Digester: JFD MADARANG

ARSADI DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR DIMALOTANG vs. SECRETARY OF DPWH SIMEON DATUMANONG and SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA BONCODIN
25 November 2004 : J. TINGA
DOCTRINE: Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or
functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. Decentralization comes in two formsdeconcentration and devolution.
Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from
the national office to the regional and local offices. Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of
powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the central government to local government units.
To this end, Art. X.Sec. 16 of the Constitution limits the power of the President over autonomous regions. In essence, the provision also
curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions.
Petitioners:
Disomangcop is the OIC, Office of the District Engineer of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del Sur (DPWH-ARMMFED, hereafter)
Dimalotang is the Engineer II of the DPWH-ARMM-FED, and President of the rank and file employyes of the DPWH-ARMM-FED.
Respondents:
DBM Secretary, pettitioners wanted to compel her to release funds appropriated for public works projects in Marawi City and Lanao del Sur
to the DPWH-ARMM-FED; and
DPWH Secretary, to compel him to allow the DPWH-ARMM-FED to implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional area
FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6734 (ARMM Organic Act) was passed by Congress, and ratified in a plebiscite by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and
Tawi-Tawi. Pres. Cory Aquino passed EO 426 to place the control and supervision of the DPWH withn the ARMM under the Autonomous
Regional Government.
In 1999, then DPWH Sec. Gregorio Vigilar issued DO 119 creating the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have
jurisdiction over national infrastructure projects under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.
In 2001, Pres. Estrada signed into law RA 8999 establishing the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur, which includes the City of
Marawi and the municipalities in the First District of Lanao del Sur.
Also in 2001, RA 9054 amending RA 6734 lapsed into law. RA 9054 contained detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the retained areas of governance of the National Government. Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join the ARMM.
Thereafter, RA 6734 and RA 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.
Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the SC seeking to annul and set aside DO 119, and prohibit the
DPWH Sec from implementing DO 119 and RA 8999.
Issue

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION

Supreme Court

WON DO 119 is
unconstitutional

DO 119 is
unconstitutional. It was
issued with grave
abuse of discretion. It
also violates the
autonomy of the
ARMM for it tasked the
Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office
with functions that
have already been
devolved to the
DPWH-ARMM-FED

DO 119 is
constitutional. It was
issued in accordance
with Executive Order
No. 124, reorganizing
the then-Ministry of
Public Works and
Highways.

WON RA 8999
is
unconstitutional

RA 8999 is a piece of
legislation that was not
intelligently and
thoroughly studied. No
public hearing nor
consultation with the
DPWH-ARMM was
made. The House
Committee on Public
Works and Highways
failed to invite a single
official from the
affected agency. It was
skillfully timed for
signature by former
President Estrada
during the pendency of
the impeachment
proceedings.

RA 8999 is
constitutional. The
powers of the
autonomous regions
did not diminish the
legislative power of
Congress.

DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which

has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and
Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO 426. The
office created under DO 119, having essentially the same powers,
is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM-FED formed under the aegis
of EO 426.
EO 124, upon which DO 119 is based, is a general law
reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while EO
426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the
DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional
Government. The latter statute specifically applies to DPWHARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O. 426
in the instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a
plebiscite in effect superseded EO 124. With the repeal of EO
124 which is the basis of DO 119, it necessarily follows that DO
119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
It is not necessary to declare RA 8999 unconstitutional because it
never became operative and was superseded or repealed by
subsequent enactment.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional
autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the
Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy
affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot
be amended by an ordinary statute, such as RA 8999 (which was
never submitted in a plebiscite) in this case. The amendatory
law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
RA 8999 was repealed and superseded by RA 9054. RA 9054 is
anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional
grant of autonomy. RA 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the
National Governments jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in
Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054,
and it destroys the latter laws objective. RA 8999 contravenes
true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, considering that RA 9054 repealed RA 8999 and rendered DPWH DO 119 functus officio, the petition insofar
as it seeks the writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.

Digest by: Arnel Abeleda

CASE TITLE: Bai Sandra S. Sema v COMELEC and Didagen P. Dilangalen
Date of Case: July 16, 2008
DOCTRINE: ARMM Regional Assembly has no power to create provinces and cities because their creation necessarily includes the
creation of legislative assemblies, which only Congress can exercise.
Petitioners:

1. Bai Sandra S. Sema (Candidate in May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City)
2. Perfecto F. Marquez (separate case consolidated with the first)

Respondents:

1. COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 7902

2. Didagen P. Dilangalen (elected Representative of the newly created province Shariff Kabunsuan)

Consolidated Petitions for (1) writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and (2) declaratory relief and for the writs of prohibition and
mandamus
FACTS:
1. The first legislative district of Maguindanao Province originally consisted of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. Maguindanao Province
is part of ARMM, but Cotabato City is not (because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in a plebiscite held in 1989).
2. A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and
barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created the province of Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy
Act [MMA] 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
3. Thus, only Cotabato City was left of the original district. The voters ratified the province's creation.
4. The Sanggunian Panglungsod of Cotabato City asked COMELEC to clarify its status, and after 2 amendments, COMELEC issued a
Resolution in preparation of the May 2007 elections maintaining the status quo before MMA 201 and renamed the district "Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City."
5. Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1 st district). Later, Sema was contending
that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because
her rival Dilangalen was from there and in fact he won). Sema prays for the nullification of this COMELEC Resolution and for the exclusion
from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City. SC denied the petition.

Issue 1

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

Preliminary
Matters

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
1. Certiorari is
wrong remedy

Supreme Court
the

2. Proclamation of
Dilangalen as winner in
the elections mooted
the petition

WON Sec 19
Art
VI of RA 9054
delegating
to
the
ARMM Regional
Assembly the

Unconstitutional

Constitutional

1. True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise
of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Nor is there a law which
specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes
cast in Cotabato City for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City. These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of
the petition because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of
Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the
constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations
2. Petition is not moot because this case doesnt concern Dilangalens
election. This case will affect all the other succeeding elections for the
office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to
create in the
future additional provinces.

Unconstitutional

power to create
provinces is
constitutional?
1. It is a valid
delegation
by
Congress to ARMM
of the power to create
provinces.
Art X Sec 20 grants
to autonomous
regions through their
organic acts, the
legislative power to
promote
general
welfare.
2. It is a valid
amendment to Sec 6
of RA
7160

The grant of power to

propose
standards lower than
RA 7160 in creating
provinces shouldnt
be taken too literally.
It
should
be
construed
as
prohibiting the
Regional
assembly
from prescribing
standards that dont
comply
with
the
minimum
criteria
under RA 7160

1. Autonomous regions
dont have the power to
create provinces under
Art X Sec 20 of Consti.
Provinces must be
created by Congress.

A. Although the Constitution doesnt

prohibit regional legislative bodies from creating municipalities and
barangays,
these bodies cannot create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces or cities requires also the creation of a legislative district.
(Every province must have a representative; once a citys popn
reaches 250K, it is automatically entitled to representation)

2. The power granted

to
the
Regional
Assembly to prescribe
standards lower
than Sec 461 of LGC is
contrary to Art X Sec
10
and
equal
protection clause

1. Under Art VI Sec 6 of the Constitution, the power to increase

membership in the
House of Reps and to reapportion
legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress.

2. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its membership

must be through a national law. An inferior legislative body cannot change
membership of the superior legislative body.

3. Nothing in Art X Sec 20 of Consti (legislative power of autonomous

regions) authorizes the autonomous regions to create or reapportion

WON Sec 19
Art the majority
in the House
VI of RA 9054
created a new
legislative
district?

Yes.

1. The Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan is
automatically entitled
to one member in the
House of Reps in
May 2007 elections
2. Felwa v Salas:
When a province is
created,
the
corresponding
representative
district comes into
existence

legislative districts
4. Under RA 9054, the ARMM Organic Act, the Regional Assembly cannot
exercise legislative power over national
elections.
5. ARMM would be exercising legislative powers outside its territorial
jurisidiction
B. Sec 19, Article VI of RA 9054 allowing the ARMM Regional Assembly to
create provinces and cities without regard to the criteria fixed in Section
461 of RA 7160 will undermine the composition and independence of the
House of Reps. The ff scenarios will be possible: a) It can increase the
membership of the House of Reps beyond 250 limit b) Proportional
representation based on 1 rep for every 250,000 people will be negated
c)Representatives from ARMM can become WON Sec 19 Art the majority
in the House
No, the provision is unconstitutional.

1. Felwa doesnt apply because in that case, the new provinces were
created by Congress. It only teaches that the creation of a legislative
district doesnt emanate from the power to reapportion alone but also from
the power to create provinces
2. Sustaining Semas theory will leave Cotabato City as the lone
component of the first legislative district. It has a population of 163,849. Art
VI Sec 5(3) of
the Consti requires a city to have a population of 250,000 to be a district

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the
Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
VALID.

Digester: Geronimo, Stan

CASE TITLE: Kida vs. Senate (Decision)
Date of Case: 2011 October
DOCTRINE: Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and local
elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this task nor can the
Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a legislative problem.
Petitioner:
Datu Michael Abas Kida

in his personal capacity and in

representation of Maguindanao
Federation of Autonomous
Irrigators Association, etc.
Other petitioners include Rep. Edcel Lagman and Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of
Representatives, Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer, Louis Barok Biraogo
Respondent:
Senate of the Philippines, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, COMELEC
FACTS:
On June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the
second Monday of May 2013 and every 3 years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the
President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.

*History and Trivia: On August 1, 1989 Congress acted through RA No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the ARMM.
RA No. 9054 (Expanded Organic Act) was the subsequently passed which, among others, reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the
second Monday of September 2001.
A No. 9140 was passed in 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001.
RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3
years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations
for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,
resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. Thus, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections.

I.
On the issue
of synchronization

Petitioner

Respondent

SC

the synchronization mandated by the

Constitution does not include the regional
elections of the ARMM.

Synchronization as a recognized
constitutional mandate. The
Constitution mandates
synchronization, and in support of this
position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5,
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
of the 1987 Constitution

While the Constitution does not expressly

state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.

The objective behind setting a common

termination date for all elective officials is to
synchronize the holding of all future elections
whether national or local to once every three
years. This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations.
Although called regional elections, the
ARMM elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a local
election based on the wording and structure of
the Constitution. A basic rule in constitutional
construction is that the words used should be
understood in the sense that they have in
common use and given their ordinary meaning,
except when technical terms are
employed. Understood in its ordinary sense, the
word local refers to something that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district,
ARMM officials will serve within the limited
region of ARMM.

II. On ths issue

of Presidents
Certification on
the Urgency of
RA No. 10153

RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional for

its failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of
the Constitution.

The phrase "except when the

President certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment, etc." in Art.
VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two
stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed
three readings on separate days and
[ii] it has been printed in its final form
and distributed three days before it is
finally approved.

In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the

court held that the phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section
26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before
a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed
three readings on separate days and [ii] it has
been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the

President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
Presidents certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.

RA No. 10153 fails to comply with Section

26(2), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides that before bills passed by either
the House or the Senate can become laws,
they must pass through three readings on
separate days. The exception is when the
President certifies to the necessity of the
bills immediate enactment

In any case, despite the Presidents

certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies
the requirement for three readings on separate
days of every bill must always be observed to
enable our legislators and other parties
interested in pending bills to intelligently
respond to them. We find that both advocates
and the opponents of the proposed measure had
sufficient opportunities to present their views.
In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No.
10153 on the cited ground.
III. On the issue of
RA 10153 being
amendments to RA
No. 9054

RA 9150, 9333 and 10153 amend RA

No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1
and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in
order to become effective.

The postponement of the ARMM

regular elections does not constitute
an amendment to Section 7, Article
XVIII of RA No. 9054. Adoption of
supermajority voting requirement
unconstitutional for giving RA No.
9054 the character of an irrepealable
law

Neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153

amends RA No. 9054. RA No. 9054 only
provides for the schedule of the first ARMM
elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the
Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which
it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter,
RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent
laws cannot be considered amendments to RA
No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any
provision in the latter law; they merely filled in
a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law
by providing the date of the subsequent regular
elections.

 The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA

No. 10153 has also been challenged
because they did not comply with Sections
1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in
amending this law. (Act may only be
reamended or revised by the Congress of
the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds
(2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting
separately and approved by a majority of
the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose xxx)

It also does not require a

plebiscite as such requirement applies
only in the creation of autonomous
regions under paragraph 2, Section 18,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution.

This view that Congress thought it best to

leave the determination of the date of
succeeding ARMM elections to legislative
discretion finds support in ARMMs recent
history. The First Organic Act (RA No. 6734)
left the date to be fixed in another legislative
enactment. RA No. 9054 then provided that the
first elections would be held on the second
Monday of September 2001 but Congress
passed RA No. 9140 and 9333 to reset the date
of the ARMM elections. From these legislative
actions, we see the clear intention of Congress
to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and
distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only
acted consistently with this intent when it
passed RA No. 10153 without requiring
compliance with the amendment prerequisites
embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article
XVII of RA No. 9054.

Re: supermajority voting: Even assuming

that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3)
voting requirement required under Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck
down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of
an irrepealable law by requiring more than what
the Constitution demands. Section 16(2),
Article VI of the Constitution provides that a
majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business. In contrast, Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of
no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate,
voting separately, in order to effectively amend
RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting
requirement is higher than what the
Constitution requires for the passage of bills,
and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it
had passed.
Re: plebiscite requirement: the
enlargement of the plebiscite requirement
required under Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution to be excessive to point of
absurdity and, hence, a violation of the
Constitution. Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution states that the plebiscite is required
only for the creation of autonomous regions and
for determining which provinces, cities and
geographic areas will be included in the
autonomous regions. With these wordings as
standard, we interpret the requirement to mean
that only amendments to, or revisions of, the
Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions. The date of the
ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically
mandated Congress to provide for in the
Organic Act.

IV.
On the
issue of local
autonomy
granted to the
ARMM

alleged violations of the right of

suffrage of the people of ARMM

failure to adhere to the elective and

representative character of the executive
and legislative departments of the ARMM.

Faced with the problem of how to provide

the ARMM with governance in the intervening
period between the expiration of the term of
those elected in August 2008 and the
assumption to office 21 months away of
those who will win in the synchronized
elections on May 13, 2013, the Court identified
the three options open to Congress in order to
resolve this problem.
o (1) to allow the elective officials in the
ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of
RA 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office
o (2) to hold special elections in the ARMM,
with the terms of those elected to expire when
those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office; or
o (3) to authorize the President to appoint
OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153,
also until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office.
The Court ruled:

1st ruled out. Holdover

for those who were elected in
executive and legislative
positions in the ARMM during
the 2008-2011 term as an
option that Congress could
have chosen because a
holdover violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution.[1]

V. On the issue of
appointment of
OICs

2nd - COMELEC has no authority to order

special elections. The power to fix the date of
elections is essentially legislative in nature.
After Congress has so acted, neither the
Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at
the call of the COMELEC.
3rd- The Court has no power to shorten the
terms of elective officials, the Court is not
empowered to adjust the terms of elective
officials. Based on the Constitution, the power
to fix the term of office of elective officials,
which can be exercised only in the case
of barangay officials, is specifically given to
Congress.

[1] Section 8. The term of

office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive
terms.

petitioners challenged the grant to the

President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective
ARMM officials until the officials elected
under the May 2013 regular elections shall
have assumed office. Corrolarily,

The President can appoint those whom the

President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and since the Presidents authority to
appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it
falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional
basis.

 the power of appointment also gave the

President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section
16, Article X of the Constitution.

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the

President under other situations or where the
power of appointment would extend beyond the
adjustment period for synchronization would be
to foster a government that is not democratic
and republican. But this conclusion would not
be true under the very limited circumstances
contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the
period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms
of governance both under Section 18, Article
X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will
not systemically be touched nor affected at
all. To repeat what has previously been said,
RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and
continuously, with full effect in accordance with
the Constitution, save only for the interim and
temporary measures that synchronization of
elections requires.

Dispositive Portion:

Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHELD the
constitutionality of this law.

(M. Espinal)
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines
Feb. 28, 2012
Doctrine: Where the Constitution has already provided for a fixed term for local elective positions, and
no express or implied legislative imprimatur for exercising power in a holdover capacity is given, the
President may by law be allowed to make the necessary appointments in the interim (i.e. until the
successors to such positions have been elected and qualified).
Petitioners: (7 consolidated cases) Datu Kida, Basari Mapupuno, Rep. Edcel Lagman, Almarim Tillah, Atty. R.
Macalintal, Louis Biraogo, Jacinto Paras
Respondents: Senate, Chair of COMELEC, P. Ochoa as Exec. Sec.
FACTS:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Consideration filed by petitioners following the Court's decision of 2011,
which upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May
2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
ISSUES:
(a)
elections?

Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local

(b)
Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority
vote and plebiscite requirements?
(c)

Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?

(d)

Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?

(e)
Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature of
ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?
(f)
Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the Presidents supervisory powers over
autonomous regions?

Held:
a) Synchronization mandated by the Constitution includes the election for the autonomous regions. This is gleaned
from the Transitory Provisions (ARt. XVIII) and the corresponding deliberation of the Constitutional Commission on
this matter. The intent, from the discussions, show that the proposal was actually to start synchronizing the local
elections in 1992. There was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the
municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of
elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. ARMM
was not intended to be a different class as the Constitution only speaks of national and local elections. Local
(meaning confined to a certain district) circumscribes the autonomous region. This negates the contention by
petitioners that regional, pertaining to ARMM, is not "local" and that it should be in a different, distinct class.
Autonomous regions are provided for under Art. X of the Constitution, signifying the intent that they are likewise
treated as a local government entity.
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Applying this
principle to determine the scope of local elections, we refer to the meaning of the word local, as understood in
its ordinary sense. As defined in Websters Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, local refers to
something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political
subdivision. Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim
Mindanao, fall within this definition.
To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not
enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.

b) No. RA 9054 merely fixed the schedule of the first ARMM election. RA 10153 merely filled the void by providing for
the dates of the succeeding elections. The latter law therefore cannot be said to amend the former, as it only filled a
gap and did not work to change or alter any of the former's provisions. Similarly, since RA No. 10153 does not
amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment
requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054 (supermajority and plebiscite).
The twin requirements, as elucidated in the main case by the SC, only apply to amendatory provisions which
substantively pertain to the creation of the autonomous region. The fixing of the date of succeeding elections is not
such a provision. Requiring it to be subject to the supermajority vote only renders it irrepealable by restraining the
legislative body to a stricter standard (2/3 vote) than that which the Constitution ordinarily requires. Plebiscite is
likewise not necessary for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the
Constitution. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose[.] We interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionallyessential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which
Congress must provide for in the Organic Act[21] require ratification through a plebiscite. Petitioner posits that RA
No. 10153, in giving the President the power to appoint OICs to take the place of the elective officials of the ARMM,
creates a fundamental change in the basic structure of the government, and thus requires compliance with the
plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No. 9054. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic
structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government and
directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices to perform the functions pertaining to the said offices.
c) The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective
positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional
elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period
within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have already established that elective ARMM
officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It,
therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a
holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit
by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three
(3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress. Even assuming that a

holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA
No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to
the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to suppress the
holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly acted
within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the wisdom of
this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the
executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise from
the legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization.
d) Although COMELEC has the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific
terms and circumstances provided for in the law (violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible). Here, ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the
constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of
the circumstances. Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and this Court can
compel the COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected officials
in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the
Court nor the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an amendment of Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to three years.
e) and f) Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it
falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis. Petitioners assert
that the authority granted to appoint goes beyond the power of the President to exercise supervision over the
autonomous regions. The SC, however, held that there is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of
supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the
specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in
office only until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision
even hints that the President would wield the feared power of control, so much as to be able to also recall the

appointments he already made. The appointment is only for a specific purpose (as an interim measure to ensure
continuity of government and public service, and for a specific time - until the successors are duly elected and
qualified). The adoption of this measure is a matter of necessity in order to comply with a mandate that the
Constitution itself has set out. Moreover, the implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim
measure is comparable to the interim measures traditionally practiced when, for instance, the President appoints
officials holding elective offices upon the creation of new local government units.
Dispositive:
[The petitioners' argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal circumstances which led to
the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections,
Congress had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of the fact that: (a) holdover by
the incumbent ARMM elective officials is legally impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special elections and
shorten the terms of elective local officials for less than three years.] Therefore, the constitutionality of RA 10153 is
upheld and the petitions are denied with finality for lack of merit.

