Infinite Regresses of Justification and of Explanation

Author(s): John F. Post

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jul., 1980), pp. 31-52
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319392 .
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JOHN F. POST

INFINITE REGRESSES OF JUSTIFICATIONAND

OF EXPLANATION

(Received23 January,1979)

According to WilliamAlston, the weakest link in the regressargumentfor

foundationalismis the rejection of infinite regressesof justification.' I am
not so sure;someother links look as weak. But Alston is rightthat the reasons
typically given for rejecting regressleave much to be desired.What follows
is (1) an argument against infinite justificational regressesthat is free of
problems in the argumentsto date; and (2) an applicationof this result to
show that for a wide variety of concepts of explanation, including some
according to which an explanation is not a justification, an infinite regress
of explanationsis also impossible, for reasons that have the additionaleffect
of underminingleadingversionsof the Principleof Sufficient Reason.
In exploring (1) we shall see that there are logical or conceptual grounds,
contained in any plausible concept of rational justification, for rejecting
infinite justificationalregresses.This contrasts with argumentsthat make the
pathology of regresseither a practical matter, such as the finiteness of our
faculties, or pragmatic, such as the circumstancesin which it would be
appropriateto request or give a justification.2 If, instead or in addition,it is
conceptually impossible for there to be such a regress, then it makes no
difference whether we consider an infinite intellect, who could actually
justify every statement in the regress,or a finite one, who would only be able
to justify any particularstatement on request. In either case there cannot be
a regressin which every statement is justified by prior statements. Thus my
argumenttakes into account the objection that only an unreasonablethesis
about justification would require us to reject the regress, namely that a
person must actually justify every statement in the regress,as opposed to
being able to justify any particularone on request.3
Rejoicing by foundationalists would be premature. No foundationalist
moral follows from the rejection of justificational regresses unless the
remaininglinks in the regressargumentare sound. In Section III enumerate
these links and sketch objections to the most importantone. Whetherthe obPhilosophical Studies 38 (1980) 31-52. 0031-8116/80/0381-0031$02.20
Copyright ? 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

32

JOHN F. POST

jections can be met is an issue too complex to settle here (indeed epistemologists seem generally to have underestimated its complexity). Instead I
conclude the paper with a couple of morals that can be drawn far more
readily. Both extend beyond epistemology, into metaphysics. One moral
(Section III) is that there cannot be an infinite regressof explanations,for a
very diversefamily of concepts of explanation,includingsome accordingto
which explanations are not justifications or even arguments. Again the
reasons are not practical, such as the finiteness of our faculties, but logical
or conceptual, entailed by the very notions of explanationinvolved.Even for
an infinite intellect, regressesof such explanationsmust end. The other moral
(Section IV) is that leadingversions of the Principleof Sufficient Reasonare
either demonstrablyfalse or question-beggingin their intended applications
in CosmologicalArgumentsfor God.

What conditions should inferentialjustification satisfy? In particular,what is

it for personP to be inferentiallyjustified at time t in believingstatement Y
on the basis of statement X, or for X to justify Y for P at t? No answer
appears as yet to have achievedconsensus. Fortunatelynone is requiredfor
our purpose. Most of the lists of conditions proposedin the literatureinclude
something like the following: at time t, (a) P believes Y (dispositionallyor
occurrently);(b) P is justified in believingX; (c) P believesthat X adequately
supports Y; (d) P is justified in believing X adequately supports Y; (e) P
believes Y because he believes both X and that X adequatelysupportsY; and
(f) there is no defeater; that is, no statement Z such that P is justified in
believingboth Z and that (X & Z) does not adequatelysupport Y.4 For our
purpose, conditions (a)-(f) may be refined or augmentedin many ways,
according to one's views about inferentialjustification. For example, let X,
Y, Z be sets of statements;or replace(d) by 'X adequatelysupports Y', or
(f) by 'P is justified in believingthere areno defeaters',and so on. Adopt any
plausible revision you like. Then construe 'X justifies Y' whereverit occurs
below in terms of your revision.My argumentagainstinfinite justificational
regresseswould still work, with only minor modifications.
Suppose,contraryto what is to be shown, that for some personP at a time
t, and some statementXO,

INFINITE

(1)

REGRESSES

OF JUSTIFICATION

33

',XnjustifiesXn -1, ..., X1 justifies XO,

where no Xi in the regressisjustifiedby any set of Xi<i (to preventcircularity).

(1) is a non-circular,justification-saturatedregress(for P at t), meaning that
every statement in the regressis justified by an earlierstatement,and none is
justified by any set of later statements (for P at t). Thus the question of
whether there can be an infinitejustificationalregressis to be construedhere
as the question of whether there can be a non-circular,justification-saturated
regress.
If anything counts as an inferentialjustification relation,logical implication does, in a sense to be specified, provided it satisfies appropriate
relevance and non-circularity requirements. Let us say a statement X
properly entails a statement Y iff X semanticallyentails Y, where the entailment is relevant and non-circular on any appropriate account. Thus if
anythingcounts as an inferentialjustificationrelation,properentailmentdoes,
in the sense that whereX and Y are statementsratherthan sets of statements,
(2)

If X properlyentails Y, then Y is justified for P if X is - provided

P knows that the properentailmentholds and would believe Y in
light of it if he believedX

Next we shall see that if there could be even one justification-saturated

regress- like (1) - then we could justify any logically contingent statement
whatsoever.The point is not new, nor is my argumentfor it entirelynew. But
the argumentwill plug some old holes and help us to see what is new, the
implicationsfor regressesof explanation.
Let XO be a logically contingentstatement,and adopt some (alphabetical)
ordering of the infinitely many statements of P's language.Then construct
the entailment-saturatedregress
(3)

., Xn , ... I X, XO,

where Xi (i >0) is the (alphabetically) first statement such that (i) Xi

properly entails Xi-,; (ii) Xi is not entailed by any Xj<1; and (iii) Xi is
not justified for P on the basis of any set of XA< i. Also, assume that for
each Xi, P knows(or could come to know) thatXi properlyentails Xi- 1. And
assumethat P would believeXi-, in light of this entailmentif P believedXi.
The construction of (3) presupposesthat at every step of the regressthere
is some statement XAsatisfyingconditions (i)-(iii). This is one of those old

