The Brenner-Wallerstein Debate

Author(s): Robert A. Denemark and Kenneth P. Thomas

Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 1988), pp. 47-65
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association
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International
StudiesQuarterly
(1988) 32, 47-65

Debate
The Brenner-Wallerstein
ROBERT

A.

DENEMARK

MemphisState University
KENNETH

P.

THOMAS

University
of Chicago

One of the most criticalevaluationsof Immanuel Wallerstein'sworldsystemsperspectivecomes fromMarxistswho dislikethe dominantrole

played by trade as opposed to class interactionin his analysis.At the
forefrontof this critique is Robert Brenner,whose articlein New Left
Review, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of NeoSmithianMarxism,"has elicitedfarless of a debate than is warranted.In
the firstpart of thisarticlewe carefullyoutlinethe variouspartsof this
importantcritique,brieflydrawingattentionto some of the much more
fundamentalissueseach addresses.In the second partwe considerone of
the mostimportantof these issues,thatof the mostappropriatelevel of
analysisforunderstandingpoliticalphenomena.The debateoverthispoint
and sixteenth
revolveslargelyaround events in Poland in the fifteenth
centuries.Thus thisratherarcane topictakescenterstagein an argument
We concludethatwhileone shouldmaintain
withfarbroaderimplications.
a widersystemlevelof analysis,moreattentionmustbe paid to theconcrete
determinants
of powerwithinpoliticalunitsas well.

Introduction
The world-systemsperspective put forward by Immanuel Wallerstein has elicited a
great deal of critical comment. Its stress on a system level of analysis and the
importance it attaches to trade have not, however, gone unchallenged. The result has
been a livelyinteraction that has advanced our understanding of the world political
and economic system.However, one of the more interestingcritiques, now ten years
old, has been largely ignored. Robert Brenner's "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism" (New LeftReview, 1977) is a complex
Marxist critique of the firstof Wallerstein's world-systemvolumes, and takes the
perspective to task for its methodological, conceptual, and empirical content. Yet to
date few authors have addressed themselves to this major attack, and then only
Authors'note:The order in whichthe names of the authors appears is arbitrary.The workwas a trulycollaborative effort.We would like to thank Mark Gasiorowski,Piotr Gorecki, Charles Lipson, William Marty,Susanne
Hoeber Rudolph, the membersof the Programon InternationalPolitics,Economicsand Securityat the University
of Chicago, and the editorsand anonymousreviewersof ISQ fortheircomments.An earlierdraftof thisarticlewas
presented at the 1985 meetingof the American PoliticalScience Association.
C 1988 InternationalStudies Association

48

The Brenner-Wallerstein
Debate

cut to theheartof some

selectively.
This is unfortunatebecause Brenner'scriticisms
analysis,as
of themostimportantquestionsposed byMarxistcriticsofworld-systems
wellas some of the more fundamentalquestionsraisedby studentsof international
politicaleconomyand worldpoliticsgenerally.
This articleis designed to accomplishfivetasks.First,we will fullyoutlinethe
pointsof contentionthatexistbetweenWallersteinand Brenner.Each willbe placed
in itsbroadercontextas partof a debateof interestto studentsof politicaleconomy.
Second, we will begin the process of assessingthe meritsof the argumentseach
makes.Particularattentionwillbe paid to thequestionof themostappropriatelevel
school is thatthe
of analysisfor studyingpolitics.The claim of the world-systems
systemlevel of analysisis the correctone fromwhichto gain a vantagepoint on
phenomena of interest.This is disputed by Brenner and others,and Brenner's
analysisof this question will be the topic of much of the rest of this paper. For
Brenner,the nation-stateis the proper level of analysis,and the proper unit of
in contrast,theworld-system
is theproperlevel
analysisis theclass. For Wallerstein,
includingclasses
of analysis,and thereare a numberof unitsof analysisof interest,
and states.
This debate willnotbe consideredin theabstract.Our thirdtaskwillbe to takeup
these argumentsempirically.We have chosen to do so in the contextof a single
criticalcase. The case we have chosenis thatof Poland in thefifteenth
and sixteenth
of theeconomytookplace.
centuries,a periodin whicha fundamentalrestructuring
A verystrongset of reasons existforour choice of such a seeminglyarcane case.
First,both Brennerand Wallersteinrelyheavilyon an analysisof eventsin Poland
during this period to support their differentcontentions.Each agrees on the
centrality
of Poland duringthisperiod to the theoreticalquestionat hand.
The factthatbothBrennerand Wallerstein
deal withPolandis nottheonlyreason
forus to considerit important.Each authordeals witha numberof countriesthat
mightserveas good testcases. Our studyhas convincedus,however,thatPoland is in
factthe ideal testinggroundforthesecompetinginterpretations.
Poland's economy
duringthisperiod,and it was setin the contextof a far
was relativelyundiversified
fewhistoricalor contextualvariables
simplerworldthanhas existedsince.Relatively
standin the wayof a directconsiderationof the competingpropositions.
Poland mayalso be identifiedas a "strongly"
incorporatedarea usingthe criteria
Poland provided
levelsof incorporation.
suggestedbyHall (1986) fordifferentiating
an importantstaple,grain,in notinsignificant
amountsto the mostimportantareas
of thecore throughthemediumof a highlyorganizedand centralizedprocess.This
smallregionof thecountry,nor werethetrade
graindid not come froma relatively
vulnerableto disruption.
patternsthatdeveloped particularly
Finally,Poland is not a "straw"case. In our viewBrenner'sargumentthateven
foreign militaryinterventiondoes not alter the essentiallyinternal,class-based
mechanismsthatdeterminesocialorganizationis a weak one thathas alreadyfallen
preyto an analysisby Bergesen(1984). Wallersteingoes further.He contendsthat
forcesfarless obtrusivethana foreignmilitary
presencecan fuelimportantchanges.
Our choiceof Poland duringthisperiodallowsus to considerthisstrongerversionof
Wallerstein'sproposition.
Poland may thus be formallyidentifiedas a "crucialcase" under the criteriafor
such a test that Eckstein(1975) has developed. It is a strongcase that has been
as beingofcentraltheoretical
identified
importance.To a very
byall theparticipants
extentonlythevariablesof interestto us operate.This makesthestudyof
significant
Poland duringthisperiod of greatgeneralinterest.The sequenceof eventsthereis
directlyrelatedto the argumentsBrennerand Wallersteinmakeregardingthemost
appropriatelevel of analysis from which to understandpoliticaland economic
events.If eithershould fail to adequatelyexplain eventsin Poland it would be a
major stikeagainsthis chosen theoreticalperspective.

