Shipping Tan - The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (And Trust)

The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust), Feb.
2010 version
The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust):

Or why is international cooperation difficult?
Better Safe than Sorry ---Folk Wisdom
Shiping Tang
School of International Relations and Public Affairs (SIRPA),
Fudan University, Shanghai, China, 200433
Shiping Tang is Professor at School of International Relations and Public Affairs

(SIRPA), Fudan University, Shanghai, China. Prior to his current appointment, he was
Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore, where this article was largely completed.
His latest publications include A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive
Realism (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and
International Conflict (Security Studies, 2005), Fear in International Politics: Two
Positions, (International Studies Review, 2008), The Security Dilemma: A
Conceptual Analysis (Security Studies, 2009), Foundational Paradigms of Social
Sciences (Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2010), Social Evolution of
International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis (European Journal of
International Relations, 2010), Offense-Defense Theory: Toward a Definitive
Critique (Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2010), The Security Dilemma
and Ethnic Conflict: Toward an Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict (Review of
International Studies,2010), and The Positional Market and Economic Growth
(Journal of Economic Issues, 2010-11). He can be reached at twukong@yahoo.com
The author thanks Rajesh Basrur, Christer Jonsson, Terrence Lee, Mingjian Li, Evan
Montgomery, Norrin Ripsman, and Brian Rathbun for their helpful comments. Earlier
versions of the paper were presented in the 49th Annual Convention of International
Studies Association in San Francisco, March 26-29, 2008 and the third joint Fudan
University-Lund University workshop of Building Peace: Conceptual and
Operational Issues at Fudan University, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2008. Special
thanks also go to the audience in a seminar held at RSIS.
The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust), Feb. 2010 version
Abstract
I propose a social evolutionary psychology of fear (and trust) as part of a
fundamental explanation for why international cooperation is difficult but
non-cooperation easy. I argue that for the sake of our survival, evolution has molded
our mind to detect and overreact to signs of danger while discounting signs of safety.
This core psychology of fear is then reinforced by three other traits: attribution biases,
ethnocentrism, and disinclination for systemic thinking. The result is a highly robust
and integrated social evolutionary psychology of fear. The social evolutionary
psychology of fear facilitates our mistrusting of others and limits our trusting of
others whenever there is uncertainty over others intentions, thus making international
difficult because cooperation generally requires some trust ex ante to materialize. As
a result, malign intentions are easy to detect and difficult to hide whereas benign
intentions are too easily dismissed and discounted thus hard to detect. I provide
evidences from both social psychology literature and international relations literature
to substantiate my hypothesis. I also derive specific hypotheses from the social
evolutionary psychology of fear (and trust) to be tested. Finally, I draw some
implications for theorizing social psychology via a social evolutionary approach.
ii
Outline
Introduction
I. Definitions and Clarifications
II. The Evolutionary Social Psychology of Fear and Trust
A. The Core Evolutionary Psychology of Coping with Fear
B. Toward an Integrative Social Psychology of Fear
a. Attribution Biases
b. Ethnocentrism
c. Lack of Systemic Thinking
III. Evidences from Psychological Literature

A. Evidences for a Core Psychology of Fear
B. Evidences for an Integrated Psychology of Fear-I
a. Attribution Biases and Ethnocentrism
b. Attribution Biases and Lack of Systemic Thinking
c. Ethnocentrism and Lack of Systemic Thinking
C. Evidences for an Integrated Psychology of Fear-II
a. Fear and Attribution Biases
b. Fear and Ethnocentrism
c. Fear and Lack of Systemic Thinking
IV. Evidences from IR Literature: Reading Threat vs. Reading Reassurance

V. Munich: Getting the Challenge Posed by Malign Intentions Right
VI. Implications
A. Toward a Social Evolutionary Psychology
B. Some Hypotheses for Experimental Testing
C. Trust and Fear in Social Theories
D. Containing Fear in International Politics
Conclusion
iii
Introduction
Fear and trust are essential for understanding any interpersonal or intergroup
relations.1 This article seeks to outline a social evolutionary psychology of fear (and
trust) from an evolutionary perspective, thus providing part of the fundamental
explanation for why international cooperation is difficult but non-cooperation easy.
Specifically, I propose that two general types of intentionbenign intentions and
malign intentions--pose almost diametrically opposite challenges for our perception.
Malign intentions are easy to detect and difficult to hide whereas benign intentions
are too easily dismissed and discounted thus hard to detect. This general fact is part
of the fundamental reason why international cooperation is difficult while
international non-cooperation easy.
The ultimate cause behind this general fact lies in our evolutionary past. During
the long evolutionary process leading to modern human, we have been strongly
conditioned to detect and over-react to potential danger posed by othersbe it human
or other non-human animal species--while ignoring and under-reacting to potential
friendliness from others, for the sake of our survival. This core psychology of fear is
then reinforced by three other psychological traits, resulting in a highly robust and
integrated social evolutionary psychology of fear. The social evolutionary psychology
of fear discourages our trusting of others but encourages our mistrusting of others,
and mistrust in turn breeds a sense of insecurity or fear of others, when others possess
the capabilities to do harm. Because robust and extensive cooperation generally
requires robust and extensive trust ex ante to materialize, the social evolutionary
psychology of fear in turn makes international difficult (Figure 1).
1
Here, fear specifically denotes fear for ones survival or a sense of insecurity that is determined by
the probability that another organism (i.e., an animal, an individual, or a state) is malign and the
capabilities it posses to harm oneself. Many have used fear to refer things other than fear for survival.
For a discussion on fear and other fear-related emotions (e.g., anxiety, terror, panic), see hman (2000).
Different types of fear may have very different consequences for our psychology. Trust is a function of
ones estimation that the other side is benign (i.e., it will not threaten ones life or interest). The
opposite of trust is mistrust, and mistrust is a function of ones estimation that the other side is
malignant (i.e., it will threaten ones life or interest). Trust and mistrust thus are two poles of a
spectrum that is underpinned by ones uncertainty over others intentions and they have an inverse
relationship: trust reduces mistrust, and vice versa (Hardin 1992, 512-6; Kydd 2005, 6-12; see also
Deutsch 1958, 265-7; Gambetta 1988, 217-9). The middle point of the spectrum is non-trust.
The rest of the article unfolds as follows. Section 1 provides some important
caveats. Section 2 outlines an integrated social evolutionary psychology of fear and
trust. Section 3 and 4 present evidences for the psychology of fear and trust from
psychology literature and international relations (hereafter, IR) literature, respectively.
Section 5 further reinforces the central thesis by revisiting the case of Munich. Section
6 draws some implications for social psychology and social theories in general. A
brief conclusion follows.
I. Caveats
Several caveats are in order before I proceed further.
First, I am primarily interested in advancing the social evolutionary psychology
of fear as a theoretical framework for understanding the problem of cooperation in
international politics. Thus, although I explicitly adopt a social evolutionary approach
toward social psychology (and international politics) here, I can only define social
evolution and elaborate what constitutes a social evolutionary approach elsewhere,
partly because social evolution is vastly more complex than biological evolution. Here,
suffice to say that social evolutionary psychology is not Evolutionary Psychology
(hereafter, EP). EP is essentially an upshot of sociobiology, insisting that natural
selection is the only force that has shaped the evolution of our psychology (Buller
2005; Richardson 2007). In contrast, social evolutionary psychology is based on a
social evolutionary approach, rejecting a sociobiological approach toward human
society while insisting that natural selection is not the only force that has shaped the
evolution of our psychology: social forces have been equally indispensable.2
Second, three key aspects of evolutionary theorizing should be emphasized at the
very beginning, to minimize much lingering confusion (and doubt) about evolutionary
theorizing. By definition, evolutionary theorizing is necessarily post hoc. As such, the
power of evolutionary theorizing does not lie with its capacity for proving (in the
literal sense) the past and predicting the future. Rather, evolutionary theorizing tries to
2
Following Buller (2005), I use evolutionary psychology to denote a research field and Evolutionary
Psychology (in capital initials) a paradigm.
better non-evolutionary theorizing on three fronts: 1) organizing and synthesizing a

wider body of evidence than non-evolutionary theorizing; 2) providing a more
coherent, integrative, and fundamental explanation for a much more diverse
observations than non-evolutionary theorizing; and 3) generating testable hypotheses
that predict what have been evolved out there, and these hypotheses cannot be easily
generated by non-evolutionary theorizing.
Third, because I am interested in cooperation among groups, especially ethnic
groups and states, I take in-group and out-group identities as given in the discussion
below, assuming that individuals have internalized an in-group versus out-group
identity that has been solidified during the course of social evolution after a long
history of us-versus-them war (Diamond 1997). Group identities profoundly shape
our perception, attitude, and behavior toward other individuals and groups, depending
on whether they belong to our ingroup or an outgroup (see the discussion below).
Fourth, although I imply that insights from interpersonal interactions can be
extrapolated somewhat into intergroup interactions, I am deeply aware of the
interpersonal-intergroup discontinuity (Inkso et al., 2007) and that there are distinct
dissimilarities (and similarities) between perceiving individuals and perceiving groups
(Hamilton and Sherman 1996; Abelson et al, 1998). Consequently, we have to firmly
reject a purely individualistic approach toward intergroup relations (e.g., Fearon and
Latin 1996; Hardin 1995). I cite studies at the interpersonal level simply because some
lessons from interpersonal level can be extrapolated to group level. Moreover, as a
growing number of social psychologists have recognized and I concur, the right way
forward is to move away from the dichotomy of person versus group and think that
individuals make decisions as individuals within their groups.
Fifth, I take it as given that there are real differences among individuals to trust in
both interpersonal and intergroup settings. Due to differences in genetic makeup and
personal experiences (e.g., growing up in a nice neighborhood versus growing up in a
bad neighborhood), some individuals are more willing to trust others and less likely to
over-react toward potential danger posed by others. More trustful individuals are more
likely to be doves; whereas more distrustful individuals hawks. 3 Yet, this

difference, I shall emphasize, despite being real, does not nullify the social
evolutionary psychology of fear: even doves tend to distrust.
Finally, I intentionally exclude motivated biases (e.g., domestic politics need)
that can influence decision makers perception of fear. I insist that the fundamental
traits that are singled out in the discussion below are really more fundamental, and
without these fundamental traits, motivated biases will not have an operational
foundation. Moreover, existing IR literature has shown that most motivated biases
tend to reinforcealthough they do sometimes weaken--the fundamental psychology
of fear (e.g., Jervis 1976, Lebow 1981, Stein 1988; Larson 1997). As such, the net
result from the interaction between the social evolutionary psychology of fear and
motivated biases remains that decision-makers do unconsciously exaggerate threat
posed by others and they can reduce their fear about possible threat posed by others
only by acting consciously.
II. The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear

Most of, although perhaps not all, our social psychological traits are the result of
our evolutionary past, and they serve two critical purposes: survival (as individuals
and groups) and mating (as individuals).4 As such, some of our most prominent
psychological traits must have some benefits for our survival. From the point of view
of survival, fear for ones survival or fear of death from the danger or threat posed by
others and the environment is absolutely essential for our survival. As a result, during
3
More recently, Oxley et al (2008) showed that more fearful individuals are more likely to be
conservatives and hawks whereas less fearful individuals are more likely to be moderates and doves.
Admitting that there are real personality differences among individuals due to their different genetic
makeup and socialization experience does not invalidate the social evolution paradigmrather, it
validates it. After all, without varieties or differences among individuals, selection in evolution
becomes impossible. For an earlier discussion on evolution and personality, see Tooby and Cosmides
1990a; Buss 1995, 18-23. In an earlier short article, Kahneman and Renshon (2007) contended that
hawks usually won debates on the use of force. Their elaboration, however, does not really provide a
compelling explanation why it is so. Existing literature has revealed two traits for predicting
personalities along the dimension of dove versus hawk--social dominance orientation (SDO) and
right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). The relationship between SDO and RWA has been an intensively
researched area, and a possible integration of the two theories may be emerging.
4
Some evolutionary biologists hold that survival is subordinate to reproduction (e.g., Dawkins 1996
[1976]). Such a notion is invalid. See the discussion in section 6 below.
our evolutionary past, our abilities for detecting and reacting against danger have been
robustly selected, and fear may be the most fundamental psychological trait that
evolution has bestowed upon Homo sapiens. From this perspective, an integrated
social evolutionary psychology of fear can be developed.
A. The Core Psychology of Fear

