Maureen BURCH, James Graf, and the Sagebrush..., 1998 WL 34354883...

1998 WL 34354883 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.) (Appellate Brief)

Court of Appeal, Second District, California.
Maureen BURCH, James Graf, and the Sagebrush Committee, Appellants,
v.
CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent,
Glendale Unified School District, Real Party in Interest.
No. B115299.
March 11, 1998.
Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BS034463 Honorable George P. Schiavelli, Judge
Appellants' Opening Brief
Deborah K. Orlik, Esq. (#124436), 2222 Foothill Blvd. #E314, La Canada, California 91011-1456, 818/249-9617, Attorney
for Appellants.
*i Table of Contents
1. Background and the Parties ........................................................................................................................
2. Procedural Background ...............................................................................................................................
3. This Appeal .................................................................................................................................................
4. The Education Code Sections at Issue .......................................................................................................
5. The Trial Court the Court Made a Critical Error in Law When it Concluded That This Case is More
Properly a 1085 Action .................................................................................................................................
a. The Board had an obligation to conduct a hearing .....................................................................................
b. The Board's act would not have redrawn school district boundaries ..........................................................
c. Fullerton does not apply .............................................................................................................................
6. The Trial Court Committed an Error in Law: Failure to Address the Board's Standard of Review ............
7. The Trial Court Committed an Error in Law: GUSD's Failure to Timely File its Appeal ..........................
8. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................
*ii Table of Authorities
Statutory Authority
Code of Civil Procedure
1094.5 ..................................................................................
1085 .....................................................................................
Code of Regulations 18570 .................................................
Education Code
35705 ...................................................................................
35706 ...................................................................................
35709 ...................................................................................
35710 ...................................................................................
35710.5 ................................................................................
35711 ...................................................................................
35752 ...................................................................................
35753 ...................................................................................
Education Code 4000 (former).............................................
Cases
Board v. LAFCO (1992) 3 Cal.4th 903..................................
Fullerton v. State Board of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779.
Hollywood Circle v. Dept. ABC (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 532
.................................................................................................

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Pomona College v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th

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11

*1 1. Background and Parties

Petitioners and Appellants herein are residents of the western La Canada-Flintridge area of Los Angeles County, commonly
known as the Sagebrush. The individual Petitioners/Appellants are members and officers of The Sagebrush Committee, a
political action committee and also a Petitioner/Appellant herein.
The Sagebrush is a relatively small area of land comprising under 400 acres. It consists of approximately 950 homes which, in
turn, house approximately 200-250 school age children. Though the area is geographically part of La Caniada, its schools are in
the Glendale Unified School District (GUSD), the Real Party herein. When the city of La Canada Flintridge incorporated as
a City in the 1970's it included the Sagebrush within the City limits as the City limits extended to a natural boundary: Pickens
Canyon. Since that time the residents of the Sagebrush have been trying to get into the La Canada Unified School District
(LCUSD) and out of GUSD. The first attempt, in the 1970's, was unsuccessful.
The present dispute arises out of the efforts by the Sagebrush community to become part of the LCUSD in the 1990's. Put
simply, the dispute arises out of the fact that Petitioners want the Sagebrush area transferred to the LCUSD with which the
students and parents have greater contact and identity.

*2 2. Procedural Background
In 1991, Petitioners Maureen Burch, James Graf and the Sagebrush Committee began the territory transfer petition process
by gathering a sufficient number of signatures from Sagebrush residents and presenting evidence to the Los Angeles County
Committee on School District Organization (County Committee). In accordance with the requirements of the Education Code,
the County Committee conducted public hearings on the proposed transfer in 1992. The County Committee also had before it
comprehensive information concerning both school systems, the demographics of the geographic areas involved, the contentions
of the various interested parties and an analysis of the application of Education Code 35753 1 , 2 . *3 The County Committee
found nine criteria of 35753 had been substantially met and approved the petition for transfer of territory in May 1992.
In June 1992, the County Committee decided on a voting area which comprises those homes which feed the two local elementary
schools which the County Committee determined would be most affected by the transfer of territory.
In the proceedings before the County Committee, GUSD opposed the proposed reorganization, claiming that the transfer would
not be in the students' best interests and that the criteria contained in Education Code 35753 were not satisfied.
GUSD filed two appeals with the State Board which Petitioners have argued were filed late and were, therefore, invalid. The
State Board, however, accepted the appeals and ordered the administrative record. GUSD's first appeal filed pursuant to 35711,
argued that, because of the large Armenian population in GUSD, moving the 250 Sagebrush kids out of GUSD would be
tantamount to segregation, as in Brown v. Board of Education. (AA00753-765) GUSD's second appeal filed pursuant to *4
35710.5 3 , argued that the criteria of 35753 were not met. (AA00766-772) The State Board's staff conducted further analysis
of the 35753 criteria, rejected the Armenian argument and recommended to the State Board that the appeals be summarily
denied. (AA00724-00800) Nevertheless, in an unprecedented move, the State Board voted to grant the second (the 35710.5
appeal) appeal by a 7-1 vote on June 11, 1993. (AA00864) At the same time, the Board mooted the first appeal (the 35711
appeal). (AA00857, ln. 17)
The State Board conducted a review of the 35753 criteria as if the Sagebrush petition was before the Board in the first instance
(that is, as if it was not an appeal). (AA00724-00800 Staff Report) The Department of Education (which staffed the State Board)
was instructed to conduct that review by the State Board's legal counsel. (AA00637) The State Board did not review any of