Digested by: Dorothy Puguon

Case Title:

ORDILLO vs. COMELEC

December 4, 1990
Petitioners:
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao),
Former Vice-Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), and TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay
Councilman PEDRO W. DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and DONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident REY ANTONIO;
Kiangan residents ORLANDO PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO; Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE
B. BAYWONG, and VICENTE LUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO GANO; Mayoyao residents PEDRO M.
BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO IGADNA; and Banaue residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL PUMELBAN,
ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA, GABRIEL LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY
GABRIEL, and NADRES GHAMANG,
Respondents:
COMELEC; The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary; The Cabinet Officer
for Regional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC,
National Treasurer,

Doctrine:
A REGION is made up of more than one constituent unit - province.

Facts:

January 30, 1990, the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio held a plebiscite
pursuant to RA 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."

COMELEC showed that the creation of CAR was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes from the Ifugao Province only and rejected by
148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city.

February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified
by majority of the votes cast in the province of Ifugao only.

Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President stating that "considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and
city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then, alone,
legally and validly constitutes the CAR."

March 9, 1990, Petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region.
Issue:

Whether or not
the province of
Ifugao, being the
only province
which voted
favorably for the
creation of the
CAR can, alone,
legally and validly
constitute such
Region.

Petitioners:

There can be no
valid CAR in only
one province as
the Constitution
and RA 6766
require that the
said Region be
composed of
more than one
constituent unit.

Respondents:

The creation of the CAR became

effective upon its approval by
the majority of the votes cast in
the province of Ifugao. And
pursuant to Section 13 (a) that
only the provinces and city voting
favorably shall be included in the
CAR, the province of Ifugao being
the only province which voted
favorably can, alone, legally
and validly constitute the CAR."

This is supported by the

Supreme Court:

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the

CAR.

Bases:

1. Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution

"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in

Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common

pronouncement in Abbas v
COMELEC, which states that:

" what is required by the

Constitution is simple
majority of votes
approving the Organic Act
in individual constituent
units and not a double
majority of the votes in all
constituent units put
together, as well as in the
individual constituent units."

and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and

social structures, and other relevant characteristics xxx"

Provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote

that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent
unit, which in the ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the
Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings
of contiguous provinces.

Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must

join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas.

2. RA 6766 Article III

Section 1 provides that the CAR is to be administered by the

Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government
and local government units.

"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers

and functions necessary for the proper governance and
development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."

Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the

autonomous region.

3. Analysis of the following Sections prove that RA 6766 never

intended CAR to be composed of only one province.

A. Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of RA 6766 vest the legislative

power in the Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be
elected from regional assembly districts apportioned
among provinces and the cities composing the
Autonomous Region.

If CAR is composed of Ifugao alone, then the province is in

an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies
the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
exercising their legislative powers over the province of
Ifugao.

B. Article XII, Section 10 creating a Regional Planning and

Development Board composed of the Cordillera Governor,
all the provincial governors and city mayors or their
representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly,
and members representing the private sector. The Board
has a counterpart in the provincial level called the Provincial
Planning and Development Coordinator.

If it takes only one person in the provincial level to

perform such functions while on the other hand it takes an

entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the

regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must
be covered at the regional level.

C.

Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) allotting P10M to the

Regional Government for its initial organizational
requirements cannot be construed as funding only a
lone and small province.

The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total

population of the areas covered by RA 6766. It has the
second smallest number of inhabitants from among the
provinces and city above mentioned.

D.

Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on

Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6)
members coming from different provinces and cities in
the Region.

Under the respondents' view, the Commission would have a

Chairman and only one member. It would never have a
quorum.

E. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as

practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of
the Region.

F.

Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for

the various indigenous cultural communities of the
Region.

G. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a

common regional language based upon the various
languages and dialects in the region which regional
language in turn is expected to enrich the national
language.

4. The decision in Abbas v. COMELEC is not applicable in the

case.

The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces

and cities shall comprise the autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao which is the same rule to be followed in the Cordillera.

There is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue
on whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or
Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only one province or
one city is to constitute it.

Edward Dayog
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COA
January 29, 1990
The CAR created under E.O. 220, which was issued by the President using her legislative powers, is not the autonomous region
envisioned in Article X of the Constitution. It was merely a region an aggrupation of LGUs within a certain territorial subdivision of the
country and exercises no power other than the powers already given to those LGUs and in connection with the coordination of
programs by the National Government.
Petitioners: 1. Cordillera Broad Coalition; 2. Lilia Yaranon; 3. Bona Bautista; 4. James Brett; 5. Sinai Hamada
Respondents: 1. Commission on Audit; 2. Catalino Macaraig, Executive Secretary; 3. Vicente Jayme, Secretary of Finance, et al.

FACTS:
- Article X of the Constitution provides for the establishment of autonomous regions in the Cordilleras and in Muslim Mindanao. Such autonomous
regions will exercise not just administrative, but devolved political powers. It likewise provides that these regions will be created via organic acts
passed by Congress and ratified via plebiscites.
- July 15, 1987: The President, in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, issued Executive Order
No. 220 (EO 220) which created the Cordillera ADMINISTRATIVE Region (CAR). It covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, KalingaApayao, and Mountain Province, and the City of Baguio.
- The rationale for EO 220 as stated in its Whereas clause is the urgent need to reorganize the existing administrative structure in the Cordilleras
PENDING the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera AUTONOMOUS Region.
- The main function of CAR is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region with the local government
units and the executive departments of the National Government. It shalle have a Cordillera Regional Assembly (policy-formulating body) and a
Cordillera Executive Board (implementing arm) until such time as the autonomous regional government is established.

Issue 1:

W/N the issuance of EO

220 pre-empted the

Petitioner's
Contention: Yes.

Respondent's
Contention: No.

Supreme Court: No.

What it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of

the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the

enactment of an organic
act by Congress.

By issuing EO 220, the

President has virtually
pre-empted Congress
from its mandated task
of enacting an organic
act and created an
autonomous region in
the Cordilleras.

National Government in the areas covered by the administrative

region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras.
It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in
anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. It created a region, covering a specified area,
for administrative purposes with the main objective of
coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and
services. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
Such a step is necessary because the Constitution outlines a
complex procedure for the creation of such an autonomous region
which will certainly take time.

Issue 2:

Petitioner's
Contention: Yes.

Respondent's
Contention: No.

W/N CAR under EO 220

is a territorial and
political subdivision.

Supreme Court: No.

Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and

political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical
personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it
vested with the powers that are normally granted to public
corporations.

We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the
administrative regions created under the Reorganization Plan of
1972 which created 11 (later 12) regions throughout the country.
Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President
over the CAR and the offices created under EO 220, and considering
further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the
National Government, the CAR may be considered more than
anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National
Government.
Issue 2:

Petitioner's

Respondent's

Supreme Court: No.

Contention: Yes.
W/N the creation of the
CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee
of the local autonomy
for the provinces of
Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao, and
Maountain Province,
and the City of Baguio
as LGUs.

Contention: No.

It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local

autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, Sec. 2] refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more
technical language, the decentralization of government authority.
This administrative autonomy is guaranteed for ALL LGUs
EXCEPT the future autonomous regions of the Cordilleras and
Muslim Mindanao which contemplate the grant of political, not
just administrative, autonomy.

PETITION DENIED.

Obiter
1. During the pendency of this case, RA 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted
and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under EO 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art.
XXI of RA 6766.
2. From what the author of the digest knows, the plebiscite for the creation of the Autonomous Region of the Cordilleras has not yet been
conducted.

CASE TITLE: Bagabuyo vs. Commission on Elections

Allen B. Barrientos
Date of Case: 8 December 2008

Digester: Jasper

DOCTRINE: Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists
under the apportionment or reapportionment provision in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner: Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo (no background in the case)
Respondent: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371 was enacted, increasing Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two.
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371, providing for additional
Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the new congressional district.
On 27 March 2007, Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837.
ISSUE

PETITIONERS CONTENTION

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION

Whether or not the principle of

hierarchy of courts was violated.

In the Reply: Pursuant to the

case of Del Mar vs. PAGCOR, the
Supreme
Court
may
take
cognizance of the case if
compelling reasons, or the nature
and importance of the issues
raised, warrant the immediate
exercise of its jurisdiction.

In the Comment: Bagabuyo did

not respect the hierarchy of courts,
as the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
is
vested
with
concurrent
jurisdiction over cases assailing
the constitutionality of a statute.

Whether or not a plebiscite is

required R.A. No. 9371 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 7837
are unconstitutional.

In the Petition: R.A. No. 9371

and Resolution No. 7837 are
unconstitutional
because
the
COMELEC cannot implement R.A.
No. 9371 without providing for the
rules, regulations and guidelines

In the Comment:
R.A. No. 9371 merely increased
the representation of Cagayan
de Oro City in the House of
Representatives
and
Sangguniang
Panglungsod

THE SUPREME COURTS

RULING
The principle of hierarchy of courts
states that recourse must first be
made to the lower-ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction
with a higher court. Among the
cases
considered
sufficiently
special and important to be
exceptions to the rule, are
petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and quo warranto
against involving the validity of
statutes. The present petition is of
this nature
The creation, division, merger,
abolishment,
or
substantial
alteration of borders of local
government units1 governed by
Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution
should
be

for the conduct of a plebiscite

which is indispensable for the
division or conversion of a local
government unit.
In the Reply:
Cagayan
de
Oro
City's
reapportionment under R.A.
No. 9371 falls within the
meaning of creation, division,
merger,
abolition
or
substantial
alteration
of
boundaries of cities under
Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution;
The creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration
of
boundaries
of
local
government units involve a
common
denominator
the
material change in the political
and economic rights of the local
government
units
directly
affected, as well as of the people
therein;
A voter's sovereign power to
decide on who should be elected
as the entire city's Congressman
was arbitrarily reduced by at
least one half because the
questioned law and resolution
only allowed him to vote and be
1

pursuant to Section 5, Article VI

of the 1987 Constitution;
The criteria established under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when
there is a creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such
creation,
division,
merger,
abolition
or
alteration
of
boundaries
of
a
local
government unit took place; and
R.A. No. 9371 did not bring
about any change in Cagayan
de Oro's territory, population and
income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required.

distinguished from the concepts of

legislative apportionment2 and
reapportionment3.
Legislative
reapportionment is governed by
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Under both Article VI, Section 5,
and Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution, the authority to act
has
been
vested
in
the
Legislature. Other than this, not
much commonality exists between
the two provisions since they are
inherently different although they
interface and relate with one
another.
The
aim
of
legislative
apportionment under Section 5,
Article VI is to equalize population
and voting power among districts.
In contrast, Section 10, Article X,
of the 1987 Constitution is
concerned with how a local
government unit may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered. It
speaks of two specific standards
that must be observed in
implementing
this
concern,
namely, the criteria established in
the local government code and the
approval by a majority of the votes

A municipality has been defined as "a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a
city or town for the purpose of local government thereof (Martin, Public Corporations, Revised 1983 Edition, p. 5.).
The determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative
body (Blacks Law Dictionary).
The realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation (Blacks Law Dictionary).

voted for in the district

designated by the COMELEC;
A voter was also arbitrarily
denied his right to elect the
Congressman and the members
of the city council for the other
legislative district; and
Government funds were illegally
disbursed without prior approval
by the sovereign electorate of
Cagayan De Oro City.

cast in a plebiscite in the political

units directly affected. Under the
Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160) passed in 1991, the criteria
of income, population and land
area are specified as verifiable
indicators of viability and capacity
to provide services. The division or
merger of existing units must
comply
with
the
same
requirements, provided that a
division shall not reduce the
income, population, or land area of
the unit affected to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed
in the Code.
A pronounced distinction between
Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X,
Section 10 is on the requirement
of a plebiscite. The Constitution
and the Local Government Code
expressly require a plebiscite to
carry out any creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of a local government
unit. In contrast, no plebiscite
requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment
provision.
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face,
purely
and
simply
a
reapportionment
legislation
passed in accordance with the
authority granted to Congress
under Article VI, Section 5(4) of
the Constitution.
Under Section 1 of the said law, no

division of Cagayan de Oro City as

a political and corporate entity
takes place or is mandated.
Admittedly,
the
legislative
reapportionment carries effects
beyond the creation of another
congressional district in the city by
providing,
as
reflected
in
COMELEC Resolution No. 7837,
for
additional
Sangguniang
Panglunsod seats to be voted for
along
the
lines
of
the
congressional
apportionment
made.
The
effect
on
the
Sangguniang
Panglunsod,
however, is not directly traceable
to R.A. No. 9371, but to another
law R.A. No. 6636. However,
neither does this law have the
effect of dividing the City of
Cagayan de Oro into two political
and corporate units and territories.
Rather than divide the city either
territorially or as a corporate entity,
the effect is merely to enhance
voter representation by giving
each city voter more and greater
say, both in Congress and in the
Sangguniang Panglunsod.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

Digester: Jel Gallego

SAMSON v. AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133076. September 22, 1999
DOCTRINE: Plebiscite is required in creation, division, merger and abolition of an LGU. Affected LGUs vote in the plebiscite, it
contemplates that all persons concerned will have the opportunity to raise those issues even before they

vote on the principal question of the creation (abolition, merger, division) of a city.
Petitioner: Moises S. Samson - incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City
Respondents: Alexander Aguirre Executive Secretary
COMELEC
Department of Budget
FACTS:

1. Feb 23, 1998: Pres. Ramos signed into law RA No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of QC.
2. Petitioner Samson is challenging the constitutionality of RA No. 8535 and is seeking to enjoin the Exec Sec from implementing the law, the
COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation of Novaliches City, and the DBM from disbursing funds for the plebiscite. He prays for
a prelim. injunction or a TRO.
ISSUE: WON RA 8535 is unconstitutional
PETITIONER
YES
R.A. No. 8535 failed to
conform to the criteria
established by the Local
Government Code
particularly, Sections 7,
11(a) and 450(a), and its
Implementing Rules as
provided in Article 11(b)(1)
and (2)

RESPONDENT through OSG

NO
Petitioner
failed
to
substantiate allegations with
convincing proof. Petition has
no document supporting that
R.A.
8535
is
unconstitutional.
Petitioner has the burden of
proof to overcome the legal
presumption that Congress
considered all the legal
requirements under the Local
Government Code of 1991 in
passing R.A. 8535.
We pray that the case be

SUPREME COURT
NO
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union: All presumptions are indulged in
favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality
must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must
negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
Issue therefore is WON petitioner was able to successfully overcome the
presumption of validity accorded R.A. No. 8535.
Bill originated in the House of Representatives. Samson did not present any
proof, but only allegations, that no certifications were submitted to the House.
Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands
that the law passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had

dismissed for lack of merit

Certifications as to income,
population, and land area
were
not
presented
to
Congress
during
the
deliberations that led to the
passage
of
R.A.
No.
8535. This is clear from the
minutes of the public hearings
(Oct 3 & 7, 1997) conducted
by the Senate Committee on
Local Government on the
proposed charter of the City
of Novaliches.

complied with all the requisites therefor.

Plus, present in the hearings were resource persons from diff govt offices like
NSO, Bureau of Loc Gov Finance, Land Management Bureau and DBM, aside
from officials of QC itself. In their official capacity, they spoke and shed light on
population, land area and income of the proposed city. Their official statements
could serve the same purpose contemplated by law requiring certificates. Their
affirmation as well as their oath as witnesses in open session of either the
Senate or the House of Representatives gives even greater solemnity than a
certification submitted to either chamber routinely.
Petitioner failed to show that, aside from the oral declarations during the public
hearings, the representatives present did not also submit written certifications.
Petitioner, however, did not even bother to present a copy of said petition if only
to prove that it was without the written certifications attached as required by
law. We are thus constrained to presume, as respondents urge, that these
requirements were met appropriately in the passage of the assailed legislative
act.
This omission is not fatal to the validity of RA 8535. While Section 12 speaks of
the site of government centers, such site can very well also be the seat of
government, from where governmental and corporate service shall be
delivered.
Petitioner failed to present any concrete evidence on this point. QC Mayor
Mathay was present during the deliberations and made no mention of anything
concerning such adverse effects. As chief executive of QC, he would be the
first person to protest any development that might prove detrimental to
QC. Lack of objections and a mere stressing that QC voters be included in
plebiscite indicates non-existence of negative issues. Plus, in the plebiscite as
contemplated on R.A. 8535, all persons concerned will obviously have the
opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote on the principal question
of the cityhood of Novaliches.
Even if true, this wont invalidate R.A. No. 8535. Purpose is to inform the City
Council of the move to create another city and to enable it to formulate its
comments and recommendations on said petition. The Quezon City Council
members are obviously aware of the petition. The matter has been widely
publicized in the mass media so they could not claim not knowing contents of
the barangays petition to create the City of Novaliches.
Creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited

amendment of the Constitution. The ordinance appended to the Constitution

merely apportions the seats of the House of Representatives to the different
legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila
shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and municipalities as claimed by
petitioner.
R.A. No. 8535 failed to
specify
the
seat
of
government of the proposed
City of Novaliches as required
under Section 11(a) LGC.

Under Section 12 LGC,

Novaliches can still establish
a seat of government after its
creation.

There is no certification
attesting to the fact that QC,
the mother LGU, would not
be adversely affected by the
creation of the Novaliches
City in terms of income,
population, and land area.

QC Council was not furnished

a copy of the petition of
concerned barangays calling
for the creation of the City of
Novaliches.
The said law will in effect
amend the Constitution.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Digester: Daven Mendoza

CASE TITLE: Tobias v. Abalos
Date of Case: 1994 December 08
DOCTRINE: A plebisicite is valid as long as it includes people who affected by the principal subject of such plebiscite; the exclusion of
people, who are affected not by the principal subject but one ancillary thereto, does not operate to invalidate the plebiscite.
Petitioner: Robert V. Tobias, Ramon M. Guman, Terry T. Lim, Gregorio D. Gabriel and Roberto R. Tobias Jr.
(Taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong)
Respondent: City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, City Treasurer William Marcelino and the Sangguniang Panlungsod
All from Mandaluyong. Impleaded as public respondents.
FACTS:
1. The municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
2 R.A. No. 7675 was signed into law on February 9, 1994. The origin bill was sponsored by Ronaldo Zamora, representative of the abovementioned legislative district.
3. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994 (per LGC), where the people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city.
4. The turnout rate was only 14.41% of the voting population. Of the votes case, 18,621 voted "yes" while 7,911 voted "no." R.A. No. 7675 was
deemed ratified and in effect.
5. Petitioners assail Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675, which set a legislative district for Mandaluyong and the remaining portion of the
previous district was considered to be the new legislative district of San Juan.
TOBIAS et al
ABALOS
SUPREME COURT
1. It contravenes the one subject, one
1. The creation of a separate district
1. There is no violation of the rule. The
bill rule (Article VI, Section 26(1) of the
for Mandaluyong is not distinct from
creation of the district is part of the
Constitution). They contend that the
the subject of its conversion into a
conversion. The conversion into a
law actually has two subjects: creation
highly urbanized city. It is a natural and
highly urbanized city with a population
of the city and the division of the
logical consequence of such
of not less than 250,000 must be
district. The latter subject is not
conversion because the Constitution
related to the "one city-one
germane to the first (this was reflected
itself provides that cities with a
representative" proviso in the
in the title) , hence, non-compliance
popolation of at least 250,000 must be
Constitution (Article VI, Sec. 5(3)). The
with the one subject, one bill rule.
set up as legislative districts. (Article
creation of a separte district is
VI, Sec. 5(3)). Moreover, the one title,
mandated by this Constitutional
one bill must be construed liberally.
requirement of setting up a district for

a city with at least 250,000 residents.

