Professional Documents
Culture Documents
19 December 2009
‘Views from the Bund’ is a monthly publication that gives clients a value- China
added view on China macro, strategy, and industry insights. Equities Research Team
• Key investment theme: In FY10, the China equity market may offer Frank Li
AC
good investment opportunities but also presents many uncertainties and (852) 2800-8511
risks. On one hand, we believe Chinese equities could stage a rally frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
between now and 1Q10, driven by: 1) the government’s recent J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited
reiteration of its “proactive fiscal policy” and “relatively loose monetary
policy” for 2010, which should help alleviate the market’s concerns Relative index performance
about possible earlier-than-expected monetary tightening; 2) the upward
earnings estimate revision momentum for MSCI China; 3) a marked
sequential improvement in liquidity from Dec-09 to 1Q10; and 4) the
expectation that Rmb will resume appreciation in FY10. On the other
hand, we could start to see an increase in market volatility for MSCI
China if and when the government starts to tighten its monetary policy
(possibly in 2Q10). We could see de-rating pressure for sectors that are
highly correlated with fixed-investment growth as we approach mid-
2010, when the equity market is likely to start pricing in a potential sharp
slowdown in fixed asset investment growth in 2011. Our major Source: Bloomberg.
investment strategy lies in focusing on defensive growth stocks—stocks
with good earnings visibility, low penetration rate, strong secular growth,
and those that should be least affected by a potential tightening kicking in
as of 2Q10 and a downshift in FAI growth in 2011.
• What is changing: We highlight our two key investment themes for
FY10: 1) accumulating consumption–related stocks to benefit from
China’s growth rebalance; and 2) identifying undervalued China
companies, which are likely to report record high earnings in FY09, but
are still trading at a decent discount to their highs in FY07, and are free
from major multiple contraction pressure.
• Information: We continue to see short-term trading opportunities for
media and airline stocks, and food inflation plays.
• China model portfolio adjustment: We stay positive on: A) China
banks; B) the coal sector; and C) defensive growth names—internet,
tissue and diapers, gas, selected consumer staples, and healthcare. We are
negative on: A) property on tightening concerns; within the sector, we
favor those with the most exposure to Tier 2-3 cities; B) telecoms; C)
FAI–related plays, including downstream commodities, commercial
vehicles and construction; and D) IPPs.
China: Top picks
Reuters Mkt cap Avg. dly TOEPS Y/Y growth (%) P/E (x) P/BV (x) ROE (%) Div. yld (%)
Rec ticker (US$MM) (US$MM) 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E 2009E 2009E 2009E
China Citic Bank - H Share OW 0998.HK 42,410 39.9 13.6 52.4 14.7 9.6 2.1 15.2 1.7
China Construction Bank OW 0939.HK 198,050 236.7 14.2 30.1 12.8 9.8 2.6 21.3 3.5
China Gas Holdings Limited N 0384.HK 1,588 5.4 NM NA 25.6 NA 3.4 14.3 0.0
Sinopharm OW 1099.HK 8,032 NA 42.1 15.3 47.2 40.9 4.7 12.7 0.5
Sina Corp N SINA US 2,796 53.3 -24.2 29.5 45.7 35.3 3.5 8.7 0.0
Source: Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan estimates. Prices and valuations are as of December 16, 2009.
See page 153 for analyst certification and important disclosures, including non-US analyst disclosures.
J.P. Morgan does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may
have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their
investment decision.
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Table of Contents
Macroeconomic views .............................................................3
Market strategy .......................................................................16
Autos .......................................................................................66
Consumer................................................................................84
Energy .....................................................................................93
Financials: Banks ...................................................................99
Financials: Insurance...........................................................109
Healthcare .............................................................................128
Real estate ............................................................................130
Transportation ......................................................................136
Telecom.................................................................................138
Utilities and infrastructure...................................................142
2
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
The strong momentum in industrial activity continued along with a steady and broad-
based recovery in exports. On the domestic front, the pace of fixed investment
growth eased modestly in November, which may help to ease some of the concerns
about the buildup of excess capacity in some industries, in our view. Meanwhile, data
about retail sales, which had shown an impressive gain in recent months, were rather
mixed in November, underscoring the leadership’s decision to renew support for
Chinese consumers. Overall, the latest data flow and policy tone are consistent with
our GDP outlook of a 9.5% rise next year.
Meanwhile, along with the steady recovery in GDP growth, the focus on macro
policy going into 2010 will gradually turn to structural adjustment and rebalancing of
the economy, the quality and sustainability of the recovery, and managing inflation
expectations, in our view. In particular, in the fiscal policy, we expect public
3
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
With regard to the fixed investment cycle, it is well recognized that public sector
investment spending, especially infrastructure investment, has been the major force
behind the economy’s impressive recovery this year. The conference highlighted that
going into 2010 the macro policy should ensure an appropriate pace of growth in
fixed investment, with the focus on completing ongoing investment projects, while
closely monitoring the number of new ones.
On monetary policy, while the conference emphasized the continuity and stability of
the policy stance, it also highlighted the importance of flexibility, suggesting that the
pace of credit expansion should be managed and adjusted according to changes in the
global and domestic economies. Also, credit support should be channeled to sectors
with greater impact on employment, new strategic industries, and small- and
medium-sized enterprises.ok.
For the property sector, policymakers focused on the provision of housing and the
fulfillment of genuine household demand for home purchases. The conference also
highlighted the policy target of speeding up the urbanization process, with emphasis
on encouraging the rural migrant population to settle in urbanized areas, especially in
medium-sized and smaller cities.
For the export sector, the conference suggested that in fostering steady recovery in
exports, it is important to encourage further upgrading of the value-added content of
exports. Again, policy continuity and stability with regard to the export sector were
stressed, along with the need for developed economies to consolidate the market and
further explore exports market.
Overall, the general macro policy tone coming out of the Economic Work
Conference was largely consistent with our view on the growth and macro policy
outlook for 2010. Our forecast for 2009 full-year GDP growth stands at 8.6% with
the 2010 GDP growth forecast at 9.5%. We expect the PBoC to begin raising
benchmark policy rates moderately by mid-10 with a total of two 27bp hikes over the
second half of next year. On the currency front, we expect the continuation of the
gradual appreciation of the Rmb exchange rate to begin sometime in 2Q10 and
expect Rmb/US$ to reach 6.5 by end-10.
