to
inform the court of the death of his client and the non-substitution of such party will
not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the
death of such party. The decision rendered shall bind the partys successor-ininterest.[21]
The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is
in a better position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of
his client and to inform the court of the name and address of his legal representative.
[22]

Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon
proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir of the
deceased to appear for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court,
after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the envelopes,
failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or heir of the deceased.
There was no court order for deceaseds legal representative or heir to appear, nor
did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for the
deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such legal
representative, nor did the heirs ever ask to be substituted.
It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while
Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February 1985. No motion for the substitution of the
spouses was filed nor an order issued for the substitution of the deceased
spouses Saligumbas in Civil Case No. 2570. Atty. Miralles and
petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear, never
confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. The record is
bereft of any evidence proving the death of the spouses, except the mere notations
in the envelopes enclosing the trial courts orders which were returned unserved.
Section 17 is explicit that the duty of the court to order the legal representative
or heir to appear arises only upon proper notice. The notation Party-Deceased on
theunserved notices could not be the proper notice contemplated by the rule. As the
trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of a party
without the proper manifestation from counsel, the trial court was well within its
jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. Moreover, there is no showing that the
courts proceedings were tainted with irregularities.[18]
Likewise, the plaintiff or his attorney or representative could not be expected to
know of the death of the defendant if the attorney for the deceased defendant did not
notify the plaintiff or his attorney of such death as required by the rules.[19] The judge
cannot be blamed for sending copies of the orders and notices to defendants spouses
in the absence of proof of death or manifestation to that effect from counsel.[20]

Atty. Miralles continued to represent the deceased spouses even after the
latters demise. Acting on their behalf, Atty. Miralles even asked for postponement of
the hearings and did not even confirm the death of his clients nor his appointment as
Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge. These clearly negate petitioners contention that
Atty. Mirallesceased to be spouses Saligumbas counsel.
Atty. Miralles still remained the counsel of the spouses Saligumbas despite the
alleged appointment as judge. Records show that when Civil Case No. 2570 was
called for trial on 25 October 1984, Atty. Miralles appeared and moved for a
postponement. The 25 October 1984 Order reads:
ORDER
Upon petition of Judge Miralles who is still the counsel on record of this case
and who is held responsible for anything that will happen in this case, postpone the
hearing of this case to JANUARY 25, 1985 AT 8:30 in the morning. x x x[23]
The trial court issued an Order dated 1 June 1984 directing the defendants to secure
the services of another counsel. This order was sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. by
registered mail but the same was returned with the notation Party-Deceased while
the notice to Valeria Saligumba was returned with the notation Party
in Manila.[24] EliseoSaligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984. When
Atty. Miralles appeared in court on 25 October 1984, he did not affirm nor inform the
court of the death of his client. There was no formal substitution. The trial court issued
an order resetting the hearing to 25 January 1985 and directed that a copy of the
order be furnished petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. atCOA, PNB, Manila by registered
mail.[25] When the case was called on 25 January 1985, Atty. Miralles sought for
another postponement on the ground that his client was sick and under medical
treatment in Manila.[26] Again, there was no manifestation from counsel about the
death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. The trial court issued an Order dated 25 January
1985 setting the reception of evidence for the defendants on 3, 4, and 5 June 1985. A

copy of this order was sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. by registered mail. Nonetheless,
as the trial court in Civil Case No. 5288 declared, the non-substitution
of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. did not have any legal significance as the land subject of
Civil Case No. 2570 was the exclusive property of Valeria Saligumba who inherited it
from her deceased parents.
This notwithstanding, when Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February 1985,
Atty. Miralles again did not inform the trial court of the death of Valeria Saligumba.
There was no formal substitution nor submission of proof of death of
Valeria Saligumba.
Atty. Miralles was remiss in his duty under Section 16, Rule 3
of the Revised Rules of Court. The counsel of record is obligated to protect his clients
interest until he is released from his professional relationship with his client. For its
part, the court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except
such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.[27]
An attorney must make an application to the court to withdraw as counsel, for
the relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record; at least,
so far as the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the
end of the litigation.[28] Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the
conduct of the case.[29] Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer
remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do
what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date of hearing for
the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of
record.[30]
Petitioners should have questioned immediately the validity of the proceedings
absent any formal substitution. Yet, despite the courts alleged lack of jurisdiction over
the persons of petitioners, petitioners never bothered to challenge the same, and in
fact allowed the proceedings to go on until the trial court rendered its decision. There
was no motion for reconsideration, appeal or even an action to annul the judgment in
Civil Case No. 2570. Petitioners themselves could not feign ignorance of the case
since during thependency of Civil Case No. 2570, petitioner Ernesto Saligumba, son
of the deceased spouses, was among the persons present during the delimitation of
the land in question before the Commissioner held on 5 November 1977.
[31]
Petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. was likewise furnished a copy of the trial courts
orders and notices. It was only the Answer filed by petitioner Generoso Saligumba in
Civil Case No. 5288 that confirmed the dates when the spouses Saligumbas died and
named the latters children. Consequently, Atty. Miralles was responsible for the
conduct of the case since he had not been properly relieved as counsel of record. His
acts bind his clients and the latters successors-in-interest.
In the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners have not shown
much interest in the case. Petitioners Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and
Eduardo Saligumba were declared in default for failure to file their answer. Petitioner
Ernesto Saligumba was out of the country working as a seaman. Only
petitioner Generoso Saligumba filed an Answer to the complaint. The petition filed in
this Court was signed only by petitioner Generoso Saligumba as someone signed on
behalf of petitioner Ernesto Saligumba without the latters authority to do so.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 24 May
2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5288.
Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 156966. May 7, 2004]

PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DELFINO TECSON,

respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The facts, by and large, are undisputed.
On various dates in 1996, Delfino C. Tecson applied for six (6) cellular phone
subscriptions with petitioner Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PILTEL), a company
engaged in the telecommunications business, which applications were each approved
and covered, respectively, by six mobiline service agreements.
On 05 April 2001, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Lanao
Del Norte, a complaint against petitioner for a Sum of Money and Damages.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue,
citing a common provision in the mobiline service agreements to the effect that Venue of all suits arising from this Agreement or any other suit directly or indirectly
arising from the relationship between PILTEL and subscriber shall be in the proper
courts of Makati, Metro Manila. Subscriber hereby expressly waives any other
venues.[1]
In an order, dated 15 August 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Lanao del
Norte, denied petitioners motion to dismiss and required it to file an answer within 15
days from receipt thereof.
Petitioner PILTEL filed a motion for the reconsideration, through registered mail, of
the order of the trial court. In its subsequent order, dated 08 October 2001, the trial
court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision of 30 April 2002, saw no merit in the petition and
affirmed the assailed orders of the trial court. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration,
but the appellate court, in its order of 21 January 2003, denied the motion.
There is merit in the instant petition.
Section 4, Rule 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure[2] allows the parties to
agree and stipulate in writing, before the filing of an action, on the exclusive venue of
any litigation between them. Such an agreement would be valid and binding provided
that the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent, that it is
expressed in writing by the parties thereto, and that it is entered into before the filing
of the suit. The provision contained in paragraph 22 of the Mobile Service
Agreement, a standard contract made out by petitioner PILTEL to its subscribers,
apparently accepted and signed by respondent, states that the venue of all suits
arising from the agreement, or any other suit directly or indirectly arising from the
relationship between PILTEL and subscriber, shall be in the proper courts of Makati,
Metro Manila. The added stipulation that the subscriber expressly waives any other

venue[3] should indicate, clearly enough, the intent of the parties to consider the
venue stipulation as being preclusive in character.
The appellate court, however, would appear to anchor its decision on the thesis that
the subscription agreement, being a mere contract of adhesion, does not bind
respondent on the venue stipulation.
Indeed, the contract herein involved is a contract of adhesion. But such an
agreement is not per se inefficacious. The rule instead is that, should there be
ambiguities in a contract of adhesion, such ambiguities are to be construed against
the party that prepared it. If, however, the stipulations are not obscure, but are clear
and leave no doubt on the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations must be held controlling.[4]
A contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts. It is true that this
Court has, on occasion, struck down such contracts as being assailable when the
weaker party is left with no choice by the dominant bargaining party and is thus
completely deprived of an opportunity to bargain effectively. Nevertheless, contracts
of adhesion are not prohibited even as the courts remain careful in scrutinizing the
factual circumstances underlying each case to determine the respective claims of
contending parties on their efficacy.

HYATT ELEVATORS AND

ESCALATORS CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 161026

- versus GOLDSTAR ELEVATORS,

Promulgated:
PHILS., INC.,*
Respondent.
October 24, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Well established in our jurisprudence is the rule that the residence of a corporation is
the place where its principal office is located, as stated in its Articles of Incorporation.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the June 26, 2003 Decision[2] and the November 27, 2003
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 74319. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads as follows:

In the case at bar, respondent secured six (6) subscription contracts for cellular
phones on various dates. It would be difficult to assume that, during each of those
times, respondent had no sufficient opportunity to read and go over the terms and
conditions embodied in the agreements. Respondent continued, in fact, to acquire in
the pursuit of his business subsequent subscriptions and remained a subscriber of
petitioner for quite sometime.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed Orders dated May 27, 2002 and
October 1, 2002 of the RTC, Branch 213, Mandaluyong City in Civil Case No. 99-600,
are hereby SET ASIDE. The said case is hereby ordered DISMISSED on the ground
of improper venue.[4]

In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. National Merchandising Corporation,[5]

the contracting parties, being of age and businessmen of experience, were presumed
to have acted with due care and to have signed the assailed documents with full
knowledge of their import. The situation would be no less true than that which obtains
in the instant suit. The circumstances in Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves,[6] wherein this
Court invalidated the venue stipulation contained in the passage ticket, would appear
to be rather peculiar to that case. There, the Court took note of an acute shortage in
inter-island vessels that left passengers literally scrambling to secure
accommodations and tickets from crowded and congested counters. Hardly,
therefore, were the passengers accorded a real opportunity to examine the fine prints
contained in the tickets, let alone reject them.

