POLICE POWER

Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30 September 1982]

Old taxis maybe phased out
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 2 concur in the result
Facts:
On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issued Memorandum Circular 77-42 which phases
out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region having
year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, the Director of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional
Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capital Region (NCR),
to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and
accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phaseout in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of
model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including
its members Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao, filed a petition with the BT (Case
80-7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and
operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models
which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for
operation. On 16 February 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the BT a "Manifestation and Urgent
Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28
November 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to
Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than 10 December
1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the
protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. TOMMI, et.
al., through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups ofthe case, but was later informed that the
records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, TOMMI, et. al., instituted a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order with
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Memorandum Circular 77-42, phasing out 6-year old taxicabs and older, is a valid administrative
issuance.
Held:
Presidential Decree 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable
standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed,
observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. The overriding consideration in the
issuance of Memorandum Circular 77-42 is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers
posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit
all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even
if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Dispensing with a public
hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is not violative of procedural due process. Previous notice
and hearing is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future
conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. It is impractical to subject
every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation to determine its road-worthiness, not to speak of the
fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and

corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and
justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by
that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They
are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially
considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight
hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due
process has been met.

Velasco v. Villegas [GR L-24153, 14 February 1983]

Ordinance prohibits any operator of barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers in any
adjacent room to forestall possible immorality.
En Banc, Fernando (J): 10 concur, 1 reserving vote, 1 took no part
Facts:
Ordinance 4964 was issued by the city of Manila prohibiting any operator of any barbershop to conduct
the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room(s) of said barber shop, or in
any room(s) within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the
barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person. Tomas Velasco, Lourdes
Ramirez, Sy Pin, Edmundo Unson, Apolonia Ramirez, and Lourdes Lomibao, as component members of
the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association, filed petition for declaratory relief with the lower court,
challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance as it allegedly amounts to a deprivation of property of
their means of livelihood without due process of law. The petition was denied by the lower court as its
availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. Hence,
the appeal.
Issue: Whether Ordinance 4964 is a valid police power measure.
Held:
The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for
engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an
entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to
forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of
customers."
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. It has made
clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in statutory form the police power to a
municipality. The clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation
to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such is the progressive
view of Philippine jurisprudence and it has continued to be.

Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January 1984]

LOI restricting the use of heavy vehicles during stated days and hours as a fuel-saving measure is
justified under the police power.
En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 took no part
Facts:
Letter of Instruction 869 was issued on 31 May 1979 to respond to the protracted oil crisis dating back to
1974, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and holidays from 12

am Saturday to 5:00 am Monday, or 1 am of holiday to 5:00 am of the day after the holiday; but
exempting service, truck, diplomatic, consular corps, and tourist cars. Pursuant thereto, Alfredo L. Juinio,
then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and Romeo P. Edu, then
Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued on 11 June 1979, Memorandum Circular 39,
which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of
the above-specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Memorandum Circular 39 does
not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense that
of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for ninety days whichever is
longer. Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista questioned the validity of LOI 869 and MC 39
through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether LOI 869 and Memorandum Circular 39, banning certain vehicles from using the motorways in
specified time, are constitutional and/or valid.
Held:
A regulatory measure enjoys a presumption of constitutionality or a presumption that such an act falls
within constitutional limitations. When a questioned statute deals with a subject clearly within the scope
of the police power, and which is asked to be declare void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute. Herein, as to LOI 869, the determination of the mode and manner through which
the objective of minimizing the consumption of oil products and measures conducive to energy
conservation (require and establish taxi stands equipped with efficient telephone and communication
systems; strict implementation and observance of cargo truck hours on main arteries; strict observance of
traffic rules; effective solution of traffic problems and decongestion of traffic through rerouting and quick
repair of roads and efficient operation of double decker buses; rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying
and give the private car owner the option and responsibility of deciding on the use of his allocation; allow
neon and electrically devised advertising signs only from five o'clock p.m. to nine o'clock p.m.; prohibit
immediately the importation of heavy and luxury cars and seriously re-examine the car manufacturing
program) are left to the discretion of the political branches. The question before the Court is limited to
whether or not LOI 869 as implemented by MC 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. On the
other hand, as to MC 39, while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the
conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a
vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of MC 39 would be ultra vires. It must
likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the
procedure required by law.

Tablarin v. Gutierrez (J) [GR 78164, 31 July 1987]

The NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have
initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education is a valid police power
measure. (see also DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572. Dec. 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 533)
En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur
Facts:
Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into
colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did
not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical
Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987,

Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or
successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985
[which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a
certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school
year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT
and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the
petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a
Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge
denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee
for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.
Held:
No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of
1959" defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education;
(b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed
certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take
appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish
to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify
under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." The regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those
Del Rosario v. Bengzon [GR 88265, 21 December 1989]
The Generics Act implements the constitutional mandate for the State to protect and promote the right to
health of the people and to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost.
En Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 12 concur, 2 concur in result
Facts:
On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its publication, as
provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order 62 was amended by
Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the effectivity of the
sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act and
Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national
organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of
kindred persuasion, filed a class suit requesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal)
of the Generics Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant thereto as

unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The petition was captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over
which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, the
Court decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead.
Issue:
Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of similar import in
their prescription in the Generics Act is a lawful regulation.
Held:
Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it implements the constitutional
mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II
and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no
substitution" and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the
circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the brand name and its
generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his
prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with "no substitution," the
patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent would thereby be
curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still
developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority.