FPIF Task Force on Terrorism

A Secure America in a Secure World

Principal Author: John Gershman

Task Force Members

Robert Alvarez Salih Booker
Elsbeth L. Bothe John Cavanagh
Marcus Corbin David Cortright
Kristen Dawkins Lloyd J. Dumas

Rev. Dr. Robert W. Edgar

John Feffer Van Gosse
William D. Hartung

Colleen Kelly Michael Klare

Lawrence J. Korb Jules Lobel
Robert K. Musil, PhD, M.P.H.

Col. Dan Smith (Ret.) Joe Stork

Joe Volk Bruce Zagaris
John Zavales Stephen Zunes

Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF)

w w w. f p i f . o r g

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FOREIGN POLICY

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2004 by Foreign Policy In Focus / Interhemispheric Resource Center
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A New Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. Strengthen Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. Strengthen International and National Legal Systems to Hold Terrorists Accountable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
C. Defend and Promote Democracy at Home and Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
D. Attack Root Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Changing Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

II. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
III. A Failed Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A. Overemphasis on Military Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B. Failure in Intelligence Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C. Undermining Democracy and Civil Liberties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
D. Undermining Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
E. Weakening International Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
F. Failure to Attack Root Causes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

IV. A New Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

A. Strengthen Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Improve Intelligence Gathering and Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2. Strengthen Border Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. Protect Critical Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. Support Emergency Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5. Prevent Terrorists from Obtaining Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B. Strengthen International and National Legal Systems to Hold Terrorists Accountable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
C. Defend and Promote Democracy at Home and Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
D. Attack Root Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1. Strengthen and Democratize International Bodies for Effective Global Governance: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2. End Support for Repressive Regimes: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3. Deal with Failed States: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4. Reorient U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Central Asia: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5. Address Poverty and Inequality: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6. Promote Clean Energy:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

V. Changing Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
App. 1: Funding for Counterterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
App. 2: Major U.N. Conventions Against Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
App. 3: U.N. Security Council Resolutions Regarding Terrorism Post-September 11, 2001. . . . . . . . 47
Foreign Policy In Focus Task Force on Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
p. i

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I. Executive Summary
The Bush administrations war on terrorism
reflects a major failure of leadership and makes
Americans more vulnerable rather than more secure.
The administration has chosen a path to combat terrorism that has weakened multilateral institutions
and squandered international goodwill. Not only has
Bush failed to support effective reconstruction in
Afghanistan, but his war and occupation in Iraq have
made the United States more vulnerable and have
opened a new front and a recruiting tool for terrorists
while diverting resources from essential homeland
security efforts. In short, Washingtons approach to
homeland security fails to address key vulnerabilities,
undermines civil liberties, and misallocates resources.
The administration has taken some successful steps
to counter terrorism, such as improved airline and
border security, a partial crackdown on terrorist
financing, improved international cooperation in
sharing intelligence, the arrest of several high-level alQaida figures, and the disruption of a number of
planned attacks. But these successes are overwhelmed
by policy choices that have made U.S. citizens more
rather than less vulnerable. The Bush White House
has undermined the very values it claims to be
defending at home and abroaddemocracy and
human rights; both Washingtons credibility and its
efforts to combat terrorism are hampered when it
aids repressive regimes. Furthermore, the administration has weakened the international legal framework
essential to creating a global effort to counter terrorism, and it has failed to address the political contextsfailed states and repressive regimesthat
enable and facilitate terrorism.
Six factors explain the failure of the Bush administrations approach:
A. Overemphasis on Military Responses: The Bush
administration has used everyones legitimate concerns about terrorism to justify a massive increase
in military spending that has little or nothing to
do with combating terrorism. According to the
Center for Defense Information, only about onethird of the increase in the FY2003 Pentagon
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budget over pre-Sept. 11 budgets funds programs

and activities closely related to homeland security
or counterterrorism operations. In addition, by
enshrining preventive war in the national security
strategy both as a general policy doctrine and for
countering terrorism in particular, the administration has further reduced everyones security.
B. Failure in Intelligence Sharing: The White House
has failed to develop better mechanisms to share
critical information both among intelligence agencies
and between federal and local agencies. The recently created Terrorist Threat Intelligence Center is
unaccountable to Congress and fails to place the
coordination of intelligence gathering in the hands
of those who must act on the findings.
C. Undermining Democracy and Civil Liberties: The
Bush administration has undermined democracy
at home through increased government secrecy.
On the civil liberties front, the USA PATRIOT
Act imposes guilt by association on immigrants,
expands the governments authority to conduct
criminal searches and wiretaps, and undermines
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of
Rightsnone of which have proved necessary or
effective in tracking down terrorists.
D.Undermining Homeland Security: Bushs approach
to homeland security has two key flaws. First, his
administration has been far too laissez-faire in its
approach to ensuring the security of the 85 percent of the nations critical infrastructure owned or
controlled by the private sector. Second, it has
failed to meet the basic needs of emergency
responders, has underfunded key national agencies
like the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection, and has created new
unfunded mandates for local governments, forcing
them to transfer scarce funds from social services
and public safety to homeland security tasks.
E. Weakening International Institutions: The Bush
administration has been hostile to a whole set of
multilateral institutions that are central to enhancing international law and security, from the
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International Criminal Court to nearly all multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts,
including the Biological and Chemical Weapons
Conventions, the ABM Treaty, and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

and the folly of traditional responsestypically militaryto threats against U.S. citizens.

America needs a new agenda for combating terrorism,

one that secures citizens against attacks and that
situates the use of force within an international legal
F. Failure to Attack Root Causes: The Bush White
and policy framework. This agenda must bring internaHouse has failed to address
tional terrorists to justice,
the root causes of internadebilitate their capacity to
tional terrorism and the
wage terrorism, and undersocial and political conThe 9/11 Commission recommendations, mine the political credibility
texts in which such terrorof terrorist networks by
while important, remain inadequate
ism thrives, including
addressing related political
to forging the comprehensive strategy
repressive regimes, failed
grievances and injustices.
necessary to effectively combat terrorism. Below, we outline a four-part
states, and the way in
which poverty and
framework for a new agenda
inequality can create conto counter terrorism.
ditions of support for terrorist acts. Addressing the basic causes and condiA. Strengthen Homeland Security
tions that facilitate terrorism in no way implies
To do this, the emphasis needs to be on preventing
appeasement. Rather, it reflects both a pragmatic
terrorist attacks and mitigating the effects of terrorist
commitment to diffuse terrorisms political roots
violence. Specific initiatives should:
and a normative commitment to respect the values
the United States preaches. Yet, heedless to the
Improve Intelligence Gathering and Oversight: The
time bomb of widening global wealth disparity,
coordination of intelligence gathering related to
the Bush administration has taken advantage of
domestic security should be based within the
the crisis surrounding the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks
Department of Homeland Security, since this is
to justify its pursuit of an expanded trade and
the agency responsible for acting on the informainvestment liberalization agenda. This agenda fails
tion. The CIAcurrent home of the Terrorist
to address the central challenges of reducing
Threat Intelligence Centerhas proven unable to
poverty and inequality and of promoting sustaincoordinate well with other intelligence agencies.
able growth in developing countries.
The key issue facing the improvement of domestic
counterterrorism intelligence capabilities does not
involve a choice of organizational form (i.e.,
A New Framework
boosting the FBIs capabilities or creating a new
A different approach would not fight a war on terdomestic intelligence body) but rather an effort to
rorism. Rather, it would treat terrorism as an ongoreinstate civil liberties and reinforce judicial and
ing threat that needs to be tackled through a strong,
congressional oversight of intelligence operations.
coordinated strategy focused on strengthening civilian
Strengthen Border Security: Adequately fund key borpublic sectors and enhancing the international coopder security programs and agencies such as the
eration necessary to prevent and respond to terrorist
Container Security Initiative, the Coast Guard,
attacks. Although the military has a clear role to play,
and the Bureau of Customs and Border
it is a supporting actor in the fight against terrorism
Protection.
and Washington must restructure the military in
Protect Critical Infrastructure: It is essential that govways that enhance its capacities to respond to the
ernment step up security for critical infrastructure,
threat posed by international terrorism. The safety
especially regarding:
challenge of terrorism exposes the weakness of
Washingtons conventional ideas of national security
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 Nuclear Power Plants: Spent reactor fuel pools

at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants represent potentially the most consequential vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The most
important step that can be taken to significantly reduce this vulnerability is to learn
from several European nations that have
placed all spent fuel older than five years into
thick-walled, dry storage modes.
The Chemical Industry: The Department of
Homeland Security needs to establish and
enforce minimum requirements for the
improvement of security and the reduction of
potential hazards at chemical plants and other
industrial facilities that store large quantities
of hazardous materials.
Food and Agriculture Safety: There is a need
for a comprehensive national plan both to
defend against the intentional introduction of
biological agents in an act of terror and to
create a network of laboratories to coordinate
the detection of bioterror agents in the event
of an attack.
Information Technology: There are numerous
serious proposals to better secure information
technology in virtually all of the nations critical infrastructure, from the air-traffic-control
system to aircraft themselves, from the electric-power grid to financial and banking systems, and from the Internet to communication systems.
Support Emergency Responders: In addition to improving emergency preparedness plans, the administration needs to provide training, equipment, and
increased support to all levels of government to
strengthen emergency response capabilities by fire,
police, and rescue departments as well as public
health systems, all of which will be frontline emergency responders in case of a terrorist attack.
Prevent Terrorists from Obtaining Weapons: To prevent
terrorists from obtaining conventional or other
weapons of mass destruction, specific initiatives
should:
Strengthen International Conventions: There is a
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trol, nonproliferation, and elimination of

weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
End the National Missile Defense Program (also
known as Star Wars): The Sept. 11 attacks
highlight how imminent security threats are
posed not from missiles but from other types
of delivery systems. Combined with concerns
about the destabilizing effects of the missile
defense system and the false promise of security it offers, the United States should end
efforts to build a National Missile Defense
system and redirect those monies toward arms
control and disarmament efforts.
Control Weapons in Russia: There is a need for
increased funding for the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and other efforts to monitor and control weapons material in Russia
and the former Soviet Union.
B. Strengthen International and National Legal
Systems to Hold Terrorists Accountable
An effective response to terrorism requires bolstering the national and international legal infrastructure
necessary to identify and prosecute the individuals
and organizations that facilitate, finance, perpetrate,
and profit from terrorism.
Specific initiatives should:
Expand international police cooperation;
Adopt the Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction for prosecutions of crimes against
humanity;
Strengthen the institutions of international law by
supporting the creation of a specialized tribunal
for judging international terrorists; and,
Provide technical assistance to countries to implement all the recommendations of the Financial
Action Task Force with respect to money laundering and terrorist financing.
In those instances where military force is necessary
to combat nonstate actors like al-Qaida, working
through international institutions is justified on both
normative and pragmatic grounds. The use of force
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should require specific authorization from the United

Nations Security Council that includes specific goals
and a time line, and military operations would
preferably be under U.N. control. In any event, the
exercise of such force should adhere to international
humanitarian law and the principles of the just war
tradition.
C. Defend and Promote Democracy at Home
and Abroad
Antiterrorist efforts should not sacrifice the very
values that Americans are trying to defend.
Washington must listen closely to the mounting concerns of civil libertarians and constitutional rights
groups who caution that the new counterterrorism
campaign may lead to a garrison state that undermines all that America stands for while doing little to
protect citizens against unconventional threats. The
USA PATRIOT Act is perhaps the greatest threat to
civil liberties in the country today, and we applaud
the numerous states, cities, towns, and counties that
have passed resolutions demanding that local law
enforcement not implement the provisions of those
regulations that infringe on basic rights.
In forging international coalitions against terrorism,
the administration should strengthen restrictions on
the provision of military aid, weapons, and training
to regimes that systematically violate human rights.
Proactively, the White House and Congress should
more rigorously condition such programs on adherence to internationally recognized human rights standards. In addition, the United States should support
efforts to strengthen international legal and human
rights norms, conventions, and organizations and
should evaluate its own foreign policies in light of
those norms.
D. Attack Root Causes
Combating terrorism requires looking beyond any
one terrorist eventhorrific as it may beto address
the broader socioeconomic, political, and military
contexts from which international terrorism emerges.
Because terrorism is a particular kind of violent act
aimed at achieving a political objective, a preventive
strategy must address its political roots.
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U.S. policy must recognize a distinction between

international terrorism in general and the specific
threat posed by al-Qaida and other extremist Islamist
movements, so as not to be perceived as waging a war
on Islam. The 9/11 Commission Report, for example,
is careful to make such a distinction. This requires
that U.S. policymakers learn to distinguish between
illegitimate demands and legitimate demands pursued
through illegitimate means. The anti-democratic and
jihadist character of al-Qaidas ideology suggests that
even if the United States were to pursue the kinds of
alternative policies outlined here, Americans would
still be the target of attacks by committed members
of al-Qaida and similar groups. Addressing root causes is one way of insuring that terrorist group efforts
to mobilize support meet as inhospitable a social,
economic, and political climate as possible.
The success of these policies will only be fully realized
when there are no more breeding grounds for terrorist politics. These political contexts include: repressive
political regimes, which spawn terrorism; failed and
failing states, which can provide terrorists with arenas
for operations; poverty and inequality, which can
enhance support for terrorist acts and provide a
source of recruits, even though poverty itself does not
cause terrorism; and efforts by the United States to
institutionalize its positions of global dominance,
including through alliances with repressive regimes.
Specific initiatives should:
Strengthen and Democratize International Bodies for
Effective Global Governance: By proclaiming global
dominance as its overarching strategic objective,
the United States has made itself a target. Bushs
pursuit of the preventive war doctrine as the foundation of such dominanceembodied in the
invasion and occupation of Iraqcan be used to
justify the argument that the current war on terrorism is in fact a war on Islam. And
Washingtons current foreign policy has further
reinforced the beliefs of those who argue that the
United States is an imperial power intent on holding itself above the law.
In addition to strengthening the U.N. and other
multilateral institutions, the United States must
reconfigure its approach to security. We suggest a
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dual focus: on the cooperative arrangements necessary to insure our protection in an era of international terrorist networks with global reach, and
on deterrence against possible threats from state
antagonists. Such efforts require a vibrant network
of global, regional, and bilateral alliances whereby
the security of the world strengthens the security
of America.
End Support for Repressive Regimes: The United States
must, in both word and deed, make a clean break
with its history of support for repressive regimes
throughout the world. Such a move would entail
curbing military aid, expanding human rights and
democracy, and reducing the dependence of the
United States and its allies on oil imports from
repressive regimes. Additional steps would include:
(1) withholding military aid and opposing
weapons sales to countries that systematically violate basic human rights, and (2) increasing support for human rights and democracy in North
Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast
Asia, Colombia, and elsewhere through bilateral
and multilateral initiatives.
Deal with Failed States: The Afghanistan situation,
and the broader reality that weak and failing states
can provide enabling conditions for the operations
of terrorist networks, has highlighted the need for
increasing the U.N.s capacity to engage in peace
enforcement, peacekeeping, and other nationbuilding activities.
Reorient U.S Policy in the Middle East and Central
Asia: A broader U.S. policy along the lines of
respecting basic human rights and democratic
freedoms in the Middle East and elsewhere could
still contribute to easingthough not eradicatingthe conditions associated with terrorism.
Such efforts would involve eliminating weapons of
mass destruction and addressing the political
grievances behind continuing unrest in the region.
This includes opposing the bigotry embodied in
both al-Qaidas and other extremist groups opposition to Israels existence. The United States
should continue its strategic and moral commitment to Israeli sovereignty, but there is a distinction between Israels right to exist and support for
the occupation in the West Bank and Gaza.
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Washingtons tacit approval of the occupation

plays a major role in fueling anti-American
extremism, sentiments that al-Qaida has opportunistically used to its own advantage. Specific initiatives should:
End U.S. financial and military backing for the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza;
Advocate Palestinian self-determination and a
negotiated settlement as outlined in U.N.
Security Council resolutions;
Promote efforts to create a zone free from
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle
East;
Strengthen the multilateral forces involved in
Afghanistan to provide the security necessary
for reconstruction and development; and
Set an immediate timetable for the withdrawal
of U.S. troops from Iraq and channel support
primarily through the United Nations to promote reconstruction and development.
Address Poverty and Inequality: An expansion of
broad-based development can, under certain conditions, weaken local support for terrorist activities
and discourage terrorist recruits. Since approval of
some organizations engaged in terrorist acts is due
in part to the social services and financial incentives that those organizations provide, an expansion of economic opportunities can decrease direct
participation in those organizations or dampen
enthusiasm for their activities.
Development policies that weaken states capacities to insure access to, or provision of, basic services can create conditions in which terrorist
groups can more easily mobilize support. At the
global level, the Bush administration should end
its promotion of trade and investment agreements
that reinforce the discredited policies of the
Washington Consensus. Instead, the United States
should reorient discussions at bilateral, regional,
and global economic organizations and meetings
toward creating a multilateral framework more
conducive to the development of poor countries.
Washington should also reduce the debt owed to
it by developing countries, champion debt reducp. 5

tion efforts at the international financial institutions, and seek an end to structural adjustment
lending by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.
Promote Clean Energy: The United States should pursue an energy policy at home and abroad that
emphasizes conservation, energy efficiency, and
renewables and that makes itself and its allies less
reliant on imported oil supplies.

Changing Course
No single component of this framework is an adequate response to terrorism. Only by joining all four
strategiespursuing prevention and preparedness,
strengthening the international framework for multilateral action, defending and promoting civil rights,
and addressing root causeswill the U.S. government be able to truthfully tell the American people
that it is doing all that it can to prevent future terrorist attacks. Our proposed security strategy would be
more effective at making the U.S. a safer place for all
its citizens. It would also have the added advantages

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of improving the nations quality of life by improving

public safety, health care, and air quality.
The 9/11 Commission has accomplished a great
deal by placing this debate at the forefront of policy
debates. But its recommendations focus somewhat
narrowly on intelligence operations and congressional
oversight without addressing the broader foreign policy, military, and homeland security issues that are
equally important to constructing an effective
response to terrorism. Its contribution, while important, remains inadequate to forging the comprehensive strategy necessary to effectively combat terrorism.
The challenge is to construct a national security
policy that demonstrates Americas new commitment
to protecting U.S. citizens by incorporating effective
counterterror measures into the national security
strategy. At the same time, American citizens must
demand and U.S. foreign policy must assert a
renewed commitment to constructing an international framework of peace, justice, and security that locks
terrorists out in the coldwith no home, no supporters, no money, and no rallying cry. With that
response, the events of September 11, 2001, will
indeed have changed America and the world.

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II. Introduction
Everything changed on September 11, 2001, and
the United States will never be the same. This conventional wisdom has become a mantra, repeated
over and over again by the media, and it continues to
echo throughout America. The immediate aftermath
of Sept. 11 offered the United States and the Bush
administration a fateful choice. The Bush administration could have chosen a path to respond to terrorism that built upon a renewed sentiment of interest
in foreign policy, diplomacy, and international affairs
on the part of U.S. citizens and that leveraged the
spirit of international solidarity and goodwill toward
Americans that emerged in the immediate aftermath

of the attacks, represented most dramatically in the

famous Le Monde headline: Nous sommes tous
AmricainsWe are all Americans, now.
Nearly three years after the tragic and criminal
attacks, the Bush administration has clearly squandered that opportunity and chosen a path to combat
terrorism that has weakened multilateral institutions,
undermined the international legal architecture, and
transformed international support into growing antiAmerican sentiment. Its efforts in this area, despite its
avowed successes, reflect a major failure of leadership
andmore importantlyhave made Americans
more vulnerable rather than more secure.

Box 1: What Is Terrorism?