ROBERT

A. DENEMARK

AND KENNETH

P. THOMAS

49

Our fourthtaskwillbe to shed lighton some of the criticalsocio-economicand

politicalprocessesof thisperiod. This is necessaryin thatno real considerationof
Poland can proceed withoutsome understandingof the linkagesthat tie these
phenomena together.Centralto thispart of the paper are discussionsof surplus
transferand land/laborratios.The mechanismsof surplustransferare of considerable interestfromthe perspectiveof variousliteraturesand we willchallengethe
waysin whichbothBrennerand Wallersteindeal withthissubject.We willalso offer
some pointsdesignedto help clarifythenatureof thisimportantdebate.Land/labor
ratiosare of less contemporary
importance,althoughour discussionwillseekto shed
some lighton whytheyare of interestin thiscase and how such issuesmightfitinto
our considerationof more contemporary
events.
Our final tasks are evaluative. We will consider the relative strengthsand
weaknesses of each of the competingexplanationsofferedand conclude that
Wallerstein'suse of a systemlevelof analysisis bettersuitedto explainingsocialand
politicalphenomenathanBrenner'sstate-level
analysis.We willarguethatBrenner's
reducesour understandingof the
exclusivefocuson eventswithinthe nation-state
patternof incentivesforactorswithinthe statein thosefrequentcases wheresuch
incentivesare "externally"generated.
Neverthelessthere are serious flawsin Wallerstein'sargumentas well. Wallerstein'spositionis weakenedby his relianceon the processof unequal exchangein a
period when the requirementsnecessaryfor thatdynamicto play itselfout were
absent.Likewise,his broad focus,whileallowingus to understandthe forcesthat
circumscribe
events,presentsissuessuchas theexactformof laborexploitationthat
evolvesand the methodsdesignedto implementitin fartoo directlypredetermined
a manner.Littleattentionis paid to the actual forcesand processesthatmold the
resultingsocial formsat the microlevel. We will conclude thatwhile one should
maintainthe wider systemlevel of analysis,more attentionmust be paid to the
concretedeterminants
of powerwithina politicalunitas well.Finally,we willreview
therelevanceof theseconclusionsforstudentsofinternational
politicaleconomyand
of worldpoliticsmore generally.
The Debate betweenBrennerand Wallerstein
lines.Each criticism
RobertBrennercriticizesWallersteinalong six interdependent
pointsto a similarity
betweenthe methodof Wallersteinand thatof Adam Smithas
comparedto thatof Karl Marx.
TheDefinition
ofCapitalism
The firstcritiquerestson the verydefinitionof capitalismitself.To elucidatehis
points,BrennerlocatesWallersteinin thecontextof thedebatebetweenPaul Sweezy
and MauriceDobb over the transitionfromfeudalismto capitalism(Sweezy,1954).
tookplace in partbecauseofthedevelopmentof
Sweezyargued thatthistransition
of urban and rural life. The
trade and in part because of the differentiation
provisionofluxurygoods (and weapons)via tradeengenderedin feudallordsa need
to increasetheirincomes.This need manifesteditselfin thesearchformoreefficient
formsof accumulation.The nascentdivisionof laborbetweenvillageand estatethat
thanthe manoralsystemand was
had developed proved to be much more efficient
thus strengthened.This led, albeitslowly,to the commutationof labor servicesto
moneyrentsand eventuallyto the use of (capitalist)tenantson the land.
Dobb takes a verydifferenttack. He emphasizesinternal,"qualitative"changes
such as the increasingalienationof the workerfromthe means of production,
increasingproductivity,
and innovationsthatallowed forthe extractionof greater
amounts of relative,not just absolute,surplus value. From this perspectivethe

50

The Brenner-Wallerstein
Debate

specificeffectsof tradeand specializationwerefacilitated

bythetransition;
theydid
not cause it.

Brenneragrees withDobb and is much more criticalof Sweezythan Dobb was.

Feudal lords,he argues,could not envisionthe optionof increasingproductionby
freeinglabor to increase workerproductivity
and theirown incomes,since this
assumesa capitalistlogicnotyetin existence.The changefromlabordues to money
rentsis likewiseseen as completelyunimportant
becauseserfswerenotyetseparated
fromtheirmeans of productionor freeto seek wage labor (Brenner,1977:43-44).
Brenneralso notes thattherewas no necessarycompulsionto increaseincomesas
would exist given marketpressures.A simpleincreasein absolutesurpluswrung
fromthe peasants,and not a transitionto a wholenew system,would be the more
likelyresponseto trade fromthisperspective.
Further,Brennersuggeststhatthe idea thatthebuddingurbanareas provideda
havenforfleeingserfsand hencea home forwage laboris notcorrect.The periodic
demographiccrises,broughton in partbecause of an increasedexploitationof rural
labor, limited the food productionnecessaryto support urban areas while the
ultralimitedmarketforluxuriescreatedby the lords gave riseto a restrictive
guild
systemand not to freewage labor (Brenner,1977:47).
Sweezy'sdefinitionof the transitionfromfeudalismto capitalismas the pointat
which productionfor exchange replaces productionfor use is thus rejected by
Brenner,who argues thatboth trade and productionforexchangewere inherent
and weaponssupportedfeudalpartsof thefeudal system.The tradein preciosities
ismratherthanunderminedit(Brenner,1977:46,49). The freelaborpoweroffered
as a commodityand the necessityto produce for the market-phenomena that
definecapitalismin Brenner'sview-are not broughtinto being by what Sweezy
identifiesas important.

Not surprisingly,
Wallerstein'ssuggestionthat"productionforsale in a marketin
whichthe object is to realize the maximumprofit"as the definingelementof the
capitalistworld-system
(Wallerstein,1974b:398)is immediately
rejectedbyBrenner,
whosuggeststhatsucha definition
the
impliesthatcapitalismis simplyand inevitably
resultof a trade-baseddivisionof labor fueledby the profitmotivein a worldof
rationalactors (Brenner,1977:53-55). For Wallerstein,then,the
(capitalistically)
commodification
of labor power is not seen as essentialfor accumulationon an
extendedscale or forinnovationto take place.
Brenner concludes that this view of capitalismas adopted from Sweezy by
Wallersteinis at best ahistoricaland at worstcircularin that it assumes that a
capitalistdynamicalready exists and leads to the developmentof the capitalist
system.This logic is shownby Brennerto be an integralpartof the ideas of Adam
Smithand thus,he suggests,it is prone to the same limitations
as Smith'sworkis.
A synthesis
of thisdebate leavesus withthemuchbroaderquestionthatmade the
initialexchange betweenSweezyand Dobb of such interest.Whatis the natureof
inherentin a systeminduce paralysisand
epochal change? Do the contradictions
allowfortheriseof a wholenew set of dynamics,or does thegroundworkfora new
era lie just beneath the surface of society,waitingonly to be broughtout by a
more dominantforces?
weakeningof older,temporarily
The Growthof Capitalism

Given the fundamentalriftbetween Brenner and Wallersteinon the nature of

capitalismit is not surprisingthat disagreementwould also exist on the central
dynamicof its growth.For Brenner,growthand developmentoccur when labor is
divorcedfromthemeansofsubsistenceand productionsuchthatneitherworkernor
owneris self-sufficient.
Such a situationfuelsthe need forextendedaccumulation

