Oceans K Aff/Neg

1AC

CT 1 Real World
CONTENTION I: THE 21ST CENTURY
QUANTUM MECHANICS CHALLENGES 5 BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE WORLD
Wendt 04
[Alexander Wendt Ohio State University SOCIAL THEORY AS CARTESIAN SCIENCE: AN AUTOCRITIQUE FROM A QUANTUM PERSPECTIVE Forthcoming in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, eds.
(2005), Constructivism and International Relations, Routledge]
Quantum Theory 16
Quantum theory is perhaps best introduced by the classical worldview that it overthrew. Like quantum
metaphysics, the classical worldview is an interpretation of physical theory, in this case classical physics,
and as such essentially metaphysical. It makes five basic assumptions: 1) that the elementary units of
reality are physical objects (materialism); 2) that larger objects can be reduced to smaller ones
(reductionism); 3) that objects behave in law-like ways (determinism); 4) that causation is mechanical and
local (mechanism); and 5) that objects exist independent of the subjects who observe them
(objectivism?). 17 In philosophy of mind these assumptions are shared by materialists, 17dualists, and
proponents of the linguistic turn alike, and thus by extension by most positivists and interpretivists in
social science. 18 Quantum theory challenges all five. At the sub-atomic level physical objects dissolve
into ghost-like processes; wholes cannot be reduced to parts; the world does not behave
deterministically; causation is non-local; and objects do not exist independent of the subjects who
observe them. Importantly, these findings do not necessarily invalidate the classical worldview at the
macro level, since quantum states normally decohere into classical ones above the molecular level,
which is why the everyday world appears to us as classical. Decoherence has been a barrier to
developing a unified quantum theory encompassing both micro and macro levels, 19 and is a
fundamental obstacle to the quantum consciousness hypothesis in particular (see below). But at least at
the micro- level the quantum revolution has decisively overturned the claim of the classical worldview to
provide a complete description of reality.
Although the formal structure of quantum theory is highly esoteric, its basic experimental findings are
relatively straight forward, if counter-intuitive, and clearly described in a number of good, popular books.
20 The philosophical literature is also accessible, being concerned with the theorys interpretation, not its
formalism. 21 Thus, while I can claim no understanding of quantum physics, with some hard work I think I
have gained some of its metaphysics, which is what matters here. Since understanding the quantum
consciousness hypothesis requires some physics, however, let me start with four findings from quantum
theory: wave-particle duality, wave function collapse, the measurement problem, and non-locality.18
1) Wave-particle duality refers to the fact that sub-atomic phenomena have two irreducible and nonequivalent descriptions. Under some experimental conditions they are best described as waves, in others
as particles. Importantly, these descriptions are not just different but mutually exclusive. This leads to
Heisenbergs famous Uncertainty Principle, according to which we cannot know the position and
momentum of a particle at the same time. A complete description of quantum systems must therefore
include both descriptions, standing in a relation of what Niels Bohr called complementarity, where each
is inherently partial. 22 Wave-particle duality challenges two assumptions of the classical worldview.
One is that science can achieve an integrated, unitary Truth about the world. Quantum theory seems to
be true, but its truth requires contradictory narratives much like the situation with Explanation and
Understanding in social science, as I suggest below.

The other challenge is to the materialist view of matter. To see this it is necessary to understand the
peculiar nature of waves in quantum theory. Classical waves, like ripples on a pond, are caused by the
interaction of physical objects (water molecules), and as such pose no problem for materialism. Quantum
waves, in contrast, refer to the probability of finding physical objects (particles) at various locations. These
probabilities are not determined by an underlying distribution of particles, 23 since the Uncertainty
Principle tells us that as long as an electron propagates as a wave we have no basis for saying it remains
a particle at all. Unlike classical waves, then, waves in quantum theory do not refer to actualities but
potentialities events that could happen, which is a much broader class than those that actually do.
19
2) Wave function collapse refers to the fact that the transition from wave to particle is instantaneous in
time and has no apparent physical cause. Such quantum leaps challenge the determinism of the
classical worldview, and as such have caused much angst among physicists, with Einstein famously
complaining that God does not play dice. 24 But their anomalous character also points toward a
possible solution, since wave function collapse is strongly analogous to our experience of consciousness,
which involves free will and also does not seem to have a physical cause an analogy that the quantum
consciousness hypothesis will exploit.
3) The measurement problem refers to the fact that it is impossible to measure quantum phenomena
without disturbing them: the process of measurement inevitably leads to a change in the appropriate
description of sub-atomic particles. As long as we dont measure them they appear as waves, and as
soon as we do as particles. This challenges another basic assumption of the classical worldview, the
subject-object distinction, and with it the possibility, even in principle, of true objectivity. In quantum
measurement observer and observed initially constitute a single system, rather than two as they are
classically. Far from being just a given, the subject-object distinction is now emergent from the process of
measurement itself, which makes a cut in a previously undivided whole. Within social science postmodernists, feminists, and others have made similar critiques of the subject-object distinction at the
macro-level, but generally without a quantum basis. A quantum connection would give these critiques
additional force, and point toward the necessity of a participatory epistemology in social inquiry.
4) Finally, nonlocality refers to the fact that when wave functions are entangled they have effects on
each other in the absence of any apparent causal connection, in what 20Einstein called spooky action at
a distance. 25 When one wave function changes as a result of measurement, the appropriate description
of the other instantaneously changes as well. This challenges the classical worldviews mechanical theory
of causation, but more fundamentally its atomism. Entangled particles do not behave as if they were
distinct objects, but rather as parts of a superposition of particles that absorbs their individual identities
into a larger whole. This makes quantum theory radically holistic, 26 and again intriguingly similar to
social life, at least on my argument in Social Theory.

QUANTUM MECHANICS IS OUR REALITY

Strassler 12
[Matt Strassler, theoretical physicist & visiting scholar at Harvard University, B.S. Princeton; Ph.D
Stanford. PuBlished over 75 papers on string theory and on particle physics. Quantum Physics Is Very
Real Of Particular Significance Conversations About Science October 9, 2012]
Just ask the Nobel Prize committee: is quantum physics some sort of speculative new science? (A smart educated
woman asked me, just a week ago, `What do you think about that quantum physics stuff?, as though it were in the
same category as theories of consciousness, speculations about the origin of life, and string theory.) No way: its all
over your computers and cell phones; its in many modern light bulbs; its the laser that reads the prices at the
grocery store and your ticket at a concert; its the heart of the best timepieces and the eyes of the best
microscopes; its what makes solids solid and liquids flow, and powers chemical reactions and radioactivity; its

probably playing a big role in biology that were just starting to understand; and its sunshine and moonlight and
the glowing auroras borealis and australis. Its the foundation and fabric of your world.
And though it may be bizarre, it is by no means abstract. Maybe in the early 1930s one could still say it was
abstract; but already for many decades particle physicists have passively observed individual particles, one at a
time, behaving in quantum mechanical ways. Today scientists can control individual quantum objects, things
whose behavior can only be predicted by accepting the odd rules and counter-intuitive implications of our
quantum world. In particular, physicists have learned to capture and manipulate individual photons (particles of
light), atoms, and ions (atoms with an electron removed or added, to make them electrically charged see the
Figure below.) It is for their work advancing these capabilities, making possible new classes of experiments and
opening up the potential for new technologies, that Serge Haroche and David Wineland have won the Nobel Prize
for 2012. Read about it here (brief press release or summary for non-technical readers) using your preferred
quantum-mechanical device.