4
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
15
10
5
Real GDP
0
2006 2007 2008 2009
5
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
• On the import side, it appears that the solid import gain in November was
largely driven by imports of mechanical and electrical products (up 7.8%
m/m, sa, and 40.9% 3m/3m, saar). With regard to commodities, in volume
terms, imports of crude oil fell 13.8% m/m, sa in November, to record 17.1
million tons (nsa). On the other hand, imports of refined oil products rose
4.1% m/m, sa in November, to reach 2.4 million tons (nsa). Meanwhile,
sequential trends in the import of a number of major industrial metals are
either showing a notable slow pace of gain, or outright decline, including
imports of iron ore (+11.4% 3m/3m, saar by November), copper (-60.1%
3m/3m, saar) and aluminum (-85.9% 3m/3m, saar), reversing from the
elevated pace of growth during 1H09.
50
25
-25
-50
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
6
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Bank loans rose at 33.8%oya in November, compared with the 34.2%oya growth in
October, with the sequential trend rising at 22.0% 3m/3m, saar. New loan creation
was at Rmb294.8 billion (-38.2%oya) in November, compared with Rmb253 billion
for October. For the first 11 months of the year, new loan creation was at Rmb9.21
trillion, compared with Rmb4.14 trillion during the same period in 2008.
A significant amount of bill discounting was matured in November, with total bill
discounting falling by Rmb108.5 billion. Besides, short-term corporate loans also
declined modestly by Rmb20.5 billion in November. On the other hand, new
7
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
The central bank’s weekly open market operations suggest that Rmb299 billion was
drained from the banking system in November, though the net amount of liquidity
withdrawal has slowed lately. Along with PBoC’s steady withdrawal of excess
liquidity through open market operations, the sequential trend growth rates in M2
money supply and total bank loans have been steadily moderating from the elevated
pace in 1H09, rising 22.0% 3m/3m saar through November (chart below). Looking
ahead, we believe that the central bank will continue to rely on open market
operations to manage overall liquidity.
1000 2007
500
0
Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan
8
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
3.2%oya, translating into a rise of 1.0% m/m, sa, with the particular impact of heavy
snow on food prices during the month. Excluding the food component, non-food CPI
continued to fall at 0.7% oya in November, compared with the 1.6% decline,
translating into a modest gain of 0.2% m/m, sa. Overall, we expect headline CPI to
rise at a moderate 3.0% in 2010.
In addition, PPI declined at 2.1% oya in November, compared with the 5.8% decline
in October, translating into a rise of 1.0% m/m, sa. Among major PPI categories, the
pace of %oya decline narrowed most notably for mining (-4.1%oya in November,
compared with -16.3%oya in October) and industrial raw materials (-1.7%oya in
November, compared with -8.3%oya in October). Meanwhile, the PPI for consumer
goods fell modestly at 0.2%oya in November, compared with the fall of 1.4%oya in
October.
Putting the two separate PMI series together suggests that the sequential trend in
China’s manufacturing sector remains in a solid expansion phase, supported by
steady and broad-based demand growth on the domestic front as well as improving
external orders. In addition, the manufacturing order-to-inventory ratio remained at
the highest level since April 2008, suggesting that with further steady recovery in
final demand conditions, the solid growth in the manufacturing sector will continue.
• The output component rose again to 59.4 in November in the NBS series
(from 59.3 in October), the highest level since April 2008. The further
increase in the PMI output component was led by industries, including
textiles, garment and footwear, transportation equipment, electric machinery
and instruments, and tobacco processing, while the output component for
sectors including petroleum processing and coking, beverage manufacturing,
and paper making and printing eased in November.
9
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
• The PMI input price components rose again in November, after easing in
September and October. For the NBS series, the input price component rose
to 63.4 (from 56.9 in October), the highest level since July 2008, with a
broad-based increase in input costs across most industries. Corporate input
costs increased along with the gain in global crude oil and coal prices, while
the heavy snow and natural gas shortage in the country in November put
further pressure on input costs.
50
Markit PMI
40
30
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
10
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
5 60
0 40
Markit PMI
-5 input prices 20
-10 0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Information
Rmb NEER and movement in major currencies
In the People’s Bank of China’s 3Q monetary policy report, the central bank, as usual,
stated that the exchange rate will be managed in a proactive, controlled and gradual
manner, and “based on international capital flows and movements in major
currencies”. The last phrase caught widespread market attention with regard to the
potential for a major near-term move in Rmb. However, in our view, the central
bank’s latest statement on Rmb should be read more as a forward-looking statement,
rather than suggesting that the Rmb will in the near-term play catch-up with major
developed and developing currencies’ rise against the US$ since early this year.
On a trade-weighted basis, through the ups and downs in the greenback over the past
year, the Rmb NEER, as well as the NEER for other currencies which have seen a
significant rally this year, such as A$ and Brazilian real, are all roughly back to the
levels prior to the beginning of the financial crisis (chart below). Hence, while we
expect a resumption of gradual appreciation in the Rmb exchange rate, in terms of
timing, our view has always been that this will likely begin sometime in 2Q10, when
the export sector resumes positive over-year-ago growth rates and as officials
become convinced that the global recovery is on a sure footing. Our Dec-10 estimate
for Rmb/US$ is 6.5.
11
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
90 AUD
Appreciation
80
70
2008 2009
60 Exports 90
REER
40 95
100
20
105
0
110
-20 115
-40 120
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Going forward, our global team is looking for a moderate recovery in the US
consumer demand (J.P. Morgan expects the US consumer spending to rise 2.0%y/y
in 2010) and a sustained and synchronized expansion of the global economy through
2010. Hence, we expect net external trade to show a moderate positive contribution
to China’s headline growth next year, which would support the resumption of a
gradual appreciation of Rmb. Timing-wise, it will more likely begin sometime in
2Q10, when exports turn decisively positive (in %oya terms), and as officials become
convinced that the global recovery is on a sure footing, in our view.
12
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
15 75
China exports to
10 50
the US
5
25
0
US retail sales ex motor 0
-5
vehicles, parts and gas
-10 -25
-15 -50
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
13
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
-4 US
-8
98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Hence, concerns about capital inflows would likely constrain the extent of the rise in
China’s policy rates (we look for two 27bp hikes in benchmark rates next year),
especially considering that the China-US interest rate differential is already at the
highest level since 2004 (chart below), and as the US Fed is expected to hold policy
rate close to zero through the course of next year.
Figure 18: China’s forex deposits and loans and Rmb deposits in Hong Kong
%oya, 3mma, both scales
Accelerating CNY Yuan deposits
60 in Hong Kong 200
appreciation
FX deposits 150
40
FX loans 100
20
50
0
0
-20 -50
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Non-consensus call
Market concerns about policy tightening is overdone
Financial market investors have been concerned about policy tightening in Asia,
including China, as the economic activity continues with steady recovery, with
growing concerns about an asset bubble. In this regard, latest statement from China’s
top leadership is in tune with our view that authorities will be cautious regarding an
14
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
“exit strategy,” even as the real economy continues to show a solid recovery,
especially as policymakers are not yet convinced that the global recovery is on a sure
footing. At a meeting with senior European officials recently, Premier Wen
commented that a premature “exit” from macro policy stimulus could risk derailing
the global economic recovery. Authorities’ latest decision to extend a series of
consumption-related stimulus measures, including those for auto and home electrical
appliances, into next year, while at the same time to re-impose the 5.5% tax on
transaction of residential properties which have been held for less than five years, in
order to curb property speculation, highlights the authorities’ latest approach to
continue supporting domestic consumption, while fine-tuning sectoral policies to
contain asset inflation.
