CONCEPCION ABELLA DE DIAZ V.

ERLANGER & GALINGER,

INC., ET. AL.
59 PHIL. 326

PONENTE: HULL, J.

FACTS:
Domingo and Concepcion (plaintiff) are married. During the
marriage, Domingo purchased from Erlanger & Galinger, Inc.,
machinery and equipment for the construction and installation of
an electric light plant at Tabaco, Albay. However, Domingo was
not able to pay the full amount of the purchase price. Erlanger &
Galinger sued Domingo and a judgment was obtained against him
for the remaining balance for his purchase.

Pursuant to the judgment made by the CFI of Albay, the sheriff
levied on certain properties of the spouses that includes a
commercial building, palay and lumber, and a Buick automobile.
However, plaintiff argued that the properties levied upon were
paraphernal.

Plaintiff thereupon brought this action in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur alleging that the properties, which had
been levied upon, were her own paraphernal property. The court
issued a temporary injunction and after hearing, declared that the
properties levied were paraphernal, that obligation which was
the basis of the judgment was a personal obligation of the
husband, and that under article 1386 of the Civil Code, the fruits
of the paraphernal property of the wife were exempt from
execution in this case.

The defendant appealed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged properties of the wife are exempt
from execution for the dets contracted by the husband.

RULING:
Paragraph 2, of Article 1404, of the Civil Code provides:
xxx Buildings constructed during the marriage on land belonging
to one of the spouses shall also belong to the partnership, but the
value of the land shall be paid to the spouse owning the same. xxx

The buildings in dispute, were built on the lands of appellee with
the appellees own personal money. At first view there is no
limitation on the second paragraph of the abovementioned
article, but Manresa in his Commentaries, holds that if the
building is constructed by the owner of the land with her private
money, the building does not belong to the partnership but to the
owner of the land. SC concurred with the trial court that the
buildings in the case at bar are not subject to levy and sale.

As to the items of palay and lumber, the SC was not convinced
from the evidence that they belong exclusively to appellee, but on
the contrary, SC believed that they were part of the conjugal
property (article 1407, Civil Code). Likewise, as to the Buick
automobile.

WHEREFORE, The judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur is affirmed so far as it relates to the ownership of
the buildings. As to the other items, including the rents of the
paraphernal property, it is reversed. The case will be remanded
to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for action in
conformity with this opinion. No expression as to costs. So
ordered.



JOCSON V. CA
170 S 333

PONENTE: MEDIALDEA, J.

FACTS:
Moises Jocson (petitioner) and Agustina Jocson-Valdez are the
are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and
Alenjandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vaquez is the
husband of Agustina. Alejndra Poblete predeceased her husband
without her instestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio
Jocson also died intestate on April1, 1972.

The dispute concerns the validity of 3 documents executed by
Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. The said documents conveyed,
by sale, to Agustiina Jocson-Vasquez apparently all properties of
their father. Petitioner assails these documents and prays that
they be declared null and void.

According to the petitioner, as to the first document, the
defendant-respondents obtained the sale through fraud, deceit,
undue pressure and influence, thus the sale was null and void. He,
also added that said defendants have no work or livelihood of
their own, to make the sale possible. As to the second and third
document, he alleged that the consent of their father was
obtained through fraud, deceit, undue pressure,
misinterpretation and unlawful machinations and trickeries
committed by defendants with dishonest and selfish motives. He
also assailed that it would also be impossible for the defendants,
on the 2nd and 3rd document, to buy the said property because
as stated earlier, they dont have sufficient means to purchase the
said properties.

Lastly, petitioner Moises assails the sale, because according to
him this was really as donation between his father and his sister.
He further provided that the, while the property is a conjugal one,
a party was not given a judicial administration and cannot sell the
property with the consent of the other.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property is considered under conjugal
partnership, pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code.

RULING:
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the
presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof that
the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The fact that the properties
were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses' coverture. It may be that the properties
under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a
bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra
Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates
of title as married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on
their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's,
the registered owner. This is so because the words "married to'
preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil
status of Emilio Jocson.

In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio
Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in
his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
SPS. BUADO V. CA AND NICOL
GR NO. 145222

PONENTE: TINGA, J.

FACTS:
On April 30, 1984, spouses Roberto and Venus Buado
(petitioners) filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol
with Branch 19 of RTC of Bacoor, Cavite.

On April 6, 1987, the RTC rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to
pay for damages. The CA and SC affirmed the said decision and
became executory on March 5, 1992. On October 14, 1992, the
trial court issued a writ of execution.

Finding Erlinda Nicols personal properties insufficient to satisfy
the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real
property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of
Cavite.

On February 2, 1994, Romulo Nicol (respondent) filed a
complaint for the annulment of certificate of sale and damages,
alleging that the peitioners connived and directly levied upon and
execute his real property without exhausting the personal
properties of Erlinda. The case was assigned to Branch 21 of RTC
of Imus, Cavite.

Petitioners insist that respondent, who is the husband of the
judgment debtor, is not the "third party" contemplated in Section
17 (now Section 16), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, hence a
separate action need not be filed. Furthermore, petitioners assert
that the obligation of the wife redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership and cited authorities to the effect that the
husband is liable for the tort committed by his wife.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband, who was not a party to the suit but
whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the
other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a
stranger?

RULING:
In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the
character of the property must be taken into account.

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature.
Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family.

The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance
payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded
that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.