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the procedural steps taken by the Los Angeles County Committee pursuant to 35705, 35706, 35709 or 35710. 4 The State
Board gave notice of its decision June 17, 1993. (AA00868-869)
This action was filed on June 27, 1995. (Tab #2 AA00870) Because of a personal conflict with one Writ judge and the fact that
the other Writ judge was out *5 ill, this case was transferred into Fast Track in the Los Angeles Superior Court January 10,
1996. The State Board appeared in a document stating that the State Board would not appear. (Tab #600844) GUSD handled
all of the defense of this issue. (GUSD filed two demurrers and one extraordinary writ.) The trial was originally scheduled for
May 6, 1996 and was thereafter rescheduled five times (between April and August) due to the court's schedule and GUSD's
repeated ex parte requests for delays. A trial was finally held on August 26, 1996. Ninety days later the trial court requested
more briefing. (Tab #20 AA01154)) The court deemed the matter submitted again on February 6, 1997 (Tab #28 AA01225)
and rendered judgment denying Petitioners' writ on May 30, 1997. (Tab #29 AA01226)
Petitioners timely filed a motion for a new trial citing 13 errors. (Tab #32 AA01238) The Trial Court granted a hearing on a
new trial within days (Tab #33 AA01257) and held a hearing on Petitioners' motion on July 23, 1997. By way of an order dated
July 29, 1997, this Court granted Petitioners a new trial on a single issue: the scope of the State Board's review upon GUSD's
appeal brought pursuant to 35710.5. (Tab #38 AA01321)
On January 29, 1998, the trial court granted Petitioners' writ in part, ruling that the State Board did not have jurisdiction under
35710.5 to review the 35753 criteria but, instead, only had the jurisdiction to review the procedures undertaken by the County
Committee. (Tab #40 AA01328) As neither of GUSD's appeals argued that the County Committee did not follow the procedures
set forth in 35705, 35706, 35709 or 35710, there is nothing more for the State Board to review. Nevertheless, the trial court
remanded to the State Board for review in light of the Court's order.

*6 3. This Appeal
Petitioners' writ was granted in part, as the relief requested in the writ was to allow the territory transfer issue to go to a vote
of the areas as defined by the County Committee. Instead, the trial court has remanded to the State Board. Both GUSD and the
State Board have announced that they will appeal from that decision, in spite of GUSD's counsel's complete agreement with
the court's interpretation of the statute in an earlier letter to the State Board (AA00751-753). However, no notice of appeal has
yet been filed. This, Petitioners suspect, is due to the fact that GUSD and the State Board have only one agenda: to keep the
Sagebrush in GUSD for as long as humanly possible--even at the expense of judicial time and effort.
Petitioners' appeal, then, is now designed to keep the ball rolling (and keep these issues alive) in the hope that this Court will
order an expedited briefing schedule after the appeals are consolidated. Petitioners anticipate that GUSD will make every effort
to delay, postpone, and confuse this issue because every day the Sagebrush children remain in GUSD means more money for
GUSD schools. Even though GUSD has publicly stated that it doesn't care about the Sagebrush kids staying in GUSD (and is
only concerned with the Sagebrush homes' assessed value), Petitioners fear a protracted and expensive battle ahead.