34

JOHN F. POST

holes to be plugged.But first note that deductive non-circularityin (3), which

in the intended sense is guaranteedby (i) and (ii), does not entail justificational non-circularity,which is guaranteedby (iii). Even though no Xi is
entailed by any X,<i, it does not follow that no Xi is justified by any Xj<1, or
by any set of X1i<, either of which would inducejustificationalcircularity.A
personP might justify some Xi in (3) on the basisboth of Xi+, (deductively)
and of some set of Xi<i (non-deductively).Hence we must requirethat Xi
is not justified for P on the basis of any set of Xj<i, not merely that Xi is
not entailed by any Xi<i. The need for this sort of requirementhas been
overlooked - another of those holes - in some attemptsto show that a noncircularjustificationalregresscould be constructedfor any statement.6
James Cornmanrequiresthe regressto contain no empiricalstatementXi
that is logically equivalentto one of its own evidentialancestorsXj>i.7 But
even though this excludes one sort of justificational circularity,it allows
others, in which Xi is justified ('inductively',say) by some set of descendants
Xj<i in a regresswhere no statementis equivalentto one of its own ancestors
Xj>i (or indeed to any set of them). Thus constructinga regressthat satisfies
Cornman'srequirement(a 'Comman regress')does not in general count as
constructing a regressthat is non-circularin the requiredfull sense of (iii).
Even though a Cornman regress could be constructed for any contingent
statement, it would not follow that a justificational regress, non-circular
in the requiredfull sense of (iii), could be constructed for any contingent
statement. Hence there is a hole in Comman'sattempt to show that a noncircularjustificational regresscould be constructed for any contingent statement XO.
To plug these holes, let us begin with regress(3) and the presupposition
that at every step of the regressthere is a statement Xi satisfyingconditions
(i)-(iii). It helps to consider an example of (3). To construct one modulo
some appropriate ordering of the statements of P's language, let Z be
contingent and use modusponens as follows:
(4)

...,X&(XD(Y&(YDZ))),

Y&(YDZ),Z,

where Z does not entail Y, (Y & (Y D Z)) does not entail X, and so on. This
sort of infinitely iterated application of modus ponens guaranteesthat for
every statementXi-1 in (4), there is a statement Xi that satisfies(i) and (ii).
Satisfaction of (ii) can easily be checked. As for (i), misgivingson the score
of relevancecan be met either by requiringthat Z and Y share some non-

INFINITE

REGRESSES

OF JUSTIFICATION

35

logical terms in common, that Y and X do, and so on; or more strongly by
requiringthat any such term in Z appearin Y, any in Y appearin X, and so
on. Modus ponens is only one entailment-formwith which to construct
instances of (3) that satisfy (i) and (ii); there aremany others. Furthermore,
there are complex or 'mixed' instances of (3) in which the form by which Xi
entails Xi-1 is distinct from that by which Xi+1 entails Xi. Whateverthe
entailment-forms, we see that for any logically contingent XO we can
construct an instance of (3), such as (4), that satisfies(i) and (ii).
What about condition (iii)? Again, consider (4). Statement Z will justify
for P a set JOof statements,possibly null and possibly infinite, but definitely
not universal. For either Z justifies every statement whatsoever for P or it
does not. If it does, then since the negation of a statementis also a statement,
every statement plus its negation is justified by Z, which is intolerable for
rationaljustification (recall also that Z is contingent). Thus we can be sure
there is some Y that is not justified by Z - some Y not in JO.In particular,
let Y be the (alphabetically)first statement not in JO such that any nonlogical term in Z is in Y, and Z does not entail Y; thus Y satisfies not only
(iii) but (i) and (ii). Next, the set {Z, (Y & (Y D Z))} will justify for P a set
J1 of statements. As with JO, we can be sure that there are statementsnot in
J1. Let X be the first statementnot in J1 such that any non-logicalterm in Y
is in X, and (Y& (Y D Z)) does not entail X; thus X satisfiesnot only (iii) but
(i) and (ii). In this way we see that at every step of the regress,there will be
a next statement that satisfies (i)-(iii), hence that the regressis non-circular
in the requiredfull sense of (iii). It follows that
(A)

For any contingent XO one can construct an instanceof (3) that

satisfies (i)-(iii), out of which one can construct a non-circular,
justification-saturatedregresslike (1).

For X1 properly entails XO, so that by (2), XO is justified for P if X1 is. P

would be entitled to claim that X1 is justified, hence that X1 justifiesXO,by
arguingagain from (2) that X1 is juw+ifiedif X2 is, and claimingthat X2 is
justified (see further the second paragrap>h
below). If challengedabout X2, P
could appeal again to (2) and claim that X3 is justified, and so on. For each
statement in (3) P could, if challenged, cite its predecessoras justification.
But then Xo is justified, since everythingin Xo's justificationalancestry (3)
is justified (again see the second paragraphbelow). Moreover,that ancestryis
non-circular,since by (iii) no Xi in (3) is justified by any set of Xi<i. Note

36

JOHN F. POST

that Xo's negation could be justified too (for example, substitute 'not-Z'
for 'Z' in (4) plus the instructionsfor constructing(4)).
Clearly, being able arbitrarilyto justify any contingent statement whatsoever,hence any plus its negation,is unacceptable.So we must conclude
(B)

Therecan be no justification-saturatedregresses.