ROBERT

A. DENEMARK

AND KENNETH

P. THOMAS

51

and innovation,whichgivescapitalismitsextraordinary
productivecapacityand its
particularviciousness.Technical advance, productivevariation,and any other
actionsthatincrease productivity
and generaterelativesurplusvalue stand at the
heartof dynamiccapitalistgrowth.
Brennerdoes notdenythatotherphenomena,specifically
trade,mayplaya minor
role in the growthprocess.But he is quickto downplayanyadditionalcontribution
on the part of such secondaryphenomenaand hence clearlyrejectsWallerstein's
propositionthattrade may have a determiningimpactupon capitalistgrowthand
development.His denial is mostcompleteand proceedsin threeparts.
Brennerbeginsbydenigratingthesuggestionthatprimitive
accumulation(usually
via trade) played a decisive role in the developmentor expansion of capitalism
(Brenner, 1977:66-67). Brennernotes thatprimitiveaccumulationwas a concept
used by Smithand harshlycriticizedby Marx in part for its circularnature-the
assumptionthatthe accumulationof capital,whichpresupposessurplusvalue and
hence capitalistproduction,can explain the originof capitalism.Brennersees the
reallyimportantquestions as being those that considerwhy accumulationfrom
outsidean area (as in exploitationof theperipherybythecore) was necessaryin the
firstplace, whythisnew wealthwouldbe used forproductiveand not unproductive
purposes,and whyaccumulationof thissort,whichhad existedbefore,had never
beforehad thisparticularimpact.BrennercontendsthatWallerstein
addressesnone
of thesequestionsand thattheanswersto themlie in theelucidationof specificclass
structuresand relationsand not in the simpleexistenceof such accumulation.
Brenner'ssecond criticism
of Wallerstein's
viewof growthand developmentis that
it restssolelyon quantitativeexpansion.As more areas are broughtintoa system,
specializationincreasesand more absolutesurplusmaybe siphonedoff(Brenner,
1977:56-57). The firstpart of this formulationis seen as based upon Smith's
conceptionof the gainsto be made fromexpandingspecialization.The second part
derivesdirectlyfromthe disputeover definitions
discussedabove. The presenceof
relativesurplusvalue is viewedbyBrenneras evidenceof theinnerdynamictoward
accumulationand growth,whichdefinecapitalism,whileincreasingabsolutesurplus
does not suggestthissame processat all.
Third,Brennerrejectswhathe believesto be Wallerstein's
pictureof thedynamics
of the developmentof the systemas a whole. Brenner interpretsWallersteinas
of an
suggestingthatthemode of laborcontrol,and indeed theentireclassstructure
area, is determinedby the requirementsof maximizingproductionof exports
(Brenner, 1977:56-57). He reads Wallersteinas saying that once an area is
the production
incorporatedintothe system,the classformationthatbestfacilitates
of goods to be offeredon the worldmarketwillinevitably
come intobeing.'
Againwe are facedwitha muchbroaderquestionjustbelowthesurface.The field
of internationalpolitical economy has been significantly
affectedby studies of
dependencyand the imperialismof freetrade.Along withour searchforquantifiable variableswe appear to have adopted tradeas an importantphenomenon.But to
whatextentis this(and notmuchmorecomplexphenomenasuchas theexpanding
oflaborpower,or theacquisitionof
divisionof labor,theincreasedcommodification
surplus value) adopted for the sake of expediency?To what extentmightwe be
ignoring what is truly fundamental,and instead studyingprocesses that are
epiphenomenallargelybecause theyare easiestto identifyand measure quantitatively?Both the proper role thattrade should play in Marxistanalysisand a more
carefulconsiderationof the role it does playin the worldare at issue here.
' Brenner's ratherodd interpretationappears to resultfromhis failureto distinguishbetween"capitalism"as he
definesit and "the capitalistworld system"as Wallersteinuses the phrase.

52

The Brenner-Wallerstein
Debate
The Nature of Underdevelopment

Followingon Brennerand Wallerstein's

disagreement
overdevelopment,theirthird
major area of discordregardsthe natureof underdevelopment.
Brenner'scritique
includesa generalreviewof Andre GunderFrank's"developmentof underdevelopment"hypothesis,an analysisof the role thatWallersteinassertsthe stateplaysin
underdevelopment,
the questionof the impactthatthe typeof good produced and
traded may have on an area's development,and the applicabilityof Arghiri
Emmanuel'sconceptof unequal exchange.
Brennerplaces Wallersteinsquarelyin Frank'scamp. Underdevelopment
is here
believedto be caused byexternalexploitation.Areascapableof providingimportant
goods are dominatedby more advanced countries,alwaysin competitionwithone
another for resourcesand outletsfor capital,whichquicklyintroduceor solidify
systemsof forcedlabor or slavery.All activity
becomesoutwardlydirectedand takes
place to thedetrimentof the"colony."Frankbuttresses
thisargumentbynotingthat
where highlyvaluable goods were discoveredafterinitialcolonization,small (European) freeholderswerereplacedbyforcedor slavelabor,as happenedin Barbados
in the mid-seventeenth
century(Frank,1975:451-56). Wheregoods of greatvalue
were not found, as in North America, exploitationwas less direct,immigrant
freeholderswere not displaced,and laterdevelopmentwas facilitated.
Brenner'scriticismof these propositionsechoes his earlierarguments.He contendsthatexploitationresultsnot fromexternaldemand but fromthe typeof class
structurethatevolvesand it is onlywithinthe contextof the relationsof ownersto
labor thatunderdevelopmentcan be understood(Brenner,1977:85-86).
Brenneralso takesissue withWallerstein'scontentionthatthe developmentof a
weak statein peripheralareas allows for underdevelopment.Wallersteinsuggests
that countriesthat develop a strongstate apparatus gain both an initialand a
long-term
edge overthosethatdo not.A strongstatemayactto codifylawsfavorable
to commerce,and as a major purchaserof goods and services,as a provideror
guarantorof capital,and as a mobilizerof sundrynecessaryresources.Areaswherea
stateapparatus is not strongwill be at a disadvantageboth in the shortand long
termswhen strongerstatesmay exploitthe weakerarea in such a way as to stop a
strongstatefromever evolvingthere.
and empirically.
Brennerargues againstthisidea boththeoretically
First,he notes
that such a propositionassumes capitalistmotivationprior to the existenceof
capitalism.Second, he pointsout the circularnatureof a propositionthatsuggests
and underdevelopment
to a weakstate.
thata weak stateleads to underdevelopment
Finally,Brenner claims that the strongstateof France did not secure for itselfa
positionin the core. Poland, too, had a strongstatein Brenner'sview,and thisdid
not prevent its ending up in the periphery.SimilarlyPrussia, a raw-materials
producer,developed a strongstate.2
Brenner is also criticalof the propositionthatthe typeof good produced and
exportedwillhave an effecton development.Wallersteinsuggeststhatone of the
reasonsunderdevelopmentexistsin certainareas is thattheywere relegatedto the
task of producing raw materials.Such productionentails few linkages and is
oriented.Brennercontends,however,thatthenatureof a good cannotin
externally
and of itselfdeterminethe natureof developmentin the area thatproducesit. To
supporthis position,BrennernotesthatNorthAmericaproducednothingbut raw
materials,mostlyfood staples,throughitsearlyhistory.Rapid and successfulNorth
Americandevelopmentis not to be seen as an anomaly,however.What differenti2 A good analysisof Brenner and Wallersteinon the role of the state may be found in Garst (1985). He argues,
correctlyin our view,thatWallerstein'spositionchanged subtlybetweenthe firstand second volumesof TheModern
World-System.