The district was actually required.
Even if there is doubt, jurisprudence
has laid down the principle that the
one subject, one rule should be
construed liberrally. From this it is
determinable that the creation of the
district is, at least, germane to the
subject matter of the law.
2. The division of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate districts
has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the HoR beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution.

2. The Constitution clearly provides

that the HoR shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, but it is
qualified by the clause "unless
otherwise provided by law."

2. The import of the last clause is that

the present composition of Congress
may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative
enactment. The increase in
congressional representation under
the assailed law is, therefore, valid.

3. The division was not made pursuant

to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the
minimum population requirements.

3. The law enjoys the presumption of

having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including
due consideration of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of
separate legislative districts.

3. The fact that there is no mention of

any census to is insufficient to strike
down the law. It is presumed that
Congress put in the required work and
the requirements have been met. It is
not required that all laws emanating
from the legislature must contain all
relevant data considered by Congress
in the enactment of said laws.

4. It preempted the right of Congress

to reapportion legislative districts

4. Congress itself passed the law. It

4. It was Congress itself which drafted,

deliberated upon and enacted the

pursuant to Article VI, Sec. 5(4) of the

Constitution.

could not pre-empt itself.

assailed law, including Section 49

thereof. Congress cannot possibly
preempt itself on a right which pertains
to itself.

5. The people of San Juan should

have been included in the plebiscite as
it involved a change in their legislative
district.

5. The principal subject involved in the

plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city, not about the legislative district.

5. The district representation was only

ancillary to the principal subject of the
plebiscite. Thus, the inhabitants of San
Juan were properly excluded from the
said plebiscite as they had nothing to
do with the change to cityhood of
Mandaluyong. There is also no
"gerrymandering" here. As noted by
the OSG, the author of the law
consistently won in San
Juan/Mandaluyong, so he would in fact
be diminishing his constituency.

Dispositive Portion:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon et al v. Hon. Mendez et al

Digester: Romero

December 6, 1994

DOCTRINE: Where a municipality is defective in some essential features of its organization, it may, nevertheless, be recognized as an
existing corporation de facto.
Petitioner: Municipality of San Narciso (MSN) and MSN public officials (mayor & councilors)

Respondent: Municipality of San Andres (MSA) and MSA public officials (mayor & councilors)

FACTS:

1959: President CP. Garcia, issued EO 353, creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon 4.

Important: EO 353 was issued upon the request of the petitioner itself the Municipal Council of San Narciso, Quezon.

1965: Pres. CP. Garcia issued EO 174 which classified the MSA as a 5th class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement lad
out in RA 15155.
4

by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios

Sec. 2 thereof states that "any first class municipal district the annual receipts of which shall average more than four thousand pesos for four consecutive fiscal years shall ipso
facto be classified as a fifth class municipality and shall thereafter be governed by the provisions of Articles one to five, Chapter 64 of the same Code."

1989 (30 YEARS LATER): Petitioner MSN filed a petition for Quo Warranto before the RTC against the officials of the MSA.

Petitioner MSN sought to nullify EO 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the MSA be permanently ordered to refrain from
performing the duties and functions of their respective offices.

Petitioner MSN Argument: EO 353, a presidential act, was a usurpation of powers of legislature and a clear violation of the principle of separation
of powers.

Respondent MSA filed MTD on the following grounds:

1. Petitioners are estopped from questioning EO 353 because it was at their instance that EO 353 was issued.
2. MSA has been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed.
3. Petitoner is not the proper party to bring action for Quo Warranto, it should be the State acting through the SolGen.
RTC: resolved to defer action on the MTD.

1991: Respondent MSA filed another MTD alleging that case is now moot and academic with enactment of LGC, citing Sec. 442(d):

Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. . . .

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.

RTC: Dismissed the petition for Quo Warranto for lack of cause of action (matter belonged to the State) and whatever defect in the creation of
MSA was cured by LGC.

Petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari. (but the SC considered it as Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 because issue on grave abuse
of discretion was raised)

ISSUE

PETITONER ARG

(MINOR
ISSUE)

RESPONDENT ARG
State is the proper
party, acting through
the SolGen.

WON
Petitioner is
the proper
party to
bring this
action

SUPREME COURT
No, petitioner is not the proper party to bring this action.

When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic,

the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for QW or any other
direct proceeding.

But in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of
the Municipality of San Andres, the court shall delve into the merits of
the petition.

(MINOR
ISSUE)
WON
Petitioner is
estopped
from
questioning
validity of
EO 353

While enactment of LGC

may have converted MSA
into a DE FACTO
municipality, the petition for
QW had been filed before
LGC was enacted,
therefore, petitioner
municipality had acquired a
vested right to seek

Petitioners are
estopped from
questioning EO 353
because it was at their
instance that EO 353
was issued.

Yes, petitioners are estopped from questioning EO353.

EO 353 was issued in 1959, but it was only after 30 years that
petitioners decided to challenge legality of the EO.

A QW proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political

subdivision must be timely raised. Public interest demands it.

nullification of EO353.

MAIN
ISSUE:
What is the
legal status
of the
Municipality
of San
Andres?

EO 353, a presidential act,

was a usurpation of powers
of legislature and a clear
violation of the principle of
separation of powers.

Therefore, EO 353, creating

the Municipality of San
Andres, is a nullity.
Therefore, officials of San
Andres had no right to
exercise the duties and
functions of their respective
offices that rightfully
belonged to the
corresponding officials of
San Narcisio.

*Remember that San

Andres was created by

Adopted on 15 October 1986

Municipality of San
Andres has been in
existence since 1959,
its corporate personality
could no longer be
assailed.

Also, enactment of LGC

rendered case moot
and academic because
it effectively cured
whatever defect there
was in creation of San
Andres, via Sec 442(d).

Granting that EO 353 was a nullity, the MSA attained the status of a
DE FACTO municipal corporation because certain governmental acts
all pointed to the States recognition of the continued existence of the
MSA:

1. After more than 5 years as a municipal district, EO 174 classified

the MSA as a 5th class municipality.
2. Under Administrative Order No. 33, issued in 1978 by the SC
pursuant to PD 537, the MSA had been covered by the 10th
Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the
province of Quezon.
At present time, all doubts of the DE JURE status of MSA must be
dispelled.

Under the Ordinance6 apportioning seats of the House of

Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the MSA has
been considered to be 1 of 12 municipalities composing the 3 rd District
of the province of Quezon.

segregating 6 barrios from

San Narciso

Significant also is Sec. 442(d) of the LGC: municipal districts

organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities."

The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the

legislature. Congress did just that when it incorporated Sec. 442(d) in
the LGC. Curative laws aimed at giving "validity to acts done that
would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to
the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.

The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of

Quezon must now be conceded.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

GUANGKO
Calanza v. PICOP
24 April 2009
DOCTRINE: RTC erred in passing upon the issue of the boundary dispute between the provinces of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur since the
resolution of the boundary dispute primarily resides with the sangguniang panlalawigans of the two provinces and the RTC has only appellate
jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991.
Petitioner: Miners
Respondent: Loggers -- Paper Industries Corporation Of The Philippines (PICOP); Good Earth Mineral Corp. (GEMCOR)
FACTS:
1.

Petitioners filed with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development Service, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region
XI, of Davao City, applications for small-scale mining permits for the purpose of extracting gold.

2.

On 22 December 1992, the governor of Davao Oriental, Rosalind Y. Lopez, approved the applications and issued six small-scale mining
permits in favor of the petitioners.

3.

Since the mining areas applied for by petitioners were within the respondent PICOPs logging concession area under Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) that covered large tracts of forest lands of the Provinces of Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Davao Oriental and Davao
del Norte, petitioners negotiated with PICOP for their entry into the mining site at Barangay Catihan, Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental.

4.

PICOP refused petitioners entry into the mining area7.

5.

On 7 May 1993, petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against PICOP and its officers
before the RTC of Banganga, Davao Oriental.

6.

RTC granted but on appeal, the CA reversed.

Grounds:

1.
2.
3.

that it has the exclusive right of occupation, possession and control over the area being a logging concessionaire thereof;
that petitioners mining permits are defective since they were issued by the governor of Davao Oriental when in fact the mining area is situated in Barangay
Pagtilaan, Municipality of Lingig, Surigao del Sur;
and that mining permits cannot be issued over areas covered by forest rights such as TLAs or forest reservations unless their status as such is withdrawn by
competent authority.

Issues:
Jurisdiction of RTC

PETITIONER:

RESPONDENT:
RTC of Davao
Oriental has no
jurisdiction over the
complaint of
petitioners since the
disputed area is
situated in the
Province of Surigao
del Sur.

Supreme Court:
There is boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial
area of a Local Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by two or more LGUs.
Under paragraph (c) of Section 1188 of LGC, the settlement of a boundary
dispute involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians or
the provincial boards of the different provinces involved. Section 119 9 of
the Local Government Code gives a dissatisfied party an avenue to
question the decision of the sanggunian to the RTC having jurisdiction
over the area.
Article 17, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing The Local
Government Code of 1991 outlines the procedures governing boundary

Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute. Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as
possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the
provinces concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly
urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a
certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days
from the date of the certification referred to above.1avvphi1
9

Section 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the
proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute x x x

disputes, which succinctly includes the filing of the proper petition, and in
case of failure to amicably settle, a formal trial will be conducted and a
decision will be rendered thereafter. An aggrieved party can appeal the
decision of the sanggunian to the appropriate RTC.
Clearly, the RTC cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case
since there was no petition that was filed and decided by the sangguniang
panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Neither can the
RTC assume original jurisdiction over the boundary dispute since the
Local Government Code allocates such power to the sangguniang
panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Since the RTC has
no original jurisdiction on the boundary dispute between Davao Oriental
and Surigao del Sur, its decision is a total nullity.
Validity of permits

The issuance of
petitioners permits
were void ab initio
since the same
violated Section 5 of
Republic Act No.
7076, otherwise
known as the
Peoples Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991,
which allegedly
prohibits the
issuance of mining
permits over areas
covered by forest
rights such as TLAs
or forest reservations
unless their status as
such is withdrawn by
the competent
authority.

Petitioners small-scale mining permits are legally questionable. Under

Presidential Decree No. 1899, applications of small-scale miners are
processed with the Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7076, which took effect on 18 July 1991,
approval of the applications for mining permits and for mining contracts
are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. Composed of
the DENR representative, a representative from the small-scale mining
sector, a representative from the big-scale mining industry and a
representative from an environmental group, this body is tasked to
approve small-scale mining permits and contracts.
Instead of processing and obtaining their permits from the Provincial
Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners were able to get the same from the
governor of Davao del Norte. Considering that the governor is without
legal authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and
void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 June 2000 and its Resolution dated 10 November 2000
reversing the 26 November 1993 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Banganga, Davao Oriental, Branch 7, are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Digester: Ivan Galura

CITY OF PASIG v. COMELEC

1999 September 10
Petitioner: Municipality
Respondents:

of Pasig, Municipality of Cainta

COMELEC

FACTS:

3. 1. 2 petitions questioning the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite proceedings (creation of Brgy
Karangalan and Brgy Napico) pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the
Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig
4. 2. City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay
Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite was set for June 22, 1996.
5. 3. City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig
City. Plebiscite was set for March 15, 1997.
6. Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed
Petitions with COMELEC; called attention to a pending case before RTC for settlement of boundary
dispute which includes areas involved in creation of new barangays.
7. COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until
after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the two municipalities
8. COMELEC dismissed other Petition for being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as
scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by
the majority of the votes cast
ISSUE
1. KARANGALAN

PASIG/CAINTA

1. Pasig:
No
prejudicial question;
such
rule
contemplates a civil
and criminal action
and does not come

COMELEC

SUPREME COURT

1. boundary
dispute
between the
Municipality of
Cainta and the
City of Pasig

1. Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental: in

the interest of good order, we can
very well suspend action on one case
pending the final outcome of another
case closely interrelated or linked to

into play where both

cases are civil

2.

NAPICO

presents a
prejudicial
question
which must
first be
decided
before
plebiscites for
the creation of
the proposed
barangays
may be held

the first

2. Moot and
academic
because a
plebiscite had
already been
held in the
case of the
proposed Brgy
Napico.

2. Tan v. COMELEC: "[C]ommission of

that error should not provide the very
excuse for perpetration of such
wrong... Should this Court decline
now to perform its duty of
interpreting and indicating what the
law is and should be, this might tempt
again those who strut about in the
corridors of power to recklessly and
with ulterior motives, create, merge,
divide and/or alter the boundaries of
political subdivisions, either brazenly
or stealthily, confident that this Court
will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they
manage to bring about a fait
accompli."

Plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final
resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of
Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.
Dispositive Portion:

Digester: Ernesto C. Herrera III

CASE TITLE: MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA V. MADRONA
Date of Case: April 30, 2003
DOCTRINE: Regional Trial Courts exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over boundary disputes involving a Municipality and an
independent component city.
Petitioner:
MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. NAPARI
(Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542 by virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC)
Respondent:
1. Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA (Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 35))
2. CITY OF ORMOC, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA SR (Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent
component, city created under Republic Act No. 179)
FACTS:
1. A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc.
2. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement by a joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City
and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga.
3. No amicable settlement was reached.
4. To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City.
5. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss.
6. RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. It further ruled that Section 118 of the Local
Government Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their
differences.
Issue(s)

Municipality of Kananga

WON respondent court

may exercise original
jurisdiction over the
settlement of a boundary
dispute between a
municipality and an
independent component
city.

1.
That the RTC of Ormoc 1.
RTC had jurisdiction
has no jurisdiction over the under BP 129.
subject matter of the claim;
.

Madrona and Municipality

of Ormoc

Supreme Court
2.
Both parties aver that the governing law
at the time of the filing of the Complaint is
Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government
Code (LGC), Under this provision, the
settlement of a boundary dispute between a
component city or a municipality on the one
hand and a highly urbanized city on the other -or between two or more highly urbanized cities

-- shall be jointly referred for settlement to the

respective
sanggunians
of
the
local
government units involved.

2. There is no question that Kananga is a

municipality constituted under Republic Act No.
542. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized,
but an independent component, city created
under Republic Act No. 179.

3. Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation

in which a component city or a municipality
seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly
urbanized city, not with an independent
component city. While Kananga is a
municipality, Ormoc is an independent
component city. Clearly then, the procedure
referred to in Section 118 does not apply to
them.

4. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no

application to the instant case, the general rules
governing jurisdiction should then be used. The
applicable provision is found in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691.

5. Since there is no law providing for the

exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency
over the settlement of boundary disputes

between a municipality and an independent

component city of the same province,
respondent court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss.
RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies except those expressly withheld
from their plenary powers. They have the power
not only to take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the first time, but
also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts
at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only
original,
but
also
exclusive.

2.
That
a
condition 3.
Section 118 of the
precedent
for
filing
the Local Government Code had
complaint
has
not
been been substantially complied
complied with.
with, because both parties
already had the occasion to
meet and thresh out their
differences

Nevertheless, a joint session was indeed held,

but no amicable settlement was reached. A
resolution Resolution No. 97-01 to that effect
was issued, and the sanggunians of both local
government units mutually agreed to bring the
dispute to the RTC for adjudication.

Dispositive Portion: the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Order AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. .

Digester: John Michael Vida

CASE TITLE: ABRAHAM RIMANDOvs.NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC. and COURT OF APPEALS
Date of Case: July 23, 2012
DOCTRINE: (bold)
Petitioner: Abraham Rimando former Mayor of Municipality of Naguilian, La Union
Respondent: Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc. (represented by Rosemarie Llarenas)
FACTS:
This case involves a petition for mandamus and damages filed by NETC against Mayor Rimando to compel him to issue a business permit for
NETC.
In support of its plea, NETC claimed that its business was being conducted on a parcel of land which formerly belonged to the National
Government but was later certified by the DENR as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
NETC then had operated its business of emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007.
On January 18, 2008, NETC filed an application for the renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees. However, Rimando
refused to issue a business permit unless and until Llarenas executed a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. NETC was amenable
to signing the contract subject to some proposed revisions (which were, however, unacceptable to Rimando). The parties did not reach an
agreement, hence the petition for mandamus filed in the RTC of Bauang, La Union.
RTC: Denied petition for lack of merit for the following reasons:
(a) The Municipality of Naguilian is the declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax Declaration No. 002-01197,
(b) Under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the municipality has the right to require the petitioner to sign a
contract of lease because its business operation is being conducted on a real property owned by the municipality, and
(c) A mayors duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature which may not be enforced by a mandamus writ.
CA: Appeal was dismissible as on the ground of mootness, but nevertheless ruled on the same for academic purposes. However, CA disposed of
the case, stating that the factual milieu of the case justified the issuance of a writ of mandamus. CA disagreed with RTC on the following grounds:
(a) The tax declaration in the name of the municipality was insufficient basis to require the execution of a contract of lease as a condition sine
qua non for the renewal of a business permit,
(b) Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality anchored its imposition of rental fees, was void because it failed
to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,

However, Rimando may not be held liable for damages since his inaction was done in the performance of official duties that are legally protected
by the presumption of good faith. Furthermore, the civil action filed against the petitioner had already become moot and academic upon the
expiration of his term as the mayor of Naguilian, La Union.
Surprisingly, despite its previous pronouncement that the issue has become moot and academic, the CA nevertheless disposed of the appeal by
reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC.
Hence the petition by Rimando.
Issue 1:
WON
a
mayor may
be
compelled
by
mandamus
to issue a
business
permit.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Rimando argues that
a mayors duty to
issue
business
permits
is
discretionary in nature
which may not be
enforced
by
a
mandamus writ.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
NETC argues that the
parties did not reach a
common
ground
hence, the need to file
a
petition
for
mandamus to compel
Rimando to renew
NETCs
business
license. Furthermore,
the business has
been operating on the
DENRs land since
2005.

SUPREME COURT:
A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the
exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature.
Citing Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, the Court stated that the Local Govt
Code Section 444(b)(3)(iv) states that the power of the municipal mayor to issue
licenses is pursuant to the General Welfare Clause (GWC) under Section 16 of the
Local Govt Code.
The GWC encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. Local
government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Evidently, the LGC is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue
licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the
conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance.
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to
issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated
police power of a municipal corporation.
Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question
of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ
of certiorari, but definitely not of mandamus.
Therefore, the RTC correctly ruled that the petition for mandamus is incompetent
to compel the exercise of a mayors discretionary duty to issue business permits.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112152 is hereby SET
ASIDE.

The

Decision

dated

May

26,

2009

of

the

Regional

Trial

Court

of

Bauang,

La

Union

is

REINSTATED.