When judgments are made under uncertainty, there are two general types of errors
(false positive/type I and false negative/type II). A profound dilemma posed by
uncertainty is that a decision maker cannot simultaneously minimize both errors:
decreasing the likelihood of one error inevitably increases the likelihood of the other
error. To resolve this dilemma, evolution has primed our brain toward making the less
costly error: evolution has bestowed us with an error-management capacity
(Haselton and Buss 2000; see also Andrews 2001).
Because failing to detect and react toward danger can be devastating and
potentially fatal, our brain is willing to risk false positive (i.e., elicitation of a fear
response toward a stimulus that eventually turned out to be harmless) rather than false
negative (i.e., failure to elicit the defense response toward a stimulus that eventually
turned out to be harmful) when facing an unknown other. While making a false
positive error may waste some resources on an unnecessary defense response; making
a false negative error risks of being harmed and thus death. Consequently, when
facing potential danger from others, we inevitably bias our perception toward making
false positive errors. In other words, our brain has been robustly conditioned to
over-detect and overreact toward danger through arousing fear: Better Safe (and
Wrong) than Sorry (but Right) (hman and Mineka 2001; see also Haselton and
Nettle 2006, esp. 52-7).
Because our brain has been wired to systematically over-detect and overreact
toward danger, it must also have been wired to systematically underestimate security.
As a result, we are inclined to mistrust others but disinclined to trust others: we are
quick to suspect and react toward others suspicious behaviors but we will be extra
5
cautious when it comes to embracing others benign gesture. Although this does not
mean that we can never trust each other or that we will never be deceived by a foe, it
does mean that we are far less likely to embrace others behaviors that may signal
benign intentions. In other words, it will take far more evidence to convince us that
the other side is not malign--not to mention benign--than what will be required to
convince us that the other side is malign.
This core psychology of fear is the ultimate cause why the two kinds of intentions
pose diametrically opposite challenges for us. Due to this core psychology of fear, we
are fare more likely to exaggerate and over-react to than ignore and under-react to
the danger posed by others, and we are far more likely to doubt and dismiss than
embrace others gestures that signal benign intentions. As a result, malign intentions
are difficult to hide while benign intentions are too easily dismissed and discounted.
B. Toward an Integrated Social Psychology of Fear

The core evolutionary psychology of fear is reinforced by other psychological
traits, and these traits too contribute to our survival, partly by interacting with the core
psychology of fear. I single out three groups of trait: attribution biases, ethnocentrism,
and disinclination for systemic thinking.5
a. Attribution Biases and the Psychology of Fear

Explaining our own and others behavior is an attribution process. Inferring
others intentions from their behavior, which partly explains others behavior, is thus
an attribution exercise. Because decision makers tend to take other states behavior as
intentional, inferring the intentions behind other states presumably intentional
behaviors is a constant task for decision makers in international politics.6
Social psychological research has demonstrated that our attribution attempts are
5
There may be other traits that directly or indirectly contribute to the integrated psychology of fear. I
merely suggest that the three traits singled out here are the more fundamental ones.
6
Our explanation mode for explaining others unintentional behavior is quite simple: we simply state
its cause (Malle, Knobe, Nelson 2007). For attribution, the dichotomy of dispositional vs. situational is
more valid than the dichotomy of internal vs. external (Sabini, Siepmmann, Stein 2001).
often biased and these biases are both prevalent and robust. Yet, are these biases
or errors really mere errors or biases? If all these errors or biases are merely
errors or biases--which by implication, are inimical to our survival and reproduction,
they should have been eliminated or at least considerably weakened during the course
of evolution. In light of the fact that these errors remain robust in our psychology,
isnt it possible that these errors may have well served some important functions that
facilitate our survival and reproduction? Put it differently, cant these errors and biases
actually be adaptations or evolved psychological mechanisms that have contributed to
our survival and reproduction?7
I advance that many of our attribution biases have indeed contributed to our
survival, partly by reinforcing the core psychology of fear. Attribution biases directly
interact with the core psychology of fear to reinforce our biases for over-detecting
and over-reacting toward potential danger posed by other individuals or groups. Such
an evolution-derived understanding of course at least partly explains why these biases
remain hard-wired in our psychology.
When it comes to explaining others intentional behavior, we tend to attribute
dispositional intentions to others unfriendly thus undesirable behavior--the other
side has behaved unfriendly because it is inherently malignant. In contrast, we tend to
explain way others friendly behavior with situational factors: the other side has
behaved friendly not because it is inherently benign but because it has to. This sharp
contrast between explaining others desirable behavioral and explaining others
undesirable behavioral strongly guards us against the possibility that the other side
may have always been malign or it may become malign (and behave badly) at any
time. By attributing dispositional malign intentions to others unfriendly, and often
even ambiguous, behavior, we prolong the time that our mind remains alert versus
others. By attributing situational causes to others friendly behavior, we shorten the
7
An earlier attempt to understand the functions of attribution (biases) failed to even consider an
evolutionary perspective (Forsyth 1980). More recently, Andrews (2001) attempts to link the
fundamental attribution error (FAE) with evolution, but he failed to link attribution with survival
although he came really close. For similar questionings of our labeling many psychological
mechanisms and traits as errors or biases thus implying that they are counterproductive for our
survival and reproduction, see Cosmides and Tooby (1996); Krebs and Denton (1997); Haselton and
Buss (2000); Haselton and Nettle (2006); Haselton and Funder (2006).
time that our mind remains relaxed versus others and make sure that our mind can be
easily aroused to be alert again.
From an evolutionary point of view, attribution biases and errors thus
rigorously facilitate our survival, when they interact with the core psychology of fear.
They keep our mind alert toward potential dangers posed by others by preventing our
mind from trusting others too easily and lapsing into complacency for too long.
b. Ethnocentrism and the Psychology of Fear

Human beings are feeble as individual predators (or hunters), when compared to
other predators such as tiger, lion, and leopard. As such, only groups of humans could
have survived the early period of our evolutionary past. Belonging to a group provides
one with many benefits, from security via cooperation to a sense of belonging (Marks
1987, 83-89; Stevens and Fiske 1995).8 Ingroup is thus a form of social resource
(Correll and Park 2005). Because ingroup needs some cooperation, and thus trust,
among members with the group to sustain, social exchanges within the ingroup are
characterized by a bias toward trust rather than fear or distrust: the group is a kind of
container of generalized reciprocity (Yamagishi & Kiyonari 2000). Having an
ingroup identity, however, must entail an outgroup identity: the two identities cannot
exist without the other. This clear differentiation of us versus them is at the core of
ethnocentrism (Sumner 1906, 12; Campbell 1965, 298-300; LeVine and Campbell
1972, 12-21), which is essentially egocentrism (i.e., me-versus-others) at the group
level (Krebs and Denton 1997, 22-4). Thus, ethnocentrism itself, which is
fundamentally centered upon ingroup versus outgroup identity, is a production of
social evolution, driven by the need of survival as individuals within groups (Sumner
1906, 12; see also Brewer and Caporael 1990; 2006; Caporael & Brewer 1995).
Ethnocentrisms interaction with the core psychology of fear can be
straightforwardly understood, and these influences are automatic unless one
8
To some extent, Stevens & Fiske (1995) presents an integrated social evolutionary psychology of
living within groups, thus complements with the framework offered here. Unfortunately, although they
did point out that the need to belong is fundamentally connected with the need to survive, they did not
engage with fear at all: their social survival perspective is really about how to live better within groups,
rather than about how to survive as individuals within groups. See also Caporael (1997).
consciously tries to minimize then (Devine 1989; see also Krebs and Denton 1997).
Foremost, (partly) by interacting with the core psychology of fear, our
ethnocentrism generally leads us to extend some trust to members of our ingroup but
not to those of an outgroup (Brewer 1981; Insko et al 1990; Stevens & Fiske 1995;
Yamagishi & Kiyonari 2000). Ethnocentrism thus favors cooperation among members
in an ingroup but hinders cooperation with an outgroup.
Second, individuals value their own groups interest but neglect other groups
interest. As such, when it comes to understanding others behavior, we generally lack
empathythe ability to see things from others angle. We thus tend to neglect others
legitimate interests--including their fear of ourselves, when trying to interpret others
behavior. Without taking others interest into account, we then tend to discount
possible legitimate reasons behind their behavior and emphasize their possible malign
intentions: all of us are victims of nave realism, as Lee Ross and his colleagues
noted (Ross and Ward 1995; Robinson et al, 2005).
Third, because ethnocentrism demands loyalty to our own group, we-- especially
decision makers--fear that we may fail to safeguard our groups interest by being
soft on an outgroup as our opponent. As such, decision makers tend to be more
sensitive to others unfriendly and undesirable behaviors and more cautious in
embracing and reciprocating to others friendly and desirable behaviors.
Finally, ethnocentrism prevents critical thinking about our own behavior: we
instinctively justify our own behaviors as rational and righteous, or at the worst,
without any other choices (Ross and Ward 1995). Ethnocentrism thus prevents us
from pondering whether our own behavior might have somehow contributed to
others undesirable or ambiguous behavior. Being unable to see more external reasons
for others undesirable or ambiguous behavior, we once again end up in exaggerating
the possibility that their unfriendly, undesirable, or even ambiguous behaviors
have been caused by their malign intentions while discounting the possibility that
their behaviors might have been provoked by some of our own behaviors.
c. Simplistic Thinking and the Psychology of Fear

9
We have a general disinclination to think in a systemic or global way (Jervis

1997). In other words, we have a habit of simplistic thinking, a phenomenon that is
much more general and prevalent than what has been captured under the label of
heuristic or schematic thinking in standard social psychology literature (e.g., Nisbett
and Ross 1980; Simon 1990). Simplistic thinking is also a product of evolution. At the
very beginning of our species when stable food supply tends to be lacking, saving
effort and thus energy is conducive to our survival in the jungle in the long run.
Because thinking systemically requires far more effort thus more energy than thinking
linearly, we have developed this general disinclination to think systemically as a form
of effort-reduction for our mental process (Shah and Oppenheimer 2008; see also
Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). Evolution has primed us to produce the best
inferences () for the least investment. (Gilbert 1989, 207)
Simplistic thinking fits flawlessly with our need to cope with potential danger.
Facing a potential danger, thinking simplistically or even reflexively is a virtue
because it allows us to react to potential danger faster, whereas deep thinking when
facing a potential danger can be debilitating, sometimes fatal.
When it comes to attributing intentions to others behavior, simplistic thinking
means that we generally do not ask whether the other sides unfriendly and
undesirable behavior may be a rational reaction to a situation he faces (sometimes
conditioned by his fear of ourselves and others). Moreover, when attributing
intentions to others behavior, we tend to focus on the more observable part of others
(i.e., immediate behavior, military capability) and avoid more systemic inquiries into
the hidden causes behind others behaviors. Instead, we often jump to the conclusion
that he must have behaved badly because he is inherently malign.
Most critically, simplistic thinking hinders us from avoiding some of our
attribution biases, reducing our ethnocentrism, and preventing us from containing our
fear about others, because all these tasks require a more systemic thinking than our
brain normally performs. This will be true even if we know that our cognition usually
suffers from all those biases and errors, not to mention that most decision makers
have only the faintest idea about the existence of those biases and errors.
10
III. Evidences from Psychology Literature

Each of the four psychological traits has been amply demonstrated, but do they
really interact to form an integrated social psychology of fear? From an evolutionary
perspective, the answer can only be affirmative. Major psychological traits are bound
to interact, because such interactions are conducive to, if not indispensable for, our
survival: a compartmentalized brain in which different functions or functional areas
do not interact with each other is at a seriously, if not fatally, disadvantageous position
for coping with the complex environment we face.
This section provides evidences for an integrated social psychology of fear from
psychology literature. These evidences can be divided into three categories: 1) those
indicating a core psychology of fear; 2) those indicating that the other three major
psychological traits that have been identified as part of the integrated psychology of
fear do interact with each other; and 3) those indicating that the core psychology of
fear does interact with the other three major psychological traits singled out.
A. Evidences Indicating a Core Psychology of Dear

