MOBILISING MIGRANTS SKILLS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN

THE MENA REGION

Making the Most of Young Migrants Skills

Conference jointly organized by UNFPA-ASRO & OECD

Tunis, 13-14 May 2013

RECENT MIGRATION TRENDS IN AND FROM THE REGION

Conference Background Paper

Martin Baldwin-Edwards
Mediterranean Migration Observatory, Athens and ICMPD, Vienna

Introduction
Patterns of labour migration into, within and from the MENA region were already in flux by
the late 2000s, and were then impacted by two massive events the economic crisis of
advanced capitalism (most notably the eurozones austerity measures in the South) and the
Arab Spring. This paper begins with the state of the region up until the advent of the
economic crisis. The effects on migration flows of the economic crisis and the Arab Spring
are then examined; this is followed by an evaluation of their implications for managing
future labour migration flows concerning the MENA countries.

Migration patterns in MENA prior to the global economic crisis

A glance at estimates of MENA migrant stocks globally circa 2005 indicates the great
variation of migration history across the region (see Fig. 1).
Figure 1

Source: Holzmann (2010)

In absolute numbers, the greatest stocks of expatriates come from the three North African
countries of Morocco, Egypt and Algeria. As a proportion of population, the largest numbers
are from West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon and Jordan. Even Kuwait and Bahrain have emigrant
proportions comparable with those of North Africa, though. At face value, these data tell us
little more than the extent of past emigration: more detailed analysis of patterns of
migration is required.

Broadly, there are three migration systems within the MENA region (BaldwinEdwards, 2005: 4). These consist of the Maghreb countries1 (historically large emigration
flows, primarily to France), the Mashreq countries2 with a post-Ottoman migration history
amongst them, and the GCC countries3 where large-scale oil production since the 1970s has
utilized mass temporary labour immigration on a continuous basis.
Taking the entire Arab region, labour migration flows are shown for 2008 in Figure 2,
below. About 50% of emigration is within the Arab region predominantly to the GCC
countries. Half of labour migration is to OECD countries, of which France is the primary
destination (see Figure 3).

Figure 2

Source: IOM compilation of World Bank data, cited in Haque and Debnath (2010)

Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Mauritania

Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen
3
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman
2

Figure 3

Source: IOM compilation of OECD data, cited in Haque and Debnath (2010)

The Maghreb
Over the last decade, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria continued to have France as both the
primary locus of their diaspora and also as a major destination country for recent flows.
However, new labour migration corridors opened up mostly directed towards Spain and
Italy and by 2007 stocks of Moroccans in Spain and France were roughly the same,
according to host country data4 (CARIM database, 17/09/2009). The latest available
remittance data5 (with the caveat of variable remittance behaviour) tend to confirm the
importance of Spain and Italy with remittances of 25 and 16 per cent, respectively, of the
total for Morocco, in comparison with 28 per cent from France. Remittances to Algeria are
almost exclusively from France, while those for Tunisia are primarily from Italy and Libya.
Libya, until the revolution, was not a country of significant emigration, but rather of very
large labour immigration both regular and irregular. Its immigrant stock in 2005 of
between 1.1 and 1.8 million constituted 25-30% of population: they were from Egypt,
Tunisia, Morocco and sub-Saharan African countries (Baldwin-Edwards 2006: 313). More

The stock of Moroccans in France is significantly undercounted, owing to exclusion from the data of those
with French citizenship and sans papiers. The Moroccan consulate estimate is almost double for that year
(Di Bartolomeo et al., 2009). For both Spain and Italy, the figures are more reliable owing to mass
regularizations conducted in the mid-2000s (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, 2009).
5
World Bank 2012

recent estimates (Hafez and Ghaly 2012: 8) suggest a figure of around two million Egyptians
working in Libya, often travelling and working informally.
The characteristics of recent legal flows to OECD countries from the Maghreb are
significantly divergent. For Algerians, the most important flows are to France, Spain and
Canada; whereas recent flows to Canada were 70% highly educated and 11% aged 15-24,
for Spain and France they were around 20% highly educated and 5% youth. Additionally, the
flows to Spain were 70% male (OECD 2012a: 272). Moroccan flows have favoured Spain
over both Italy and France since 2003, although declining markedly from 2008. The
proportion of highly educated migrating to Spain and Italy has been exceptionally low (58%), with 18% of migrants aged 15-24 (OECD 201a2: 290-1). Tunisian flows retain France as
the most favoured destination, followed by Italy and (much smaller numbers) Germany and
Canada. The flows to France consist of around 20% highly educated, whereas those to Italy a
mere 2%; to Canada, the proportion is 70%. The proportion of youth migrating is very low to
all countries less than 10% (OECD 2012a: 300-1). Libya, until the Revolution, was a country
of low emigration levels: in 2010 the primary destinations were the UK, Germany, Canada
and the USA primarily for study, but also for employment or residence. The proportion of
highly educated was high, except for the small numbers going to Italy and Israel (OECD
2012a: 288-9).
Survey data (OECD 2012a) taken over the period 2008-10 on the desire or intention
to migrate show similar patterns across the four countries. Between 24 and 29 per cent of
the population expressed a desire for permanent emigration; 32-44% of young people (1524); and 18-31% of the highly educated. 22-26% of respondents (excluding Libya) stated
their intent to migrate permanently within the next 12 months.