ROBERT

A. DENEMARK

AND KENNETH

P. THOMAS

53

ated thisfromotherraw-materials
producingareas was the existenceof freewage
labor, which facilitatedinnovationand accumulationat an early stage (Brenner,
1977:86-90).
Finally,Brenner questions the relevance of Emmanuel's concept of unequal
exchangein thiscontext.Unequal exchangeis seen byWallersteinas playinga large
of surplusfromtheperipheryto thecore.
and even predominantrole in thetransfer
Brennernotes,however,thatunequal exchangeas conceivedbyEmmanuelrestson
the equalization of profitrates across the world marketgiven the possibilityof
cross-bordercapital mobility.Clearlyany systemso based would be hard set to
functionin the period from 1450 to 1640 whichWallersteindiscusses.The small
amountof traderelativeto productionthatmightbe expectedin thisera also limits
the relevanceof thismechanism.
A numberof broad questionsarise fromthispartof the debate. In essenceit is a
betweenand
call fora more carefulconsiderationof the natureof therelationships
we are led to
among classes,the state,production,and exchange.More specifically,
questionthe degree to whichclass interactionguides and mediatesall of the other
processeswhileremaininginsulatedfromchangesin the strengthof the state,the
natureof production,or in the extentand directionof exchange.
TheRole oftheIndividual
The fourtharea of disagreementbetweenthe two authorsconcernsthe abilityof
individualsto recognizeand act upon theirown best interests.Wallersteinand his
precursorsare accusedof assumingthatindividualswouldactin a mannerconsistent
with what we today call economic rationality.That feudal lords would move to
increaseproductionwhen in need of additionalfunds,thatserfswould recognize
theirsuperiorbargainingpositionin timesof demographicdecline,thattheleaders
of countrieswould help augmentsystemsof productionthatincreased revenues
from exports-all of these are viewed by Brenner as incoherent,ahistorical
assumptions.This atomism,a keyfacetof theworksof Adam Smith,is clearlyviewed
as incompatiblewiththe Marxiantradition.
This atomism is criticizedby other authors as well. Theda Skocpol decries
Wallerstein's"two-stepreduction,"firstof "socio-economicstructureto determination by world marketopportunitiesand technicalproductionpossibilities"and
and policiesto determination
bydominantclassinterests"
second,of "statestructures
impliesthatindividualsalwaysand clearly
(Skocpol, 1977:1078-79). Such treatment
and thattheoptimization
see theirinterestsfromamongtheuniverseof possibilities
intorequisitepolicies,institutions,
of thoseinterestsis clearlyand neatlyconvertible
and actions. The role that the individual plays, the degree to which context
ofinterests
intooutcomes-thatis,therole
constrainsthataction,and thetranslation
of politics-are all partof thisdebate.
LevelofAnalysis
TheAppropriate
area of disagreementrevolvesaround thequestionof theappropriatelevel
The fifth
of analysis.Wallersteinsuggeststhat his perspectiveis superiorto othersin part
identifiesthe criticalnatureof eventsthatoccur outsidethe
because it successfully
boundariesof an individualcountry.Foremostamonghisexamplesof theseimpacts,
of Eastern
identifiedlargelyin termsof tradein necessities,is the peripheralization
Europe and especiallyPoland duringwhathe termsthe "long"sixteenthcentury.
Wallersteinargues thatthe crisisof feudalismin the fourteenthcenturyengendered in Europe the drive for threethings:gold to ease liquidityproblems;new
sourcesof basic commoditiessuch as food and fuel; and a desireon the partof the

54

Debate
The Brenner-Wallerstein

nobilityto augment their incomes. WesternEuropean states,notablyPortugal

positionvis-a-vis
because of itsadvantageousgeographicalposition,itsweakmilitary
Spain, and its highlycentralizedstateapparatus(a consequenceof the reconquest),
foundexternaltradeto be a solutionto theseproblems(Wallerstein,1974a: chapter
2). To theextentthatthesecountriesdid moveto increasetheirtrade,a furtherneed
arose forfood to supportthe growingurban commercialsector.
In EasternEurope the same crisisengenderedthe same drives.Here, however,
the opportunityfor
geographyand otherfactors(such as lack of capital)restricted
overseasexpansion'a la Portugalwhileprovidingin itsstead the WesternEuropean
demand forgrain.This, Wallersteinsuggests,largelyexplainsthe "refeudalization"
thatoccurredin the 1500s when labor dues, whichhad declined withthe demographiccrisis,were increasedin responseto opportunitiesfortrade.It is upon this
and similarexamplesthatWallersteinbases hisclaimwithregardto theappropriate
level of analysis.The situationin Poland, he asserts,can be understoodonly as a
of the developmentof capitalismon a world scale. He goes on to
manifestation
suggestthatthesystemthatevolvedin Poland mustbe viewedas a capitalistsystem:
capitalistin thatthe developmentof capitalismelsewhereand thissystem'sinclusion
of Poland throughthe mediumof exchangehelped determinethespecificrelations
of productionthatemergedin Poland. As Poland's developmentcan be understood
onlyin termsof developmentselsewhere,and as thosedevelopmentswerecapitalist
in natuWre,
Poland mustbe viewedas partof the capitalistsystem.
Brennerdisagreescompletely.His firstargumentis thatthe "big impact"of the
of exports),
worldmarket(by whichhe appears to mean the largestconcentration
can be seen in Poland only afterrefeudalizationand hence could have in no way
contributedto it(Brenner,1977:80-8 1). Second,he claimsthatat theirheightPolish
exportswere too small (onlybetween5 and 7 percentof totalproduction)to have
one.3 Third, he notes that
had any real impactat all-much less a determinative
Poland did not respond to price increaseswithincreasedproductionas one would
expect of a "capitalist"area or system.While Polish exports did rise, Brenner
suggeststhe increasewas due more to the vicissitudesof weatherthan to market
demand.
To Brenner'sdisservicehe never directlyaddresses the questionof the approEach
priateunitof analysis,but his positionis clearifonlyimplicitin hisstatements.
impermeableunitwithinwhichall
individualcountryis viewedas being a virtually
relevantdata necessaryfortheexplanationof eventsreside.4If Poland suffersfrom
the reasons
describedbut not explainedbyWallerstein,
the stateof affairscorrectly
forthismaybe found in the internalclass structureof Poland withoutthe need to
considerexternalconditions(Brenner, 1977:71). Finally,neitherPoland nor cersincecapitalism's
tainlytheentiresystemcould be consideredin anyway"capitalist,"
of laborpower,was absent.On this,Brenner
definingelement,thecommodification
is mostadamant.
The questionof theappropriatelevelof analysisfromwhichto addressquestions
is amongthemosthotlydebatedof theissuesraised.Sincethepublicationof Singer's
(1961) seminal articlethe debate has proliferatedand three differentlevels are
or implicitly,
bya varietyof authorsbothwithinand outside
championed,explicitly
the mainstreamof internationalrelationsscholarship.
3 Brenner's estimateof the magnitude of exports relativeto total productionis part of a larger dispute on this
issue, whichis discussed by Maria Bogucka (1981). She concludes thatPolish grain exportsduring thisperiod were
more in the range of 20 to 25 percentof total production(Bogucka 1981:14).
' It is interestingto note thaton page 76, in a discussionof the rise of England, trade is admittedto play a critical

role, but that Brenner later ignores the implications of this for his assumption that the nation-stateis the
appropriate unit of analysis.

ROBERT

A. DENEMARK

AND KENNETH

P. THOMAS

55

Methodologicalindividualists
likeBuena de Mesquitaarguethat"scientific
analysis
of the decisionmaker,"
and responsibility
cannotevade thisultimateaccountability
and whilehis positionis not whollyexclusionaryregardingthe use of nation-states,
alliances,or even systems,theyare seen to functionas constraintson individual
allowsus to avoid the pitfallsof the
choice,whichwhen studied with"sensitivity,"
towardthemakingof the
Arrowianparadox and proceedwiththegreatestefficiency
most"meaningfulgeneralizations"(Buena de Mesquita,1981:5).
The traditionallevel of analysisin internationalrelationsis the state. Krasner
describesthestateas an "autonomousactor"whoseobjectives"cannotbe reducedto
some summationof privatedesires"(Krasner,1978:5-6). He argues thatthe state
maybe a unitaryactorbecause itscentraldecisionmakerspossessa consistentset of
goals acrosstimeand thatsuch a treatment
providesa degreeof explanatorypower
superiorto thatof interest-group
liberalismor Marxism.
Structuralists,
too, have their representativesof both traditionaland radical
flavors.Waltzarguesthatwhenthe"organizationof unitsaffectstheirbehaviorand
theirinteractions,
thenone cannotpredictoutcomesor understandthemmerelyby
of thesystem'sunits,"and a
knowingthe characteristics,
purposes,and interactions
systemsapproach is necessary(Waltz,1979:39). The need forstudyat the systemic
level is stronglyindicated,he suggests,by the "repeated failure"of explanations
derived "throughexaminationof interactingunits"(Waltz, 1979:68). Outside the
NorthAmericanmainstream,
thisissueis also addressedin theworkof Marxistslike
Poulantzaswho believethatthe appropriateunitof analysisis socialclass,whilethe
appropriatelevel of analysisis the nation-state
(Poulantzas,1975).
Practical Implications