We believe China’s fiscal spending plans have largely been laid out through 4Q10
and are unlikely to be reversed. On monetary policy, the PBoC is likely to move in
stages, relying on open market operations to withdraw excess liquidity, combined
with sector-specific actions such as a partial withdrawal of the stimulus provided to
real estate late last year to reduce the risk of an asset bubble and inflation. Overall,
going into 2010, if the new loan target comes in at Rmb7-8 trillion, and if the M2
growth target comes in at about 17% (compared with our forecast of a nominal GDP
growth of 12.2%), we believe monetary conditions should remain largely supportive
of the economy’s recovery. We expect the PBoC to begin raising policy rates
moderately by mid-10, with a total of two 27bp hikes over the second-half of next
year. On the currency front, we expect a resumption of the gradual appreciation of
the Rmb exchange rate beginning sometime in 2Q10, looking for the Rmb/US$ rate
to reach 6.5 by end-10.
15
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Market strategy
AC From beta to alpha: Searching for hidden value in China
Frank Li
(852) 2800-8511
equities
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com (Extracted from the note, “China Strategy: From beta to alpha: Searching for hidden
Peng Chen value in China equities,” published on 18 December 2009. Please see the original
(852) 2800-8507 note for pricing dates.)
peng.p.chen@jpmorgan.com • The China equity market may offer good investment opportunities but also
Lan Deng present many uncertainties and risks in FY10: On one hand, we believe
(852) 2800-8520 Chinese equities could stage a rally between now and 1Q10, driven by: (1) the
lan.x.deng@jpmorgan.com government’s recent reiteration of its “proactive fiscal policy” and “relatively
loose monetary policy” for 2010, which should help alleviate the market’s
J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited
concerns about a possible earlier-than-expected monetary tightening; (2) the
upward earnings estimate revision momentum for MSCI China; (3) a marked
sequential improvement in liquidity from Dec-09 to 1Q10; and (4) the
expectation that Rmb will resume appreciation in FY10. On the other hand, we
could start to see an increase in market volatility for MSCI China, if and when
the government starts to tighten its monetary policy (possibly in 2Q10). We
could see de-rating pressure for sectors that are highly correlated with fixed-
investment growth as we approach mid-2010, when the equity market is likely to
start pricing in a potential sharp slowdown in fixed asset investment growth in
2011.
• Entering an alpha year in FY10: Our major investment strategy lies in
focusing on defensive growth stocks—stocks with good earnings visibility, low
penetration rate, strong secular growth, and those that should be least affected by
a potential tightening kicking in as of 2Q10 and a downshift in FAI growth in
2011. We highlight our two key investment themes for FY10: (1) accumulating
consumption-related stocks to benefit from China’s growth rebalance; and (2)
identifying undervalued China companies, which are likely to report record-high
earnings in FY09, but are still trading at a decent discount to their highs in FY07,
and are free from major multiple contraction pressure.
• Sector views: We stay positive on: (A) China banks, as we believe the recent
correction on fund-raising concerns creates a good opportunity to accumulate
bank shares; (B) the coal sector; and (C) defensive growth names—internet,
tissue and diapers, gas, selected consumer staples, and healthcare. We continue
to see short-term trading opportunities for media and airline stocks, and food
inflation plays. We are negative on: (A) property—on tightening concerns;
within the sector, we favor those with the most exposure to tier 2-3 cities; (B)
telecoms; (C) FAI-related plays, including downstream commodities,
commercial vehicles and construction; and (D) IPPs.
Table 1: China: Top five picks
Reuters Mkt cap Avg. dly TOEPS Y/Y growth (%) P/E (x) P/BV (x) ROE (%) Div. yld (%)
Rec ticker (US$MM) (US$MM) 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E 2009E 2009E 2009E
China Citic Bank - H Share OW 0998.HK 42,410 39.9 13.6 52.4 14.7 9.6 2.1 15.2 1.7
China Construction Bank OW 0939.HK 198,050 236.7 14.2 30.1 12.8 9.8 2.6 21.3 3.5
China Gas Holdings Limited N 0384.HK 1,588 5.4 NM NA 25.6 NA 3.4 14.3 0.0
Sinopharm OW 1099.HK 8,032 NA 42.1 15.3 47.2 40.9 4.7 12.7 0.5
Sina Corp N SINA US 2,796 53.3 -24.2 29.5 45.7 35.3 3.5 8.7 0.0
Source: Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan estimates. Prices and valuations are as of December 16, 2009.
16
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Source: Bloomberg.
Investment summary
After the one-directional bull market for most of 2009, the China equity market may
offer good investment opportunities as well as present many uncertainties and risks
in FY10. The rationale for our view is summarized below:
On one hand, we believe Chinese equities may stage a rally between now and 1Q10,
driven by:
On the other hand, we could start to see an increase in market volatility for the MSCI
China, if and when the government starts to tighten its monetary policy (possibly in
2Q10). Meanwhile, we could see de-rating pressures for sectors that are highly
correlated with fixed-investment growth as we approach the middle of 2010. By then,
the equity market should start pricing in the potential sharp slowdown in fixed asset
investment growth in 2011, as the two-year (FY09E and FY10E) economic stimulus
policies fade away.
17
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
We highlight two key investment themes for FY10: (1) accumulating consumption-
related stocks to benefit from China’s growth rebalance: from an investment and
export-driven economy to a domestic consumption driven economy; and (2)
identifying undervalued China stocks, which are likely to report record-high
earnings in FY09, but are still trading at a decent discount to their highs in FY07 and
are free from major multiple contraction pressure.
With regard to the sector allocation, we maintain our overweight stance on:
• Coal names, because (1) coal prices have started to rally, with Qinghuangdao
coal prices up 30% as of the end of August 2009; (2) the supply-side discipline
on the consolidation of small coal mines; and (3) the transportation bottleneck at
the Daqing railway line.
• Defensive growth names – companies that are positioned in sectors with low
penetration rate and strong secular growth, and companies with good earnings
quality--internet, tissue and diapers, gas, selected consumer staples, and
healthcare.
• Media as a late cycle recovery play and with stronger earnings growth in FY10
than FY09.
• Airlines stand to benefit from (1) the rising cargo and passenger traffic on
domestic and international routes on the back of the strong economic recovery
and (2) Rmb resuming appreciation as of 2Q10.