Without any doubt, fear is one of our primary emotions (hman 2000;
Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006). As such, we should not be surprised that our fear has
an evolutionary foundation.
Perhaps the most compelling and direct evolutionary evidence for a core
psychology of fear is that our brain has been robustly wired to detect danger posed by
snakes and spiders, bearing strong imprints from our history as a species in the jungle.
Ophidiophobia (fear of snake) and arachnophobia (fear of spider) are evident in other
primates, indicating the long history of this primitive fear/phobia (hman and Mineka
2001; LoBue and Deloache 2008). These phobias are phylogenetic or hard-wired:
they do not require any prior learning experience and they are present in infants who
have yet to become locomotive (Menzies and Clarke 1995).
A closely related phenomenon is that individuals can detect threatening faces (e.g.,
11
angry faces) faster and more accurately than neutral and especially friendly ones:
threatening faces stand out in the crowd (hman, Lundqvist, and Esteves 2001; see
Hansen and Hansen 1988 for the pioneering study).
A second stream of evidence for a core psychology of fear comes from the fact
that we have developed a sophisticated and yet almost automatic mechanism for
detecting others untrustworthy behaviors such as non-cooperation, cheating, (verbal
or physical) deception, and betrayal in social interactions. Although these behaviors
usually pose only non-lethal threat against us, our brain has developed a robust
defense against these behaviors because these behaviors do threaten our welfare and
can potentially threaten our life.
To begin with, our brain possesses an automatic attention bias for detecting
non-cooperative behaviors by others, and hence untrustworthy players or
non-cooperators (Vanneste et al. 2007). More importantly, there is a strong correlation
between noncooperative behavior and fear-related emotion: non-cooperators are seen
as more threatening and thus arouse more fear (Verplacetse et al, unpublished).
Moreover, cheaters are looked at longer and remembered better. (Chiappe and
Brown 2004) In other words, once we recognize somebody as untrustworthy (thus
potentially dangerous), we tend to remember his/her face clearly and persistently.
Such a differentiation in reacting to potential threatening individuals and to
non-threatening individuals can only be understood as a result driven by an
evolutionary need for self-protection: we need to remember the faces of those
trust-violators vividly so that we will not be harmed by them again.
Perhaps most strikingly, individuals almost always underestimate their ability to
detect cheating although they can actually detect deception quite accurately. In two
experiments, 86% and 90% of the participants believed that it is very difficult to
detect deception although they were able to detect deceptions in 89% and 87% of the
trials, respectively (Verplacetse et al. 2007). Individuals can even detect verbal
deception quite accurately: Without any previous training, individuals can detect
deceptions more than 53% of the time (Bond and DePaulo 2006). This contradiction
again exemplifies the need for detecting dangerit keeps the mind constantly alert.
12
A third stream of evidence is that we almost inevitably become more reluctant to

trust after being betrayed, deceived, and cheated, and this general reluctance to trust
not only applies to the perpetrators of those betrayals, deceptions and cheatings, but
spreads more generally to other individuals. This is most evident among individuals
whose trust was violated: Individuals who have been sexually abused or have learned
to distrust from other experiences (e.g., growing up in a ghetto) will usually become
very reluctant to trust others again (Janoff-Bulman 1992).
A fourth stream of evidence is the prevalent, profound, and often automatic
negativity bias or positive-negative asymmetry (Peeters & Czapinski 1990;
Taylor 1991; Baumeister et al 2001; Rozin and Royzman 2001). Negative entities
(events, objects, and personal traits) have more potency in arousing our brain and
their impact lasts longer than positive entities (i.e., negativity potency). Negative
entities also dominate positive ones in our cognitive integration (i.e., negativity
dominance).9 There should be little doubt that part of this negativity bias is an
evolved mechanism to keep our brain alert to potential dangers because negative
entities are more likely to indicate potentially dangerous, if not life-threatening, things
than positive entities (Roese 1997, 135).
Finally, consistent with an evolutionary explanation of the psychology of fear,
fear has a robust molecular and neural foundation in brain with amygdale at the center
of our fear-processing machinery (Cheng et al 2003; de Gelder et al., 2005; Delgado
et al., 2008; reviewed in Schafe & LeDoux 2008). Fear often automatically causes
flight reaction from the body (de Gelder et al., 2005). More importantly, fear
processing is intimately linked with long-term memory-formation: fear-related
memory formation requires de novo mRNA and protein synthesis (Duvarci, Nader &
LeDoux, 2008), strongly indicating that our brain has evolved to store both long-term
(e.g., snakes) and short-term (e.g., a bad experience) information about possible
dangers. Not surprisingly, negativity bias too has a robust neuro-physiological
9
In section 6 below, I argue that the negativity bias should be more finely delineated. Rozin and
Royzman (2001) listed two additional manifestations of this bias, greater steepness of negative
gradients and greater negative differentiation. Not all of the negative biases are connected to the
social evolutionary psychology of fear.
13
foundation (Ito et al 1998; Baumeister et al 2001, 336-337; Smith et al 2003).

All these observations are consistent with a social evolutionary psychology of
fear. Our brain has been robustly programmed to pay more attention and remain
consistently alert or even hyper-vigilant toward possible danger around us rather
than become complacent. This negativity bias given to potential danger is
widespread, consistent, automatic, and often profound.
B. Evidences Indicating an Integrated Psychology of Fear-I

There exist compelling evidences that the three traits signaled out as part of the
integrated psychology of fear do interact with each other, thus indirectly indicating
that an integrative psychology of fear exists. The logic is straightforward: If the three
traits interact with each other, then there is no reason why they do not interact with the
core psychology of fear.
a. Attribution Biases with Ethnocentrism

Egocentrism is fundamentally a concern for ones own interest, and
ethnocentrism--a mentality of taking ones in-group as the center of the universe
(Sumner 1906, 12-13), is egocentrism at the group level (Messick and Mackie 1989).
As Sumners initial exposition strongly suggested, ethnocentrism must affect
attribution regarding in-group and out-group. After Allports classic (1958 [1954]) and
Pettigrews extension (1979), many studies have unambiguously revealed that
ethnocentrism does interact with attribution (reviewed in Hewstone 1990; Brewer
1999; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002), although most studies focus the interaction
between egotism and attribution whereas studies that explicitly address the interaction
between attribution and traits of ethnocentrism other than egotism have been scant.10
The interaction between egotism and attribution has been well documented: there
10
Egotism is about defending ones ego (i.e., a self-serving bias). Because defending ones ego is a
form of symbolic self-interest, egotism can be understood a central sub-trait of egocentrism. Many of
the work discussed here implicitly treat egotism as the most salient trait of egocentrism and
ethnocentrism. I differentiate egotism from egocentrism/ethnocentrism, with the understanding that the
later subsumes the former. For elaboration on ethnocentrism and group identity in group conflict, see
LeVine and Campbell (1972); Brewer (1986); Tajfel and Turner (1986).
14
is a general self-serving or egotistic bias in our attribution. We tend to attribute

positive outcomes achieved by groups with which we have been associated to our
own behavior but to dissociate us from negative outcomes (Miller 1976; Schenkler
and Miller 1977; Sicoly and Ross 1977; Ross and Sicoly 1979). We also tend to
attribute our own socially desirable behaviors--especially those that have led to
positive outcomes--to our dispositional traits, while attributing our undesirable
behaviors--especially those that have led to negative outcomes--to situational causes
(Stevens and Jones 1976). The other side of the ego-defending bias is to denigrate
others ego: doing so achieves the same purpose of elevating our own ego over others
(Fein and Spencer 1997). Thus, we tend to attribute others undesirable behaviors,
especially those that have led to negative outcomes, to their dispositional traits. Such
a pattern of attribution helps us elevating our ego relative over others ego or at least
preventing us from losing our ego relatively: our biases and errors in attribution have
an explicit ego-defending function (Forsyth 1980; Greenwald 1980). From an
evolutionary point view, this makes perfect sense: maintaining a high self-esteem
relative to others is conducive to our engaging and excelling in the competition for
survival and reproduction (Krebs and Denton 1997).
These ego-defending biases in attribution are much more pervasive at intergroup
level than at interpersonal level, and together they constitute ethnocentric attribution
bias. This bias is so robust and pervasive that Pettigrew (1979) called the ultimate
attribution error (UAE), and UAE has withstood scrutiny much better than the
perhaps better known fundamental attribution error (FAE) (Hewstone 1990;
Chatman and von Hippel 2001).11 We tend to attribute negative outcomes that both
our ingroup and an outgroup have been associated mostly to the behaviors by the
outgroup. Moreover, we are far more likely to have biases when explaining other
groups undesirable behaviors (Ross and Fletcher 1985; Maass et al., 1989; 1995;
1996; Weber 1994). These attribution biases undoubtedly serve the purpose of
protecting our identifications with our ingroup.
11
Marriage constitutes a form of grouping. Thus, it is not surprising that couples often explain each
others positive behavior with internal/dispositional factors whereas negative behaviors with
external/situational factors (Taylor and Koivumaki 1976).
15
Although Lee Ross and his colleagues fail to even mention ethnocentrism in their
interpretation of the results, there is little doubt that reactive devaluation of others
conciliatory proposals testifies the interaction between ethnocentrism and attribution.
When a peace proposal that was actually proposed by Israelis was presented to Israeli
Jews and pro-Israel Americans as a proposal from Palestinians, the proposal was
viewed unfavorably (i.e., biased in favor of Palestinians). When the same proposal
was presented to Israeli Jews and pro-Israel Americans as a proposal from Israelis,
however, it was viewed as favorably and even-handed (Moaz et al., 2002).
The overall result from the interaction between ethnocentrism and attribution is a
profound double standard of us-versus-them when it comes to judging ones own
and others rhetoric and behaviors. This double standard has been demonstrated in the
United States versus Soviet Union (Oskamp 1965; Larson 1997, 193-4), the United
States and South Vietnam versus North Vietnam and Vietcon (Ashmore et al 1979),
Israel versus Palestine (Moaz et al, 2002), and non-German Jews versus non-Jewish
Germans (Doosje & Branscombe 2003).
b. Simplistic Thinking and Attribution Biases

Both the fact that human judgment under uncertainty relies on many heuristics
and the fact that attribution also relies on many heuristics have been well documented
long back (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Ross 1977; Nisbett and Ross 1980).
Unfortunately, after Fischhoff and Rosss initial attempts to integrate the two subfields
of inquiry (Fischhoff 1976; Ross 1977, 198-204), no sustained attention has been
given to the possible interaction between cognitive heuristics and attribution biases.
Nonetheless, it is clear that many of our cognitive heuristics can be deployed as
part of an effort-reducing mechanism for understanding others intentions and
motives (Shah and Oppenheimer 2008). Indeed, many earlier experiments of Tversky
and Kahneman involved attribution, although in a somewhat reverse way. In many of
their experiments, subjects were asked to identify which type of individual (i.e. a
Chinese studies professor or a psychology professor) better fits with a given profile.
Apparently, the task of identifying which individual better fits with a given profile
16
cannot possibly be separated from the task of sticking few attributes to a supposedly
typical individual. Similarly, consumers use brand name and country of origin to
judge products quality, thus essentially attributing quality to products by relying on a
few heuristics (Chang 2004; Maheswaran et al 1992).
c. Ethnocentrism and Simplistic Thinking

If our reasoning does depend on heuristics, then it should not be a surprise that
these heuristics are usually derived from our own experiences and readings into the
world: at the very least, they are more available thus accessible than those of others.
Since ethnocentrism is part of our own identity thus experience, it is no surprise that
some of ethnocentrisms most central traits are tied to heuristics. As a result, we tend
to explain others behavior with some very pernicious mental shortcuts.
Categorization, label, and stereotype, critical components of prejudice and
ethnocentrism are all based on highly available and exaggerated beliefs (Allport
1958 [1954], 191), and they are essentially heuristics (Pettigrew 1979, 463).12 Our
brain depends on categorization (Allport 1958 [1954], 19),13 and after we are done
with categorization, we have to label categories of individuals or groups with
linguistic labels--and these labels are usually prejudiced and biased: they are nouns
that cut slices (Allport 1958 [1954], 174-177; see also Maass et al, 1989; 1995).
These labels then serve as heuristics for perceiving others, and they form part of the
foundation of stereotypes and thus prejudice (Allport 1958 [1954]). Not surprisingly,
these heuristics are most salient when it comes to explaining behaviors by individuals
from an outgroup (Pettigrew 1979; Hewstone 1990; Tajfel 1982, 3-7; Devine 1995).
Indeed, stereotyping itself is an energy-saving heuristics (Macrae, Milne, and
Bodenhausen 1994). The fact that we tend to form stereotypes about other groups
based on our experiences with one or two individuals from those groups too reflects
the interaction between ethnocentrism and simplistic thinking (Rothbart et al, 1978).
12
13
As such, one can argue that ethnocentrism is a collective of pernicious heuristics.