The Mashreq
The Mashreq countries despite their historical commonalities exhibit a wide range of
characteristics with regard to migration. However, all have a high youth population (25-42%
under 15 years) and very high unemployment (Haque and Debnath 2010: 54). There are also
very large population flows both historically and contemporaneously involving refugees,
legal and irregular labour migrants, and family members. Three countries (Jordan, Syria and
Lebanon) have had massive stocks of refugees for decades. All of the Mashreq other than
Yemen and Palestine has inflows of unskilled labour migration, both from within the region
and from Asia and Africa. All of the Mashreq also has significant outflows of skilled labour
migration to GCC countries, and to a lesser extent to the USA and Canada. There is also
some circular migration, especially involving contiguous territories: these include flows
between Syria and Lebanon and between Egypt and Libya, most of which are unregulated.
Since labour markets are weakly regulated across the region, irregular status of migrants is
extensive and results in impressionistic data that are weakly related to reality on the
ground. It is difficult to provide reliable data on migration flows involving Mashreq
countries.

Over the last decade, the most important labour migration corridors within the Arab
region are shown in Fig. 4, below distinguished by average skill level.
Figure 4
Principal labour migration routes of Mashreqi nationals
High degree of high-skilled workers

Predominantly low-skilled workers

EgyptGCC

YemenSaudi Arabia

EgyptLibya

EgyptJordan

LebanonGCC

Syria Lebanon

LebanonUSA, Canada

EgyptLebanon

JordanGCC

SyriaJordan

SyriaGCC
Source: own compilation from multiple data sources
Note: large flows are indicated in bold type

From outside the region, there are also some significant undocumented inflows of unskilled
and semi-skilled migrants from Asia and Africa (see Fig. 5).
Figure 5
Labour immigration channels into the Mashreq
AsiaLebanon
AfricaLebanon
AsiaJordan
AsiaSyria
Source: own compilation from multiple data sources

The most important Mashreq country for labour emigration is Egypt. Despite various pieces
of putative research concerning Egyptian irregular migration to Europe,6 proportionately
few migrate either legally or illegally to the OECD area. In 2010, the main legal flows into the
OECD were to Italy and the USA at just under 10,000 persons each (OECD 2012a: 277)
and comprised high proportions of the highly skilled. There are also small flows for seasonal
work in Italy and Greece (23,000 and 7,000 respectively, in 2008). Although there are some
irregular flows to the EU, the numbers are trivial. In contrast, migration within the MENA
region constitutes the principal labour migration flows: in 2008, out of 1.1 million permits
6

E.g. various surveys on intention to migrate, made by Eurostat and the ETF

granted by the Egyptian state, 96% were within the MENA region, 97% were to males, and
45% were initial permits (CAPMAS data).7 The proportion of highly qualified workers is put
at 26% and those working abroad and obtaining a qualification there is put at 36% a high
ratio. The number authorized to work in Saudi Arabia for this same year is stated as 522,000
(49%) and in Kuwait as 180,000 (17%). Although CAPMAS provides no recent data for flows
to Jordan and Lebanon, the older data show in 2001 a stock of temporary workers in Jordan
of 227,000 and in Lebanon of 13,000 (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: Table 4). Hassan (2010: 75)
reports that 205,500 Egyptians were granted work permits in Jordan in 2008, of which 86%
were with incomplete schooling. Jordanian census data for 2004 show Egyptians as being
28.7% of the foreign population (Blangiardo 2012: 26), amounting to some 98,000 persons.
Lebanese work permit data for 2007 show around 17,000 Egyptians registered (Tabar and
Rassi 2010: 97-98) obviously, a rather trivial number.
Trends in remittances to Egypt indicate a shift away from the USA which was the
leading source country over the period 1999-2009 (El-Sakka 2010). Remittance data for
2011 totalled US$14.32b and put Saudi Arabia in first place at 28%, followed by Jordan
(19%), Kuwait (11%) and Libya (10%).8 Remittances from the USA, Qatar and the UAE are at
much lower, similar levels. Although remittance data are not such reliable indicators of
migration stocks or flows, these data show fairly conclusively that Egyptian labour migration
since the mid-2000s is increasingly focused on Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other GCC countries
and until the Arab Spring both labour migration and remittances were increasing
significantly on an annual basis.
Survey data on desire to migrate permanently (conducted over 2008-2010) show
19% of the total population, 22% of the highly educated and 27% of youth. These figures are
well below those of all the Maghreb countries. The most favoured countries of destination
were stated as being Saudi Arabia (34%), Kuwait (11%) and the USA (10%) (OECD: 2012a:
277).9
Lebanon has a long history of forced emigration owing to its extended period of civil war
(1975-1990); similarly it became quite dependent on remittances over that period. Since
then, many migrs have returned, amounting to around 85% by the year 2000 (Tabar and
Rassi 2010: 91). The Lebanese economy since 1990 has been unable to provide employment
for its skilled workforce , and there is high unemployment especially of the youth (Tabar
and Rassi 2010). Highly skilled emigration to the GCC is extensive, with an estimated third of
the labour force working in GCC countries in 2008 (some 350,000 persons). Moreover, the
presence of highly-skilled Lebanese in top managerial positions across the GCC is highly
visible, and estimated at around a third of all director positions (Hourani 2010: 10). Although
7

