Medina, Ronaldo D.

2013 79219

Philo 1 WF 7:00-8:30 AM
Tangco, R.

Meno
1

Soc. Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point of view; for very likely you may
be right:-You affirm virtue to be the power of attaining goods?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And the goods which mean are such as health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver,
and having office and honour in the state-those are what you would call goods?

Men. Yes, I should include all those.

Soc. Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the great king, virtue is the power of
getting silver and gold; and would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem
this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and dishonest, equally to
be deemed virtue?

Men. Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.

Soc. Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue, as would appear, must
accompany the acquisition, and without them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.

We can transform Menos definition of virtue (1) into the equivalent categorical statement All V is P,
furthermore, All P is V since definitions are convertible where V is the class of all things which possess the
property of being virtues and P is the class of all things which possess the property of being the power (or
ability) of attaining goods. Socrates clarifies the scope of good by citing instances in (5). In (6), Meno is
forced to admit that not all mode of acquisition can be deemed as virtue. In particular all acquisition that is
unjust and dishonest cannot be virtue. As such All U is not V or, equivalently, No U is V where U is the class
of acquisition which are unjust and dishonest. By definition of U, we can deduce that All U are P.
Furthermore, from the foregoing discussion, we can also deduce the statement Some P are not V this line
of reasoning was followed by Socrates as in (7). We have thus reduced the argument into categorical
statements. It follows that Menos definition is inadmissible. Let us check whether Socrates argument is valid.
Menos definition of virtue: All V is P and as such All P is V.
Socrates main argument:
No U is V.
All U are P.
Some P are not V.
Since all U are P, then there exists P which are U (in particular those in U that are P). Hence the statement
Some P are U is true. This is a general theorem; let us call this Theorem 1.
1.
2.
3.
4.

No U is V.
All U are P.
Some P are U.
Some P are not V.

2, Thm. 1
1, 3, EIO-1.

Line (4), an O statement, follows from line (1) and (3), statements E and I, respectively, by one of the 15 valid
syllogisms: Mood EIO, Figure 1. Hence we have shown that Socrates argument is valid since the argument he
put forward transforms into a valid syllogism via a deduction using Theorem 1. In conclusion, the statement
All P is V is contradictory to Some P are not V and thus Menos definition of virtue is inadmissible.

Cratylus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Soc. And is not naming a part of speaking? For in giving names men speak.
Her. That is true.
Soc. And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action?
Her. True.
Soc. And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own?
Her. Precisely.
Soc. Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given according to a natural
process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we
name with success.

We can rephrase the arguments as follows, ignoring some details not necessary to our purpose:
1. All naming is speaking.
2. All speaking is a sort of action.
3. All actions is that which has a special nature of its own.
All naming is that which a special nature of its own.
We proceed as we have down in the passage from Meno to analyze the argument using categorical syllogisms.
Let N denote the class of things which possess the property of naming, S denote the class of those which
possess the property of speaking, A denote the class of action, and P denote the class of objects with a special
nature of its own. Thus,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

All N is S.
All S is A.
All A is P.
All N is A.
All N is P.

premise
premise
premise
1, 2, AAA-1
4, 3, AAA-1

This shows that Socrates argument is valid. We used the valid syllogism: Mood AAA figure 1 in our proof.