Allport (ibid, chap. 10) also noted the interaction between simplistic thinking and prejudice.
17
B. Evidences Indicating an Integrated Psychology of Fear-II

Although the integrated psychology of fear has yet to be systematically studied in
psychology literature, there are evidences suggesting that the core psychology of fear
and do interact with attribution and ethnocentrism. Unfortunately, there seem to be no
direct study on the possible interaction between fear and simplistic thinking,
At the interpersonal level, the most direct evidence indicating that the psychology
of fear interacts with attribution comes from the studies of hostile/sinister attribution
bias in children and adults. We have a general tendency to attribute hostile/sinister
intentions to others hindering thus undesirable behaviors, even though those
behaviors may be totally unintentional or at least their intentionality is ambiguous: we
tend to be paranoiac (Dodge et al., 1986; Epps & Kendall 1995; Kramer 1998;
Kramer and Messick 1998).14 Apparently, hostile/sinister attribution bias is a form
of defensive mechanism aroused by fear, even if the fear is unfound: when we
attribute hostile intentions to others undesirable behaviors, we elevate the level of our
alertness toward others thus reduce the probability that we will be taken advantage of
by others again.
A second stream of evidence indicating that the psychology of fear interacts with
attribution comes from studies on the interaction between suspicion and attribution.
Steven Fein and his colleagues showed that suspicion that an actor might have ulterior
motives does affect perceivers attribution, by triggering a more sophisticated
attribution process (e.g., Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990; Hilton, Fein, & Miller 1993;
Fein & Hilton 1994; Fein 1996). Suspicion constitutes the primary component, if not
synonym, of distrust (Kramer 1998, 252; see also Fein 1996, 1165), and suspicion that
others may want to harm us will inevitably entail some fear. Thus, although existing
research does not directly test the impact on attribution of the suspicion that others
may want to harm us, it is reasonable to speculate that such suspicion will bias us
toward believing that others are more threatening than they really are (Fein 1996, 166).
14
Evidently, the sinister attributional error is essentially the hostile attributional bias into
adulthood. Kramer (1998, 267-8) noted the parallel between the two attributional errors/biases, without
linking them via either developmental or evolutionary thinking.
18
After all, the motive to do us harm is the most ulterior motive that others can possess!
Indeed, when perceivers believe that actions or motives of the actor could affect
them, suspicion may cause perceivers to see the actor in a more negative light, even if
the perceivers are not convinced that the actors behavior was indeed affected by
ulterior motives. (Fein and Hilton 1994, 167) In international relations in which
group survival and ego is at stake, suspicion and the fear derived from it will likely be
reinforced by group dynamics, thus further biasing us toward guarding against the
potential danger that can be posed to us by others.
Related and much more extensive evidence that supports an intimate interaction
between the core psychology of fear and attribution comes from the literature on
negativity biases. Apparently, negative outcomes promote more extensive
retrospective elaboration and attribution, whereas positive outcomes rarely do (Roese
1997; Baumeister et al 2001, 340-343; Rozin and Royzman 2001).
The studies on the interaction between trust and attribution can be understood as
studies on the interaction between the core psychology of fear and attribution because
trust is the opposite of mistrust and mistrust contributes to fear. Numerous studies on
the interaction between trust or lack of trust and attribution, usually based on some
variants of the prisoners dilemma (PD) game, support the conclusion that trust or
lack of trust significantly influences our attribution regarding others behavior (Kelley
and Stahelski 1970a; 1970b; for review, see Lindskold 1978). Violation of trust also
prompts victims to greater attributional search for the causes of the violation
(Janoff-Bulamn 1992; see also Peeters & Czapinski 1990; Taylor 1991, 70-71).
Regarding the interaction between fear and egocentrism, Dodge & Somberg
(1987) showed that threat to the ego exacerbates hostile attribution bias. Meanwhile,
Fenigsteini & Vanable (1992) showed that egocentrism heightens fear, often to the
level of mild paranoia.
At the intergroup level, perhaps the most direct evidence indicating the social
evolutionary psychology of fear comes from sinister/hostile attribution bias and
reactive devaluation among negotiators. Seasoned negotiators consistently believe
that their opponents are more strategic, wicked, and obstructive than themselves,
19
especially when their opponents have been unwilling to yield.15 In contrast, when
their opponents did offer compromises and concessions, seasoned negotiators
consistently devalue those compromises and concessions, judging them to be
insufficient and mostly driven by situational factors (especially by negotiators
toughness) rather than by opponents desire to compromise or intentions to cooperate
(Ross and Ward 1995, esp. 275-8). Obviously, sinister/hostile attribution bias
corroborates with the notion that malign intentions are hard to hide whereas reactive
devaluation with the notion that benign intentions are easily dismissed or discounted.
Together, these two traits perfectly corroborate with the two key predictions of the
social evolutionary psychology of fear
In addition, there are strong evidences indicating that fear is a potent factor in
driving the interaction between ethnocentrism and attribution. Members of groups are
deeply concerned with the survival of their in-groups and other forms of non-lethal
threat posed against their in-groupsthreats can be real or imagined, and this fear of
ingroups survival is enough to arouse the defensive component of the ethnocentric
attribution bias (Weber 1994, 500-502; Quillian 1995; Corneille, Yzerbyt, and
Genevive Buidin 2001; Hewstone, Rubin and Willis 2002, 586; Stephan and Stephan
2000). Ethnocentrism and fear about ingroups survival also unambiguously reduces
individuals willingness to trust outgroups and individuals from outgroups. In Israel,
the heightening of Jews fear of their group survival, aroused from the shifting
demographical distribution of Jewish and Arab population and a growing Arab
militancy in the middle-1980s, made Jews far less willing to trust Arabs (Smooha
1985). Overall, we tend to be somewhat paranoiac in intergroup interactions (Kramer
1998; Kramer and Messick 1998). This makes perfect evolutionary sense: being
somewhat paranoiac is conducive to our groups survival. Indeed, it is interesting to
note that the widely recognized interindividual-intergroup discontinuity may be
mostly underpinned by fear and greed (Wildschut and Insko 2007).
15
I put Ross and Wards work under the category of intergroup level because most negotiations they
interviewed are negotiators for corporations. Although Ross and Ward (1995) failed to link negotiators
tendency to attribute sinister or hostile intentions to their opponents with the sinister/hostile attribution
bias, it is apparent that the tendency is a manifestation of the bias.
20
Finally, from real life cases in international politics, Jervis (1976, 343-9) and
Larson (1997) uncovered abundant evidences that in confrontational inter-state
relationships (which by implication entails some fear), attribution biases,
egocentrism/ethnocentrism, and simplistic thinking do interact with each other among
decision-makers. Decision-makers generally attribute the causes of desirable
outcomes to their own effort and stop there. At the same time, however,
decision-makers also generally attribute the causes of undesirable outcomes to our
lack of influence and others malign intentions and then stop there. Apparently, when
we attribute the causes of desirable outcomes to our own influence, we not only
elevate our ego but also reduce the possibility of systemic thinking because systemic
thinking may lead to a reduction in our estimation of our influence. At the same time,
when we attribute the causes of undesirable outcomes to our lack of influence and
others malign intentions, we protect our ego and reduce the possibility of systemic
thinking because systemic thinking may lead to a recognition that we might have a
hand in causing the undesirable outcome. Both outcomes, however, point to the
conclusion that we are nice and they are bad, thus reducing the chance of building
trust and cooperation between the two groups.
IV. Evidences from IR Literature:

Reading Threat vs. Reading Reassurance
So far, I have relied on experimental evidences from social psychology in
constructing an integrated social psychology of fear. Yet, no amount of experiment in
social psychology can truly capture the complexity of international relations. As such,
more direct and crucial evidence for an integrated social evolutionary psychology of
fear (and trust) in international relations will have to come from IR literature itself,
and the most direct and strongest evidence will be that decision makers do read two
different kinds of signals--signals of threat that signal malign intentions and signals of
reassurance that signal benign intentions--differently.
In interstate interactions, states face the problem of reading the credibility of each
21
others moves (rhetoric and behavior): how can one state know that the other state
means what it just said or did? The social evolutionary psychology of fear outlined
above predicts that reading credibility of a signal of threat and reading credibility of a
signal of reassurance will present states with diametrically opposing challenges: states
are likely to exaggerate the threat posed by others but underestimate the goodwill
from others. Existing IR literature provides evidences that this is indeed the case.
Credibility, be it credibility of a signal of threat or a signal of reassurance, is a
relational rather than a dispositional concept: a signals credibility is not in the mind
of the signals sender but in the mind of the signals receiver. A signals credibility is
its receivers estimation of the degree of sincerity behind the signal. Moreover, there
are two types of credibility: behavioral vs. bargaining/signaling (Tang 2005, 38-40).
Behavioral credibility derives from a states past behavior in conflict or cooperation.
Bargaining/signaling credibility derives from a states present signal. When states
engage in reading others signals, they are dealing mostly with bargaining credibility.
From the literature on costly signaling of resolve in conflict (e.g., Schelling 1966;
reviewed in Powell 2002), it becomes apparent that decision makers and IR scholars
deploy a common equation to assess the credibility of a signal of threat: the credibility
of a states threat is a function of the multiple of the states perceived (military)
capability, interest, and resolve, discounted by the external constraints the state faces
(Tang 2005, 38; 2008, 454). More formally, CT , the credibility of a states signal of
threat in its opponents mind, is determined by the equation below (equation 1):
CT = f (
a states military capability interest resolve intentions