There is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism. Even U.S. government agencies use different definitions. For the purposes of this agenda, we adopted the definition of terrorism used by the Bush administration in its
Homeland Security Strategy: any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare that is intended
to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or governments. We consider this a useful definition, both because it captures the essence of what is involved in terrorist violence and because it is broad enough to include as terrorism acts
committed by states as well as nonstate groups. According to this definition, a whole range of nationsincluding the
United Statesand numerous international terrorist groups like al-Qaida have engaged in terrorist acts.
A consensus definition of terrorism has eluded even the U.S. government. The Pentagon, the FBI, the State
Department, and the Department of Homeland Security as well as key government policy documents all use different
definitions of terrorism, distinguished mainly by whether state agents are included. For example, the National Security
Strategy articulated in September 2002 defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against innocents. But the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism published in February 2003 adopts a version of
the State Department definition, which excludes states: premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense defines terrorism as the calculated use, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.
Finally, the USA PATRIOT Act, adopted in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, adds yet another definition of terrorism
to the U.S. criminal code (domestic terrorism) and amends three legal definitions of terrorism already on the books (federal terrorism, international terrorism, and terrorism transcending national borders). Section 802 of the PATRIOT Act
defines domestic terrorism as involving acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States, if the actors intent is to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion. This could be
used to define as terrorism a whole range of nonviolent forms of political activism and dissent.

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p. 7

III. A Failed Policy

After Sept. 11, 2001, Americans began to think of
national security in terms of ensuring their individual
safety and protecting the American homeland.
Suddenly, foreign policy and military policy became
not just about the U.S. role in global affairs but
about the security of Americans at home. Foreign
policy has entered popular consciousness in such a
way that it is no longer about distant lands and their
peoples but about U.S. families, homes, communities, and workplaces. For a short time, defense policy
was redefined as defending America and Americans
rather than as force projection. Moreover, there
remains a popular consensusdisregarded at the
upper levels of the Bush administrationthat international cooperation and multilateralism constitute
the only viable approach to preventing and combating terrorism. In other words, most Americans know
we cannot do it alone.
There exists no universally accepted definition of
terrorism, nor is there a single definition shared by
the U.S. government. The Bush administrations definition of terrorism (stated in its Homeland Security
Strategy) is adequate: any premeditated, unlawful act
dangerous to human life or public welfare that is
intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations
or governments. For the record, this means that
both states and nonstate entities can be guilty of
committing acts of terrorism. Also, by such a definition, the United States government and its allies have
already engaged in and supported acts of terrorism.1
Although most acts of terrorism are politically motivated, political grievances do not justify terrorism. All
acts of terrorism are crimes, and terrorists retain sole
responsibility for their actions. If a state of war existed, many activities would also be judged as violations
of the rules of war. Worldwide, the number of international terrorist attacks has declined in recent years
compared to the mid-1980s, but the lethality of such
attacks has increased. According to the Department
of State, the annual number of international terrorist
attacks peaked at 666 incidents in 1987 and had
declined to 348 by 2001, declining further to 208 in
2003. But the number of significant terrorist events
p. 8

(as defined by the State Department) in 2003 was

175, which represents a 20-year high. Casualties
resulting from international terrorist attacks during
2001 were the highest ever recorded3,572 persons
killed and 1,083 injured. (In 2003 the number of
people killed was 652). The terrorist attacks against
the United States on September 11, 2001, represented the most lethal international terrorist attack ever.
Since then, significant terrorist attacks (as classified
by the U.S. Department of State in its Pattern of
Global Terrorism) have increased.2
Why We Shouldnt Fight a
Global War on Terrorism
Unfortunately, the Bush administration has sustained
an emphasis on military responses to terrorism, framing the efforts as a global war on terrorism. This
declaration of war is a mistake for two reasons.
First, it is meaningless to say we are fighting a war
on terror. Terrorism is a particular type of political
violence. As former National Security Adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski noted, declaring a war on terror
is like declaring a war on blitzkrieg.3 It is more accurate to say that the United States is engaged in fighting a particular group of Sunni extremists. That
groupal-Qaida and its sympathizershas transformed itself into a dual identity: a cadre and a
movement.4 The cadre is still mostly at large and able
to communicate, plan, and mobilize support,
although less easily than before Sept. 11, 2001. The
movement is a geographically and politically diverse
network oriented around a common set of images
and rhetoric that numbers at least 18,000 according
to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.5
Second, many of the real successes in combating alQaida in the two years since Sept. 11, 2001, have
come from international cooperation on intelligence
and from police work and domestic investigations.
Warthe use of military forcehas been secondary
at best. In the case of the invasion and occupation of
Iraq, which is presented (falsely in our view) as part
of the global war on terrorism, it has been directly
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counterproductive. As the International Institute for

Strategic Studies notes, the impact on al-Qaida of the
war in Iraq has been to accelerate recruitment.6
The Bush administration has failed to provide a
compelling strategic vision that would unite
Americans and the world in an effort to combat terrorism.7 It has produced a wide array of strategy
papers dealing in whole or in part with terrorism,
such as the National Security Strategy, the Strategy to
Combat Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Strategy, Homeland Security Strategy, Maritime
Security Strategy, Critical Infrastructure Protection
Strategy, and Cyberspace Security Strategy. But
though these strategies identify goals, subordinate
objectives and specific activities, they generally do
not discuss or identify priorities, milestones, or performance measureselements that are desirable for
evaluating progress, obtaining results, and ensuring
effective oversight.8 In a report released just prior to
the Sept. 11 attacks, the General Accounting Office
noted that the federal government lacks a national
strategy to guide resource investment for combating
terrorism. That assessment still applies nearly three
years after the attacks, and as we discuss below, many
of the Bush administrations priorities in pursuing the
global war on terrorism have increased, rather than
decreased, our vulnerabilities.
Success and Failure
There have been some successes: improved airline
and border security, a crackdown on terrorist financing, improved international cooperation in sharing
intelligence, the arrest of high-level al-Qaida figures,
and the disruption of planned attacks. Also, the war
in Afghanistan succeeded in disorganizing the top
leadership of al-Qaida and in ousting the Taliban.
But some of these successes have come at high
costs, and the failures and weaknesses of the Bush
approach to combating terrorism appear to overwhelm the successes. The costs of the war on terrorism relative to democracy and domestic civil liberties
are paralleled by new alliances with repressive regimes
abroad. The administrations efforts to combat terrorism are hampered by the hypocrisy demonstrated
when it shelters perpetrators of state terrorism and
aids repressive regimes. Furthermore, the administrawww.fpif.org
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tion has weakened the international legal framework

essential to creating a multilateral effort to combat
terrorism, and it has failed to address the political
contextsfailed states, repressive regimesthat
enable and facilitate terrorism. Finally, the invasion
and occupation of Iraq resulted in the creation of a
new recruiting vehicle for al-Qaida while essential
homeland security measures are shelved due to the
ever-growing cost of this unnecessary and counterproductive war. The price tag so far for that misguided operation is $151 billion and rising.9 The U.S. is
simply on the wrong path when it comes to reducing
the threats posed by terrorists.
Six factors explain the failure of the
White Houses approach:

A. Overemphasis on Military Responses

First, the Bush administration has emphasized military responses to terrorism, framing the efforts as a
war on terrorism. And it has used legitimate concerns about terrorism to justify a massive increase in
military spending that has little or nothing to do
with combating terrorism. According to the Center
for Defense Information, only about one-third of the
increase in the Pentagons FY2003 budget (when
compared with pre-Sept. 11 budgets) appears to be
directed at programs and activities closely related to
homeland security or counterterrorism operations.10
The Pentagons spending priorities downplay nonmilitary approaches, even though many of the real
successes in combating al-Qaida in the two years
since the Sept. 11 attacks have come from international intelligence sharing and police work. By
enshrining preventive war as a policy doctrine in the
national security strategy in general and for combating terrorism in particular, the administration has
actually reduced rather than increased U.S. security in
several ways. For starters, it reinforces the image of
the United States as eager to use military force and
willing to do so without regard for international law
and legitimacy. This can make it more difficult for
the United States to gain international support for its
use of force, and it may lead others to resist U.S. foreign policy goals more broadly, including efforts to
fight terrorism. Advocating preemption also warns
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potential enemies to hide the very assets that

Washington might wish to take action against.
Finally, if the United States enshrines preemption as a
core policy doctrine, it legitimates its adoption by
other countries, which increases overall global instability and reduces security, as other countries are
emboldened to justify attacks on their enemies as preemptive in nature.

B. Failure in Intelligence Sharing

Second, the Bush administration has failed to facilitate the sharing of information among intelligence
agencies and between federal and local agencies. In
Congress Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community
Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001, the initial and final reports of
the independent 9-11 Commission clearly identified
the failure of intelligence agencies to connect the
dots and to share information between themselves.11
The Bush administration has responded by creating
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, coordinated
by the Director of Central Intelligence. The new
TTIC has several problems that will reduce its effectiveness and undermine accountability. Placed under
the authority of the DCI rather than under the secretary of homeland security, the TTIC is disconnected
from those with direct responsibility for safeguarding
homeland security. This impedes its ability to develop
an effective, integrated approach for countering the
terrorist threat to the United States. The TTIC also
lacks effective congressional oversight, since its director is appointed by the DCI without congressional
approval. Moreover, the FBI needs a massive overhaul
if it is to effectively coordinate domestic intelligence
operations, due to the fact that it remains at its core a
crime-fighting agency.
The failure of the TTIC to constitute an effective
response to terrorism is recognized by groups across
the political spectrum.12 It has already failed in two of
its most basic tasks: producing reliable data and sharing information with agencies responsible for implementing counterterrorist activities or monitoring the
performance of counterterrorism programs and policies. The fact that the Department of State had to
correct its Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003the first
p. 10

report whose data was gathered by the TTICdoes

not bode well for the collection of reliable intelligence
data. In addition, despite repeated requests, in early
2004 the TTIC had still not made available to the
Department of State and the Congressional Research
Service an unclassified version of its database.13

C. Undermining Democracy
and Civil Liberties
Third, the Bush administration has undermined
democracy at home by rolling back governmental
transparency in a manner that reduces accountability
and unnecessarily infringes on civil liberties. The
White House has impeded the investigation by the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States of the conditions that facilitated the
Sept. 11 attacks, it has failed to declassify important
documents regarding possible ties between Saudi
Arabian citizens and the Sept. 11 attackers, and it has
compromised the integrity of the Environmental
Protection Agency by pressuring it to alter its reports
on environmental health in lower Manhattan in the
aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks.
On the civil liberties front, Attorney General John
Ashcroft has demonstrated a consistent willingness to
spearhead what a broad range of citizen groups
from the American Civil Liberties Union to the
National Rifle Associationhave viewed as an intrusive and dangerous effort to expand the governments
ability to spy on its citizens. It was only with a broad
range of citizen mobilization that the most repressive
elements of the initial draft of the USA PATRIOT
Act were deleted from final legislation.
Some provisions of the act, such as those relating to
money laundering and aviation security, are laudable.
But as legal analysts David Cole and James Dempsey
have noted, the USA PATRIOT Act imposes guilt by
association on immigrants; authorizes executive
detention on the suspicion that an immigrant has at
some point engaged in a violent crime or provided
humanitarian aid to a proscribed organization; allows
the government to deny entry to aliens for pure
speech reasons, resurrecting a relic of the McCarthy
era; expands the governments authority to conduct
criminal searches and wiretaps without first showing
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probable cause that the subject is engaged in criminal

activity; sanctions secret searches in cases that have
nothing to do with terrorism; gives the CIA access to
the power of grand juries; reduces judicial oversight
of intrusive information-gathering activities; and
expands the access of the FBI to a broad range of
records.14 Finally, the Bush administration weakens
U.S. claims to support democracy and the rule of law
through its use of military commissions to try
enemy combatants.

D. Undermining Homeland Security

Fourth, current policy undermines domestic security. Despite some successes in improving airline and
border protection, the Bush administrations plan for
homeland security is flawed in both strategic
approach and resource allocation.
In addition to the unnecessary restriction of civil
liberties discussed above, the White House has unduly relied on immigration restrictions to address border security and has been lax in protecting critical
infrastructure, an estimated 85 percent of which is
owned or controlled by the private sector. The Bush
administration has taken a laissez-faire approach to
the private sectors role in homeland security, expecting that voluntary effortsrather than regulations
will be sufficient to achieve domestic safety objectives. But even in the absence of terrorist attacks, it is
clear that national security will not be provided
through voluntary initiatives alone, as demonstrated
by a series of system failures ranging from blackouts
in the Northeast in 2003 to recurring computer virus
outbreaks. As a classic public good, adequate security
cannot be produced by the market.15
On the resource side the Bush administration has
failed to meet the basic needs of emergency responders, has underfunded critical agencies like the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the
Coast Guard, and has created new unfunded mandates for local governments, forcing them to transfer
scarce funds from social services and public safety to
homeland security tasks. For example, only about
$750 million in federal funds apparently was directed
to the nations three million emergency responders in
2002 for training and equipment needed to react to
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terrorist attacks, although the administration had

promised $3.5 billion. There is also inadequate funding for basic services in the fight against terrorism.
For example, the administrations 2004 budget
included $2 billion in cuts from crime prevention
and public safety programs, and the proposed
FY2005 proposed budget cuts $805 million from
emergency responders over FY2004 levels.16
Moreover, the administrations anti-terrorism programs in the public health sector are not strengthening the public health infrastructure in an integrated
way but are instead creating new funding and program categories, exacerbating existing fragmentation.
For example the administration has diverted funds
from multipurpose infrastructure-building to singleagent preparedness (namely smallpox), according to
the Institute of Medicine. The focus on bioterrorism
has diverted state and local health departments from
other urgent public health work on a range of
issues.17 One report suggests that the diversion of
public health resources to instead focus on bioterrorism contributed to the worst outbreak of tuberculosis
in Seattle in 30 years.18

E. Weakening International Institutions

Fifth, White House posturing is weakening international institutions. The Bush administration has been
hostile to a whole set of multilateral institutions that
are central to enhancing global law and security, from
the International Criminal Court to nearly all multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts, including the Biological and Chemical Weapons
Conventions, the ABM Treaty, and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Strengthening these
agreements, however, represents one of the best
means of preventing access by terrorists to weapons
of mass destruction. Furthermore, the Bush administration has been unable or unwilling to demand
greater funding for bilateral WMD threat reduction
programs, which now total about $1 billion annually.
The Bush administrations campaign against the
International Criminal Court is a good example of
how to mobilize the political will to link other countrys positions on human rights issues with military
aid. The tragic dimension is that this linkage is servp. 11

ing to undermine rather than strengthen international law and is weakening U.S. claims to be a world
leader in the struggle for human rights. The revelations of torture and abuse in Afghanistan and at Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq, the efforts to unilaterally
exempt U.S. counterterror operations from the
Geneva Conventions, the return or transport of terrorists or other national security suspects to countries
where torture is a widespread or systematic problem,19 and the continued legal limbo of detainees in
Guantanamo all reflect a cavalier approach to global
human rights and international law. Such behavior
makes hypocrisy and double standards appear to be
the norm.

F. Failure to Attack Root Causes

Sixth, the Bush administration has failed to address
the root causes of terrorism and the social and political contexts in which terrorism thrives, such as failed
states, repressive regimes, and the role of poverty
global wealth inequality can create conditions of support for terrorist acts and can provide an environment for recruits, even though poverty doesnt cause
terrorism.
These strategic flaws are easily visible in the 2002
National Security Strategy, which recognizes that
America is now threatened less by conquering states
than we are by failing ones. However, the 2002 NSS
offers no vision of how to deal with failed or failing
states, let alone a concrete set of policies or programs
aimed at addressing the security challenges posed by
failed states. Administration officials are unwilling to
recognize a need for the kind of nation building
activities that they denigrated prior to the Sept. 11
attacks. Such efforts would require a more systematic
and constructive engagement with the United Nations
and with other countries, a redirection of resources
within the Pentagon toward various forms of peace
operations for the military, and an expansion of nonmilitary humanitarian and development programs.
At the national level, the Bush administrations
National Security Strategy identified failed states as a
critical U.S. security concern in part due to their
links with international terrorism and in part because
failed states harbor other global security threats such
p. 12

as transnational crime, drugs, and HIV/AIDS.

Despite this warning in the NSS, the White House
has neither articulated a comprehensive strategy for
engaging failed states nor identified the scale of
resources needed to do so. A delicate balance of unilateral and multilateral approaches would need to
characterize such a operations, which could easily
conflict with the administrations current emphasis
on promoting free trade agreements.
Washington has launched new foreign aid efforts,
but much of the debate has bypassed failed or weak
states and focused on good performers, democracy
promotion efforts (a difficult task in failed states),
and allies in the war on terrorism. Such restrictions
may actually facilitate further state failure rather than
strengthening the mechanisms of governance necessary to provide basic security and legitimacy. The foreign economic policy debate needs to be enriched to
incorporate the creative use of aid, trade, and investment in creating the conditions necessary for
strengthening weak and failed states and thus
enhancing overall governance.
As the first target in the post-Sept. 11 war on terrorism, Afghanistan represents a cautionary tale.
Since the successful toppling of the Taliban and the
disorganization of al-Qaidas leadership, the Bush
administration has not demonstrated a willingness to
commit the human and financial resources necessary
to promote reconstruction and development in
Afghanistan, failing to even request any monies for
Afghanistan in its initial budget request for FY 2004.
This approach is shortsighted for three reasons. First,
it repeats the same errors of the late 1980s, when
Washington backed the Mujahedeen against the
Soviet Union. While U.S. support did not create alQaida, that assistance did create the conditions that
facilitated the creation of al-Qaida, destroyed the
Afghan state, and internationalized the extremist
jihadist movement. Second, it ignores the need for
strengthening the Afghan state so as to undermine
the remnants of al-Qaida and the Taliban, subordinating the warlords to central control, and providing
an enabling environment for an effective and broadbased reconstruction and development program.
Third, it reinforces the view that the U.S. war in
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ing what remaining reservoirs of support America has

in the Arab and Muslim world.20
In an equally troubling development, the Bush
administration has taken advantage of the crisis surrounding the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks to pursue an
expanded free trade agenda justified on the grounds
that free trade leads to growth, which reduces poverty
and thereby reduces terrorism. It has pursued this
agenda despite the evidence that terrorism is driven
by political and ideological grievances rather than
economic injustices. The White House argument is
also based on the unfounded claim that the currently
dominant approach to economic globalization

reduces poverty. According to the World Bank,

extreme poverty increased in every region of the
developing world outside Asia during the past
decade, a period when nearly all countries pursued
reforms aimed at opening their countries to the global economy.
Finally, the Bush administration has failed to
address the issue of energy security and to reorient
domestic U.S. energy policy to promote conservation
and the use of renewables. Such steps would increase
Americas autonomy with respect to the Middle East
and would strengthen the security of the energy
infrastructure at home.