The Facts

A contract duly executed is the law between the parties, and they are obliged to
comply fully and not selectively with its terms. A contract of adhesion is no exception.
[7]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the questioned decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68104 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 5572 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, Branch 4, is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate
complaint by respondent against petitioner with the court of proper venue. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The relevant facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
Petitioner [herein Respondent] Goldstar Elevator Philippines, Inc. (GOLDSTAR for
brevity) is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of marketing,
distributing, selling, importing, installing, and maintaining elevators and escalators,
with address at 6th Floor, Jacinta II Building, 64 EDSA, Guadalupe, Makati City.
On the other hand, private respondent [herein petitioner] Hyatt Elevators and
Escalators Company (HYATT for brevity) is a domestic corporation similarly engaged
in the business of selling, installing and maintaining/servicing elevators, escalators
and parking equipment, with address at the 6th Floor, Dao I Condominium, Salcedo
St., Legaspi Village, Makati, as stated in its Articles of Incorporation.
On February 23, 1999, HYATT filed a Complaint for unfair trade practices and
damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines against LG
Industrial Systems Co. Ltd. (LGISC) and LG International Corporation (LGIC),
alleging among others, that: in 1988, it was appointed by LGIC and LGISC as the
exclusive distributor of LG elevators and escalators in the Philippines under a
Distributorship Agreement; x x x LGISC, in the latter part of 1996, made a proposal
to change the exclusive distributorship agency to that of a joint venture partnership;
while it looked forward to a healthy and fruitful negotiation for a joint venture,

however, the various meetings it had with LGISC and LGIC, through the latters
representatives, were conducted in utmost bad faith and with malevolent intentions; in
the middle of the negotiations, in order to put pressures upon it, LGISC and LGIC
terminated the Exclusive Distributorship Agreement;
x x x [A]s a consequence,
[HYATT] suffered P120,000,000.00 as actual damages, representing loss of earnings
and business opportunities, P20,000,000.00 as damages for its reputation and
goodwill, P1,000,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages, and P500,000.00 as
and by way of attorneys fees.
On March 17, 1999, LGISC and LGIC filed a Motion to Dismiss raising the following
grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the persons of defendants, summons not having
been served on its resident agent; (2) improper venue; and (3) failure to state a cause
of action. The [trial] court denied the said motion in an Order dated January 7, 2000.
On March 6, 2000, LGISC and LGIC filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim
ex abundante cautela. Thereafter, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to
Expunge Complaint which was denied.
On December 4, 2000, HYATT filed a motion for leave of court to amend the
complaint, alleging that subsequent to the filing of the complaint, it learned that
LGISC transferred all its organization, assets and goodwill, as a consequence of a
joint venture agreement with Otis Elevator Company of the USA, to LG Otis Elevator
Company (LG OTIS, for brevity). Thus, LGISC was to be substituted or changed to
LG OTIS, its successor-in-interest. Likewise, the motion averred that x x x
GOLDSTAR was being utilized by LG OTIS and LGIC in perpetrating their unlawful
and unjustified acts against HYATT. Consequently, in order to afford complete relief,
GOLDSTAR was to be additionally impleaded as a party-defendant. Hence, in the
Amended Complaint, HYATT impleaded x x x GOLDSTAR as a party-defendant, and
all references to LGISC were correspondingly replaced with LG OTIS.
On December 18, 2000, LG OTIS (LGISC) and LGIC filed their opposition to
HYATTs motion to amend the complaint. It argued that: (1) the inclusion of
GOLDSTAR as party-defendant would lead to a change in the theory of the case
since the latter took no part in the negotiations which led to the alleged unfair trade
practices subject of the case; and (b) HYATTs move to amend the complaint at that
time was dilatory, considering that HYATT was aware of the existence of GOLDSTAR
for almost two years before it sought its inclusion as party-defendant.
On January 8, 2001, the [trial] court admitted the Amended Complaint. LG OTIS
(LGISC) and LGIC filed a motion for reconsideration thereto but was similarly rebuffed
on October 4, 2001.