)
the situational constraint faced by the state as perceived its opponent
From the discussion on cost, risk, and credibility of reassurance signals that
signal benign intentions for cooperation (e.g., Deutsch 1958; Giffin 1967; Gambetta
1988; Mitchell 1991; Larson 1997, 26-30; Hardin 2002, 11-13, 113-29; Kydd 2005,
chap. 7; Yamagishi et al 2005), it is apparent that the credibility of a reassurance
22
gesture depends on its cost, risk (i.e., potential loss if the gesture is not reciprocated),
potential gain (e.g., savings in resources regardless whether the other side reciprocates
plus other benefits when the other side reciprocates), and situational constraint faced
by its sender (i.e., the degree that the reassurance signal is driven by situational
necessity), again all as perceived by its receiver. Thus, a proper equation for
estimating the credibility of a reassurance signal, C A , is (equation 2):
CA = f (
the attempt' s cost + risk - the attempt' s gains, all as perceived by the receiver
)
the situational constraint faced by the initiator as perceived by the receiver
In other words, the credibility of a reassurance signal is determined by the sum of

its perceived cost and its perceived risk, minus its perceived potential gains to the
sender, and then discounted by the perceived degree of situational constraint faced by
the sender. Apparently, the more the reassurance attempt is perceived to be driven by
situational necessity, the less credible the reassurance attempt is.
From these two structurally different equations, one conclusion becomes apparent.
Because there is no discounting factor in the equation for calculating the credibility of
another states threat, we are far more likely to exaggerate than to underestimate it. In
contrast, because there is a situational discounting factor (i.e., situational constraint)
in the equation for calculating the credibility of another states reassurance signal, we
are far more likely to underestimate it than to exaggerate it.
Worse yet, from the literature that examines actual costly signaling in cooperation
in the real world (e.g., Jervis 1976, 35-43; Mitchell 1991; Larson 1997; Kydd 2005,
chap. 7 & 8), it is apparent that the equation that decision makers and, quite often
scholars too (e.g., Montgomery 2006, 163-4), actually deploy to assess the credibility
of a reassurance signal is not equation (2), but the following one (equation 3):
23
CA = f (
the attempt' s cost - the attempt' s gains, all as perceived by the receiver
)
the situational constraint faced by the initiator as perceived by the receiver
In other words, when reading others reassurance signals, we tend to discount or

even ignore the risk associated with such signals. At the same time, however, we tend
to exaggerate the potential benefits that sender can gain from a reassurance signal.
Moreover, we tend to underestimate the cost of a reassurance signal to the sender.
Most apparently, we tend to dismiss the other sides concession such as reduction in
some military capabilities and adopting a more defensive troop deployment posture as
insignificant and reversible, thus essentially meaningless. Further, we usually do not
take the potential cost for reversing a reassurance signal into account.
Yet, undoing a reassurance gesture almost always carries some genuine cost. For
instance, while reducing troops may actually save some precious resources, it is still
genuinely costly because it will be costly to re-increase them, both financially and
diplomatically. Likewise, redeploying some already pulled back forces significantly is
costly, financially and diplomatically. Because forward re-deployment of forces is
more likely to indicate a shift toward a more aggressive posture, a state that redeploys
its troops forwardly is likely to be perceived as aggressive. Indeed, even breaking a
public verbal promise or pledge carries some diplomatic cost. As such, this potential
cost of reversing an already sent reassurance attempt must be counted as part of the
total cost of a reassurance attempt. Otherwise, it will be hard to understand why
irreversible reassurance or self-binding commitments carry more credibility both in
conflict and in seeking cooperation (Mitchell 1991, 418-424; Larson 1997, 28; Moaz
and Felsenthal 1987; Schelling 1966; Stein 1991, 441-4). Similarly, it will be hard to
understand why states willingness to codify and regularize some cooperative
behaviors and norms signals some benign intentions too. Our tendency to neglect the
cost of reversing a reassurance attempt inevitably underestimates the attempts cost.
Overall, our psychology of fear drives us to under-estimate the credibility of
others reassurance signals: We have an instinct to devalue others conciliatory
proposals or concessions (Ross 1995; Ross and Stillinger 1991; Ross and Ward 1995).
24
Indeed, long before Lee Ross and his colleagues coined the phrase of reactive
devaluation, Robert Jervis anticipated it in the context of international relations:
tension-reducing initiatives will be less effective since the perceiver is likely to
believe that they show, not that the other actor is friendly, but that the perceivers
policy of firmness is working. (Jervis 1976, 346-8, quote from 347; see also Mitchell
1991, 409, 428n10)
Not surprisingly, when a peace proposal that was actually proposed by Israelis
was presented to Israeli Jews and pro-Israel Americans as a proposal from
Palestinians, the proposal was viewed unfavorably (i.e., biased in favor of
Palestinians). When the same proposal was presented to Israeli Jews and pro-Israel
Americans as a proposal from Israelis, however, it was viewed as favorably and
even-handed (Moaz et al., 2002).
A classical example of reactive devaluation from the real world was Forest
Dulless reaction toward Khrushchevs reduction of over one million Soviet Union
troops in 1956. John Foster Dulles dismissed the move as a move that could be easily
reversed and discontinued. Moreover, Dulles focused on the potential savings from
which the Soviet Union can gain from the reduction but totally ignored the potential
risk associated with this move when it was not reciprocated by the United States and
its allies (Larson 1997, 29, chap. 2). A more recent example was from the aftermath of
the Falklands/Malvinas War. Although both Britain and Argentina were eager for
some kind of de-escalation after the war, neither side took gestures from the other side
to be gestures for real reconciliation (Mitchell 1991).
IR specialists also tend to fall into the trap of this reactive devaluation. Both
Richard Bitzinger (1994) and William Wohlforths (1994/95) read Gorbachevs
decision to unilaterally destroy more intermediate range nuclear missiles than what
Reagan had initially demanded right after their Revkjavik Summit as as solely derived
from Wests tough bargaining tactics and the economic (thus external) constraints that
Gorbachev faced, thus devaluing Gorbachevs concessions even with hindsight!
Finally, even sophisticated (Western) IR scholars often tend to infer whether a
reassurance attempt from the other side was costly enough from whether it was
25
deemed to be credible enough and/or reciprocated by ones own side. For instance,
Montgomery to assert that Khrushchevs troop reduction in 1956 was not sufficiently
costly simply because it was not perceived by the United States to be so (Montgomery
2006, 177). Likewise, Richard Bitzinger (1994, 77) asserted that Gorbachevs initial
reassurance signal was not reciprocated because Regan and many of his advisors
deemed it to be incredible. Yet, an obvious possibility why Khrushchev failed to
convince the United States of his benign intentions may be that then Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles was simply too hawkish or too fearful to trust any reassurance
attempt from Khrushchev, short of total submission. Similarly, Gorbachev might have
failed to convince the United States of his benign intentions because then Secretary of
Defense Casper Weinberger and National Security Advisor Alexander Haig were
simply too hawkish or too fearful to trust any reassurance attempt from Khrushchev,
short of total submission (Larson 1997, 32, 237, 243).
Hence, while a reassurance attempt must have been sufficiently credible to
succeed in convincing the other side that one is benign, it is misleading to infer that a
reassurance attempt must have not been costly enough because it did not succeed in
convincing the other side that one is genuinely benign. By inferring whether a
reassurance signal by the other side is sufficiently costly from its success in
convincing ones own side that it is genuinely benign, one neglects the obvious
possibility that the ones own side was too aggressive or too fearful that even a very
costly reassurance attempt, short of total submission, would not have succeeded. This
general tendency to infer whether a reassurance attempt by the other side is costly
enough from its success most likely reflects the work of ethnocentrism and attribution
biases among IR scholars, implicitly underpinned by fear.
Overall, the contrasting pattern of reading the credibility of a threat and the
credibility of a reassurance is consistent with the social evolutionary psychology of
fear outlined above. Existing IR literature thus provides considerable evidence for the
social evolutionary psychology of fear outlined above.
26
V. Munich: Getting the Challenge by Malign Intentions Right

A frequently invoked and thus abused analogy for justifying hard-nosed policies
against another state when one is unsure of another states intentions has been the
tragedy of Munich leading to the outbreak of World War II. In this section, I revisit
Munich. By doing so, I reinforce the notion that malign intentions is difficult to hide,
a key prediction of the social evolutionary psychology of fear.
Munich can have three possible interpretations, and only one of them supports the
notion that malign intentions are easy to hide. The other two interpretations actually
point to the exact opposite.
The first interpretation is that the Munich tragedy resulted because Chamberlain
was fooled by Hitler--that is, Chamberlain did not recognize Hitlers malign
intentions. Obviously, only this interpretation supports the notion that malign
intentions are difficult to detect.
The second interpretation is that Chamberlain was not sure of the exact extent of
Hitlers greed or ambition although he recognized Hitlers malign intentions. This
interpretation does not support the claim that malign intentions are easy to hide, and it
centers on Chamberlains uncertainty over Hitlers scope of expansion and resolve for
expansion, rather than his intentions to expand. To take this interpretation to be
equivalent to the first interpretation is to commit the error of conflating intentions
with interest or resolve.
The third interpretation is that the Munich tragedy resulted not because
Chamberlain was unsure of Hitlers malign intentions or because he was unsure of the
exact extent of Hitlers greed although he recognized Hitlers malign intentions, but
rather because (he believed) Britain and France lacked the military capabilities and
thus the resolve to resist Hitler in Munich.16 Again, this interpretation does not
support the claim that malign intentions are easy to hide.
The first interpretation of the Munich tragedy now looks increasingly untenable,
16
With hindsight, Britain and France would have been better off by fighting in Munich rather than a
year later when they did half-heartedly (Murray and Allet, 2000). Obviously, a more sound explanation
is a combination of the second and the third interpretation.
27
in light of newly available evidences. For instance, David Edelstein (2002) opted for
the first interpretation, noting that Hitler before 1939 recognized the value of not
revealing his malign intentions completely. Yet, Edelstein himself came very close to
show that Hitler had already revealed his malign intentions by 1936 through a series
of moves from 1933 to 1936. Hitler withdrew from disarmament conference in
October 1933, demanded Germany to have a 300,000-man army in March 1934,
instituted conscription and built an air force in 1935, and re-remilitarized Rhineland in
March 1936. Moreover, Hitler played with peace rhetoric only after a genuine
alarming behavior. In light of the logic of reading intentions (Kydd 2005; author, a),
Hitlers behaviors before 1936 clearly revealed his malign intentions and other states
should have read his malign intentions unambiguously.
And this is indeed what had happened. As early as 1934, and certainly by 1936
when Hitler had re-militarized Rhineland, most French and British decision-makers,
including none other than Neville Chamberlain himself, had concluded that Germany
posed a grave threat to European peace (Layne 2008, 404-5; Ripsman and Levy 2008,
150; see also Edelstein 2002, 29).17 By the time of Munich, France and Britain
leaders had no doubt about Hitlers aggressiveness, although uncertainty on the scope
of Hitlers ambition still abounded. By any measure, uncertainty about Hitlers
intentions (i.e., being fooled by Hitlers pretension of benign intentions) was not a
major cause of the Munich tragedy. In other words, Britain and France might have
failed to stand firm against Hitler for a variety of reasons; but failure to recognize
Hitlers malign intentions and the threat posed by him was not one of them. While
Hitler recognized the value of concealing his true intentions; he was never as good at
it as Edelstein believed him to be. Edelstein has misinterpreted Munich as a case
indicating that malign intentions are hard to detect.
The third interpretation, which is more commonly held (for good reasons) and
more reasonable, attributes a major cause of France and Britains appeasement to
Hitler in Munich to the two countries domestic pathology and real constrains (e.g.,
17
Although Layne (2008) and Ripsman and Levy (2008) differ on the exact motivation of British
appeasement policy toward Hitler, they agree on a key point that the British recognized the clear and
present danger posed by Hitler as early as 1933 and certainly by 1936 the latest.
28
Britains imperial overextension) rather than their uncertainty over Hitlers malignant
intentions. Indeed, Edelstein (2002, 28) himself explicitly admitted (casually, of
course), it was domestic pathology and real constrains that had prevented Britain and
France from arming themselves adequately.
Both Britain and France were saddled by domestic pathologies before Munich. In
both countries, elites were divided over the priority of their defense, and the general
public and many powerful interest groups that were strongly against war (Schweller
2006). A perhaps more powerful cause might have been the division between Britain
and France. Many British elite accepted the legitimacy of many of Germanys
grievances about the Versailles settlement, (Layne 2008, 427), and the English
Channel certainly provided Britain with a sense of security that France does not enjoy
(Levy and Thompson 2005). Moreover, Britain was still recovering from the Great
Depression in 1929, while still trying to maintain its vast empire. Perhaps most
importantly, Chamberlain wanted to avoid war because he understood that another
great power war would have meant not only the end of the British Empire but also the
end of Britain as a great power. Considering the severe external constraints that
Britain faced at that time, Chamberlain thus might have done his best to preserve the
British Empire (Layne 2008; Ripsman and Levy 2008). The gap between Britain and
Frances determination to confront France undoubtedly created divisions between
Britain and France.
Britain and Frances domestic pathologies, external constrains, and strategic
divisions were then perhaps reinforced by two perceptual pathologies. First, Britain,
France, and the Soviet Union all believed that the distribution of power on the
European continent was still multipolar when it was indeed bipolar, that is, only
Hitlers Germany and the Soviet Union were great powers on the continent, and
Britain and France were no longer great powers (Schweller 1998). Because Britain,
France, and the Soviet Union believed the European continent was still multipolar, all
of them tried to buck-pass the heavy burden of resisting Hitler to others (Posen 1984,
29
232-3; Christensen and Snyder 1990; Schweller 1998; Mearsheimer 2001, chap. 8).18
Second, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union believed that WWII would again be a
war of attrition just like WWI. Each of the three powers thus believed that the other
could stand on its ownat least for a while--against Hitler and Hitler could not score
quick and decisive victories (Christensen and Snyder 1990, 156-65; Posen 1984,
232-3).19 If this is the case, then one does not have to jump into the fighting too
quickly, and it is much better to sit on the sideline and let the others do the fighting.
Together, these two perceptual pathologies reinforced Britain and Frances inclination
to avoid war with Hitler, as far as possible.
The combined outcome of these causes was an inadequate or ineffective response
(with hindsight) or under-balancing against the looming threat posed by Hitler. In
Munich, Britain and France thus had to appease Hitler simply because they were
ill-prepared for fighting Hitler: (they believed that) they lacked the capability, and
thus resolve, to resist Hitler. Hitler was able to move forward with his evil designs
because France and Britain were not well prepared to stop him, not because they did
not know his devilishness. Surely, the fact that Britain and France did not really fight
Germany after declaring war on Hitler when Hitler invaded Poland in September 1939
(i.e., the Phony War) indicated that Britain and France were not ready to fight Hitler
even after Poland, both capability and resolve wise.
Thus, the most notorious case of appeasement was not caused by the defenders
uncertainty about their adversarys aggressive intentions but rather by their lack of
capability and resolve to resist. Munich does not support the notion that malign
intentions are difficult to detect. Indeed, for the average guys on the street and most
decision makers, Munichs principal lesson is that one cannot retreat before a looming
danger (Khong 1992), and this reading is also the right one. Munich does not support
the notion that a deceptive aggressor can easily fool his opponents (Khong 1992).
By contending that the history of WWII before 1939 when Hitler invaded Poland
18
Schweller contended that European powers believed that the European continent was still multipolar
when it was actually bipolar, whereas others contended that the European continent was really
multipolar. These two arguments lead to the same conclusion: buck-passing dominated.
19
Thus, Stalin was stunted by the quick collapse of France: Couldnt they put up any resistance at
all? (Christensen and Snyder 1991, 157)
30
indicates that malign intentions are difficult to gauge, many have misinterpreted
history, unintentionally or intentionally. They have exaggerated the difficulty of
reading other states malign intentions, thus also the danger of seeking cooperation via
intentions-reading and trust-building.
Interestingly enough, this misinterpretation of Munich and the fact that Munich
remains such a powerful political symbol or myth actually reflects the social
evolutionary psychology of fear. Fear is so powerful that some fear can last long after
the source of the fear has been gone: we fear the ghost of predators past (Byers
1998). Just as we still retain our phobia of snake although most of us as city dwellers
are unlikely to encounter snakes in their daily life, we fear the prospect of facing
another Hitler although Hitler may be one-of-a-kind and we are highly unlikely to
encounter another Hitler (Jervis 1976, 233; Layne 2008, 434). Certainly, Munich
remains one of the most favorite political myths that politicians like to invoke when
trying to sell assertive or even aggressive policies they favored: they intuitively know
that fearrather than trust or sense of security-arouses the public (Layne 2008,
436-7). All of them understand that Munich perfectly serves the purpose of constantly
alerting us to the possible danger of falling into complacency. Most likely, many IR
specialistsbecause they are ethnocentric consciously or subconsciously--have been
constantly trying to warn their respective states from underestimating possible threat
by altering us to the possibility of another Munich.
VI. Implications
The social evolutionary psychology of fear outlined above has implications for
both social psychology and international relations. In this section, I shall focus on its
more immediate implications, leaving its implications for more fundamental issues
(e.g., the role of human nature in social theories) to later work.
A. Toward a Social Evolutionary Psychology