Available from Egypts statistical service, http://www.capmas.gov.eg/

Own calculations from World Bank 2012
9
Actually, these results indicate a poor construction of the OECD survey methodology. Clearly there is no
possibility to migrate permanently to GCC countries, so the question focused on permanent emigration has
little meaning for most labour migrants.
8

high-skill migration to the Gulf continues as a major labour migration stream, there are still
no proper data on flows. One estimate for the period 1997-2007 suggests that around 50%
of migration was directed to the GCC countries (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010: 2). At the
beginning of the global crisis, one commentator notes that some 40,000 Lebanese returned
from the GCC since they had no job security there (Tabar and Rassi 2010: 93). Recent
remittance data are not helpful in determining temporary migration destinations either,
since they are dominated by the very large (and affluent) diaspora communities in the USA,
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden et al.; for 2011, remittances from Saudi Arabia
amounted to $639m at 8% of total remittances, and were zero or negligible from other GCC
countries.10
The Lebanese economy for some time has had a shortage of unskilled menial labour,
and has significant labour immigration. In particular, since the 1960s there has been largescale circular migration of unskilled male Syrians for seasonal or temporary work. This was
estimated at around 400,000 in 2008, almost all with no official status and no work permit
(Tabar and Rassi 2010: 98-101).11 In addition to the Syrian immigration, Lebanon has an
immigration policy for temporary labour immigration (similar to the GCC kafala system, see
below); in 2007 some 120,000 work permits were issued. There is a wide mix of immigrant
nationalities, including non-Arab Africans (31%), Filipinos (19%), Sri Lankans (18%),
Egyptians (14%), and smaller numbers of non-Arab Asians and other Arabs (Tabar and Rassi
2010: Figure 20). In previous years, the estimated number of immigrants (excluding Syrians)
was around 200,000 with only 87,000 work permits issued (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: 10); it is
unclear if the same pattern of a high degree of irregularity pertains.
Jordan, like Lebanon, is a country with significant high-skill emigration alongside significant
low-skill immigration. It also hosts the largest refugee population ratio in the world around
50% (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: 9). Emigration of the highly-skilled began in the 1990s, with
very high unemployment, and was directed primarily to the GCC and the USA. By 2008 the
number of expatriate Jordanian workers was stated as being 350,000,12 of which 162,000
were in oil-producing countries primarily the UAE (34%), Qatar (32%), Kuwait (19%) and
Oman (12%) (Blangiardo 2012: 26). Some 71,000 were resident in the USA, and another
55,000 distributed across a range of other countries. Remittances to Jordan in 2011 show
only three significant sources: these are the West Bank and Gaza ($1.5b), Saudi Arabia
($900m) and the USA ($450m). The significant remittances from Saudi Arabia contradict the

10

Own calculations from World Bank 2012

There is an open border policy with Syria, such that entry is permitted with merely an ID card and Syrians are
not required to leave Lebanon after expiry of their labour contract.
12
This figure is much lower than the estimates made for the mid-2000s by Kapiszewski. He suggested that the
stock of temporary workers from Jordan within the GCC was 490,000 of which most were in Saudi Arabia
(260,000) and the UAE (110,000). However, this figure also includes Palestinians with Jordanian passports
(Nassar 2010: 23).
11