For if we allow even one, circularor not, then we have no plausibleway of

disallowingnon-circularjustification-saturatedregresseslike (3), that satisfy
(i)-(iii). Since for any contingent XO we can construct such a regress,we
could, in light of (2), arbitrarilyjustify any contingency at all, which is
absurd. Generally the complaint has been that a saturated regresswould
justify nothing. The real trouble is the reverse,an absurdembarrassmentof
riches. Of course we may go on to say that reallythe regressjustifies nothing
after all, provided we understand the basic reason why: if it justified
something, then for any contingent XO another regresscould be constructed
to justify XO.
Foundationalistssometimes reject regresson the groundsthat no matter
how far back in the regresswe go, we always find a statement that is only
mediately justified if at all. From this it is supposed to follow that the
terminalstatementXOis not justified.8 But this clearlyis question-begging.It
presupposes not only the sound principle that XO is justified only if
everything in its justificational ancestry is justified, but also that XO is
justified only if somethingin its ancestryis immediatelyjustified. The latter
is just the characteristicthesis of foundationalism.It might be true, but it
cannot be assumedin the regressargumentfor foundationalism.
Foundationalists(and others) also operate on another sound principle,
namely that XO is justified if and only if everythingin its justificational
ancestry is either mediately or immediatelyjustified. (Non-foundationalists
can accept the principlebecause it does not entail that there areimmediately
justified statements.) So long as the ancestryis finite we can trust our intuitions in applyingthe principleto help decide when XO is justified and when
it is not. But the structure of the regress argument for foundationalism
requires at one point that we assume, for the sake of argument,that the
ancestry is infinite. As so often with infinity, our intuitions need tutoring.
To begin with, the principle last mentioned entails that XO is justified if
everything in its ancestry is mediately justified. For if everythingin Xo's

INFINITE REGRESSES

OF JUSTIFICATION

37

ancestry is mediately justified, then a fortiori everythingis either mediately

or immediatelyjustified, from which it follows by the principlethat XO is
justified. Next, when the regressis finite, there is a first statement X, at
which we must face the question of whetherX,, is mediately or immediately
justified. Since in the present context we are consideringonly non-circular
regresses,we would have to answerthat X, is immediatelyjustified if at all.
But when the regressis infinite, there is no first statement,and we neverhave
to face the music. Every statement is mediately justified. Hence every statement is either mediately or immediatelyjustified, so XOis justified.
The situation is analogous to what happens when the usual notion of
deductive proof is applied (uncritically) to infinite sequences of formulas.
A proof becomes a sequence, finite or infinite, in which every formula
is either an axiom or entailed by earlierformulasin the sequence. But it is
easy to construct for an arbitrarilychosen formula X an infinite sequence
in which every formula is entailed by earlier ones (cf. (4)), so that every
formula is either an axiom or entailed by earlier formulas. Hence on this
notion of proof, we could prove anything.9 The moral seems to be that a
proof-sequence must contain at least one unproved prover. Of course we
cannot infer that a justificationalregressmust contain an unjustifiedjustifier,
nor an immediatelyjustified one. Neverthelessthis foundationalistintuition,
that there must be immediatelyjustified justifiers, doubtless owes much to
deductive models of justification descended from Aristotle's theory of
demonstration.
To conclude this section, note that the argumentfor (B), the impossibility
of justification-saturatedregresses,depends not on pragmaticconsiderations,
but conceptual, entailed by features of justification presupposedin the foregoing. In this connection, what has been presupposed(in additionto (a)-(f)
or their plausible revisions) is that if anything counts as an inferential
justification relation, proper entailment does, in the weak sense of (2); that
XO is justified if (and only if) everything in its ancestry is (we can even
require that everything in the ancestry be either mediately or immediately
justified); and that we should not be able to justify arbitrarilyany contingent
statement we like (hence any plus its negation). These featuresare present
in any plausible concept of rationaljustification. Thus even for an infinite
intellect there cannot be an infinite regressof justifications.

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JOHN F. POST
II

Granting the conceptual impossibility of an infinite justificational regress,

what are the implicationsfor foundationalism?Certainlyno foundationalist
moral follows without furtherassumptions.Whathas been shown is only that
in any sequence R of justifications, there must be at least one statementXn
not justified by earlier statements in R; that is, R cannot be justificationsaturated. Little can be inferred about Xn from this fact or its proof. Xn
might be unjustified, immediatelyjustified, self-justified,justified by later
statements in R, or justified by statements Y outsideR altogether.In this last
case, of course, any sequence R' that includes Y and Xn cannot be justification-saturatedeither, and must contain at least one Xn' not justified by
earlierstatementsin R'. But Xn ' might be justified by statementsthat occur
in R' later than Xn', or by a third sequence R", and so on, providedthe
branching sequences R, R', R", ..., do not form a justification-saturated
regressthemselves.
Foundationalism follows only if the non-foundationalist altematives
among the above are excluded. Notoriously, this is not so easy as it may look,
especially with regardto the alternativein which Xn is justified by later statements in R. Such a case would count as an instance of what I have called
'justificationalcircularity'(in which some Xi is justified by a set of Xf<d).
But the term 'circularity'hidesan importantdistinction. Let R be (1), so that
Xn justifies Xn-1, ..., X1 justifies XO, and suppose XOjustifies Xn. ThenXn
is justified by a laterstatementin R, namelyXO.At thispoint, foundationalists
(and some others) typically infer that XO justifies XO, and charge R with
circularityin this literalsense of a closed loop, en route to concludingthat so
far as R is concerned, whether XO is justified is therefore left completely
open.10
But this inference and this notion of cicularity chargedto R presuppose
that justification is transitive(i.e., if X justifies Y and Y justifies Z, then X
justifies Z). Suppose there are justification relations that are non-transitive
(whether there are any I consider below). Then even if Xn is justified by XO
(or by other statements occurringin R later than Xn), it would not follow
that XO justifies XO or that R contains a circle or closed loop in the
intended literal sense. Instead, non-transitive relations of justification
obtaining among Xn, ..., XO could allow some of Xn, ..., XO to supporteach
other without circularityin any such literal sense, and in such a way that