4. The Education Code Sections at Issue

The history of the relevant Education Code sections is as follows: Under the 1976 version (Education Code 4000 et seq.),
territory transfers were only permitted when both school districts agreed to the transfer.
*7 Although the law changed in 1980, the county committee still only had the authority to make recommendations to the State
Board of Education. At that time, only the State Board had the authority to call an election. In the case of the Sagebrush transfer,
GUSD would not agree to the transfer of territory. Accordingly an election could never take place under the 1976 law. This is
what happened to the Sagebrush original petition in the late 1970's. (AA00051-64) The 1980 amendments did not change the
requirement of agreement by the school districts. 5

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However, in 1990, the Legislature segregated transfers of territory such as the transfer instigated by the Sagebrush petition,
from the other types of proposals for school district reorganization. Among other changes, the Legislature eliminated the
necessity of consenting school boards. Thus, the Sagebrush transfer petition began in 1991 after the Legislature took out the
requirement of consent of the school district governing boards.
Section 35710 was added to provide:
For all other petitions to transfer territory, 6 if the county committee finds that the conditions enumerated
in [35753] are substantially met, the county committee may approve the petition and, if approved, shall
so notify the county superintendent of schools who shall call an election in the territory of the districts as
determined by the county *8 committee and in the manner described in part 4 (commencing with 5000)
to be conducted at the next regular election. (Emphasis added.)

It is this 1990 change where the Legislature took the power to call territory transfer elections away from the State Board and
vested that power in the County Committee. The legislative history of this statutory change reflects that the county committees
and the State Board wanted this change because they agreed that territory transfers are more properly locally controlled. The
County Committee is specifically directed to use the same criteria (the 35753 criteria) as the State Board uses on other school
district organization changes. The County Committee is given the same discretion (may approve the petition) as the State
Board has for other reorganizations under 35753.
At the same time, in 1990, the Legislature enacted an appeal process for transfers of territory -- 35710.5 -- the pivotal statute in
this case. With 35710.5, the Legislature specifically: 1) limited appellate review of transfers of territory under 35709 (school
boards consent -- no vote required) and 35710 (school boards do not consent -- election required) to issues of noncompliance
with the procedural provisions of sections 35705, 35706, 35709 and 35710; and 2) made the process an appeal.
Not before, but just with regard to the Sagebrush petition appeal, the State Board developed the opinion that it was entitled to
completely review the 35753 criteria upon appeal under 35710.5 because 35710.5 includes the words noncompliance with
the provisions of ... 35710 and 35710 includes reference *9 to the county committee finding that the 35753 conditions
are substantially met. (See Wolfertz memo to Reibson, AA00637)
This opinion is wrong. 7

The operative word in 35710.5 is noncompliance -- the State Board can review noncompliance with provisions
of.... Noncompliance necessarily connotes procedural requirements. One complies or does not comply with procedural
requirements. If you are talking about meeting the substantive requirements of 35753(a), you don't talk about noncompliance
-- you talk about not satisfying, not meeting, or questioning the substantive requirements or findings. (This is how 35711 is
phrased: question a finding.) Use of the word noncompliance in 35710.5 necessarily means that the State Board could
review only those procedural requirements with which 35710 compels the county committee to comply -- those things the
county committee had to do.
Read the way it was meant to be read, the statute says: for all other (other than those falling under 35709) petitions to transfer,
where the county has made the requisite findings, the county committee may approve and, if approved, shall so notify... What
the county committee has to do under 35710 is: so notify. The county superintendent also has to do an act under that
statute: shall call an election. Review under 35710.5 of noncompliance with the provisions of ... *10 35710 is limited
to those directions to the county and to the superintendent. It does not extend to reanalysis of the 35753 criteria.

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A careful reading of these statutes confirms this interpretation as does a reading of the legislative history of these statutes. (And
GUSD's lawyer agreed with this interpretation in 1992. AA00751-752) 8
Instead of interpreting the appeal statute (35710.5), the trial court focused on 35753 (the nine criteria which must be satisfied
for the County Committee to approve a territory transfer petition) which begins with the words: The State Board may approve
a territory transfer petition... (See footnote 2 herein.) Believing that the word may gave the State Board carte blanche to: a)
hold or deny a hearing; and b) deny a transfer even if it does meet the 35753 criteria, the trial court denied Petitioners' writ
in May 1997. (Tab #30 AA01227)
Although this may be a fair reading of 35753, 35753 simply does not apply to this action. GUSD appealed from the decision
of a County Committee; it did not object to a petition brought to the State Board in the first instance. Section 35753 does not
apply. Only 35710.5 applies to this case.