IV. A New Framework

A different strategy would not fight a war on terrorism but would treat terrorism as an ongoing
threat that needs to be tackled through a strong,
coordinated strategy focused upon strengthening
civilian public sectors and nurturing the international
cooperation so necessary for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. Although the military has a
clear role to play, it should be a supporting actor in
the fight against terrorism. The challenge that terrorism poses to everyones safety necessitates a reevaluation both of conventional ideas about national security and of the dominant responsestypically militaryto terrorist threats.
One shortcoming of the current approach has been
the Bush administrations failure to adequately understand and articulate the nature of the threat posed by
terrorist networks with international reachlike alQaidato the American people and the world at
large. Indeed, as University of Bradford analyst Paul
Rogers and Oxford Research Group Director Scilla
Elworthy have argued, the general [U.S.] political
process has concentrated almost entirely on seeing
the perpetrators simply as fundamentalists acting
from motives of sheer hatred for the United States
and all it stood for ... little attempt has been made to
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understand the motivations for this action, or to see

it as part of a longer-term strategy, or, indeed, to
investigate the political context.21 It is not uncommon to hear al-Qaida simply dismissed as a bunch of
crazy madmen. This is misguided at best and counterproductive at worst. Pretending that terrorism has
no link to other forms of politics is ahistorical and
will provide poor guidance in crafting an effective
response.
Terror is not a creed but a political strategy to
extract resources and increase power.22 No longer
dependent on sponsorship by sovereign states, modern terrorists engage in a potpourri of transnational
crimes to finance their operations. These include illegal immigration, contraband smuggling, visa fraud,
piracy, illegal trafficking in human beings, diamond
smuggling and tobacco diversion, and associated tax
fraud. Although the vast majority of terrorist attacks
worldwide continue to be carried out with conventional weapons, such as firearms and bombs, there is
a growing concern about terrorists using unconventional weapons, namely, weapons of mass destruction
such as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
weapons.23

p. 13

Emphasizing military responses to terrorisman

inevitable outcome of using war as the policy
framework for U.S. anti-terrorism policyfails on
practical grounds alone, independent of any moral or
ethical considerations. In such a war the nature of
victory is unclear, and the faith leap into war risks a
destructive spiral into open-ended conflict and militarization.24 Even worse, the prosecution of a war
against terrorism risks incurring civilian casualties,
triggering a backlash, and intensifying violence and
conflict.
War, in other words, is the least effective approach
to combating terrorism and should represent the last,
rather than the first, resort. America needs a new
agenda for combating terrorismone that secures
Americans against terrorist attacks and that integrates
the use of force within an international legal and policy framework. This agenda must bring international
terrorists to justice, debilitate their capacity to wage
terrorism, and undermine the political credibility of
terrorist networks by addressing related political
grievances and injustices. The following four-part
framework for a new national security policy counters terrorism and propagates justice using an
approach that:
Strengthens homeland security by preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating the effects of terrorist
violence.
Strengthens the national and international legal system to insure that those responsible for planning,
financing, directly supporting, and engaging in
terrorist violence are held accountable. Military
force may only be used to advance the rule of law
within a multilateral and international legal framework.
Defends and advances civil liberties, human rights,
and democracy both at home and abroad.
Attacks the root causes of terrorism by addressing the
socioeconomic and political conditions that enable
terrorism (in whatever form and for whatever
ends) to appear to be a viable strategy for pursuing
political objectives.

p. 14

A. Strengthen Homeland Security

Prevention must have a central place in counterterrorism policy. Prevention requires tightened border
security, improved intelligence and oversight of intelligence agencies, strengthened protections for critical
infrastructure, and denying terrorists access to
weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons,
and other items that can be used as weapons (trucks
containing hazardous materials, airplanes, etc.).
Mitigating the effects of terrorist attacks requires
honing disaster preparedness and emergency response
plans and strengthening the infrastructures and public services that might either be targets of an attack or
that would be necessary to respond effectively to such
an attack.
It is too soon to tell if the Department of
Homeland Security will be able to effectively coordinate the range of activities essential to insuring
domestic safety. However, creation of the new department itself illustrates the degree to which the
Department of Defense and other security agencies
have focused their efforts on the exercise of military
force abroad rather than effectively addressing the
unconventional menaces that pose the most immediate threat to the safety of the United States and its
citizens. This is not an argument for the Pentagon to
take responsibility for directly insuring homeland
security, but it does reflect the fact that national
security has more often focused on the capacity to
project U.S. military force abroad than to insure the
safety of U.S. citizens and the U.S homeland. In
Americas new, heightened sense of the threats to
individual and national security, citizens and policymakers should insist that the Defense Department
reduce its focus on increasing its global reach and
concentrate more on providing the elemental security
Americans should expect.
Homeland security is a complex job that requires
the coordination of activities by federal, state, and
local governments as well as the private sector and
individual citizens. Estimates of the federal share in
total homeland security spending (including state and
local governments and the private sector) are hampered by a lack of reliable data on such spending by
non-federal government agencies and businesses. For
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Box 2: National Strategy for Homeland Security

In advance of congressional authorization, this government document outlined and made the case for the largest federal reorganization in 50 years to create the Department of Homeland Security. It comprises strategies: to prevent terrorism, including intelligence and warning as well as border and transportation security, to reduce vulnerability to terrorism,
including protecting critical infrastructure, and to minimize the damage from attacks, including emergency preparedness
and response. The National Strategy for Homeland Security is far more detailed than either of the companion strategy
documents on National Security and Combating Terrorism, listing pages of recommendations ranging from recapitalizing
the Coast Guard, to securing cyberspace, to restructuring the FBI for a counterterrorist mission, to creating smart borders that will (somehow) both increase the efficiency of transferring goods and people across borders and intensify the
scrutiny of them. At the same time, it promiseswith virtually no detailto develop a national infrastructure protection
plan and create a national incident management system. Ideologically opposed to regulation of private business, the
document mentions that it intends to rely on the voluntary efforts of these companies. This plan puts a great deal of faith
in the public-spiritedness of private interests, since 85 percent of U.S. infrastructure is in private hands.
Source: White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/>.
FY2004 the Office of Management and Budget identified net non-Department of Defense federal government expenditures on homeland security at $33.4
billion, which was between 40 percent and 80 percent of total homeland security expenditures,
depending on the estimates used for state and local
governments and the private sector.25
The question is, with the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, have the administration and its allies in Congress effectively declared
victory? If so, they have made a fatal mistake. Many
of the most critical steps remain to be taken, and
most of them appear boring, almost mundane, and
certainly not prime photo-op material. Such steps
include insuring that local first responders can communicate with each other, protecting all transportation networks, and reinforcing security at private
facilities such as office buildings, nuclear power
plants, and chemical manufacturing and storage sites.
There are errors of commission and omission in the
administrations approach to homeland security (as
embodied in the Homeland Security Strategy and the
Homeland Security Act). The errors of commission
involve an overly restrictive approach toward civil liberties, civil rights, and transparency in government
policymaking and an overreliance on immigration
restrictions for border security, addressed in Section 2
below. The errors of omission involve major strategic
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gaps with respect to the private sector and intelligence operations as well as underfunding critical program areas. (see Box 2).
In terms of economic and educational impacts, the
National Academy of Sciences and over 20 other
educational and academic associations have noted
that problems with the visa security systemincluding the lack of transparency, arbitrariness, and stigma
associated with the current visa processing system
are,
discouraging and preventing the best and brightest
international students, scholars and scientists from
studying and working in the United States, as well as
attending academic and scientific conferences here and
abroad. If action is not taken soon to improve the visa
system, the misperception that the United States does
not welcome international students, scholars and scientists will grow, and they may not make our nation
their destination of choice now and in the future. The
damage to our nations higher education and scientific
enterprises, economy and national security would be
irreparable. In the long run, a robust network of
global interactions is essential to winning this war.
Our nation needs a visa system that does not hinder
such international exchange and cooperation.26

p. 15

The visa review system must be reformed so that the

need to conduct adequate security checks does not
overwhelm understaffed offices and so that more efficient and timely decisions can be made. Such steps
are essential if there is going to be an effective public
diplomacy program. The United States must demonstrate that past and potential future terrorist attacks
will not result in the creation of a fortress America.
1. Improve Intelligence Gathering and
Oversight
The Bush administration made several changes
since the Sept. 11 attacks to address the intelligence
failures that contributed to the success of the
attacks.27 These efforts culminated in the creation of
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.28 The TTIC
includes elements of the Department of Homeland
Security, the FBI, the CIA, and the Department of
Defense, and its head reports to the director of the
CIA. Furthermore, states and localities have created
similar bodies, such as the California Terrorism
Information Center, the Los Angeles Operational
Area Terrorism Early Warning Group, and similar
groups in New York City.
In response to The 9/11 Commission Report, the
Bush administration has proposed the creation of a
national intelligence director and a national counterterrorism center. The former would play a coordinating role in the intelligence community, similar to one
of the roles played by the director of central intelligence (the other role is as head of the CIA). The latter would largely build on the TTIC and would be
moved from its current home at the CIA to report to
the proposed new intelligence director.
The TTIC has several problems that reduce its
effectiveness and undermine accountability. Since the
TTIC is under the authority of the director of central
intelligence rather than the secretary of homeland
security, it is disconnected from those with direct
responsibility for safeguarding homeland security.
This arrangement impedes the TTICs ability to
develop an effective, integrated approach to countering the terrorist threat to the United States, and it
risks duplication that could harm homeland security
efforts.29 Furthermore, the TTIC lacks effective conp. 16

gressional oversight, as its director is appointed by the

CIA director without congressional approval.30
Finally, the FBI must continue to overcome severe
organizational weaknesses with respect to counterintelligence operations. The 9/11 Commission Report
details numerous recommendations which, if implemented, would significantly enhance the FBIs effectiveness as a counterintelligence agency.31
What is most important about intelligence gathering activities is that they are done effectively and that
there is coordination both among and between intelligence agencies as well as close interaction with those
responsible for operationalizing that intelligence.
Furthermore, though there is a need for improved
intelligence collection, analysis, and operationalization, such efforts should not run roughshod over
basic civil liberties and should not compromise the
level of transparency necessary to insure accountability in intelligence operations.
Specific initiatives should:
Establish a national intelligence director who would
be able to exercise budgetary and appointment
control over the intelligence community, as proposed by the 9/11 Commission.
Restructure the TTIC (or similar counterterrorism
center) to have it report directly to the head of the
Department of Homeland Security.
Improve intelligence operations through greater
international coordination and cooperation in
sharing intelligence, developing improved human
and technical intelligence capabilities that do not
infringe on basic civil liberties.
Improve oversight of intelligence agencies, in part by
requiring greater transparency in the budget for
the CIA and other intelligence agencies.
Increase the personnel assigned to counterterrorist
operations, since both the CIA and the FBI continue to operate without adequate support staff for
their counterterrorist operations, including, critically, foreign language specialists.32
Expand federal funding for foreign language study in
order to insure an adequate level of skilled translators and interpreters.
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2. Strengthen Border Security

Since Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration has
taken several steps to make U.S. borders more secure,
including the Container Security Initiative, new visa
and immigration systems under the Department of
Homeland Security, efforts to combat forgeries of
identity documents, and greater security in airlines,
airports, and seaports. Effective border security begins
well beyond the actual U.S. borders, in the visa
offices of U.S. embassies and consulates and in airports and ports abroad. Bilateral programs will have
an important role to play, but more multilateral
efforts will be essential if airports, ports, and containers are to be effectively secured.
Several glaring weaknesses remain:
Information from visa and immigration data systems
must be fully linked to establish complete immigration
histories of visitors and residents, and government
agencies must greatly improve their informationsharing capabilities as well as their systems for
maintaining watch lists. The State Department has
tried for 10 years to get access to FBI information

to add to TIPOFF, its terrorist watch list, as the

CIA has already done. Centralizing this information in TIPOFF will avoid long visa processing
delays, which damage U.S. political and economic
relations abroad. The fact that this sharing of
information has not yet happened is an appalling
example of failed interagency cooperation.
Moreover, the United States has still not created a
single database of suspected terrorists, relying
instead on lists from eight different agencies. This
situation has persisted for more than a decade
since the first World Trade Center bombing, when
the problem first received national attention, and
for more than two years since the Sept. 11 attacks,
despite the fact that President Bush on several
occasions committed the government to creating a
single, effective list. On December 1, 2003, an
interagency body, the Terrorist Screening Center,
was opened within the FBI to consolidate data,
weed out obsolete information, and develop new
technology to better identify suspected terrorists.
However, the TSC suffers from the lack of a dedicated budget and ongoing failures to obtain the
cooperation of several agencies to share their

Box 3: Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security

This government document outlines the Coast Guards role in homeland security. While expressing the agencys commitment to improving its protection of U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, maritime borders, ports, coastal
approaches and boundaries, and the seams between them, it is, among all the security documents, the least specific
about how these goals will be achieved. The Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security promises to conduct ongoing vulnerability assessments of major sea lines of communication and to allocate resources toward more stringent reporting
requirements, more thorough ocean surveillance, and the tracking of high-interest vessels and cargoes. Its new missions, such as closing port security gaps, will however require additional and upgraded capabilities, which will have to
be recapitalized, that is, given more money. These include the Coast Guards Deepwater Forces, whose targets
exceed the capabilities of shore-based small boats, its National Strike Force, focusing on hazardous substance releases, and its Sea Marshals, which will inspect suspect vessels before they reach U.S. ports, giving priority to those from
countries with terrorist links and those otherwise unfriendly to the United States. To fulfill its mandates, the Coast Guard
will need more cutters, coastal patrol boats, aircraft, and command and control technology.
The document cites one example of the Coast Guards potential role in executing the new doctrine of preemptive
strikes, namely, to intercept a shipment of smuggled plutonium on its way to a rogue state. It also reports that the Coast
Guard is now newly involved in national security missions overseas, operating in areas such as the Persian Gulf.
Source: U.S. Coast Guard, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security,
<http://www.uscg.mil/news/reportsandbudget/Maritime_strategy/USCG_Maritme_Strategy.pdf>.
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p. 17

information . In the view of one congressional

staff member, the TSC is a hollow box.33
The Container Security Initiative, which aims to
provide security for container shipments, is now
operable in nearly all of the countries targeted for
the first phase of the program. Yet the program
remains underfunded by an order of magnitude,
according to the Brookings Institution.34 Cindy
Williams, a former Congressional Budget Office
defense budget specialist, has estimated that shifting $5 billion from the Defense Department
would boost inspection of containers by the necessary factor of ten.35 Broader port security also
remains an issue as an estimated 70 percent of the
ports slated to meet international standards for
container security by July 1, 2004 did not meet
the target, and U.S. port security remains uncertain due to a lack of staffing and resources.36
The Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection remain woefully underfunded,
receiving far below what they need to meet their
new missions, which incorporate a whole host of
non-homeland security as well as homeland security tasks. (see Box 3).
3. Protect Critical Infrastructure
The Department of Homeland Security has identified at least 16 sectors for critical infrastructure protection: chemical, electricity, energy, emergency management and response, financial services, food, information technology, multistate public transit, real
estate, research and education networking, surface
transportation, telecommunications, highway, water,
and public health. (see Box 4).
The private sector plays a crucial role in securing
critical infrastructure, because that sector operates
about 85 percent of the nations infrastructure. But
the Bush administration has taken a laissez-faire
approach to the private sectors role in homeland
security, expecting that voluntary efforts by these
businesses will be sufficient to achieve homeland
security objectives. For example, the Department of
Homeland Security has yet to conduct basic risk and
vulnerability assessments to help the private sector
guide its own investments.
p. 18

The Department of Homeland Security has promoted the creation of private-sector information
sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) on a voluntary
basis to facilitate private-sector coordination with the
federal government on homeland security programs
and to serve as mechanisms for gathering, analyzing,
and appropriately sanitizing and disseminating information to and from infrastructure sectors and the
federal government. Because of the voluntary nature
of participation, membership and outreach through
the information sharing and analysis centers covers
just under two-thirds of the private-sector critical
infrastructure in the country, according to the
General Accounting Office.37
According to the ISAC council, the Bush administration has not made adequate provision for the participation of the private sector in national-level
homeland security exercises conducted by the federal
government, such as the Department of Homeland
Securitys May 2003 national terrorism exercise
(TOPOFF 2), which was designed to identify vulnerabilities in the nations domestic incident management capability. (In that exercise the participation of
the private sector was simulated).38 Furthermore,
additional government resources will be necessary to
facilitate the operations of these industry associations,
to support operations, to increase membership, to
develop metrics, and to support capacity-building
activities. Four of the most significant private-sector
issues of concern involve spent reactor fuel pools at
nuclear power plants, the chemical industry, food
safety, and information technology.

Nuclear Power Plants

Spent reactor fuel pools at U.S. commercial nuclear
power plants represent potentially the most consequential vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Unlike reactors, which are housed inside steel vessels surrounded
by heavy structures and containment buildings, spent
fuel pools, containing some of the largest concentrations of radioactivity on the planet, are in much more
vulnerable buildings. If water is caused to drain from
the pools, a catastrophic fire could contaminate an
area many times greater than that devastated by the
1986 Chernobyl accident.

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Box 4: The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets
This government document targets a core mission area identified in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The
elements of critical infrastructure are identified as: agriculture and food, water, public health, emergency services,
defense industrial base, telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous
materials, and postal and shipping. Key assets are defined as individual targets whose destruction could cause largescale damage to life, property, and/or national prestige. These are: national monuments, nuclear power plants, dams,
government facilities, and commercial key assets (which refers to the nations 460 skyscrapers).
The report includes a rough inventory of each of these categories (e.g., telecommunications: two billion miles of
cable, oil and natural gas: 300,000 producing sites) and commits the Department of Homeland Security to developing
a comprehensive database of these assets and an assessment of the vulnerabilities of each. Analyzing each sector, the
document briefly assesses vulnerabilities, problems in addressing them, and plans for doing so.
For example, for the chemical industry and hazardous materials, the report warns there is no clear federal legal or
regulatory authority to help ensure comprehensive, uniform standards for chemical facilities. But, it says, since risk profiles vary widely across the industry, because of differences in technologies, product mix, etc., no single security regime
would be appropriate for all. Cautioning that many current laws governing toxics are outdated, the report applauds trade
associations for developing voluntary security codes for their members, though it acknowledges that many of these
members dont comply. The document commits the Department of Homeland Security and the Environmental Protection
Agency to developing legislation requiring the most hazardous facilities to undertake vulnerability assessments (selfevaluation) and to take reasonable steps to reduce vulnerabilities. The report also promises to evaluate whether measures are necessary to regulate the sale of pesticides. Those are its only recommendations for action.
One of the most potentially vulnerable and hazardous sectors, the nuclear power plant complex, receives one of the
most cursory treatments. Security procedures have been enhanced, we are assured, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission is evaluating additional measures. Those mentioned are: criminalizing the act of bringing unauthorized
weapons and explosives into nuclear facilities, legislation authorizing security guards to carry more powerful weapons,
applying sabotage laws to nuclear facilities, and public awareness campaigns.
Among the collection of counterterrorism strategy documents, this one wrestles most directly with the conflict between
the administrations ideological impulse to protect private interests and governments responsibility for the public interest.
The report applauds the many businesses that have increased their security to an extent economically justifiable in a
competitive marketplace. The private sector will look to the federal government when the threat appears to exceed a
reasonable security investment, the report says. It speaks of developing incentives for businesses to do more, suggesting that early adopters might be rewarded.
Discussing the role of states and localities, the document acknowledges that they are being asked to do more, and
that their fiscal crises make this extremely difficult. As to what the federal government might be able to do about this
(i.e., help make up the shortfall), the document limits itself to a few extremely vague observations about the need for
unprecedented cooperation across all levels of government to deal with issues of informed resource investment.
Source: White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical.html>.

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p. 19

The most important step that can be taken to significantly reduce this risk is to place all spent fuel
older than five years into thick-walled, dry storage
modes. Germany has done this for the past 25 years
to protect against airplane crashes and terrorist
attacks. The cost of putting the U.S. spent reactor
fuel inventory into dry, hardened storage modes over
the next 10 years is estimated at $3.5 billion to $7
billion, which could be paid from existing funds collected from nuclear-generated electricity for the disposal of this material.

The Chemical Industry

The risk of terrorist attack on industrial facilities
that store large quantities of hazardous chemicals is a
pressing homeland security issue. According to the
Environmental Protection Agency, there are 123
facilities where a release of chemicals could threaten
more than one million people. There are more than
750 additional facilities where such a release could
threaten more than 100,000 people.39 The Bush
administration is expecting that voluntary measures
by the U.S. chemical industry will provide effective
protection against terrorist attacks. But without minimal standards, enforcement requirements, or monitoring, such efforts will be inadequate. For example,
the members of the chemical industry ISAC cannot
even estimate what percentage of the industry is participating in the ISAC.
The Department of Homeland Security needs to
establish minimum requirements for the improvement of security and the reduction of potential hazards at chemical plants and other industrial facilities
that store large quantities of hazardous materials, as
voluntary standards remain inadequate.40 Specific initiatives should:
Conduct a vulnerability/hazard assessment.
Develop a prevention, preparedness, and response
plan that incorporates the assessment results and
includes actions to reduce vulnerabilities by
improving security and using safer technology.