Upon perusal of the factual and legal arguments raised by the movantsdefendants, the court finds that these are substantially the same issues posed by the
then defendant LG Industrial System Co. particularly the matter dealing [with] the
issues of improper venue, failure to state cause of action as well as this courts lack of
jurisdiction. Under the circumstances obtaining, the court resolves to rule that the
complaint sufficiently states a cause of action and that the venue is properly laid. It is
significant to note that in the amended complaint, the same allegations are adopted
as in the original complaint with respect to the Goldstar Philippines to enable this
court to adjudicate a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action it appearing preliminarily as sufficiently alleged in the plaintiffs pleading that
said Goldstar Elevator Philippines Inc., is being managed and operated by the same
Korean officers of defendants LG-OTIS Elevator Company and LG International
Corporation.
On June 11, 2002, [Respondent] GOLDSTAR filed a motion for reconsideration
thereto. On June 18, 2002, without waiving the grounds it raised in its motion to
dismiss, [it] also filed an Answer Ad Cautelam. On October 1, 2002, [its] motion for
reconsideration was denied.
From the aforesaid Order denying x x x Goldstars motion for reconsideration, it filed
the x x x petition for certiorari [before the CA] alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the [trial] court in issuing the
assailed Orders dated May 27, 2002 and October 1, 2002.[5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the trial court had committed palpable error amounting to grave
abuse of discretion when the latter denied respondents Motion to Dismiss. The
appellate court held that the venue was clearly improper, because none of the
litigants resided in Mandaluyong City, where the case was filed.
According to the appellate court, since Makati was the principal place of business of
both respondent and petitioner, as stated in the latters Articles of Incorporation, that
place was controlling for purposes of determining the proper venue. The fact that
petitioner had abandoned its principal office in Makati years prior to the filing of the
original case did not affect the venue where personal actions could be commenced
and tried.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
The Issue

On April 12, 2002, x x x GOLDSTAR filed a Motion to Dismiss the amended

complaint, raising the following grounds: (1) the venue was improperly laid, as neither
HYATT nor defendants reside in Mandaluyong City, where the original case was filed;
and (2) failure to state a cause of action against [respondent], since the amended
complaint fails to allege with certainty what specific ultimate acts x x x Goldstar
performed in violation of x x x Hyatts rights. In the Order dated May 27, 2002, which
is the main subject of the present petition, the [trial] court denied the motion to
dismiss, ratiocinating as follows:

In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals, in reversing the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court, erred as a matter of law and jurisprudence, as well as committed grave abuse
of discretion, in holding that in the light of the peculiar facts of this case, venue was
improper[.][7]
This Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Sole Issue:
Venue
The resolution of this case rests upon a proper understanding of Section 2 of Rule 4
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court:
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiff resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendant resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Since both parties to this case are corporations, there is a need to clarify the meaning
of residence. The law recognizes two types of persons: (1) natural and (2) juridical.
Corporations come under the latter in accordance with Article 44(3) of the Civil Code.
[8]
Residence is the permanent home -- the place to which, whenever absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return.[9] Residence is vital when dealing with
venue.[10] A corporation, however, has no residence in the same sense in which this
term is applied to a natural person. This is precisely the reason why the Court in
Young Auto Supply Company v. Court of Appeals[11] ruled that for practical
purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its
principal office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation.[12] Even before
this ruling, it has already been established that the residence of a corporation is the
place where its principal office is established.[13]
This Court has also definitively ruled that for purposes of venue, the term residence
is synonymous with domicile.[14] Correspondingly, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not
fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place
where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal
functions.[15]
It now becomes apparent that the residence or domicile of a juridical person is fixed
by the law creating or recognizing it. Under Section 14(3) of the Corporation Code,
the place where the principal office of the corporation is to be located is one of the
required contents of the articles of incorporation, which shall be filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
In the present case, there is no question as to the residence of respondent. What
needs to be examined is that of petitioner. Admittedly,[16] the latters principal place
of business is Makati, as indicated in its Articles of Incorporation. Since the principal
place of business of a corporation determines its residence or domicile, then the
place indicated in petitioners articles of incorporation becomes controlling in
determining the venue for this case.