*11 5. The Trial Court the Court Made a Critical Error in Law When it Concluded That This Case is More Properly
a 1085 Action.
Petitioners filed this writ pursuant to CCP 1094.5. (AA00870) Thereafter, the trial court conducted the case as a CCP 1094.5
action, allowing no new evidence. However, after the trial in August 1996, the court issued a request for more briefing in
November 1996 (Tab #20 AA01154) and thereafter decided that this action was more properly brought under CCP 1085.
(Tab # 30 AA01227; see specifically AA01230-31) This error is critical: 1) because of the effect it had on the introduction of
Petitioners' evidence, 2) because of the standard of review exercised by this court, and 3) because of the duties of the Board
to give reasons for their decision. In its May 1997 decision the trial court decided that this case was properly brought under
1085 because: a) The Board was under no obligation to conduct a hearing; b) The Board was redrawing school district lines,
which is inherently quasi-legislative; c) Fullerton v. State Board is controlling and that case says that the Board's action is quasilegislative. All of these assumptions are erroneous and led the Court to erroneous conclusions of law.

a. The Board had an obligation to conduct a hearing.

i. For purposes of CCP 1094.5, the obligation to conduct a hearing is satisfied if required by statute, an organization's internal
rules and regulations or due process. Pomona College v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1716.
*12 A formal hearing such as we know it in the judicial system, is not required. Id. The hearing required by the statute
may include only written testimony, a dispositive ruling and records kept of the proceedings. Id. Under both Education Code
35710.5 and 35711 (the appeals statutes), the State Board is obligated to review the record and render a decision. Under the
rule in Pomona, this is sufficient to make CCP 1094.5 mandamus available.
ii. Education Code 35752 makes a hearing mandatory whenever the Board reviews a petition for school district reorganization.
There is no reason to believe that there is any difference between the mandatory hearing to be held when a petition comes to the
Board in the first instance or gets there by way of appeal. It is a petition so the Board is obligated to give it some sort of hearing.
iii. Code of Regulations 18570 makes a hearing mandatory and now specifically states that an appeal under 35710.5 or
35711 shall be set for hearing before the State Board.
iv. The Board's internal policies mandated a hearing. Mrs. Dronenberg (a member of the Board) says (AA00858, in 23-24) the
Administrative Committee held a public hearing on this matter as required by law. She was quoted saying the same thing in
the Board Highlights report. (AA01181)
As a hearing was required by law and internal policies, CCP 1094.5 review is appropriate.

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b. The Board's act would not have redrawn school district boundaries.
The trial court did not deny that the Board's actions were the application of a specific set of rules to an existing fact pattern,
but based its conclusion that this is a *13 quasi-legislative act on the State Board's determination...would have drawn the
GUSD and LCUSD geographic areas permanently. (Tab #30 AA01230, lns 11-13) As eventually decided by the trial court,
in an 35710.5 appeal, the Board had no power to redraw school district lines and denying GUSD's appeal would not have had
the effect of redrawing school district lines. The power to redraw these lines is reserved to the people of the State of California.