data cited above, and are in accord with the estimates made by Kapiszewski in 2006 (see Fn.
12).
Immigration into Jordan is extensive and largely unskilled, and is thought to contain
a mix of authorized and mostly irregular immigrant workers (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: 9).
According to the Ministry of Labour, in 2008 there were 303,000 legal immigrant workers, of
which 70% were from other Arab countries (Nassar 2010: 23). 206,000 of these were
Egyptians of which 99% were male, 86% with less than completed secondary education
and working in agriculture (34%), industry (17%), commerce (17%) and services (12%)
(Hassan 2010: 75). Data from the 2004 census show 342,000 residents, at 7.7% of total
population; 82.5% were from other Arab countries, the most numerous being Egyptians at
98,000 persons13 (Blangiardo 2012: 26). Data on remittances sent from Jordan in 2011 seem
to confirm the pattern of large-scale temporary immigration mostly from Egypt and Asia.
Remittances totalled $5billion (very high for the population size) of which the largest flows
were to Egypt (53%), Syria (10%), China (9%), Sri Lanka and Indonesia (4% each), Lebanon
(3%) and Bangladesh, India and the Philippines at 2% each.14
Syria, even before the current civil war, has been a difficult country to assess in terms of
emigration and immigration. It has also been a recipient of fairly large numbers of refugees
in recent times, although not at the level of Jordan. Syria has never provided information on
emigration of its nationals, and very limited information on its small labour immigration
flows. One report cites official estimates of Syrians in the GCC in 2010 as being over a
million, with 700,000 in Saudi Arabia and 500,000 in Kuwait (Seeberg 2012: 9), but there is
no other evidence supporting such a large presence.15 The primary destinations of Syrians
prior to the conflict were Lebanon (see above), Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the USA, as
well as various EU countries. The skill level is thought to vary according to destination, with
the lowest-skilled going to Lebanon and Jordan, and high-skill migrants going to the GCC and
OECD countries. In 2010, the principal legal migration to OECD countries was to Germany,
the USA and Sweden but the numbers involved are small, and trivial in comparison with the
probable flows to the GCC. Survey data (2008-10) show a medium level of desire to migrate
(24%), but with the most favoured destination cited as the United Arab Emirates, at
20%(OECD 2012a: 299). Remittance data16 for 2011 show a total of $2.08b, of which 25%
came from Jordan, 17% from Kuwait, 13% from Saudi Arabia and 9% from the USA.17
Immigration into Syria is no less a mystery: even the large refugee communities have
not been properly counted. In 2010 these were thought to number just under half a million
13

Presumably, irregular workers and residents are mostly missing from these data; this might imply that the
actual numbers are two or three times higher.
14
Own calculations from World Bank 2012.
15
Kapiszewski (2006) estimated for 2003/4 that there were 100,000 Syrians in each of Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, and trivial numbers elsewhere in the GCC.
16
It should be borne in mind that the most substantial (circular) migration into Lebanon will not show up in
remittance data, as money transfer will simply be made by carrying them across the border.
17
Own calculations from World Bank 2012.

Palestinian refugees and their descendants, around 1 million Iraqis and another 300,000
stateless Kurds (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012: 3). With a new immigration law of 2010, the
Syrian state started to record legal labour immigrants: these were estimated as just under
one thousand in 2010, despite press estimates of 5,000 to 7,500 skilled foreign workers.
Domestic workers, regulated since 2001, were estimated at 75-100,000 women, mainly
from Indonesia, the Philippines and Ethiopia (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012: 4). There are no
data in the World Bank database concerning remittances sent from Syria, so a cross-check is
not possible.
Yemen has had a long history of labour migration to the GCC, but this was dealt a severe
blow after the second Gulf War when 850,000 workers were deported from the GCC for
security reasons: entire camps of Yemeni in poverty were set up, and were dependent on
the state for assistance (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: 10). Economic conditions have not
obviously improved since, and there is little legal emigration from Yemen to the OECD area.
Survey data on intention to migrate show a very high level for high-skill workers (42) with
the preferred destinations being predominantly Saudi Arabia (56%0 and the UAE (13%)
(OECD 2012a: 305). Remittance data for 2011 show remittances only from Saudi Arabia, at
just over $1b.
Despite the poverty of Yemen, there are also some immigrants in the country: these
consist of high-skill Egyptian and Syrian workers, and refugees from Sudan (Di Bartolomeo
2010b: 2). The presence of these is confirmed by remittances sent from Yemen in 2011,
showing $181m sent to Egypt and $124m to Sudan.