Petitioner argues that the Rules of Court do not provide that when the plaintiff is a
corporation, the complaint should be filed in the location of its principal office as
indicated in its articles of incorporation.[17] Jurisprudence has, however, settled that
the place where the principal office of a corporation is located, as stated in the
articles, indeed establishes its residence.[18] This ruling is important in determining
the venue of an action by or against a corporation,[19] as in the present case.
Without merit is the argument of petitioner that the locality stated in its Articles of
Incorporation does not conclusively indicate that its principal office is still in the same
place. We agree with the appellate court in its observation that the requirement to
state in the articles the place where the principal office of the corporation is to be
located is not a meaningless requirement. That proviso would be rendered nugatory
if corporations were to be allowed to simply disregard what is expressly stated in their
Articles of Incorporation.[20]
Inconclusive are the bare allegations of petitioner that it had closed its Makati office
and relocated to Mandaluyong City, and that respondent was well aware of those
circumstances. Assuming arguendo that they transacted business with each other in
the Mandaluyong office of petitioner, the fact remains that, in law, the latters
residence was still the place indicated in its Articles of Incorporation. Further
unacceptable is its faulty reasoning that the ground for the CAs dismissal of its
Complaint was its failure to amend its Articles of Incorporation so as to reflect its
actual and present principal office. The appellate court was clear enough in its ruling
that the Complaint was dismissed because the venue had been improperly laid, not
because of the failure of petitioner to amend the latters Articles of Incorporation.
Indeed, it is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for
the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the
principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiffs caprice; the
matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.[21] Allowing petitioners arguments may
lead precisely to what this Court was trying to avoid in Young Auto Supply Company
v. CA:[22] the creation of confusion and untold inconveniences to party litigants. Thus
enunciated the CA:
x x x. To insist that the proper venue is the actual principal office and not that stated
in its Articles of Incorporation would indeed create confusion and work untold
inconvenience. Enterprising litigants may, out of some ulterior motives, easily
circumvent the rules on venue by the simple expedient of closing old offices and
opening new ones in another place that they may find well to suit their needs.[23]
We find it necessary to remind party litigants, especially corporations, as follows:
The rules on venue, like the other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and
orderly administration of justice or the impartial and evenhanded determination of
every action and proceeding. Obviously, this objective will not be attained if the
plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose the court where he may file his
complaint or petition.
The choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiffs whim or caprice. He may be
impelled by some ulterior motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular court
even if not allowed by the rules on venue.[24]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33952 March 9, 1987
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Branch XV), et al
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and Prohibition With Preliminary Injunction seeking to
annul the Order of respondent Court dated August 13, 1971 and to prohibit
respondent Court from proceeding in any manner with Civil Case No. 678-M (15043)
for alleged lack of jurisdisction.
The dispositive portion of the questioned Order (Rollo, p. 57) reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, let a restraining order be issued directing the
defendant Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, not to fence
the land in question or continue with the fencing thereof or, from
threatening and actually obstructing, molesting and/or preventing
by force the entry to, and/or exit from, the said land the plaintiffs
and their families, or from constructing network of roads, streets
and canals thereon, or from introducing any other improvements
thereon, or otherwise exercising rights of possession and union
thereon until further orders from this Court.
In the meantime, let the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction be set for hearing on August 28, 1971, at 8:00 a.m.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner is the duly registered owner of several adjacent parcels of land situated in
Ugong Sur, Pasig, Rizal, bounded by Ortigas Ave., E. Rodriguez, Jr. Ave. and
Escarpment Road, containing an area of 162 hectares, more or less, consolidated
into one parcel, under TCT-NO. 227758 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Said parcel
is a portion of the Mandaluyon Estate (also sometimes known as "Hacienda de
Mandaloya," Hacienda de Mandaloyen, "Hacienda de Mandaloyoa, etc.) over which
Petitioner, thru its predecessor-in-interest, the "Provincial del Santisima Nombre de
Jesus de Agustinos Calzados," has been in continuous possession since 1862 or 125
years ago, as confirmed by the Court in Compana Agricola de Ultramar v. Marcos
Domingo, et al., 6 Phil. 246 (1906), when it affirmed the decision of the Court of Land
Registration declaring the Compana Agricola de Ultramar, also one of petitioner's
predecessors-in-interest, owner of the lands in question to the exclusion of the claims
of contestants or any persons holding under them.

Sometime in 1967, Civil Case No. (10339) was filed against petitioner by a certain
Pedro del Rosario and three others, in their own behalf and in behalf of 104 others, as
a class suit, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, seeking, among other things, the
declaration of petitioner's titles null and void, allegedly for lack of publication in the
land registration proceeding from which they were derived and for alleged fraud
employed in registering under Act No. 496 certain parcels of agricultural land in
Quezon City and Pasig, Rizal (Rollo, p. 63) which form part of the Mandaloyon Estate
(Rollo, p. 9) and the declaration of plaintiffs thereon as lawful owners and possessors
of their respective landholdings. In this case, respondent Court issued a restraining
order ex-parte, still in force and effect when the instant petition was filed.
In view of the adverse decision rendered by respondent Court, petitioner filed a
motion for new trial within the reglementary period on the ground of newly discovered
evidence (Rollo, p. 9) which motion was denied by respondent Court. As a result,
petitioner was constrained to go up on certiorari to the Court of Appeals, which
enjoined respondent Court from taking any further action in Civil Case No. 7-M
(10339) (Rollo, p. 76). As of the filing of this petition here in the Supreme Court, the
case was still pending decision with the Court of Appeals, as to whether respondent
Court should be ordered to grant a new trial for the reception of new evidence (Rollo,
p. 10).
On August 10, 1971, Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) was filed by Inocencio Bernardo
and five others for and in their own behalf and in behalf of 37 others against
petitioner, filed as a class suit concerning another portion of the Mandaloyon Estate,
containing an aggregate area of 1,923,454 sq. meters. The complaint is generally
identical to that of Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), and seeks, as in the aforementioned
case, that the original certificates of title Nos. 13, 33, 336, 337 and 344 be declared
null and void for lack of publication in the land registration proceeding and certain
transfer certificates of title of petitioner derived therefrom, more specifically TCT Nos.
227758, 35749, 35750, and 100110, and for alleged fraud in registering the parcels of
land beingclaimed by plaintiffs therein; and that the plaintiffs be declared as lawful
owners and possessors of their respective landholdings (Rollo, p. 48).
An urgent ex-parte motion of private respondents (plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 678-M
[15043]), opposing among others, petitioner's construction of fences and high walls,
roads, streets and canals on the land in dispute, having been filed (Rollo, p. 60),
respondent Court issued the afore-quoted questioned Order of August 13, 1971.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner filed its petition on August 23, 1971 (Rollo, p. 14). Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on August 24, 1971 for being premature and for lack of
merit (Reno, p. 110) which motion was opposed by petitioner by motion filed on
August 24, 1971 (Rollo, p. 120).
Meanwhile, petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 678-M (15043), filed with
respondent Court their Answer with Counterclaim dated August 24, 1971 (Rollo, p.
174) and an Opposition to plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction with countermotion for issuance of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against plaintiffs
dated August 26, 1971. On the same date, petitioner filed with the lower court an