c. Fullerton does not apply

The trial court relied on Fullerton v. State Board of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779 both for the proposition that the Board's
act was quasi-legislative (Tab #30, AA01230, ln. 14) and that the trial court's standard of review was arbitrary, capricious or
unsupported by evidence (Tab #30, AA01239, ln. 27) However, Fullerton does not apply to this case for the following reasons:
i. Fullerton was argued under former Education Code Section 4200(a-e). Under the Code as then structured, all petitions for
reorganization went to the Board in the first instance. (The County Committee only had the authority to make a recommendation
to the Board under the then-existing law.) Therefore, Fullerton was not an appeal to the Board. The appeal statute by which
GUSD dragged the Sagebrush petition to the Board (35710.5) was not enacted until 1990, well after the Fullerton decision.
As discussed previously herein, after Fullerton, the Legislature completely revised these Education Code sections. It took the
earlier blanket quasi-legislative power away from the Board. In its place, the Legislature gave the power to call a vote of the
people to the County Committees in those areas where the county is large enough to have a County Committee and gave the
same power (the power to *14 call a vote) to the Board in those areas where the county has no committee. Additionally, the
Board was given the power to approve or disapprove appeals, which would have the effect of denying or allowing a vote in
accordance with the County Committee's decision. All of this was agreed to by the trial court in its decision of January 29,
1998. (Tab #40 AA01329)
As the County Committee had the quasi-legislative power in this instance (or something akin to it, if, in fact, setting an issue
for a vote is quasi-legislative) and the Board had only appellate review authority, it cannot be said that the Board's action was
quasi-legislative. The Board's action would not have had the effect of redrawing school district lines. Further, and perhaps
more importantly, there is no instance in American government where a legislative act of a lower body is appealed to a higher
legislative authority. This is an anomaly in American civics. It simply cannot be true.
Thirdly on this point, both 35710.5 and 35711 both clearly state that this is an appeal. An appeal clearly connotes a judicial
procedure. Had the Legislature wanted to reserve a quasi-legislative power to draw district lines to the Board in 1990 (when
35710.5 was written) or in 1980 (when 35711 was added), it could have easily done so. Instead, it reserved only the powers
of an appellate body to the Board. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
ii. Fullerton does not have as a holding that school district boundary actions are 1085 actions. The parties in that case stipulated
to 1085. A stipulation of the parties which is never addressed as an issue by the court does not have the power of stare decisis.
*15 iii. Fullerton is a plurality opinion and does not command the power of stare decisis. Board v. LAFCO (1992) 3 Cal.4th
903 disapproving Fullerton. That the trial court concluded that Petitioners' writ of mandate action was properly 1085 instead
of 1094.5 critically limited the Court's standard of review (Tab #30, AA01239 lns 16-28) and caused the Court to disallow
evidence outside of the Administrative Record and is, by itself, error.

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6. The Trial Court Committed an Error in Law: Failure to Address the Board's Standard of Review
Because the trial court improperly determined that the Board's function was quasi legislative, as discussed above, it failed
to consider the Board's function as an appellate body and what the Board's standard of review was. As is clear from the
Administrative Record, every other petition to be appealed to the Board was reviewed under a substantial evidence review.
In the Sagebrush case, however, the Administrative Committee apparently reviewed the petition de novo and concluded
that the Sagebrush Petitioners (the respondents to GUSD's appeal) did not sustain their burden of proof -- the burden to prove
that GUSD's appeal should be denied! As pointed out at trial, this is not the way any appellate agency works and the Board
should not be permitted to apply these standards and burdens arbitrarily to Petitioners here. This is especially true because the
Sagebrush Petitioners had no notice of this anomalous burden of proof and had no opportunity to respond after being notified
of this new burden.

*16 7. The Trial Court Committed an Error in Law: GUSD's Failure to Timely File its Appeal
Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of the timeliness of GUSD's appeal to the Board. 9 (Tab #13
AA01043) The Court denied that motion.
Petitioners' argument on summary judgment is simple: the County Committee announced its decision to allow the Sagebrush
territory transfer petition to go to a vote on May 6, 1992. It announced on June 3, 1992 what the voting district would be. On July
2, 1992, GUSD filed its first appeal (the 35711 ethnicity appeal) arguing that removing the Sagebrush kids from GUSD would
be tantamount to segregation. As the decision to allow the vote was announced in May and GUSD did not file its appeal until
July, the appeal was untimely under 35711 which allows the district 30 days to appeal. As GUSD's appeal is from the decision
of the County Committee to allow a vote at all (i.e. that the Sagebrush children should not be transferred out of the district under
any circumstances), the time for filing the appeal begins to run at the time the decision to grant the petition (to allow the vote)
was made: May 6th. The size of the voting district (the June 3rd announcement) is irrelevant to GUSD's 35711 appeal.
Time limits for filing appeals are traditionally jurisdictional. Hollywood Circle v. Dept. ABC (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 532. As
GUSD failed to file its 35711 *17 ethnicity appeal on time, it should have been summarily denied. Reviewing it was in
excess of the State Board's jurisdiction.
The State Board's counsel wrote to GUSD's counsel after receiving the 35711 ethnicity appeal and said, in essence, why don't
you also file an appeal under 35710.5? (AA00577) GUSD filed its 35710.5 appeal on July 21, 1992, certainly outside of the
30 day time limit set forth in 35710.5 if the May 6th date is used, but also outside of the time limit if the June 3rd date is used.
The trial court, again because of its mistaken belief that the State Board had quasi-legislative authority in territory transfer
appeals, apparently decided the summary judgment motion against Petitioners again because of the Court's belief that when
operating as a quasi-legislative body the State Board had the authority not just to accept a late appeal but to ask for an appeal on
any issue it decided it wanted to review. However, the State Board had no quasi-legislative authority on a 35710.5 appeal and,
as time limits are jurisdictional, the State Board had no authority to ask GUSD for an additional appeal and had no authority
to review an appeal filed late.
Now that the trial court has decided that the State Board does not have quasilegislative authority in territory transfer appeals,
it may well decide this issue differently as well.