ETHICALLY, YOU SHOULD RESPECT THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL WHEN DETERMINING

TRUTH
McIntyre 99
[Michael E. McIntyre Centre for Atmospheric Science at the Department of Applied Mathematics and
Theoretical Physics, Silver St, Cambridge Lucidity and science III: Hypercredulity, quantum mechanics, and
scientific truth Interdisc. minor updates from Sci. Revs. , 23 , 29{70 (March 1998)]
Scientific research can reasonably be described as a search for truth, in an important and nontrivial
sense. But respect for the scientific ideal is incompatible with the myth, or instinctive, quasi-religious
belief, that science is about discovering final, infallible, absolute or ultimate truth. That myth, if publicly
endorsed by scientists, inadvertently or otherwise, is perilous because it fuels tribal conflicts like the
current `science wars' and increases public confusion about science. This in turn helps the psychological,
social, and economic forces, including the forces within big commerce, that work toward discrediting the
scientific ideal and ethic for reasons both conscious and unconscious, restricting our options for coping
with an uncertain and dangerous future. Future possibilities include the risk of substantial sea level rise,
continuing unstoppably for a century or more after first detection. Also possible | and arguably likely if
the scientific ideal is too far discredited | is the destruction of the system of free market democracy and
free trade, the government by consent and prosperity of individuals on which big commerce itself
depends.
Our understanding of the actual and potential human behaviour patterns that might lead to such
destruction is being sharpened by evidence from linguistics, palaeoclimatology, palaeoanatomy, and
genetics, and from research on perception and cognition. It is remarkable that any such selfunderstanding is possible for us, and even more remarkable that any human society allows such matters
to be openly discussed. Both things demonstrate our species' adaptability and the power of cultural
evolution, more precisely the adaptive power of the intimate and intricate interplay, or dynamic, of
what we falsely dichotomize as `nature and nurture', as if they were two separate things. This adaptive
power is one reason why our children and their descendents might dare, against the odds, to hope for
some kind of civilized future existence incorporating a new covenant between science and society. `I
would know my shadow and my light, so shall I at last be whole.' Michael Tippett 128
Respect for science is on trial in today's world. This is not only trial by soundbite but also, more to the
point, trial by our deepest fears and imaginings. 129 130 Paradoxically, it is the same world where
science has made it possible for all children to be wanted children 131 | perhaps the greatest of all

blessings | where the economic running is being made by scientifically minded competitors, and where
scientific skills and knowledge are crucial to meeting the growing threats from poverty, war, terrorism,
environmental change, and new disease epidemics. 132 133 ; ; 1 Like it or not, science and technology
are increasingly powerful tools for good and evil. Human societies, especially those with democratic
aspirations, need some understanding of the tools they use. If today's democracies are to survive as
democracies of any kind they will need to find ways of alleviating the widespread, profound, and
dangerous confusion 134 135 about what science is and what it is not, and about the value of science to
society. That value includes the human value of the scientific ideal, meaning the ideal in the sense
discussed in Parts I and II of this series 136 | a value now largely neglected and perhaps even largely
unrecognized by today's societies, as expressed officially by trends in science policymaking and auditing.
I shall argue that this puts us in far greater peril than is commonly believed. There is plenty of lip service
to the ideal, but society's actual incentives are increasingly stacked against it.
The rest of this book will try to sketch what seems to be involved. Alongside well known themes there
are some new twists, coming from recent discoveries in linguistics and palaeoclimatology and from
insights into perception and cognition, plus evidence from palaeoanatomy and genetics. There are
increasingly clear implications not only for science policymaking and auditing but also for education, and
for scientists' professional codes of conduct.
CARD CONTINUES
The value of the scientific ideal
But what is it, then, this value to society, this human value, of the scientific ideal? Con- trary to popular
mythology, it is not only the value of cheap long-distance communication, painless dentistry, heart
pacemakers, and the like. It is not only the value of the invisible science base, the unmeasurable
infrastructure of tacit skills and mental flexibility 152 re- quired to reach and make use of tomorrow's
new knowledge, new understanding, and new technologies, a prerequisite to future developments of
practical and economic value | such as the maintenance or improvement of food safety, the mitigation
or prevention of the new disease epidemics, the humane avoidance of overpopulation and
environmental stress, the development of robustness, security, maintainability, reliability, and
auditability of com- puter software and electronic transaction systems, 153 154 the efficient and
sustainable use of energy and other resources, 155 156 the containment of terrorism, 157 the early
detection of environmental change whether natural or manmade | the value of good science and
technology as our eyes and ears on an uncertain future, without which our heads, and our leaders'
heads, will be firmly buried in the sand, at great future cost. 131 132 158 Nor indeed is it only the
invisible and unmeasurable cultural value, the value of the intellectual thrill and astonishment of great
discoveries and great leaps of the imagination, and the spiritual value of something that transcends the
individual: ; ; ; ; Then felt I like some watcher of the skies When a new planet swims into his ken ... |
John Keats 159
Of course, it is all of these. But it is also something still less visible and still less measurable, though still
more crucial and still more valuable, in a hard economic sense, increasingly forgotten in the obsession
with short-term wealth creation. It is the value, beyond price, of respect for the scientific ideal, if such
respect can be maintained, as a moderating or countervailing force, or if you will an insurance, against
renewed cycles of social chaos and totalitarian repression in a world full of modern weapons, biological,
physical, chemical, psychological, information-technological, and economic 155 | an insurance against

what today's politicians might call wealth destruction on a gigantic scale, a scale incalculably greater
than the recent wealth destruction by food safety scares, itself caused in large measure by disrespect for
the scientific ideal. 139 270
This is one of the points missed by those who see wealth creation as the sole justification of science. I
am talking about an insurance against wealth destruction on the scale of gross national products, an
insurance against the breakdown of democracy itself, of government by consent, of free trade and
personal prosperity | the breakdown of the increasingly fragile economic, technological, and
psychological infrastructures of modern human societies | an insurance whose premiums are dwarfed
by the cost of the disasters insured against. It is a long term insurance whose value might command
significant public understanding, if explained well enough. It has not, I think, been explained nearly well
enough in recent years, because its value, though long recognized by careful thinkers, 160 now seems to
be forgotten not only in popular mythology but also, I shall argue, in today's official science
policymaking, much of which powerfully discourages the scientific ideal. This forgetfulness seems to be
connected in part with the workings of the short sighted, not to say blind, international market forces
that seem to dominate our situation today, and to which I shall also refer, the very forces whose
enormous strength makes us forget that they too are vulnerable | that the markets themselves depend
for their wealth creating potential on the avoidance of social chaos and totalitarian repression.
But how can respect for the scientific ideal be socially stabilizing, rather than destabilizing as some
would now have us believe? As long recognized by careful thinkers, something very fundamental is
involved, something both visible and invisible. It is something about our own human nature that we
seem close to understanding quite well, and that in any case we need to understand as well as possible.
It is a matter of ubiquitous psycho- logical realities, of our unalterable genetic inheritance, 161 162 part
of what our politicians both underestimate 163 and perilously exploit. Respect for the scientific ideal
cannot solve all our problems, but it can help with `clearing space to speak of the unspeakable', 164 with
tipping the balance | as has already happened so remarkably in recent centuries | toward
understanding, moderating, and redirecting some of the most terrible and potent forces that lead to
social instability.
These forces manifest themselves most plainly, as everyone knows, in the phenomena called bigotry
and superstition, sectarianism and racism, scapegoating and witch hunting, 165 kamikaze terrorism and
other forms of human sacrifice, 166 and genocidal warfare. They are forces whose crosscultural
presence and whose potential for social catastrophe have been amply and repeatedly demonstrated
throughout history, as well as in recent living memory. I shall hypothesize that they involve what is
usually called `instinctive' behaviour, 167 in- cluding unconscious cultural influence | more aptly
nature{nurture or genetic{memetic 168 interactions, the intricate, inextricable interplay of genome and
culture 161 167 171 | and I assume that these forces are latent in everyone and could easily be powerful
enough to destroy democracies and free market economies of the type now familiar, which, throughout human existence, have not, after all, been among the usual types of human society, 172 especially
under environmental stress.
These forces are protean: they are taking new forms and we must not think that under- standing them is
trivial. But I shall argue, too, that our species' astonishing adaptability leaves room for an optimism that
is not naive. As has happened before, new understanding can take us on new journeys, in directions
previously undreamt of.

CARD CONTINUES
Respect for the success of standard quantum mechanics compels us to say that in some sense, which no
one fully understands | a point on which experts agree | it is a superbly good model. It is an
astonishingly accurate and reliable model, of certain aspects of the outside world in an impressive range
of circumstances. Among many examples, one of the simplest yet most striking, especially when
regarded as evidence for a vast domain of applicability, is the so called blackbody radiation law, the
curve plotted in Fig. 3, and, by implication, its quantum mechanical basis. The radiation law is described
by a very simple equation. Yet it closely fits not only the relevant laboratory data but also very precise
observations of what is called the cosmic background microwave radiation, consistent with cosmological
models in which the radiation fills the whole universe and originated, in a thermodynamically
reasonable way, at an early stage of the cosmic `big bang'. 224 Ref. 223 ; 19gives the technical details
concerning observational accuracy; note, however, that in Fig. 3 not only the observational points, but
also their statistical error bars, are invisible | hidden well inside the thin curve. This is an example of the
goodness of fit ignored by the cultural relativist and social constructivist philosophies of science.
Standard quantum mechanics correctly predicts, furthermore, phenomena so strongly counterintuitive
that their repeated experimental confirmation is one of the greatest wonders of the world. The fact that
computers work, most of the time, is wonder enough; and there are phenomena still more
conspicuously strange, going under names like entanglement, nonlocality, quantum teleportation, or
Einstein{Podolsky{Rosen{Bohm phenomena, now confirmed by many careful experiments. 149 212 216
310

CT 2 Topicality
CONTENTION II THE TOPIC
THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE
ITS NON-MILITARY DEVELOPMENT OF THE EARTH'S OCEANS.