omnibus motion praying for the Court to order the dropping of persons as plaintiffs,
except Inocencio Bernardo for improper class suit pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, and the payment by plaintiff of the correct amount of filing fees
based on the assessed value of the property involved which is P2,242,150.00.
Petitioner also filed in the lower court a motion to lift restraining order of August 13,
1971, dated August 26, 1971 also.

13, 1971, dated August 26, 1971 for which inaction petitioner has been definitely
restrained from performing any act of ownership and dominion over almost 200
hectares of land (Rollo, p. 394).

On August 24, 1971, respondents filed a motion to dismiss (Rollo, pp. 110-111) but
the Court required them in the resolution of August 25, 1971 to file an answer to the
petition and set the case for hearing on September 3, 1971 (Rollo, p. 132). In
compliance thereof, respondents filed their Answer to the petition on September 1,
1971 (Rollo, p. 137).

In the resolution of October 12, 1971, the Supreme Court directed the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's filing of a bond in the sum of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00), enjoining respondent Court from enforcing the
restraining order issued by it on August 13, 1971 and from proceeding in any manner
with Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) until further orders by the Court (Rollo, p. 421).
The corresponding writ was issued on October 14, 1971 (Rollo, p. 422).

At the hearing the parties argued their respective causes and petitioner was required
to file a reply to respondents' answer (Rollo, p. 240).
On September 6, 1971, petitioner filed a manifestation informing this Court of the
incident report from its security guard with pictures showing the extent of the damage
caused by respondents to petitioner's walls on the property in question for record
purposes in view of their materiality and pertinence to the instant petition (Rollo, p.
241).
On the same date, petitioner filed with the lower court an urgent manifestation and
motion asking respondent Court to resolve petitioner's pending motions, especially its
motion to lift restraining order of August 13, 1971 and the omnibus motion (Rollo, p.
398).
On September 8, 1971, petitioner filed a Reply to the Answer of respondents to the
petition (Rollo, p. 255). On the same date, respondents filed a manifestation
containing their proposals in compliance with the Order of the Court during the
hearing of the case on September 3, 1971, that parties execute an agreement
between themselves that would govern the status quo in their relationship over the
land in question while still litigating against each other under Civil Case No. 678-M
(15043) in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Civil Case Nos. 2028 to 2098 For
Forcible Entry in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal (Rollo, p. 379). On the same
date, petitioner filed its manifestation informing the Court that parties failed to enter
into such agreement (Rollo, p. 246) for which reason the Court resolved to require
respondents to comment thereon (Rollo, p. 391).
On September 10, 1971, defendant Company (petitioner herein) filed another urgent
manifestation and motion with respondent Court, reiterating its urgent manifestation
and motion of September 6, 1971, urging respondent Court to immediately resolve
the urgent questions pending before it, most especially petitioner's motion to lift
respondent Court's restraining order, and the omnibus motion, both dated August 26,
1971 (Rollo, p. 402).
On September 16, 1971, petitioner filed another manifestation informing the Court,
among others, that it is not waiving its petition on file with the Court and that
respondent Court had not yet acted upon its motion to the restraining order of August

On October 2, 1971, petitioner filed a manifestation explaining why it failed to enter

into an agreement with respondents as required by the Court (Rollo, p. 404).

The only issue in this petition is:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING ITS ORDER
OF AUGUST 13, 1971.
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is undisputed that petitioner is the duly registered owner of the land in dispute as
evidenced by OCT Nos. 13, 33, 334, 336 and 337 by virtue of Decrees Nos. 240,
1942 and 1425 issued in GLRO Record Nos. 699, 875 and 917 of the Philippine
Government. In fact, private respondents admitted that much in their complaint in Civil
Case No. 15043 entitled "Bernardo et al. v. The Director of Bureau of Lands, et al."
filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Rollo, p. 50), although they claim that the
present title of petitioner TCT No. 227758 is itself void, regardless of source (Rollo, p.
141).
Likewise undisputed is the fact that respondent Judge has declared that GLRO
Record No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 are null and void in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339)
entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. v. Ortigas and Company Ltd. Partnership, et al." for
alleged lack of publication (Rollo, p. 50). Nonetheless such decision has not become
final, because of a petition for injunction filed in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
10339-R where respondent Judge was immediately enjoined by said appellate court
from proceeding in the aforesaid case and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and
Rizal to desist from taking any action involving the Original Certificates of Titles of the
petitioner (Rollo, p. 76).
Furthermore, the fact of continuous possession by the petitioner thru its predecessorin-interest, Provincia del Santisima Nombre de Jesus de Agustinos Calzados since
1862 or 125 years ago has as aforestated, been confirmed by the Supreme Court
in Compana Agricola de Ultramar v. Marcos Domingo, et al. (6 Phil. 246 [1906]). That
decision is without question, decisive in the instant case. As held by the Court some
years ago, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes "a ruling constituting the law of the case,
even if erroneous . . . may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become
final. . ." (NWSA v. NWSA Consolidated Union, et al., 27 SCRA 227 [1969], citing

