Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila
Police Force and a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A.
San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of
certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese
descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee,
complainant Jose Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by
him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's
Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was
a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to
the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change
of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the
explanation for the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by
him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor
General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught.
Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to
be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement
that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case
for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of
the complaints being dismissed, This is one of those instances
then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent
cannot be found guilty of malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General,
"admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery
in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as
captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends
that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of
servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus,
they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the everconstant scrutiny of the public.
While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the
law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also
axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently
basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not always be
subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or
decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be
negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory
prerogatives.18
xxxx
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs
xxxx
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the
illegal dismissal case before him, there are barely four (4)
months left with the Employment Contract between David
Edward Toze and International School Manila.
From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution
of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006
that does not escape the attention of this Commission. There
appears an orchestrated effort to delay the resolution of the
reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and
keep status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Tozes
Employment Contract with International School Manila come
August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal dismissal case moot
and academic.
xxxx
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in
the resolution of [the] assailed Order x x x should not be
countenanced, specially, under the circumstance that is
attendant with the term of the Employment Contract between
David Edward Toze and International School Manila. The
respondents lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending
incident before him for more than five (5) months only to
thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the respondents
disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence.1wphi1 Failure to
decide a case or resolve a motion within the reglementary
period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition
of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate x x x.
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and
enjoined to decide a case with dispatch. Any delay, no matter
how short, in the disposition of cases undermine the peoples
faith and confidence in the judiciary x x x. 21
Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a
lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning
banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the
said period that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot
resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its
liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor
General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance
of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall
have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed
claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to
preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the
liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary
Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a
person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as
liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver
previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section.
The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the
assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or
sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and
other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such
institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions,
institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate
court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such
institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and
executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is
concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As aforediscussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the
Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a
different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005
which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that
confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not
inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that
in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is
not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the
contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of
Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to
Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is
for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the
lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in
defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of
sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is
intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government
employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.61 The example given by the proponents of
this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the
company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting
might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously.62 In the
cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in
1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment
conduct may well occur during the period of employment
through the dampening of aggressive administration of
government policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this
concern as "probably excessive."64 He opines "x x x it is hard to
imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone
who had just been disloyal to his or her last client the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that
law firms want the best government lawyers the ones who
were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous
advocates."65 But again, this particular concern is a non
factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against
PER CURIAM:
POSITION
President
Executive Vice-President
of Delegates
Atty. Justiniano Cortes
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P.
Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L.
Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B.
Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M.
Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J.
Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B.
Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio
E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C.
Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S.
Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C.
Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella,
Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo
Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S.
Person.
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
"Nomination Form
pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted
having formed their own slates for the election of IBP national
officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella
D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and for Governors:
Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez
(Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila),
Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine,
Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P.
Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western
Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit
M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President,
Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for
Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil
Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy
Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog),
Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern
Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco
(Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao)
(Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B.
Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F.
Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P.
Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A.
Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and
alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some
food,
drinks,
earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p.
101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his
three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar
Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed
about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar
association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to
the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain
Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74.
This does not include the expenses for his campaign which
began several months before the June 3rd election, and his
purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty.
Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang up over
P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the
rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's
supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the
principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated
Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on
June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made
a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar
enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal
until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9)
regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation
shall begin anew.
Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without
prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other
measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Bicolandia
Central Luzon
2005
20052007
3. Rogelio Vinluan
Southern Luzon
20072009
4. Roan L. Libarios
Eastern Mindanao 20092011
As there were only four (4) regions which had served as EVP,
there are still five (5) other regions which have not yet so
served. These regions are:
1. Northern Luzon
candidate in the forthcoming elections for the EVP. 59 IBPWestern Visayas counters that his election could not be
considered as part of the current rotation as he was elected
following the special elections held as a result of the October 6,
1989 Resolution of the Court. It has also been argued that he
merely served as Interim President.
As Velez60 declared that the election of EVP De Vera completed
the first rotational cycle, it could only mean that all regions had
their respective turns in the first rotational cycle. Thus, in this
second rotational cycle, issues as to the nature of his election
and service as IBP-President during the First Rotational Cycle
are inconsequential.
At any rate, Eugene Tan could not be considered as an interim
president. It was Justice Felix Antonio who was designated by
the Court as Interim Caretaker until the election of the IBPPresident by the elected IBP-BOG. The election of the new
President and Executive Vice-President was directed by the
Court itself and in no way can it be said that they served on an
interim basis. Besides, at that time, under Section 47, the
rotation concerned the presidency only. Section 47 was ordered
to be amended only in the December 14, 2010 Resolution, 61
despite Bar Matter No. 491 and Velez,62 which recognized the
operational fact that the rotation was from the position of
President to that of EVP.
If Eugene Tan served only up to April, 1991, it was not because
he served merely in the interim. He served up to that time only
because he resigned. As reflected in Bar Matter No. 565,
dated October 15, 1991, Tan resigned as IBP-President when
he was charged by several staff members of the IBP in a lettercomplaint to the Chief Justice, with favoritism or discrimination
in the hiring of officers and employees in the IBP and with
extravagant and irregular expenditure of IBP funds. The Court
found the acts of Eugene Tan as constituting grave abuse of
authority and serious misconduct in office, which would have
warranted his removal from office. Considering that he had
earlier tendered his resignation as IBP-President and his term of
in the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh
cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again
entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by
exclusion.
b) Election through a "rotation by exclusion" allows for a more
democratic election process. The rule provides for freedom of
choice while upholding the equitable principle of rotation which
assures that every member-chapter has its turn in every rotation
cycle.
c) On the other hand, rotation by pre-ordained sequence, or
election based on the same order as the previous cycle, tends
to defeat the purpose of an election. The element of choice
which is crucial to a democratic process is virtually removed.
