[G.R. No. 127876.

December 17, 1999]

ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL
AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and
DEPARTMENT
OF
AGRARIAN
REFORM
ADJUDICATION
BOARD, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas.This land
is covered by Tax Declaration.
The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C. Aquino. In February
1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional Constitution. As head of the
provisional government, the President exercised legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened
under a new Constitution.[1] In the exercise of this legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987,
Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229
providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the program.
On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from
the President.[2] This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later
placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Issue:

whether this Court can take cognizance of this petition despite petitioners failure to exhaust administrative
remedies

Held:

Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence.[91] Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioners application
for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power
to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from
the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.

Finally, we stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in
the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOAs already issued to
the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has
yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses
in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries
in 1993.[92] Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. [93] It goes against
the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of
the land they till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of
the land.
Dar vs Sutton
162070
Oct 19, 2005
PUNO, J.:
Facts:

On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the
government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1] their landholdings to petitioner
DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage
farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate,
inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and
breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the
CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS
and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection
therewith.[4] Petitioner ignored their request.

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,[5] which provided that
only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as
of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider
as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their
entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.[6]
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an
Order[7] partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of
CARL.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding
should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of
petitioner DAR.[10]
Issue:
Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention

limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is valid?

Held:
we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the
1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising.
it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions
of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must
conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an
administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails.[22] The assailed
A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the
coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.

[G.R. No. 100091. October 22, 1992.]

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR.

LEONARDO A. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ALVIN OBRIQUE,
REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS
ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO), respondents.

DECISION

CAMPOS, JR., J :
p

Facts:
The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the
estate located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at
Marilag, Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public demand for an agricultural school
in Mindanao. It expanded into the Bukidnon National Agricultural High School and was
transferred to its new site in Managok near Malaybalay, the provincial capital of Bukidnon.
the school embarked on self-help measures to carry out its educational objectives,
train its students, and maintain various activities which he government appropriation could not
adequately support or sustain. In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a
livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources
of the University were leased to its faculty and employees.
The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed.
Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can
project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged
harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the
complaint.
On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents
were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP.
Issue:
Whether the DARAB has the authority to order the segregation of a portion of a private
property titled in the name of its lawful owner, even if the claimant is not entitled as a
beneficiary?
Held:

The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform.

In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not share tenants or lease
holders of the CMU, yet it ordered the "segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous
area of Four Hundred Hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and directed
the DAR Regional Director to implement its order of segregation. Having found that the
complainants in this agrarian dispute for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to
claim as beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not share tenants or leaseholders, its
order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was without legal authority. We do
not believe that the quasi-judicial function of the DARAB carries with it greater authority than
ordinary courts to make an award beyond what was demanded by the
complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian dispute. Where the quasi-judicial body finds that
the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an
erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be
awarded to future beneficiaries.

G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and
HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili,
Camarines Sur, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION),
ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, Respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
Facts:
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial
Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in
order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government
employees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for
their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized
the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the
amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private
respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of
possession in an order dated January18, 1990.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were
denied in the order dated February 1990.c

Issue:
whether or not theProvince of Camarines Sur has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings
under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337)?
Held:

Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section

9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local
government, units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land
Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use,
before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise,
there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which
expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government
units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Roxas and company inc vs damba nfsw

G.R. No. 149548
December 4, 2009
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Facts:
Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in
the Municipality ofNasugbu, Batangas
On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and
took over legislative power from the President. This Congress passed Republic Act
No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.
Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with
respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to
the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed
under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL.
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its President,
Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of
Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly

authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to

non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it
was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other
uses.