People v. Olarte 19 SCRA 494 [1967]; Balmes v. Suson, 28 SCRA 304 [1969];
Mangayao v. Guzman, 55 SCRA 540 [1974]; National Mines and Allied Workers
Union [NAMAWU-MIF] v. Luna, 83 SCRA 607 [1978]; Solis v. People, 84 SCRA 377
[1978]). The law of the case does not apply to what is embodied in the decision solely
but also to its implementation carried out in fealty to what has been decreed (Libudan
v. Panama Gil 45 SCRA 17 [1972]).
On the basis of such facts, it is clearly evident that the restraining order issued by the
lower court is improper and without basis.
But just as important is the well-settled rule that injunction will not lie to take the
property out of the control of the party in possession (PNB v. Adil, 118 SCRA 117
[1982]). In a similar case, the Court ruled that in actions realty, involving preliminary
injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by
a proper action for the purpose. To authorize a temporary injunction, the complainant
must make out at least aprima facie showing of a right to the final relief. Preliminary
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse (Buayan Cattle Co. Inc. v. Quint
128 SCRA 286-287 [1984]).
Two requisites are necessary if a preliminary injunction is to issue, namely, the
existence of the right to be protected, and the facts against which the injunction is to
be directed, are violative of said right. In particular, for a writ of preliminary injunction
to issue, the existence of the right and the violation must appear in the allegation of
the complaint and a preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to
be entitled to the relief demanded in his complaint. Furthermore, the complaint for
injunctive relief must be construed strictly against the pleader (Buayan Cattle Co. Inc.
v. Quintillan supra).
Respondents anchor their claim on the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 7M (10339), (Rollo, p. 89) which, however, has not become final, apart from the fact
that as petitioner pointed out both groups of plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339)
and Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) are claiming the same lots, Lots 49 and 50, PSU25901. (Rollo, p. 52-A, par. [d] and pp. 66-67 [b]).
Thus, the existence of a "clear positive right" especially calling for judicial protection
has not been shown. As held by the Court, injunction is not to protect contingent or
future right; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right (Yaptinchay v. Torres, 28
SCRA 489 [1969]).
Another factor which militates against the validity of the restraining order issued is the
fact that said order was issued ex-parte.
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court makes it clear that no preliminary injunction
may issue ex-parte, except where the delay made necessary by the giving of notice
would prevent effective relief and might be productive of serious damage (National
Mines Allied Workers Union [NAMAWU-MIF] v. Valero, 132 SCRA 578 [1984]).

What the restraining order of respondent Judge enjoins, is the fencing of the property
by the petitioner, a titled owner, its construction of a network of roads, streets and
canals thereon or its introduction of improvements or exercise of acts of possession.
A careful study of the records reveals no case of extreme urgency which bears
strongly in respondents' favor, much less any impending damage that they may suffer
because of petitioner's actuations. The area of the land in question as described in
the complaint is 192 hectares, more or less. The census made by the Philippine
Constabulary per agreement of April 16, 1971, Annex "E " of the Answer found 89
incomplete structures occupying areas of between 2.5 to 10 sq. meters scattered in
the premises. Only 71 of the structures were claimed by persons appearing in the list.
Of the 43 parties to the case filed in the court a quo only twenty eight (28) appear in
said list. Therefore, fifteen (15) of the said parties are not in possession of any portion
of the land in question.
In sharp contrast, it is admitted that petitioner is in possession of the portions not
occupied by the structures. Petitioner's possession is of more than 99% of the land in
question (Reply, Rollo, pp. 299-300). Unquestionably, therefore, it is the petitioner
who stands more to suffer from the invasion of the land in dispute by speculators,
squatters, and other unscrupulous persons who were led to believe that the decision
of the lower court nullfying petitioners titles is already final (Rollo, pp. 406-407).
On this issue, the Supreme Court adopted a resolution on October 12, 1971, which
reads:
L-33952 (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. v. Hon. Vivencio M. Ruiz, et al).
Upon consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties in this case
as well as the annexes thereto, it appearing that petitioner is the
registered owner of the land involved herein and that it has the
right, at least prima facie, to exercise rights of ownership and
possession over said land: As prayed for, let a writ of preliminary
injunction issue, upon the filing of a bond in the sum of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to be approved by this Court,
enjoining respondent Judge from enforcing the restraining order
issued by him on August 13, 1971 and from proceeding in any
manner with Civil Case No. 678-M (15043), until further orders by
this Court. (Rollo, p. 418)
Finally, under Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge may issue a temporary
restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the
expiration of the 20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the
temporary restraining order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no
action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said
20-days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day
by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. A
temporary restraining order can no longer exist indefinitely for it has become truly
temporary (Board of Transportation v. Castro, 125 SCRA 417 [1983] citing Dionisio, et
al. v. Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch II, G.R. No. 61048
promulgated on August 17, 1983). In the same case, the Court ruled that respondent

Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in failing to resolve without considerable

delay petitioner's motion for the dissolution of the restraining order.

On the other hand as to the portions claimed by respondents for themselves, it is

evident that their action is already barred by laches.

Petitioner argues further, that a class suit is not proper in this case as such
presupposes a common and general interest by several plaintiffs in a single specific
thing (Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Consequently, it cannot be maintained
when each of those impleaded as alleged plaintiffs "has only a special or particular
interest in the specific thing completely different from another thing in which the
defendants have a like interest." (Berces v. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473). (Rollo, p. 24).

In a line of decisions, the Court has uniformly held in favor of the registered owner
who had been in possession of the property in dispute for a considerable period of
time, as follows:

Petitioner's contention is meritorious.

It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay v.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of
class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each
member of the class an actual party (Borlaza v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348; Newsweek,
Inc. v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 63559, promulgated May 30,
1986).
In the case at bar, a class suit would not lie because each of the defendants has an
interest only in the particular portion of the land he is actually occupying, and not in
the portions individually occupied by the other defendants. (Berces v.
Villanueva, supra; Rallonza v. Evangelista, 15 Phil. 531). They do not have a common
or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy (Newsweek, Inc. v. The
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,supra).
Hence, there is merit in petitioner's contention that only the principal plaintiff named in
the complaint Inocencio Bernardo can remain as party plaintiff, and all the rest must
be dropped from the case, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. And
since Bernardo does not pretend to own almost two million square meters involved in
the case, the restraining order of respondent Judge granting that it could be
maintained must be co-extensive with the boundaries of Bernardo's claim. Otherwise
stated, respondent Judge cannot restrain petitioner from performing acts of ownership
or dominion over the entire 200 hectares involved in this case.
But more than the foregoing, it will be noted that in respondents' complaint, they pray
among other things that the Original Certificates of Titles in question be declared null
and void and the land in dispute, except that portion being claimed as their own, be
declared as properties of the public domain (Rollo, p. 55).

Having been registered owners of lot for more than 40 years and
having possessed it during said period, their title had become
indefeasible and their possession could not be disturbed. (Sinoan v.
Sorongon 136 SCRA 407).
Failure of the deceased or his predecessors-in-interest to take
steps to assert any rights over the disputed land for 20 years from
date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action on the
ground of laches. (133 SCRA 718 [1984], Caragay-Layno v. Court
of Appeals).
Cause of action to recover possession of property is barred by
laches due to petitioner's inaction for more than 50 years. ( Alarcon
v. Bidin, 120 SCRA 390).
On the other hand, private respondents lay stress on the alleged fact that the instant
petition of certiorari is not proper as the petitioner is not without any remedy, speedy
and adequate in the lower court itself. They say petitioner could and should have
moved for a reconsideration of the restraining order of the lower court (Rollo, p. 111).
This contention is untenable.
The Supreme Court has categorically ruled that a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is not a prerequisite to an appeal, a petition for review or a petition for
certiorari. The amendments to the Rules of Court by the Judiciary Reorganization Act,
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) and by the interim Rules have been held to apply
prospectively, Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. v. Japson, 142 SCRA 211-212 [1986]).

On this point, the Supreme Court has already ruled that in all actions for the reversion
to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon, the
Republic of the Philippines is the real party in interest. The action shall be instituted
by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines (Director of Lands v. Lim, et al., G.R. No. L-4372, April 30, 1952).

This case was brought before the Supreme Court for the resolution of an incident in
Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) and the normal cause of action to take thereafter,
would be to remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. However, in
line with jurisprudence, that such time consuming procedure may be properly
dispensed with to resolve the issue (Quisumbing v. Court of Appeals, L-60364, June
23, 1983, 122 SCRA 709-710) where there is enough basis to end the basic
controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing with procedural steps
which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of their respective claims
(Velasco v. Court of Appeals, L-47544, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 621-622), We will
now resolve this entire controversy.

It will be noted that respondents themselves allege that the Director of Lands refused
to be a party plaintiff (Rollo, p. 49). Consequently, as to the portion of land being
claimed for the government by respondents, the case has to be dismissed.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the restraining order issued by the lower court is hereby
SET ASIDE; Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) is dismissed; and the injunction issued by
this Court in the resolution of October 12, 1971 is hereby made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.