INFINITE

REGRESSES

OF JUSTIFICATION

39

circularity
hides
XOwouldbe justified.Thusuncriticaltalkof justificational
the distinctionbetween literal circles of justification,whichpresuppose
transitivity,and those 'circles'that consistof kindsof mutualsupportthat
do not giveriseto transitivity.
Generally,regressargumentsfor foundationalismconcern themselvesonly
with circles and not with 'circles', except perhaps to claim they can make
no sense of 'circles' that are not circles. Transitivityis presupposedin either
case. The presuppositionlurks also in the occasionalfoundationalistgibe that
that coherentist rejects small circles but accepts big ones."1 The gibe misses
the point that the big circles are meant to be 'circles'of mutualjustification
for which transitivityfails, so that the big circles cannot be reducedto little
ones by applyingtransitivity.
It follows that the alternativespresented by regressargumentstypically
are not exhaustive. The altematives usually presented are that any (branch
of a) justificationalregresseither terminatesin immediatelyjustified beliefs,
terminates in unjustified beliefs, contains a circle, or continues infinitely.
Too often, whether it contains a 'circle' is neglected. Excluding circles of
justification seems easy. Excluding 'circles'is not at all easy, unlessjustification is obviously transitive.Is it?
Attacks on the transitivity of justification have taken several forms. I
sketch them not in order to establishnon-transitivity- the argumentwould
be too long and complex - but to show that transitivityis not at all obvious.
Indeed a number of philosophershold the opposite: it is non-transitivitythat
is obvious (for some important types of justification). One form of attack
uses direct counter-examples:concrete instances of statementsX, Y, Z such
that for P at t, X justifies Y, and Y justifies Z, but X does not justify Z. 12
Both to deflect these counter-examplesand to clarify what the foundationalist
may actually have meant all along, one should consider the modified
transitivityprinciple,
(MT)

If X justifies Y, and YjustifiesZ, and (X & Y) justifiesZ, then X

justifies Z. 13

But (MT) appearsvulnerableto a second form of attack (and possibly also

to the first). Suppose, as is often the case, that Xjustifies Y only if X confers
a high degree of probabilityupon Y. Then (MT) seems in trouble, since the
probability conferredupon Z by Xmay be less than the requireddegree,even
though X does confer the requireddegree upon Y, Y confers it upon Z, and

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JOHN F. POST

(X & Y) confers it upon Z. 14 A third form of attack is to exhibit a theory

that best explains certain phenomena,within which theory some statements
support or justify each other. Done properly, this would be to presenta circumstance in which X justifies Y, Y justifies X, and (X & Y) justifies X.
If (MT)held, X wouldjustify itself, which all partiesagreeis to be rejected.'5
The final form of attack to be consideredhere focuses on those justifications that consist in inference to the best explanation. So far as I know, this
attack on transitivity is new. Suppose X justifies Y for P at t just because
hypothesis Y is the best explanation of (the evidence described by) X
according to P at t - Y provides a better explanation than any alternative
availableto P at t. Suppose further that Y justifies Z in exactly the same
sense, as does (X & Y). Then the antecedent of (MT)is satisfied.Whatabout
the consequent? If X justified Z in the intended sense, then Z would be the
best explanation of X. But by hypothesis Y is the best explanation of X.
Presumablythere can be only one best explanation of X. Hence Z cannot
be the best explanation of X, so X cannot justify Z in the intended sense.
(MT) fails when justification is taken as inference to the best explanation;
so too for simple, unmodifiedtransitivity.16
This argumentmay seem too true to be good. But ratherthan analyze it
here, I content myself with noting that like the other forms of attack, it at
least succeedsin raisingseriousquestionsas to whether all types of inferential
justification are transitive.Perhapsin the last analysisthey are, but regress
argumentsfor foundationalismcan hardly take the point for granted.Their
weakestlink, it would now appear,is the rejectionof 'circles'of non-transitive
justification, ratherthan rejectionof infinite regress.

III

I turn now to the first of a couple of moralsthat can more readilybe drawn
from the impossibility of a saturatedregressof justifications:there cannot be
a saturated regressof explanations, for a very large family of concepts of
explanation. To begin with, let us say an explanationaffords a justification,
or is justification-affording(J-A), accordingto a givenconcept of explanation,
if and only if
(5)

If X explains Y for P at t, then X justifies Y for P at t.

INFINITE

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41

We need to be very clear about what (5) commits us to. The answeris: very
little. It does not commit us to saying, even in the case of J-A explanations,
that X's explaining Y is a justification of Y by X. The reasonis that X might
justify Y for P on groundsindependent of the explanation of Y by X. Even
if the groundsarenot independent,as is most often the case, still the explanation need not be a justification, but only afford or provide materialsfor the
construction of a justification."7Thus (5) does not commit us to the view,
even for those concepts for which it holds, that explanationsare arguments,
though such explanations may happen to be the most intuitive instances of
J-A explanation, at least according to those who view explanations as
arguments.All (5) implies is that for any concept of explanationwhich is or
can be reconstructedas a relation between statements,if X explains Y for P
at t, then there is some justification or other of Y by X forP at t (i.e., some
way or other in which conditions (a)-(f) or their plausible revisions are
satisfied). Nor does our focussinghere on J-A concepts of explanationimply
that any other concept is somehow inferior, for example as a model of
scientific explanation.
Clearly(5) is quite latitudinarian.Nevertheless(5) can be used to show the
impossibility of a saturated regressof explanations,for a very wide variety
of concepts of explanation. For suppose, contrary to what is to be shown,
that for some personP at a time t,
(6)

...,

Xn explainsXn -1, ..., X1 explainsXO.

(6) would be an explanation-saturatedregressfor P at t, meaningthat every

statement in the regress is explained for P at t by an earlier statement.
Providedthe explanationsin (6) are alljustification-affording,it would follow
from (6) by (5) that every statement in the regressis also justified for P at t
by an earlierstatement.That is, it would follow by (5) that for P at t,
(7)

..., Xn justifiesXn _1, ..., X1 justifiesXO.