Food and Agricultural Safety

Although a bioterrorism attack on U.S. agriculture is
highly unlikely to result in famine or malnutrition, it
could have significant human and economic costs and
p. 20

could cause widespread public concern and confusion.41

The recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease that arose
naturally in the United Kingdom, for example, led to
the destruction of millions of animals and cost billions
of dollars.42 There is a need for a comprehensive national
plan to defend against the intentional introduction of
biological agents in an act of terror. Such a plan would
outline a research agenda including filling gaps in knowledge about foreign pests and pathogens, defining appropriate roles for federal and state agencies, and making
specific preparations to respond to attacks conducted
with a shorter list of pathogens and pests representative of the various bioweapons and the plant or animal species they would target. Developing countermeasures for this subset of agents would be valuable
to officials and front-line personnel in the event of an
attack, even if the agent ultimately confronted does
not happen to be on the short list.
And finally, a network of laboratories needs to be
created to coordinate the detection of bioterror
agents in the event of an attack. A nationwide agricultural bioterrorism communications system, modeled after the Centers for Disease Control and
Preventions Health Alert Network, is also necessary. And new technologies are needed to aid in the
early detection of bioterror agents, especially genetically engineered ones. Early detection is key to stopping the spread of an agricultural bioterror attack.43
Specific initiatives should:
Consolidate the responsibility for inspecting food into
a single agency; increase the number of food inspectors and their resources to insure security at food
processing facilities, and expand capacities for
identifying and treating exotic animal diseases.44

Information Technology
Information technology is essential to virtually all of
the nations critical infrastructures, from the air traffic
control system to the aircraft themselves, from the
electric power grid to the financial and banking systems
and, obviously, from the Internet to communication
systems. In sum, this reliance of all of the nations
critical infrastructures on information technology
makes any of them vulnerable to sabotage through
their computer or telecommunication systems.45
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An attack involving information technology can

take different forms. The technology itself can be the
target. A terrorist could also either launch or exacerbate an attack by exploiting the IT infrastructure or
could use IT to interfere with attempts to achieve a
timely response. Thus, IT is both a target and a
weapon. Likewise, IT has a major role in counterterrorismit can prevent, detect, and mitigate terrorist
attacks. For example, advances in information fusion
and data mining may facilitate the identification of
important patterns of behavior that help to uncover
terrorists or their plans in time to prevent attacks.
Second, emergency response involves the agencies,
often state and local, that are called upon to respond
to terrorist incidentsfirefighters, police, ambulances, and other emergency health care workers.
These agencies are critically reliant on IT to communicate, to coordinate, and to share information in a
prompt, reliable, and intelligible fashion.46
The threat of a terrorist attack on IT, or cyberterrorism,47 is seen today by policymakers and the public as being one of the greatest dangers to the United
States. As the director of the Department of
Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, warned, a terrorist
can sit at one computer connected to one network
and can create worldwide havoc.48 The notion of
cyberterrorism links the fear of random, violent victimization with the distrust and outright fear of computer technology.49 It is this union that has compounded the fear of cyberterrorism.
Despite such fear, the possibility of a cyberterrorist
incident remains small. (see Box 5). A RAND study found

that while most of the current interests have focused

on newer, trendier threats to information systems
our analysis showed that some of the old fashioned
threats pose a greater danger.50 Al-Qaidas training
manual, Military Studies in the Jihad Against the
Tyrants, bears this in mind, noting that explosives
are the preferred terrorist weapon, because explosives
strike the enemy with sheer terror and fright.51
Those who warn about cyberterrorism often raise
the possibility of terrorists hijacking nuclear weapons,
airliners, military computers, electrical grids, and
food supplies from across the globe. However, most
critical government systems, such as those at the
Department of Defense, FBI, and CIA, are not connected to the Internet and thus are protected from
outside attacks. Other government agencies that
developed proprietary systems in a fit of bureaucratic
self-preservation left only a select few who understand the systems well enough to compromise it.52
Government systems connected to the Internet are
more vulnerable, but since the Internet itself had its
beginnings in a Department of Defense project
designed to ensure open communications after a
nuclear attack, the possibility of taking the entire
Internet off-line is remote at best.
Many officials also point out the danger to power
grids, oil pipelines, and dams that use supervisory
control and data acquisition systems. Increasingly,
such systems are operated over the Internet, making
them more vulnerable to a cyberterrorist. In the past
few years, dam and water systems have been hacked,
but even after such a breach, it is difficult to cause

Box 5: Information Technology Attacks and Terrorism, 1996-2003

Computer Security Incidents:
International Terrorist Attacks:
Cyberterrorist Incidents:

312,337
2,463
0

Source: Terrorist attacks data from Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (revised),
<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/33777.htm>, computer security incident data from Carnegie Mellon
University Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), <http://www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html>. Also see
James A. Lewis, Cyber Attacks: Missing in Action, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2003,
<http://www.csis.org/tech/0403_cyberterror.pdf>.
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p. 21

mass disruption. Emulating government proprietary

systems, utility companies use complex processes that
require specific technical know-how. Even if such systems were taken over by cyberterrorists, the effect of
bringing down an electrical grid would be likened to
recent power outages in New York City, a major
inconvenience at worst.
Despite these built-in protections, the vast complexity of the Internet, security weaknesses in commercial
software, and a movement away from proprietary systems demand that further defenses against cyberterrorism be employed. The Bush administration
released the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
in February 2003 (see Box 6) to help meet the challenges presented by cyberterrorists and wider abuse of

the Internet. Although the strategy advances the

issues of centralizing security responses, testing civilian agency preparedness, and further securing government cyberspace, it fails to propose new legislation or
government oversight to implement the variety of
public-private initiatives it proposes.
The National Cyber Security Division of the
Department of Homeland Security is responsible for
implementing the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace. Although the division has been effective
at creating new organizations to strengthen federal
information technology defenses, coordinate responses to systems threats, and improve information sharing, the departments own inspector general has
released two reports criticizing DHS performance in

Box 6: National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

This government document outlines the strategy for protecting what it calls the control system of our country. It
describes this task as mostly a private sector responsibility, and it suggests that government intervention be limited to
such roles as ensuring the continuity of government and deterring cyber attacks capable of inflicting debilitating damage
to the economy.
The strategy has five facets. The task of developing a National Cyberspace Security Response System includes such
components as rapid identification, information exchange, and remediation by means of a public-private architecture for
responding to national-level cyber incidents (concerns for protecting privacy and civil liberties are explicitly mentioned
here); expanding the Cyber Warning and Information Network to support the Department of Homeland Security in coordinating crisis management for cybersecurity; and coordinating processes for voluntary participation in developing
national public-private contingency plans.
The National Cyber Security Threat and Vulnerability Reduction Program is to include enhancing law enforcements
capabilities to prevent and prosecute attacks, reducing and remediating software vulnerability, and understanding infrastructure interdependence and improving the physical security of cyber systems. The National Cyber Security
Awareness and Training Program will focus mainly on educating the public about its role in securing its own parts of
cyberspace. Securing Governments Cyberspace will involve tasks like continuously assessing threats, authenticating
authorized users of federal cyber systems, improving security in government outsourcing and procurement, and encouraging state and local governments to consider establishing information technology security programs. National Security
and International Cyberspace Security Cooperation will include strengthening cyber-related counterintelligence efforts
and improving coordination within the national security community.
Although this last domain does include encouraging other nations to accede to the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime, international cooperation is the weakest and most timid area in the strategy. Beyond endorsing this single
convention, multilateral collaboration aims mainly to facilitate dialogue among international public and private sectors
focused on protecting information infrastructure and promoting a global culture of security.
Source: White House, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/>.
p. 22

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these areas. The first highlights failures in determining priorities, focusing resources to address vulnerabilities, and setting benchmarks to guide the implementation of the national cyberspace strategy.
The report specifically notes that the DHS has
failed to:
Prioritize its initiatives for addressing the recommendations in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace;
Identify the resources needed to ensure that it can
identify, analyze, and reduce long-term cyber
threats and vulnerabilities;
Develop strategic implementation plans, including
performance measures and milestones, focusing on
the divisions priorities, initiatives, and tasks;
Institute a formal communications process both
within the DHS and for interactions with the
public, private, and international sectors;
Initiate and implement a process to oversee and coordinate efforts to develop best practices and create
cybersecurity policies in collaboration with other
government agencies and the private sector; and
Review or update the actions and recommendations
in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.53
Equally troubling, the inspector general also found
that the Department of Homeland Securitys management of intra-departmental IT issues lags far behind
other federal agencies. In particular, the chief information officer at the DHS does not have adequate
authority or resources to insure effective strategic
management of IT resources within the department.
He also lacks the resources to insure effective identification and implementation of information security
standards for the department as a whole.54
These DHS shortcomings highlight key challenges
facing the implementation of an effective cybersecurity strategy and underscore the need for an alternative
policy agenda that would devote adequate resources,
legislation, and attention to a balanced and measured
response to the vulnerabilities of IT systems.
Specific initiatives should:
Create Greater Incentives in the Private Sector: Though
not likely to be a primary terrorist target, the priwww.fpif.org
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vate sector and individuals are subject to economic

damage from cyber-criminals. Nearly $12.5 billion
in damages were inflicted on the global economy
in 2003 from viruses, worms, and other tools used
by hackers, according to the research company
Computer Economics. This was more than the
2002 figure of $11.1 billion, but much lower than
the 2000 level of $17.1 billion.55 Furthermore,
hijacking of individual computers could lead to
denial of service or other types of attacks on
critical infrastructure. Thus, private businesses and
individuals have a role to play in cybersecurity.
Specific initiatives should:
Promote tax incentives to increase network
security expenditures;
Pass laws to create or enhance liability on the part
of manufacturers or network operators for negligent actions or omissions that harm others;
Mandate insurance requirements or incentives
for security investments;
Require public companies to include a discussion of potential cyber risks or actual security
breaches in their annual Form 10-K disclosure, in order to promote attention to security
on the part of chief executive officers and
boards of directors (similar to the approach
utilized by the Securities and Exchange
Commission to address Y2K concerns); and
Create general standards for hardware and
software manufacturers.56
Improve Cybersecurity in Critical Public Agencies and
Private Organizations:
As supervisory control and data acquisition systems move from relying on dedicated, proprietary networks to the Internet, systems must
be tested and certified to be secure by a statedesignated testing agency authorized by the
Department of Homeland Security;
The security of our nations cyber networks
depends on well-trained computer personnel.
Equally important is the security risk these
people pose. All personnel responsible for
security at government agencies and critical
infrastructure locations should have backp. 23

ground checks conducted and should pass a

computer security certification test;
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspaces
recommendation to test government agencies
preparedness and contingency planning
should be fully implemented.
Improve Emergency Response Systems: Emergency
responders must have a robust information infrastructure in the face of a real or potential terrorist
attack. Since many systems rely upon the Internet
and voice communication systems, backup systems must be able to be rapidly deployed. The
National Research Council has identified the following areas of priority research:
Develop communication systems to handle
more capacity for emergency communication
and coordination;
Create first-responder communication systems that are interoperable between federal,
state, and local agencies;
Be able to rapidly deploy secure wireless networks in case of emergency.
Additional specific initiatives to address critical
infrastructure security should include:
Make ventilation systems on large skyscrapers
less accessible to terrorists by modifying air
intakes and installing new air filtering systems.
This would cost an estimated $1 billion.57
Insure compliance with the provisions of the
Aviation Security Act and expand security for
the air cargo system.
Increase resources and coordination for the
protection of information and communications technologies through the Critical
Infrastructure Assurance Office and the
National Infrastructure Protection Center.
4. Support Emergency Responders
In addition to improving emergency preparedness
plans, the White House needs to provide support to
all levels of government to strengthen infrastructures
and public services such as information and communications networks, water and food distribution
p. 24

channels, public health and emergency response systems, utilities and energy, transportation and financial services. Critically, most of these systems consist
of civilian public servants, such as fire, police, and
rescue departments and public health personnel, all
of which will be frontline first responders in case of a
terrorist attack.
Strengthening such infrastructures and public services would have significant positive side effects, since
natural disasters, ordinary criminals, and infectious
disease outbreaks also threaten these systems. The
public health system is critical due to its roles both in
surveillance (i.e., determining if a terrorist attack has
involved biological or chemical weapons) and in the
treatment of victims. Recent exercises of mock terrorist attacks have indicated that public health infrastructures are rapidly overwhelmed in cases of WMD
attacks, suggesting that the public health system
should be a key area for increased spending. These
services require both international and national level
collaboration, as some of the infrastructuressuch as
public health and the Internetcannot just be
addressed nationally.
The burden of preparing for and responding to catastrophic terrorist attacks lies primarily outside the
federal government at the local and state levels and
impacts the private sector companies that own and
operate much of the nations critical infrastructure.
Most of the expertise about both the vulnerabilities
and the most practical protective measures to save
lives and avert mass societal and economic disruption
is to be found outside the federal level as well.
The current federal budget for emergency responders is $27 billion for five years beginning in 2004.
Based on assessments from emergency responder
groups nationwide, a recent Council on Foreign
Relations report estimates that federal, state, and
local efforts in this area will fall short by about $100
billion over the next five years.58 Federal funding
should make up at least half of this shortfall in order
to support a series of improvements including:
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ing training and equipment, and purchasing interoperable communication systems.

The National Guard will play a critical role when
the next catastrophic terrorist attack happens on
American soil, and it must be well-trained and equipped. Governors will expect National Guard
units in their states to help with detecting chemical
and biological agents, treating victims, managing secondary consequences, and maintaining civil order.
When called up by governors, the National Guard
can be used to enforce civil lawsunlike regular military forces, which are bound by posse comitatus
restrictions against performing law enforcement
duties. The National Guards medical units, engineering units, military police units, and ground and air
transport units will likely prove indispensable in helping to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack.
The National Guard is currently equipped and
trained primarily for carrying out its role in supporting conventional combat units overseas. Its homeland
security mission can draw on many of these capabilities but requires different emphases.59
Specific initiatives should include:
Adequate financial support for first responders
nationwide;
Increased funding for public health at the local, state,
and federal levels to improve surveillance of infectious disease outbreaks, provide adequate amounts
of vaccines and medicines to respond to a bioterrorist attack, and ensure a functioning hospital
system capable of treating victims. This includes
funding for the biomedical and psychological
impacts of terrorist attacks;60 and
Federally financed training for National Guard units
to facilitate collaboration with state civil authorities and to include exercises with local emergency
responders in support of the new homeland security plans being developed by each governor.
5. Prevent Terrorists from Obtaining Weapons
The anthrax scares in late 2001 showed that terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction do not
require large numbers of casualties in order to trigger
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ence between states and terrorists regarding acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is that states can
be deterred from using WMDs by the likelihood of
retaliation. Because terrorists are harder to locate,
they are less easily dissuaded. As a recent report from
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peaces
Nonproliferation Program noted: the nexus of greatest danger comes at the intersection of terrorists and
state stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. It remains very difficult for a terrorist group to
produce nuclear weapons material on its own.
Therefore, the security and elimination of state stockpiles of weapons and weapon-usable materials must
become the primary objective.61 Most stockpiles of
weapons-grade material are not held by rogue or outlaw states but rather by entities otherwise seen as
sympathetic to the United States, such as the
republics of the former Soviet Union, Pakistan, and
civilian nuclear power facilities throughout the world.
The Bush administration has been unwilling to allocate greater funding for WMD threat reduction programs, which now cost about $1 billion annually.62
At the same time, one should not overestimate the
likelihood of terrorists using weapons of mass
destruction in an attack. An excessive focus on a
WMD attack may lead to inadequate preparations
for defending against attacks utilizing conventional
weapons. Though terrifying to contemplate, the low
probability/high consequence WMD attacks may not
represent the most significant terrorist threats. More
appropriate risk and threat assessments are necessary
to be able to develop appropriate strategies and to
prioritize spending effectively.
On the global level, the Bush administration has been
hostile to most arms control and disarmament efforts,
including the Biological and Chemical Weapons
Conventions, the ABM Treaty, and the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. Strengthening these regimes, however, represents one of the best means of preventing
access by terrorists to weapons of mass destruction.
In addition, reforms of the export control process
should mean strengthening the current U.S. system
and pursuing better multilateral controls. Especially
in this time of heightened security risks, the question
the U.S. government should be asking is whether
current controls will keep arms, technology, and
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Box 7: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

Among the component documents of the Bush administrations national security policy, this one is framed most openly
as including elements that represent a fundamental change from the past. The most important is our new concept of
deterrence, namely the doctrine asserting the right of the United States to commit preemptive strikes against those suspected of planning to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its friends, or its allies. The document
asserts that some states that sponsor terrorism have WMDs and see them as militarily useful weapons of choice to
overcome the overwhelming U.S. advantage in conventional forces. The first element of the Bush strategy is counterproliferation. This encompasses interdiction by using military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement tools to prevent
WMD transfer to hostile states and terrorist organizations; deterrence, which reserves the right to respond to the use of
WMDs against the United States, its friends, or its allies with all options (sanctioning a U.S. nuclear strike in response
to a chemical or biological attack); and defense and mitigation, again permitting preemptive measures against potential
future attacks as well as active defenses to disrupt or destroy WMDs en route to their targets.
The nonproliferation component of the strategy advocates international action to strengthen the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Threat Reduction cooperative programs. The
administrations track record gives reason to suspect that rather than taking a leadership role in these efforts, the United
States may, as with the Kyoto Protocols, use the failure of other nations to act as a reason for its own inaction. The
strategys call for constructive and realistic measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention will presumably continue to emphasize voluntary measures that dont require inspections of U.S. manufacturers. The section on
export controls promises to give full weight to both nonproliferation and commercial interests, that is, the interests of
U.S. weapons exporters.
This policy outline acknowledged that its new doctrine of preemptive deterrence would require improved intelligence
and strengthened alliances. It is worth noting that the administration then proceeded to implement the doctrine in Iraq on
the basis of intelligence that was flawed and in a way that has left our alliances substantially weakened.
Source: White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf>.
weapon components out of the hands of terrorists
and away from unstable regimes. To do so would
require not only improving controls over U.S. equipment but ensuring that recipients of U.S. defense
goods and services share U.S. values and protect sensitive U.S. equipment. It would mean creating a truly
transparent system, so the public can provide essential commentary on arms transfers. And it would
mean working with other nations to establish international arms control regimes of the highest quality.63
Specific initiatives should:
Extend the Leahy Law, which prohibits U.S. military
assistance to foreign military units that violate
human rights with impunity, to all weapons transfers and make it permanent. Since 1997, the
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Foreign Operations Appropriations Act has prevented U.S. military aid from going to foreign
military units where there is credible evidence of
human rights abuses. The law is intended to prevent those specifically accused of abuses from benefiting from U.S. security assistance. But the law
would be more effective if it prevented all military
equipmentno matter who paid for itfrom
going to such units. It should also be made permanent instead of needing to be reapproved on an
annual basis.
Follow through on the International Code of
Conduct Act, which passed as part of the FY2001
State Department Authorization Act and directed
the State Department to pursue a multilateral
agreement on arms transfers. The agreement was
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supposed to prevent arms from going to states that

do not respect human rights, are engaged in acts
of armed aggression, or support terrorism or the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Under the Clinton administration, the State
Department began informal discussions with
European exporters regarding such an agreement.
But beyond a U.S.-E.U. Declaration on
Responsibility in Arms Exports issued at the
December 2000 U.S.-E.U. Summit, no real
progress has been made, and the code appears to
have been put on the back burner. The State
Department should recommence talks with other
major arms exporters about international normative controls, perhaps beginning with a formal
commitment to use the criteria set out in the
European Unions Code of Conduct.
Develop an international arms trade treaty. Although
the International Code of Conduct is intended to
be politically binding, the United States should
also endorse the idea of a legally binding treaty on
the arms trade. Arms control and human rights
groups have already developed a draft treaty that
would prohibit arms transfers where there is a
high risk of weapons being used either to violate
international human rights and humanitarian law
or to contravene the U.N. Charters rules on
nonaggression and nonuse of force. This draft
treaty sets out minimum core standards designed
to prevent the most egregious arms transfers. It is
based on the international legal principle that any
state aiding another state in the violation of international law (in this case through the transfer of
weapons used in the violation) shares in the
responsibility for the illegal act.
Strengthen the conventions for control, nonproliferation, and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, including the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions,
the Missile Technology Control Regime, the
Fissile Material Control Regime, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. This includes enhancing verification measures and reporting requirements, increasing transparency, and insuring adequate resources
for agencies responsible for onsite inspections.
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Support the action agenda for the G-8 Global

Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction and other multilateral initiatives to combat proliferation, as outlined
in a series of recent reports on nonproliferation.
(see Box 7).64
End efforts to build a National Missile Defense system (also known as Star Wars) and redirect
funds to nonproliferation efforts.
Increase funding for the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency and other efforts to monitor and control
weapons material in the former Soviet Union, and
provide funding for engaging former Soviet
weapons scientists in peaceful, commercially sustainable activities.
Ratify the Protocol on the Illicit Manufacture or
Trafficking in Firearms to the Convention on
Organized Crime, which the United States has not
signed. Implement the action plan on small arms
approved at the recent U.N. conference on the
trade in small arms.65
Support the efforts of the new independent international commission on weapons of mass destruction proposed by the Swedish government, chaired
by Hans Blix, that was set up in the fall of 2003.