RZ Zamora
Retired Justice EMILIO GANCAYCO, Petitioner, vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and MMDA, Respondents.
(October 11, 2011)
Sereno, J
Doctrine: The National Legislature may delegate police power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them
by the national lawmaking body.
Facts:

In the 1950s retired Justice Gancayco bought a parcel of land along EDSA.
In 1956, the QC council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial
Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of QC, and providing Penalties in Violation
thereof.
o An Arcade is any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as
protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.
o Under the Ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing
the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge
of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the
space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.
o At this time, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings
was left to the discretion of local government units.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco.
o Sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the
application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
o City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, subject to the condition that
upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own
expense when public interest so demands.
Decades after, in March 2003, the MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in QC pursuant to Metro
Manila Councils (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002 which authorized the MMDA and local government units to clear the
sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions.
o MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code
of the Philippines (Building Code) in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave him 15 days to clear the portion of the
building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.

Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. After the lapse of the 15 days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall,
or what was referred to as the wing walls, of the ground floor structure. At the time of the demolition, the affected portion of the
building was being used as a restaurant.
Justice Gancayco filed a petition for TRO/Preliminary Injunction seeking to prohibit the MMDA and City Government of QC from
demolishing his property. RTC held for Gancayco. The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the
enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished
the subject property.
o

Petitioner
Issue 1: W/N
Gancayco
was estopped
from assailing
the validity of
Ordinance
No. 2904.

Respondent
Justice Gancayco was estopped
from challenging the ordinance,
because, in 1965, he asked for an
exemption from the application of
the ordinance. Justice Gancayco
thereby recognized the power of the
city government to regulate the
construction of buildings.

Supreme Court
Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on two
grounds: (1) whether the ordinance takes private property without due
process of law and just compensation; and (2) whether the ordinance violates
the equal protection of rights because it allowed exemptions from its
application.
On the first ground, Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the
ordinance. It was only in 2003 when he was allegedly deprived of his property
when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building. Because he was
granted an exemption in 1966, there was no taking yet to speak of.
Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority
are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel
cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra
vires. (Acebedo Optical vs CA)
The mere fact that a law has been relied upon in the past and all that time has
not been attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for considering
petitioner estopped from assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a
constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not
a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. (British American
Tobacco vs Camacho)
On the second ground, Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the
ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It
bears emphasis that Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the
application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one.
Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as
there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer.

Issue 2: W/N
Ordinance
No. 2904 is
constitutional.
YES

10

The ordinance
authorized the
taking of
private property
without due
process of law
and just
compensation,
because the
construction of
an arcade will
require 67.5
square meters
from the 375
square meter
property.
The ordinance
was selective
and
discriminatory
in its scope and
application
when it allowed
the owners of
the buildings
located in the
Quezon CitySan Juan
boundary to
Cubao
Rotonda, and

The City Government of Quezon

City claimed that the ordinance was
a valid exercise of police power,
regulating the use of property in a
business zone.
MMDA alleged that Gancayco could
not seek the nullification of an
ordinance that he had already
violated, and that the ordinance
enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality.

Zoning and the regulation of the construction of buildings are valid

exercises of police power
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
for the subjects of the same. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature,
however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards
as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
(MMDA vs Bel-air)
To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first
determine whether there was a valid delegation of police power. Then we can
determine whether the City Government of Quezon City acted within the limits
of the delegation.
It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the
city council, police power by virtue of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 537, or
the Revised Charter of Quezon City.10
Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction
of buildings, the Charter also expressly provided that the city government had
the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be
erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them.
With regard meanwhile to the power of the local government units to issue
zoning ordinances, we apply Social Justice Society v. Atienza: A zoning
ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into
specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. The power to

To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with
such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.

Balete to
Seattle Streets
to construct
arcades at their
option.

establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from
the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the
residents of a locality.
It is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of QC when it issued
the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the
health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their
prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage
along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents
of QC. More especially so because the contested portion of the building is
located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA.
Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code, which was passed after the
Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance
No. 2904.11
Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing
or zoning ordinances require it. Apparently, the law allows the local
government units to determine whether arcades are necessary within their
respective jurisdictions.

Issue 3: W/N
the wing wall
of
Gancaycos
building is a
public
nuisance. NO

The questioned property was a

public nuisance impeding the safe
passage of pedestrians.

Issue 4: W/N
the MMDA
legally
demolished
the property
of Gancayco.
No

MMDA alleges that by virtue of

MMDA Resolution No. 02-28,
Series of 2002, it is empowered to
demolish Gancaycos property. It
insists that the Metro Manila
Council authorized the MMDA and
the local government units to clear
the sidewalks, streets, avenues,

11

The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption
from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building
are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and
adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance
may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a
nuisance.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only
courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance.
The Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be
demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with
the Building Official.
The penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the
demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it
merely prescribes a punishment of a fine of not more than two hundred
pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than thirty (30) days, or by
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court.

Section 102. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with
the principles of sound environmental management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a
framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design quality of materials, construction, occupancy, and
maintenance.

alleys, bridges, parks and other

public places in Metro Manila of all
illegal structures and obstructions. It
further alleges that it demolished
the property pursuant to the
Building Code in relation to
Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.
MMDA claims that the City
Government of Quezon City may be
considered to have approved the
demolition of the structure, simply
because then QC Mayor
Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution
No. 02-28. In effect, the city
government delegated these
powers to the MMDA. The powers
referred to are those that include
the power to declare, prevent and
abate a nuisance and to further
impose the penalty of removal or
demolition of the building or
structure by the owner or by the city
at the expense of the owner.

The MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances. Thus, it cannot
supplement the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 merely
through its Resolution No. 02-28.
There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary to the claim
of the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the
acts of the former. In its Answer, the city government stated that the
demolition was undertaken by the MMDA only, without the participation and/or
consent of Quezon City. Therefore, the MMDA acted on its own and should
be held solely liable for the destruction of the portion of Gancaycos building.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648 is AFFIRMED.

Digester: Jam Marfil

CASE TITLE: The Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association
July 7, 2010, First Division, J. Leonardo-de Castro
DOCTRINES:
1. A mere corrective issuance is not invalidated by the lack of notice and hearing.
2. It is always a wise policy to reconcile apparently conflicting rights under the Constitution and to preserve both instead of nullifying one
against the other. (Citing the case of Co v. IAC)
*The case is comprised of three consolidated cases involving Petitions for Review on Certiorari regarding the operation of The Learning Child, Inc.
a preparatory and grade school located in Ayala Alabang Village. The first two Petitions, with the owners of the school and disabled students as
petitioners respectively, assail the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which enjoined the schools continued operation for violating
the Deed of Restrictions annotated on the title where the school stands. The Deed of Restrictions limits the use of the lot to merely setting up a
preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school.
On the other hand, the last Petition, with the homeowners association and owners of properties near the school as petitioners, challenges the
Court of Appeals Decision, which upheld the validity of a Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning
ordinance. The zoning ordinance, as corrected by the challenged Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution, classifies the subject property as institutional
where the operation of a grade school is allowed.
Petitioners for G.R. No. 134269:
The Learning Child, Inc. and Sps. Felipe and Mary Anne Alfonso (owners of school)
Respondents for G.R. No. 134269:
Ayala Alabang Village Association, Sps. Ernesto and Alma Arzaga, Maria Luisa Quisumbing, Arturo Sena, KSL Corporation, SLV Management
Corporation and Lawphil, Inc (owners of properties within the vicinity of the school)
Petitioners for G.R. No. 134440:
Jose Marie V. Aquino and four other minors represented by their parents and attorneys (minor children who suffered from various learning
disabilities and behavioral disorders benefiting from schools full-inclusion program)
Respondents for G.R. No. 134440:
Ayala Alabang Village Association, Sps. Ernesto and Alma Arzaga, Maria Luisa Quisumbing, Arturo Sena, KSL Corporation and Lawphil, Inc.
(owners of properties within the vicinity of the school)
Petitioners for G.R. No. 144518:
Ayala Alabang Village Association, Sps. Ernesto and Alma Arzaga, Maria Luisa Quisumbing, Arturo Sena, KSL Corporation, SLV Management
Corporation and Lawphil, Inc (owners of properties within the vicinity of the school)
Respondents for G.R. No. 144518:

Municipality (now City) Of Muntinlupa, The Learning Child, Inc., Spouses Felipe and Mary Anne Alfonso, and the Hon. Court of Appeals (Special
Fifteenth Division)
FACTS:
In 1989, the spouses Mary Ann and Felipe Alfonso opened The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC), a preparatory school which initially
consisted of nursery and kindergarten classes. In 1991, TLC was further expanded to include a grade school programthat is, the School of the
Holy Cross, which provided additional grade levels for pupils who initially enrolled advanced. However, a Deed of Restrictions was annotated on
the title where the school stands indicating that: The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a
preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which may include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage
for school vehicles. This restriction was set by Ayala Land, Inc., the original owner of the lot.
It was the association of homeowners of Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA) who had the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the
subject property. Thus, AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso, essentially (1) protesting the TLCs and the spouses Alfonsos
violation of the Deed of Restrictions, (2) requesting them to comply with the same, and (3) ordering them to desist from operating the grade school
and from operating the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of the two classrooms allowed by the ordinance.
In 1992, AAVA, together with complainants-in-intervention who were owners of properties near the schools vicinity, filed an action for injunction
against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract, particularly of the Deed of Restrictions. In 1994, the RTC ordered the school to
cease and desist from operating beyond nursery and kindergarten classes at the end of the school year 1994-95. However, this decision was set
aside by the RTC upon the Motion for Reconsideration of the Alfonso spouses who alleged that with the passage of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance
No. 91-39 reclassifying the subject property as institutional, there ceased to be a legal basis for the RTC to uphold the Deed of Restrictions on
the title of the spouses Alfonso. This was because the Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its Sangguniang Bayan, passed Resolution No. 94-179
correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the schools lot in Appendix B in Ordinance No. 91-39.*****NOTE: The Zoning
Ordinance case has its own issues with regard to notice and hearing. This has its own case which will be discussed below****
Yet, in another twist of events, the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC Resolution and reinstated the original RTC Decision enjoining TLC and the
spouses Alfonso from the operation of the school beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms. The Court of
Appeals held that there is no conflict between the Deed of Restrictions, which limited the use of the property for the establishment of a preparatory
school, and the provisions of the Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39, which reclassified the subject property as institutional. The Court of
Appeals continued that there are valid grounds for it not to apply the Ortigas case cited by the RTC Resolution, holding that while the subject
property in said case was found in an area classified as industrial and commercial, a study of the location of defendants school would clearly
reveal that the same is situated within a residential area the exclusive Ayala Alabang Village.
***On the Zoning Ordinance Case
According to the HLURB, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a case of a mere correction of an error but an actual rezoning of the property
into an institutional area, and therefore remanded the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of the required public
hearings. The Municipality of Muntinlupa, TLC and the spouses Alfonso appealed the HLURB Resolution to the Office of the President. On July
27, 1999, the Office of the President rendered its Decision, which held that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is a mere rectifying issuance to an

alleged typographical error in Ordinance No. 91-39, and therefore does not need for its validity compliance with the mandatory requirements of
notice and hearing pursuant to Resolution No. 12, series of 1991 of the Metropolitan Manila Council.
The AAVA appealed the decision of the Office of the President to the CA. However, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Office of the President
that being merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning enactment, the questioned Resolution did not have to comply with the mandatory
requirements of notice and hearing.
ISSUES AND HOLDING:
G.R. No. 144518 (This is the third petition, but Court decided to focus on this first since the validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 impinges
on the issue of the legality of operating a grade school in the subject property, which is the main issue in G.R. Nos. 134440 and 134269.)
1. W/N the CA was
correct in upholding
the validity of
Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94179;

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
AAVA claims that notice and hearing are required
under the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of
the Metropolitan Manila Area, contained in
Resolution No. 12, series of 1991, of the then
Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC).

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
Not discussed.

SUPREME COURT:
We are not persuaded (by the petitioners
contention). Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179,
being a mere corrective issuance, is not
invalidated by the lack of notice and hearing as
AAVA contends.
The purpose of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94179 is clearly set forth in its whereas clauses.
Even more telling that there was indeed a
typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance
No. 91-39 is the fact that both the Official Zoning
Map of Muntinlupa and that of the Ayala Alabang
Village show that the subject property, described
as Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V of Ayala Alabang
is classified as institutional. On the other
hand, neither the Official Zoning Map of
Muntinlupa nor that of the Ayala Alabang Village
classify Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V of Ayala
Alabang as institutional. The official zoning
map is an indispensable and integral part of a
zoning ordinance, without which said ordinance
would be considered void.
Indeed, Section 3 of Ordinance No. 91-39
expressly provides that the Official Zoning Map
of Muntinlupa shall be made an integral part of
said ordinance. Both the MMC and the HLURB

2. W/N there was a

need to legislate a
new zoning
ordinance to correct
the typographical
error.

3. W/N the courts

may disturb the
findings of an
administrative

AAVA claims that even assuming arguendo that

there was a typographical error in the said zoning
ordinance, the proper remedy is to legislate a new
zoning ordinance, following all the formalities
therefor, citing the leading case of Resins,
Incorporated v. Auditor General.

AAVA claims that the power to evaluate, approve or

disapprove zoning ordinances lies with the HLURB
under Article IV, Section 5(b) of Executive Order
No. 648. AAVA claims that the decisions of

Not discussed.

Not discussed.

Board of Commissioners approved the Official

Zoning Map of Muntinlupa. Furthermore, the
very reason for the enactment of Muntinlupa
Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 is the need to
accomplish an updated zoning map.
Again, we disagree (with petitioners). Resins
was decided on the principle of separation of
powers, that the judiciary should not interfere
with the workings of the executive and legislative
branches of government: If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive on which we
cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree.
In Resins, it was a taxpayer who alleged that
there was an error in the printing of the statute,
unlike in the case at bar where it is the
Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself which
seeks to correct its own error in the printing of
the ordinance. While it would be a violation of
the principle of separation of powers for the
courts to interfere with the wordings of a statute,
there would be no violation of said principle for
the court to merely affirm the correction made by
the same entity which committed the error. In
Resins, there is a presumption of regularity in
favor of the enrolled bill, which the courts should
not speculate on. In the case at bar, it is the
curative Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179
which is entitled to a presumption of regularity.
We should remind AAVA that the Court of
Appeals, the court that was first to reexamine
the case at bar, affirmed the Decision of the
Office of the President, which had set aside the

agency.

administrative agencies on matters pertaining to

their jurisdiction will generally not be disturbed by
the courts.

HLURB ruling. The authority of the HLURB is

certainly subordinate to that of the Office of the
President and the acts of the former may be set
aside by the latter. Furthermore, while it is true
that courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such
agencies, it should be noted that the HLURB
and the then MMC were both tasked to regulate
the rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila area.
The then Municipality of Muntinlupa submitted
Resolution No. 94-179 to both the HLURB and
the MMC for their appropriate action. The MMC
approved Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179,
and this approval should be given more weight
than the disapproval of the HLURB since it was
the MMC itself which issued the Uniform
Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan
Manila Area (MMC Resolution No. 12, Series of
1991), the issuance alleged by AAVA to have
been violated by the Municipality of Muntinlupa.

G.R. No. 134440 (This is the second petition.)

1. W/N the CA was
correct in denying
Aquino, et al.s
Motion to Intervene

Aquino, et al., premised their

intervention on their being grade
school students in the School of the
Holy Cross, wherein they allegedly
benefit from the full-inclusion
program of said school. Under said
full-inclusion program, Aquino, et
al., who claim to suffer from various
learning disabilities and behavioral
disorders, are enrolled full-time in
educational settings enjoyed by
regular,
typically
developing

Considering the date of the Motion for Leave to

Intervene, February 5, 1998, it is apparent that
Aquino, et al., would not still be in grade school
at this time, thus rendering their alleged interest
in this case moot. Neither could Aquino, et al.,
claim to represent other special children since
the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the
Motion for Leave to Intervene bore no indication
that it was intended as a class action; they
merely sought to represent themselves. Since
the interest of Aquino, et al., in the instant case
is already moot, it is but proper for us to affirm

children. Aquino, et al., alleges that

TLC is the only educational
institution in the Philippines that
offers a full-inclusion program,
adding that other schools offer only
partial integration programs wherein
children with special needs join their
typically developing classmates
only in certain classes.

the denial of their Motion for Leave to Intervene

before the trial court.
While we sympathize with the plight of the minor
intervenors, we cannot allow that a program
commenced by the defendants (AAVA) way
beyond the institution of the case in 1992 could
be considered as a valid defense. To do so
would put into the hands of the defendant in a
case the power to introduce new issues to a
litigation on appeal with the assistance of
intervenors.

G.R. No. 134269 (This is the first petition.)

1. W/N Muntinlupa
Municipal
Ordinance No. 9139, as allegedly
corrected by
Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 91179, has the effect
of nullifying the
provisions of the
Deed of
Restrictions on the
subject property;

TLC and the spouses Alfonso insist

on the applicability of the case of
Ortigas and likewise cited Presley v.
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. in
order to drive home its point that
reclassification of properties is a
valid exercise of the states police
power, with which contractual
obligations should be reconciled.

AAVA counters that even where

the exercise of police power is
valid, the same does not operate
to automatically negate all other
legal relationships in existence
since the better policy is to
reconcile the conflicting rights and
to preserve both instead of
nullifying one against the other,
citing the case of Co v.
Intermediate Appellate Court.
AAVA thus adopt the finding of the
Court of Appeals that even
assuming that the subject
property has been validly
reclassified as an institutional
zone, there is no real conflict
between the Deed of Restrictions
and said reclassification.

Court rules in favor of respondents.

A careful study of the pertinent documents yields
the conclusion that there is indeed a way to
harmonize the seemingly opposing provisions in
the Deed of Restrictions and the assailed zoning
ordinance. It is noted that the restriction in the
title limits the use of the subject property for
preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school,
without regard to the number of classrooms.
The two-classroom limit is actually imposed, not
by the Deed of Restrictions, but by MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the
National Capital Region, which classified Ayala
Alabang Village as a low density residential area
or an R-1 zone. The principal permitted uses
of a low-density residential area or R-1 zone,
the classification of the subject property as listed
in Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01,
includes: 4. Nursery and kindergarten schools,
provided that they do not exceed two (2)
classrooms.
On the other hand, one of the principal uses of

an institutional site, as per the classification of

the subject property by virtue of Ordinance No.
91-39 as corrected by Muntinlupa Municipal
Resolution No. 94-179 includes: Nursery and
kindergarten schools
The jurisprudence cited by TLC and the spouses
Alfonso requires a meticulous review. We find
that a clarification of the doctrines laid down in
the aforestated cases of Co, Ortigas, and
Presley is in order.
In the Ortigas case which had been interpreted
differently by the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
this Court, in upholding the exercise of police
power attendant in the reclassification of the
subject property therein over the Deed of
Restrictions over the same property, took into
consideration the prevailing conditions in the
area.
Near the end of the Ortigas Decision, this Court
added: Applying the principle just stated to the
present controversy, We can say that since it is
now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and
comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly
residential purposes, defendants-appellees
should be permitted, on the strength of the
resolution promulgated under the police power
of the municipality, to use the same for
commercial purposes. In Burgess v. Magarian,
et al., it was held that "restrictive covenants
running with the land are binding on all
subsequent purchasers x x x." However,
Section 23 of the zoning ordinance involved
therein contained a proviso expressly declaring
that the ordinance was not intended "to interfere
with or abrogate or annul any easements,
covenants or other agreement between parties."
In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in

the subject resolution

In the case at bar, as observed by the Court of
Appeals, the subject property, though declared
as an institutional lot, nevertheless lies within a
residential subdivision and is surrounded by
residential lots. Verily, the area surrounding TLC
did not undergo a radical change similar to that
in Ortigas but rather remained purely residential
to this day. Significantly, the lot occupied by
TLC is located along one of the smaller roads
(less than eight meters in width) within the
subdivision. It is understandable why ALI, as
the developer, restricted use of the subject lot to
a smaller, preparatory school that will generate
less traffic than bigger schools. With its
operation of both a preparatory and grade
school, TLCs student population had already
swelled to around 350 students at the time of
the filing of this case. Foreseeably, the greater
traffic generated by TLCs expanded operations
will affect the adjacent property owners
enjoyment and use of their own properties.
AAVAs and ALIs insistence on (1) the
enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions or (2)
the obtainment of the approval of the affected
residents for any modification of the Deed of
Restrictions is reasonable. On the other hand,
the then Municipality of Muntinlupa did not
appear to have any special justification for
declaring the subject lot as an institutional
property. On the contrary, Engr. Hector S.
Baltazar, the Municipal Planning and
Development Officer of Muntilupa, testified that
in declaring the subject property as institutional
the municipality simply adopted the classification
used in a zoning map purportedly submitted by
ALI itself. In other words, the municipality was
not asserting any interest or zoning purpose
contrary to that of the subdivision developer in

declaring the subject property as institutional.