Issue:
Whether or not THE CLOAs ISSUED BY THE DAR in ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE NO. A-9999-008-98 SUBJECT OF G.R. No. 179650 TO THE FARMERBENEFICIARIES INVOLVING THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN HACIENDA
PALICO MUST BE CANCELLED?
Held:
There is no logical recourse except to cancel the CLOAs issued for the nine parcels of
land which are portions of TCT No. 985 covering 45.9771 hectares in Hacienda Palico (or
those covered by DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98). As for the rest of the
CLOAs, they should be respected since Roxas & Co., as shown in the discussion in G.R. Nos.
167540, 167543 and 167505, failed to prove that the other lots in Hacienda Palico and the other
two haciendas, aside from the above-mentioned nine lots, are CARP-exempt.
Conformably, Republic Act No. 3844 (R.A. No. 3844), as amended,[42] mandates that
disturbance compensation be given to tenants of parcels of land upon finding that (t)he
landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning
Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes.[43] In addition, DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994 directs the payment of disturbance
compensation before the application for exemption may be completely granted.
Roxas & Co. is thus mandated to first satisfy the disturbance compensation of affected
farmer-beneficiaries in the areas covered by the nine parcels of lands in DAR AO No. A-9999008-98 before the CLOAs covering them can be cancelled. And it is enjoined to strictly follow
the instructions of R.A. No. 3844.

Ros, et al. vs DAR, et al.G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land. By virtue of a MunicipalOrdinance, these lands
were reclassified as industrial lands. As part of their preparation for thedevelopment of the subject lands as an
industrial park, petitioners secured all the necessary permits andappropriate government certifications.However,
the DAR disallowed the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed thepetitioners to cease
and desist from further developments on the land.Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Injunction with
Application for TemporaryRestraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. However, the RTC, ruling
that it is the DAR whichhas jurisdiction, dismissed the complaint.When the case was brought to the SC, it was
referred to the CA. However, the CA affirmed thedismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAR has the primary jurisdiction over the case.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive AgrarianReform Program,
agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is
vested in the DAR.The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to
or disapprove
applicationsfor conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural
pursuantto Section 4(i) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under
certain conditions, the reclassification orconversion of agricultural lands.It being settled that jurisdiction over
conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the complaint forinjunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and
appellate courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the
courts from resolving a controversy overwhich jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. Foragrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR); morespecifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
2. Whether or not the RTC can issue a writ of injunction against the DAR.
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No injunction, restrainingorder,
prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of AgrarianReform (DAR),
the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program

RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB

,
petitioner
,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE ofthe [CAR] RTC, Branch 4, Iligan
City, and SPOUSES DOMINGO and EUGENIA MARTIL
,
respondents

.Topic:Jurisdiction
Facts:
1.Petitioners (Runa and her now deceased husband) were tenants of a land owned by theprivate respondents (sps
Domingo). They led an action in the RTC of Lanao Del Nortefor damages when they claim that they were
unlawfully disposed of the property.2.The RTC dismissed the case ruling that it no longer has
jurisdiction over agrarian caseswhich was transferred to the DAR. The CA (after being referred by it from the SC)armed
the RTC decision.
Issue:Was the dismissal proper (who has jurisdiction over agrarian cases)?
Decision:

Petition is denied.
o
RA 665 investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with origicnal jurisdiction,generally, over all cases
involving agrarian laws,the Department of AgrarianReform with original jurisdiction, generally, over all
cases involving agrarianlaws. Sec 50 specically provides: Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. TheDAR is
hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicateagrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over allmatters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those fallingunder the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
[DA] and theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources *DENR+.

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA),

petitioner,vs.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010Topic:Dierence between exemption, conversion & reclassication
Facts:1.The Sec of Agrarian issue several DAR administrative orders (AO) 07-97 and 01-99 regarding theconversion of
agricultural lands to non-agricultural lands which includes among other things (1)those to be converted to residential,
commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes. After the issuance of these orders, several
orders where again issuedamending some provisions of the earlier issued orders.2.To address the
unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, theSecretary of Agrarian
Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 (along with AO No. 05-07amending AO 01-02)on 15 April 2008, which
temporarily suspended the processing and approvalof all land use conversion applications.3.The petitioner
led a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporaryrestraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction) due to their claim of actual slow down ofhousing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the
housing shortage, unemployment and illegalsquatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner
and its members butmore so of the whole nation. The petitioners contention:a.When the DAR Sec issued the
said order, in eect it included lands reclassied under RA6657 from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or

other non-agriculturaluses after 15 June 1988 TO BE agricultural

lands for purposes of conversion,redistribution, or otherwise. The Secretary
of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdictionas he has no authority to expand or enlarge the legal signication of the
term agriculturallands through DAR AO No. 01-02. Being a mere administrative issuance, it must conformwith the
statute.
Issue:
In relation to reclassication of lands : WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTIONOVER LANDS THAT HAVE
BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL,OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES?
Decision:

The petition was dismissed. SC ruled in favor of the DAR Sec:

The petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
The instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in essence, it seeks thedeclaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR

AO. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a Petition for Declaratory Relief over which thisCourt has
only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.
The DAR Sec did not act any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himselfany performance of judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogative which a requisite for any actionof grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The DAR Secissued the orders in order to implement the land use conversion provisions of
RepublicAct No. 6657. Issuance was done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrativefunctions.
Executive Order No. 129-A authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove theconversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agriculturaluses. Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same executive order has
given the DAR theexclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural
lands forresidential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by law.The DAR Sec
acted within the scope of his authority when it dened what isagricultural land (lands not reclassied as
residential, commercial, industrial or othernon-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use
conversion)

Fortochi vs corona
Background facts: On October 1997, alleged farmer-beneficiaries commenced a hunger strike in front ofthe Department
of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City. They protested the decision of the Office ofthe President (OP) dated
March 29, 1996 which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land fromagricultural to agro-industrial/institutional
area. Note that this decision already became final and executory.

The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by NQSRMDC (NorbertoQuisumbing Sr. Management and
Development Corp). It was leased as a pineapple plantation toDel Monte.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became interested in the property, and enacted anordinance converting
the said land to industrial/institutional with a view to attract investors inorder to achieve economic vitality.

Apparently, land conversion issues need to go through the Department of Agrarian Reform. TheDAR rejected the land
conversion and instead opted to put the same under CARP and ordered thedistribution of the property to the farmers.

The case reached the OP. The OP rendered a decision reversing the DAR and converting the landto agro-indusrial area,
which became the subject of the strike of the farmers.
The hunger strike was dramatic and well-publicized which commanded nationwide attention that
even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for their cause.

These events led the OP, through then Deputy Exec. Sec. Corona, to issue the socalled Win Win
Resolution,
substantially modifying its earlier Decision (see decision dated March 29, 1996) after it hadalready become final and
executory.

It modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and
ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed toqualified farmer-beneficiaries.

The Supreme Court, in their decision dated April 24, 1998, ruled for Fortich and company and declared that
the Win
Win Resolution is VOID and of no legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996 resolution
of the OP already became final and executory.

ALERT

This is where the issue relevant to our topic arose: Aggrieved, respondents Corona and Garilaofiled [separate]
motions for reconsideration
for the said ruling (separate MRs pero rinesolve ng Courtthrough one resolution).

The Court, in their Resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998, voted

TWO-TWO
on the separate MRs filed by Corona and Garilao assailing the April 24, 1998 Decision.

Hence, this motion. The respondents pray that this case be referred to the Court
en banc
. They contend thatinasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were
resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met. Consequently, thecase
should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision:

Art. 8, Sec. 4 (3) Cases

or
matters

heard by a division shall be

decided
or
resolved
with theconcurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issuesin the case
and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of suchMembers. When the required
number is not obtained, the
case
shall be
decided en banc
:Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.

Issue/Held:
Whether or not the aforementioned resolution of the Court (the resolution addressing the MR, whereinthe justices
voted 2-2) should be referred to the Court
en banc

NO.
Ratio:

A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the framers to
draw a distinction
between CASES and MATTERS.
CASES are
decided
.

MATTERS, which inc

lude motions, are
resolved
.

Otherwise put, the word decided must refer to cases; while the word resolved must refer tomatters, applying
the rule of
reddendo singula singulis
.
o

This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but alsoof the other provisions of
the Constitution where these words appear.

With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en bancfor decision
whenever the required number of votes is not obtained.

Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in theresolution of a
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaksonly of
case and not matter.

The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by adivision. If there
is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is torefer it to the Court en banc.
o

On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files amotion for
reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in thevoting does not leave the case
undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view ofthe failure of the members of the division to muster the
necessary vote for its reconsideration.

Quite plainly,
if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decisionis not reconsidered and must
therefore be deemed affirmed.
Such was the ruling of this Court in theResolution of November 17, 1998.