B. Strengthen International and

National Legal Systems to
Hold Terrorists Accountable
An effective response to terrorism requires strengthening the national and international legal infrastructure necessary to identify and prosecute the individuals and organizations that facilitate, finance, perpetrate, and profit from terrorism. A strengthened
United Nations should be the primary instrument for
pursuing this objective. Unilateralist elements within
the U.S. Congress and a lack of enthusiasm by members of the administration have been major obstacles
to a more sustained and constructive U.S. engagement with the U.N. system. In the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administration
made an apparent U-turn with respect to the United
Nations, suddenly recognizing its importance in
combating terrorism. For example, there are 10 major
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U.N. conventions and two protocols dating back to

1963 related to terrorism. (see Appendix 2). Before
September 11, 2001, only two countries were parties
to all 12 instruments. By the end of 2002, 16 countries, including the United States, had become parties
to each of the 12 conventions and protocols.
(Currently over 40 countries are parties to all 12). In
addition to its rapid campaign to ratify counterterrorism conventions, Washington supported a series of
U.N. Security Council resolutions identifying commitments for countries to help combat terrorism. (see
Appendix 3).
But that momentary honeymoon seems to have
ended with the debate over the invasion of Iraq and
with the Bush administrations ongoing campaign to
undermine the International Criminal Court. Such
moves weaken the international legal architecture that
represents a globalization of Americas firm principles
and beliefs in the centrality of the rule of law.
Revelations of torture sanctioned by Bush administration personnel and efforts to exempt U.S. troops
from Geneva Convention restrictions in waging the
war on terrorism have also raised legitimate questions over the seriousness of the Bush administrations
commitment to international law.
Specific initiatives should:
Encourage international police cooperation and bolster Interpol, while avoiding repression of political
dissidents; expand extradition treaties, while protecting the rights of dissidents to gain asylum in
exile; and strengthen law enforcement cooperation
with other countries in counterterrorism efforts.
Strengthen the U.N. Security Councils CounterTerrorism Committee and work to create an
organization within the U.N. that is solely responsible for issues relating to terrorism, with a focus
on monitoring compliance with U.N. conventions
on international terrorism.
Promote the adoption of the Princeton Principles on
Universal Jurisdiction for prosecution of crimes against
humanity under international law, in national
courts, and based on universal jurisdiction.66
Strengthen institutions of international law by proposing the creation of a specialized tribunal for
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judging international terrorists, joining the

International Criminal Court, ratifying human
rights conventions, and increasing financing for
the U.N. human rights regime.
Exercise military force only to implement the rule of
law under an international legal framework.
Going to war is always legitimate, if there is imminent danger of an attack, but otherwise the use of
military force should be a last resort.
The Use of Force and Preemption
A major weakening of the international legal architecture as it relates to security comes from the Bush
administrations elevation of preemption [actually
preventive war] to a policy doctrine as part of the
national security strategy in general and for combating terrorism in particular. This has actually reduced
rather than increased U.S. security in several ways.
First, it reinforces the image of the United States as
too quick to use military force and to do so outside
the bounds of international law and legitimacy. This
can make it more difficult for the United States to
gain international support for its use of force and,
over the long term, may lead others to resist U.S. foreign policy goals more broadly, including efforts to
fight terrorism. Second, elevating preemption to the
level of a formal doctrine may increase the administrations inclination to reach for the military lever as a
first choice, even when other tools still have a good
chance of working. Third, advocating preemption
warns potential enemies to hide the very assets that
U.S. leaders might wish to take preemptive action
against or to defend the country from. Finally, if the
United States enshrines preemption as a core policy
doctrine, it legitimates the policys adoption by other
countries, which increases overall global instability
and reduces security, as other countries are emboldened to justify attacks on their enemies as preemptive
in nature. (see Box 8).
Let us be clear: preempting terrorist attacks through
the use of intelligence and police enforcement methods is to be valued as an important component in the
struggle against terrorism. But there needs to be a different emphasis on the use of military force than the
Bush administrations focus on preventive war.67
Deterrence should be the first step, recognizing that
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preemption is always legitimate under international

law, if there is a clear and demonstrable imminent
threat. The leadership of al-Qaida and similar groups
may not be deterrable and may require a military
response. If so, that use of force should have specific
authorization from the United Nations Security
Council, should include specific goals and a time
line, and should be under U.N. control. Any exercise
of force should adhere to international humanitarian
law and the principles of the just war tradition.
These principles require that: the objective must be
to establish peace, not to exact retribution or revenge;
the force used must be only the level necessary to
achieve a military objective, not to inflict unnecessary
suffering; the weapons used must discriminate
between combatants and noncombatants; and every
effort must be taken to avoid killing civilians.68

Specific initiatives should:

Support the creation of a U.N. Rapid Deployment
Police and Security Force.
Follow the steps outlined in international law when
confronting states accused of sponsoring terrorism, as was done with regard to Libya following
the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Unilateral
actions through aid, trade, and sanctions policies
or the use of military force are not prohibited, but
such actions should be grounded in international
law, and, all things being equal, multilateral action
is preferred to unilateral action.69
Limit the Ability of Terrorists to Mobilize Financial
Resources: In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the
Bush administration has supported a series of multi-

Box 8: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

By focusing on efforts to interdict terrorists outside of U.S. borders, this broad policy blueprint is intended to complement
the National Strategy for Homeland Security, which addresses security within U.S. borders. The National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism outlines an array of methods for dismantling terrorist networks and bringing terrorists to justice:
coordinating intelligence through the newly created Terrorist Threat Integration Center, using carrots (incentives) and sticks
(diplomatic and military pressure) to induce compliance among states suspected of harboring terrorists, and shutting
down terrorist financial channels. The national security state is alive and well: All bilateral and multilateral discussions
undertaken by all federal government departments and agencies are to include combating terrorism as a standard agenda item. There is even rhetorical attention given to addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism through economic
and political development efforts; however, only market-based economies are interpreted as anti-terrorist mechanisms.
The State Departmentworking with U.S. military regional commandersis given the lead role in coordinating regional strategies with international partners. As part of this strategy, the United States promises increased anti-terrorist training to foreign police and military forces. However, U.S. citizens have experienced counterterrorism being used to justify
constrictions of their own civil liberties, and the history of U.S. foreign military training indicates that the current counterterrorist mission may likewise be used overseas as one more pretext for violations of human rights.
The strategy endorses the 12 U.N. counterterrorism protocols and gives particular mention to the international standards for combating terrorism contained in UNSCR 1373. Yet, although expand[ing] our law enforcement effort to capture, detain and prosecute known and suspected terrorists is a declared priority, the principal international institution
dedicated in part to that purpose, the International Criminal Court, is ignored.
Released on the eve of an Iraq war defined as the new centerpiece of the war on terrorism, the strategy proclaimed
that we will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might. However, the post-Sept. 11 expenditure ratio of
military to nonmilitary activities allocated to combat terrorism, well over 5-to-1, would certainly dispute this declared intent.
Source: White House, National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/
02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf>.
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p. 29

lateral, bilateral, and domestic initiatives to target the

financial assets of terrorist organizations. This is an
important first step, and it reflects a 180-degree turnabout from the administrations prior opposition to
increased monitoring of money laundering and
tougher regulation of tax havens and offshore financial centers. Under provisions of the USA PATRIOT
Act, the United States came into full compliance at
the end of 2003 with all of the recommendations
that require special action by the leading international group working on money laundering and terrorist
financing, the Financial Action Task Force.70
Some terrorist groups, such as those in Europe, East
Asia, and Latin America, rely principally on common
criminal activities including extortion, kidnapping,
narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, and fraud. Other
groups, such as those in the Middle East, rely primarily on commercial enterprises, donations, and funds
skimmed from charitable organizations both to
finance their activities and to move materiel and personnel. Still other groups rely on state sponsors for
funding. In this latter case, a more sophisticated
approach is required to combat terrorist financing,
including efforts to regulate the trade in conflict diamonds or to develop alternatives to crops like opium
poppies and coca. Confronting state-funded terrorism also requires greater exercise of diplomatic skills,
technical assistance, and foreign aid than the Bush
administration has been willing to provide.71
Several recent reports have detailed weaknesses of
the broader efforts to crack down on terrorist financing.72 The U.S. General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, concluded that federal
authorities were struggling to halt terrorist funding
and still did not have a clear understanding of how
terrorists move their financial assets. According to the
United Nations Monitoring Group, al-Qaeda continues to receive funds it needs from charities, deeppocket donors and business and criminal activities,
including the drug trade. Extensive use is still being
made of alternative remittance systems, and al-Qaeda
has shifted much of its financial activity to areas in
Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia where
the authorities lack the resources or the resolve to
closely regulate such activity.73

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There has been a dramatic expansion of legislation

to combat money laundering and terrorist financing
at global, regional, and national levels. Except in
jurisdictions that do not have adequate legislation,
the major emphasis at the moment needs to be on
insuring effective implementation. This is the case
with many poor countries, which are still building
the capacity of regulators and law enforcement. In
such an effort, international cooperation is essential.
As a senior Treasury Department official told
Congress on March 24, 2004, we have found that
our success is also dependent on the political will and
resources of other governments.74 Both the Bush
administrations broader failure to support multilateralism and the growing anti-American sentiment
worldwide hamper such cooperation. The United
States needs to be a leader in this realm, but such
efforts are hindered both practically and symbolically
when it wasnt until 2004 that the Office of Foreign
Assets Control, the bureau of the U.S. Treasury primarily responsible for combating terrorist finance,
deployed more personnel to combat illegal financial
flows to al-Qaida and other organizations involved in
terrorism than to tracking illegal flows to Cuba.75
Specific initiatives should:
Implement all the recommendations of the Financial
Action Task Force, support the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Developments initiative on tax havens, and increase transparency in
international financial flows.76
Ratify the International Convention on the Suppression
of Financing of Terrorism and the U.N.
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime,
both of which the United States has signed.
Work with the Bank for International Settlements to
facilitate greater international cooperation among
central banks in order to develop effective means
to monitor financial flows.
Support the activities of the Egmont Group (the network
of government agencies responsible for addressing
money laundering) with both funding and technical assistance in order to expand the capacities of
other nations to combat money laundering.

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C. Defend and Promote Democracy at

Home and Abroad
They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.
Benjamin Franklin, 1759
Counterterrorist and anti-terrorist efforts should
not sacrifice the very values Americans are trying to
defend while combating terrorism. Washington must
listen closely to the mounting concerns of civil libertarians and constitutional rights groups who caution
that the new counterterrorism campaign may lead to
a garrison state that undermines all that America
stands for while doing little to protect citizens against
unconventional threats.
Many of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act
go far beyond what previous anti-terrorist commissions have prescribed regarding the need to expand
law enforcements power to fight terrorism. For
example, bipartisan commissionssuch as the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of
Mass Destruction (the Gilmore Commission) and the
National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer
Commission)noted that already-existing guidelines
for FBI investigations regarding terrorism were adequate in scope. The commissions reports emphasize
the more difficultbut more importanttasks of
effective cooperation and management of interagency
investigations and improved coordination among law
enforcement agencies at both the domestic and international levels. Such low-profile, low-impact activities
require greater attention but dont translate into
sound bites and press coverage.
Popular opposition to the chilling impact of the
USA PATRIOT Act and to executive orders on civil
liberties has led numerous states, cities, towns, and
counties to pass resolutions demanding that local law
enforcement not implement the provisions of those
regulations that infringe on civil rights.77 Such efforts
indicate how out-of-step the Bush administration is
with the broad American public regarding the balance between liberty and security.

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In the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks,

the Bush administration arrested or detained more
than 1,200 people, although the government has
refused to disclose exactly how many were apprehended, who they are, or what has happened to all of
them. Of these 1,200, at least 762 foreigners who
were inside the United States illegally were detained
as part of the FBIs investigation. More than 500
have been deported so far. A recent audit by the
inspector general at the Justice Department found
significant problems with the detentions, including
allegations of physical abuse. Only one of the
detained foreigners, Zacarias Moussaoui, has been
charged with a terrorism-related crime.
These roundups failed to locate terrorists and damaged one of the countrys greatest potential assets in
the war on terrorism: the communities of ArabAmericans and Muslim-Americans. The overemphasis
on the immigration system as a tool of border security has resulted in the arrest of a large number of
noncitizens on grounds not related to domestic security. This approach has been largely ineffective and
has provided the nation with a false sense of security.
In some cases, the administration simply used
immigration law as a proxy for criminal law enforcement, circumventing constitutional safeguards. In
other cases, the government seems to have acted out
of political expediency, creating a false appearance of
effectiveness without regard to the cost. The governments major successes in apprehending terrorists
have not come from post-Sept. 11 immigration initiatives but from other efforts, such as international
intelligence activities, law enforcement cooperation,
and information provided by arrests made abroad.
Washingtons harsh measures against immigrants
since September 11, 2001, have failed to make U.S.
citizens safer, have violated fundamental civil liberties, have weakened the economy, have reduced
worldwide support for the United States, and have
undermined national unity.78 In terms of the economy, the costs can include the potential to reduce the
number of foreign workers and foreign students in
science and technology, thereby possibly reducing
income to U.S. higher education institutions and,
ultimately, the strength and dynamism of a future
U.S. science and technology workforce. Half of all
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doctoral degrees in engineering, mathematics, and

computer science are issued to foreign students, and
unnecessarily restrictive immigration rules have made
it more difficult for them to work here, reducing
potential productivity in the U.S. economy.
Not satisfied with the new powers granted to it
under the USA PATRIOT Act, the Justice
Department drafted the Domestic Security
Enhancement Act of 2003 (or PATRIOT Act II),
which would continue to reduce checks and balances
on presidential power and which contains several
measures of questionable effectiveness that continue
to erode civil liberties.79 When the draft of PATRIOT
Act II was leaked, a public outcry forced Attorney
General Ashcroft to withdraw his explicit support.
But parts of the legislation are now being submitted
as amendments to other bills.
It is possible both to defend the country and to
protect core American values and principles, but
doing so requires a different approach, an approach
that does not sacrifice the very values that terrorists
seek to destroy, thereby granting them a de facto victory. A new approach would recognize that a balance
between liberty and security need not require sacrificing the former for the latter, and it would refuse to
sacrifice the fundamental elements of transparency
and accountability, which are necessary for democracy to remain vital. Specific initiatives should:
Review the USA PATRIOT Acts amendments to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allowing surveillance where foreign intelligence is a significant
purpose.
Pass legislation that preserves those provisions of the
USA PATRIOT Act that do not violate civil rights
provisions and are effective against terrorism, such
as the Civil Liberties Restoration Act and the
Security and Freedom Ensured (SAFE) Act.80
Oppose the use of military commissions to try terrorist
suspects under existing military orders and instructions. Such trials would undermine the basic rights
of defendants to a fair trial, would yield verdicts
possibly including death sentencesof questionable legitimacy, and would deliver a dangerous
message worldwide that the fight against terrorism
need not respect the rule of law.
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Regarding foreign policy, the administrations

approach to combating terrorism should embody
respect for the very human rights that America
defends and promotes at home. This means that citizens should loudly proclaim opposition to religious
extremism and to actions taken in its name, no matter who is the perpetrator. This also means that citizens should reject zealous policies that undermine
human rights normsincluding inflicting casualties
on innocent civiliansin the name of a war on terrorism, such as proposals for lifting restrictions on
the CIA to allow assassinations and the hiring of
human rights violatorsboth measures that the CIA
has itself rejected.
In forging international coalitions against terrorism,
the administration must not ease restrictions on the
provision of military aid, weapons, and military
training to regimes that systematically violate human
rights. According to Human Rights Watch, both the
executive and legislative branches have taken steps to
loosen legal controls on foreign military assistance,
paving the way for future arms transfers to governments that are known human rights abusers.81 This
is clearly the wrong path to take. Instead, the United
States should strengthen the international legal and
human rights regimes and should evaluate its own
foreign policies in light of those norms.
In a positive step, the U.N. Security Council has made
counterterrorist measures mandatory for all states.
However, it has excluded human rights from the work
of its Counter Terrorism Committee. Many regional
organizations have adopted their own counterterrorist
programs, often with sweeping definitions of terrorism and no reference to human rights. Some U.N.
human rights bodies and experts have raised concerns
but have been unable, by virtue of their limited mandates, to present a comprehensive analysis.
The U.S. should be at the forefront of insuring that
counterterrorism operations are intimately linked
with human rights concerns. It should insure adequate support for the newly created post of an independent expert to assist both individual nations and
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in
making recommendations on states obligations to
promote and protect human rights while countering
terrorism. The United States should also insure that
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the U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee expands its

scope to include monitoring the impact of counterterrorist measures on human rights.82

D. Attack Root Causes

Combating terrorism requires looking beyond any
one terrorist eventhorrific as it may beto address
the broader socioeconomic, political, and military
contexts from which terrorism emerges. Because terrorism is a particular kind of violent act aimed at
achieving a political objective, a preventive strategy
must also address its political roots. Addressing root
causes is neither a panacea nor appeasement but is
instead both a pragmatic effort to address the conditions that enable terrorism and a normative commitment to shape government policies to embody the
values that America espouses. A focus on addressing
the political origins of terrorism does not mean that
U.S. and international authorities should refrain from
hunting down those responsible for terrorist acts. The
success of these policies will only be fully realized
when there are no more breeding grounds for terrorist politics.
U.S. policy must recognize a distinction between
international terrorism in general and the specific
threat posed by al-Qaida and other extremist Islamist
movements. Care must be taken to insure that the
United States is not perceived as waging a war on
Islam, and attention must be focused on the contrast
between illegitimate demands and legitimate
demands pursued through illegitimate means. The
anti-democratic and jihadist character of al-Qaidas
ideology suggests that even if the United States were
to pursue the kinds of alternative policies outlined
here, Americans would still be targets of attacks by
committed members of al-Qaida and similar groups.
Some political and economic contexts that nurture or
trigger terrorism include: repressive political regimes,
which limit the opportunities for nonviolent expressions of political grievances; failed and failing states,
which provide terrorists with unregulated arenas for
operations; poverty and inequality, which can
enhance support for terrorist acts and provide a
source of recruits, even though poverty itself does not
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tionalize a position of global dominance, including

through alliances with repressive regimes. Addressing
root causes is one way of insuring that the efforts of
terrorist groups to mobilize support meet as inhospitable a social, economic, and political climate as
possible.
Specific initiatives should:
1. Strengthen and Democratize International
Bodies for Effective Global Governance:
By proclaiming global dominance as its overarching
strategic objective, the United States has made itself a
target. Bushs pursuit of the preventive war doctrine
as the foundation of such dominanceembodied in
the invasion and occupation of Iraqcan be used to
justify the argument that the current war on terrorism is in fact a war on Islam. And Washingtons current foreign policy has further reinforced the beliefs
of those who argue that the United States is an imperial power intent on holding itself above the law.
In addition to strengthening the U.N. and other
multilateral institutions, the United States must
reconfigure its approach to security. We suggest a
dual focus: on the cooperative arrangements necessary to insure our protection in an era of international terrorist networks with global reach, and on deterrence against possible threats from state antagonists.
Such efforts require a vibrant network of global,
regional, and bilateral alliances whereby the security
of the world strengthens the security of America.
2. End Support for Repressive Regimes:
Longstanding U.S. government support for repressive regimesparticularly in the Arab world, but in
the Muslim world more broadlyhas facilitated conditions where terrorism can emerge. U.S. support for
autocratic governments such as Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, and Indonesia under Suharto closed off
nonviolent forms of political competition among the
local citizens. Local rulers, like those in Saudi Arabia,
have largely turned a blind eye to the financing of
movements and organizations that promote antidemocratic ideologies and, in some cases, engage in
terrorist acts. Washington must, in both word and

p. 33

deed, make a clean break with its history of support

for such regimes throughout the world.

institutions, the United States is more likely to

become a target of terrorists.