The notion that fear is fundamentally driven by evolution is not new. Indeed, after
31
observing his two-year-old sons fear of caged zoo animals and noting that fear is one
of the earliest feelings which children experience, Darwin (1877, 288) perceptively
speculated: May we not suspect that the vague and very real fears of children, which
are quite independent of experience, are the inherited effects of real danger and
adjective superstitions during ancient savage time [of our ancestors]?
Yet, despite the assault by EP (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Buss 1995),
evolutionary thinking has not made much an inroad in social psychology. The notion
that our major psychological traits are fundamentally driven by evolution has yet to
take a firm root in social psychology: most studies make no attempt to link the
psychological traits under examination with evolution, not to mention social evolution.
Social psychologists have yet to really give Darwin his due. (Kitcher 2003)
The social psychology of fear is no exception. Some have attempted partial
synthesis of the psychology of fear (e.g., Marks 1989; Janoff-Bulman 1992, 55-59,
65-69; De Becker 1997; hman and Mineka 2001; Barrett 2005; Haselton and Nettle
2006, 52-7), but they are exceptions. 20 Moreover, they mostly focus on the
psychology of fear at the individual level rather than the group level (see below).
Similarly, when explaining the origin of negativity bias, Skowronski and
Carlston (1989) failed to consider an evolutionary explanation altogether. Rozin and
Royzman (2001) listed an adaptive/evolutionary, a developmental, and a neural
explanation for the origin of negativity bias. Baumeister et al (2001) criticized
existing explanations of the origin of negativity bias and did toy with an
evolutionary explanation, but eventually failed to pursue it seriously.
Terror-management theory (TMT) does try to link death with human psychology,
by insisting that human social motivation has a terror-management root (Solomon,
Greenberg, and Pyszczynski 1991; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon 1997).
Unfortunately, TMT has either conflated our fear of untimely death (thus yearning for
survival) with our anxiety or terror about our eventual death (thus yearning for
immortality) or has mistakenly over-emphasized the latter over the former (Leary and
20
Gudykunst (1995) developed an anxiety/uncertainty management theory, and he failed to link his
theory with fear, not to mention evolution.
32
Schreindorfer 1997, 26-7). Yet if we have to differentiate fear from anxiety, terror, and
panic (hman 2000), then our fear of death has to be studied separately from the
terror from our awareness of our eventual death. Moreover, our fear of death must
hold ontological priority over the terror from our awareness of our mortality: the latter
comes much later than the former in individuals mental development. Certainly, ever
since ancient Greece, man has understood that our fear of death and our terror from
our realization of our eventual mortality have very different implications for human
behavior (Ahrensdorf 2000). If TMT is a theory centered upon the terror of eventual
death rather than a theory centered upon fear of immediate death, then TMT is better
understood as a theory for cultural traits (e.g., religion, rituals), and much of its
supporting evidence is better understood as so.
Meanwhile, although EP has been making some progresses and some bold (thus
questionable) claims about our psychology, it for a long time has mostly focused on
the psychology of mating rather than that of survival (e.g., Buss 2003[1995]; Dawkins
1996 [1976]). In the Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology edited by David Buss
(2005), there were three entries on survival but seven entries on mating. More
strikingly, in the Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology edited by Dunbar and
Barrett (2007), there were eight entries on mating but no entry on survival at all! It
seems as if that EPs adherents believe that we can reproduce without first securing
our survival! Yet, survival must come before reproduction: unless an individual can
survive into adolescence, he/she cannot reproduce (Caporael and Brewer 1995, 31).
After all, even David Buss, a prominent EP proponent who sometimes seemed to be a
firm believer in the reproduction first thesis (e.g., Buss 1997), often put survival
ahead of reproduction when he slipped (Buss 1995, 6; 9; 2003 [1995], 152)
Furthermore, EP and social psychology in general has focused on individuals,21
reflecting the dominance of the individual/person-paradigm in social psychology
(Steiner 1986). Not surprisingly, most existing studies of fear and survival too made
little effort to link with group dynamics. Yet, if human psychology had mostly
evolved for surviving within small groups (Brewer and Caporael 1990; Caporael and
21
This is especially true for EP, which tends to focus on mating: mating is an individual thing.
33
Baron 1997), then the psychology of surviving as groups must have left important
imprints over our psychology. If so, studying social psychology of fear at group level
and exploring the impact of group dynamics on individuals psychology of fear is
equally, if not more, important as studying individuals psychology of fear as if it is
independent
from
group
dynamics.
22
In
light
of
the
profound
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity that intergroup relations tend to more

competitive and less cooperative than interpersonal relations (Wildschut and Insko
2007), such a practice will not be able to contribute too much to our understanding of
cooperation and conflict between humans, often as groups.
Moreover, ethnocentrism exists only in ethnical groups, nation, and states, and the
boundaries among these groups are more rigid thus more difficult to trespass (Tajfel
and Turner 1986, 8), Yet most groups in laboratory experiments are of only
experimental origin and members with these experimental groups do not have the
same kind of bonds as found within members of ethnic groups. Hence, while
laboratory studies of intergroup interactions do offer important insights into the
dynamics of intergroup interactions between ethnic groups in the real world, they
cannot possibly provide an adequate picture about the later. To advance our
understanding about cooperation and conflict between ethnic groups, social
psychologists should design their experiments more realistically to reflect the
hardened boundaries and ethnocentrism between ethnic groups, states, and nations.
The social evolutionary psychology of fear outlined above represents one of the
few attempts that explicitly set out to integrate social psychology via survival, at both
the individual level and the group level. Thus, perhaps the foremost implication of our
proposed framework is that it is possible, if not more compelling, to integrate the
fragmented field of social psychology via survival. Such an integrative approach
sheds new lights on why some of our psychological traitsoften labeled as errors
and biases--have been so robust and prevalent. For instance, it is straightforward to
think that egocentrism (especially our general lack of empathy), loss aversion, and
22
TMT (Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski 1997) has tried to link with group dynamics (e.g.,
groups world view, culture). But TMT deals with terror from mortality rather than fear of death.
34
counterfactual thinking are all somehow connected to serve the purpose of facilitating
our survival (and mating). It is thus high time for psychologists to take the
evolutionary psychology of survival at both individual and group level seriously
because many observations in social psychology, especially those bear the label of
errors and biases, simply do not make much sense unless in the light of our need
to survive as individuals and groups in evolution, to paraphrase the late Dobzhansky.23
Finally, we hope that our research can encourage social psychology to explicitly
address some of the bigger and more pressing questions faced by human society. At
the beginning of social psychology as a science, many leading voices have asked and
investigated big questions (e.g., Allport 1958; Deutsch 1958; LeVine and Campbell
1972). As social psychology becomes more specialized, however, it has generally
avoided big questions, and the coming of evolutionary psychology has not changed
this situation. Our discussion shows that social evolutionary psychology can offer
fundamental insights into some of the most fundamental problems in social life (i.e.,
conflict and cooperation, war and peace).
B. Some Hypotheses for Experimental Testing