SUBPOINT A. UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Akrivoulis 02
[Dimitrios Efthymiou Akrivoulis PhD International Relations, University of Kent @ Canterbury, Thesis for
PhD: The Quantum Politics Metaphor in International Relations: Revising American NewtonianismJuly
2002]
As we have seen in our general introduction to the present thesis, the literature of International Relations
has rather recently and in various ways criticised the Newtonian character of particular spatiotemporal
appreciations mostly associated with the state, the notion of sovereignty, and state agency. Much of the
respective questioning is related to a more general critique of the traditional variations (idealism/realism)
of IR theorising. There are at least four recurrent themes in such criticisms. First, they usually suggest
that both of these theories have fallen in what Agnew has called the territorial trap, meaning an
ahistorical reification of states as fixed units of sovereign space; a dichotomising of domestic and foreign
or inside and outside which obscures cross-border processes; and a view of the state as the preexisting
container of society.458 Second, and as a corollary, that they have reduced our imaginative
excavations of future political possibilities into two-choice logical games, ranging between the
eternalisation and the extinction of the state.
Third, that they have unproblematically coincided society with national society, drawing, fourth, a
demarcation line separating what is inside from what is outside the state, thus delineating what is
considered to be the division of labour between Political Theory and International Relations. The result of
all this is that our political conceptualisations are still framed by what Walker, following Schuhl and Milic,
has called the Gulliver fallacy, meaning the continuous replication or projection of what we think is valid
about state agency to any other form of authority or organisational form by virtue of an absolute and
homogenous conceptualisation of space.
Indeed, criticising either political realism or idealism on the ground of their Newtonian spatiotemporal
appreciations might be important in its own right. Nevertheless, the approach opted for here does not aim
at building upon the arguments made so far against the traditional way of theorising about international
politics. What I find especially intriguing in such arguments and perhaps needs to be further explored
concerns, first, their shared claim that we are still restrained by a limited political imagination in our
conceptualising political spatiotemporality and, second, the often asserted relationship between this
limited imagination and Newtonian spatiotemporality. To claim that our traditional ways of conceptualising
the qualities and traits of the state, for example, are framed by a Newtonian conceptualisation of political
space and time implies that a limited political imagination is at work. In other words, it means that we are
still framed by a spatiotemporal imaginary that ideologically prescribes where we are supposed to locate
political life. In still other words, Newtonian spatiotemporality is appreciated as an ideological tropology,
and in that sense it is approached as providing the legitimate imaginative variations for conceptualising
the political spatiotemporality of international politics. The issue becomes even more interesting once we
consider that the spatiotemporal conceptualisations under question always entail a particular way of
imagining not only the space and time of international politics, but also how change and action takes
place in this spatiotemporality.
In that sense, what is of importance is neither identifying such spatiotemporal conceptualisations with
Newtons theories, nor tracing a straight, uninterrupted line of intellectual thought, through which
Newtons theories survived in time and were finally reflected in international politics. The crucial questions

here concern, instead, the ideological import of the Newtonian imaginary, as defined and discussed in a
more general context in Chapter III, on the imaginative schematisation of political spatiotemporality: How
exactly are the space and time of international politics conceptualised through this imaginative
schematisation? Does our political imagination still correspond to this Newtonian imaginary of political
spatiotemporality?
In the Newtonian imaginary of political spatiotemporality the space and time of international politics are
conceptualised as absolute and homogeneous, a passive and mutually exclusive arena, where human
beings, societies or states imagined as discrete, mutually exclusive entities with distinct properties act
and interact with conformity according to fixed laws against a fixed geographical, cultural and temporal
background, like physical objects interacting through force-fields. 459
Through the employment of Newtonian metaphoricity political action is visualised as taking place within
the regulating confines of a closed, mechanical and stable system, and thus imbuing political life with a
lingering sense of primordiality and physical composition, an aura of objectivity, inevitability, and
reification.460 In these spatiotemporal confines, any change and (inter-)action could not only be perfectly
measured and readily identified, but also predicted, regulated and controlled .461
More specifically, space is imagined as absolute, real and objective, existing independently of and prior to
the agents interactions, being either human beings, societies or states. It is also imagined as immovable,
implying that although the agents spatial relations may vary, it is conceptually impossible for the relations
among parts of space to vary, remaining always similar, dynamically inert. Thus, both political space and
political interaction are conceptualised as existing independently from each other. Even more
interestingly, the imaginative schematisation of political space as homogeneous and infinitely divisible
implies that, as two points in physical space separated by a spatial interval are always external one to the
other, political space is similarly demarcated, defining separate areas of political authority and interaction.
In this imaginary, time is also imagined as linear, homogeneous, spatialised, floating independently from
sociopolitical interaction, and measurable as a kind of one-dimensional continuous space .462 Political
events are thus identified as unique instances in time measured and remembered through its
embodiments in orreries, clocks, or calendars. Given the role of time in sociopolitical organisation,
constituting the standardised principle for co-ordination, regulation and control, it is perhaps not difficult to
appreciate the impact of such an understanding of time on the appreciation of sociopolitical order, stability
and change.
A good example of how such a Newtonian spatiotemporal metaphoricity has indoctrinated the imaginative
conceptualisation of the space and time of international politics is the balance-of-power metaphor,
discussed in Chapter IV. There we saw how the metaphor was employed in a Newtonian manner not only
to describe state interaction and the distribution of power in the international system, but also to provide a
closed, systemic model for obtaining stability. In the evoked imagery, state-interaction is depicted as
planetary movement in absolute space and time, regulated by gravitational forces rendering states
mutually exclusive to each other. Yet, one may suggest, the conceptualisation of international politics in
such terms is admittedly outmoded and hence any attempt to criticise contemporary political imagination
on these grounds is nothing but an oversimplification of more recent conceptualisations of state
interaction. This may be the case, but such imaginative schematisations of space, time and political
interaction are not only reflected, but actually rooted in the rather truistic asseveration that political life is
primarily located within the state as the dominant agent of international politics, as institution, container
of all cultural meaning and site of sovereign jurisdiction over territory, property and abstract space, and
consequently over history, possibility and abstract time463.
Disciplined by the Newtonian orthodoxies of perspective space and neutralised time, contemporary
political imagination still depicts states as distinct entities separated by hardened borders, inviolate
territorial spaces and defensible centres ... all dedicated to maintaining territorial control over sovereign
spaces.464 The Newtonian imaginary of political spatiotemporality as an absolute and homogeneous
container of political identification and interaction has been central to the conceptualisation of the state as
the nation-state. On the one hand, this conceptualisation has been ratified by the spatialisation of time