The sixthand finalcritiqueleveled at Wallersteinis clearlythe weakest.Brenner

notes thatif Wallerstein'spositionis correctthe resultwould be some "politically"
division
unacceptableconclusions:"So long as incorporationintothe world/market
of labor is seen automaticallyto breed underdevelopment,
the logical antidoteto
capitalistunderdevelopmentis not socialism,but autarky"(Brenner,1977:91). This
is clearlya case of workingbackwardfromone's conclusionand does nothingto
advance the debate on developmentand underdevelopment.
The Question of the AppropriateLevel of Analysis
With the exception of this last point, each of these criticismsis interestingand
warrantsfurtherconsideration.In thissection,however,we are goingto concentrate
on the differencesbetweenWallersteinand Brennerregardingthe properlevel of
analysis.This is a centralissuebecause thedevelopmentof a system-level
perspective
is the raison d'etre of world-systems
analysis.Since both authorsdiscuss Poland
extensively,and since Poland otherwisefitsthe criteriaof a criticalcase, an
Polishhistory
willshed lighton their
examinationof fifteenth
and sixteenth-century
competingclaims.We willcompare and reviewthe explanationsgivenby each for
thechangesthattookplace in Poland duringthosecenturies,a periodduringwhich
thelot of the peasantrybecame steadilymoreonerous,theaforementioned
"second
serfdom."5

5 Recent historiographyhas emphasized thatthe second serfdomwas not a homogeneous phenomenon and did
not touch all sectors of Polish society.There existed throughoutboth free peasants and free rural wage labor.
Nonetheless, the second serfdom affecteda large proportionof the peasantryand concentratedresources into
export production,cripplingPolish handicraftsand industrialdevelopment.A good introductionto thisliterature
is Maczak et al. (1985).

56

Debate
The Brenner-Wallerstein
Explaining the "Second Serfdom"

While Brenner never explicitlyargues for using the nation-stateas the unit of
analysis,hispositionon thequestionis quiteclear: socialchangewithina countrycan
be explained by the processesof class formationand class strugglethattake place
withinit. No other hypothesesare necessary.Althoughhe does not deny that a
country'straderelationscan have some effecton theseprocesses,theyenterintothe
equation only as one of many factorsthat influencethe relative strengthof
contendingclasses(Brenner,1976:53). Oddly enough,in hiscritiqueof Wallerstein,
getslostand classstruggleappears,to all intentsand purposes,
eventhisqualification
as a deus ex machina with no presuppositions.Indeed, he argues that Poland's
incorporationintotheworldsystemcannotaccountfortheworseningof conditions
forthepeasantrybecause thesecondserfdomin factpreceded"thebigimpactof the
worldmarket"(Brenner,1977:81).
In this section we will consider Brenner'sclaim by seekingto understandthe
nature and timingof both the "big impact"of the grain trade and of the second
serfdom.Carefulanalysiscastsdoubton Brenner'sversion,and we suggestsome of
the reasons whytrade plays more of a role in "internal"processesthan Brenner
would have us believe.
Wallersteinlocates the beginningsof the Baltic grain trade in the fourteenth
centuryand notes thatthe "coercedcash-croplabor" thatcharacterizedthe second
serfdom was "widespread by the 16th centurythroughoutthe peripheryand
of the European worldeconomy"(Wallerstein,1974a:92).
semiperiphery
In pointof fact,PolishgrainexportswerenotimportantuntilthePoles conquered
Danzig (Gdansk)in theThirteenYears War (1454-66), therebyassuringthemselves
secureaccess to the Baltic(Hoszowski,1960:122). Accordingto MarianMalowist,in
the 1460sannual grainexportsthroughDanzig amountedto about2,500 lasts(1 last
equals approximately60 bushels),increasingto 6,000 to 10,000lastsannuallyat the
end of thecentury(Malowist,1959:184). Otherauthoritiesgivecomparablefigures:
ofPoland
History
StanislawHoszowskigives 10,000 lastsfor 1490,and the Cambridge
also gives 10,000lastsfortheend of thecentury(Reddawayet al., 1950:447). Trade
grewsteadilythroughthe firsthalf of the sixteenthcentury,reachingthe level of
50,000 lastsannuallyby 1560,by Hoszowski'sestimate.Between1620 and 1650 this
of 75,000 to 120,000lasts,withMalowistgivingthe
was to reacha peak in thevicinity
settlingfor 100,000
History
lowerfigure,Hoszowskithe higher,and the Cambridge
lasts.
Whatwas happeningwiththe peasantryat thistime?In thefirstplace, theirlegal
began to surfacein 1493
peasantmobility
statuswas worsening.New lawsrestricting
and are among the earliestsurvivingstatutesof Poland's parliament,the Sejm
(Cowie, 1977:321; Wyczanski,1985:141). Subsequentlaws to reduce movementoff
theland werepassed in 1496 (whenitbecameillegalformorethanone of a peasant's
sonsto leave thesoilwithoutthelandlord'spermission),1501, 1503, 1505, 1510,and
1511 (Fox, 1924:111; Malowist,1959:182; Maland, 1973:283; Anderson,1974:282).
In 1511 the peasantslosttheirrightof appeal to royalcourts,and in 1518 the king
agreed notto acceptthecomplaintsof subjectsagainsttheirlordsat all (Reddawayet
al., 1950:260, 426).
of thepeasantsdoes not
It shouldbe noted,however,thattheeconomicwell-being
as an immediateresultof the enactmentof
seem to have deterioratedsignificantly
these laws. Malowistnotes thatincreasedduties placed on the peasants generally
occurred when grain prices were favorable,thus minimizingtheir impact and
reducingtheresistancethattheymightotherwisehave putup (Malowist,1959:188).
More detrimentalin nature were the sharp increasesin labor dues over this
period.JeromeBlum notes thatlabor dues stood at one day per week in the first