It is therefore proper to reconcile the apparently
conflicting rights of the parties herein pursuant
to the aforementioned Co case. In Co,
agricultural tenant Roaring, facing a demolition
order, filed a complaint for maintenance of
possession with the Court of Agrarian Relations
of Quezon City. The landowner challenged the
jurisdiction of the court arguing that the
classification of the subject property therein from
agricultural to a light industrial zone. This Court
denied the applicability of the reclassification,
and clarified Ortigas:
This is not to suggest that a zoning ordinance
cannot affect existing legal relationships for it is
settled that it can legally do so, being an
exercise of the police power. As such, it is
superior to the impairment clause. In the case
of Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank, for example, we
held that a municipal ordinance establishing a
commercial zone could validly revoke an earlier
stipulation in a contract of sale of land located in
the area that it could be used for residential
purposes only. In the case at bar, fortunately for
the private respondent, no similar intention is
clearly manifested. Accordingly, we affirm the
view that the zoning ordinance in question, while
valid as a police measure, was not intended to
affect existing rights protected by the impairment
clause.
It is always a wise policy to reconcile apparently
conflicting rights under the Constitution and to
preserve both instead of nullifying one against
the other.
In Presley, the Deed of Restrictions of Bel-Air
subdivision likewise restricted its use for a

residential purpose. However, the area (Jupiter

Street) where the lot was located was later
reclassified into a high density commercial (C-3)
zone. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) sought
to enjoin petitioner therein from operating its Hot
Pan de Sal Store, citing the Deed of
Restrictions. We allowed the operation of the
Hot Pan de Sal Store despite the Deed of
Restrictions, but not without examining the
surrounding area like what we did in Ortigas:
Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized
since the passage of Ordinance No. 81-01. The
records indicate that commercial buildings,
offices, restaurants, and stores have already
sprouted in this area. We, therefore, see no
reason why the petitioner should be singled out
and prohibited from putting up her hot pan de
sal store. Thus, in accordance with the ruling in
the Sangalang case, the respondent court's
decision has to be reversed.

2. W/N AAVA is
estopped from
enforcing the Deed
of Restrictions.

TLC and the spouses Alfonsos

main argument against the
enforcement of the Deed of
Restrictions on their property is that
AAVA had allegedly abrogated said
restrictions by its own acts.

Not discussed.

Furthermore, we should also take note that in

the case of Presley, there can be no
reconciliation between the restriction to use of
the property as a residential area and its
reclassification as a high density commercial (C3) zone wherein the use of the property for
residential purposes is not one of the allowable
uses.
We are not convinced.
Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one
party from asserting as against the other party
and his privies any right or title in derogation of
the deed, or from denying the truth of any
material facts asserted in it.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the gravity of

AAVAs acts so as to bar the latter from insisting

compliance with the Deed of Restrictions. It
cannot be said that AAVA abrogated the Deed of
Restrictions. Neither could it be deemed
estopped from seeking the enforcement of said
restrictions.
Dispositive Portion (This is really long):
This Court hereby resolves to affirm with modification the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 insofar as
they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the
Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes. Pursuant to Muntinlupa Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected under Muntinlupa
Municipal Resolution No. 94-179, we therefore delete the two-classroom restriction from said Decision.
This Court, however, understands the attendant difficulties this Decision could cause to the current students of the School of the Holy Cross, who
are innocent spectators to the litigation in the case at bar. We therefore resolve that the current students of the School of the Holy Cross be
allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The school, however, shall no longer be permitted
to accept new students to the grade school.
WHEREFORE, the Court rules on the consolidated Petitions as follows:
1. The Petition in G.R. No. 134269 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096
dated November 11, 1997 and July 2, 1998, respectively, insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision ordering the defendants in
Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a
maximum of two classrooms, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the two-classroom restriction is deleted, and (2) the current
students of the School of the Holy Cross, the Learning Child Schools grade school department, be allowed to finish their elementary studies in
said school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The enrollment of new students to the grade school shall no longer be permitted.
2. The Petition in G.R. No. 134440 is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096
dated July 2, 1998, insofar as it dismissed the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Jose Marie V. Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Veloso, Christopher
E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce is hereby AFFIRMED.
3. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54438, dated August 15, 2000, which
upheld the validity of a Mandaluyong Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Digester: Renz
CASE TITLE: ORTIGAS & CO. vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO.
Date: December 14, 1979
Doctrine: Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations"; for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an
ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or
ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... "
FACTS:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA,
Mandaluyong, Rizal. On March 1952, plaintiff entered into two separate agreement of installment sale over two parcels of land (Lot 5 & 6) in favor
of Augusto Angeles. On July 1962, the vendees transferred their rights over the lots in favor of Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment, the
plaintiff executed the deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the
stipulations that
1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes
The above restrictions were later annotated in TCT and issued in the name of Emma Chavez. Eventually, defendant acquired the lots and the
building restrictions were also annotated in the TCT. Defendant bought Lot No. 5 directly from Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and
encumbrances while Lot No. 6 was acquired from Republic Flour Mills who purchased the said Lot No. 6 free from all liens and encumbrances,"
as stated in the Deed of Sale between it and Emma Chavez.
Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development
of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiff-appellant where commercial and industrial sites are also
designated.
Defendant-appellee maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial
and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal.
On May 1963, defendant-appellee began the construction of a building to be devoted to banking purposes. The following day, plaintiff-appellant
demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction. The latter refused to comply. Hence, plaintiff filed a complaint to enjoin
defendant from continuing the construction of the building.

TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION

The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27. It predicated its
conclusion on the exercise of police power of the said municipality, and stressed that private interest should "bow down to general interest and
welfare. The trial court decision further emphasized that it "assumes said resolution to be valid, considering that there is no issue raised by either
of the parties as to whether the same is null and void.
ISSUE
WON
Resolution No.
27 s-1960 is a
valid exercise
of police power

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION
No discussion

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION
No discussion

SUPREME COURT
The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as
an exercise of police power is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said
resolution was never questioned before it.
But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late to raise the issue, we are of the
opinion that its posture is unsustainable.
Section 312 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," empowers
a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations"; for the
municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an
ordinance.
Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a
regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the
provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... "
An examination of Section 1213 of the same law which prescribes the rules for its

12

Sec. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or city councils and municipal and regularly organized
municipal district councils.
xxx xxx xxx
Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding Municipal Boards or City
Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the
case may be. Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to
planning and zoning.

interpretation likewise reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be

"liberally construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it
shall be presumed to exist." The same section further mandates that the general
welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to
local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material
progress of the people in the community.

WON the
Resolution can
nullify or
supersede the
contractual
obligations
assumed by
defendantappellee.

13

Said resolution
cannot nullify
the contractual
obligations
assumed by the
defendantappellee
referring to the
restrictions
incorporated in
the deeds of
sale and later in
the
corresponding
Transfer
Certificates of

Defendantappellee
maintains that the
area along the
western part of
EDSA from Shaw
Boulevard to
Pasig River, has
been declared a
commercial and
industrial zone,
per Resolution
No. 27, dated
February 4, 1960
of the Municipal
Council of

The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract
between "a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in
which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The
exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case at bar.
While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.,
"the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in
a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of the
power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any
other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not,
confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it
must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life."
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to

SEC. 12. Rules for the Interpretation of the Local Autonomy Act.

1. Implied power of a province, a city or municipality shall be liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to
the existence of the power should be interpreted infavor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist.
2. The general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of local governments in promoting the economic condition, social
welfare and material progress of the people in the community.
3. Vested rights existing at the time of the promulgation of this arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality
on one hand and third party on the other, should be governed by the original terms and provisions of the same, and in no case
would this act infringe existing right.

Title issued to
defendantappellee

Mandaluyong,
Rizal

the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality.
Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where
lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial
and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery
which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports
an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly
conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been
expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations,
the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not
perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

Digester: Dave Cagahastian

Social Justice Society v. Atienza

2007 March 7
Doctrine: The

City Mayor has a duty to enforce ordinances approved by the Sangguniang

Panlungsod.
Petitioner: Social

Justice Society (political party with offices in Manila and with "many members who are
Manila residents)
Cabigao and Tumbokon (taxpayers)
Respondents:

Lito Atienza,

Jr. (Manila City Mayor)

FACTS:

9. 1. Manila City Council, invoking its police power under the general welfare provisions of the LGC,
enacted Ordinance No. 8027 that:
a. reclassified from Industrial to Commercial an area described as "Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the
Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street".
b. ordered the owners of land performing Industrial activities to cease and desist from operations
within 6 months. Among those affected were the "Pandacan Terminals" of Petron, Caltex and Shell
("the Three").
10.
Later, the City of Manila, the Pandacan Terminals and the DOE entered into a MOU for the
"scaling down of operations":
a. immediate removal of 28 tanks and creation and maintenance of buffer zones around
the Terminals.
b. limiting the Three's operations in the area to common facilities operated and managed jointly by
the Three.
c. the Mayor to endorse the MOU to the City Council
d. the DOE and Mayor to monitor compliance by the Three and protect the buffer zones from illegal
settlers.
3. The Manila City Council ratified the MOU, for a 6-month effectivity and later extended another 4
months.

4. Petitioners filed the instant petition after the grant of extension, to compel enforcement of Ordinance
8027 and the removal of the terminals.
ISSUE

SJS et al

Atienza

SUPREME COURT

1. Petitioners have standing since mandamus

concerns a public right, people interested
need not show specific interest. Moreover,
petitioners are Manila residents and have
specific interest.
1. on the
application of
Ordinance 8027

Atienza has duty to

implement Ordinance
"upon approval thereof
by the sangguniang
panglunsod" under
Sec. 455(b)(2), LGC.

Ordinance
superseded by the
MOU and resolutions
ratifying MOU.

1. Mayor, as LCE, has ministerial duty to

enforce the Ordinance if the Council has not
been repealed nor annulled by the courts.

2. Dimaporo v. Mitra: Officers cannot refuse to

perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the
duty.

2. on the MOU
superseding
Ordinance 8027

1. Issue need not be resolved, since the MOU

was valid only until 30 April 2003; no legal
hindrance for Atienza to enforce the
Ordinance.
2. Ordinance 8027 was enacted after Sept. 11
to protect Manila residents from "catastrophic

devastation" in case of a terrorist attack on

the terminals, and is a valid protective
measure.

Dispositive Portion: Petition

granted. Atienza to enforce Ordinance 8027.

Digester: Roddel Paraos

CASE TITLE: SJS v Atienza
Date of Case: February 13, 2008
DOCTRINE:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into industrial, commercial and residential zones is recognized in almost all
jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of their inhabitants.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema
lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Though police power rests with the legislature, this power may be delegated.
Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments.
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there
must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
Petitioner: Social Justice Society
Intervenors: Chevron is engaged in business of importing, distributing, and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines; Shell and Petron
are engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining, importing, distributing, and marketing petroleum products in the Philippines; DOE is a
governmental agency tasked to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the government
relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.
Respondent: Jose L. Atienza, as Manila Mayor
FACTS:
SJS, in the original petition, sought to compel respondent Atienza to enforce Ordinance 8027, which became effective on Dec 28 2001. The said
ordinance reclassified the are described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their business within 6 months. Among the businesses are the Pandacan Terminals of
the oil companies.
June 26, 2002- City of Manila and DOE entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the oil companies, agreeing on the scaling
down of the terminals. Based on these facts, the SC ruled in its March 2007 decision that respondent had the ministerial duty under the LGC to
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including Ordinance 8027.

In the motions for intervention, the oil companies said that Chevron filed a complaint for the annulment of Ordinance 8027 in the RTC Manila. Shell
also filed a case the same day, and the 2 cases were consolidated. While the cases were pending, city council of Manila enacted Ordinance 8119.
Again, the companies filed complaints to annul the new ordinance.
The parties filed a joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim on the first case, and this was granted.
WON the
intervention of
the oil
companies and
DOE should be
allowed

WON the
injunctive writs
are
impediments to
the
enforcement of
Ordinance 8027

Intervenors
N/A

Respondent
N/A

SC
Yes, the intervention should be allowed in the interest of
justice.
Though for the DOE and the oil companies the last requirement
is absent14, the court has recognized exceptions in the interest of
substantial justice. The oil companies have a direct and
immediate interest in the implementation of Ordinance 8027.
Though their motion to intervene is late, the parties presented
novel issues and arguments which were not considered in the
March 2007 decision, hence this will be allowed.
No, said writs are not impediments to the enforcement of the
ordinance.

Respondent did not unlawfully

fail or neglect to enforce
Ordinance 8027 since he was
lawfully prevented by the
injunctive writs issued by the
Manila RTCs
Says he informed the
court of the pendency of
the civil cases and that a
TRO was issued by the
RTC in the consolidated
cases

Though Chevron and Shell have in their favor the writs of

injunction, the status quo order in favor of Petron is no longer in
effect since the court granted the motion to withdraw.
The parties failed to inform the Court about the injunctive writs.
Respondent should have updated the court via manifestation.
The fact that in his memorandum, respondent mentioned the
issuance of a TRO does not change the facts. Under the Rules of
Court, this TRO is valid only for 20 days, hence the Court
presumed that this had already lapsed.
Though the injunctive writs were mentioned in respondents
rejoinder, this was expunged for being a prohibited pleading.
2 requisites for issuance of preliminary injunction: (1) the right to
be protected exists prima facie and (2) the acts sought to be
enjoined are violative of that right.

14

(g)The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

It is a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of

validity and, as such, cannot be restrained by injunction. The
Court said that the issuance of said writ is proper only when:
... the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind
of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a
showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought

This presumption of validity

must be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness
appears on the face of the
ordinance itself.

The Court said: Nowhere in the judges discussion can we

see that, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right of
Chevron and Shell to the remedy sought, he was convinced
that they had made out a case of unconstitutionality or
invalidity strong enough to overcome the presumption of
validity of the ordinance.
The ordinance, on its face, does not at all appear to be
unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject area from industrial to
commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the power of
municipal corporations:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into
industrial, commercial and residential zones is recognized in
almost all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police

power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of their
inhabitants.
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to
divide its territory into residential and industrial zones, and to
prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and
occupations are to be established exclusively in the latter zone.

WON
Ordinance 8027
was
superseded by

Respondent alleged that

he did not inform the
Court of the said
ordinance because he

Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the

authority, derived from the police power, of forbidding the
appellant to continue the manufacture of toyo in the zone where it
is now situated, which has been declared residential.
The Court was not informed of the Ordinance 8119. While courts
are required to take judicial notice of laws, ordinances are not
one of those enumerated in the Rules of Court for the court to
take mandatory judicial notice.

Ordinance 8119

Respondent judicially admitted

that Ordinance 8027 was
repealed by Ordinance 8119 in
the earlier case when the

thought it was different

from Ordinance 8027
and that the 2 were not
inconsistent.
The stipulation in said
joint motion to withdraw
simply meant that
Petron was recognizing

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot

subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent to that
which was pleaded, the rule is not applicable here. To constitute
a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same

parties in the joint motion to

withdraw stated that the issue
was rendered moot and
academic by virtue of passage
of Ordinance 8119.
Also, respondent in his answer
expressly stated that
Ordinance No. 8119, which
in effect, replaced Ordinance
[No.] 8027
Oil companies and DOE argue
that Ordinance No. 8119
repealed Ordinance No. 8027.
They assert that although there
was no express repeal of
Ordinance No. 8027,
Ordinance No. 8119 impliedly
repealed it.
According to the oil companies,
Ordinance No. 8119
reclassified the area covering
the Pandacan Terminals to
High Density
Residential/Mixed Use Zone
(R-3/MXD) whereas Ordinance
No. 8027 reclassified the same
area from Industrial II to
Commercial I

WON
Mandamus lies

Mandamus does not lie against

respondent in consideration of

the validity of Ordinance

8027, and that it had
conceded the issue of
constitutionality of
Ordinance 8027

case in which it is offered. Respondent made the statement in the

earlier case for annulment of the ordinance, and not this case
before the SC.

In passing Ordinance
No. 8119, the
Sanggunian did not
intend to repeal
Ordinance No. 8027 but
meant instead to carry
over 8027s provisions
to 8119 for the purpose
of making Ordinance
No. 8027 applicable to
the oil companies even
after the passage of
Ordinance No. 8119.

There was no implied repeal.

He quoted an excerpt
from the minutes of the
July 27, 2004 session of
the Sanggunian during
the first reading of
Ordinance No. 8119.

The oil companies should be considered estopped by first relying

on the argument that Ordinance 8119 superseded 8027, and
then also impugning 8119s validity.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a

statute of later date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature
to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be
given effect.
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are
irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the
conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The
second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier
one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to
repeal the earlier law. The oil companies argue that the
situation here falls under the first category.
The Court said that the excerpt quoted by respondent show that
there was never an intent to repeal Ordinance 8027. There was
also no conflict between the 2 ordinances, since both ordinances
actually have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning
classification from industrial to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027)
or mixed residential/commercial (Ordinance No. 8119).
Also, it is a rule in statutory construction that a general law does
not repeal a specific law. Ordinance 8027 deals with a specific
area in Manila, while Ordinance 8119 deals with the whole City of
Manila.
[the] Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the
legislative [or executive departments] of the government in the

to compel
respondent
Mayor to
enforce
Ordinance 8027

WON
Ordinance 8027
is
Unconstitutional

the separation of powers of the

executive and judiciary.
Petitioners had a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy to
compel respondent to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 which was
to seek relief from the
President of the Philippines
through the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) by
virtue of the Presidents power
of supervision over local
government units.

legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere

ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some
officer thereof.
The function of mandamus is the power to compel the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office, trust or station.
A party need not go first to the DILG in order to compel the
enforcement of an ordinance. This suggested process would be
unreasonably long, tedious and consequently injurious to the
interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its constituents
whose welfare is sought to be protected.
Ordinance 8027 is not unconstitutional, and it is valid.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power. Police
power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make

statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,

education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi
est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).
Though police power rests with the legislature, this power may be
delegated.
Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause,

encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments:

Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government

units shall ensure and support, among other things, the

preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and selfreliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their

inhabitants.
LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or the city council, specifically enact ordinances15.
This power was also provided for in the Revised Charter of
Manila (RA 409)16.
The enactment of Ordinance 8027 is a legitimate exercise of
police power.
As with the State, local governments may be considered as
having properly exercised their police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method.
The ordinance in question was enacted for the purpose of
promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety
and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian
was forced to take measures against devastation of possible
terrorist attacks, hence the reclassification of the area.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of
a particular class. The Sanggunian was in the best position to
determine the needs of its constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
15

Section. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panglungsod, as the legislative branch of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code xxxx
16

Section 18. Legislative powers. The [City Council] shall have the following legislative powers:

(g) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this chapter xxxx

objectives of the government. The government may enact

legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary.
The Sanggunian resorted to a zoning ordinance, which is defined
as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision
into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.
The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and
residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is
exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is
within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Manila.
Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair
and oppressive as it does not
only regulate but also
absolutely prohibits them from
conducting operations in the
City of Manila.