18
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 20: Price movements in basis points (as of December 14, 2009)
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
27-Oct- 27-Nov - 27-Dec- 27-Jan- 27-Feb- 27-Mar- 27-Apr- 27-May - 27-Jun- 27-Jul- 27-Aug- 27-Sep- 27-Oct- 27-Nov -
08 08 08 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09
Source: Bloomberg.
30
Current=16.7x
25 +1 std dev = 20.5x
20
long term av g PE=15.8x (since y ear 2000)
15
10
-1 std dev = 11.1x
5
0
Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09
19
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
x
5
Current=2.5x
4.5
4
+2 std dev = 3.7x
3.5
+1 std dev = 2.9x
3
long term av g PB=2.2x (since y ear 2000)
2.5
2
1.5
-1 std dev = 1.5x
1
-2 std dev = 0.8x
0.5
0
Oct-00 Oct-01 Oct-02 Oct-03 Oct-04 Oct-05 Oct-06 Oct-07 Oct-08 Oct-09
UTILITIES -5%
Telecom -5%
INDUSTRIALS 45%
HEALTHCARE 48%
BANKS 68%
ENERGY 70%
INSURANCE 74%
MATERIALS 85%
IT 204%
Source: Bloomberg.
20
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Among others, the government is still concerned about (a) the sustainability of the
world economic recovery; (b) the domestic employment conditions. Meanwhile,
inflation does not appear to be the government’s top concern for the moment, even
though the report does mention about the management of inflationary expectations.
The overall monetary policy stance is in line with our base-line scenario that the
central government is unlikely to make major adjustments to the monetary policy in
the near team. In our view, the central bank will not begin raising benchmark policy
rates until mid-2010, when inflation pressure finally builds up (around 3-4%oya) and
export recovery is on a more solid footing (with the headline growth rate returning to
around 20%oya).
We believe this is positive for China’s stock market as it helps alleviate the market’s
concerns about possible earlier-than-expected tightening measures, thus creating a
favorable environment for the stock market from now to 1Q10.
21
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Now that we have more pillars for the underlying economic strength, we expect
China’s 2010 GDP growth to accelerate to 9.5%oya, after an estimated 8.5% growth
in 2009. Based on our forecasts, the three components—consumption, investment
and net trade—are expected to contribute 4.6ppt, 4.7ppt and 0.2ppt, respectively, to
the headline GDP growth in 2010. Notably, we expect the net trade’s contribution to
GDP to swing from -2.6ppt in 2009 to +0.2ppt in 2010.
0 -10
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
22
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
5 6
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: CEIC, J.P. Morgan.
Real (adjusted
60 Nominal
by PPI)
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: CEIC, J.P. Morgan.
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Total Mining Non-ferrous Electronics Infrastructure Real estate
metal
23
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 29: Real estate investment growth and floor space started
%oy a Real estate FAI
80
60
40
20
0
Floor space started
-20
-40
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Consensus is now looking for 9.6%Y/Y FY10 GDP growth for China, compared to
the forecast of 8.4% made in June 2009. (Source: Consensus Economics Inc.)
Similarly, we have also raised our FY10 GDP growth forecast to 9.5% Y/Y, from our
8.5% forecast published in June, to capture the expected larger contributions from
private consumption, private housing investment and export.
24
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
• On the export front, we are currently looking for a gradual recovery in 2010.
However, a stronger-than-expected global consumer demand recovery, as
implied by the elevated orders/inventory ratio of our global PMI and the
notable moderation in job contraction in the US November non-farm
payroll, could lay the foundation for upside surprises for China’s exports in
coming quarters. Indeed, the return of export orders, as suggested by the
steady pick-up in the export orders components of China’s PMI in recent
months, pointed to a sooner-than-expected coming-back in external demand.
Industrial profits in 22 key provinces and municipalities across China declined 3.4%
Y/Y in the first ten months of this year, compared to -9.1% in the first nine months of
this year. In October alone, industrial profits amounted to Rmb232.2 billion for the
22 key provinces and municipalities, rising 65.2% Y/Y, marking October the third
consecutive month with Y/Y growth rate staying above 60%. It is worth noting that
the historical monthly average for industrial profits for the whole country is Rmb300
billion, translating into a monthly average of Rmb235 billion for 22 provinces.
Hence, industrial profits have largely returned to the trend level as of October 2009.
25
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
The improvement in industrial profit growth was broad-based across major industrial
sectors. Of the total 39 sectors, 34 have seen either a rising Y/Y growth or a
narrowing Y/Y decline in their profits for January-October 2009, compared to only
14 sectors in the 2Q09. Among all, the best performers include chemical fiber, rubber
and transportation equipment, which all registered higher Y/Y growth rate for 10M09
than 9M09. On the other hand, steel, non-ferrous metals and electric and telecom
products still recorded Y/Y decline in 10M09, although the rate of decline moderated
in 10M09 versus 9M09.
Figure 32: Industrial profits in 22 provinces and municipalities across China on the rise
6.0% 0.0%
4.0%
-10.0%
2.0%
-20.0%
0.0%
-2.0% -30.0%
-4.0% -40.0%
Jan/09 Feb/09 Mar/09 Apr/09 May /09 Jun/09 Jul/09 Aug/09 Sep/09 Oct/09
Industrial Enterprises' rev enue grow th (LHS) Industrial Enterprises' profit grow th (RHS)
Figure 33: Industrial profit growth by industry in 22 provinces and municipalities across China
200.00%
150.00%
100.00%
50.00%
0.00%
-50.00%
-100.00%
Steel Nonferrous Metals Electronic Chemical Fiber Rubber Transportation
Equipment
Jan-Sep Jan-Oct
Even so, we believe there is still room for further upward earnings estimate revisions,
as consensus’ FY10 EPS estimate is still well below the level seen prior to the fallout
from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
26
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 34: Continued upward revisions in consensus earning estimates (EPS in Rmb)
7
6.5
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in Sep08
6
5.5
5 2010
4.5
3.5
2008 2009
3
Dec/07 Feb/08 Apr/08 Jun/08 Aug/08 Oct/08 Dec/08 Feb/09 Apr/09 Jun/09 Aug/09 Oct/09 Dec/09
Unless there is any sudden structural change in the lending business in China, this
front-loading pattern will be repeated in 2010, in our view. We forecast average
monthly new lending in the system for 1Q10 to be above Rmb800 billion (we expect
new loan creation in 1Q10 to account for roughly 35% of the estimated total new
lending in FY10, based on the seasonal pattern), compared to a monthly average
lending of Rmb420 billion in 3Q09 and an estimated Rmb250 billion for December
2009.