and its treatment as homogeneous and empty affecting the formation of collective, national memories,
histories and traditions. 465 On the other hand, it has been secured by the homogenisation,
fragmentation, and partitioning of space. In the Newtonian imaginary, state borders are not mere lines
drawn on maps, facilitating the visualisation of its spatial delimitation, but boundaries of self-realisation,
demarcating outside from inside, domestic from foreign, belonging from not belonging, us from them.
These borders are thus imagined as the easily-definable demarcations of political identification, leading to
the modern proliferation of spatially delineated identities.
With political space defined through a single fixed viewpoint, as if it were depicted in one of
Brunelleschis or Raphaels paintings, state sovereignty is similarly imagined as the mere doctrinal
counterpart of the application of single-point perspectival forms to the spatial organisation of politics ...
[between] territorially defined, territorially fixed, and mutually exclusive state formations.466 Also seen
through this single viewpoint, time is not understood as locally defined, but instead as universal,
producing regular, repetitive, and predictable events; it is the time of history and progress. This always
neutral and homogeneous time becomes the common denominator of almost every representational
effort from art to politics, the temporal medium in which all issues are contained and rationalised. It
seems, then, that our political imaginary of political spatiotemporality is still rooted especially in
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century ontological traditions467 that correspond to the Newtonian
appreciations of absolute and homogeneous space and time, where clear, distinct, absolute border lines,
and territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion468 demarcate the
exercise of political power and delimit the various levels where political action takes place.
It has been widely suggested that with the end of the Cold War, the accelerating flows and complex
networks of intense political relationality characteristic of the New World Order could not be contained by
such spatiotemporal schematisations, calling for a reappreciation of political spatiotemporality. According
to Luke, for example, whereas Cold-War international politics has been conceptualised as fixed in stable
spaces and predictable times, and then mirrored in categories of comparable fixity and stability, the
centres of the post Cold-War New World Order are uncertain, its borders are indeterminate, its orders
are tangled as blocs melt into flows, crumble into disarray, or tumble into holes.469 In a similar manner,
Jameson proposes the charting of new cognitive maps, which must nevertheless not return to some
older kind of machinery, some older and more transparent national space. 470 The claim that
contemporary transformations, perplexities and complexities are hard to grasp through our outdated
schematisations is frequently made. We are still unable to understand the paradoxical effects of
contemporary globalisation, interestingly addressed by Robertson as glocalisation,471 that has led to the
creation of new universals and new particulars as diversity, heterogeneity, instability, and
heteromorphism emerge from sharing access to the same flows of symbols, capital, images,
technologies, skills, and commodities.472
Pondering on such claims brings forth two relevant sets of questions. The first concerns the reasons of
this much-acclaimed inability to grasp fundamental discontinuity and change in international politics. We
keep asking questions like: Is it because our descriptive tools have missed the changing fashion? Is it
because our Newtonian metaphors of political spatiotemporality do not suffice to describe and contain the
contemporary transformations and accelerating mutations of political practice? Is it because we lack, as
Ruggie has suggested, an adequate vocabulary 473 or, according to Harvey, the appropriate
perceptual equipment?474 Need we not then develop a new metaphorics that could more adequately
describe and contain the paradoxes and transformations mentioned above? No matter how imperative
such questioning might seem, it could prove problematic to the extent that it implies the existence of an
autonomous realm of political reality, the meaning of which remains uninfluenced by the ways we think
and talk about it. This questioning is also misleading as what could be missed or undervalued is that this
alternative thinking and talking always already presupposes an alternative way of imagining international
politics. Once we fully recognise this, perhaps we are not far from appreciating that the political
significance of developing an alternative vocabulary, of employing a new spatiotemporal metaphoricity, is
not to be determined by its representational sufficiency or adequacy, but by its imaginative capacity to
disclose new political possibilities.

The second set of questions stems from the relationship often drawn between the conceptualisation of
the state and the imaginative schematisation of political spatiotemporality in Newtonian terms. This
questioning concerns the role and place of the state in an alternative imaginary of political
spatiotemporality: How could we conceptualise the accelerating transformations of the post-Cold War era,
when our political imagination is still framed by the Newtonian, fixed, stable and predictable
spatiotemporal delimitations associated with the state? The same question is sometimes posed in even
more dramatic terms: How can we still meaningfully talk about international politics as inter-state politics,
now that the once easily and clearly determinable lines demarcating the exercise of legitimate political
authority by the state are more uncertain than ever? One could pose here a series of relevant, more or
less dramatic, questions that would revolve, to a greater or a lesser extent, around the gradual
attenuation or even demise of the state. One could then assume that questioning the Newtonian
imaginary of political spatiotemporality necessarily involves the withering away of the state from our
imaginative depictions. The conclusion seems inescapable that reimagining political spatiotemporality in
other-than-absolute and -homogeneous terms involves an imaginary depiction of international politics
characterised by the absence of states. It is this rather agonistic conclusion that renders the questioning
even more misleading, for as Walker has pointed out:
[w]hat is at stake in the interpretation of contemporary transformations is not the eternal presence or
imminent absence of states. It is the degree to which the modernist resolution of space-time relations
expressed by the principle of state sovereignty offers a plausible account of contemporary political
practices, including the practices of states.475

SUBPOINT B EXPLORATION
Logsdon 09
(John, professor of political science at George Washington, former director of the Space Policy Institute
Fifty Years of Human Spaceflight Why Is There Still a Controversy?,
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100025875_2010028362.pdf)
Exploration as a Compelling Rationale Many believe that the only sustainable rationale for a governmentfunded program of human spaceflight is to take the lead in exploring the solar system beyond low Earth
orbit.20 The MIT white paper provides an insightful definition of exploration: Exploration is a human
activity, undertaken by certain cultures at certain times for particular reasons. It has components of
national interest, scientific research, and technical innovation, but is defined by none of them. We define
exploration as an expansion of the realm of human experience, bringing people into new places,
situations, and environments, expanding and redefining what it means to be human. What is the role of
Earth in human life? Is human life fundamentally tied to the earth, or could it survive without the planet?
Human presence, and its attendant risk, turns a spaceflight into a story that is compelling to large
numbers of people. Exploration also has a moral dimension because it is in effect a cultural conversation
on the nature and meaning of human life. Exploration by this definition can only be accomplished by
direct human presence and may be deemed worthy of the risk of human life.21 In the wake of the 2003
Columbia accident that took the lives of seven astronauts and the report of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board that criticized the absence of a compelling mission for human spaceflight as a failure
of national leadership,22 the United States, in January 2004, adopted a new policy to guide its human
spaceflight activities. The policy directed NASA to implement a sustained and affordable human and
robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond and to extend human presence across the
solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human
exploration of Mars and other destinations.23 This policy seems totally consistent with the definition of
exploration provided in the MIT white paper. The issue is whether such a policy and its implementation,
focusing on human exploration beyond Earth orbit, can provide an adequate and sustainable justification
for a continuing program of government-sponsored spaceflight that will make contributions that will
outweigh the costs and risks involved to the primary objectives of national pride and prestige, and also
to some of the several secondary objectives.

SUBPOINT C: DEVELOPMENT
Sumner & Tribe 08
[Andrew Sumner, co-director of the Kings International Development Institute at Kings College London;
MSc, PhD, London SB University; Michael A Tribe Search Research Fellow, Badford Centre for
International Development, University of Bradford Chapter 1: What is Development? in International
Development Studies: Theories and Methods in Research and Practice]
Development is a concept which is contested both theoretically and politically, and is inherently both
complex and ambiguous ... ... Recently [it] has taken on the limited meaning of the practice of
development agencies, especially in aiming at reducing pov- erty and the Millennium Development Goals.
(Thomas, 2004: 1, 2)
The vision of the liberation of people and peoples, which animated development practice in the 1950s and
1960s has thus been replaced by a vision of the liberaliza- tion of economies. The goal of structural
transformation has been replaced with the goal of spatial integration.... ... The dynamics of long-term
transformations of econ- omies and societies [has] slipped from view and attention was placed on shortterm growth and re-establishing fi nancial balances. The shift to ahistorical performance assessment can
be interpreted as a form of the post-modernization of development policy analysis. (Gore, 2000: 7945)
Post-modern approaches... see [poverty and development] as socially constructed and embedded within
certain economic epistemes which value some assets over others. By revealing the situatedness of such
interpretations of economy and pov- erty, post-modern approaches look for alternative value systems so
that the poor are not stigmatized and their spiritual and cultural assets are recognized. (Hickey and
Mohan, 2003: 38)
One of the confusions, common through development literature is between devel- opment as immanent
and unintentional process... ... and development as an inten- tional activity. (Cowen and Shenton, 1998:
50)
If development means good change, questions arise about what is good and what sort of change
matters... Any development agenda is value-laden... ... not to consider good things to do is a tacit
surrender to... fatalism. Perhaps the right course is for each of us to refl ect, articulate and share our own
ideas... accepting them as provisional and fallible. (Chambers, 2004: iii, 12)
Since [development] depend[s] on values and on alternative conceptions of the good life, there is no
uniform or unique answer. (Kanbur, 2006: 5)
1.1. Introduction
What is the focus of Development Studies (DS)? 1 What exactly are we interested in? In this fi rst
chapter we discuss perhaps the fundamental question for DS: namely what is development? Following
Bevans approach (2006: 712), which has been outlined in our Introduction, this is the fi rst knowledge
foundation or the focus or domain of study.
In this introduction we discuss the opening quotations to this chapter in order to set the scene. The
writers who have been cited are, of course, not unique in address- ing the meaning of development, but
the selections have been made in order to introduce the reader to the wide range of perspectives which
exists.
It would be an understatement to say that the definition of development has been controversial and
unstable over time. As Thomas (2004: 1) argues, development is contested, ... complex, and
ambiguous. Gore (2000: 7945) notes that in the 1950s and 1960s a vision of the liberation of people
and peoples dominated, based on structural transformation. This perception has tended to slip from
view for many contributors to the development literature. A second perspective is the defi nition
embraced by international development donor agencies that Thomas notes. This is a defi nition of