Despite claims by the Bush administration and others that poverty is a key cause of terrorism (a point
we discuss in more detail below), it is political conditions that most shape terrorism. As a National
Academy of Sciences study noted, terrorism and its
supporting audiences appear to be fostered by policies
of extreme political repression and discouraged by
policies of incorporating both dissident and moderate
groups into civil society and the political process.83

The kinds of policies that would be most effective in

reducing U.S. support for repressive regimes would
include: withholding military aid and opposing weapons
sales to countries that systematically violate basic
human rights; increasing support for human rights
and democracy in North Africa, the Middle East,
Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Colombia, and elsewhere through bilateral and multilateral initiatives;
reducing the dependence of the United States and its
allies on oil imports from repressive governments.

Similarly, the global projection of U.S. military

power abroad, represented by a growing archipelago
of overseas military bases, often serves as a physical
reminder of U.S. political and military support for
repressive governments. Recognizing that this in no
way absolves terrorists of culpability in their attacks,
reorienting U.S. policy along the lines of respecting
basic human rights and democratic freedoms could
still contribute to easingnot eliminatingthe conditions associated with terrorism.
Let us be clear: democracy is not a panacea, nor are
there any panaceas for combating terrorism.
Democratic countries such as Spain, Italy, Japan, and
Germany have confronted sustained activities by terrorist organizations. Furthermore, there is no reason
to believe that increased democracy will necessarily,
in the short term, lead to a decline in radical Islamist
political movements that oppose many U.S. policies,
including U.S. support for Israel. But increasing the
political space for nonviolent political conflict is the
best long-term solution for minimizing the choice by
either organizations or individuals to use terrorism to
advance their goals.
As a global power, the United States is always likely
to be a potential target for terrorists, whatever policies Washington pursues. Americas best defense is to
insure that its foreign policies defend and promote
basic human rights and democracy. This is both
because these values embody the best of America and
because when democratic institutions are present and
human rights are respected, terrorism of any sort is
less likely. When Washingtons policies undermine
rather than promote human rights and democratic

p. 34

3. Deal with Failed States:

Since the early 1990s, wars involving failed states
have resulted in the deaths of about 8 million peoplemost of them civilianswhile displacing another 4 million. These states include Afghanistan,
Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
the Sudan, where those impoverished, malnourished,
and deprived of fundamental needs such as security,
health care, and education number in the hundreds
of millions. Before the toppling of the World Trade
Center buildings, the issue of failed states was routinely framed as an issue of humanitarian concern
(i.e., refugees and reconstruction). But the events of
September 11 and its aftermath have placed the issue
of failed states squarely in the mainstream of traditional national security policy both in the United
States and abroad. Although foreshadowed by earlier
security strategy documents under the Clinton
administration, post-Sept. 11 concern over failed
states has dominated policy debates regarding security, development, humanitarian intervention, and the
balance of unilateral and multilateral approaches to
foreign policy.84
Failed states have become central elements of concern for security policy for several reasons: they can
serve as operational bases and safe-havens for international terrorists; they can often spawn wider regional
conflicts, which can substantially weaken security and
retard development in their subregions; and they can
induce significant costs for the United States in terms
of refugee flows, lost trade and investment opportunities, increased spread of infectious diseases,
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weapons proliferation, billions of dollars in humanitarian aid, and the emergence of regional complexes
of war and organized crime.
The failure of the Bush administration to develop
an effective strategy to deal with the complex security
challenges posed by failed, failing, and flailing states
is by now apparent and illustrates, yet again, the dangers of framing efforts to combat terrorism as a war
on terrorism. The Afghanistan situation, and the
broader reality that weak and failing states can provide enabling conditions for the operations of terrorist networks, has highlighted the need for increasing
the U.N.s capacity to engage in peace enforcement,
peacekeeping, and other nation-building activities.
Yet Washington remains unwilling to expand support
for U.N. peacekeeping operations. Michael
OHanlon of the Brookings Institution estimates that
the world should double its capacity to engage in
peacekeeping operations, which would provide a
valuable and constructive role for U.S. military assistance that might otherwise be channeled to repressive
governments.85 These missions are important not
only for humanitarian reasons but for national security ones as wellto deprive terrorists of sanctuaries
and sources of income (from diamonds, drug trading,
and the like) that they can often obtain in failed or
failing states.
Specific initiatives should:
Strengthen the multilateral forces involved in
Afghanistan to provide the security necessary for
reconstruction and development; and
Expand support for peacekeeping initiatives through
the U.S. Armys Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute at Carlisle Barracks and expand military
assistance aimed at strengthening other countries
efforts to engage in peacekeeping operations.
4. Reorient U.S. Policy in the Middle East and
Central Asia:
U.S. policy in the Middle East and Central Asia
must also shift. Such a reorientation would include
efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and
to address the political grievances behind continuing
unrest in the region. But U.S. efforts to advance
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democratic politics in the Middle East face a serious

credibility gap due to Washingtons longstanding support for authoritarian regimes in the region, its continued support for the Israeli occupation, and its
invasion and occupation of Iraq, exacerbated by revelations of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison.86 As the U.S.
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab
and Muslim World highlighted in its October 2003
report, hostility toward America [in the Muslim
world] has reached shocking levels.87
Such a reorientation is perfectly compatible with
opposing the bigotry embodied in both al-Qaidas
and other extremist groups opposition to Israels existence. Washington should continue its strategic and
moral commitment to Israels right to exist, but there
is a distinction between a countrys right to exist and
its decision to occupy neighboring lands (i.e., the
West Bank and Gaza). Support for the Israeli occupation plays a major role in fueling anti-American
extremism, sentiments that al-Qaida has opportunistically used to its own advantage. For example, it was
not until Osama bin Ladens fourth call to arms,
issued on the eve of the bombardment of Afghanistan
on October 7, 2001, that he focused on Israels occupation of Palestinian lands.88 U.S. credibility in the
region and prospects for advancing other objectives
are essentially nil until a political settlement is
reached in Palestine. As Thomas Carothers has noted,
Real progress with the credibility gap probably cannot be achieved without a substantial rebalancing of
the U.S. approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
which appears unlikely to occur under the Bush
administration.89
At the rhetorical level, the Bush administration has
acknowledged the valuable role that democracy can
play in reducing the attractiveness of terrorism. Bushs
initiatives include: a new aid programthe Middle
East Partnership Initiativeto support democratic
change, the reorientation of existing aid programs in
the Arab world to sharpen their pro-democratic content, a diplomatic stance consisting of giving greater
praise to those Arab governments that do take positive political steps and putting a little more pressure
on those that do not, and a new push to promote
Arab economic reform and free trade (with the hope

p. 35

that improved economic conditions will, over the

long term, stimulate political reform).

rily through the United Nations to promote

reconstruction and development;

Iraq is not likely to serve as a demonstration project

for democratization in the region, even if a stable
democracy is installed, which does not seem likely in
the foreseeable future, because Iraq does not represent
a model of internally generated democratization that
could be emulated elsewhere in the region, as happened in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the
1980s and 1990s. Instead, it hinges on the much
less appealing example of what the application of
enormous foreign military force and subsequent
political intervention and economic aid can make
possible.90

Encourage Iraqi efforts to form a Truth and

Reconciliation Commission, a tribunal, or some
other mechanism to hold accountable those guilty
of crimes against humanity and other human rights
violations. An immediate step would be to open
the files on all U.S. government involvement and
relations with the reign of Saddam Hussein; and

Moreover, the Bush administrations predilection for

unilateralism has weakened even its small efforts at promoting democratic reform in the region. After a draft
copy of its Greater Middle East initiative was leaked
in February 2004, the White House had to quickly
backpedal.91 The final version of the Broader Middle
East and North Africa Initiative has been largely
defanged of any significant goals or benchmarks. In
moving ahead, the Bush administration would do
better to work with the Europeans and to start with
smaller, focused initiatives. As Thomas Carothers
notes, The effort can succeed only if it eschews
some of the signature elements of that campaign to
date, such as the dubious philosophy of youre either
with us or against us and the misguided notion that
creating fear in the Arab world breeds respect.92

An expansion of broad-based development can

weaken local support for terrorist activities and discourage terrorist recruits. Sincere, bottom-up, indigenous-guided development can thwart efforts by terrorist groups to entice destitute recruits by offering
social services or financial incentives. On the other
hand, promises of development that are unfulfilled or
underfunded, or development projects and programs
that exacerbate inequalities and grievances, can backfire and actually reinforce support for extremist
groups.93 Current research suggests that there is no
easy, generalizable conclusion in either direction, but
poverty deserves to be fought on its own terms, independent of its connections, presumed or otherwise,
to terrorism.

Specific initiatives should:

End U.S. financial and military backing for the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza;
Advocate Palestinian self-determination and a negotiated settlement as outlined in U.N. Security
Council resolutions;
Spearhead efforts to create a zone free from weapons
of mass destruction in the Middle East;
Strengthen the multilateral forces involved in
Afghanistan to provide the security necessary for
reconstruction and development;
Set an immediate timetable for the withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Iraq and channel support primap. 36

Underwrite efforts to provide secular and nonsectarian education as an alternative to religious schools
that promote violent jihadist ideologies.
5. Address Poverty and Inequality:

The Bush administration has justified its push for

greater free trade on the grounds that free trade
reduces poverty, which in turn reduces terrorism.
There is good reason to doubt all the connections in
that syllogism.94 In September 2002, the administration included a chapter in its National Security
Strategy of the United States of America on the
importance of trade and investment liberalization in
the fight against terrorism. The argument is based on
the unfounded claim that the current approach to
globalization reduces poverty.
According to the World Bank, extreme poverty
increased in every region of the developing world
outside Asia during the past decade, a period when
nearly all countries pursued reforms aimed at opening their countries to the global economy. Excluding
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China, which still maintains strong government

intervention in many areas of its economy, the number of extremely poor people in the developing world
increased in the 1990s. So it is entirely unclear that
the Bush administrations emphasis on trade liberalization has had a significant impact on reducing
poverty. Furthermore, there appears to be greater evidence that terrorism on the part of subnational
groups is associated with political repression, especially the repression of efforts to articulate national and
religious identities.95
Development policies that weaken states capacities
to insure access to, or provision of, basic services can
create conditions in which terrorist groups can more
easily mobilize support. At the global level, the Bush
administration should end its support for trade and
investment agreements that reinforce the discredited
policies of the Washington Consensus. Instead, the
United States should reorient discussions at bilateral,
regional, and global economic organizations and meetings toward creating a multilateral framework more
conducive to the development of poor countries.96
Washington should also reduce the debt owed to it
by developing countries, champion debt reduction
efforts at the international financial institutions, and
seek an end to structural adjustment lending by the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Critics may note that such an agenda does not
address the root causes of terrorism, since poor people are not, by and large, leaders of terrorist movements, or even, in the case of al-Qaida, the actual
foot soldiers in attacks such as the Sept. 11 skyjackings. Furthermore, critics argue, even the countries of
origin of the Sept. 11 highjackers do not rank among
the poorest countries. But anti-poverty policies and
programs are one important element of the broader
arsenal of anti-terror programs, embodying, if nothing else, a healthy dose of enlightened self-interest.
An effective strategy to combat terrorism would promote a policy agenda including the following three
distinct but related poverty-alleviation approaches:
First, although rarely drawn from the poorest of the
poor, terrorists can use poor peoples grievances to

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legitimate terrorist actions and to raise funds as

part of their proclaimed efforts at combating
poverty or providing relief and welfare programs
to communities that are neither reached by economic growth nor helped by government programs. Genuine, redistributive development can
weaken the ability of terrorists to claim the mantle
of legitimacy and can thereby serve to weaken
their cause.
Second, the United States can gain greater international cooperation in the effort to combat terrorism if it is seen as a good partner with other countries around issues of primary concern to them
and their citizens. Poverty and development are
such issues.
Third, carefully crafted development projects can
help strengthen the capabilities of states whose
cooperation is necessary in efforts to combat terrorist financing. Sustainable economic growth can
be both a source and a product of increasing state
capacity for regulation.
A commitment to this three-pronged approach would
demonstrate that the United States is concerned
about the deepening social and economic polarization
around the world and, instead of pursuing economic
strategies that contribute to these deepening divides,
is committed to formulating policies that hold more
promise for the worlds poor and disenfranchised.
Pursuing policies that strengthen the developmental
and democratic prospects for peoples worldwide will
not render America immune from terrorist attacks.
But such a commitment would likely be more effective in diminishing terrorist threats than a reliance on
military responses, and it would help solidify a
worldwide alliance uniting Northern and Southern
nations to hold terrorists accountable for their
crimes. Terrorists would then have nowhere to hide.
6. Promote Clean Energy:
The United States should pursue an energy policy at
home and abroad that emphasizes conservation, energy efficiency, and renewables and that makes itself
and its allies less reliant on imported oil supplies.97

p. 37

V. Changing Course
The sobering reality of terrorism is that it constitutes a threat to individual, national, and international security that can never be completely eliminated.
Despite Americas best efforts, there will always be
ideologues, fanatics, and alienated groups that may
resort to terrorism to express their frustration and to
make their political point.
No single component of the framework outlined
above is an adequate response to terrorism. Only by
joining all four strategiespursuing prevention and
preparedness, strengthening the international framework for multilateral action, defending and promoting civil rights, and addressing root causeswill the
U.S. government be able to tell the American people
that it is doing all that it can to prevent future terrorist attacks. Our proposed security strategy would be
more effective at making the U.S. a safer place for all
its citizens. It would also have the added advantages
of improving the nations quality of life by improving
public safety, health care, and air quality.
The 9/11 Commission has accomplished a great
deal by placing this debate at the forefront of policy
debates. But its recommendations focus somewhat
narrowly on intelligence operations and congressional
oversight without addressing the broader foreign policy, military, and homeland security issues that are
equally important to constructing an effective
response to terrorism. Its contribution, while essential, remains inadequate to forging the comprehensive
strategy necessary to effectively combat terrorism.
Combating terrorism should not become a crusade
that trumps all other policy concerns. Commitments
to environmental protection, human rights, democratic political transitions, economic development,
poverty alleviation, disarmament, and gender equalityto name a few of the stated U.S. policy goals
must remain strong. But neither can counterterrorism
simply be appended to these policy imperatives.

p. 38

The challenge is to construct a national security

policy that demonstrates Americas new commitment
to protecting U.S. citizens by incorporating effective
counterterror measures into the national security
strategy. At the same time, American citizens must
demand and U.S. foreign policy must assert a
renewed commitment to constructing an international framework of peace, justice, and security that locks
terrorists out in the coldwith no home, no supporters, no money, and no rallying cry. With that
response, the events of September 11, 2001, will
indeed have changed America and the world.
This framework for a new counterterrorism policy
represents the views of FPIF co-directors and staff
but does not necessarily reflect the views of either the
FPIF Advisory Committee or the board members of
FPIFs two sponsoring organizations, the
Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute
for Policy Studies. John Gershman, <john@irconline.org>, who is a co-director of Foreign Policy In
Focus (online at www.fpif.org), was the principal
author of this reform agenda along with Emira
Woods, Erik Leaver, Miriam Pemberton, Emily
Schwartz Greco, Theo Rose, and Julie Ajinkya.
We appreciate the advice, comments, and criticisms
offered by Robert Alvarez, Sarah Anderson, Tom
Barry, Salih Booker, Elsbeth L. Bothe, John
Cavanagh, Marcus Corbin, David Cortright,
Kristen Dawkins, Margot Dick, Lloyd J. Dumas,
Rev. Dr. Robert W. Edgar, John Feffer, Van Gosse,
William D. Hartung, Colleen Kelly, Michael Klare,
Charles Knight, Lawrence J. Korb, Saul Landau,
Jules Lobel, Steve LaMontagne, Robert K. Musil,
Dan Smith, Joe Stork, Joe Volk, Bruce Zagaris, John
Zavales, and Stephen Zunes while not holding them
responsible for any of the positions or conclusions
herein.

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Endnotes
1

The General Assemblys Sixth Committee is currently considering a

draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that
would include a definition of terrorism, if adopted. For more on
this, refer to the Web site of the Sixth Committee at:
<http://www.un.org/ga/57/sixth/index.html>.

All data is from the corrected version of the Patterns of Global

Terrorism 2003 report issued by the State Department. A significant international terrorist event is defined as such by the State
Department if it results in loss of life or serious injury to persons,
major property damage (more than $10,000), and/or is an act or
attempt that could reasonably be expected to create the conditions
noted. Controversy over the original version of the Patterns of Global
Terrorism 2003 report raised concerns about methodology and possible political manipulation of the document. The report was revised
to show an increase in significant terrorist attacks in 2003 over 2002
and 2001. This report was the first to use data generated by the
recently created Terrorist Threat Integration Center. See
<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/> for the revised data.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global

Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 28.

Steven Simon, Update on the War on Terror, RAND

Corporation, September 17, 2003. See also Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The
Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2002) and Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam (New York: Columbia
University Press, forthcoming). For a discussion of the nature of the
Afghan-Pakistan network, see: Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier
Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2004); Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al
Qaeda (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Jason Burke,
Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I.B. Taurus, 2003);
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New
York: Random House, 2003); Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of
God (New York: Harper Collins, 2003); and Jessica Stern, The
Protean Enemy, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey,

2003/2004 (London: IISS, 2004).

Ibid.

See Thomas P. Barnett, The Pentagons New Map (New York: G.P.
Putnam, 2004), p. 31.

U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of Randall A. Yim,

Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues,
Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, Testimony to the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives, GAO-04-408T, February 3, 2004, at:
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04408t.pdf>.

For the cost of the Iraq War see Institute for Policy Studies and
Foreign Policy In Focus, Paying the Price: The Mounting Costs of the
Iraq War, June 2004 at: <http://www.fpif.org/papers/0406costsofwar.html>. Also see U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Military Operations: Fiscal Year 2004 Costs for the Global War on
Terrorism Will Exceed Supplemental, Requiring DOD to Shift Funds

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from Other Uses, GAO-04-915, July 2004 at:

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04915.pdf>.
10

Center for Defense Information, Security after 9/11: Strategy Choices

and Budget Tradeoffs, January 2003, p. 7. For example, the
Department of Defenses FY 2003 budget is about $48 billion higher than the last pre-Sept. 11, 2001, annual defense budget. This represents a real increase of 15 percent. Yet only about one-third of this
increase appears to be for programs closely related to homeland
security and combating terrorism. Such activities continue to absorb
a relatively small share of the DoDs overall budget. The Office of
Management and Budget and the DoD estimate that the DoD
spent roughly $20 billion on these activities in FY 2003 and will
spend about the same in FY 2004. This is approximately 5 percent
of the annual defense budget. Even given ambiguities in classification, it is difficult to consider more than 20 percent of the DoD
budget as essential to counterterrorism operations or capabilities.
Also see Foreign Policy In Focus/Center for Defense Information
Task Force, A Unified Security Budget For the United States, March
2004 at: <http://www.fpif.org/pdf/defensereport/fulltext.pdf>.