Table 4: Chinese commercial banks have incentives to front-load new lending early each year
Monthly new Rmb loans (in billions)
2007 2008 2009
Jan 567.6 803.6 1620.0
Feb 413.8 243.4 1070.0
Mar 441.7 283.4 1890.0
Apr 422.0 463.9 591.8
May 247.3 318.5 664.5
Jun 451.5 332.4 1530.4
Jul 231.4 381.8 335.9
Aug 302.9 271.5 410.4
Sep 283.5 374.5 516.7
Oct 136.1 181.9 253.0
Nov 87.4 476.9 294.8
Dec 48.5 771.8
Source: CEIC, J.P. Morgan.
27
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Table 5: New loan creation and total loan growth forecasts (Rmb loans only)
2008A 2009E 2010E
Loan outstanding at the end of the year (Rmb in trillions) 30.3 40.3 47.3
Annual new loan creation (Rmb in trillions) 4.9 10.0 7.0
Total loan growth (% Y/Y) 18.7 33.0 17.4
Source: CEIC, J.P. Morgan estimates.
Naturally, the expected rise in newly created bank loan in early 2010 should warrant
a more favorable liquidity condition than in 4Q09. This, in turn, should help boost
China’s equity market in 1Q10. There seems to be some correlation between China’s
stock market performance and the change in monthly new loan creation, as shown in
figures below.
Figure 35: MSCI China’s performance and the change in monthly new loan creation
2,300 13% 15%
1,890 13%
2,000
10%
1,700 9% 1,530
1,400 4% 5%
-1% 0%
1,100 0%
-1%
800 592 665 -2%
517
-5% 410 -5%
500 356 253 295
200 -10%
Mar/09 Apr/09 May /09 Jun/09 Jul/09 Aug/09 Sep/09 Oct/09 Nov /09
New loan (Rmb bn) MSCI China index 's 1m performance follow ing loan data releases
Figure 36: A-share performance and the change in monthly new loan creation
2,300 15%
13%
1,890
2,000 6% 10%
9%
1,700 7%
6% 1,530 5%
1,400 2%
-3% 0% 0%
1,100
665 -10% -5%
800 592 517
410 -10%
500 356 253 294.8
200 -15%
Mar/09 Apr/09 May /09 Jun/09 Jul/09 Aug/09 Sep/09 Oct/09 Nov /09
New loan (Rmb bn) SHCOMP index 's 1m performance follow ing loan data releases
28
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
8.4
8.0
7.6
Forward
J.P. Morgan forecast: Consensus
7.2
end Dec 09: 6.75
6.8 end Mar 10: 6.70
end Jun 10: 6.65 J.P. Morgan
6.4
6.0
Sep 04 Dec 05 Feb 07 Apr 08 Jul 09 Sep 10
While we expect the Rmb to be stable for the rest of the year to reflect Chinese
authorities’ attempt to support the export-related jobs, we believe the government
will resume Rmb appreciation in FY10 (J.P. Morgan forecasts Rmb/US will reach
6.5 by end-10), as:
(1) The gradual recovery of exports should reduce the government’s concern about
Rmb appreciation on export-related jobs. Notably, the sequential trend growth for
China’s exports has come out of the negative territory entering 2H09 and hovered
above 40% 3m/3m, saar in November 2009.
(2) Inflationary pressure is building up, making Rmb appreciation a powerful tool to
counter inflation for the medium term. The rising food inflation since mid-09, and
the recent hike in gasoline and diesel, electricity, and water prices, as well as the
widely anticipated price liberalization for gas and power, all suggest that rising
inflationary pressure is emerging.
29
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
%3m/3m, saar
40
30
20
10
0
-10
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
30
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
currencies. Meanwhile, the expectation of faster Rmb appreciation could draw more
liquidity inflows into China, which could provide an additional impetus to asset
prices in China.
Steel
The resumption of Rmb appreciation would have a positive impact on the China steel
sector in general.
The Rmb appreciation will reduce purchasing costs of imported materials, especially
iron ore, which account for around 30% of total steel production cost. China
imported 566 million tons of iron ore from January to November FY09, with a total
value of US$44,785 million. A 1% appreciation in Rmb will thus have a large impact
on the cost of steel products.
The negative impact on steel exports is largely offset by the cost-saving on imported
materials, as China’s steel net exports plunged 88% Y/Y to only 5.11 million tons
from January to November 2009, accounting for less than 1% of China’s total crude
steel production. We don’t expect steel exports to recover until 2011. As a result, we
believe the Rmb appreciation’s impacts on steel exports should be limited. In our
calculation, every 1% Rmb appreciation will boost Angang’s and Maanshan’s FY10
earnings estimates by 4.1% and 12.2%, respectively.
Paper
The paper industry would be a big winner from currency appreciation because nearly
all of the sales are denominated in Renminbi and the majority of its costs (importing
pulp and recovered paper) and capital expenditures is in US dollars.
Within this sub-sector, we believe Nine Dragons Paper has a further advantage in
that it has a significant amount of US$-denominated debts as well as an aggressive
expansion plan which requires purchasing imported equipment denominated in
foreign currencies.
31
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Airlines
A stronger Rmb will be positive for Chinese airlines:
IPPs
The potential impact of Rmb appreciation will be from two fronts: (1) one-off gain
on the depreciation of foreign currency debts; and (2) cheaper coal costs from
overseas markets (e.g. Newcastle).
(1) Our calculations suggest that 1% Rmb appreciation will lead to a potential 0.5-
5.1% one-off gain on 2010E earnings for Huaneng/Datang/CRP/Huadian. (2) Given
that imported coal only accounts for a very small portion of total coal consumed
(<5%), we believe the earnings impact will be minimal.
Internet
We expect U.S.-listed Chinese internet shares to benefit from the potential Rmb
appreciation versus the US dollar.
We believe the sector will see higher US$-based earnings, mainly through direct
translation gains, as well as slight margin improvements. Hence, should the average
Rmb-US$ exchange rate rise by 5% in 2010, as we currently expect, we could see
5% earnings accretion in the sector.
Margins improvements mainly come from lower capex in Rmb terms (computer-
related capex is typically linked to US$), and lower games licensing upfront payment
(for games licensed overseas, upfront payment is typically signed in US$).
Many of the Chinese internet companies have positive cash sitting in their bank
accounts generated from operations and majority of the cash is in Rmb. Hence, some
companies could see translation gains.
32
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
(B) Sectors that will be negatively affected by Rmb appreciation are mainly
export-related sectors, such as shipping and container manufacturers, as Rmb
appreciation could hurt China’s export volumes, hence the top-line, which will not be
completely offset by higher import volumes given the trade imbalance.
Shipping
A stronger Rmb will be negative for shipping companies.