But (7) is just the discredited(1), a justification-saturatedregress,which we

have shown to be conceptuallyimpossible.Therefore
(C)

An explanation-saturatedregressis conceptually impossible, for

any regressof J-A explanations.18

The family of explanatoryconcepts to which result (C) applies is very large

and very diverse, as one would expect in light of how little (5) requires.The

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JOHN F. POST

family includes not only deductive-nomologicalconcepts, but also deductivestatistical, inductive-statistical,functional, plus a variety of non-empirical
concepts, such as those often used in Principlesof Sufficient Reason.It also
includes concepts accordingto which explanationis given only in answerto
why-questions actually asked in appropriatecircumstances,with due regard
to emphasis problems and any other context-dependentfeatures(provided,
of course, (5) remainssatisfied)."9
One notable concept not in the family is Wesley Salmon's statisticalrelevance(S-R) conception of explanation. On the S-R view the explanation
of Y by X consists of (among other things) pointing out a statisticalrelevance
between the events or regularitiesmentioned in X and those mentioned in
Y. But the relevanceis not in general such as to warrantclaiming there is
some justification or other of Y by X, though often there will be one. For
example, the fact that a particular person contracted leukemia may be
explained by the fact that (a) he was two kilometers from an atomic
explosion, and (b) the probability of leukemia is causally related to the
distance. But (a) and (b) hardly justifj the statement that this person
contracted leukemia, since the probability of his doing so, though causally
related to his distance from the blast, is very small (much less than 1/100),
hence far too small to warrantclaimingthe statementis inductivelyjustified
by (a) and (b).20 Therefore the S-R concept does not satisfy (5); that is,
S-R explanations are not in general J-A. So we cannot use (C) or the
argument for (C) to show there can be no saturated regress of S-R
explanations.Perhapsthere cannot be, but some other argumentis required.
Neverthelessthere are important subclassesof S-R explanationsfor which
(C) does hold. Salmon recognizesthat "deduction of a restrictedlaw from a
more general law constitutes a paradigmof a certain type of explanation",
and that for the S-R account to be successful, it must be able to "handle
cases of this sort"21. Salmon handles them by having the justificatory
deductive relations exhibit the physical relationshipbetween the restricted
and the more generalregularitiesexpressedby the two laws. It is this physical
relation, not the deductivejustification, that has explanatorysignificance.In
other words, "an explanationmay sometimes providematerialsout of which
an argument, deductive or inductive, can be constructed", even though
explanationsare not arguments.22
Obviously, explanation of restricted regularitiesby more generalones is
only one type of case in which a justificatory argumentcan be constructed

INFINITE

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43

exhibiting the physical,causal relationsthat do have explanatorysignificance.

Often a certain particular event e cannot but occur, given other relevant
events plus physical regularities;that is, determinismobtainsin the case of e.
Let us grant that the physical, causalrelationsarewhat have the explanatory
significancefor P at t. Neverthelesssuch explanationswould providematerials
out of which an argumentcan be constructed that justifies, for P at t, the
belief that e occurs. Even where determinismof this sort fails, the probability
of e's occurrenceoften is high enough to warrantjustified belief, in contrast
to the leukemiaexample.
In all such cases, an S-R explanation provides materials out of which a
justification, deductive or inductive, can be constructed. Hence in all such
cases, if X S-R explains Y for P at t, then X justifies Y for P at t, even though
S-R explanations are not arguments.In other words, in such cases even S-R
explanations are justification-affording.What such cases have in common is
that in light of the relevantevents, causalrelations,processesand interactions
mentioned in X, the probability of the events or regularitiesmentioned in Y
is high enough for a justification of Y by X to be constructed from the
materials of the S-R explanation. Let us call such S-R explanations high
probability S-R explanations.Since they satisfy (5), and thus are J-A explanations, it follows by (C) that
(D)

A saturated regressof high probability S-R explanations is impossible.

(D) is of considerableinterest, even though there are events and regularities

that do not have high probability S-R explanations. The reason is that for
centuries philosophical discussions of explanatory regressestypically have
presupposed some variety of determinism for the physical events or
regularities to be explained (most notably, perhaps, in connection with
Principles of Sufficient Reason). Deterministic presuppositions were not
shaken fundamentallyuntil the advent of quantum theory, and hardly overnight even then; indeed thriving pockets of resistance survive. Thus
philosophers who discuss explanatory regresses,and who do not think of
explanations as arguments,typically are discussingwhat in effect are high
probability S-R explanations: regressesin which events and regularitiesare
explained for P at t by reference to, and have a high probability in light
of, their causal relations with other events and regularities.Thereforeeven
when such philosophers do not construe explanations as arguments, the

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JOHN F. POST

explanationsthey have in mind typically are such as to providematerialsout

of which justificatoryargumentscan be constructed.In light of (D), we know
that a saturated regressof such explanationsis impossible,whatevercertain
philosophersmight have thought.
Explanatory regressesare one thing, causal regressesanother. The latter
are regressesof causally related non-linguisticevents and regularities.Even
though there can be no explanation-saturatedregressesfor any personP at t
(assumingwe are speakingof J-A explanation), it does not follow that there
cannot be, for example, an infinite series of physical events each caused by
a temporal predecessor.(Such a series need not be temporallyinfinite, but
might occupy a finite temporalinterval.)23The causallyrelatedevents could
occur without P's knowledge, hence without P's having an explanation of
them; or even with his knowledgeyet without explanation.
But suppose for the sake of argument that P is an omniscient God.
Suppose further that the type of causation involved in the series of events
is such that if event ei causes e1, then there is an explanation of e1 by
reference to ei (that is, a statement Xi to the effect that ei occurs explains
Xi). Being omniscient, God would know the explanation (i.e., that Xi
explains Xi). Suppose finally that God and the type of explanationinvolved
are such that
(8)

If X explains Y for God, then there is a justification of Y by X

for God (cf. (5)).