This is not accurate

since the ordinance
merely prohibits the oil
companies from
operating their
businesses in the

Ordinance 8027 is not unfair or oppressive, or confiscatory.

The oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in
other appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely
exercised its power to regulate the businesses and industries in
the zones it established.

Pandacan area.
The ordinance is unfair and
oppressive because they have
invested billions of pesos in the
depot. Its forced closure will
result in huge losses in income
and tremendous costs in
constructing new facilities.

In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or

restriction of property interests to promote public welfare which
involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary
only when the states power of eminent domain is exercised. In
eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to some
public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police
power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or

forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The

restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from
danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of
a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the
public.
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds

ordinance has discriminated

against and singled out the
Pandacan Terminals despite
the fact that the Pandacan area

it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the right of the
community.
Ordinance 8027 is not partial and discriminatory.
An ordinance based on a reasonable classification does not
violate constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the law. The

is congested with buildings and

residences that do not comply
with the National Building
Code, Fire Code and Health
and Sanitation Code.

requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it

must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class.
Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not a high-value
terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion occurring
in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage
caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly,
there is a substantial distinction.

Through RA 7638, the national

legislature declared it a policy
of the state to ensure a
continuous, adequate, and
economic supply of energy
and created the DOE to
implement this policy. DOE is
empowered to establish and
administer programs for the
exploration, transportation,
marketing, distribution,
utilization, conservation,
stockpiling, and storage of
energy resources. Considering
that the petroleum products
contained in the Pandacan
Terminals are major and critical
energy resources, they
conclude that their
administration, storage,
distribution and transport are of
national interest and fall under

17

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

The ordinance is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA 8479.

Nothing in these statutes prohibits the City of Manila from
enacting ordinances in the exercise of its police power.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously
protected under the Constitution in Article II, Section 25 17. Article
X of the Constitution also promotes local autonomy.
The laws cited merely gave DOE general powers to establish
and administer programs for the exploration, transportation,
marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and
storage of energy resources and to encourage certain practices
in the [oil] industry which serve the public interest and are
intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure
continuous supply of petroleum products. These powers can be
exercised without emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted
them.
To rule against the power of LGUs to reclassify areas within their
jurisdiction will subvert the principle of local autonomy
guaranteed by the Constitution.

DOEs primary and exclusive

jurisdiction.
They further assert that the
terminals are necessary for the
delivery of immediate and
adequate supply of oil to its
recipients in the most

economical way. Ordinance No.

8027 frustrates the state policy
of ensuring a continuous,
adequate, and economic
supply of energy expressed in
RA 7638, a national law.
DOEs supervision over the oil

industry under RA 7638 was

subsequently underscored by
RA 8479.
DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs.
Section 4 of Art X of the Constitution18 confines the power of the
president to that of supervision. Hence, the alter egos of the
president cannot exercise the power of control over them.

18

SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Xxxx

Zoning ordinances of LGUs are

required to be submitted to the
Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA)
for review and if found to be in
compliance with its
metropolitan physical
framework plan and
regulations, it shall endorse the
same to the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).

Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of

mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body. It does not allow the
supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate. Here, what the
DOE seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted by local
officials, a power that not even its principal, the President, has.
Ordinance 8027 is not invalid for failure to comply with RA 7924
and EO 72.
RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use
plans and zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities. This
was only found in its implementing rules which made a reference
to EO 72. EO 72 expressly refers to comprehensive land use
plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a
CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific
ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area in
order to prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack.
Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB
ratification are necessary, the oil companies did not present any
evidence to show that these were not complied with. Hence, the
presumption of validity will come into play.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the motions for leave to intervene of Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation, and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy, are hereby GRANTED. Their respective
motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 39 is ORDERED to DISMISS the consolidated cases of
Civil Case No. 03-106377 and Civil Case No. 03-106380.
We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and
other parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present
site.
No separate opinions.

Digester: Justin Batocabe

CASE TITLE: Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner
Date of Case: September 6, 2001

DOCTRINE:

Petitioner: Lucena Grand Terminal

Respondent: JAC Liner, a common carrier which ply various routes to and from Lucena

FACTS:
1) Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena issued City Ordinance Nos. 1631 19 and 177820 to alleviate traffic conditions in the city
19

Ordinance No. 1631

AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A
COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA
xxx
SECTION 1. There is hereby granted to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, hereinafter referred to as the "grantee", a franchise
to construct, finance, establish, operate, and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena.
SECTION 2. This franchise shall continue for a period of twenty-five years, counted from the approval of this Ordinance, and renewable at the option of the
grantee for another period of twenty-five (25) years upon such expiration.
xxx
SECTION 4. Responsibilities and Obligations of the City Government of Lucena. During the existence of the franchise, the City Government of Lucena shall
have the following responsibilities and obligations:
xxx

2) These assailed COs provide that busses and jeepneys are directed to proceed to Lucena Grand Terminal, prohibiting them from entering the
city, and declaring other terminals inoperable
3) JAC Liner maintained a terminal in the city and was affected by the COs. They filed a petition for prohibition and injuction with the RTC
4) RTC rendered judgment:
a) CO 1631 is valid insofar insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
(c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal.
xxx

20

Ordinance No. 1778

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS
PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995
xxx
SECTION 1. The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys is hereby regulated as follows:
(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the cityand are hereby directed to proceed to the common
terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers.
(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance.
xxx
SECTION 3. a) Section 1 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses from other municipalities and/or local government units going to Lucena City are directed to proceed to the
Common Terminal located at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, to unload and load passengers.
xxx
c) Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall utilize the facilities of the
Lucena Grand Central Terminal at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, this City, and no other terminals shall be situated inside or within the City of

b) Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631

c) Declared illegal sections 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e) of CO No. 1778
d) Issuance of a Writ of Prohibition and/or Injunction directing the respondents public officials, the City Mayor and the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Lucena, to cease and desist from implementing Ordinance No. 1778 insofar as said ordinance prohibits or curtails petitioner from
maintaining and operating its own bus terminal.
5) MR denied. Petitioner went directly to the SC, but the petition was referred to the CA since there was no reasons cited on why it the SC may
take cognizance on 1st instance. CA affirmed RTC

Issue 1
whether the trial court
has jurisdiction over
the case, it not having
furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General
copy of the orders it
issued therein

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Petitioner argues that
since the trial court failed
to serve a copy of its
assailed orders upon the
Office of the Solicitor
General, it never
acquired jurisdiction over

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

None stated

Supreme Court
YES as there is no procedural defect

Respondent actually served a copy of its petition upon the Office of

the Solicitor General on October 1, 1998, two days after it was filed.
The Solicitor General has issued a Certification to that effect. There
was thus compliance with above-quoted rules.

Lucena;
d) Section 4 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall avail of the facilities of the
Lucena Grand Central Terminal which is hereby designated as the officially sanctioned common terminal for the City of Lucena;
e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity which wasgiven the exclusive franchise by the San
gguniang Panglungsod under Ordinance No. 1631; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

the case

Issue 2
whether the City of
Lucena properly
exercised its police
power when it enacted
the subject
ordinances.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

They are constitutional

ursuant to the power of
the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to
"[r]egulate traffic on all
streets and
bridges; prohibit encroac
hments or obstacles
thereon and, when
necessary in the interest
of public welfare,
authorize the removal of
encroachments and
illegal constructions in
public places"

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
COs are
unconstitutional on
the ground
that, inter alia, the
same constituted
an invalid exercise
of police power, an
undue taking of
private property,
and a violation of
the constitutional
prohibition against
monopolies.

Supreme Court

NO, it did not

See below for space saving concerns

The terminals are public

nuisances

Respecting the issue of whether police power was properly exercised when the subject ordinances were enacted: As with the State, the
local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are

reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated,
there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public
interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.

However as to lawful method SC says:

The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.
Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such
measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the
problem lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the
law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals,
apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been
enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside
the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are
unable to meet the specifications.

Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which
indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments
and obstacles does not extend to terminals.1a\^/phi1.net

Neither are terminals public nuisances. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the
rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.

Dispositive Portion:

Petition DENIED

Digester: Justin Batocabe

CASE TITLE: Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner
Date of Case: September 6, 2001

DOCTRINE:

Petitioner: Lucena Grand Terminal

Respondent: JAC Liner, a common carrier which ply various routes to and from Lucena

FACTS:
1) Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena issued City Ordinance Nos. 1631 21 and 177822 to alleviate traffic conditions in the city
21

Ordinance No. 1631

AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A
COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA
xxx
SECTION 1. There is hereby granted to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, hereinafter referred to as the "grantee", a franchise
to construct, finance, establish, operate, and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena.
SECTION 2. This franchise shall continue for a period of twenty-five years, counted from the approval of this Ordinance, and renewable at the option of the
grantee for another period of twenty-five (25) years upon such expiration.
xxx
SECTION 4. Responsibilities and Obligations of the City Government of Lucena. During the existence of the franchise, the City Government of Lucena shall
have the following responsibilities and obligations:
xxx

2) These assailed COs provide that busses and jeepneys are directed to proceed to Lucena Grand Terminal, prohibiting them from entering the
city, and declaring other terminals inoperable
3) JAC Liner maintained a terminal in the city and was affected by the COs. They filed a petition for prohibition and injuction with the RTC
4) RTC rendered judgment:
a) CO 1631 is valid insofar insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
(c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal.
xxx

22

Ordinance No. 1778

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS
PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995
xxx
SECTION 1. The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys is hereby regulated as follows:
(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the cityand are hereby directed to proceed to the common
terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers.
(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance.
xxx
SECTION 3. a) Section 1 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses from other municipalities and/or local government units going to Lucena City are directed to proceed to the
Common Terminal located at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, to unload and load passengers.
xxx
c) Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall utilize the facilities of the
Lucena Grand Central Terminal at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, this City, and no other terminals shall be situated inside or within the City of

b) Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631

c) Declared illegal sections 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e) of CO No. 1778
d) Issuance of a Writ of Prohibition and/or Injunction directing the respondents public officials, the City Mayor and the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Lucena, to cease and desist from implementing Ordinance No. 1778 insofar as said ordinance prohibits or curtails petitioner from
maintaining and operating its own bus terminal.
5) MR denied. Petitioner went directly to the SC, but the petition was referred to the CA since there was no reasons cited on why it the SC may
take cognizance on 1st instance. CA affirmed RTC

Issue 1
whether the trial court
has jurisdiction over
the case, it not having
furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General
copy of the orders it
issued therein

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Petitioner argues that
since the trial court failed
to serve a copy of its
assailed orders upon the
Office of the Solicitor
General, it never
acquired jurisdiction over
the case

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

None stated

Supreme Court
YES as there is no procedural defect

Respondent actually served a copy of its petition upon the Office of

the Solicitor General on October 1, 1998, two days after it was filed.
The Solicitor General has issued a Certification to that effect. There
was thus compliance with above-quoted rules.

Lucena;
d) Section 4 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall avail of the facilities of the
Lucena Grand Central Terminal which is hereby designated as the officially sanctioned common terminal for the City of Lucena;
e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity which wasgiven the exclusive franchise by the San
gguniang Panglungsod under Ordinance No. 1631; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Issue 2
whether the City of
Lucena properly
exercised its police
power when it enacted
the subject
ordinances.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

They are constitutional

ursuant to the power of
the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to
"[r]egulate traffic on all
streets and
bridges; prohibit encroac
hments or obstacles
thereon and, when
necessary in the interest
of public welfare,
authorize the removal of
encroachments and
illegal constructions in
public places"

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
COs are
unconstitutional on
the ground
that, inter alia, the
same constituted
an invalid exercise
of police power, an
undue taking of
private property,
and a violation of
the constitutional
prohibition against
monopolies.

Supreme Court

NO, it did not

See below for space saving concerns

The terminals are public

nuisances

Respecting the issue of whether police power was properly exercised when the subject ordinances were enacted: As with the State, the
local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated,
there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.

The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public
interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.

However as to lawful method SC says:

The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.
Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such
measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the
problem lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the
law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals,
apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been
enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside
the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are
unable to meet the specifications.

Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which
indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments
and obstacles does not extend to terminals.1a\^/phi1.net

Neither are terminals public nuisances. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the
rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.

Dispositive Portion:

Petition DENIED

PARAYNO V. JOVELLANOS
2006 July 14
Digest by Joeyboy Lacas
Doctrine: A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonable necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
Petitioner:
Concepcion Parayno
- Owner of a gasoline station in Calasiao, Pangasinan
Respondents:
Jose Jovellanos
- He filed a case is the HLURB against petitioners predecessor (Dennis Parayno), opposing the establishment of the gasoline station
on the grounds that: (a) it was within the 100-meter prohibited radius and (b) it posed a pernicious effect on the health and safety of
the people in Calasiao
Municipality of Calasiao, Pangasinan
- The Sangguniang Bayan of Calasiao recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of petitioners gasoline station based on
the same grounds cited by co-respondent Jose Jovellanos
Facts:
1. Dennis Parayno was the previous owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasio, Pangasinan.
2. Jose Jovellanos filed a case in the HLURB against Dennis Parayno, praying for the closure or transfer of the said gasoline to
another location on the grounds that: (a) it was within the 100-meter prohibited radius under the zoning ordinance of the Municipality
of Calasiao and (b) it allegedly posed a pernicious effect on the health and safety of the people in Calasiao.
3. HLURB rendered a decision in favour of Dennis Parayno, such decision became final and executory.
4. Ownership over the gasoline filling station was transferred to petitioner Concepcion Parayno.

5. Subsequently, some residents of Calasiao petitioned their Sangguniang Bayan (SB) for the closure or transfer of the said gasoline
filling station to another location. The SB then issued Resolution No. 50, recommending to the Mayor the closure of transfer of
location of petitioners gasoline filling station. The said resolution hinged on the same grounds cited by Jose Jovellanos in his petition
before the HLURB.
Procedural facts:
6. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the SB resolution but it was denied. She filed an action for prohibition and mandamus
with the RTC but the trial court did not see the propriety of issuing a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Petition moved for
reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court.
7. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. After the CA dismissed the petition,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal before the SC.
Issue 1

PETITIONER

RESPONDENTS

SUPREME COURT

Whether or not the

Municipality validly
exercised its police
power in ordering the
closure/transfer of
petitioners gasoline
filling station?

The closure/transfer
of her gasoline filling
by respondent
municipality was an
invalid exercise of the
latters police power

Reiterates grounds
cited in Resolution
No. 50

Respondent municipality invalidly used its police power in

ordering the closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline filling
station.

SC Ratio: While respondent municipality had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health
and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that
the gasoline filling station of petitioner was within the 100-meter prohibited radius, the records do not show that it even attempted to
measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of the
zoning ordinance of the municipality. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never
conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the
guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a
nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property; hence, it
cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.

Issue 2

PETITIONER

RESPONDENTS

Supreme Court

Whether or not the

principle of res
judicata applies in this
case?

The decision of the

HLURB, in a previous
case filed by
Jovellanos, barred the
grounds invoked by
respondent
municipality
Resolution No. 50.

Res judicata does not

apply. Respondent
municipality claims
that it was not a party
to the HLURB case
but only its corespondent
Jovellanos. Hence,
there was no identity

Respondents argument is untenable. Res judicata

applies.

of parties between the

first and second
actions.
SC Ratio: For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) the judgment or order must be final; (2) the
judgment must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
Respondent municipality does not contest the first, second and third requisites. However, it claims that it was not a party to the
HLURB case but only its co-respondent Jovellanos. Hence, the fourth requisite was not met.
The absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res judicata to apply. A shared identity of interests is sufficient to
invoke the application of this principle. The proscription may not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional party.
Res judicata may lie as long as there is a community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the second case
although the latter may not have been impleaded in the first.
In the assailed resolution of respondent municipality, it raised the same grounds invoked by its co-respondent in the HLURB: (1) that
the resolution aimed to close down or transfer the gasoline station to another location due to the alleged violation of the zoning
ordinance and (2) that the hazards of said gasoline station threatened the health and safety of the public. The HLURB had already
settled these concerns and its adjudication had long attained finality.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution
No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.

Digester: Janine Bareo

CITY OF MANILA vs. LAGUIO, Jr.

April 12, 2005
TOPIC: Police Power; General Welfare Clause and limitations on the exercise thereof

DOCTRINE: The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to
due process and equal protection. The only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them
to promote the general welfare. The LGC still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether
the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
Petitioner: City of Manila, Mayor Lim, VM Atienza, City Council
Respondent: Judge Laguio, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC)
FACTS:
MTDC is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened
Victoria Court in Malate. It petitioned the RTC to declare Ordinance no 7783 of the City of Manila as invalid and
unconstitutional.
The ordinance prohibits the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of entertainment, amusement,
services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area. It included motels as one of the prohibited establishment. The ordinance gives
the owners and operators 3 months from the date of approval to wind up business, transfer outside the Ermita-Malate area or
convert it to business allowed. The establishment will be padlocked and permanently closed if the ordinance is violated.
The RTC enjoined the petitioners from implementing the ordinance and declared it null and void.
ISSUE: WON the Ordinance was valid NO! The ordinance is ultra vires and unconstitutional.
Petitioner City of Manila
The city council had the power to
prohibit
certain
forms
of
entertainment in order to protect
the social and moral welfare of
the community as provided for in
LGC Sec. 458 (a) 4 (vii).
The power of regulation included
the power to control, to govern

Respondent MTDC
The ordinance was invalid and
unconstitutional for the following
reasons:
1. The city council has no
power
to
prohibit
the
operation of motels as LGC
Sec. 458(a) 4(iv) grants the
city council only the power
to
regulate
the

SC
The ordinance is in contravention of the LGC as the
latter merely empowers LGUs to regulate, and not
prohibit the establishments enumerated in the
ordinance
The only power of the City Council to
legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to
promote the general welfare. The LGC still
withholds from cities the power to suppress
and prohibit altogether the establishment,

and
to
restrain
places
exhibition and amusement

of

establishment,
operation,
and maintenance of hotels,
motels etc.

There
is
no
inconsistency
between PD 499 and the
ordinance
because
it
only
unauthorized certain forms of
businesses and allowed the area
to remain a commercial zone.
The ordinance was enacted to
protect the social and moral
welfare of the community in
conjunction with its police power
found in the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila.

2. The ordinance is violative of

PD 499 which specifically
declared portions of the
Ermita- Malate area as a
commercial zone

It enjoys
validity.

of

4. The
ordinance
violates
MTDCs constitutional rights

It is a valid exercise of police

power.

a) It is confiscatory and
constitutes an invasion
of property rights

the

presumption

It did not infringe the equal

protection clause as there existed
substantial and real differences
between the Ermita-Malate area
and other places in the city

3. The ordinance does not

constitute a proper exercise
of police power as the
compulsory closure of the
motel business has no
reasonable relation to the
legitimate
municipal
interests sought to be
protected.

b) It constitutes a denial of
equal
protection
as
there is no reasonable
basis for prohibiting the
operation of motels but
not pension houses in
the Ermita- Malate area
but not outside of the
area

operation
and
maintenance
of
such
establishments.
- The rule is that the City Council has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it and
those which are necessarily implied or
incidental to the exercise thereof.
The decree allowed the establishment and operation
of all kinds of commercial establishments
except warehouse or open storage depot...
- The ordinance must not be in conflict with or
repugnant to the general law
The LGC is a later expression of the
legislative will, which must prevail over the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila. LGC Sec,
534(f) states that all general and special laws, city
charters which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this code are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
The charter which empowers the city council
to prohibit motels must be considered
repealed by the LGC
a) The ordinance infringes the Due Process
Clause
The police power granted to LGUs must always be
exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection.
Individual right may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of the public interest or public
welfare.
- The means employed for the accomplishment
of the objective of the ordinance were
unreasonable and unduly oppressive. It
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a
persons fundamental right to liberty and
property
The directive to wind up business operations

amounts to a closure of the establishment.