development which is directly related to the achievement of poverty reduction and of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs).
There is a third perspective from a group of writers that Hickey and Mohan (2003: 38) broadly identify as
post-modernists. 2 The post-modern position is that development is a discourse (a set of ideas) that
actually shapes and frames reality and power relations. It does this because the discourse values
certain things over others. For example, those who do not have economic assets are viewed as inferior
from a materialistic viewpoint. In terms of real development there might be a new discourse based on
alternative value systems which place a much higher value on spiritual or cultural assets, and within
which those without significant economic assets would be regarded as having signifi cant wealth.
There is, not surprisingly, considerable confusion over the wide range of divergent conceptualizations, as
Cowen and Shenton (1998: 50) argue. They differentiate between immanent (unintentional or underlying
processes of) development such as the development of capitalism, and imminent (intentional or willed)
development such as the deliberate process to develop the Third World which began after World War II
as much of it emerged from colonization.
A common theme within most defi nitions is that development encompasses change in a variety of
aspects of the human condition. Indeed, one of the simplest defi nitions of development is probably
Chambers (2004: iii, 23) notion of good change, although this raises all sorts of questions about what
is good and what sort of change matters (as Chambers acknowledges), about the role of values, and
whether bad change is also viewed as a form of development.
Although the theme of change may be overriding, what constitutes good change is bound to be
contested as Kanbur (2006: 5) states, because there is no uniform or unique answer. Views that may be
prevalent in one part of the development com- munity are not necessarily shared by other parts of that
community, or in society more widely.

SUBPOINT D. OCEANS
Steinberg 13
[Philip E. Steinberg Professor of Geography at Florida State University and Marie Cure International
Incoming Fellow at Royal Holloway, University of London. Of other seas: metaphors and materialities in
maritime regions, Atlantic Studies, 10:2, 156-169 29 April 2013]
Rethinking the ocean
On a childs world map (and even on many of those consulted by adults), the ocean appears as blue, flat,
and unchanging: stable in both space and time. More sophisticated maps present the topography of the
ocean floor and may even show changes in hue to represent the different depths of regional seas. Still,
however, the overall aesthetic is one borrowed from representations of land: The ocean is fundamentally
presented as a series of latitude-longitude points that can be characterized by certain constant values
across key variables, with the most salient being the categorical divide between land that is covered by
water and land that is not covered by water. This representation serves modernity well, as it reproduces
the idea that the world consists of, on the one hand, static terrestrial points on the inside that may be
settled, developed, and grouped into states and, on the other hand, aqueous points on the outside that,
due to the absence of properties that160 P.E. Steinberg enable settlement and territorialization, may be
written off as beyond society. 27 However, this representation fails to communicate the complexity of the
ocean as a mobile space whose very essence is constituted by its fluidity and that thereby is central to
the flows of modern society. 28 Of course, land is also, in a geological sense, mobile. Doreen Massey
points this out as she uses the geological mobility of land to undermine modernist notions of place as
static and amenable to development along a single trajectory. 29 However, I would assert that the
mobility of water is qualitatively different because its fluidity is inevitably experienced by anyone who
actually encounters its physicality (as opposed to observing its representation on a map). It is readily
apparent to the untrained observer that water is constituted by moving molecules and by forces that push
these molecules through space and time. By contrast, the invisibility of plate tectonic movement endows
terrestrial space with an aura of stability that is expressed in an idealization of place that transcends the

vicissitudes of time and movement; indeed, it is the power of this image on land that prompts Massey to
destabilize place by turning to the hidden mobilities of plate tectonics.
To develop ways for understanding the ocean as a uniquely mobile and dynamic space, as well as one
with depth, it is useful to turn to the tools of oceanography, a discipline rarely engaged by humanitiesoriented scholars (or, for that matter, social scientists) who adopt a regional seas perspective. In
particular, I turn here to the distinction that oceanographers make between Eulerian and Lagrangian
modeling techniques. 30 Oceanographers who work from a Eulerian perspective measure and model fluid
dynamics by recording the forces that act on stable buoys. Eulerian researchers compare the presence
and characteristics of these forces at different points in an effort to identify general patterns across space
and time. Eulerian research remains dominant in oceanography, perhaps because it mimics the terrestrial
spatial ontology wherein points are fixed in space and mobile forces are external to and act on those
points, or perhaps because the alternative is both costlier and mathematically more complex. 31 From the
Eulerian perspective, as in the modernist ontology that tends to inform our understanding of regions
(whether they are defined by a central continent or by a central ocean), matter exists logically prior to
movement. The fixed points of geography, represented in the world of Eulerian oceanography by buoys,
would persist even in the absence of the forces of movement that cross the space between and beyond
these points. Likewise, from this perspective, London and New York would exist as points on a map and,
if they were settled, they would have social dynamics and institutions, even if they did not have centuries
of linkages as nodes in a trans-Atlantic economy.
The alternative is to adopt a Langrangian perspective wherein movement, instead of being subsequent to
geography, is geography. Oceanographers working from this perspective trace the paths of floaters that
travel in three-dimensional space, with each floater representing a particle, the fundamental unit in
Lagrangian fluid dynamics. Movement is defined by the displacement across space of material
characteristics within mobile packages, not abstract forces, and these characteristics are known only
through their mobility. 32 In other words, objects come into being as they move (or unfold) through space
and time. Conversely, space ceases to be a stable background but a part of the unfolding. The world is
constituted by mobility without reference to any stable grid of places or coordinates. From this
perspective, movement is the foundation of geography. 33 To return to the previous example,Atlantic
Studies 161 London and New York exist as they are only in their continual reconstruction through flows of
connectivitity. These connections (and the space central to these connections the ocean) can be seen
only as constitutive parts/processes of the cities, not as manifestations of their external functions.
Although not specifically referencing oceanographic research, Manuel DeLanda elaborates on the
conceptual links between, on the one hand, Deleuzian philosophy and, on the other hand, the
Riemannian differential geometry that forms the mathematical basis for Lagrangian fluid dynamics. 34 In
both cases, there is an absence of a supplementary (higher) dimension imposing an extrinsic
coordinatiza- tion, and hence, an extrinsically defined unity. 35 Space, from this perspective, is less a
thing or a stationary framework than a medium that is constantly being made by its dynamic, constitutive
elements.
My point in introducing this strand of fluid dynamics is not to suggest that the world of ocean-basin
regions can be modeled in Lagrangian fashion. Rather, I discuss it to suggest an alternate route for
developing decentered ontologies of connection. This is, after all, the explicit goal of the poststructuralist
cultural studies wing of ocean region studies and it is even implicit among political economists who seek
to denaturalize the assumed primacy of the (re)production-oriented terrestrial region (e.g. the territorial
nation-state). However, as I noted in the previous section, all too often this agenda is pursued by scholars
who reduce to a metaphor the ocean that lies at the center of the ocean region or, worse yet, who simply
ignore it.
Following, but also going beyond, Blums provocation, I propose that, as part of the process of
incorporating actual, lived experiences of the ocean into the studies of maritime regions, we need also to
bring the ocean itself into the picture, not just as an experienced space but as a dynamic field that
through its movement, through our encounters with its movement, and through our efforts to interpret its
movement produces difference even as it unifies. A Lagrangian-inspired ontology may well provide a
means for doing this.