That said, a bigger downside risk is that Rmb appreciation/revaluation could hurt
Chinese export volumes which will not be completely offset by higher import
volumes given the trade imbalance. Every 1% reduction in container volume could
increase CSCL’s and China Cosco’s FY10E losses by 5% and 4%, respectively, on a
full-year basis.
(1) Our calculations suggest that 1% Rmb appreciation will lead to a potential 1.1%
FX gain to a 2.2% one-off FX loss on 2010E earnings. (2) Our calculations suggest
that 1% Rmb appreciation will lead to a potential 0.2-1.0% recurring FX loss. Net-
net, a 1% Rmb appreciation will result in a potential 0.4% gain to 3.2% loss on their
2010E EPS.
Table 9: Rmb appreciation impact on China infrastructure contractors and power equipment
producers
EPS impact - 1% Rmb appreciation
Company name Ticker (bbg) Total (Rmb) Incl: recurring Non-recurring
China Infrastructure contractors
CRCC -3.2% -1.0% -2.2%
CRGL -0.4% -0.6% 0.2%
CCCC 0.1% -1.0% 1.1%
China Power Equipment Producers
Shanghai Electric -0.9% -0.9% 0.1%
DF Electric -0.5% -0.5% 0.0%
Harbin Power 0.4% -0.6% 1.0%
China High Speed -0.1% -0.2% 0.1%
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
(C) For other sectors, such as banks, consumer staple/discretionary, telecom and
autos, whose earnings, assets and liabilities are largely denominated in Rmb
terms, the impact of Rmb appreciation should be rather limited if not neutral, in our
view.
33
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Banks
Banks are not a major beneficiary of Rmb appreciation, even though indirectly banks
indeed benefit from Rmb appreciation, especially from overseas investors who hold
foreign currencies and are buying Rmb assets. For domestic investors who already
hold Rmb on hands, however, an appreciation means very modestly negative (almost
immaterial) impact on banks.
• For most banks in the sector, earnings, assets and liabilities are
predominantly in renminbi, so does equity. Hence, overall this is good for
foreign investors who currently hold foreign currencies. Indirectly, more
liquidity inflows into China would be positive for asset prices, which are
good for banks overall, at least in the near term, although the risk of
bubbling asset prices is worth monitoring or guarding against.
• In Rmb terms, however, most H-share banks will experience very modest
and immaterial impact from translation loss on their non-structural net FX
opening position (i.e., the FX-denominated assets minus FX-denominated
liabilities). Some banks may also have some foreign-currency/overseas
earnings from their overseas operations, which are also subject to translation
loss.
• However, since 2007 most banks, including BOC, have controlled their net
FX position to a relatively low level; so that translation losses have been
largely immaterial since 2007. As given in the table above, due to legacy
issue, only BOC still has a large net FX position. However, even in BOC’s
case, every 5% Rmb appreciation affects earnings by only 2% at the
maximum in Rmb terms.
Relatively speaking, BOC will see slightly more negative impact. But even in this
case, the impact should be very modest and could be more than offset by potential
upside surprise in overseas impairment write-back.
Autos
The impact on autos—Neutral.
On one hand, producers will benefit from the US$-denominated cost, even though
the impact will be very limited due to the high localization rate for most listed
34
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
vehicles except for Brilliance China, whose BMW JV only has a 40% localization
rate.
Potential winner: DongFeng Motor – DongFeng’s exports account for less than 1%
of its total sales income, which, we expect, to have a very limited impact on its
bottom line. However, DongFeng will benefit from the Rmb appreciation as about
20% of its costs are denominated in US$.
Potential losers: Great Wall Motor, Sinotruk, Weichai and Qingling – as exports
account for 7% of Great Wall Motor’s sales, 8% of Sinotruk’s sales, 8% of Weichai’s
sales and 3% of Qingling’s sales. None of these companies have US$-denominated
costs to hedge the negative impact of Rmb appreciation on their sales income.
On the other hand, medium and high-end auto producers will be subject to increased
competition from imports. With the Rmb appreciating, imported vehicles’ purchasing
cost will be lower, thus increasing the pricing pressure for medium- and high-end
vehicles. Hence, Denway, which gets a large part of its earnings from its upper-
medium Accord models, and Brilliance China, which could record around 60% of its
FY10 earnings from BMW cars, will be negatively affected. In comparison, around
55% of DFM’s cars sold are small cars, which will be less affected, in our view.
Telecoms
As all three operators have all revenues, costs and capex denominated in Rmb terms,
there would be very little effect on these items if Rmb appreciates.
China Unicom has 6% of its total debt denominated in US$ terms with an Rmb value
of Rmb511 million. If Rmb rises to 6.5 versus US$ by the end of 2010, interest-
saving would be roughly Rmb1.5 million/year, which is immaterial compared to its
operating profits. China Mobile’s and China Telecom’s debt, borrowed from state-
owned banks, is therefore all in Rmb terms.
Table 11: The impact of Rmb appreciation on debt, revenue, costs and capex for China telcos
Debt
CM All of CM’s debt is denominated in Rmb, so no impact
CT All of CT’s debt is denominated in Rmb, so no impact
CU has 6% of total debt denominated in US$ with current value of Rmb511MM. A 6% appreciation of the currency will see this marked-to-market
CU debt value falling from Rmb511 million to Rmb480 million (around Rmb30MM)
It may also result in small interest savings of roughly Rmb1.5 million a year which would be immaterial
Revenues, costs and capex
CM Almost all of CM’s revenues, costs and capex are denominated in Rmb. Some international interconnect settlement costs in US$ but this is immaterial
CT Almost all of CT’s revenues, costs and capex are denominated in Rmb. Some international interconnect settlement costs in US$ but this is immaterial
CU Almost all of CU’s revenues, costs and capex are denominated in Rmb. Some international interconnect settlement costs in US$, but this is immaterial
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
35
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
The key messages conveyed from the conference include: (1) maintaining the
“proactive fiscal policy” and “relatively loose monetary policy” to ensure stable and
rapid economic growth in FY10; (2) switching its growth mode to achieve quality
and sustainable growth, balanced regional development, and energy conservation; (3)
focusing on boosting domestic consumption, by promoting urbanization and
improving national income distribution
In our view, we believe the key policy tone is largely conducive to China’s stock
market, with consumer sector and banks being the major potential beneficiaries.
However, the growth mode adjustment could be negative for FAI related plays.
(1) The government to maintain the “proactive fiscal policy” and “relatively
loose monetary policy”
As discussed earlier, the relatively accommodative monetary conditions should be
intact in early next year, creating a favorable environment for the stock market from
now to 1Q10. (For more details, please refer to the section, Favorable macro
conditions from now to 1Q10, on page 7).
That said, we could see volatility and de-rating pressure kicking in 2H next year for
sectors such as commodities (aluminum, steel and cement), infrastructure and
machinery, commercial vehicles and construction, which are highly correlated with
fixed-asset investment growth and could be negatively affected by the onset of the
monetary tightening kicking in as of mid-2010.