ROBERT

A. DENEMARK

AND KENNETH

P. THOMAS

57

quarterof the sixteenthcentury(Blum, 1957:830). By 1550 thishad increasedto

three days, and in 1600 it stood at six days per week (Stavrianos,1981:66). This
change took place over a period thatsaw a 300 to 500 percentincreasein grain
exports.So while the second serfdom"ruined" the peasants in the long run, as
Malowistasserts,itappears to have had itsworsteffectslaterin thesixteenthcentury
betweengrain
whenlabordues increaseddrastically.
Figure1 showstherelationship
the peasantry,and
exportsas reportedby a number of sources,laws restricting
feudal labor dues.
Which came first,then? The answer depends on how we conceptualizethe
relationshipbetweentrade and the worseningof the peasants' lot. Clearlygrain
exportswere at theirpeak only afterthe bruntof refeudalization.But evidence
indicatesthatsignificant
increasesin exportsdid precede the major attacksagainst
the serfs'legal statusand abilityto appeal to royalcourts.These attacksbegan after
the300 to 400 percentincreasein grainexportsthattookplace in thelasthalfof the
fifteenth
century.Our viewis thattheinitialincreasein trademade landlordsaware
of newopportunities
to increasetheirincomeat a timewhenmanorsfacedeconomic
declinefromthe demographiccrisisof the period,fromthelords'desiresforgoods
now availablein themarket,and fromthefinancialsqueeze facedbythoselordswho
receivedfixedmoneyrentsfromtheirpeasantsduringthattimeof inflation.Thus
the earliergraintrade,even thoughitwas notverylarge,providedan incentivefor
landlordsto increasetheirproduction.Because of the relativeshortageof agricultural labor and the low level of technology,theiractivitytook the formof trying,
to tie the peasantsto the land and destroytheirabilityto
ultimatelysuccessfully,
petitionhigherauthoritywhen theirburdensappeared unjust.If thisviewof the
process(tradeas motivator)is correct,thenBrenneris wrongin searchingfora "big
impact"of trade.The graintradeobviouslycould nothave grownto itshigherlevels
untilthere was a solutionto the problemof the labor shortage.Althoughexport
figuresat the end of the fifteenth
centurywere low relativeto those of a century
later,theyhad experiencedan intenserise of three-foldor four-foldproportions
overa period of less thanfourdecades. More and morelandlordshadtobeproviding
to imaginethatthefundstheyearnedwerenot part
grainforexportand itis difficult
of the reason theydecided to engage in thisnew activity.Hence, we contendthat
trade had its impactat relativelylow levelsof exports-prior to the passage of the
laws restrictingthe peasantry-by providinga formof relieffromthe pressing
problemsof the day and motivating
politicalactionbythe lordsto solvetheirlabor
shortage.
This viewis furthersupportedby the datingof the second serfdomprovidedby
on Poland whombothWallersteinand
Blum,Malowist,and Topolski,theauthorities
Brenner accept, and whom Brenner accuses Wallersteinof misusing(Brenner,
1977:80). For instance,Blum saysmerelythatat theend of thefifteenth
centurythe
peasants were "well on their way" to reenserfment(Blum, 1957:821). Malowist
describesthe second serfdomas beginningat the end of the fifteenth
centuryand
requiringmorethan 100 yearsto carrythrough(Malowist,1966:27).JerzyTopolski,
on whomBrennerreliesparticularly
heavily,datesitas "the 16thand thefirsthalfof
the 17th centuries"(Topolski, 1974:347). Brenner seems to be close to Blum's
positionwhenhe saysthatby 1500 thedebasementof thepeasantryhad "gone a long
way,"butas we have seen above he combinesthiswitha claimthatthiswas beforethe
worldmarketcould have had an impacton class structures(Brenner,1976:41). As
we have suggested,however,thereis no need forthereto have been a largevolume
of trade forit to have had a "big impact"on the class structureof Poland.
On thequestionof therelativetimingof thesetwoprocesses,then,we wouldargue
thatonce Polishlordswereable to exportsignificant
amountsof grain(whichbecame
possibleonlywhentheyhad a secureoutleton the Baltic),theyhad theincentiveto

Debate
The Brenner-Wallerstein

58

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ROBERT

A. DENEMARK

AND KENNETH

P. THOMAS

59

increasethe amountof farmlabor at theirdisposal.Under the prevailingratiosof

land to laborthiscould be done onlythroughthereenserfment
of thepeasantry.We
are able to date thisat least as earlyas 1490, slightly
beforethe passage of the first
laws restrictingthe peasants. Thus, on the question of dating, it appears that
Brenner'sexplicitargumentin "The Originsof CapitalistDevelopment"is incorrect.
The StrugglebetweenLords and Peasants

The factthatBrenneris incorrectin hisassertionthattheincreasein tradecame too

late to playan importantrole in the onsetof thesecond serfdomcertainlydoes not
provethatWallersteinis bydefaultcorrect.As we have noted,Brenner'sviewis that
the developmentof Poland depended on the formand distribution
of class power
withtrade playinga minor role as one of the many factorsthatin thisinstance
increasedtheabilityof thelordsto triumph.He contendsthatitwas thespecificclass
structurethatled to whatmightnow be called "thedevelopmentof underdevelopment."Brennersuggestsfourwaysin whichthe class relationsbroughtthisabout
(Brenner,1976:41):
1. The availability
of serflabor discouragedinnovationin agriculture;
2. thelord'ssurplusextractionmeantthatthepeasantshad no money;hence,itwas
impossiblefora home marketto arise;
3. therestrictions
on peasantmobility
precludedthegrowthof industriallabor,and
weakenedthe towns;
4. the lords worked to eliminatemerchantmiddlemenbetweenthemselvesand
foreigntradersand encouraged importsof manufacturesfromthe West,thus
underminingany possibilityfor the growthof locallycontrolledcommerceor
industryin Poland.
We would not deny thatthese factorsplay a critically
importantrole in underdevelopment.They are broadly acknowledgedin somewhatdifferenttermsby
Chirot(1975) and byWallersteinhimself.Brenner'scontention,
bothin his critique
of Wallersteinand elsewhere,is thatclass relationsdeterminethe mannerin which
commercial(or demographic)phenomenaare translatedintosocialstructure(Aston
and Philpin,1985). Hence the distribution
of class forces,and not the existenceor
theformof trade,is theprimarydeterminant
of development.Whatdeterminesthe
relativestrengthof the classes, however,are "the sources of class solidarityand
power of the peasantry,especiallyin theirvillagecommunities,and of the lords,
especially in their militaryorganization and above all their state" (Brenner,
1978:129).6But neitherthenatureof incentivesforactionnorthequestionof timing
is wellunderstoodbyreferenceto thesefactorsalone. As Richards(1979:492) notes,
any search for "firstcauses" is likelyto founderon the shoals of the complexand
interactive
natureof tradeand classconflict.Indeed, froma Marxistperspectiveitis
a truismthatclass struggleis ever-present.
What Brennermustaccountforis why
Polish class struggletook the formit did. He does not address the question of
incentivesfor action and so is unable to explain whythe owningclass soughtthis
on themobility
specificsetof legal restrictions
of thepeasants.Brenneris also unable
to address the questionof timing.Clearlypeasantmobilityhinderedan increasein
manoral production,but whywere earlier liberalizationsoverturnedonly at this
Was itcoincidencealone thatsaw suchchangesin classstructure
particularjuncture?
takingplace so quicklyafterthe acquisitionof a secure Baltic port and a large
increasein grainexports?
6A more detailed analysis of the peasants' organizationsmay be found in Brenner (1976). For a critique,see
Topolski (1981).

60

Debate
TheBrenner-Wallerstein

Brenner's(Inadequate) Retort
Apart from the potentialshortcomingsof his own analysis,Brenner does not
adequatelyaddress threeof Wallerstein'sstrongersupportingpoints:the effectsof
surplus transfer,the importanceof the nature or relativevalue of the good
activities.
Onlyin thecontextof theargumenton
produced,and the role of military
in Wallerstein's
surplus transferdoes he help illuminatesome real shortcomings
however,failsto shed muchadditionallight
work.Brenner'sattemptat clarification,
on the subject.
Surplus Transfer