8. Conclusion
This action was filed as a writ of Mandate in June 1995. It is patently unfair that the trial court took 2 1/2 years to come to
a conclusion in Petitioners' favor and now Petitioners must endure an appeal. Petitioners respectfully request that every effort

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be made by this Court to expedite the process. The children who were entering *18 kindergarten in 1991 when the petition
process began are shortly entering junior high school.

Footnotes
All references are to the California Education Code unless specifically noted.
1
35753. Conditions for approval
2

4
5
6
7
8

(a) The State Board of Education may approve proposals for the reorganization of districts, if the board has determined, with respect
to the proposal and the resulting districts, that all of the following conditions are substantially met:
(1) The new districts will be adequate in terms of number of pupils enrolled.
(2) The districts are each organized on the basis of a substantial community identity.
(3) The proposal will result in an equitable division of property and facilities of the original district or districts.
(4) The reorganization of the districts will not promote racial or ethnic discrimination or segregation.
(5) The proposed reorganization will not result in any substantial increase in costs to the state.
(6) The proposed reorganization will not significantly disrupt the educational programs in the proposed districts and districts affected
by the proposed reorganization and will continue to promote sound education performance in those districts.
(7) The proposed reorganization will not result in a significant increase in school housing costs.
(8) The proposed reorganization is not primarily designed to result in a significant increase in property values causing financial
advantage to property owners because territory was transferred from one school district to an adjoining district.
(9) The proposed reorganization will not cause a substantial negative effect on the fiscal management or fiscal status of the proposed
district or any existing district affected by the proposed reorganization.
(10) Any other criteria as the board may, by regulation, prescribe.
(b) The State Board of Education may approve a proposal for the reorganization of school districts if the board determines that it is
not practical or possible to apply the criteria of this section literally, and that the circumstances with respect to the proposals provide
an exceptional situation sufficient to justify approval of the proposals.
35710.5. Appeal to State Board of Education
(a) An action by the county committee approving or disapproving a (transfer of territory) petition pursuant to Section 35709 or 35710
may be appealed to the State Board of Education by the chief petitioners or one or more affected school districts. The appeal shall
be limited to issues of noncompliance with the provisions of Section 35705, 35706, 35709, or 35710. If an appeal is made as to the
issue of whether the proposed transfer will adversely affect the racial or ethnic integration of the schools of the districts affected, it
shall be made pursuant to Section 35711.
The County Committee must give notice, hold public hearings and make findings pursua to these statutes.
Although not provided for in the statute, some petitioners who could not get the consent of the school boards petitioned directly to
the State Board under the old law -- a process the State Board and staff found tedious and time-consuming.
meaning those transfer petitions which were not subject to 35709 (consenting school boards)
And the obvious inference is that 35710.5 appeals prior to this time had been reviewed under the correct standard for just procedural
errors by the county committee. If this were not true, Wolfertz would have had no need to write this memo to Reibson.
GUSD's lawyer conceded that a 35710.5 appeal was restricted to procedural errors. In a letter to the State Board of Education (July
15, 1992), she wrote:
...our office contacted James Marlatt of the Los Angeles County Committee and was informed that with the exception of appeals
pursuant to Education Code 35711, appeals to the State Board were now limited to procedural issues.... Furthermore, the provisions
of the Education Code that govern appeals appear to support Mr. Marlatt's statement. For instance, 35710.5 states that, the appeal
[under 35709-35710] shall be limited to issues of non-compliance. Similarly, 35710 states that, if the county committee finds that
the conditions enumerated in paragraphs (1) through (10), inclusive, of subdivision (a) of 35753 are substantially met, the county
committee may approve the petition. What this provision indicates is that an appeal is permissible when a county committee fails
to make the requisite findings. (Emphasis added)
This was primarily out of frustration that the trial date had been kicked over several times. As a writ action, this case should not have
taken 2 1/2 years. It took so long, in fact, that the Petitioners' standing and the Statute of Limitations became an issue. For that reason,
Petitioners amended the petition for writ of mandate to include the Sagebrush Committee as a Petitioner in the event that the case
lasted so long that the original Petitioners' children were graduated by the conclusion of the case.

End of Document

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