- It substantially divests the respondent of the
beneficial use of its property and goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a
taking without just compensation.
The ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary
and unrestricted power to close down establishments.
b) The
ordinance
violates
protection clause

the

equal

There are no substantial distinctions between

motels, inns, pension houses, hotels and other similar
establishments. No reason exists for prohibiting
motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels and
others.
There is no logic for prohibiting the businesses of
motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of
this area

Dispositive Portion:
Petition Denied. The decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance void is affirmed.

CASE TITLE: White Light Corporation v. City Of Manila

Date of Case: January 20, 2009
Ponente: TINGA, J p
Digester: Annie Ballesteros
DOCTRINE: For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Petitioner: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist & Development Corporation
Respondents: City Of Manila, Represented By Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
FACTS:
Petition based on Rule 45, assailing a city ordinance (Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,
Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments
in the City of Manila) that prohibited establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for
abbreviated stays.
Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene. The RTC granted the motion to
intervene.
The City filed an Answer alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. The case was submitted for decision without trial
as the case involved a purely legal question. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The City filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The SC treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
Issue

Petitioners
Contention

Whether
Ordinance
1774 is
CONSTITUTIO
NAL as a
legitimate

1. The
Ordinance is
an invalid
exercise of
police power;
and it is an

Respondents Contention
1.

The Ordinance is a valid exercise of police

power pursuant to Section 458 (4) (iv) of
the Local Government Code which confers
on cities, among other local government
units, the power: [To] regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance

Supreme Court Holding

No. The police measure is an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights.

exercise of
police power.

unreasonable
and
oppressive
interference
in their
business.

of cafes, restaurants, beer houses, hotels,

motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports.
The Ordinance is also a valid exercise of
the power of the City under Article III,
Section 18 (kk) of the Revised Manila
Charter, thus: "To enact all ordinances it
may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
the prosperity and the promotion of the
morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants.

2. It is
unconstitution
al and void
since it
violates the
right to
privacy and
the freedom
of movement.

The subject establishments "have gained

notoriety as venue of 'prostitution, adultery
and fornications' in Manila since they
provide the necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and
thus became the 'ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill-seekers.'
2.

The Ordinance did not violate the right to

privacy or the freedom of movement, as it
only penalizes the owners or operators of
establishments that admit individuals for
short time stays. Second, the virtually
limitless reach of police power is only
constrained by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method. The
lawful objective of the Ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral
activities. There is a lawful method since
the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the
establishments is justified by the wellbeing of its constituents in general. Finally,

as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators

Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty
is regulated by law.
RATIO:
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash up rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice
a day. The ban is sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. The means must align with the Constitution. It must appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the
means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is already prohibited and could be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in
easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures
would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, the Ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as
restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.
Test of a valid ordinance. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Due process. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are
protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must

follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the
established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the
due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. The
concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
Dispositive Portion: Ordinance is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Digester: Ansis V. Pornillos

CASE TITLE: ALBON vs. FERNANDO
Date of Case: June 30, 2006
DOCTRINE: No public money or property shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes. This is in consonance with the
fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public
purposes.
Petitioner: Aniano A. Albon ordinary citizen?
Respondent: Bayani F. Fernando City Mayor of Marikina
FACTS:
In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision. It was undertaken by the city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993 like other infrastructure projects relating to roads,
streets and sidewalks previously undertaken by the city.
On June 14, 1999, petitioner Aniano A. Albon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 73, a taxpayers suit for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction with damages against respondents (who were at that time officials of Marikina), namely, City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, City
Engineer Alfonso Espirito, Assistant City Engineer Anaki Maderal and City Treasurer Natividad Cabalquinto
RTC & CA: denied the petition
The City of Marikina was authorized to carry out the contested undertaking pursuant to its inherent police power.
The sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision were public in nature and ownership thereof belonged to the City of Marikina or the Republic
of the Philippines following the 1991 White Plains Association decision. Thus, the improvement and widening of the sidewalks pursuant to
Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993 was well within the LGUs powers.
Issue 1
W/N Ordinance No. 59,
s. 1993 is a valid
exercise of Marikina
City's police power

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

He alleged that the

sidewalks were private
property because
Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision was owned
by V.V. Soliven, Inc.
Hence, the city
government could not

Like all LGUs, the City

of Marikina is
empowered to enact
ordinances for the
purposes set forth in the
Local Government Code
(RA 7160). It is
expressly vested with

Supreme Court: YES.

Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such
powers and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may
be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective
provisions of the basic services and facilities, including
infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of
their residents and which are financed by their own funds. These
infrastructure facilities include municipal or city roads and bridges
and similar facilities.

use public resources on

them.
This was done in
violation of the
proscription against the
use of public funds for
private purposes as well
as Sections 335 and
336 of RA 71605 and
the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

police powers delegated

to LGUs under the
general welfare clause
of RA 7160. With this
power, LGUs may
prescribe reasonable
regulations to protect
the lives, health, and
property of their
constituents and
maintain peace and
order within their
respective territorial
jurisdictions.

There is no question about the public nature and use of the

sidewalks in the Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. One of the
"whereas clauses" of PD 1216 (which amended PD 957)
declares that open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in a
residential subdivision are for public use and beyond the
commerce of man. In conjunction herewith, PD 957, as amended
by PD 1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside open
spaces which shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the
general public.
Thus, the trial and appellate courts were correct in upholding the
validity of Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993. It was enacted in the
exercise of the City of Marikinas police powers to regulate the
use of sidewalks.

Cities and municipalities

also have the power to
exercise such powers
and discharge such
functions and
responsibilities as may
be necessary,
appropriate or incidental
to efficient and effective
provisions of the basic
services and facilities,
including infrastructure
facilities intended
primarily to service the
needs of their residents
and which are financed
by their own funds.
These infrastructure
facilities include
municipal or city roads
and bridges and similar
facilities.
Issue 2

Supreme Court: NO.

W/N a local government

No public money or property shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes. This is in consonance with the

unit (LGU) validly use

public funds to
undertake the widening,
repair and improvement
of the sidewalks of a
privately-owned
subdivision?

fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for
public purposes.
Case was remanded to the lower court to determine ownership of open spaces (including the sidewalks) in Marikina
Greenheights

Note:
SC ruled however that both the trial and appellate courts erred when they invoked our 1991 decision in White Plains Association and automatically
applied it in this case.
The ruling in the 1991 White Plains Association decision relied on by both the trial and appellate courts was modified by this Court in 1998 in White
Plains Association v. Court of Appeals. Citing Young v. City of Manila, this Court held in its 1998 decision that subdivision streets belonged to the
owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation.
The word "street," in its correct and ordinary usage, includes not only the roadway used for carriages and vehicular traffic generally but also the
portion used for pedestrian travel. The part of the street set aside for the use of pedestrians is known as a sidewalk.
Moreover, under subdivision laws, lots allotted by subdivision developers as road lots include roads, sidewalks, alleys and planting strips. Thus,
what is true for subdivision roads or streets applies to subdivision sidewalks as well. Ownership of the sidewalks in a private subdivision belongs to
the subdivision owner/developer until it is either transferred to the government by way of donation or acquired by the government through
expropriation.
Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money or property shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes. This is in
consonance with the fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public
purposes.
In Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, the Court laid down the test of validity of a public expenditure: it is the essential character of the direct
object of the expenditure which must determine its validity and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the
general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the
public or to the State resulting from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business does not justify their aid
by the use of public money.
Moreover, the implementing rules of PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, provide that it is the registered owner or developer of a subdivision who
has the responsibility for the maintenance, repair and improvement of road lots and open spaces of the subdivision prior to their donation to the
concerned LGU. The owner or developer shall be deemed relieved of the responsibility of maintaining the road lots and open space only upon
securing a certificate of completion and executing a deed of donation of these road lots and open spaces to the LGU.

Therefore, the use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes Section 335
of RA 7160. This conclusion finds further support from the language of Section 17 of RA 7160 which mandates LGUs to efficiently and effectively
provide basic services and facilities. The law speaks of infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the LGU
and "which are funded out of municipal funds." It particularly refers to "municipal roads and bridges" and "similar facilities."
Applying the rules of ejusdem generis, the phrase "similar facilities" refers to or includes infrastructure facilities like sidewalks owned by the LGU.
Thus, RA 7160 contemplates that only the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may be
bankrolled with local government funds.
Clearly, the question of ownership of the open spaces (including the sidewalks) in Marikina Greenheights Subdivision is material to the
determination of the validity of the challenged appropriation and disbursement made by the City of Marikina. Similarly significant is the character of
the direct object of the expenditure, that is, the sidewalks.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City for the reception of evidence to determine (1)
whether V.V. Soliven, Inc. has retained ownership of the open spaces and sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision or has donated them to
the City of Marikina and (2) whether the public has full and unimpeded access to, and use of, the roads and sidewalks of the subdivision. The
Marikina City Regional Trial Court is directed to decide the case with dispatch.

Digester: (Rachel Kate Tacason)

CASE TITLE: CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA
Date of Case: October 31, 1919
DOCTRINE: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law
must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority
exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the
law.
Petitioner: City of Manila
Respondent: Chinese Community of Manila, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having
for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila
FACTS:

This is an action by the city of Manila for the expropriation of land for an extension of Rizal Avenue north. The
petition for condemnation was opposed by the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" (Chinese Community of Manila)
and Ildefonso Tambunting and various others who obtained permission of the trial court to intervene in the case.

All of the defendants allege in their opposition that the proposed extension of Rizal Avenue cuts through a part of the Chinese Cemetery, North
of Manila, and necessitates the destruction of many monuments and the removal of many graves.

CFI RULING:
NO NECESSITY for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question. Petition dismissed.
ISSUE:

WON, in expropriation proceedings, the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

NO.

YES
YES.

Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the

city of Manila) provides that "the city
(Manila) . . . may condemn private property
for public use."
Once it has established the fact, under the
law, that it has authority to expropriate land,
the city of Manila may expropriate any land it
may desire; that the only function of the court
in such proceedings is to ascertain the value
of the land in question; that neither the court
nor the owners of the land can inquire into
the advisible purpose of purpose of the
expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the
courts are mere appraisers of the land
involved in expropriation proceedings, and,
when the value of the land is fixed by the
method adopted by the law, to render a
judgment in favor of the defendant for its
value.

If the court finds that there is some

law authorizing the plaintiff to
expropriate, then the courts have
23

Supreme Court

Plaintiff is without right or

authority to expropriate the
cemetery or any portion thereof.
The expropriation was not a
public improvement.

It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper

authority should grant the expropriation of a
certain or particular parcel of land for some
specified public purpose, that the courts would be
without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of
that legislation.

Existing street and roads

furnished ample means of
communication for the public in
the district covered by such
proposed expropriation.

If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature

should grant general authority to a municipal
corporation to expropriate private land for public
purposes, the courts have ample authority in this
jurisdiction, under the provisions 23 above quoted,
to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue
properly presented, concerning whether or not the
lands were private and whether the purpose was,
in fact, public.

Other routes were

available, which would
fully satisfy the plaintiff's
purposes, at much less
expense and without

The power of the court is not limited to that question, whether

the plaintiff has a right. The right of expropriation is not an
inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it
can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the
power upon it. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists

It was not either necessary nor

expedient that subject
properties be expropriated for
street purposes.

Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure).

Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented; that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of
condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be condemned together with the interest of each defendant separately.
Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall then appoint
commissioners.
Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of the commissioners. Section 248 provides for an appeal from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said section 248 gives the Supreme Court authority to inquire into the right of
expropriation on the part of the plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no right of expropriation existed, it shall remand
the cause to the Court of First Instance with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession of the property and that he recover
whatever damages he may have sustained by reason of the possession of the plaintiff.

no other function than to authorize

the expropriation and to proceed to
ascertain the value of the land
involved; that the necessity for the
expropriation is a legislative and not
a judicial question.
Inasmuch as the legislature has
given it general authority to take
private property for public use, that
the legislature has, therefore,
settled the question of the
necessity in every case and that the
courts are closed to the owners of
the property upon that question.

disturbing the resting

places of the dead.
Respondent Tambunting:
Because of the nature of
the purpose for which the
land was being used (as
cemetery) it has become
quasi-public.

for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that
the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the
law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon
the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land
must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the
court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or
that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended
that the right is being exercised in accordance with law.
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain is public, is a question of fact. Whether the land is
public, is a question of fact; and, in our opinion, when the
legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands
the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the
exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should
inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions.

More from the Court.. (to save space, wont tabulate it)

Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the power to exercise the right of
eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned. But when that right or authority is exercised
for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry
and to hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the general authority.
As long as there is a constitutional or statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a
public use, it occurs to us that the question whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately, at least, a
judicial question. The legislative may, it is true, in effect declare certain uses to be public, and, under the operation
of the well-known rule that a statute will not be declared to be unconstitutional except in a case free, or
comparatively free, from doubt, the courts will certainly sustain the action of the legislature unless it appears that
the particular use is clearly not of a public nature. The decisions must be understood with this limitation; for,
certainly, no court of last resort will be willing to declare that any and every purpose which the legislative might
happen to designate as a public use shall be conclusively held to be so, irrespective of the purpose in question and
of its manifestly private character
Re: Cemetery WON public or private
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese,
which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question

public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city
of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property.
Dispositive Portion: In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question,

the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that
adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the
plaintiff.
For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
CONCURRING:
MALCOLM, J.
The Code of Civil Procedure, in prescribing how the right of eminent domain may be exercised limits the
condemnation to "private property for public use." (Sec. 241.)
The Chinese Cemetery of Manila was established during the Spanish administration in the Philippines by public
spirited Chinese. Sometimes after the inauguration of the new regime in the Philippines, a corporation was organized
to control the cemetery, and a Torrens title for the lands in question was obtained. From the time of its creation until
the present the cemetery has been used by the Chinese community for the burial of their dead. The facts presented
lead us straight to the conclusion that the Chinese Cemetery is not used by a family or a small portion of a
community but by a particular race long existing in the country and of considerable numbers. The case, then, is one
of where the city of Manila, under a general authority permitting it to condemn private property for public use, is
attempting to convert a property already dedicated to a public use to an entirely different public use; and this, not
directly pursuant to legislative authority, but primarily through the sole advice of the consulting architect.
DISSENTS:
STREET, J. Concurred with Justice Moir in the view that the authorities of the city of Manila are the proper judges of
the propriety of the condemnation and that this Court should have nothing to do with the question of the necessity
of the taking.

MOIR, J. It is a right of the city government to determine whether or not it will construct streets and where, and the court's sole duty was to see
that the value of the property was paid the owners after proper legal proceedings ascertaining the value. It is argued that plaintiff must show that it
is necessary to take this land for a public improvement. The law does not so read. Necessity for taking is not a judicial question.
Re: the discussion of the court that the Chinese cemetery is public property: In its answer the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" says it is "a
corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands," and that it owns the land which plaintiff seeks to
acquire. The facts that it is private corporation owning land would seem of necessity to make the land it owns private land. The fact that it belongs
to the Chinese community deprives it of any public character.
The decision should be reversed and the record returned to the Court of First Instance with instructions to proceed with the case in accordance
with this decision.

Trina Fernandez
SANGALANG vs. IAC and Ayala Corp.
December 22, 1988
DOCTRINE: The reclassification of the subject area into a Commercial Zone is a legitimate exercise of police power of the State which
cannot be deterred by the terms of the contract between the petitioners and the private respondents.
Mother Case:
Petitioners: Sanggalang Spouses--Residents of Jupiter St. claiming that Ayala Corp. is liable for the maintenance of the perimeter wall
Respondent: Ayala Corp., developer of Bel-Air Village
**BAVA CASES:
(These cases are the important ones to the topic)
Petitioner: Bel-Air Homeowners Association--Complaining about respondents use of their properties along Jupiter St. for commercial purposes
when their Deed of Restrictions specifically state that they should be used for residential purposes only
Respondents: 4 different cases with residents with properties along Jupiter St. and one in Reposo St. who converted their residences into
commercial establishments
1)
2)
3)
4)

Tenorio -- Restaurant
Romualdezes -- Bakeshop and Cafe
Filley -- Leased to an advertising firm
Moncal -- Leased to Majal Development Corporation

FACTS:
The Municipal Council of Makati enacted Ordinance No. 81 in 1975 providing for the Zonification of Makati wherein Bel-Air Village was classified
as a Class A Residential Zone with boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter St. This was followed by Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance for the NCR adopted by the Metro Manila Commission as Ordinance No. 81-01 in 1981. the boundary was determined as Jupiter St.
and the area of buendia Extension from Reposo St. to EDSA was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone

The Makati Government advised BAVA that in the interest of public welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic congestion, that they should open
certain roads to the public.
BAVA expressed their residents concerns but voluntarily opened all the roads required by the government except Jupiter St.
After 2 more unheeded advisories, the municipal officials allegedly opened, destroyed and removed the gates at the corner of Reposa St. and
Jupiter St. and Jupiter St. and Makati Ave., forcibly opening them to traffic.
With the opening of these roads to the public, there was a tremendous increase in the volume of traffic passing through the area.
Purchasers of the commercial lots as referred to above, began construction of their establishments thereby demolishing parts of the wall which
stood within the boundary of their lots.
With the opening of the entire length of Jupiter St. to public traffic, the different residential lots ceased to be used for purely residential purposes.
They became for all purposes, commercial in character.
BAVA Cases:
(The order is the same as above)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Dismissed on procedural grounds

CFI found for BAVA but the CA reversed, citing Ordinance No. 81 and 81-01
CFI found for BAVA but it was reversed by the CA on similar grounds as in #2
According to the CFI, the commercialization of Makati and the opening of jupiter St. to human and vehicular traffic were circumstances that
made compliance with the Deed of Restrictions extremely difficult and unreasonable

WON the Private

Respondents are liable to
BAVA for going against
the Deed of Restrictions
and building commercial
enterprises on their
properties in Jupiter St.

BAVAs Contention: The

Deed of Restrictions
specifically limit the use
of the subject lots for
residential purpose only

Private Respondents
Contention: Ordinance
80 and 80-1 have
already changed the
character of their
properties

Supreme Court: The National Government itself, through the Metro Manila
Commission had reclassified Jupiter St. into a high density commercial zone,
pursuant to Ordinance 81-01. Petitioners therefore have no cause of action
on the strength alone of the Deed of Restrictions.
POLICE POWER:
The restrictive easements of Bel-Air are, like all contracts, subject to the
over-riding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State
may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power.
While our jurisdiction guarantees the sanctity of contract, it cannot
contravene law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Above
all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to
promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the
expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary.
Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police
power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise apart
from the Non-Impairment guarantee of the Constitution, which is secondary
to the compelling interests of general welfare.

Dispositive: PETITIONS are denied. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant a reversal of the
judgments.

Digest by: Monica G.