The GCC countries

The Gulf countries since the 1970s have engaged in mass importation of temporary labour
(expatriates), resulting in the highest immigrant/population ratios in the world. Figure 6
shows recent recorded immigrant labour stocks and proportions for the GCC countries
ranging from 51% in Saudi Arabia to 94% in Qatar.
Figure 6
Foreign labour force in GCC countries, circa 2008 (000s)

Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Bahrain
Oman
Qatar
UAE
TOTAL

Total labour
force
8,455
2,093
597
1,169
1,265
3,043
16,622

Foreign labour
force
4,282
1,742
458
809
1,193
2,588
11,072

Source: Baldwin-Edwards 2011, Table 2

% foreign
50.6
83.2
76.7
69.2
94.3
85.0
66.6

The GCC countries (with the exception of Oman) are very reluctant to provide detailed data
on immigration stocks or any data at all on flows. This is partly owing to the semi-regulated
immigration system Kafala which allows citizens and businesses to sponsor an
immigrant worker and accept responsibility for his/her presence on the territory. It is also
partly owing to the political sensitivity of such high immigrant stocks in quite conservative
societies with increasing unemployment of their nationals. However, given that the great
majority of immigrant workers (some 70%) are resident for less than ten years, immigrant
stocks give a picture of cumulative migration flows over the last decade.
As previously noted, a very large proportion of migration from the Mashreq is
directed to the GCC countries, mostly as skilled workers. The proportion of Arab workers in
the GCC has been declining consistently since 1970, from a peak of 72%, to 56% in 1985 and
31% in 1996 (Nassar 2010: 20). For 2007, it is calculated at 22% of the GCC stock of foreign
workers, although with significant differences between countries. Figure 7 shows the
proportions of Arab, Asian and Others (Europe, America, other) as provided by the Arab
Labor Organization. The highest ratio of Arab workers is in Qatar (40%), Kuwait (36%) and
Saudi Arabia (30%). The total stock in the GCC is 2.45 million and the largest stock is in Saudi
Arabia at 1.25 million (ALO data). However, this stock of 2.45m Arab expatriates represents
only 22% of expatriate workers: the main origin is Asia, at 72%.
Figure 7
GCC labour force by nationality group, ca. 2007

Source: Arab Labor Organization data

Using IOM data, Haque and Debnath (2010) construct a pie-chart of principal origins of
migrant workers in the GCC countries for 2007. (Presumably these are stock data.) The chart
is reproduced below, as Figure 8. From these data, it can be seen that the most important
sources countries are India at 23%, Bangladesh (13%), Pakistan (12%), Egypt (11%) and the

Philippines at 7%. By region, South Asia is the most important at 55%, followed by Arab
countries (28%) and South East Asia (12%).
Figure 8
Origin of expatriate workers in the GCC, ca. 2007

IOM and Haque and Debnath (2010)

Recent data on labour emigration flows from Asia have been collected by the OECD. Figure 9
shows labour migration flows out of the Asian countries into MENA,18 for 2010/2011
(excepting Pakistan, 2008).
Figure 9
Labour emigration flows to the MENA region, 2010/2011 (000s)

18

Almost all the flows are to the GCC, with three small exceptions: Bangladeshi (37,000), Filipinos (22,000) and
Sri Lankans (16,000). 50% or more went to Libya, and the remainder to various Mashreq countries.

Source: own calculations from OECD (2012b: Table III.A.1.2)

In contrast to the stock data, these flow data indicate a rather greater presence of Filipinos
and Pakistanis as well as Sri Lankans and Nepalese. However, the destination countries vary
widely by nationality, and the OECD data are able to identify these (also by gender, for some
nationalities). Figure 10 shows a breakdown of which GCC countries Asian migrants went to,
for this period.
Figure 10
Labour immigration into MENA from Asia, 2010/2011 (000s)

Source: own calculations from OECD (2012b: Table III.A.1.2)

As can be seen from the chart, each country has a very different mix of immigration
nationality inflows. Saudi Arabia has the largest stock and receives the largest total inflow,
with an emphasis on Filipinos and Indians. The UAE currently takes in almost as many
immigrants as Saudi Arabia at just under 900,000 for 2010; its preferred nationalities are
Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Filipinos. Qatar has an unusual preference for Nepalese workers,
whereas Oman prefers Indians and Kuwait Filipinos. Four sending countries (Nepal,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand) provide gender data: apart from Sri Lankans, for whom
48% of the flow is female, the female ratios are very low within the range 2.511.3%. One
GCC country Kuwait has an unusually high proportion of women in its migrant inflows.
Relative to the known stocks of expatriates (see Figs. 6, 7, 8), the total Filipino
inflows are extremely high presumably reflecting a general trend in increased household
employment. The inflows into the UAE are much higher than might be expected (at 900,000
in one year, with a known stock of 2.6m), whereas those for Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman
are roughly one quarter of previous stocks (reflecting the modal employment duration of