With all these suppositions, it would follow that if there were an infinite
series of events each caused by a predecessor,there would be a justificationsaturatedregressin which each Xi is justified for God by some earlierXi. But
as seen, a justification-saturatedregress is impossible even for an infinite
intellect.
So there could be no infinite series of events each caused by its temporal
predecessor,provided all the above suppositions are true. But they are all
highly problematic. For example, the type(s) of causation involved in the
series might very well not be such that there is an explanation of e1 by
referenceto ei; or if there is such an explanation,it fails to satisfy (8), just as
S-R explanations fail to satisfy (5) unless they are high probability S-R
explanations. But even though there are so many problematicsuppositions
in this argument,we may conjecturethat certain philosophersat times have
accepted them, and that this might help explainwhy they sometimesthought

INFINITE REGRESSES

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45

they could show the impossibility of an infinite series of events each caused
by a temporalpredecessor.
So far the explanatoryregresseswe have consideredaremonotonic, consisting of only one type of explanation. But there seem also to be mixed
explanatory regresses,where the type of explanationby which Xn explains
Xn-I for P at t can be very different from the type by whichXn+l explains
Xn for P at t. One can imagine deductive, inductive, functional, and S-R
explanations strung together in variouscombinations,perhapstogether with
other types. So long as each type in the regressis J-A, a saturatedmixed
regress is as impossible as a saturatedmonotonic regress,since either sort
of explanatory regresswould, by (5), give rise to a discreditedjustificationsaturatedregresslike (7).
Since there can be no saturated regressesof J-A explanations,mixed or
monotonic, it follows that in any J-A explanatory regressthere is at least
one statement Xn not explained by an earlier statement. Could Xn be
explained either by itself, or by later statements?On most concepts of explanation, asymmetryholds:
(9)

If X explains Y for P at t, then Y does not explain X for P at

t.24

On any such concept, no statementXn explainsitself.

But could Xn be explained by later statementsin the regress?Let us say
that
(10)

Explanation is hierarchicalaccording to a given concept iff in

any regressof such explanations, no Xi is explained by any set
of Xj<i (for P at t).

Hierarchy includes asymmetry. For consider a unit regressof explanation,

in which X explains Y for P at t; then by (10), X is not explained by Y for
P at t. Thus it follows that
(E)

For hierarchical concepts of J-A explanation, any regress of

explanation contains at least one statementXn explainedneither
by earlierstatements, nor by itself, nor by any set of later statements.

That is, Xn would be an ultimate explainer - a statement that explains but

has no explanation.The point is not that we would not or could not know

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JOHN F. POST

the explanation of X, (though that would be true so far as it goes). Rather,

there would be none to be known, even for an infinite intelligence.
I suspect that most concepts of explanation are hierarchical.Explanation
has intimate ties with concepts of causation, most of which appear to be
hierarchical. In addition, it is worth noting that a foundationalist is
committed to holding that any concept of J-A explanation is hierarchical.
For according to the foundationalist,justification is hierarchical.To say it
is hierarchicalis the same as saying, as he does, that there can be no justificational circularity(compare(10) with the second paragraphof Section II). But
(5) holds for any concept of J-A explanation,by definition. If (5) holds, and
if justificationis hierarchical,then explanationis too, as can easily be checked.
As seen, many, perhaps mlost concepts of explanation satisfy (5), including
high probabilityS-R explanations.Thereforeto the extent that our concepts
of explanationwere formed or refinedunder the influence of foundationalist
intuitions - until recently the dominantepistemologyin westem philosophy
- we might well expect them to be hierarchical.But I do not know to what
extent our concepts of explanation were formed under this influence,
althoughI suspectthat the influenceon philosophers'concepts(e.g., Spinoza's)
may have been considerable.

IV

I tum now to the second of the two metaphysicalmorals,the implicationsfor

Principles of Sufficient Reason. Even when explanation is not hierarchical
accordingto a givenconcept, nevertheless
(F)

Not every statementcan have a J-A explanation(for P at t).

For suppose every statement did have a J-A explanation, for P at t, by some
statement or other. Then statement X0 would be J-A explained by some
statement X1, which in tum would have a J-A explanation,say by X2, and
so on. It would follow that for P at t,
(11)

...,X, explainsX1,

X1 explainsX0.

But (11) is just the discredited(6), a saturatedregressof J-A explanations,

which is impossible.
If not every statement has a J-A explanation, perhapsevery statement in
a certain class does - say, every truth, or every contingent truth, or every

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47

truth that merely assertsthe existence of a thing. These are the leading versions of the Principleof Sufficient Reason (PSR), and figure in variousCosmological Arguments. But whether every statement in a certain class has
a J-A explanation depends crucially upon what concept of J-A explanation
is used. Let p be a property of statements (e.g., being true, contingent,
existence-asserting,etc.). Call k hereditary with respect to explanation in
a given sense iff when X explains Y in that sense, and Y has 0, then X has
?. We can prove
(G)

Heredity Theorem: Given any concept of J-A explanation for

which 4 is hereditary, not every 4-statementhas such an explanation.

For if XO has such an explanation, say by X1, and if XO has X, then Xl has

4. But if every ?-statement has such an explanation, then X1 has such an

explanation, say by X2; and so on to infinity. This would give rise to a
saturatedregressof J-A explanations,which by (C) is impossible.
For example, consider the property of being true, and suppose we are
using a J-A explanationrelationfor which truth is hereditary(as is the case in
CosmologicalArguments).From (G) we obtain
(H)

Not every truth has a J-A explanation in any sense for which
truth is hereditary.

Thus PSR is false in any fonn which implies that every truth (and/or every
fact, state of affairs, etc.) has an explanationin any such sense. Since there
are versionsthat do, result(H) is of some interest.
Otherversionsclaim less. Often they assertonly that everylogicallycontingent truth has an explanation. However,the notions of explanationpresupposed by PSR requirenot only that the explanansbe true, but that it logically
entail the explanandum - the sufficient reasons mentioned in PSR are
supposed to be logically sufficient. But if Y is contingent and entailed by a
true X, then X is also contingent. So being contingently true is hereditary
with respect to the notions of explanationpresupposedby PSR. Therefore
by (G),
(I)

PSR is false in any form which implies that every contingent

truth has an explanation(in the presupposedsense).