As noted in the very beginning, all evolutionary theories are necessarily post hoc.
An evolutionary framework does not literally prove something: The strength of an
evolutionary framework lies with that it offers a coherent explanation and generates
testable predictions regarding some specific phenomena. In this section, I offer
several hypotheses that can be derived from the social evolutionary psychology of fear.
Confirmation of these hypotheses would then at least indirectly support the existence
of the social evolutionary psychology of fear. A general testing strategy shall try to
assess whether these predicted expressions of the social evolutionary psychology of
fear are present not only in adults, but also often in young children, and sometimes
even infants.24 In general, these expressions should be present at both interpersonal
23
Here, I shall echo Haselton and Funder (2006) in insisting that unless we can somehow link biases
and errors we have discovered so far with evolution, we are better served by not keeping adding to the
growing list of biases and errors.
24
A more convincingly test would be to test whether these traits are present in other primates,
35
and intergroup level, with the effect at intergroup level being perhaps more profound.
a. Perceiving Hostile Intentions versus Perceiving Benign Intentions
The most straightforward prediction from the social evolutionary psychology of

fear is that we recognize possible signs of malign intentions (and thus danger) more
rapidly and accurately than we can recognize possible signs of benign intentions.
There already some preliminary direct evidences for this. The face in the crowd
effect and our superb ability to detect cheating, deception, and non-cooperation
strongly suggests that we can recognize possible signs of malign intentions (and thus
danger) more accurately than possible signs of benign intentions (see section 2 above).
This contrast is even evident in our most intimate relationshipsmarriage. In
marriage, intentions to convey hostility are perceived more accurately than intentions
to convey positive feelings (Bodenhausen et al 1987).
b. Refining the Negativity Bias
Most existing studies of negativity bias or positive-negative asymmetry do

not differentiate negative events or outcomes that are brought about by other
individuals or organisms from negative events or outcomes that are brought about by
non-agents such as natural disasters (e.g., Peeters & Czapinski 1990; Taylor 1991;
Baumeister et al 2001; Rozin and Royzman 2001). The social evolutionary
psychology of fear predicts that once we do differentiate the two broader categories of
negativity, we will uncover a more profound asymmetry in individuals coping with
these two categories of negativity.
Existing studies have proved convincingly that negative entities usually entail
sophisticated counterfactual thinking, post hoc (Roese 1997; Baumeister et al 2001;
Rozin and Royzman 2001; Epstude and Roese 2008). If we differentiate negative
events or outcomes that are brought about by other individuals or organisms from
negative events or outcomes that are brought about by non-agents such as natural
disasters, we shall predict the following differences in subjects upward counterfactual
including their youngsters. This, however, may be very difficult, if not totally infeasible.
36
thinking regarding the two types of negative events. Overall, negative outcomes that
are brought about by other individuals or organisms should predict more sophisticated
upward counterfactual rethinking of the event and re-evaluating ones own detecting
capabilities (Table 1). Obviously, this post hoc rethinking serves the purpose of
enhancing our survival by improving our chance of avoiding potential future losses
(Roese 1997; Epstude and Roese 2008).25
c. Reactive Inflation versus Reactive Devaluation
As noted above, the presence of sinister/hostile attribution bias and reactive

devaluation among individuals and seasoned negotiators constitutes the most direct
evidence indicating the social evolutionary psychology of fear comes: these two traits
almost perfectly fit into the two key predictions of the psychology of fear (Framer
1994; Ross and Ward 1995). The psychology of fear predicts that these two traits
should be present among all of us, not just seasoned negotiators: their expression of
the two traits have been merely hardened by their experience of hard bargaining in the
past. Moreover, reactive inflation, which subsumes sinister/hostile attribution bias,
should be more potent than reactive devaluation.
Reactive devaluation for others conciliatory proposals and concessions can be
explored more specifically. Most of the time, the reason why we tend to react coolly
to these gestures is because we do two things. First, we tend to underestimate the cost
and risk that others are taking when they make the concession or offer. We tend to
believe that others are giving up little. Second, we tend to overestimate the potential
gains that others can reap from the move and the potential cooperation if we
reciprocate their move. Third, we tend to overestimate the situation constraint they
face when they make the gestures--we tend to believe that others make conciliatory
proposals and concessions only when they have no others choices. These traits have
been discovered among decision makers and seasoned negotiators (see above), and
they should be readily observed in laboratory settings.
25
In other words, we anticipate future loss from possible future events and take actions to prevent
those events thus losses. Thus, loss aversion, which is fundamentally underpinned by the social
evolutionary psychology of fear, is far deeper than what prospect theory has captured so far.
37
The other side of coin is that we fall into the trap of reactive inflation when
others behave undesirably by behaving unfriendly or unaccommodatingly toward us,
even if our own demand upon others may be (objectively) totally unreasonable. In
general, we tend to inflate the potential threat posed by others provocative, and
sometimes ambiguous, behaviors by doing two things. First, we tend to exaggerate or
inflate the evil intentions and capabilities (thus the potential threats they can pose)
behind others not-so-nice behaviors by ignoring possible situational factors behind
those behaviors. Second, we tend to find additional evidence, usually from others
past actions and other cues that we used to ignore, to bolster our reading into others
actions (see also table 1). The existing literature on hostile/sinister attribution bias is
already pointing to such a mechanism, and we should have little difficulties in
uncovering these traits of reactive inflation of threats in laboratory.
This combination of reactive inflation and reactive devaluation can also be
deduced from the literature on suspicion and attribution and the literature on
negativity biases. Steven Fein and his colleagues showed that suspicion that an
actor might have ulterior motives often triggers a more sophisticated attribution
process (e.g., Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990; Hilton, Fein, & Miller 1993; Fein &
Hilton 1994; Fein 1996). Although existing research does not directly test the impact
on attribution of the suspicion that others may want to harm us, it is reasonable to
speculate that such suspicion will bias us toward believing that others are more
threatening than they really are, especially when we suspect (or fear) that others
actions may affect us now or in the future (Fein 1996, 166; Fein and Hilton 1994,
167). The net result is once again a heightened alertness against the potential danger
that can be posed to us by others.
From the literature on negativity biases, we know that negative outcomes
promote more extensive retrospective elaboration and attribution, whereas positive
outcomes rarely do (Roese 1997; Baumeister et al 2001, 340-343; Rozin and
Royzman 2001). Again, although existing research does not directly test the impact of
negativity biases on attribution, it is reasonable to speculate that an earlier negative
encounter with an actor will bias us toward believing that he is more threatening (than
38
he really is) if our present encounter turns out to be again negative.26

More specifically, we can advance two predictions regarding the directionality of
this interaction between suspicion (or negativity) and attribution: suspicion leads to
over-attribution of malignant intention to others, just like a previous negative
encounter. Hence, a previous negative encounter with another actor leads us to 1)
over-attribute malign intentions to him/her when our present encounter is again
negative (i.e., again, undesirable rhetoric/behaviors from the same actor); 2)
under-estimate benign intentions to him/her when our present encounter is positive
(i.e., this time, desirable rhetoric/behaviors from the same actor).
Finally, reactive inflation and reactive devaluation together should predict
that it will be relatively easy to arouse individuals or mobilize the public with fear but
extremely difficult to arouse individuals or mobilize the public with a sense of
security. Indeed, more often than not, sense of security placates or dampens rather
than arouses or mobilizes. Thus, we try to calm down individuals who have suffered a
negative outcomes by saying everything will be ok but try to move individuals who
are reluctant to move by saying if you do not move, bad things will happen.
d. Delayed Acceptance versus Hasted Acceptance
The social evolutionary psychology of fear, in conjunction with the theory of

cognitive congruity/dissonance/balance (Osgood and Tannebaum 1955; Festinger
1957; Heider 1958)--which can be understood as an expression of egocentrism in
self-perception (Bem 1967; Steele and Liu 1983; Greenwald et al, 2002), shall predict
three related hypotheses.
First, we will be reluctant to believe that others are now behaving nicely if they
have behaved badly or even just suspiciously before. In contrast, we will readily
believe that others are now behaving badly and suspiciously even if they have
behaved nicely before. Second, we will be reluctant to attribute benign intentions to
26
This reinforcing effect of negative events can be understood as a form of Baynesian learning: more
negative encounter with another actor leads to a stronger belief that the actor is malignant or at least
unfriendly. This effect underpins why two sides in a rivalry will gradually come to view each other
with deep suspicion and often hatred. I thank a reviewer for pushing me toward making this statement.
Another way of putting this is that an earlier negative encounter increases our suspicion of the other.
39
others benign behavior if our initial impression of others has been negative. In
contrast, we will be readily to attribute malign intentions to others bad or even
ambiguous behaviors even if our initial impression of others has been positive. These
two outcomes can be understood as a diachronic (i.e., successive) expression of
negativity dominance within negativity bias (Rozin and Royzman 2001, 299), and
they are underpinned by a more fundamental phenomenon: We tend to emphasize the
possibility that intentions can quickly change from benign or neutral to malign but not
the other way around. All three expressions automatically project more danger onto
others than others really can pose, thus keep our mind alert.
There already exist some, although piecemeal, evidences for this prediction. From
folk wisdom, we know that it takes only one bad deed to destroy ones good image
among others while it takes ten good deeds to make up for ones bad deeds, either in
impression formation or in long-term relationship such as friendship and love. From
literature--which at least partially reflects folk wisdom, we know that some bad deeds
are deemed unforgivable and condemned one to hell (reviewed in Baumeister et al
2001, 328-331; Rozin and Royzman 2001, 307-312). Moreover, violation of trust
almost invariably looms larger than confirmation of trust in our mind (Kramer and
Messick 1998, 244).
From the history of the Cold War, we know that many in the West were very
reluctant to accept that Gorbachev was for real Because Soviet leaders before
Gorbachev had behaved aggressively. Meanwhile, many in the West were also
reluctant to reciprocate to Gorbachevs benign gestures--even though they recognized
Gorbachevs gestures to be benign, because they believed that he could easily switch
back to aggressive policies (Larson 1997, chap. 6; see also Lebow 1981; Kydd 2005).
Finally, regarding the prominent problem of the uncertainty over others intentions, IR
scholars--whether from the more pessimistic realism camp or the more optimistic
non-realism camp--have almost uniformly emphasized the possibility that others
intentions can change any time from benign or neutral to malign but almost never the
other way around (for a review, see Tang 2008).
40
e. Fear and Simplistic Thinking
As noted above, there have not been many studies that specifically address the
possible interaction between fear and simplistic thinking. As such, direct testing of
this possible interaction will constitute a partial but direct confirmation of the social
evolutionary psychology of fear.
The social evolutionary psychology of fear predicts that the presence of possible
threat posed by others should facilitate simplistic thinking about others behaviors.
When others seem to pose a threat to our welfare and survival, our instinct is to either
avoid/escape, and if possible, to counter the possible threat, and we shall spend
relatively little effort in trying to fathom the true motives behind others behaviors.
Again, there are indirect evidences supporting this hypothesis. In most studies of
stereotyping and prejudice in inter-ethnic group relations, the presences (perceived)
realistic or symbolic threat is perhaps omni-present in the background among
subjects mind (Stephan and Stephan 2000), and stereotypes are mental short-cuts.
C. Trust and Fear in Social Theories

Over the past decades, trust has come to occupy a critical place in social theories
(e.g., Barber 1983; Coleman 1990; Fukuyama 1995; Misztal 1996; Hardin 2006;
Hollis 1998; Larson 1997; Luhmann 1979; Kydd 2005, chap. 7; Putnam 2000;
Seligman 1997; Sztompka 1999; Uslaner 2002; Wendt 1999, chap 7; Wheeler and
Booth 2007). Because fear and trust are inseparably but inversely linked, the social
evolutionary psychology of dear has important implications for understanding the role
of trust in society and social theories.
First and foremost, trust and fear should be studied together rather than separately.
Although many often held trust as the solution to fear, risk, and many other things
(e.g., Luhmann 1979, 18-39; Seligman, Tonkiss & Passey 2000; Wendt 1999, chap. 7),
they have often failed to recognize that fear and trust are inseparably and inversely
linked. Too often, discussion on trust has failed to admit that fear--as a primary
41
emotion--holds ontological or psychological priority.27 Without taking the notion that

fear and trust are inherently linked and that fear is a primary emotion whereas trust is
a secondary emotion into their heart, many have given a utopian sentiment to trust.
They essentially take trust as the solution to many social ills but fail to admit that fear
inherently limits on the scope and depth of trust in social life, thus underestimating
the difficulty of overcoming fear and building trust in domestic or international
settings (e.g., Putnam 2000; Wendt 1999, chap. 7). Trust is no panacea toward utopia.
Second, there cannot be a purely rational choice approach toward trust and
mistrust simply because there cannot be a purely rational choice approach toward fear.
Rational choice-based treatments on trust (e.g., Coleman 1990; Elster 1989; Hardin
2002; Kydd 2005), interesting and impressive as they are, cannot possibly capture the
whole dynamics of trust. Trust, being constrained by the social evolutionary
psychology of fear and fear being a primary emotion, cannot but have an emotional
component (Lewis and Weigert 1985, 970-1; Wheeler and Booth 2008, 232-4). At the
same time, however, trust cannot be purely based on emotion either (e.g., Hollis 1998).
Precisely because fear is a primary emotion, only some rational control over fear can
overcome fear somewhat and lead to some trust.28 To adequately understand trust, we
need to bring the psychological approach and the rational choice approach together
(Lewis and Weigert 1985; Good 1988, 46-7; Gambetta 1988; see also Mercer 2005).
Third, if interpersonal trust is difficult, inter-group trust is even more so, due to
group identities and ethnocentrism: ethnocentrism inevitably favors ingroup trust but
outgroup distrust (Brewer 1981). Attempts by Deutsch (1958, 1973) and Axelord
(1984) to extrapolate lessons of forging cooperation among egoistic individuals to
forging cooperation among states or ethnic groups have vastly underemphasized the
impact of group on our behavior. Likewise, lessons on trust and cooperation within an
group (e.g., an organization, an ethnic group) will be of limited relevance for trust and
cooperation between groups. Similarly, lessons on trust and cooperation between
27
Many have recognized that trust is inherently tied to taking some risk in trusting others (e.g.,
Luhmann 1979, 18-39; Seligman 2000). Still, risk is not fear despite risk entails some fear.
28
In other words, trust is a self-conscious emotion. Unfortunately, the latest collection of essays on
self-conscious emotions has no entry on trust (Tracy, Robins, & Tangeny, 2007).
42
non-ethnic groups (e.g., women, bankers, clerks) will be of limited relevance for trust
and cooperation between ethnic groups and states (Tajfel 1982, 13-15).
Finally, because trust is conditional or situational, trust can only be limited in
scope and depth (Hardin 2000). This means that trust is usually local (i.e., trust is
constrained by social distance). As such, trust in the overall society system, usually
called system trust or political trust (Luhmann 1979; Lewis and Weigert 1985,
973-4; Levi and Stoker 2000), may be very different from interpersonal trust, not the
least because the trustee in system trust is not a person but an artificial entity. So far,
many have banked on system trust or political trust a great deal without spelling
much of the psychological, conscious, and social foundation of it.
Overall, we have only mastered fairly limited knowledge on fear and trust in
human society. Hopefully, the preceding discussion can stimulate more research on
fear and trust in human society, either at interpersonal or intergroup level, thus
contributing to a better understanding of conflict and cooperation between groups,
including ethnic groups and nation states.
D. Containing Fear in International Politics