(2) The government to change its growth mode to achieve quality and
sustainable growth, with the focus being placed on boosting domestic
consumption
This is consistent with the government’s long-held policy orientation that China
should change its economic growth mode from an investment and export-driven
economy to a domestic consumption-driven economy. Looking ahead, we expect
more stimulative measures from the government to boost private consumption.
Hence, we believe this official commitment is very positive to consumption-related
stocks. (For more detailed discussion, please see the section, OW domestic private
consumption-related stocks, on page 26).
36
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
In our view, the policy initiative should be very positive to boost domestic
consumption as more farmers come to the urbanized areas to earn more money and
spend more money. We note that this is the first time that the central government
officially proposes the relaxation on the “Hukou” system in medium and small cities
and towns on a national level.
That said, we notice that the government has realized the problems of the congestion,
and the high property prices in big cities. Hence, it does not want to lift the “Hukou”
system in big cities to worsen such problems.
In fact, the conference suggested that China should use public spending to build more
economic housing for low income households. Indeed, Premier Wen recently noted
that China’s housing policy should now be devoted to building economic housing, to
inhibiting the speculative investments in the property market, and to supporting
residents’ real demand for first home purchase and housing upgrades.
However, the supply of economic housing so far this year has come well below the
original plan. As a result, the economic housing project has failed to play an active
role in cooling down the red hot property market in China. Hence, the government
policy for the property market in 2010 should focus on: (1) inhibiting the speculative
demand; (2) accelerating the supply of economic housing in the market; and (3)
supporting the real residential housing demand.
(5) The government may be backing away from the policy of leveraging on the
fixed asset investment to boost China's economic growth.
While the government-led infrastructure investment has been the major force in
bringing about a “V-shaped” economic recovery this year, the work conference noted
that China should aim at an appropriate growth rate for fixed asset investment, given
the existing capacity overhang in many industries.
Against this backdrop, the government will carefully review any new investment
projects, although it will warrant properly completion of the on-going investment
projects.
In our view, going forward, China’s public spending is expected to focus more on
social benefits, such as social security, education, environment protection, economic
housing, rather than on the infrastructure projects, which consume a large amount of
aluminum, steel, cement, trucks.
37
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
With the fading away of the current economic stimulus package, we believe China’s
FAI will slow from 33% Y/Y in 2009 to only 18% Y/Y in 2011. If we strip out the
pricing effect (using PPI as a proxy), the real FAI growth in 2011 would slow more
notably to only 15% Y/Y in FY11, from 38.6% in FY09, given that J.P. Morgan
expects negative PPI of -5.6% Y/Y in 2009 but positive PPI of 3% Y/Y in 2011.
Hence, we believe this policy signal of relying less on FAI growth should be
negative for China’s fixed asset investment-related sectors such as downstream
commodities (aluminum, steel, and cement), trucks, engineer machinery.
%oy a RMB mn
35.0 30,000,000
30.0 25,000,000
25.0
20,000,000
20.0
15,000,000
15.0
10,000,000
10.0
5.0 5,000,000
0.0 0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
38
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
We believe two key investment themes for FY10 should be: (1) accumulating
consumption-related stocks to benefit from China’s growth rebalance: from an
investment and export-driven economy to a domestic consumption-driven economy;
and (2) identifying the under-valued China companies, which are expected to
report record-high earnings in FY09, but are still trading at a decent discount to their
highs in FY07 and are immune from major multiple contraction pressure.
These tailwinds, in our view, should further bolster the earnings visibility of
domestic consumption-related companies, such as auto, home appliance, domestic
retailers, and hence pave the way for a broad-based rally for these names in FY10
Hence, boosting domestic consumption, which only accounts for 35% of China’s
GDP composition, has clearly become the good choice for China. While China has
flagged the importance of this transition, it is only until the outbreak of the economic
crisis that China finally realized the urgency of this switch and started to come out
supportive measures to boost domestic consumption.
Notably, for the first time, the Central Economic Work Conference, concluded on
December 7, noted that the government should place boosting domestic consumption
as its top agenda for the next year. Hence, we believe the government will mostly
come up with more supportive measures to boost private consumption in coming
months.
39
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Priv ate consumption Gov ernment consumption Inv estment & change in inv entories Net ex ports
Source: CEIC.
In fact, China has clarified its stimulative policies on auto, property and home
appliance recently; the implications are summarized below:
1) Auto
News: (1) China to renew the preferential vehicle purchase tax for cars with an
engine size of 1.6 liters and below in FY10, but will lift it to 7.5%; (2) China to
maintain the policy to provide financial subsidy to help farmers upgrade from three-
wheeled and/or low-speed agricultural vehicles to light trucks and minivans; (3)
China to maintain the policy to provide financial subsidy to encourage people to
scrap old vehicles for new ones in 2010 and increase the subsidy from Rmb5,000 to
Rmb18,000 per vehicle; (4) China to expand the number of cities to promote new
energy vehicles from 17 to 20 and choose five pilot cities in which the government
will provide financial subsidy to the buyers of new energy cars.
Implications: Mildly negative for China autos, because: (1) the renewal of
preferential policies is largely within our and the market expectations; (2) the
government fails to expand the scope of vehicles to receive the preferential tax to
those with an engine of 2.0 liters and below; (2) the market had expected the 5%
preferential tax to be maintained rather than lifted to 7.5%.
(2) Property:
News: China to withdraw a preferential policy for the property sector introduced late
last year: China will impose a transaction tax (5.5%) on houses sold within five years
of holding period, virtually terminating the temporary incentive started since
December 2008, which give a tax free bracket for houses held for more than two
years.
Implications: Mildly negative for Property developers. (1) The withdrawal of the
preferential policy suggests that the government is fine-tuning its accommodative
policy stance on the property sector, implemented late last year. Premier Wen
recently noted that the policy focus for FY10 in property market should be (a)
inhibiting the speculative demand; (b) accelerating the supply of economic housing
in the market; and (c) supporting the real residential housing consumption. (2) We
note that this is not the first time the government starts to adjust its accommodative
stance. Under the guidance from the authorities, banks in several cities have already
40
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
started to tighten the mortgage policies and cancel the preferential lending for the
2nd home purchase since a few weeks ago.
Implications: Positive for home appliance producers. Now that these stimulus
programs have been successful in lifting the sales of home appliance so far this
year—sales of household electric and video appliances rose 47% Y/Y in the first ten
months of 2009—a renewal and expansion of the existing supportive policies will
likely continue to unleash rural households’ demand for such home appliance and
boost the volume growth for home appliance producers.