Only one chapter could vie for election at every turn as the
entire sequence, from first to last, is already predetermined by
the order in the previous rotation cycle. This concept of rotation
by pre-ordained sequence negates freedom of choice, which is
the bedrock of any democratic election process.
d) The pronouncement of the Special Committee, which the
Supreme Court may have adopted in AM No. 09-5-2-SC,
involving the application of the rotation rule in the previous
election for GMR may not be controlling, not being one of the
principal issues raised in the GMR elections.
7. Thus, applying the principle of rotation by exclusion in
Western Visayas which starts with a new rotation cycle, all
chapters (with the exception of Romblon) are deemed qualified
to vie for the Governorship for 2011-2013 term without prejudice
to the chapters entering into a consensus to adopt any preordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each
chapter will have its turn in the rotation.
The Court takes notice of the predictability of the rotation by
succession scheme. Through the rotation by exclusion scheme,
the elections would be more genuine as the opportunity to serve
as Governor at any time is once again open to all chapters,
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in
Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached
copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on
appeal in the Court of Appeals).
xxx
xxx
xxx
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue
respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in
two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar
Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for
Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and
Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The
marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan,
was performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code 1 as one of
exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until
after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in l977),
and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to
ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though,
that they had not lived together as husband and wife (LetterComplaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter
applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that he
was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant
blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No.
78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out
his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's
Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged
that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and
"abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar
first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the
Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of
the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because they
had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied
for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the
eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 5
March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the
recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the
charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the
hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be
reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements
in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's
Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended
the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his
marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence
from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good moral
character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the
1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross
misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for
which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7,
Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly
provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a
false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection
with his application for admission to the bar." That false
his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends
that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in
order from the beginning."
B. M. No. 1154
June 8, 2004
the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be
taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this
case. What matters is his act of concealing them which
constitutes dishonesty.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending
criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite
good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege
bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
December 3, 1948
In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage
of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar
Examinations.
Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent. Enrique M. Fernando
and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A.
Alafriz (for the Philippine Lawyers' Association) as amici curiae.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared
and written by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited
reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation,
that appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14,
1948. The story was preceded by the headline in large letters
"CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in
slightly smaller letters "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly
Probed; One School Favored," under the name "By Angel J.
Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference
we quote the news item in full:
Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were
denounced by some of the law graduates who took part in the
tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.
These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the
questions in one subject, days before the tests were given, in
the Philippine Normal School.
Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those
mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before
the tests.
The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter
claim that the tests actually given were similar in every respect
This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature
consideration, involving as it does interesting and important
points of law as well as questions of national importance.
Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of the state" found at
the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers
only to the security of the state, that is to say that only when
National Security or public safety is involved, may this Court
compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his
news report or information. We confess that it was not easy to
decide this legal question on which the conviction or acquittal of
Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the Justice is not
unanimous.
In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed
Republic Act No. 53, particularly the Senate were it originated,
we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative
body when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed.
We gathered from the said record that the original bill prepared
by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a
publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute
and that under no circumstance could he be compelled to reveal
the source of his information or news report. The committee,
however, under the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted
an amendment or change, by adding to the end of section 1 of
the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is
demanded by the public interest."
When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on
second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill
proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the
committee "unless the court finds that such revelation is
demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause
would kill the purposed of the bill. This amendment of Senator
Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the
elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that
without such exception and by giving complete immunity to
editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be committed.
Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the
disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the
would not be long before the legal profession will have fallen
into disrepute. The public would naturally lose confidence in the
lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person
contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend himself
before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he
is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations
because of sufficient and adequate preparation and training,
and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had
succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in
advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then
started his legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly,
the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious
preparations, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations and
are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly,
because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since
from the point of view of the public, they might be among those
who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained
before hand. And, incidentally, the morale of the hundreds of
students and graduates of the different law schools, studying
law and later preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be
affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea
that there is no need of much law study and preparation
inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies of
questions before the examinations and pass them and be
admitted to the Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar
examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who in a spirit of
public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the
Committee of Examiners at the request and designation of this
Court. They would be suspected, one or two or more of them
that through negligence, or connivance, or downright
corruption, they have made possible the release if they have not
themselves actually released, before examination day, the
questions they had prepared. The employees of the Supreme
Court in charge of the Bar Examinations, specially those who
copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar
examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more
important still, the Supreme Court itself which has to overall
place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a
newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they
should have come forward and furnished or stood ready to
furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an
investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the
curtain of press immunity.
Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and
assured that Bar Examination questions in at least one subject
had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a
certain university, one week before the examinations were
actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the
investigation said that examination questions in several subjects
were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said
examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing to
testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination
questions; that they were actually and carefully compared with
the legitimate examination questions given out on the day of the
examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and
willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees
said to have been seen with the said Bar Examination
questions, although they as well as the university where they
came from, was known; and even the law subjects to which the
questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not
allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazo's
informants who claim to have seen all these things.
In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar
Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately nine hundred
candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a
book for each subject. There were eight subjects, each
belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar
examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar examination
questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions by nine
hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two
hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in the hand of
eight different examiners. The examination books or papers
bear no names or identifications of their writers or owners and
said ownership and identification will not be known until the