Although I have mostly focused on the difficulties of achieving cooperation, the
discussion here obviously has also implications for understanding thus preventing
conflict. The security dilemma/spiral mechanism has long been singled out as an
important mechanism of exacerbating tensions and thus leading to conflicts among
states (Butterfield 1951; Herz 1951; Jervis 1976; Glaser 1997; author, b). Apparently,
the security dilemma critically depends on the social evolutionary psychology of fear:
If we do not tend to unconsciously exaggerate potential threat posed by others, the
security dilemma/spiral mechanism will not have its vicious self-reinforcing dynamics.
This dynamic implies that reducing fear is conducive to building more trust (via
cooperation) among states whereas politicians unintentional and intentional
exacerbating fear works against building more trust among states.
Moreover, international politics as a system has firmly evolved from an offensive
43
realism world where the logic is you-either-kill-or-be-killed into a defensive realism

world where the logic is to-live-and-to-let-live (author, c). This suggests that states
can afford to and thus should take a more optimistic view about todays world and
toward each other. In other words, states can afford to and thus should trust each other
a bit more. By doing so, they may come to realize that they can cooperate with each
other far more extensively and cordially than they have ever thought. In todays
defensive realism world, it should be in states collective interest if they can manage
to fear each other a bit less and trust each other a bit more.29
Our discussion has three immediate implications for containing fear, and thus for
facilitating cooperation and preventing conflict, in international politics.
First, leaders should consciously learn to manage their fear of other states,
including the different psychological traits that make of the social psychology of fear.
Here, reducing our ethnocentrism is perhaps second only to reducing our core fear
because ethnocentrism exercises so much pernicious effect upon our understanding of
other groups.30 Unfortunately, because fear is a primary emotion, politicians often
resort to fear to get elected or stay in office (Robin 2004). And patriotism, as an
expression of ethnocentrism, has always been a potent weapon in galvanizing the
public for hard-line and aggressive policies, since the time of Perciles.
Second and related to the first, elite and the public in a country must be extremely
vigilant when some politicians try to inoculate and arouse fear in the public.
Unfortunately, due to the fact that fear is a primary emotion, this trick of threat
inflation has been politicians favorite tacit for mobilizing the public for conflict, the
latest case being the selling of the Iraq War by the Bush administration to American
public (Kaufmann 2004; Krebs and Lobasz 2007; and Thrall 2007; see also
Christensen 1996). Even more unfortunate, and again due to the fact that fear is a
29
By now, many readers may have already begun to doubt whether I have advanced a too optimistic
picture of the world. If you have, then it again shows the power of the psychology of fear! By
contending that decision-makers can afford to trust other states a bit more in todays world, I am not
arguing that trust is more righteous than fear. Trust does not have a moral approbation because trust is
conditional (Hardin 1992, 512-6). My argument that more trust from decision makers in todays world
is justified is based on an evolutionary reading into the evolution of international politics as a system.
30
As John Herz (1959, 249) perceptively noted very early on, putting oneself into the others place
should take some of the sting out of a security dilemma. See also Jervis 1976, 83; Kydd 2005, 51.
44
primary emotion, those who voice against fear-mongering will be in an inherently

disadvantaged position in the marketplace of ideas in time of danger and crisis.31
Third, in general, states should be vigilant, firm, but moderate. More specifically,
when one is unsure of another states intentions, one should not hastily adopt an
inflexible hostile stand against it. Instead, one should actively deploy reassurance to
signal its benign intentions and then to read the other states intentions from its
reaction toward ones reassurance signals (author, unpublished; see also Kydd 2005,
chap. 7 & 8). If reassurance does reveal the benign nature of the other side, one can
then move its relationship with the other side into a more cooperative mode. One
adopts a hard-nosed policy only if one is pretty sure that the other side in malign. If
one adopts a hard-nosed policy when one is unsure of the other sides intentions, one
risk exacerbating the security dilemma, thus ending up with arms race or even
unwanted war (Jervis 1976, chap. 3).
Conclusion
How to cope with the uncertainty about others intentions and the fear derived
from it lies at the heart of international politics. Regarding this central problmatique,
the gospel in existing IR literature is that gauging others intentions is inherently
difficult (partly because they can change), and this gospel underpins the argument that
cooperation is difficult, if not impossible, in international politics (Mearsheimer 2001,
chap. 2; Jervis 1999; Tang 2008). From a concern for the fundamental challenge of
conflict and cooperation in human society, I have proposed that the gospel that others
intentions are inherently difficult to gauge is under-specified and thus misleading. To
properly understand the problem of uncertainty about others intentions, we have to
unpack intentions into two broad types: malign intentions and benign intentions.
These two types of intention pose almost diametrically opposite challenges for states.
Malign intentions are easy to detect and difficult to hide whereas benign intentions
are too easily dismissed and discounted thus hard to detect. The fundamental cause
31
For some calls for deflating fear, see Thomas Friedman, 9/11 Is over, New York Times, September
30, 2007; Fareed Zakaria, The Only Thing We Have to Fear Newsweek, June 2 2008.
45
behind this phenomenon is the social evolutionary psychology of fear. The social
evolutionary psychology of fear limits our trust of others while facilitating our
mistrust of others. Moreover, mistrust encourages fear, and fear limits not only trust
but also our incentives to engage in trust-building behaviors: fear is self-confirming
thus potentially self-reinforcing (Gambetta 1988, 234). Our general reluctance to
explore the possibility of cooperation with other groups, rather than some structural
characteristics of international politics, is the real fundamental cause behind the
difficulty of achieving cooperation in international politics.
Although I have mustered enough evidence to make a credible case for a social
evolutionary psychology of fear, more direct testing of hypotheses derived from it will
be needed. Ideally, testing these hypotheses should be designed to fit with real
situations of inter-ethnic or international relations as realistically as possible.
Preventing conflict and forging cooperation is a perennial and fundamental challenge
in human society, including international politics. Social psychologists and students of
international politics have to take on this tall task, together.
46
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66
Figure 1: The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear
Sense
Security
Fear or Sense
of insecurity
of
Others capabilities to
do harm
Uncertainty
over
others intentions
Trust
Reassurance
cooperation
and
Provocation
Competition
Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear
67
Mistrust
and
Table I: Two Types of Counter-factual Thinking after Negative Events

Negative events brought about
by another actor
Negative events brought about

by nature/bad-luck
Psychological Aspects
Self-pity/anger against self: why
had not one recognized that the
other actor was malignant (so
that one could have prevented
the outcome)?
Bad luck: should be more

careful but there is little one
could have done to avoid the
event.
Recall other negative traits of

the other actor: prolonging our
alertness against the other actor
Recall other
omens.
signs of
bad
Fear/anger/hatred against the

other actor: why was he/she so
bad or cruel?
Memories: lasting and often
slow in relapsing
Memories: depending on the

severity of the event, but
generally less long lasting than
memories of negative events
incurred by other actors.
Behavioral Aspects
Striving to improve our
detecting capacity of bad traits.
Overall impact will be marginal.
Guardedness, we will be less

willing to trust the other actor
and other actors, especially
those who are associated with
the other actor.
Repeated mishaps increase the

attraction of magic, superstition
and religion.
68

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The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust), Feb.

The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust):

Better Safe than Sorry ---Folk Wisdom

Shiping Tang is Professor at School of International Relations and Public Affairs

III. Evidences from Psychological Literature

IV. Evidences from IR Literature: Reading Threat vs. Reading Reassurance

better non-evolutionary theorizing on three fronts: 1) organizing and synthesizing a

likely to be doves; whereas more distrustful individuals hawks. 3 Yet, this

II. The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear

A. The Core Psychology of Fear

B. Toward an Integrated Social Psychology of Fear

a. Attribution Biases and the Psychology of Fear

b. Ethnocentrism and the Psychology of Fear

c. Simplistic Thinking and the Psychology of Fear

We have a general disinclination to think in a systemic or global way (Jervis

III. Evidences from Psychology Literature

A. Evidences Indicating a Core Psychology of Dear

A third stream of evidence is that we almost inevitably become more reluctant to

foundation (Ito et al 1998; Baumeister et al 2001, 336-337; Smith et al 2003).

B. Evidences Indicating an Integrated Psychology of Fear-I

a. Attribution Biases with Ethnocentrism

is a general self-serving or egotistic bias in our attribution. We tend to attribute

b. Simplistic Thinking and Attribution Biases

c. Ethnocentrism and Simplistic Thinking

As such, one can argue that ethnocentrism is a collective of pernicious heuristics.

B. Evidences Indicating an Integrated Psychology of Fear-II

IV. Evidences from IR Literature:

a states military capability interest resolve intentions

In other words, the credibility of a reassurance signal is determined by the sum of

In other words, when reading others reassurance signals, we tend to discount or

V. Munich: Getting the Challenge by Malign Intentions Right

A. Toward a Social Evolutionary Psychology

interindividual-intergroup discontinuity that intergroup relations tend to more

B. Some Hypotheses for Experimental Testing

a. Perceiving Hostile Intentions versus Perceiving Benign Intentions

The most straightforward prediction from the social evolutionary psychology of

b. Refining the Negativity Bias

Most existing studies of negativity bias or positive-negative asymmetry do

c. Reactive Inflation versus Reactive Devaluation

As noted above, the presence of sinister/hostile attribution bias and reactive

he really is) if our present encounter turns out to be again negative.26

d. Delayed Acceptance versus Hasted Acceptance

The social evolutionary psychology of fear, in conjunction with the theory of

e. Fear and Simplistic Thinking

C. Trust and Fear in Social Theories

emotion--holds ontological or psychological priority.27 Without taking the notion that

D. Containing Fear in International Politics

realism world where the logic is you-either-kill-or-be-killed into a defensive realism

primary emotion, those who voice against fear-mongering will be in an inherently

Hoboken: John Wiley &

dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review, 74, 183-200.

Review of Personality and Social Psychology (Vol. 7, Group Processes and

in World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brewer, M. B. (1981). Ethnocentrism and its Role in Intergroup Trust. In M. B.

Neuroscience, 117, 3-10.

better than cooperators in social exchange situations. Evolutionary Psychology, 2,

(2002). Hostile Attribution of Intent and Aggressive Behavior: A Meta-Analysis.

Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Diamond, J. (1997). Guns, Germs, and Steel. New York: Norton.

Security Studies, 7, 72-99.

International Security, 29, 5-48.

Kydd, A. (2005). Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton

Detecting the Snake in the Grass: Attention to