GCC expatriate workers). The flows into Kuwait, on the other hand, are extraordinarily low
(200,000 with a previous stock of 1.7 m) and also with a high female proportion.
The employment of foreigners in the GCC economies is predominantly in the private
sector which has an immigrant presence ranging from 80% in Saudi Arabia to 99% in Qatar
(Baldwin-Edwards 2011: Table 9). However, even the public sector employs immigrants, in a
range of 558% with Saudi Arabia and Qatar at the extremes. Total employment in the state
sector as a proportion of total employment is at its highest in Saudi Arabia (35%) and lowest
in Bahrain (8%). All the GCC labour markets are highly segmented, since the private sector is
reluctant to employ GCC nationals preferring immigrants for lower cost and greater
reliability and skills. With rising youth unemployment across the region, since 1990 there
have been sustained attempts to nationalize private sector employment (i.e. replace
foreign workers with indigenous ones) with a range of policies to achieve this (see BaldwinEdwards 2011: Table 24). The results have been marginal in all countries other than Saudi
Arabia, although even there the actual meaning of these figures is in serious doubt
(Baldwin-Edwards 2011: 45-47).
Looking at employment by sector19 (Appendix, Table A1), we can see that most
sectors are dominated by immigrant workers. Total migrant presence is in the range 8094%
(excepting Saudi Arabia at 53%). Bahrain has only two small sectors (agriculture and
financial services) under 50%; for Kuwait the range is 7299% for all sectors other than
utilities; in Qatar most sectors are in the range 98100%, excepting public administration,
education and social services; and the UAE is in the range 7396% for all sectors other than
public administration. Saudi Arabia is the least dominated by migrants, but the private
sector is in the range 7691%, while the public sector is very low at 227% (BaldwinEdwards 2011: 22-24). Generally, and insofar as the inadequate statistical data inform,
construction is the most important sector for employment of immigrants. This is obviously
true in the case of Qatar, and apparently for Bahrain. The other predominant sector for
immigrant employment is housekeeping, at over 10% of total employment in all countries
other than Qatar, and with an immigrant presence of 88100%.
In terms of remittances (Appendix, Table A2), Saudi Arabia remains the largest
remitter in the MENA area (at $24b) but in global terms while taking second place after the
USA it is only at a level similar to the UK, Spain, Canada and Germany. The remittances give
some indication of the relative importance of the different expatriate communities (not only
their size, but also their income levels). For Saudi Arabia, the main communities remitting
are Indians (32%), followed by Egyptians (16.4%), Filipinos (11%) and Pakistanis (11%). Other
Arab countries remitting are Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (in the range 14.5%). This
gives some indication of the importance of the Mashreq expatriate presence especially
Egyptians in Saudi Arabia.
Remittances from the UAE are mostly by Indians (78%) with Egyptians at only 3%;
this looks rather different from the immigration flow data cited, meaning that the Emirates
19

Sectoral data for Oman are not available; data for Bahrain are incomplete. See Table A1.

are now diversifying in their labour immigration needs. In particular, the large inflow of
Filipinos (no gender data) is doubtless for household employment, whereas Pakistani and
Bangladeshi migrants are associated with construction and other unskilled work. Kuwait also
has large remittances to India (37%) along with Egypt (21%) and Bangladesh (12%).
Household employment is suggested by the presence of Sri Lankans and Filipinos; and this is
confirmed by the high female proportion of inflows into Kuwait. Oman and Bahrain also
have Indians as their primary remitters (at over 60%), along with other Asian countries and
Egypt. Remittances from Qatar are predominantly from Indians and Nepalese (31 and 25%),
followed by Pakistanis (16%) and Filipinos (13%). Egyptians remit 7% of the total.

Two shocks an economic crisis and an Arab Spring

The global financial crisis
Since 2008, there have been two major global events that have impacted heavily on
migration in the MENA region. The first is the global banking crisis, with its knock-on effect
within the European Union and particularly in the Mediterranean North. Since these
countries primarily Spain and Italy20 had become the focus of large-scale unskilled male
migration from the Maghreb, the collapse in employment levels in Spain in particular
inevitably have had a major impact on both the employment of immigrants and the flows of
labour immigration. Italy has had a small decline in immigration flows since 2008, but there
are no OECD data for recent years; Spain has had a large reduction in inflows since its peak
in 2007 (OECD 2012b: Statistical Annex). More recent data for Spain from the National
Statistical Institute (INE) show overall nett emigration of foreign nationals since January
2011, which increased to around 14,000 a month by late 2012. Moroccan migration flows in
2011 show an inflow into Spain of 41,000, which is nett emigration for that year of around
20,000 persons (INE online datasets). Subsequent to Spains economic crisis, Italy has also
entered one: the impact on employment and migration are similar, but lagged behind Spain.
Despite the severe economic situation, the known voluntary returns to the Maghreb
remain small. The economic crisis has had a major impact on migration from Morocco to
Spain and Italy for the following four reasons (Arango and Quiones 2009: 11):
(a) The unusual severe impact of the crisis on employment
(b) The unusual volume and intensity of immigration flows in the 2000s
(c) Because in Spain (and Italy to a lesser extent) immigration is primarily labour
immigration
(d) The primacy of the construction sector, which is the most responsive to economic
downturn and also the sector most important for male immigrant employment
20

Although Greece was the first affected by a serious economic downturn and collapse of employment
opportunities for immigrants (as well as natives), the primary nationality affected has been Albanians.
However, some long-term Egyptian residents in Greece have returned to Egypt, but their number is not
significant relative to Egypts population size.