FIGURACION vs LIBI
November 28, 2007
The Resolutions issued by Cebu City,in exercise of its regular and official functions, constitute clear and positive evidence of the
intention of Cebu City to return or reconvey to the former owner, by way of sale, the portion of the expropriated property.
Petitioners: Natividad Figuracion, Filma Rabor and Catherine Manalastas successors in interest of Isagani who was the successor of the original
owner of land expropriated by the city
Respondents: SPOUSES CRESENCIANO and AMELITA LIBI users of subject land who refuse to vacate
Facts:
Galileo Figuracion was the owner of Lot No. 899-D-2 in Cebu City. In 1948, the local government of Cebu City expropriated the said lot,
consisting of 474 sq. m., to be part of N. Escario Street. Cebu City paid P23,700 for this lot.
The Cebu City Resolution No. 330 was passed, approving the reconveyance to IsaganiFiguracion, successor-in-interest of Galileo
Figuracion, of the unused portion of Lot 899-D-2. This unused portion was designated as Lot 899-D-2-A, consisting of 84 sq. m.
2 years later, a resurvey was conducted and it was found out that Lot 899-D-2-A actually measures 130 sq. m. Therefore, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod issued Resolution No. 2345 approving the reconveyance of 130 sq. m. of Lot 899-D-2.
[First Case]The respondents were using Lot 899-D-2-A and refused to vacate the same despite demand. Petitioners filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer in the MTC.
o MTC declared petitioners entitled to the possession of said lot and ordered respondents to remove the fence they had
constructed therein. RTC and the CA affirmed.

[Second Case] Respondents filed a complaint for easement, asking that they be granted a right of way over the said lot. However,
respondents amended their complaint twice, resulting in a different cause of action. The amended complaint prayed for the annulment of
Resolutions No. 330 and 2345, the deed of sale in favor of IsaganiFiguracion and the TCT.
o

Issue
W/N
Respondents
have legal
standing

RTC decided in favor of respondents, nullifying Resolutions No. 330 and 2345, the Deed of Sale and the TCT. CA affirmed.
Petitioner
Petitioners also
challenge the legal
standing of
respondents to
question the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod
resolutions.

Respondent

SC
No

Respondents have no interest in the title or possession of Lot No 899-D-2-A.

They are not the proper parties to file for annulment of petitioners title.

The case filed by respondents is for reversion of the subject lot. Reversion is a
proceeding by which the State seeks the return of lands of the public domain or
the improvements thereon through the cancellation of private title erroneously
or fraudulently issued over it.

The complaint
filed by the
respondents is
barred by the MTC
decision in the first
case, as affirmed
by the RTC and
CA.

W/N The
reconveyance
of the subject
lot by Cebu
City to the
petitioners is
valid

Lot 899-D-2, being

a road lot, cannot
be the subject of
sale since it is
outside the
commerce of man.
When they bought
Lot No. 899-D-1,
they did so in the
belief that they had
an outlet to Escario
Street through Lot
No. 899-D-2, then
owned by the local
government of
Cebu City

Yes

Section 101 of the Public Land Act states: All actions for the reversion to the
government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper
courts, in the name of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines.

The sole interest of the respondents is in the use of the property as access to
Escario Street. Such interest is merely tangential to any issue regarding the
ownership and possession of the property. It is not sufficient to vest legal
standing to respondents to sue for the reversion of the property.

The general rule is local roads used for public service are considered public
property under the absolute control of Congress. However, under Section 10,
Chapter II of the Local Government Code, the Congress delegated to political
subdivisions some control of local roads.
Section 21 of the LGC provides: Closure and Opening of Roads-(a) A local
government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily
close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction:
Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and
when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to
closure is provided.

Through RA 3857, the Revised Charter of Cebu City, the Congress delegated
to said political subdivision the following authority to regulate its city streets:
Section 31. Legislative powers. Any provision of law and executive orders to
the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following
legislative powers:xx to close any city road, street, alley, boulevard, avenue,
park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the city
may be lawfully used or conveyed.

The other requirement for a valid reconveyance is establishing that the former
owner or his successors-in-interest have the right to repurchase said property.
o

As held by the Court in Fery v Municipality of Cabanatuan: When

private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that
particular public use is abandoned, does the land so expropriated
return to its former owner?The answer to that question depends upon

the character of the title acquired by the expropriator, whether it be the

State, a province, a municipality, or a corporation which has the right to
acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for example,
land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that
when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to
its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated.
If, for example, land is expropriated for a public street and the
expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for
a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a
public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some
statutory provisions to the contrary. If, upon the contrary, however, the
decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of
course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator,
whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the
non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings.

The Court also held in Moreno v Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority

that where there is preponderant evidence of the existence of a right to
repurchase, the former owner of an expropriated property is entitled to exercise
such option once the public purpose for which the local government initially
intended the expropriated property is abandoned or not pursued.

It was also held in the cases Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v CA,
Reyes v National Housing Authority and Air Transportation Office v Gopuco, Jr.
that where there is insufficient evidence that the former owners of expropriated
properties were granted the right to repurchase the same, the latter may not
insist on recovering their properties even when the public purpose for which
said properties were expropriated is abandoned.

There can be no doubt that Cebu City repudiated its right to use the subject lot
for other public purpose. Instead, it recognized the right of the former owner or
his successor-in-interest to repurchase the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 20, 2002 Decision and August 20, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as
the February 23, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-21193
is DISMISSED.

Digester: Marynette M. Gravador

CASE TITLE: Sps. Yusay v. CA (SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY)
Date of Case: April 6, 2011
DOCTRINE:
A. Certiorari and prohibition does not lie against expropriation, especially since only a Resolution has been made in this case.
B.

The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9 Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

Petitioner: Spouses Antonio and Fe Yusay, landowners.

Respondent: CA, City Mayor and City Council of Mandaluyong City.
FACTS:
Spouses Yusay owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 sqm situated between Nueve de Febrero St. and Fernandez St. in Brgy Mauway,
Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to 9 other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and
only source of income.
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Reso No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin
S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the Spouses to develop it for low cost housing for the less privileged but
deserving city inhabitants.
The Spouses became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in RTC, praying for the annulment of the Reso due to its being
unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect. The City countered that the Reso was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate
the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the property; hence, the suit was premature.
RTC: (Jan 31, 2001) ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit
1. Certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Govt, because the special civil action of certiorari was only available to assail judicial or quasijudicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
2. Special civil action of prohibition did not also lie under the circumstances considering that the act of passing the resolution was not a judicial, or quasijudicial, or ministerial act; and that notwithstanding the issuance of the Reso, the City had yet to commit acts of encroachment, excess, or usurpation, or
had yet to act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
MR: (Feb 19, 2002) RTC set aside its decision and declared that the Reso was null and void.
1. Petition was not premature because the passage of the Reso would already pave the way for the City to deprive the Spouses and their heirs of their only
property;
2. There was no due process in the passage of the Reso because the Spouses had not been invited to the subsequent hearings on the reso to enable them
to ventilate their opposition; and
3. Purpose for the expropriation was not for public use and the expropriation would not benefit the greater number of inhabitants.
CA: (Oct 18, 2002) Reversal by RTC was not justified because the Reso deserved to be accorded the benefit of the presumption of regularity and validity
absent any sufficient showing to the contrary;
1. Notice to the Spouses of the succeeding hearings conducted by the City was not a part of due process, for it was enough that their views had been
consulted and that they had been given the full opportunity to voice their protest;

2. To rule otherwise would be to give every affected resident effective veto powers in law-making by a local government unit; and
3. A public hearing, although necessary at times, was not indispensable and merely aided in law-making.
MR: Denied.
Issue 1

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

WON
the
action
for
certiorari commenced in the
RTC was a proper recourse
of the Spouses..

Issue 2
Can the validity of
Resolution No. 552 be
assailed even before its
implementation?

Cites Camarines Sur vs. CA

to show that a resolution
may suffice to support the
exercise of eminent domain
by an LGU.

The terms resolution and

ordinance
are
synonymous.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court
Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of a resolution by
the Sanggunian Panglungsod
For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must allege and establish
the concurrence of the following requisites:
1. The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
3. There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.6
A petition for certiorari seeks solely to correct defects in
jurisdiction, and does not correct just any error or mistake
committed by a court, board, etc. exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions unless such court, board, etc. acts without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.8
Certiorari did not lie against the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, which was not a part of the Judiciary settling
an actual controversy involving legally demandable and
enforceable rights when it adopted the Reso, but a
legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment
or opinion.
Cam Sur v. CA is not in point because the applicable law at that
time was BP 337, the previous LGC, which had provided that a
mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent
domain. In contrast, RA 7160, the present Local Government
Code which was already in force when the Complaint for
expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this
purpose.
The Sangguniang Panglungsod did not abuse its discretion
in adopting the Reso.
Resolution
Upon a specific matter of a
temporary nature

Law that
character.

Ordinance
is permanent

in

No rights can be conferred by

and be inferred from it, which
is nothing but an embodiment
of what the lawmaking body
has to say in the light of
attendant circumstances.
Merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific
matter.
Temporary in nature.
No 3rd readimg, unless decided
otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members.

A law

General
and
permanent
character,
A 3rd reading is necessary

In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the

resolution, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its
discretion for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a
constitutionally protected right.
RA 7160 (LGC)24 required the City to pass an ordinance, not
adopt a resolution, for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
proceeding. A resolution is not sufficient to initiate an
expropriation proceeding.
Municipality of Paraaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation: The
power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs,
other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore
exercise the power to expropriate private property only when
authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and
restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations.
The local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal
council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
24

Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use,
or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided,
further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount
to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

 (In its Brief filed before CA):

Sangguniang Bayan passed
an ordinance on Oct 11,
1994 which reiterated its
Reso No. 93-35, Series of
1993, and ratified all the acts
of its mayor regarding the
subject expropriation.

Issue 3
WON the action for
prohibition commenced in
the RTC was a proper
recourse of the Spouses..

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain

through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the
language of the previous LGC.
The power of eminent domain necessarily involves a
derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people.
The manifest change in the legislative language from
resolution under BP 337 to ordinance under RA 7160
demands a strict construction.
Merely alleged the existence of an ordinance, but Spouses did
not present any certified true copy thereof. Spouses did not
raise this point before. It was mentioned by the Sanggunian,
and only in passing. In any event, this allegation does not cure
the inherent defect of the Complaint for expropriation
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face
of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere
resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is
equivalent to lack of cause of action.
In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance
authorizing and providing for the expropriation, the petition for
certiorari filed in RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of action.
Prohibition does not lie against expropriation
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair
and orderly administration of justice.
The writ is directed against proceedings that are done without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there
being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
Grave abuse of discretion: The petitioner must first
demonstrate that the tribunal, corporation, etc, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, has
exercised its or his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by
reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent
and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Excess of jurisdiction: The court, board, etc. has jurisdiction
over a case but has transcended such jurisdiction or acted
without any authority.
Prohibition was not available to the Spouses as a remedy
against the adoption of the Reso, for the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, by such adoption, was not exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but only expressing its

Issue 4
Must a citizen await the
takeover and possession of
his property by the local
government before he can
go to court to nullify an
unjust expropriation?

collective sentiment or opinion.

There can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the
immediate possession of the land under expropriation
proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision
is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just
compensation to the owner.
This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power
of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land
intended for public use, and the interest of the affected
landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the State.
Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent
domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope,
and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount
of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners. Only
when the landowners are not given their just compensation for
the taking of their property or when there has been no
agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy
of prohibition become available.
Remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that
only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners property was
issued.
As of then, it was premature for the Spouses to mount any
judicial challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be
exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified
complaint in the proper court.
Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified
complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist.
Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be
deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70618. Costs to be paid by the petitioners.

CASE TITLE: Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA

Allen B. Barrientos
DATE OF CASE: 17 May 1993

DIGESTER: Jasper

DOCTRINE: Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by
implication.
Petitioner: The Province of Camarines Sur, represented by its governor, Luis R. Villafuerte (Villafuerte), and Benjamin V. Panga, the presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 33.
Respondent: The Court of Appeals (Third Division) and Ernesto and Efren San Joaquin (the San Joaquins), owners of the parcel of land
expropriated by the Province of Camarines Sur.
FACTS:
On 22 December 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the governor
to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, the Province of Camarines Sur, through Villafuerte, filed two cases for expropriation against the
San Joaquins, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur.
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession, which was granted on the condition that a deposit
be made with the Clerk of Court of a bond amounting to Php 5,714.00.
The San Joaquins filed a petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) praying that: (a) Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 be declared null and
void; (b) the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the orders of the RTC allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property subject of the expropriation be set aside.
The CA granted the petition by the San Joaquins and also ordered the RTC to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to convert the classification of the
subject property from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
The Province of Camarines Sur filed an appeal by certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE

PETITIONERS CONTENTION

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION

THE SUPREME COURTS

RULING

Whether or not the Province of

Camarines Sur need to first
secure the approval of the DAR
before it can expropriate the
subject land.

Province of Camarines Sur: Its

exercise of the power of eminent
domain cannot be restricted by
Section 6525 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law), which requires the approval
of the DAR before a parcel of land
can be reclassified from an
agricultural to a non-agricultural
land.

Court of Appeals: The Province

of Camarines Sur must comply
with the provision of Section 65 of
the
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform Law and must first secure
the approval of the DAR of the
plan to expropriate the lands of the
San Joaquins.

A fair and reasonable reading of

the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case Heirs of Juancho
Ardana vs. Reyes shows that the
power of expropriation is
deemed superior to the power
to distribute lands under the
land reform program. Resolution
No. 129, Series of 1988, was
promulgated pursuant to Section
926 of B.P. Blg. 337 (the Local
Government Code), which does
not intimate in the least that local
government units must first secure
the approval of the DAR for the
conversion
of
lands
from
agricultural to non-agricultural use,
before they can institute the
necessary
expropriation
proceedings. Likewise, there is no
provision in R.A. No. 6657 which
expressly
subjects
the
expropriation of agricultural lands
by local government units to the
control of the DAR.
The opening, adverbial phrase of
Section 6527 of R.A. No. 6657

25

Section 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a
greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the
landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or
conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
26
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of
eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
27
Section 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a
greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the

signals that it applies to lands

previously placed under the
agrarian reform program.
Statutes conferring the power of
eminent domain to political
subdivisions
cannot
be
broadened or constricted by
implication. To sustain the CA
would mean that the local
government units can no longer
expropriate
agricultural
lands
needed for the construction of
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals,
etc., without first applying for
conversion of the use of the lands
with the DAR, because all of these
projects would naturally involve a
change in the land use. In effect, it
would then be the DAR to
scrutinize
whether
the
expropriation is for a public
purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative
branch of the local government
unit that shall determine whether
the use of the property sought to
be expropriated shall be public,
and the courts defer to such
legislative determination and will
intervene only when a particular
undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public
use.
There is also an ancient rule that
restrictive statutes, no matter how
landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or
conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.

broad their terms are, do not

embrace the sovereign unless the
sovereign is specially mentioned
as subject thereto. The Republic
of the Philippines, as sovereign, or
its political subdivisions, as
holders of delegated sovereign
powers, cannot be bound by
provisions of law couched in
general terms.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's
order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert
or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of
the private respondents.

Digester: Flores
CASE TITLE: MASIKIP v. PASIG CITY
Date of Case: Jan. 23, 2006
DOCTRINE: US v. Toribio: The power of eminent domain is the right of the government to take and appropriate private property to public
use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on the condition of providing a reasonable compensation
therefor.
Eminent Domain is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseperable from
sovereignty and inherent in government. It is lodged in the legislative branch of the government, which delegates the exercise thereof to
LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. LGs have no inherent power of
eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.
Sec. 19, LGC 1991 prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to LGUs and lays down the
parameters for its exercise.
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) adequacy of compensation; (b)
necessity of the taking; (c) public use character of the purpose of the taking.
Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only
a reasonable/practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least convenience and expense to
the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit.
Petitioner: Lourdes De La Paz Masikip registered owner of a parcel of land (4521 sq. m.) in Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City which was sought to
be expropriated by the then Municipality of Pasig
Respondent:
1. City of Pasig then Municipality of Pasig
2. Hon. Marietta A. Legaspi Presiding Judge of RTC Pasig
3. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Letter of Jan. 6, 1994 Municipality of Pasig notified Masikip of its intention to expropriate 1500 sq. m. of her property to be used for the sports
development and recreational activities of the residents of Brgy. Caniogan pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enated by the then
Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Letter of March 23, 1994 Respondent wrote another letter, but this time the purpose was allegedly in line with the program of the Municipal
Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.
Masikips Reply The intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient
nor suitable for the 2nd purpose offered by respondent.
Letter of Dec. 20, 1994 Respondent reiterated that the purpose of expropriation is to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor
residents.

Respondent then filed with the RTC a Complaint for Expropriation, praying that it issue an order for the condemnation of the property and that
commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining just compensation.
Masikip filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) on the following grounds:
1. No cause of action for the exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain:
a. No genuine necessity for the taking of the property
b. Plaintiff arbitrarily and capriciously chosen the property
c. Even granting that the property may be expropriated, the FMV far exceeds P78,000
2. Complaint is defective in form and substance
a. Plaintiff failed to allege with certainty the purpose of expropriation
b. Failed to comply with the requisites under Sec. 34, Rule VI of the IRR of the LGC, hence this proceeding is premature
3. Granting of the expropriation would violate Sec. 261(V) of the Omnibus Election Code
4. Plaintiff cannot take possession by merely depositing 15% of the value of the property based on its current tax declaration.
RTC: Denied Masikips MTD. There is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recretational activities of the residents of
Pasig. Further denied Masikips MR. Appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City to ascertain the just compensation in
accordance with the ROC.
CA: Dismissed Masikips Special Civil Action for Certiorari for lack of merit and also her MR.
Issue 1:
Whether petitioners
MTD constitutes the
responsive pleading
required by the Rules
of Court.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

SUPREME COURT:
YES, under Sec. 3, Rule 67 of the then Revised ROC.
The MTD is a responsive pleading joining the issues. It
puts in issue the right of plaintiff to expropriate
defendants property for the use specified in the
complaint. All that is required that a copy of the MTD be
served on plaintiffs atty of record. CA erred in holding
that the MTD hypothetically admitted the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint (that there is a genuine
necessity to expropriate). The RTC should have set the
case for reception of evidence to determine whether
there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking
instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is
for public use, because the purpose of expropriation
was squarely challenged and put in issue by Masikip.
Although the Rule has been amended by the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which expressly mandates
that any objection/defense to the taking of the property

Issue 2:
Whether there is a
genuine necessity for
the expropriation of
Masikips property.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
YES. It is provide
sports and
recreational facilities
to its poor residents.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
NO. (see arguments in MTD) There is
already an established sports
development and recreational activity
center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City,
fully operational and being utilized by its
residents, including those from Brgy.
Caniogan.

of a defendant must be set forth in an Answer, it is only

fair that the Rule at the time Masikip filed her MTD
should govern. The new provision cannot be applied
retroactively to her prejudice.
SUPREME COURT:
NO. The City of Pasig has failed to establish that there
is a genuine necessity to expropriate Masikips
property. The Certification Issued by the Caniogan
Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of
Ordinance No. 42 authorizing the expropriation,
indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendrez
Compound Homeowners Association, a private, nonprofit organiation, not the residents of Caniogan.
Members of said Assocaiation are desirous having their
own private playground and recreational faicility and
Masikips lot is the nearest vacant space available. The
purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically
public. Furthermore, there exists an alternative facility
for sports development and community recreation in the
area available to all residents of Pasig, including those
of Caniogan.
Right to take private property for public purposes
necessarily originates from the necessity and the
taking must be limited to such necessity. The very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a
genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character (City of Manila v. Chinese Community
of Manila). The ascertainment of necessity must
precede/accompany (not follow) the taking of the land.
The right to own and possess proeprty is one of the
most cherished rights of men. Unless the requisite of
genuine necessity for the expropriation of ones
property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the
courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private
property. Important as the power of eminent domain
may be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution
attaches to the property of the individual requires not
only that the purpose for the taking of private property

be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking,

which must be of a public character, must also be
shown to exist.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED. The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig is ordered DISMISSED.