First,Brenner'sinternalfocus obscuresthe questionof surplustransfer.Brenner

fromthe core to the periphery,then
initiallycontendsthatsurpluswas transferred
of "a long-term
transferof
contradictshimselfand refusesto rule out the possibility
surplus away fromthe periphery"(Brenner,1977:84, our emphasis).Clearlyany
intocapital,whichmeansthatsomecountriescould
such surpluscan be transformed
benefitfromhaving more available capital for investmentthan theywould have
otherwise,at the likelyexpense of others.If, as Wallersteinargues, there was a
easierforthe
transferof surplusfromPoland to theWest,itwouldbe comparatively
countriesof the West to industrializethan it would be for Poland (Wallerstein,
because, most industrial
1979:18). This is true even if, and perhaps specifically
productionin the sixteenthcenturyrequired relativelysmall amountsof start-up
capital,as Brennerhimselfsuggests(Brenner,1977:67).
It should be noted thatneitherBrennernor Wallersteinactuallygivesus a very
occurred.Neitherprovidesus withthe
persuasiveargumentof how surplustransfer
on profitsfrom
typeof data thatwould help decide thisissue (such as information
manorialaccountsor earlycommercialledgers). Indeed the data theydo cite are
per se. Brennersees therelative
largelyirrelevantto thequestionof surplustransfer
termsof tradeas importantin assessingwhetherthereis surplustransfer.He argues
in theseventeenth
thatbecause the priceof grainincreasedrelativeto manufactures
century,therewas probablya transferof surplusto the peripheryratherthanaway
from it at that time (Brenner, 1977:63,72). Wallerstein,on the other hand,
apparentlybelieves that the balance of trade is more important,as he pays close
century.
attentionto Poland's tradebalancein thesecondquarterof theseventeenth
At the same time he suggests,followingWyczanski,thatgrain pricesfelland the
termsof trade declined (Wallerstein,1980:131-33).
In fact,neither the termsof trade nor the balance of trade can be directly
translatedinto informationon surplus transfer.Withinthe confinesof Marxist
economics,moreover,Brennercannotargue thata shiftin thetermsof tradecauses
shiftin
a similarshiftin surplustransfer,
becausetheremayhavebeen an underlying
sociallynecessarylabor timethatled to thepricechanges.In thecase of Polishgrain
and Dutchcloth,itis quite plausiblethatthisoccurred.In Marx'sversionof thelabor
willmean a fallin the value of each unitor
theoryof value, a gain in productivity
product,all otherthingsbeingequal. And sincethepriceof a good oscillatesaround
its value, the price should fall by a similarproportion(Marx, 1976:36). In the
was increasing
seventeenthcenturyit was indeed the case thatDutch productivity
while Polish grain productivitywas stagnant or even declining (Wallerstein,
comprehen1980:132-33), so theshiftin termsof tradeBrennerreportsis perfectly
sible.
of surplusvalue because if
Yet thiswould have no necessaryeffecton thetransfer
price equals value in both importingand exportingtherewould be no transferof
sellingtheirgoods at a price
surplusvalue. However,if the Dutch wereconsistently

ROBERT

A. DENEMARK

AND KENNETH

P. THOMAS

61

above theirvalue,and/orbuyinggrainbelowitsvalue,theywouldreceiveadditional
surplusvalue. This would be trueno matterwhatthe processbywhichit occurred,
and itwillbe trueindependentof therelativevalue of thegoods traded.It shouldbe
equallyclear,too,thatthereis also no necessaryconnectionbetweenbalanceof trade
and surplustransfer,
unlessand untila consistently
negativebalanceof tradecaused
an actual shortageof physicalcapital.
Brennerdoes pointout a majorflawin Wallerstein's
discussionof surplustransfer:
the method by which it occurs. As we have noted, Wallersteinexplicitlyinvokes
ArghiriEmmanuel'sconceptof unequal exchangeto accountforsurplustransferin
the sixteenthcentury.Accordingto Emmanuel,unequal exchangetakesplace when
countriesexchange as "equal" commoditiesthatdo not have an equal amount of
labor embodied in them. The countrywith the higher organic compositionof
capital7or the higher wages will see a gain in surplus value as a resultof the
exchange,as long as thereis sufficient
capitalmobilitybetweenthe areas to bring
about an equalizationof the ratesof profitin bothof them.If thisconditionholds,
higherwages(adjustedforproductivity)
cannotaffecttherateof profit(whichwillbe
determinedbycompetition
amongcapitalists)
butcan increaseprices,whichwillthen
be higherthan theirvalue in termsof labor. When such goods are exchangedfor
productsfroma low-wageor slightlymechanizedcountry,whichwill have prices
below their values, there will be a transferof surplus from the low-wage (or
low-mechanization)to the high-wage(or high-mechanization)
area (Emmanuel,
1972: chapter2).
As Brenner rightlypoints out, Wallersteinoverlooksthe necessityfor capital
mobilityto make the whole processwork,and capitalwas not verymobilein the
sixteenthcentury(Brenner, 1977:63). Emmanuelhimselfbelievescapital mobility
was verylow then,and adds thatdifferences
in wage rateswerealso muchless than
they are today (Emmanuel, 1972:41). If we remove the dynamic of unequal
exchange from Wallerstein'sargument,he is hard-pressedto account for the
transferof surplusvalue. The closesthe comesto givingan alternative
accountof its
occurrenceis when he discussesthe debt cycleof Polish lords. These lords often
borrowedfromDanzig merchantswho had in turnborrowedfromDutch internationalmerchantbankers.This led to low pricesforthe purchaserssincetheyessenthe producersand merchantsto whom theylent
tiallyhad a monopsonyvis-'a-vis
(Wallerstein,1979:41). This mayprovideWallersteinwithan acceptablealternative
analysis,but substantialworkremainsto be done. And althoughthisis an important
problem,we maystillconclude thatWallersteinis on firmergroundthanBrenner.
The factthatBrenneracceptstheclaimthatsurplustransferdid takeplace (even if
he does so onlygrudgingly
and withoutreferenceto anyspecificprocess)helpsmake
Wallerstein'scase the strongerof the two.
Relative Value of theGood Produced

A second of the strengthsfound in Wallerstein'sargumentthat Brennerfails to

adequatelyaddress revolvesaround the effectthe natureor relativevalue of the
good produced in a countryhas on thatcountry'sdevelopment.Brennercontends
thatNorthAmerica,whichproduced primaryproductsfora metropolitanmarket,
thanSouth or CentralAmericaalthoughbothof those
developed much differently
areas were engaged in the same general task. Surely then the role of primaryproduct producer determinesnothingin and of itself.What Brenner fails to
consider,however,is thatNorthAmericawas not as highlysoughtafterforwhatit
was notas
producedas wereotherareas and henceitssocialand economicstructure
7 This is the ratio between constantcapital (machinery,raw materials,etc.) and variable capital (wages).

62

Debate
TheBrenner-Wallerstein

closelycontrolled.If dominantclassesare receivinghighratesof returnforproducts

scarce,yetlow-wagelabor,theywillwantno alternative
beingproducedbyrelatively
activitiesto develop that might draw away that labor or raise wages. Where
agriculturalreturnsare less remunerative,where landholdingsare smaller and
wherethecontrolthatcomes fromtheattentionofjealous lordsor themetropoleis
absent, commerce and manufacturingare more likely to develop and this is
undoubtedlybeneficialin the long term.
MilitaryIntervention