Indeed, one of the stranger effects of the economic crisis in the most affected countries has
been the loss of male (immigrant) employment alongside the relative stability of female
employment. Given two specific conditions that Maghrebi immigrants in Spain and Italy
are predominantly unskilled male workers, and that they rely on short-term contracts for
their employment it was certain that these would be the first to face unemployment. This
situation pertains, and little is actually known about the living conditions and survival
techniques of the large Moroccan populations still residing in Spain and Italy. What is
certain, is that it will be a long time before significant labour migration along this corridor
resumes.
Within the MENA area, the financial crisis had a direct impact only on Dubai owing to
its reliance on financial services; this has been resolved with assistance from other Emirates.
The GCC countries all survived the global crisis rather well: their problems lie more with the
Arab Spring and its implications both direct and indirect.

The Arab Spring

Starting with the sad yet powerful act of self-immolation of a young Tunisian in January
2011, the Arab world has gone through dramatic and in some countries violent changes.
In February 2011, as the Libyan city of Benghazi started its revolt against the Gaddafi
regime, Egyptians, other immigrants and Libyans started to flee Libya through the Egyptian
border. This was followed by flight of others across the Tunisian, Algerian and other African
borders. Far smaller numbers (27,000 recorded in 2011) of Libyans and immigrants sought
asylum by boat crossing to Italy and Malta, but were not received with a welcome. By the
end of the Libyan crisis, a minimum of 1.2 million persons had fled Libya into neighbouring
countries.
Figure 11
Refugee flight from the Libyan crisis during 2011
Libyans seeking asylum abroad
422,912
Tunisians returning to Tunisia
137,000
TCNs arriving in Tunisia
208,489
Egyptians returning to Egypt
173,873
TCNs arriving in Egypt
89,681
TCNs crossing into other African country
130,600
All crossing into Algeria
13,962
Refugees by boat reaching Italy or Malta
27,465
TOTAL
1,203,982
Sources: [row 1], Fargues and Fandrich (2012); Aghazarm et al. (2012)

However, these figures are not conclusive. In particular, there are claims that out of the
estimated two million Egyptians working in Libya, some 800,000 returned (Hafez and Ghaly,

2012: 8): it is very difficult to confirm or disprove the larger number, since the figure of
173,000 is from IOM records which may well be incomplete owing to the extreme
circumstances of war.21 Regardless, it is evident that the Libyan crisis has had a significant
impact on neighbouring countries with both loss of employment and return of their
nationals (plus Libyan refugees) into their labour markets. With the stabilization of a new
regime in Libya, oil production has resumed and other economic sectors such as
construction, agriculture, retail, private security and domestic work are again flourishing
(Attir, 2012). Irregular immigration (along with authorized recruitment) has resumed and
has been increasing; the use of Libya as a transit country for irregular migration to Europe
has also resumed, with much weaker state structures to detect and control it than had
existed under Gadafi.
A year later, and the Syrian crisis has also led to massive flows of refugees, mostly
Syrian but also some immigrants. The number is officially put at just over one million, but
informed sources indicate that it is actually over two million already (and likely to increase).
The impact , as with Libya, is primarily on its neighours Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.
Whereas Turkey has maintained some degree of control, by establishing refugee camps on
its border with Syria (and the explicit hope that they will all return, in the not-too-distant
future), the flows into Lebanon and Jordan have been effected through an open border
policy, and less regulated. In particular, owing to the delicate political balance in Lebanon,
there are indications that the large refugee presence there is starting to upset political
stability (Van Vliet and Hourani, 2012). Jordan already has a substantial refugee population,
but not such a fragile political scene as Lebanon. The impact there is more likely to be
financial and economic, with ramifications for Jordans utilization of its temporary labour
immigration schemes (such as that with Egypt).
The Arab Spring in the GCC countries has taken a different form, other than in
Bahrain where civil uprising has been brutally suppressed by Bahraini and Saudi Arabian
forces, with the implicit support of the USA and the EU. Elsewhere, there are serious worries
about socio-political stability especially with very youthful populations in the context of
increased indigenous labour forces and rising unemployment alongside immigrant presence
in the labour market of 5094%. Youth (15-24) employment rates in the GCC ranged in 2010
from 11% in Saudi Arabia to 43% in the UAE, with only Qatar achieving a high level of 67%;
these compare with a world average of 52% (ICAEW 2013). In this context, there is some
agreement by expert commentators that GCC governments have decided in practice (but
not officially) to abandon their previous nationalization policies and instead to
21