11

See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States

at: <http://www.9-11commission.gov/> and Joint Inquiry into
Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001, at: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html>.

12

See, for example, William Odom, Fixing Intelligence: For a More

Secure America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003)
among others.

13

See Congressional Research Service, The Department of States

Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors, and Related
Issues, June 1, 2004, at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32417.pdf>.

14

David Cole and James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution

(New York: New Press, 2002). Also see: Nancy Chang. Silencing
Political Dissent (New York: Seven Stories, 2002); Richard C. Leone
and Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties
in an Age of Terrorism (New York: Century Foundation and Public
Affairs, 2003); and see the work on these issues by the American
Civil Liberties Union at:
<http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12126&c=2
07>, the Center for Democracy and Technology at:
<http://www.cdt.org/security/010911response.shtml>, the Center
for Constitutional Rights at: <http://www.ccr-ny.org/>, and the
Rights Working Group at: <http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/>.

15

For example, several participants in the Information Sharing and

Analysis Centers noted that some companies were unwilling to share
essential information because of potential malicious misuse by other
private businesses. U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of
Robert F. Dacey, Director, Information Security Issues, Critical
Infrastructure Protection: Establishing Effective Information Sharing
with Infrastructure Sectors, Testimony before the Subcommittees on
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development and on
Infrastructure and Border Security, Select Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives, April 21, 2004, p. 33. This is a
small example of the broader problemabsent a more active governmental role in facilitating collaboration among the private com-

p. 39

panies that control and operate critical infrastructure, responses are

likely to be suboptimal, with potentially disastrous results.
16

For a general resource on issues relating to first responders, see the

National Academies at: <http://search.nap.edu/shelves/first/>.

17

Victor W. Sidel and Barry S. Levy, War, Terrorism and Public

Health, Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics, vol. 31, no. 4, Winter
2003, pp. 516-23 and Victor W. Sidel, R.M. Gould, and H.W.
Cohen, Bioterrorism Preparedness: Cooptation of Public Health,
Medicine and Global Survival, vol. 7, 2002, pp. 82-9.

18

Victor W. Sidel and Barry S. Levy, War, Terrorism and Public

Health, Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics, vol. 31, no. 4, Winter
2003, p. 518.

19

Human Rights Watch, Empty Promises: Diplomatic Assurances No

Safeguard against Torture, April 15, 2004, at:
<http://hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/>.

20

For additional discussion on the failures of the Bush administration

to adequately address the challenge of reconstruction in
Afghanistan, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance:
Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten
Afghanistans Stability, GAO-03-607, June 2003 at:
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03607.pdf> and Afghanistan
Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have
Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed, GAO-04403, June 2004 at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04403.pdf>
and work from Foreign Policy In Focus, such as Mark Sedra,
Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction: Where Do We Go From
Here? March 2003 at: <http://www.fpif.org/papers/03afghan/> and
Mark Sedra and Peter Middlebrook, Afghanistans Problematic Path to
Peace: Lessons in State Building in the Post-September 11 Era, March
2004 at: <http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004afgh-stbuild.html>. For
an excellent overview of the impact of U.S. assistance to the resistance against the Soviet Union see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret
History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2003).

21

Cited in David Mepham, Tackling the Roots of Terrorism:

Broadening the International Security Agenda, New Economy, vol.
9, no. 4, December 2002, pp.189-193.

22

For examples of the kind of work that represents such a framework,

see: Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror
(New York: Random House, 2003); Bruce Hoffman, Inside
Terrorism (New York: Colombia University Press, 1998); Paul Pillar,
Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings
Institution Press, 2001); Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective
Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Charles
Tilly, Violence, Terror and Politics as Usual, Boston Review, vol.
27, nos. 3-4, Summer 2002 at:
<http://www.bostonreview.net/BR27.3/tilly.html>; Charles Tilly,
Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists, Sociological Theory, vol. 22, no. 1,
March 2004; and Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve:
Globalization and International Terrorism, International Security,
vol. 27, no. 3, Winter 2002/03, pp. 30-58. For previous works, see
Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt,
Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering the New
Terrorism (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999).

23

See, for example, the much more nuanced understanding present in

Matthew J. Morgan, The Origins of the New Terrorism,
Parameters, Spring 2004 at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/
usawc/Parameters/04spring/morgan.pdf>.

p. 40

24

For discussions of the dangers of declaring a war on terrorism as

well as problems with this particular global war on terrorism, see
Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning without War (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, September 2003) and
Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (Strategic
Studies Institute of the Army War College, December 2003). Other
views include Richard Falk, The Great Terror War (New York:
Interlink, 2003).

25

Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of

the United States Government FY2005 (Washington: OMB, 2005),
pp. 25-39. See also Michael E. OHanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H.
Daalder, I. M. Destler, David Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James
Steinberg, Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 2003), p. xii. Reliable data on
private sector expenditures on homeland security is particularly difficult to obtain. The most-cited study by Deloitte Consulting and
Aviation Week estimate that private sector spending on homeland
security was between $45.9 billion and $76.5 billion in FY2003 and
would be around $46 billion for FY2004. See Anthony L. Velocci,
Jr., Emerging Security Market Promising But Diffuse, Aviation
Week and Space Technology, June 10, 2002, at:
<http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20020610/
aw46.htm>. This study relied on a survey of executives, but other
surveys by the Conference Board find little evidence of large increases in homeland security spending after FY 2003. A more recent
study estimated the amount of private sector homeland security
expenditure that would be accessible to homeland security product
and service providers at between $6 and $7 billion annually. Civitas
Group LLC, The Homeland Security Market, June 2004 at:
<http://www.civitasgroup.com/reports/20040627.pdf>.

26

For the statement, see Statement and Recommendations on Visa

Problems Harming Americas Scientific, Economic, and Security
Interests, May 12, 2004, at:
<http://www.aau.edu/resources/JointVisaStatement.pdf>.

27

See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States

at: <http://www.9-11commission.gov/> and Joint Inquiry into
Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001, at: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
serialset/creports/911.html>.

28

The CIA has: doubled the size of its Counterterrorist Center,

quadrupled the number of personnel engaged in counterterrorism
analysis, detailed 25 experienced analysts to work with their counterparts at the FBI, and created the position of associate director of
central intelligence for homeland security to facilitate the flow of
intelligence to agencies engaged in homeland security. The FBI has:
disrupted terrorist plots on U.S. soil; established 66 Joint Terrorism
task forces across America with full participation from and enhanced
communications with multiple federal, state, and local agencies; created a National Joint Terrorism task force at FBI headquarters;
established a Counterterrorism Watch center; initiated new counterterrorism Flying Squads to deploy at a moments notice; set up
Intelligence Reports offices to facilitate the vital flow of information;
and trained new analysts for the Counterterrorism Division.

29

See, for example, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/

steinberg20030214.htm>.

30

See, for example, the discussions of an alternative approach, the creation of a National Counter Terrorism Center, proposed by the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for

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Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore

Commission) in its Fourth Annual Report to the President and the
Congress, December 15, 2002, at: <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/
terrpanel/terror4.pdf>.
31

See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States

at: <http://www.9-11commission.gov/> and Statement of Laurie E.
Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues, and
Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architecture
and Systems Issues, FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make
Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities,
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and
the Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, March 23,
2004.

32

U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Progress Made

in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, GAO-03759T, June 18, 2003, p. 13.

33

Robert Block, Gary Fields, and Jo Wrighton, U.S. Terror List Still
Lacking, Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2004.

34

Michael E. OHanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M.

Destler, David Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James Steinberg,
Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 2003), p. xix.

35

36

Cindy Williams, Paying for the War on Terrorism: U.S. Security

Choices since 9/11, Paper prepared for ECAAR panel, Allied Social
Sciences Association annual meetings, January 5, 2004, at:
<http://www.ecaar.org/Articles/williams.pdf>.
See U.S. General Accounting Office, Maritime Security: Substantial
Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective
Port Security, GAO-04-838, June 30, 2004, at:
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04838.pdf>. For weaknesses in the
security of international ports, see International Maritime
Organization, ISPS Code Status Update 05: Continued Improvement
in ISPS Code Implementation, June 30, 2004, at:
<http://www.imo.org/home.asp>.

37

U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of Robert F. Dacey,

Director, Information Security Issues, Critical Infrastructure
Protection: Establishing Effective Information Sharing with
Infrastructure Sectors, Testimony before the Subcommittees on
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development and on
Infrastructure and Border Security, Select Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives, April 21, 2004, p. 30.

38

Ibid., p. 37.

39

U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of John B. Stephenson,

Director Natural Resources and Environment, Homeland Security:
Federal Action Needed to Address Security Challenges at Chemical
Facilities, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives, GAO-04-482T,
February 23, 2004, at:
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04482t.pdf>.

40

U.S. General Accounting Office, Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way

at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness Is
Unknown, GAO-03-439, March 14, 2003, at:
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03439.pdf>.

41

Discussions of the vulnerabilities of the food system predate the

Sept. 11 attacks. For example: T. M. Wilson, L. Logan Henfrey, R.
Weller, and B. Kellman, Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and

www.fpif.org
A Think Tank Without Walls

Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture, in C. Brown and

C. Bolin, eds., Emerging Diseases of Animals (Washington: ASM
Press, 2000), p. 2357; Dorothy B. Preslar, Director,
AHEAD/ILIAD, The Role of Disease Surveillance in the Watch
for Agroterrorism or Economic Sabotage, November 2000 at:
<http://www.fas.org/ahead/bwconcerns/agroterror.htm>; J. Ban,
Agricultural Biological Warfare: An Overview, The Arena, no. 9
(Washington: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, June
2000); R. Casagrande, Biological Terrorism Targeted at Agriculture:
The Threat to U.S. National Security, Nonproliferation Review, vol.
7, no. 3, 2000, p. 92105; and A. S. Kohnen, Responding to the
Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations for the United
States Department of Agriculture, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs discussion paper 200029, Executive Session on
Domestic Preparedness discussion paper ESDP200004 (John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October
2000) at: <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/
documents/Responding_to_the_Threat_of_Agroterrorism.pdf>.
42

Committee on Biological Threats to Agricultural Plants and

Animals, National Research Council, Countering Agricultural
Bioterrorism (Washington: National Academies Press, 2002).

43

Ibid.

44

For other discussions, see S. M. Whitby, Biological Warfare Against

Crops (Baskingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002).

45

National Research Council, Information Technology for

Counterterrorism: Immediate Actions and Future Possibilities
(Washington: National Academies Press, 2003), p. 2.

46

Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National

Research Council, Cybersecurity Today and Tomorrow: Pay Now or
Pay Later (Washington: National Academies Press, 2002) and
National Research Council, Information Technology for
Counterterrorism: Immediate Actions and Future Possibilities
(Washington: National Academies Press, 2003), pp. 97-98.

47

As with the definition of terrorism, defining cyberterrorism is also

fraught with difficulties. We have adapted the definition by Mark
Pollitt, Cyberterrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated
attack against information, computer systems, computer programs,
and data which result in violence against noncombatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents, in Mark Pollitt,
CyberterrorismFact or Fancy, Proceedings of the 20th National
Information Systems Security Conference, October 1997 at:
<http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/pollitt.html>.

48

Remarks by Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge to the

Electronics Industries Alliance, April 23, 2002, available at:
<http://www.eia.org/events/springconf/remarks_ridge_1.phtml>.

49

Mark Pollitt, CyberterrorismFact or Fancy, Proceedings of the

20th National Information Systems Security Conference, October 1997
at: <http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/pollitt.html>.
See also Dorothy Denning, Is Cyberterror Next? at:
<http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/denning.htm>.

50

Glenn C. Buchan, Implications of Information Vulnerabilities for

Military Operations, in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, John P. White, eds.,
The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 1999) at: <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/
MR1016/MR1016.chap10.pdf>.

51

Alan Feuer and Benjamin Weiser, Translation: The How-to Book

of Terrorism, New York Times, April 5, 2001.

p. 41

52

Joshua Green, The Myth of Cyberterrorism, Washington Monthly,

November 2002, available at:
<http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/
0211.green.html>.

53

Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security,

Progress and Challenges in Securing the Nations Cyberspace, July 2004
at: <http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
OIG_CyberspaceRpt_Jul04.pdf>.

54

Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security,

Improvements Needed to DHS Information Technology Management
Structure, July 2004 at: <http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/
assetlibrary/OIG_CIOReport_0704.pdf>.

55

George V. Hulme, Investments In Antivirus Software Are Paying

Off, Information Week, May 3, 2004, at:
<http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml?
articleID=19205575>.

56

Michael A. Vatis, Cyber Security: The Challenges Facing Our

Nation in Critical Infrastructure Protection, Testimony before the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform,
Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental
Relations and the Census, April 8, 2003, at:
<http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/ISTS/ists_docs/
testimony_whatsnew.htm>.

57

Large skyscrapers are defined as the roughly 500 skyscrapers with

occupants of 5,000 or more. See Michael OHanlon et al., op. cit.,
p. 55.

58

See Council on Foreign Relations, Emergency Responders: Drastically

Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared, July 2003, p. 2.

63

59

For a detailed discussion, see CFR Task Force, Council on Foreign

Relations, AmericaStill Unprepared, Still in Danger (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2002) at:
<http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Homeland_TF.pdf>, pp. 34-36.

Tamar Gabelnick and Rachel Stohl, eds., Challenging Conventional

Wisdom: Debunking the Myths and Exposing the Risks of Arms Export
Reform (Washington: Federation of American Scientists and Center
for Defense Information, 2003), pp. 213-19.

64

60

On the broad public health issues, see Joshua Shemer and Yehuda
Shoenfeld, Terror and Medicine: Medical Aspects of Biological,
Chemical and Radiological Terrorism (Lengerich, Germany: Pabst
Science Publishers, 2003). On the methodology for establishing criteria to evaluate the readiness of metropolitan regions to respond to
terrorist attacks, see Frederick J. Manning and Lewis Goldfrank,
eds., Preparing for Terrorism: Tools for Evaluating the Metropolitan
Medical Response System Program (Washington: National Academy of
Sciences Press, 2002). For issues involving psychological impacts, see
Institute of Medicine, Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of
Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy (Washington: National Academy
of Sciences Press, 2003). Concerns about weaknesses in the public
health infrastructure that were highlighted in the anthrax attacks
were addressed prior to the Sept. 11 attacks. See National Research
Council, Improving Civilian Medical Response to Chemical or
Biological Terrorist Incidents Interim Report on Current Capabilities
(Washington: National Academies Press, 1998).

See the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Protecting against the Spread of

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the
Global Partnership, 3 volumes (Washington: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, January 2003) and George Perkovich, Joseph
Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Jessica T.
Mathews, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).

65

For discussions on the efforts to weaken controls on arms exports,

see Tamar Gabelnick and Rachel Stohl, eds., Challenging
Conventional Wisdom: Debunking the Myths and Exposing the Risks of
Arms Export Reform (Washington: Federation of American Scientists
and Center for Defense Information, 2003).

66

See them at: <http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf>.

67

For a discussion of what an alternative security budget would look

like based on a different strategic approach see Foreign Policy In
Focus/Center for Defense Information Task Force, A Unified
Security Budget For the United States, March 2004 at:
<http://www.fpif.org/pdf/defensereport/fulltext.pdf>.

68

For a deeper discussion of such a strategy see Richard Falk, The

Great Terror War (New York: Interlink, 2003).

69

On Libya, see Christopher Boucek, Libyas Return to the Fold,

Foreign Policy In Focus special report, April 2004, at:
<http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004libya.html>.

70

Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorist Financing (New York:

Council on Foreign Relations, 2002) and Council on Foreign

61

62

George Perkovich, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B.

Wolfsthal, and Jessica T. Mathews, Universal Compliance: A Strategy
for Nuclear Security (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2004), p. 26.
For discussions of the steps needed to enhance controls over biological and biotechnological research while not stifling scientific
advancement, see: Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Defending Against
Biodefence: The Need for Limits, Biological Weapons Convention

p. 42

special paper no. 1, January 2003 at:

<http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/spec01.htm>; John Steinbruner,
The Protective Management Of Biotechnology, presented at the
conference Biosecurity: Science in the Balance sponsored by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, February 15,
2003, Denver, CO, at: <http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/
Publications/AMCS/AAASpresentation.htm>; John D. Steinbruner
and Elisa D. Harris, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens, Issues in
Science and Technology, Spring 2003 at:
<http://www.nap.edu/issues/19.3/steinbruner.htm>; and John
Steinbruner, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, and Stacy Gunther,
Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Protective Oversight System,
CISSM Working Paper, February 2003 at: <http://www.puaf.umd.edu/
CISSM/Publications/AMCS/finalmonograph.pdf>. For discussion
of the issues involved in verification of these agreements and the
kind of cooperative security approaches necessary to make them
work, see Nancy Gallagher, Verification and Advanced Cooperative
Security, in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., Verification
Yearbook 2002 (London: VERTIC, 2002) and Nancy Gallagher, The
Politics of Verification (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). For
specific discussion of the Biological Weapons Convention and the
Chemical Weapons Convention, see Elisa D. Harris, Research
Fellow, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland,
Testimony on Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes, Weapons of Mass
Destruction and the War on Terrorism, before the Subcommittee on
International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 12, 2002,
at: <http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/People/
SEN%20GOV%20AFFS%202-12-02.htm>.

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Relations, Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist

Financing: Second Report of an Independent Task Force on Terrorist
Financing (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2004).
The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body
whose purpose is the development and promotion of policies, both
at national and international levels, to combat money laundering
and terrorist financing. There are currently 33 members. For more
see: <http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/AboutFATF_en.htm>.
71

U.S. General Accounting Office, Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies

Should Systematically Assess Terrorists Use of Alternative Financing
Mechanisms, GAO-04-163, November 14, 2003, at:
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf>.

72

See, for example: Ibid; various reports from the United Nations
1267 Monitoring Group; Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorist
Financing (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002); and
Council on Foreign Relations, Update on the Global Campaign
Against Terrorist Financing: Second Report of an Independent Task
Force on Terrorist Financing (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, June 2004).

73

74

75

Jonathan M. Winer and Trifin J. Roule, Fighting Terrorist

Finance, Survival, vol. 44, no. 3, Autumn 2003, pp. 87-104 and
U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Federal
Agencies Face Continuing Challenges in Addressing Terrorist
Financing and Money Laundering, Testimony before the Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate, GAO-04-501T, March
4, 2004, at: <http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-501T>.
Cited in Council on Foreign Relations, Update on the Global
Campaign Against Terrorist Financing: Second Report of an
Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, June 2004), p. 7.
At the end of 2003, the Office of Foreign Assets Control had four
full-time staff working on tracking potential violations of laws forbidding financial flows to al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein and 21
working on illegal flows to Cuba. In early 2004, the Bush administration created the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence to
lead Treasurys efforts to cut the lines of financial support to international terrorists, a critical component of the administrations overall
effort to keep America safe from terrorist plots. The TFI is led by a
new undersecretary and two assistant secretaries and consolidates the
supervision of OFAC, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
the Office of Asset Forfeiture, and the Office of Intelligence
Support. But as of May 2004 Senator Max Baucus, the ranking
minority member of the Senate Finance Committee, claimed that
the Treasury Department still has more staff assigned to tracking
money to Cuba than to al-Qaida. See Statement of Senator Max
Baucus, Oversight Hearing of the Treasury Department and
Terrorist Financing, May 19, 2004, at:
<http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/statements/051904mb.pdf>.
According to the Department of the Treasury, they currently have
55 staff within OFAC tracking terrorist finance and 40-45 tracking
the various sanctions programs against countries like Cuba.

76

For details on the Financial Action Task Force, see

<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/> and for the listing of the 2003 version of
the 40 Recommendations, see <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/
40Recs-2003_en.pdf>.