SUBPOINT E: THE BALLOT

Akrivoulis 02

[Dimitrios Efthymiou Akrivoulis PhD International Relations, University of Kent @ Canterbury, Thesis for
PhD: The Quantum Politics Metaphor in International Relations: Revising American NewtonianismJuly
2002]
Conclusion
The present chapter discussed how political spatiotemporality could be reconceptualised through the employment
of quantum metaphors. To the extent that this alternative imaginary would aim at destabilising our given
imaginative schematisations of the space and time of international politics, the explication of its noematic content
already presupposes the claim that we still conceptualise political spatiotemporality in Newtonian terms, meaning
that our conceptualisations are still framed by the ideological contours of a Newtonian imaginary. In other words,
questioning the Newtonian premises of these spatiotemporal conceptualisations connotes the critique of a limited
political imagination and the urge to imagine the space and time of international politics in other ways. In that
sense, instead of directly relating our spatiotemporal conceptualisations with Newtons own theories, or tracing
how these theories survived in time in political theorising, it is more meaningful to examine whether our political
imagination still corresponds to the Newtonian imaginary of political spatiotemporality, as described in the first
section.
There it was further suggested that the Newtonian imaginative schematisations of space, time and political
interaction are both reflected and rooted in our imaginative tendency to locate political life within the state,
understood as the homogeneous container of legitimate authority, cultural meaning, political interaction and selfrealisation, demarcated by easily defined and readily drawn lines. The crucial question here is whether it is still
possible and meaningful to imagine international politics as taking place in absolute and homogeneous space and
time, between territorially defined and mutually exclusive state-agents. It has been often claimed that, especially
after the end of the Cold War, we are experiencing an era of intense perplexities and accelerating transformations
that are hard to contain in our Newtonian spatiotemporal conceptualisations. Such claims thus bring forth the
necessity of developing an alternative tropology that could more accurately describe and contain these
perplexities and transformations. Pointing out the problematic and misleading character of such a way of thinking,
it was suggested instead that the political significance of an alternative metaphorical language would stem not
from its alleged representational sufficiency or adequacy, but from its metaphorical capacity, as an aspect of
imagination, to disclose new political possibilities.
This brings forth another question relating to the role and place of the state in our reimagining of political
spatiotemporality. Contrary to those who assert that such a reimagination necessarily presupposes a certain
withering away or total absence of the state from our imaginative depictions, it was suggested that what is at stake
in our spatiotemporal reimagining is how we could successfully meet two core challenges. The first concerns our
persistence in delineating political spatiotemporality in Newtonian terms, that is, our tendency to locate political
authority, identity and action only within clear and definable demarcating lines. Even more fundamentally it
concerns our tendency to identify all authority, identity and action as political only when thus demarcated. The
second challenge concerns our problematic projection of this imaginative schematisation onto alternative sites of
identification, forms of agency and networks of interaction. Both of these challenges were thus further pondered
upon, while explicating the specific noematic content of the quantum imaginary of political spatiotemporality in
the second section.
In this last section the central aim has been to discuss how the space and time of international politics could be
imaginatively reconceptualised through the employment of quantum metaphoricity. We started with the assertion
that the noematic content as well as the social efficacity of the evoked quantum imaginary would depend less on
what quantum theories make of space and time than on how their spatiotemporal insights are publicly understood
and socioculturally absorbed in their dissemination and popularisation. After presenting some aspects of this
public understanding especially with respect to the so-called Many Worlds quantum theory, we portrayed the
quantum imaginary of political spatiotemporality as one characterised by instantaneous change, dynamic
interactions, and multifaceted political identification that could not be clearly and readily demarcated in absolute
and homogeneous space and time, but instead in a multiplicity of constantly emerging, simultaneously coexisting,
communicating and interrelating, yet distinct, political spatiotemporalities.
To illustrate how this admittedly perplexing and inherently paradoxical imaginary of political spatiotemporality
would affect and relate to issues like those of identity, authority and action, use was made of examples relating to
displaced communities, the European transformation, and social movements respectively. In particular, we saw

how this quantum imaginary of multiple spatiotemporalities would depict, first, the admittedly complex processes
of self-realisation and political identification experienced by diasporic communities, border-zone or displaced
people; second, the intermingling spaces of authority and interweaving temporalities, upon which authority is
sustained, that characterise the current europeanising processes; and third, the in-and-through movement of
social movements that both politicise new spaces for political mobilisation and resistance and act/move in a
multiplicity of spatiotemporalities. In all three sets of examples it was suggested that the quantum imaginary of
political spatiotemporality could prove politically significant to the extent that it could disclose a series of new
political possibilities.
We concluded our analysis by pondering on the difficulty involved in ascribing a specific political content to such an
imaginative conceptualisation of international politics. As noted, this difficulty stems mostly from our almost
canonical conviction that political life can be located only within a distinct and demarcated spatiotemporality; that
life can acquire political meaning only when thus located and demarcated. In my view, it is exactly this difficulty
that points towards the core significance of the quantum imaginary. By imagining international politics as taking
place in spatiotemporal multiplicities, involving multiple subjectivities, and characterised by lines of extreme
connections, interrelations and networks, in other words, by depicting political life as located in spaces and times
that could not be demarcated by lines of separation, perhaps we could come closer to the reconceptualisation of
what (international) politics is and where it could be located. If Walker is right to assert that imagining our possible
futures involves our ability to reimagine the character and location of political life, and to constitute appropriate
practices through which this reimagination can occur, 508 the difficulty mentioned above would then concern
more the specific political expressions the quantum imaginary might take and the constitution of these
appropriate practices. What form these expressions might have and how these practices could be constituted is
indeed a solemn question, to which we still have no answer. But posing the question and realising its significance is
a good starting point, and here the role of the quantum imaginary could prove both timely and pregnant.

CT 3 Artificial Life (2:45)

CONTENTION THREE IS A-LIFE.
Artificial Life is inevitable, the question is how we'll respond. Humanism ensures an
artificial life-human divide.
de Mul 02
[Jos de Mul professor in Philosophical Anthropology and its History and head of the section Philosophy
of Man and Culture. Moreover, he is the Scientific Director of the research institute 'Philosophy of
Information and Communication Technology' (ICT). De Mul studied Philosophy in Utrecht and
Amsterdam and in 1993 he obtained his PhD (cum laude) at the University of Nijmegen with a thesis in
which he reconstructed Wilhelm Diltheys Kritik der historischen Vernunft (Critique of historical Reason).
He has joined the Philosophy department of the Erasmus University Rotterdam since 1988.
TRANSHUMANISM The convergence of evolution, humanism and information technology 2002/05/05]
In this framework the development of information technology and the informational sciences is ofcrucial
importance.[29] Sciences based on information technology, such as artificial physics andartificial life, in
contrast to the classic mechanical sciences, are not so much driven by the question ofwhat reality is, but
how it could be. These 'modal sciences' are no longer primarily directed atimitating nature, but rather at
the creation of new nature.[30] With the aid of a computer simulation ofevolution, not only can
countless alternative evolutions be made into virtual reality, but - if we wish to- we can realize these
alternatives in physical nature with the aid of genetic engineering.[31]Reciprocally, insights from
evolution theory can also be applied to the development of artificial lifeforms. One of the reasons the
classic AI research failed was because attempts were made to program artificial intelligence top down.
Because the number of possible mutual interactions between the instructions in a software program
increases exponentially as the number of lines of code increases linearly, the program is quickly
confronted with an unmanageable complexity.[32] For this reason the bottom up approach has gained
popularity in AI and AL research in recent years. In this approach AIand AL programs are constructed in
such a way (by making use of genetic or evolutionary algorithms) that they can develop themselves
further in a process of (un)natural selection. Moreover this approach, suggests Moravec in his
subsequent publications to Mind Children, has, unlike the download procedure, the advantage that it is
not weighed down by the burden of the evolutionary baggage of the human body.[33]
In the light of the previous evolution of life on earth it is not unthinkable that, thanks to information
technology, this will again result in an explosion of radically different life forms, based on different basic
forms of build (phyla), which together will form a new kingdom (or perhaps even a variety ofkingdoms)
in the taxonomy of life, beside the existing kingdoms of the Animalia, Plantae and Fungi,Protista (singlecelled organisms with one complex cell) and Monera (simple unicellular organisms). And if evolutionary
history repeats itself, after a short period in which this multiplicity of various new life forms has
occupied all the niches in the natural, cultural (and especially virtual) world, we can expect another
decimation, after which a small number of them will carry the torch of evolution further.
In the previous section I observed that many of the techniques required for the realization of the three
outlined alternatives (genetic engineering of the human organism, the construction of cyborgs and the
development of artificial life and artificial intelligence) are already reality - or at least in theprocess of
development. Furthermore, if we take the exponential acceleration of evolution seriously,then neither

can we comfort ourselves with the thought that this will take ages. Even the failure of artificial
intelligence research, with its unrealistic expectations, gives no reason for complacency. A characteristic
of exponential acceleration is that we tend to overestimate its effects in the short term,while often
grossly underestimating its effects in the somewhat longer term.
Also some of the fundamental criticism from various quarters - here I have in mind philosophers such as
Searle, Dreyfus and Lyotard[34] - which is put forward against the presuppositions of the transhumanist
program, in my opinion gives little reason to dismiss this program as implausible. An important element
of this criticism is falsely based on the anthropocentric presupposition that man is the measure for every
form of artificial intelligence and artificial life. If, for example, it is argued that computers will never be
really intelligent, never possess consciousness or have real experiences, then it is all too easily assumed
(completely setting aside the question as to whether this criticism holdswater) that the form of
intelligence (situated in organic bodies) which has developed in Homo sapienssapiens is the measure of
intelligence berhaupt. This 'carbon chauvinism' is rather shortsighted. Like birds, aeroplanes can fly,
but they do not owe this ability to a literal imitation of a bird's wings. Neither do artificial life and
artificial intelligence need to be a literal replica of organic life and organic intelligence in order to share
its essential characteristics (such as the ability to reproduce,creativity, and the ability to learn).
Computer viruses, for example, despite the fact that the reproductive material differs from that of
natural viruses, share a number of important characteristicswith them. Even if artificial life forms, based
on silicon, should never reach the level of (human)consciousness, it is still conceivable that they will be
more successful in evolutionary survival than man.
From the end of the Old Stone Age (Paleolithicum) until the New Stone Age (Neolithicum) man
developed as we now know him (Homo sapiens sapiens). During this development a form of intelligence
came into being which deviated in essential points from previous forms of organic intelligence and
which gave the evolution of life on earth a new twist. Perhaps we are standing at the threshold of the
Newest Stone Age in which intelligent life on earth will acquire a new form and direction unrecognizable
to man. And who knows whether man will then share the fate of the innumerable species left to him as
(living)fossils in lifes Odyssey through time and space.
It scarcely needs to be argued that the transhumanistic project, which is articulated explicitly and
radically in Moravec's work, but in fact (intentionally or not) dictates an important element of the
agenda of the new information sciences, means a fundamental challenge for humanism. 'Bad'
postmodernism proclaims the end of mankind in a much more literal and radical manner than 'good'
postmodernism has ever done. This is no longer exclusively about criticism of an anthropocentric way of
thinking; the continued existence of humankind itself is at stake. What must sound ominous to
humanists is that this shall occur in the name of humanistic values such as rationality, autonomy,selfdetermination and self-realization. Transhumanism radicalizes the humanist struggle "to raise life to its
highest possible level"[35] into a call for self-transformation of the biological type of man.
Transhumanists refer not only to the theory of evolution, in which it is argued that this process of selftransformation is inherent in life, but also to Nietzsches philosophy of life.*36+ In Nietzsche'sphilosophy,
too, self-transformation is regarded as an essential characteristic of life: "All great things fail at its own
instigation, through a deed of self-elevation:the law of life compels them to this, the law of necessary
'self-overcoming' is the essence of life".[37] "And life itself has spoken this secret tome: 'See, so it spoke,
I am that which that must always overcome itself'".[38] Humankind is no exception to this. It is, in
Nietzsche's famous words in Also Sprach Zarathustra, "a rope, fastened between animal and superman -

a rope over an abyss",[39] The transhumanistic project is directed atthe technological realization of the
bermensch or, as the extropist Max More puts it: the beingexisting in us as potential,waiting to be
actualized".[40]
Supposing that life is indeed characterized by self-transformation, then we cannot take for granted that
we must strive for this self-transformation. But as has already been remarked, the defence of selftransformation is supported by humanistic ideals: The Enlightenment and the humanist perspective
assure us that progress is possible, that life is a grand adventure, and that reason, science,and good will
can free us from the confines of the past... Aging and death victimizes all humans. To transhumanists, in
the words of Alan Harrington, "death is an imposition on the human race and no longer acceptable".[41]
If we allow - and even acclaim - the fact that medical science and technology have previously combated
deadly diseases successfully, what objections can we put forward agains tstriving to improve life by
adapting the body and the mind? And what reasons could we advance against striving to transform
humankind into a superior, post-human life form? These questions seem to me to be literally a matter of
life and death at the beginning of the twenty-first century. All the more so because thanks to
evolutionary chance, which has gifted us with intelligence and imaginationour future, is by no means
fixed, but is partly dependent on the choices that we make.
To be sure - and this is the prudent lesson of 'good' postmodernism that we must not forget our
freedom of choice is limited in many ways. Our fundamental finitude means that our insight and
knowledge are always historically and culturally limited and we can only choose from a limited number
of alternatives, the consequences of which, moreover, can never be completely calculated. As our
culture becomes more complex and we intervene in nature in a more fundamental way, the number of
unforeseen and unforeseeable consequences of our actions increases strongly. Partly because of this,
our cultural and technological creations achieve their own equilibrium and dynamic,which means that in
the long term we cannot fully control them. In combination with the late capitalistic market economy,
technology even gives the impression of being an autonomous, unstoppable system. With the
evolutionist bottom up approach to the creation of artificial life and artificial intelligence, moreover, we
appear to be taking a conscious distance to what is given us to control. But perhaps it is also
anthropocentric arrogance to think that we are able to and have to control this development. Is it not
more obvious that at some point in time our mind children will(must) take over responsibility for their
development? Should we not accept that seen from theperspective of humankind this development - to
quote the title of a book by Kelly - become more and more Out of Control?[42]
But at the very least there is scope for human intervention - however limited it might be, and however
much more limited it might possibly be in the future. Certainly when we consider that evolution is a
chaotic process which is characterized by a 'sensitive dependency on the initial situation' in which the
most minute variations at the outset can have enormous consequences for the further development of
the ecological system. Because at the moment we are standing at the threshold of a development, what
little scope we have brings great responsibility with it.[43] This prompts a fundamental consideration of
the question as to if, and if so, how far and in what way, we should actively promote our own selftransformation.
In answering these questions humanists cannot rely on a number of traditional strategies, seeing that in
the light of the humanistic postulates (see 1) these have lost their validity. This applies, forexample, to
the rejection of the transhumanist program on the grounds that it would breach the given natural order.
Within the humanist world view, however, this order is not immutable (whether createdby God or not),

but a dynamic process, driven by a multitude of chance factors. Neither can the artificiality of the
intended transhuman and posthuman life be a reason to reject it. Hominoids, in fact,have always been
cyborgs - at least from the moment that Homo habilis manufactured the first stonetools. Certainly the
'artificial by nature'[44] Homo sapiens sapiens was from the outset complete and already dependent on
cultural artefacts to compensate for his physical and mental shortcomings.[45]In this sense the
transhumanist program is only an extension of the course which has characterizedevolution from the
very beginning. As has already been observed, it goes without saying that nonormative arguments can
be employed for the promotion of the transhuman and the posthuman, butneither can we can employ
any normative arguments against it.
A pragmatic argument which at first sight appears to hold more water concerns the enormous risks
involved in genetic engineering and the development of artificial life and intelligence. For this
reason,following the bio-ethicus Hans Jonas, there is an argument for the 'heuristics of fear'.[46]
According to this strategy on the basis of possible future horrors we should decide to temporarily break
off, slowdown or even stop completely, certain technological developments. In any event, we must
proceed insuch a way that we can at all times rectify the consequences of our technological
interventions.
In the light of what has been said about the fundamental limitations on human desire to control, it is
patently obvious that enormous risks are attached to the transhumanistic program. The
question,however, is whether Jonas' heuristics of fear is actually a realistic option. The notion that it is
possible to oversee and, if desired, to rectify, all the consequences of our technical interventions
appears, in thelight of unforeseen (and in the case of chaotic complexity fundamentally unforeseeable)
side-effects of informationistic interventions in nature, to be an unrealistic point of departure, and one
which clings, in a negative way, to the modernistic ideal of the makeability of reality. And the idea that
to actually call a halt to technological developments will lie within the capacity of human beings living in
a technotope would also appear to be somewhat unrealistic. We are not in a position to halt the
Odyssey of life. We should rather direct our efforts towards steering its course. Furthermore, we might
ask ourselves whether the wilful curbing - or halting - of creativity and a yearning toexperiment would
not also rob humanity of its grandeur. Nietzsche's definition of man as "the great experimenter with
himself"[47] is more than a description, it also expresses esteem. When we are weighed down by the
risks associated with the human yearning to experiment it might be a comfort to consider that the
experiment of evolution in humankind was exclusively guided by blind chance.
Taking the above considerations into account, the normative question as to whether we should promote
the transhuman and posthuman is, of course, still not answered. If we wish to answer this question we
must first ask ourselves if the presupposition of the transhumanistic program - that it will promote our
happiness - is correct. Moreover, we should bear in mind that here we are not only speaking of the
happiness of humanity, but equally of that of the transhuman and posthuman lifeforms we are striving
for. Transhumanistic ethics can be no other than a radicalized Ferne-Ethik(Ethics of distance)which within the earlier-mentioned bounds of human responsibility - not onlybears responsibility for future
generations of humankind, but also for life forms created byhumankind. As far as humankind is
concerned we can ask ourselves if suppressing chance and in the most radical scenario - the mortality
of human life in all its aspects is an ideal worth striving for. I have argued elsewhere that , chance,
contingency and fate not only forms a threat to human happiness but, paradoxically, is also one of the
principle sources which determines this fragile happiness. The elimination of chance conjours up the