The return of 200800,000 persons to Egypt might be expected to impact on labour force and
unemployment levels. Quarterly labour force survey data 20092012 (CAPMAS data) show a massive increase
in male unemployment on 31/3/2011 (up to 9.0%, from 4.8% on 31/12/2010). This was caused entirely by loss
of male employment; an increase of the male labour force in the third quarter of 300,000 was entirely offset
by an identical increase in male employment. This would suggest that the return of skilled workers from Libya
had no impact on unemployment levels, and that the loss of employment earlier in 2011 was a direct result of
the Egyptian revolution and its economic impact. It also implies that the number of returning Egyptians was no
more than 200,000 confirming the IOM estimates.

concentrate on reducing the unemployment of their educated youth and improve general
living standards (e.g. Winckler 2012: 10). In order to achieve this, most of the GCC have set
record budgets in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and Dubai focusing on public sector
employment increases in areas such as education and healthcare (ICAEW 2013). Although
these measures are targeted at indigenous employment creation, they will have a significant
knock-on effect of large increases in imported labour.

Implications for bilateral and multilateral migration agreements

with destination countries
Here, I set out three propositions derived from the above evidence, along with their
secondary consequences.
Proposition 1
The future for mass unskilled labour migration from MENA is bleak
From the Maghreb countries, unskilled labour has been quite successfully absorbed by
Spain and Italy over the last decade or more. There is little chance that it can resume in
the medium term. For Egypt, the principal route for unskilled labour has been a recent
success story the 2007 revised labour agreement with Jordan. Remittances from Jordan
in 2011 were astonishingly high at $2.66billion, and presumably came from a very large
stock of temporary unskilled workers. This arrangement is now under threat owing to the
influx of refugees from Syria and regional instability.
Two logical consequences arise from this prognosis. First, is that in the context of
very high youth unemployment and poor economic growth, irregular emigration from
North Africa (which has been at very low levels for several years) may take off again. The
second consequence is that skilled emigration is likely to be perceived as the only way
into employment, resulting in increased youth demand in MENA for education and
training.
Proposition 2
Intra-regional labour migration will increase in importance
The Maghreb countries can no longer rely on Europe not even France as recipients of
excess labour supply, owing to the severe economic crisis of the European Union. Limited
opportunities for skilled migration to North America are likely to continue, but the region
with strong economic growth and need for immigrant labour is the GCC. The Maghreb
will therefore be obliged to follow the pattern of the Mashreq, and look more to the GCC
countries. Currently, most opportunities are for skilled and highly skilled workers in the
GCC countries, as all GCC countries recruit unskilled labour almost entirely from Asia.

The former role of Libya as a major employer of both skilled and unskilled labour is
returning, but its management is questionable. The previous informality of labour
migration into the country may well continue, and political stability is still uncertain.
A secondary issue is that of management of the intra-regional flows. The Arab world
outside of the GCC (the Maghreb and Mashreq) has not participated in the Abu Dhabi
Dialogue established in 2008, and is not covered by the 2012 Framework of Regional
Collaboration. There is now the paradox that Asian workers in the GCC may end up with
more protection alongside better organized recruitment mechanisms than are available
to Arab workers. This is a serious deficit of political management and something that
could be taken up by the Arab Labor Organization, amongst others.
In particular, the
provisions of the Framework are very positive steps toward better management of
temporary labour immigration and protection of migrants rights.
Proposition 3
Continuation of the EU security regime concerning migration, alongside migration for
youth education, training and short-term work experience
The EU will doubtless continue to clamp down on irregular migration especially as
southern labour markets are no longer able to absorb foreign workers. As far as skilled
migration is concerned, the EU Blue Card is such a poorly formulated policy unable to
compete with either North America or the GCC that its take-up will be largely irrelevant
(Baldwin-Edwards 2009). Another poorly formulated EU policy that of circular migration
is likely to be abandoned as a meaningless piece of political jargon. Circular migration in
practice consists of attributes that the EU would never consider desirable such as
informal labour markets and ease of border crossing (Fakhoury 2010). The European
policy approach seems merely to be an attempt to appease far right opponents of
immigration, rather than to effectively manage labour market needs. Circular migration
(other than seasonal labour migration) is not a serious policy option for MENA-EU flows.
Replacing these failed policies, there is already some attempt being made to provide
education and training routes for MENA youth to go to EU countries. It is possible that
these would be extended to include limited work experience, in addition to training.
These could provide useful mechanisms for economic development and skills utilization
in MENA countries, although many other structural failings also need to be addressed.

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