A defender of PSR might object that what gets explained, and what has

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JOHN F. POST

explanatory significance, are not true statements (contingent or otherwise)

but things and/or events, phenomena,regularities,states of affairs,etc. But
the objection can be met by recallingthe discussionof high probabilityS-R
explanation that immediately followed (D): even when philosopherswho
defend some version of PSR do not construe explanationsas (justificatory)
arguments from statements to statements, nevertheless the explanations
they have in mind are such as to providematerialsout of whichjustificatory
argumentscan be constructed. For example, suppose one says, in the spirit
of PSR, that the explanation(for P at t) of the existence of some contingently
existing thing a lies in the causal efficacy of some other such thing b. Even
though it is the things and their causal relationsthat are to have explanatory
significance, still the explanation would provide materials out of which a
justification of Y' by X' could be constructed, where Y' states that a exists,
and X' states that b exists and is the cause of a (or perhapsthat b together
with other things form the cause of a). Since the sufficient reasons are
supposed to be logically sufficient, in effect we are dealing with a high
probabilityS-R explanation.As noted above, (5) holds for such explanations,
so they are J-A. Hence we are free to apply the Heredity Theorem(G) via
(H) and (I), where p is a property of the statements X' and Y, to show
that these (materialmode) versionsof PSR are false.
The final version of PSR I shall consider here asserts merely that every
existing thing has an explanation for its existence, either in the existence
and efficacy of another thing or in the necessity of its own nature. Let us
call this version 'Existence' PSR. Recently the claim has been made that
Existence PSR has not been disproved(unlike other versions)and that it is
all that is needed, by way of a PSR, for a valid CosmologicalArgument
for God.25 Existence PSR implies only that every truth that asserts the
existence of a thing has an explanation. Thus (H) and (I) are inapplicable.
But Existence PSR implies that every existing thing a has an explanation
either in the existence of something else b, where b causes a to exist, or
in its own existence, where a exists by the necessity of its own nature;that
is, where a is self-caused.This implies in tum that every truth of the form
'a exists' has an explanationeither by the truth 'b exists', where it is understood that b #a and b causes a to exist, or by the truth 'a exists', where it
is understood that a is self-caused,or exists necessarily.26Here we see that
the property of being a truth of the form 'x exists' is hereditarywith respect
to this sort of explanation.By (G), then, not every truth of that form - not

INFINITE

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49

every truth that assertsthe existence of a thing - has an explanationof this

sort, contraryto ExistencePSR.
A defender of PSR might object that we have misconstruedwhat it means
for a's existence to be explained by the necessity of a's own nature: it does
not imply that 'a exists' explains 'a exists', even where it is understoodthat a
is self-caused, or exists by the necessity of its own nature; for this would
violate the asymmetryof most concepts of explanation(cf. (9)).
In reply, let us ignorethe fact that asymmetryis alreadyin jeopardywhen
defendersof PSR talk of self-causedbeings. Instead,even grantingthe objection, we can use the Heredity Theorem to show that Existence PSR, even
if not refuted, would be question-beggingin its intended application. Call
a being that exists by the necessity of its own nature a 'necessarybeing'.
Suppose there is no necessarybeing and that ExistencePSR is true. It would
follow that every existing thing a has an explanation in the e..'_^nce of
something else b, where b causes a to exist. Hence every truth of the form 'a
exists' would have an explanation by the truth 'b exists', where it is
understood that b $ a and b causes a to exist. Once again,havingthe form
'x exists' is hereditarywith respectto this sort of explanation.Therefore
(J)

Not every existing thing has an explanation in the existence of

something else (for the notion of explanation presupposedby
ExistencePSR).

But Existence PSR says that every existing thing has an explanation for its
existence either in the existence of something else or in the necessity of its
own nature. That is, every existing thing either has an explanation in the
existence of something else or in a necessarybeing. By (J), then, it follows
that
(K)

ExistencePSR is true only if there is a necessarybeing.

(K) tells us that in assumingthe truth of Existence PSR, the theist thereby
presupposes there is at least one necessary being. But whether there is a
necessary being was one of the points at issue, at least accordingto many
opponents of CosmologicalArguments.This question is begged, when the
theist assumesExistence PSR. The theist also explicitly denies that the world
is a necessarybeing. In the context of his denial,the truth of ExistencePSR
presupposes,in light of (K), that there is a being distinct from the world.
Hence the theist is presupposing,unwittingly, that there is a being distinct

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JOHN F. POST

from the world, when he assumesExistencePSR in orderto show there must

be one. Once again, appealingto Existence PSR begs the question it was
intended to answer.
Perhaps there is some version of PSR that is neither refutable by the
Heredity Theorem nor question-beggingin its intended application,though
I doubt it. Of course even if there is such a version,it could still be false (e.g.,
by quantum indeterminacy);and there remain other links in Cosmological
Argumentsfor God that look as weak.27
VanderbiltUniversity
NOTES
1 In 'Two types of foundationalism',
Journalof Philosophy73 (1976), p. 173, Note 10.
I am indebted to the refereefor valuablecriticism.Section III below benefited most. I
am indebtedalso to the followingfor helpful discussionon variousoccasions:Clement
Dore, CharlesDavis,GaryGutting,John Hooker,Janet Kourany,Stephen Levy, David
Pomerantz,Scott Shuger,JeffreyTlumak,and Red Ulrich.
2 E.G., Keith Lehrer,Knowledge,(ClarendonPress,Oxford, 1974), pp. 15-16, 15556; and I. T. Oakley,'An argumentfor scepticismconcerningjustifiedbeliefs',American
PhilosophicalQuarterly13 (1976), pp. 226--27. Oakleyalso presentsan argumentthat
does not appealto the pragmatic,but I believe it fails for reasonsmentionedin Note 6,
below.
3 The objection is due to Bruce Aune, 'Remarks on an argumentby Chisholm',
PhilosophicalStudies 23 (1972), p. 329. Aune'sobjection,suitablyapplied,also appears
to undercutthe idea that a personcannotbelievean infinitelycomplexproposition.This
idea is a key assumptionin the argumentagainstregressadvancedby RichardFoley,
'Inferentialjustification and the infinite regress',AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly15
(1978), pp. 311-316, esp. p. 313. See also Note 13, below.
I Cf. DavidB. Annis, 'Epistemicjustification',Philosophia6 (1976), pp. 259-66; and
R. A. Fumerton, 'Inferentialjustificationand empiricism',Journalof Philosophy73
(1976), pp. 557-69, esp. p. 564, plus G. Harman'scounter to Annis on pp. 570-71
with regardto whatin effect aremy (c)-(e).
5 We may wish to add that X's entailing Y is broughtto P's attention;cf. F. Schick,
'Threelogics of belief, in M. Swain (ed.), Induction,Acceptance,and RationalBelief
(Reidel, Dordrecht, 1970), p. 25. Note that (2) is a weak entailmentprinciple.Strong
entailmentprinciples,to the effect that a set of rationalbeliefs is closed underentailment, are controversial.H. Kyburgimplicatesstrongprinciplesin the so-calledlottery
in M. Swain(ed.), op. cit., pp. 55-59.
paradox,in 'Conjunctivitis',
6 E.G., Oakley,op. cit., makes this mistaketwice, on p. 227. John Poilock apparently
avoids the mistake of supposing deductive non-circularityto be sufficient, but he
overlooks the obligationto guaranteethat at every step of the regressthere is some
statement that satisfies the (justificational)non-circularitycondition. See his: Knowledge and Justification(PrincetonUniversityPress, Princeton, 1974), pp. 27-28, esp.
footnote 5.
7 In 'Foundational
versusnonfoundationaltheoriesof empiricaljustification',American
PhilosophicalQuarterly17 (1977), pp. 287-97. See clause (4) of Ni on p. 289, plus
series El on p. 290. I am deeply indebted to JamesCommanfor commentshere, and
regretall the morehis tragicdeath.