terrible image of dystopias such as Aldous Huxley's Brave NewWorld in which under the motto
"Community, Identity, Stability", and with the aid of chemical and psychological manipulation, man is
transformed into a fully interchangeable 'hedonistic machine',who is no longer capable of experiencing
real feelings. If this is the consequence (or even theideal[48]) of the transhumanistic project, then the
result is less the creation of the bermensch asNietzsche (who affirmed chance in the extreme from the
standpoint of his amor fati) had in mind,than that of the nihilistic 'last man' at which Nietzsche actually
directed his criticism.[49] Would the endless stretching of life's duration towards immortality not lead to
a lapse into an Eternal Recurrenceof the Same , to bottomless boredom? Or is the terrible image of
community, identity and stability the result of an outdated modernistic illusion that it is possible to
completely control befalling chance? Or is it not the case that an increase in command and control will
actually lead to new, perhaps much more radical, forms of chance, contingency and fate, which will turn
our lives into a much greater and more varied adventure than it already is?[50] If that should be the
case, then the humanistic ideal of self-realization would not be so badly damaged by the
transhumanistic program, but would rather receive an unprecedented new stimulus.
It would be intellectually over-confident to think that we could formulate conclusive answers tothese
and associated questions.[51] All the more so if we consider that in judging of the desirablility of
transhuman and posthuman life forms it would be difficult for us to resist the tendency to judge these
from an anthropocentric perspective. But just as the ape cannot form an adequate picture of the human
life form, so it is not given to us to visualize the nature or attractiveness of these new lifeforms. And that
makes our responsibility in the creation of these life forms extremely perilous.
The most radical and difficult-to-answer question that the transhumanistic program poses tohumanism
is closely related to this. It is the question of what value the human life form has compared with
potential transhuman and posthuman life forms. Does human life have a unique intrinsic value that
justifies it defending itself against these new life forms? Or must we fall back on the argument that
prompts us to protect the panda and defend human life in the name of bio-diversity?And if we are faced
with the choice will we then apply the same criteria, which leads us to sacrifice the lives ofanimals for
the welfare of humankind? Will the superiority of transhuman or posthuman life (in the quantity of
information it carries or in its abilities) ever force us to eliminate ourselves? Will our relationship with
our mind children be comparable with that of parents who, driven by a desire that is stronger than any
moral reasoning, sacrifice themselves for their children? Or, if we are concerned with artificial, other
types of children, will this sacrifice surpass our moral capacities and will we only be able to fall back on
the egoism of our own species?
In the coming decades these and related difficult questions will repeatedly startle us out of the
anthropocentric slumber in which we usually exist. In the end all these questions are variations on the
most difficult of the difficult questions posed by the German writer Max Frisch: "Are you certain that
when you and everyone you know are no longer here, the continued existence of the human race really
interests you?"

THIS PREVENTS GOOD A-LIFE AND CAUSES BAD A-LIFE.

Abrams 08
[Jerold J. Associate Prof of Philosophy at Creighton Univ. Embracing the "Children of Humanity": How to Prevent
the Next Cylon War Battlestar Galactica and Philosophy. 2008 Amazon] [ct]

The reimagined Battlestar Galactica boasts stronger roles for women, subtler politics, and more realistic special
effects than the original BSG series. But the most important advance is the tension between humanity and the new
humanoid Cylons, which mirrors our own coming relationship with a new race of artificial beings known as
"posthumans". Posthumans are artificially enhanced humans - or completely artificial beings - with unlimited life
spans and cognitive powers well beyond ours. When these beings arrive, there's no question new social problems
will emerge; one of the first and biggest being a total communicative breakdown between humans and
posthumans - just as the Cylons went silent for forty years before re-engaging humanity. Such a division is
avoidable, however, if we begin to look upon posthumans not as slaves or tools, but as Cylons look at themselves:
as the "children of humanity." We should follow the Cylons, too, in their quest to fuse with humanity, creating ever
new and varied syntheses. In this way, we'll not only avoid dialogical division, but equally subvert slavery - theirs
or ours - and perhaps also war; while, at the same time, achieving our own distinctly human ends of longer life,
higher intelligence, and greater freedom. Failing to do so will only produce all the problems now faced by
Galactica - and only postpone the inevitable. In the words of President Roslin, posthumanity is "the shape of
things to come."

BAD ALIFE DESTROYS THE UNIVERSE.

Rheingold 92
[Howard "At the beginning of the twentieth century; computational biology" Whole Earth Review - September 22,
pg Cov] [West]
It looks as if something even more powerful than thermonuclear weaponry is emanating from that same, strangely
fated corner of New Mexico where nuclear physicists first knew sin. Those who follow the progress of artificial-life
research know that the effects of messing with the engines of evolution might lead to forces even more
regrettable than the demons unleashed at Alamogordo. At least nuclear weaponry and biocidal technologies only
threaten life on Earth, and don't threaten to contaminate the rest of the universe. That's the larger ethical problem
of a-life. The technology of self-replicating machines that could emerge in future decades from today's a-life
research might escape from human or even terrestrial control, infest the solar system, and, given time, break out
into the galaxy. If there are other intelligent species out there, they might not react benevolently to evidence that
humans have dispersed interstellar strip-mining robots that breed, multiply, and evolve. If there are no other
intelligent species in existence, maybe we will end up creating God, or the Devil, depending on how our minds'
children evolve a billion years from now. The entire story of life on earth thus far might be just the wetware
prologue to a longer, larger, drier tale, etched in silicon rather than carbon, and blasted to the stars -- purposive
spores programmed to seek, grow, evolve, expand. That's what a few people think they are on the verge of
inventing.
Scenarios like that make the potential for global thermonuclear war or destruction of the biosphere look like a
relatively local problem. Biocide of a few hundred thousand species (including ourselves) is one kind of ethical
problem; turning something like the Alien loose on the cosmos is a whole new level of ethical lapse.

GOOD A-LIFE SOLVES ALL SCARCITY BASED IMPACTS

Wang 05
[Sinclair T. Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, Taipei, Taiwan Propel to a new socioeconomic system
in an unlimited-sum world enabled by molecular nanotechnologyTaiwan Nanotechnology Newsletter;
North-South Dialogue on Nanotechnology: Challenges and Opportunities Expert Group Meeting,
International Centre for Science and High Technology United Nations Industrial Development Organization
10 12 February 2005] [ct] [http://www.ics.trieste.it/Documents/Downloads/df2550.pdf]
World socioeconomic system has evolved form zero-sum or negative-sum guardian system to a system that
combined guardian with a positive-sum commercial system. Till recent Information Technology (IT) revolution, the
world has entered into a quasi-unlimited-sum system. The world has started for the first time in history to adopt a
new set of IT socioeconomic system.
IT is virtual in nature; it cannot create an unlimited-sum situation. It is incapable of performing unlimited
reproduction of actual survival material and energy. The underlying world socioeconomic system has not been

radically changed. Therefore, with the advancement in all aspects of technology, ironically, the major population of
world is still under poverty, lack the most fundamental survival food, clean water and medical care, and the world
is still at a great peril of war and environmental devastation. Meanwhile, in the fully industrialized nations, wealth
distribution is constantly worsening, pockets of the nation are living under poverty level and crime rate is uprising.
Nanotechnology at its initial development stage, mostly focuses on structural nanotechnology, is difficult to
visualize its ultimate potential. When molecular nanotechnology (MNT) has realized self-assembly capability, a
world of unlimited-sum could become possible. It can exceed IT make unlimited reproduction from virtual to real.
MNT can abundantly create food, material and energy, and makes them as free as air. This will offer human race a
historically never experienced opportunity to undergo a paradigm shift to a totally new socioeconomic system.
CARD CONTINUES
Regardless all technology advancement, human civilizations fundamental survival mode has not changed since the
advent of human. This is the root for all wars and environmental destructions. Seize this opportunity offered by
MNT, foster a quantum jump in human survival mode and propel humanity into a higher state of being is a major
challenge for us. To have a world organization to parent the transition to a higher socioeconomic mode is a
pressing issue. Via MNT and an evolved socioeconomic system to guarantee the fundamental survival right of each
individual and each species on earth is a goal for us to strive.