77

For up-to-date information regarding such resolutions see the Bill of

Rights Defense Committee at: <http://www.bordc.org/index.html>.
For analysis of PATRIOT II, see the work of the American Civil

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Liberties Union at: <http://www.aclu.org/>, the Center for

Constitutional Rights at: <http://www.ccr-ny.org/>, and the Rights
Working Group at: <http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/>.
78

See Migration Policy Institute, Americas Challenge: Domestic Security,

Civil Liberties, and National Unity After September 11 (Washington:
2003) at:
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Americas_Challenges.pdf>.
On the issue of weakening our economy, see Genevieve J. Knezo,
Possible Impacts of Major Counter Terrorism Security Actions on
Research, Development, and Higher Education, Congressional
Research Service, April 8, 2002.

79

See <http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?
ID=11817&c=206> and documents at the Paul Revere project at:
<http://freedom.idahogreenparty.org/>.

80

For more information on the Civil Liberties Restoration Act, see the
analysis by the Rights Working Group at:
<http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/>. For more information on
the SAFE Act, see the Electronic Frontier Foundations analysis at:
<http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism/PATRIOT/
safe_act_analysis.php>.

81

Human Rights Watch report, Dangerous Dealings: Changes to U.S.

Military Assistance After September 11, February 2002, pp. 34.

82

Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human

Rights Abuses Worldwide, A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper for
the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
March 25, 2003, at: <http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/
counter-terrorism-bck.htm>.

83

Neil J. Smelser and Faith Mitchell, eds., Discouraging Terrorism:

Some Implications of 9/11 (Washington: National Academy of
Sciences, 2002).

84

See, for example, Robert I. Rotberg, The New Nature of NationState Failure, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 3, Summer
2002, pp. 85-96, and Commission on Weak States and U.S.
National Security, On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National
Security (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2004) at:
<http://www.cgdev.org/docs/Full_Report.pdf>.

85

Michael E. OHanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M.

Destler, David Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James Steinberg,
Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 2003).

86

For further discussion, see Thomas Carothers, Democracy:

Terrorisms Uncertain Antidote, Current History, December 2003,
pp. 403-6 as well as work from the Democracy and Law Project that
he leads at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at:
<http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/drl/drl_home.asp>.

87

Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim

World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction
for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World (Washington:
U.S. Dept. of State, 2003), p. 15, at:
<http://www.bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/Testimony/Peace.pdf>.

88

See the text of the message at:

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/south_asia/1585636.stm>. He
also discussed the suffering of Iraqi children under the U.N. sanctions regime, another concern broadly shared by Muslims worldwide.

89

Thomas Carothers, Democracy: Terrorisms Uncertain Antidote,

Current History, December 2003, p. 405. Other issues with respect

p. 43

to credibility are discussed in Marina Ottaway, Promoting Democracy

in the Middle East: The Problem of U.S. Credibility, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law
Project, working paper no. 35 at:
<http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp35.pdf>.
90

Thomas Carothers, Democracy: Terrorisms Uncertain Antidote,

Current History, December 2003, p. 405.

91

See the discussions by Tamara Cofman Wittes in The New U.S.

Proposal for a Greater Middle East Initiative: An Evaluation, Saban
Center Middle East Memo #2, May 10, 2004, at:
<http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/
wittes20040510.htm> and Marina Ottaway, Promoting Democracy in
the Middle East: The Problem of U.S. Credibility, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law
Project, working paper no. 35 at:
<http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp35.pdf>.

92

Thomas Carothers, Democracy: Terrorisms Uncertain Antidote,

Current History, December 2003, p. 406.

93

For the negative view, see Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova,
Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 11944. For the positive view, see Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism
& Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a
Resurgence of Terrorism (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), case
studies of Northern Ireland, Palestine, and the Philippines. But, as
Cragin and Chalk note, inadequately funded or administered programs can create rising expectations, which are subsequently unmet.
This can generate a backlash and reinforce nascent support for terrorist activities.

94

Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty, and

Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 119-44. See also David
Gold, The Economics of Terrorism, Columbia International Affairs
Online (CIAO) Case Studies (May 2004) at:
<http://www.ciaonet.org/frame/casefrm.html>; C. Berrebi,
Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and
Terrorism Among Palestinians (Princeton University, September
2003) at: <http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/477.pdf>; Basel
A. Saleh, Economic Conditions and Resistance to Occupation in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip: There is a Causal Connection,
Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economics, vol. 6, 2004
at: <http://www.sba.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume6/saleh.htm>; Basel
A. Saleh and David Laitin, Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of
the Origins and Targets of Terrorism, Mimeo (Princeton University,
November 2003); and Alan Richards, Socio-Economic Roots of

p. 44

Radicalism? Toward Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals,

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2003 at:
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/radcalsm.pdf>.
95

Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty, and

Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 119-44. Also see, Scott
Atran, Genesis of Suicide Terrorism, Science, vol. 299, 2003, pp.
1534-1539, and Scott Atran, The Strategic Threat from Suicide
Terror, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
December 2003 at: <http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/
authorpdfs/page.php?id=311>.

96

There is no shortage of proposals as to what such a framework or

frameworks would look like. For representative examples, see four
publications by Dani Rodrik: Getting Institutions Right, April
2004 at: <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/
ifo-institutions%20article%20_April%202004_.pdf>; How to
Make the Trade Regime Work for Development, February 2004 at:
<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/
How%20to%20Make%20Trade%20Work.pdf>; The Global
Governance of Trade as If Development Really Mattered (New York:
United Nations Development Program, 2001) at:
<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/
UNDPtrade.PDF>; Making Openness Work: The New Global
Economy and the Developing Countries (Washington: Overseas
Development Council, 1999) as well as Lance Taylor, Santosh
Mehrotra, and Enrique Delamonica, The Links Between Economic
Growth, Poverty Reduction, and Social Development: Theory and
Policy in Santosh Mehrotra and Richard Jolly, eds., Development
with a Human Face (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999);
Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2002); and Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel, Reclaiming
DevelopmentA Manual of Alternative Economic Policy (London:
Zed Press, 2004). Though some of these proposals differ, they share
an essential common ground: there needs to be room for diversity in
approaches to industrialization and development, such diversity
would provide for a range of acceptable forms of state intervention
by poor and rich countries alike, and the current set of trading rules
serve largely to benefit corporations in wealthier countries.

97

For examples of what an alternative strategy would look like see

Foreign Policy In Focus, PetroPolitics, January 2004 at:
<http://www.fpif.org/papers/03petropol/> and the Apollo Alliance
<http://www.apolloalliance.org/>.

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Appendix 1: Funding for Counterterrorism

(in millions of dollars)
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Housing & Urban Dvlpment.
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Department of Veterans Affairs
Corps of Engineers-Civil Works
Environmental Protection Agency
Executive Office of the President Activities
General Services Administration
International Assistance Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Admin.
National Science Foundation
Office of Personnel Management
Social Security Administration
District of Columbia
Federal Communications Commission
National Archives and Records Admin.
National Capital Planning Commission
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Postal Service
Smithsonian Institution
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Corp. for National and Community Service
Total, Combating Terrorism Budget Authority

2002 Enacted

2002 Supp.

2003 Enacted

2003 Supp.

2004 Request

$230.5
96.8
11,153.0
1,232.9
434.0
11,398.6
14.6
1,018.7
71.4
1,693.1
634.5
85.0
47.0
12.5
2.0
46.4
88.6
114.0
239.9
2.5
113.0
13.0
7.0
6.5
62.5
7.0
29.0
$28,854.9

$322.2
18.7
3,047.0
303.1
1,479.4
5,981.5
92.6
1,124.4
5.9
330.6
784.4
31.7
2.0
139.0
175.0
138.0
51.0
483.0
109.0
19.6
8.0
200.0
3.0
36.4
587.0
27.8
$15,501.4

$385.0
110.3
17,550.0
1,482.3
3,602.8
19,058.7
2.0
110.9
1,973.8
69.4
1,871.3
382.8
80.0
147.2
36.0
107.7
43.0
94.6
701.3
163.0
284.6
3.0
132.0
25.0
1.0
11.0
1.0
35.3
82.8
8.0
57.0
$48,611.6

$110.0
77.5
142.0
4,305.0
25.0
457.2
214.0
39.0
969.6
$6,339.3

$368.2
153.4
15,172.0
1,588.1
3,775.5
23,890.9
2.0
114.8
2,289.4
67.2
2,365.7
282.9
90.4
145.0
104.0
123.1
37.0
95.7
1,157.3
170.0
307.5
3.0
147.0
15.0
1.0
12.0
53.2
80.1
8.0
118.0
$52,737.2

Source: Office of Management and Budget

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Appendix 2:
Major U.N. Conventions Against Terrorism
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on
September 14, 1963.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at
Rome on March 10, 1988.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful

Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on
December 16, 1970.

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf, done at Rome on March 10,
1988.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at
Montreal on September 23, 1971.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons
including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on
December 14, 1973.
International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on December 17, 1979.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, signed at Vienna on March 3, 1980.
Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on February 24,
1988.

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Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives

for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on
March 1, 1991.
International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on December 15,
1997.
International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on December 9,
1999.
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
Conventions Against Terrorism, at:
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_conventions.html>

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Appendix 3:
United Nations Security Council
Resolutions Regarding Terrorism
Post-September 11, 2001
Resolution 1368: Adopted September 12, 2001
Condemns the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, and those responsible for the support of the
relevant terrorist organizations and calls on the international community to participate in the cooperation
and full implementation of relevant international
anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions; in particular, Resolution 1269.1
Resolution 1373: Adopted September 28, 2001
Reaffirms previous commitments to anti-terrorism
and obligates all member statesunder Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations2to criminalize terrorist funds and states harboring or supporting
terrorists and to establish effective border control regulations. The resolution creates the CounterTerrorism Committee as a subsidiary body of the
Security Council to monitor the implementation of
Resolution 1373 and to increase the capability of
states to fight terrorism.
Resolution 1377: Adopted November 12, 2001
Calls on all states to implement the affirmations in
Resolution 1373, welcomes the commitment of states
to fight international terrorism, and encourages all
states to become parties to the relevant international
conventions and protocols.

Resolution 1373, to cooperate to combat such terrorist activities.

Resolution 1450: Adopted December 13, 2002
Strongly condemns the terrorist bomb attack at the
Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Kenya, and the
attempted missile attack on Arkia Israeli Airlines on
November 28, 2002, and urges all states to cooperate
in efforts to combat such terrorist activities.
Resolution 1456: Adopted January 20, 2003
Reaffirms all previous commitments to combat terrorism and then calls upon states to cooperate closely
to implement the sanctions against terrorism and to
bring to justice those who finance, plan, support or
commit terrorist acts or provide safe havens, in
accordance with international law. All states must
take urgent action to prevent and suppress all active
and passive forms of terrorism.
Resolution 1465: Adopted February 13, 2003
Strongly condemns the bomb attack in Bogota,
Colombia, on February 7, 2003, and reaffirms the
need to combat terrorism by all means in accordance
with the U.N. Charter.
Resolution 1516: Adopted November 20, 2003

Strongly condemns the bomb attacks in Bali,

Indonesia, on October 12, 2002, and urges all states,
in accordance with Resolution 1373, to cooperate to
combat such terrorist activities.

Strongly condemns the bomb attacks in Istanbul,

Turkey, on November 15, 2003, and November 20,
2003, and urges all states, in accordance with their
obligations under Resolution 1373, to cooperate in
efforts to find and bring to justice the perpetrators,
organizers, and sponsors of these terrorist attacks.

Resolution 1440: Adopted October 24, 2002

Resolution1526: Adopted January 30, 2004

Strongly condemns the hostage situation in

Moscow, the Russian Federation, on October 23,
2002, and urges all states, in accordance with

Enumerates a list of sanctions to be imposed against

al-Qaida members and others officially identified as
members of terrorist organizations (including freezing

Resolution 1438: Adopted October 14, 2002

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funds, denying entry, etc.) and strengthens the mandate of the assigned committee to include monitoring
the implementation of these measures under
Resolution 1267 (1999).
Resolution 1530: Adopted March 11, 2004
Strongly condemns the bombings in Madrid, Spain,
on March 11, 2003 (although the resolution identifies the perpetrators as the ETA) and reaffirms the
need to combat terrorism by all means in accordance
with the U.N. Charter.
Resolution 1535: Adopted March 26, 2004
Restructures the organization of the CounterTerrorism Committee.

attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess,

transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and it
requires all states to adopt and enforce effective laws
that prohibit any nonstate actor from developing,
acquiring, or using nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for
terrorist purposes. The resolution further requires
states to submit a report detailing the steps they have
taken.
* Note: Only resolutions 1373 and 1456 have
enforcement mechanisms. All other resolutions
either reaffirm previous resolutions or simply condemn terrorist acts.
Endnotes:
1

Resolution 1269, adopted by the U.N. Security Council on October

19, 1999, condemns all acts of terrorism and calls upon all states to
cooperate to prevent and suppress terrorist activities within their
borders and to exchange intelligence regarding terrorist activities.

These are actions with respect to peace, breaches of peace, and acts
of aggression.

Resolution 1540: Adopted April 28, 2004

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, this resolution forbids states from
providing any form of support to nonstate actors that

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Foreign Policy In Focus Task Force on

Terrorism
PRIMARY AUTHOR
JOHN GERSHMAN
Co-director, Foreign Policy In Focus
Global Affairs Program Director, Interhemispheric Resource
Center
(609) 688-0065
<john@irc-online.org>
<www.fpif.org>

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

The members of the Task Force support this report as a positive
alternative agenda to combat terrorism, without necessarily
endorsing each program proposal within it. Organizational affiliations for identification purposes only.

ROBERT ALVAREZ
Senior Scholar
Nuclear Policy Project
Institute for Policy Studies
(202) 234-9382
<kitbob@starpower.net>
<www.ips-dc.org>

SALIH BOOKER
Executive Director
Africa Action
(202) 546-7961
<sbooker@africaaction.org>
<www.africaaction.org>
JOHN CAVANAGH
Director
Institute for Policy Studies
(202) 234-9382, ext. 224
<jcavanagh@igc.org>
<www.ips-dc.org>
MARCUS CORBIN
Senior Analyst
Center for Defense Information
(202) 797-5282
<mcorbin@cdi.org>
<www.cdi.org/mrp>
DAVID CORTRIGHT
President
Fourth Freedom Forum
(800) 233-6786, ext. 14
<dcortright@fourthfreedom.org>
<www.fourthfreedom.org>

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KRISTEN DAWKINS
Vice President for International Programs and Director for the
Trade and Global Governance Program
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
(612) 870-0453
<kdawkins@iatp.org>
<www.iatp.org>; <www.wtowatch.org>
LLOYD J. DUMAS
Professor of Political Economy
University of Texas at Dallas
(972) 883-2010; (972) 394-4637
<ljdumas@utdallas.edu>

REV. DR. ROBERT W. EDGAR

General Secretary
National Council of the Churches of Christ
(212) 870-2025
<redgar@ncccusa.org>
<www.ncccusa.org>

JOHN FEFFER
Policy Analyst
Foreign Policy In Focus
(301) 779-3941
<johnfeffer@earthlink.net>
VAN GOSSE
Co-Chair
Historians Against War
(717) 291-4246
<vgosse@fandm.edu>
<www.historiansagainstwar.org>
WILLIAM D. HARTUNG
Presidents Fellow
Arms Trade Resource Center
World Policy Institute
(212) 229-5808, ext. 106
<hartung@newschool.edu>
<www.worldpolicy.org >
COLLEEN KELLY
Co-director
September 11th Families for Peaceful Tomorrows
(212) 598-0970
<colleen@peacefultomorrows.org>
<www.peacefultomorrows.org>

p. 49

MICHAEL KLARE
Professor of Peace & World Security Studies
Hampshire College
(413) 559-5563
<mklare@hampshire.edu>
<www.pawss.hampshire.edu>
DR. LAWRENCE J. KORB
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
Senior Adviser, Center for Defense Information
(202) 682-1611; (202) 332-0600
<lkorb@americanprogress.org>
<www.americanprogress.org>; <www.cdi.org>

JULES LOBEL
Professor
University of Pittsburgh Law School
(412) 648-1375
<lobel@law.pitt.edu>
<www.law.pitt.edu>

ROBERT K. MUSIL, PH.D, M.P.H.

Executive Director & CEO
Physicians for Social Responsibility
(202) 667-4260, ext. 221
<bmusil@psr.org>
<www.psr.org>

COL. DAN SMITH, U.S. ARMY (RET.)

Senior Fellow
Military and Peaceful Prevention Policy
Friends Committee on National Legislation
(202) 547-6000
<dan@fcnl.org>
<www.fcnl.org>

JOE STORK
Washington Director
Middle East / North Africa Division
Human Rights Watch
(202) 612-4321
<storkj@hrw.org>
<www.hrw.org>

JOE VOLK
Executive Secretary
Friends Committee on National Legislation
(202) 547-6000, ext. 144
<joe@fcnl.org>
<www.fcnl.org>

BRUCE ZAGARIS
Partner
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe, L.L.P.
(202) 293-5555
<bzagaris@bcr-dc.com>
<www.bcr-dc.com>

JOHN ZAVALES
Research Fellow
Cuny Center
(703) 549-1261
<zavalesjg@aol.com>
<www.thecunycenter.org>
STEPHEN ZUNES
Professor, Department of Politics
University of San Francisco
(415) 422-6981
<zunes@usfca.edu>
<www.fpif.org>

Published by Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) and the
Institute for Policy Studies (IPS, online at www.ips-dc.org). 2004. All rights reserved.

Foreign Policy In Focus

A Think Tank Without Walls
Established in 1996, Foreign Policy In Focus is a network of policy analysts, advocates, and activists committed to making the United States a more
responsible global leader and global partner. For more information, visit www.fpif.org.
Recommended citation:

Foreign Policy In Focus Task Force on Terrorism, A Secure America in a Secure World, (Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus,
September 2004).
Web location:

http://www.fpif.org/
Production Information:

Primary Author: John Gershman, IRC

Layout: Tonya Cannariato, IRC

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HOW THIS REPORT WAS WRITTEN

This report builds upon FPIFs previous efforts in articulating a strategy to combat terrorism produced in 2001.
This report was drafted by a team of FPIF staffers led by John Gershman and includes contributions from Emira
Woods, Miriam Pemberton, Erik Leaver, Julie Ajinkya, Emily Schwartz Greco, and Theo Rose.
The first draft of the report was circulated to task force members in July 2003. The report was revised based on
feedback from task force members and others, and a revised version was circulated in June 2004. Additional revisions were made and the final report was issued in September 2004. The members of the Task Force support this
report as a positive alternative agenda to combat terrorism, without necessarily endorsing each program proposal
within it. Organizational affiliations for identification purposes only.
Task Force Members
Robert Alvarez, Nuclear Policy Project Salih Booker, Africa Action John Cavanagh, Institute for Policy Studies
Marcus Corbin, Center for Defense Information David Cortright, Fourth Freedom Forum Kristin Dawkins,
Institute for Agricultural and Trade Policy Lloyd J. Dumas, University of Texas at Dallas Rev. Dr. Robert W.
Edgar, National Council of the Churches of Christ John Feffer Van Gosse, Historians Against War William
Hartung, World Policy Institute Colleen Kelly, September 11th Families for Peaceful Tomorrows Michael
Klare, Hampshire College Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Center for Defense Information Jules Lobel, University of
Pittsburgh Law School Robert K. Musil, Ph.D, M.P.H., Physicians for Social Responsibility Col. Dan Smith,
U.S. Army (Ret.), Friends Committee on National Legislation Joe Stork, Human Rights Watch Joe Volk,
Friends Committee on National Legislation Bruce Zagaris, Berliner Corcoran & Rowe, L.L.P. John Zavales,
Cuny Center Stephen Zunes, University of San Francisco (Organizational affiliations for identification purposes
only.)

FOREIGN POLICY

IN F CUS
Interhemispheric Resource Center
PO Box 2178
Silver City, NM 88062
(505) 388-0208
www.irc-online.org
Institute for Policy Studies
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Washington, DC 20005
(202) 234-9382
www.ips-dc.org

A Foreign Policy In Focus publication

Cost: $10.00