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PPP:
. 2535 . 2556
Law and Economics of Public Private Partnerships: Comparison of Private
Participation in State Undertaking Act, B.E. 2535 (1992), and Private
Investment in State Undertaking Act, B.E. 2556 (2013)


Phanatit Lertprasertkul

..
2535 .. 2556



.. 2556
(.)




: Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)


; Email: Forestino_sun@hotmail.com

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25 ..2556

Abstract
This paper, by means of literature review and interview, studies and compares the Private
Participation in State Undertaking Act, B.E.2535 (1992) (PPSU Act), to Private Investment in State
Undertaking Act, B.E.2556 (2013) (PISU Act), through analysis in aspects of law and economics, such as
transaction cost and information economics, to find out the underlying reasons for the drafting a bill in
law and economics perspectives. The study has revealed the differences between the pair, that is, articles
of risk allocation, contract renegotiation, organization of the State Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO) as
central unit, and establishment of the Private Investment Promotion Fund have been amended. Such
changes could be explained by Law and Economics reasons, e.g., to lower transaction cost of private
project implementation, to clarify the law, and to reduce information asymmetries, moral hazards and
opportunistic behaviors.
Key Word: Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), transaction cost, information asymmetry, opportunistic
behavior, moral hazard


Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)


()
(value for money)

(public interest) (profit maximization)
(service delivery)

PPP
PPP ..2556
4 2556
..25351 2
(PPP unit)
1

..2556 3
, (PPPs) ,
( , 2553), .155-179.
2

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25 ..2556




..2535 .. 2556

.. 2556 ..
2535


4
PPPs





..2556 ()
(.) ( PPP unit)






11 72
5 25

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7
1.
( 4)

(asymmetric information)
(transaction cost)


2.

( 6-11) 2

( 23-31) 8

3.
( 32-42)
.
( price competition)

( 16 )
( 38 )
(opportunistic behavior)
(legal risk)
4.
43

(moral hazard)
(private interest)
(public interest)

(enforcing
cost)
5.
6 (5)


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PPP
Arrow-Lind condition
(sufficient condition) ( optimal risk
allocation)
PPP 2
(certainty) (pacta sunt
servanda) ( uncertainty)
( rebus sic stantibus)


( optimal risk allocation) 6(5)
( Biswa, N.B., Mashiro Kawai, Rajat
M. Nag, Infrastructure for Asian connectivity, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) pp438-440.)
6.
( 47-48)
( renegotiation clauses)


PPP
(optimal mechanism design)
(principe de continuite)
PPP

(the partys outside alternative)

7.

. ( 18)
(division of labor) .

(economies of
scope) ( 19-22)
21
( 49-57)

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( 50(1))
(supply of fund)
( excess demand for
fund)
25
(inefficiency)



..2535 () ..
2556 ()
(PPP unit)



(PPP unit)
8
2
( 47-48)
( 6(5))









PPP

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3
25 ..2556

. 2553.
(PPPs) . .
. 2553. - (Public Private Partnership: PPP):
. .
. .2556.
. .2535.
. 2549. . 1. : .
. 2554.
. . ..... .
Biswa, N.B., Mashiro Kawai, Rajat M. Nag. 2012. Infrastructure for Asian connectivity. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
Hodge, G.A., Carsten Greve and Anthony E. Boardman. 2010. International Handbook on Public-Private
Partnerships. UK: Cheltenham.

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