IN FINITE REGRESSES

OF JUSTIFICATION

51

Alston notes this sort of move, op. cit., p. 173, item D.

9 Cf. Bas C. van Fraassen, 'Theoretical eintities: The five ways', Philosophia 4 (1974),
pp. 95-109, esp. 99-100 and footnote 7, where the idea is attributed to Richmond
Thomason. Thomason reports (in conversation) that the idea occurred to him in
connection with the Gentzen-style consistency proof for formal number theory
presented by Elliott Mendelson, Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Van Nostrand,

Princeton,N.J., 1964),pp. 258-70; unwrittingly,Mendelson

defmesa proof (on p. 261)
so that any wf turns out to be provable. But a less esoteric illustration occurs in I. Copi,
Introduction to Logic, 5th ed. (Macmillan, New York, 1978), p. 311: by failing to mention that his proof-sequences must be finite, Copi's definition of a formal proof renders
any statement Z provable (hence any plus its negation), since an instance of (4) can be
constructed for any Z in his 'system'; so his rules were complete all along, but I pray
none of this will inspire yet another edition in his regress of editions.
10 Cf. Alston, op. cit., p. 173, item C.
l Cf. R. A. Fumerton, op. cit., p. 559.
12 Cf. Peter D. Klein, 'Knowledge, causality, and defeasibility', Journal of Philosophy
73 (1976), pp. 806-807.
13 Due to Klein, ibid., p. 807. Foley's requirement B, op. cit., p. 314, implies that justification is transitive, approximately in the sense of (MT). Hence transitivity is presupposed in his argument against infinite justificational regresses.
'4
Klein, ibid., p. 806, raises this probability objection against unmodified transitivity
but makes no mention of it in connection with (MT). Lehrer gives a probabilistic argument against a very close relative of (MT) that might well be effective against (MT), in
'Justification, explanation, and induction', in M. Swain, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
'5 Robert A. Jaeger, 'Implication and evidence', Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975),
pp. 475-485, esp. pp. 482-84, constructs such an argument against unmodified transitivity. If it works at all, I see no reason why it would not also work against (MT).
16 Lehrer raises doubts about the transitivity of explanation, though not best explanation, in 'Justification, explanation, and induction', in Swain, op. cit., pp. 112-113.
17 Cf. Wesley C. Salmon, 'Why ask, 'why?'? An inquiry concerning scientific explanation',
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 51 (1978), pp. 683-705, espec. 700. This paper
contains references to Salmon's and other work relevant to my discussion here.
10 (C) is just an instance of a more general result. Let R be any relation such that if
XR Y (for P at t), then X justifies Y for P at t (cf. (5)). The above argument then shows

therecan be no R-saturatedregress.

19 Cf. Bas C. van Fraassen, 'The pragmatics of explanation', American Philosophical

Quarterly 14 (1977), pp. 143-50, which contains further references.
20 Cf. Salmon, op. cit., pp. 688-89.

21
22
23

Ibid., p. 700.
Ibid., p. 700.

Cf. C. Misner, K. Thome, and J. Wheeler, Gravitation (W. H. Freeman, San Francisco,
1973), pp. 813-14; and Adolf Griinbaum, Modern Science and Zeno's Paradoxes
(Wesleyan University Press, Middletown 1967), pp. 83-86.
24 Cf. Salmon, op. cit., pp. 6 86-87: "Explanations demand an asymmetry not present
in inferences.... The asymmetry... is inherited from the asymmetry of causation".
25 By William L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton Unversity Press,
Princeton, 1975), pp. 73, 112-13.
26 Cf. the notion of 'causally sufficient condition in the context at hand', plus the
related notion (in effect) of 'explanatorily sufficient in the context at hand', on pages
107 and 110-11, respectively, of Brian Skyrms, 'The explication of "X knows that p" ',
reprinted in M. Roth and L. Galis (eds.), Knowing (Random m-'TS
:w York, 1970).
Roughly, 'b exists' is causally (explanatorily)sufficient for 'a exist. , the context at
hand iff there are statements describing relevant conditions such that their conjunction

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JOHN F. POST

with 'b exists' is causally (explanatorily)sufficient for 'a exists'. In the case of
explanation, we require that these additionalstatementsbe known to P at t, in the
context. It can be shownthat the HeredityTheoremstill applies.
27 Researchfor this paperwas supportedin part by the VanderbiltUniversityResearch
Council.