his levelof analysisto

considerations
byrestricting
Finally,Brennerignoresmilitary
a singlecountry.In discussingPoland he notesthat"thewarswhichtotallydisrupted
thesputteringPolisheconomyfromthemiddleof the 17thcenturydid notallowfor
the foregoingdynamicretrogressionto workitselfout" (Brenner,1977:70) This
surrenderof theutilityof Marxismforexplainingeventsas centralas majorwarsis
PerryAnderson(1974) providesa Marxistexplanationfortheseevents
unfortunate.
thatappears much more consistentwithWallersteinthanwithBrenner.In discussing theriseof absolutismin theEast (as contrastedto itsrisein theWest)he suggests
thattwinprocessesshould be noted.The East was sparselypopulatedrelativeto the
because no powerexisted
primarily
Westand labor scarcityhad fueledliberalization
thatcould stoppeasantsfromleavingforunknownareas or escapingto theestatesof
more "liberal"landholders.A codificationof laws regardinglabor and a structure
anticentralist
capable of enforcingthoselawsappeared necessaryeven to thefiercely
easternfeudalaristocracies.Largelypowerless"central"leaderswould obviouslybe
quick to complywithsuch demands,and Andersonconcludesthatin one sense, a
of serfdom,
centralstateapparatuswas "purchased"at thecostof the formalization
the destructionof the remaining"traditionalcommunal freedomsof the poor"
(Anderson,1974:195).
Anderson suggeststhat the centralstate apparatus was also necessaryin the
contextof growingabsolutismin the West.Absolutiststateswere more capable of
giventhattheycould
and realizingtheirinterests,especiallymilitarily,
identifying
greaterresourcesby virtueof theirstructuresthan could
call upon significantly
decentralizedstates.Anderson suggeststhatnowhereis thismade clearerthan in
feudal aristocracypaid for its ideology
antiabsolutist
Poland, where the virulently
withitsnationalindependence.Poland,once thelargestcountryin Europe and one
defeated
possessedby whatBrennersuggestswas a "strongstate,"was successively
orientedand thusmilitarily
superiorstatesin what
and partitionedbymorecentrally
in the Polishdecline.
Brenneridentifiesas a discontinuity
Andersonconcludesthatsuchlessonswerenoteasilyignored.He suggeststhatthe
need forcentralizationcreatedby militarynecessityand the need to controllabor
helped give rise to an absolutiststatein the East. While not as autonomousas its
counterpartsin the West,such an apparatusclearlyset the stageforthe changesin
class relationsin whichthe centralstateapparatuswould be involvedin the future.
whendevelopmentis
The military
aspectof thischangeis simplynotcomprehensible
viewedsolelyfromwithinindividualcountries.
his positionon thiswhenhe turnshis attentionto
Brennerin no waystrengthens
other areas where class structureswere in large part determinedby military
conquest.Brennerchooses to discussthe case of the Caribbean,wherethe indigenous populationwas largelywiped out and slaves importedto produce sugar, in
termsof classstrugglesthatare viewedas independentof theworldmarket.Brenner
appears to believe that the crucial issue is whether "the class structurewas
immediatelydeterminedby the needs of the marketand capital accumulation"
of the original
(Brenner, 1977:87). While it may well be that the extermination

ROBERT

A. DENEMARK

AND KENNETH

P. THOMAS

63

determined"by the market(and he

populationof the Caribbeanwas "immediately
does notconsidertheimpactthiswouldhave on hispositionifitweretrue),surelyit
is not necessary to meet such a high standard of proof to demonstratethe
of theWestIndies.
theclassstructure
importanceof the sugar tradein determining
Many other militaryoperationsthathave affectedthe class structureof a country
have been undertakenfor directlyeconomicreasonsas well. Bergesen (1984:367)
asks Brenner:"How can
givesfurtherexamplesfromSpanishAmerica,and rightly
the autonomousevolutionof Aztec and Inca class relationshave created Spanish
Latin America?" Quite simply,Brenner's narrow focus does not allow us to
comprehendadequatelysuch cases.

Summaryand Conclusion
school includes a
RobertBrenner'scritiqueof Wallersteinand the world-systems
numberof importantpoints,all of whichspeak to broader issues in the studyof
socio-politicaland economicphenomena.Of centralimportanceis the questionof
the most appropriate level of analysisfor understandingand interpretingsuch
is
use of theworld-system
phenomena.Here we have to concludethatWallerstein's
superior to Brenner's narrowerfocus on the nation-state.In the criticalcase of
Poland and the rise of the second serfdomWallerstein'sanalysisis more consistent
withthe historicalrecord and bettersuited to explainingthe timingof important
preceededthegrowthof the grain
events.Brenner'ssuggestionthatrefeudalization
withthe positionstakenin the verysourceshe cites.His
tradeappears inconsistent
implicitinsistenceon focusingonlyon theperiodof peak tradeis logicallyflawedand
does not take into considerationthe subtletiesor complexitiesof productionand
failto explainthespecificsof method
classinteraction.Brenner'scounterarguments
or of timingand do not address pointsas importantas the relativevalues of the
actionsor of surplustransfer.On thislast
goods produced or the effectsof military
pointBrennerdoes identifysome seriousproblemswithWallerstein'sanalysis,but
does not draw them to their logical conclusionor offera viable and consistent
alternativeinterpretation.
This does not mean thatWallerstein'saccountof theriseof thesecondserfdomis
It is,in itsessence,bicausal,withthegrowthof tradeand thelow
entirelysatisfactory.
of the lords' decisionto seek reenserfment
labor/landratiothe main determinants
(Wallerstein,1974a:99). While this speaks to the incentivesthe lords had for
peasant mobility,it tellsus littleabout theirabilityto carryout such a
restricting
politicalprogram.While the land/laborratiowilltellus somethingabout thisissue
(sincelow populationdensitycould mean theresimplywerenotenough peasantsto
otherexplanationfor
resistance),combiningthatwithWallerstein's
put up effective
thelords'success,(the weaknessof the towns;Wallerstein,1974a:104) stilldoes not
to explain fullywhythe lordswon.
seem sufficient
It is at this point that a useful synthesisof these disparateperspectivesmight
provideus witha muchmorecompleteunderstandingof theprocessof peripheraliprovidedbyexternalstimulito an undiverzation.The incentivesand disincentives
and providethe
sifiedand stagnatingarea explainthe timingof criticalinteractions
parameterswithinwhichtheywilltakeplace. Wherelaboris bothin shortsupplyand
too poor to serveas a market,dominantclasseswillhave strongincentivesto alter
of theone dynamic
theirconditions.Labor willbe appropriatedto servetheinterests
sector-that of exports-and conditionswillbecome harsheras the returnsto this
formof exploitationbecome betterand more widelyrecognized.This peripheraliof the regions
zation will be exacerbated by the physical(military)vulnerability
low value and few
involved,the debilitatingnatureof producinggoods of relatively

Debate
The Brenner-Wallerstein

64

linkages,and by the possibletransferof surplusvalue. All of theseprocesseswillbe

conditionedby the natureof the marketforthe good or goods offeredin trade.
With this synthesisin place three general conclusionsmay be drawn fromour
analysis.First,thedebateoverthemostappropriatelevelof analysisis welladdressed
by applyingthe argumentsof both Brennerand Wallersteinto the criticalcase of
Poland. We mayconcludethatWallerstein's
level
focuson thebroaderworld-system
is a more usefulbasis fromwhichto understandsocio-economicand politicalphenomena.This is wellillustrated
in thecase of thesecondserfdom,a criticaleventthat
cannotbe understoodin the absenceof a considerationof system-level
interactions.
Second,thisanalysisleads us to theconclusionthatwhileWallerstein's
emphasison
of Brenner,it
levelis superiorto themorestate-centric
orientation
theworld-system
is notalone a sufficient
basis fromwhichto gain insightintoprocessesand eventsof
and provideimporimportance.World-system
phenomenacircumscribe
interaction
tantincentivesand disincentives,
but one cannotadequatelydeal withsocial reality
unlessone learnsto translatetheseforcesintothemorespecificeffectstheywillhave
on internalpoliticaland economicinteractions.
of worldNeitherthe identification
systemforcesnor of internalpoliticaldynamicscan standalone.
thatwe believehelps
Finally,we have outlineda modelof Polishperipheralization
us betterunderstandthatprocessin general.So longas one is carefulto considerthe
relevantmarket,the natureof the goods beingproducedand the linkagesbetween
theincentivesand disincentives
thatmarketprovidesforimportantdomesticforces,
to other,more contemporary
one mayapply thismodel of Polishperipheralization
situations.For manyreasonsand in manyrespectsthedebatebetweenBrennerand
Wallersteinis of significant
interestto studentsof internationalpoliticaleconomy
and of worldpoliticsmore generally.

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