Table 13: China—The stimulative measures introduced this year and their impact on respective sectors
Sector Policy Impact
Home The rural home appliance promotion campaign was implemented This policy has driven a strong growth in the sale of Household Electric &
appliances nationwide in February 2009. Starting in May, more products, including Video Appliance. For instance, the sales of Household Electric & Video
energy-efficient air conditioners, were in the subsidy list. Export tax Appliance rose 47% Y/Y in the first ten months of 2009.
rebates were raised for most household appliances in June. The home
appliance trade-in program was carried out on a trial basis starting from
August.
Automobiles (1) Reduction in vehicle purchase tax from 10% to 5% for cars with an This policy has driven a strong growth in the sale of passenger vehicles with
engine size of 1.6 liters or below from January 20 to December 31, 2009. an engine size of 1.6 liters or below. For instance, the sale of PVs with an
engine size of 1.6 liters or below rose 63% Y/Y in the first ten months of
2009. On the other hand, the sale of PVs with an engine size of above 1.6
liters increased only 15% Y/Y in the same period.
(2) Providing a financial subsidy totaling Rmb5 billion to help farmers This policy has driven a strong growth in China’s mini van sales and mini
upgrade from three-wheel and/or low-speed agricultural vehicles to light truck sales. For instance, minivans’ sales volume grew 77% Y/Y and mini
trucks and mini vans. trucks’ sales volume rose 80% Y/Y in the first ten months of 2009.
(3) Providing a financial subsidy totaling Rmb5 billion to scrap old vehicles This has helped boost vehicle sale in FY09 through encouraging the
for new ones. consumers to scrap the old vehicles before their assessed usage life before
replacing such old vehicles with new ones. The policy is expected to add
1MM vehicle replacement demand.
Real estate (1) In October 2008, the Ministry of Finance released a circular to lower Primary sales volume in the eight major cities we track increased 90% Y/Y in
the property deed tax rate from 1.5% to 1% for <90sqm homes, eliminate the first ten months of year 2009.
land VAT and stamp duty on second-hand home sales, lower the
mortgage rates to 70% of benchmark lending rates for owner-occupied
homes, and reduce the minimum down payment ratio to 20%
(2) In November 2008, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural
Development proposed to invest Rmb900B in low-rent housing for
7.47MM urban low-income families in three years: home leasing for
2.87MM and financial subsidies for the rest 4.6MM. In addition, 4MM units
of affordable housing will be built in China in the next three years; houses
in danger of collapse will be renovated for employees from state-owned
forestry/coal/agricultural organizations, approximately 2.2MM units.
(3) In December 2008, the State Council decided that second-hand home
sales are exempt from the business tax (or face a reduced business tax
rate) if the home has been held for two years by the original owner, down
from five years in the past. In addition, the government would promote
financial/credit support to property developers and encourage M&As.
(4) Effective May 25, 2009, the minimum equity capital requirement was
changed to 20% for policy/ordinary housing projects and 30% for other
property development projects.
Source: Ministry of Finance, State council, J.P. Morgan.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
15% 3,000
10% 2,000
5% 1,000
0% 0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Consumer Loan (Rmb bn, RHS) Auto Purchasing loan as % of consumer loan ( LHS)
Table 14: Percentage of car sales financed by auto credit in different countries/regions
2008
China 8%
India 70%
EU 80%
Germany 71%
Italy 87%
France 78%
UK 87%
Spain 89%
US 85%
LatAm 60%
Source: CEIC, J.P. Morgan estimates.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Table 15: More supportive measures likely to be released next year to boost domestic consumption in China
Types Policies
Auto The government will likely accelerate the development of the consumer finance sector to help domestic consumption, in our view. We
believe China's consumer finance is currently in its early development stage and hence has significant growth potential. For instance,
in FY08, only 8% of people who bought cars used auto loans, thus leaving the door open for the government to come up with new
auto financing regulations that will make it easier and cheaper for consumers to get auto loans from banks and auto financing
companies.
Insurance Pilot personal income tax-deferred pension insurance is likely to be introduced in Shanghai soon, with an intention to speed up
insurance coverage in China to reduce the need for precautionary saving and thus support consumption.
Healthcare We expect the government to increase public spending on healthcare to provide a better safety net of China’s households, as
healthcare expenditure is just less than 5% of GDP in China, compared to over 10% for most developed nations.
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
Figure 45: China—Urban household’s real disposable income growth versus real GDP growth
%oya
18
Real GDP grow th
15
12
9
6
Real disposable incom e of
3 urban household
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
43
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 46: China: Rural household’s real cash income growth versus real GDP growth
We believe the upward trend in both urban and rural household income growth
should continue next year, given the improving labor market conditions, buoyant
asset market performance, favorable macro policies improving national income
distribution (such as lifting the personal income tax threshold).
In particular, rural household could benefit more from rising agriculture prices and
improved infrastructure in rural areas than urban households. And that is largely why
we see real rural household income rising at a faster pace than urban household
income as of 3Q09. (10.3%oya versus 9.6%oya)
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
3100 4
2
2100
0
1100 -2
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
Urban population (person mm) (RHS) Urban population as percentage of total population (LHS)
In our view, the policy initiative should be very positive to boost domestic
consumption as granting farmers and migrant workers full resident status would
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
enable them to enjoy the same public services and social welfare as the urbanites did,
thus reducing their precautionary savings and unleash their pent-up demand for
consumer goods. Indeed, farmers and migrant workers nowadays have a higher
propensity to consume than most urban residents given the need to upgrade their
living standard.
We note that the plan targets mid/small-sized cities and small towns rather than large
cities. This policy adjustment makes it a more effective initiative to boost private
consumption as farmers/migrant workers could have better affordability when
migrating to mid/small-sized cities and small towns than to large cities. The
disposable income gap between households in rural areas and tier 4-6 cities is the
narrowest in the rural/city comparison. (see the figure below)
Figure 52: Disposable income per capita for rural areas and tier 1-6 cities.
30000 tier 1 tier 2 tier 3 tier 4-6 rural areas
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Meanwhile, the different life styles between cities and rural areas will cause farmers
and migrant workers to consume more when they move into cities and towns. For
example, the penetration rates for different home appliances in rural areas are well
below those in urban cities, which, to some extent, reflect less dependence on home
appliances in rural areas. This leaves great potentials for a sharp increase in home
appliance consumption, especially when rural households settle in urban cities and
get themselves accustomed to the urban life style.
46
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 53: Home appliance penetration rates in urban and rural areas (unit per 100 households)
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Air-condition Refrigeratory Washing machine Color TV
Urban Rural
Source: CEIC and J. P. Morgan.
These favorable factors should be intact in 2010, based on our underlying scenario of
continued sequential improvement in domestic demand and gradual recovery on the
export front. Hence, improving consumer sentiment could lead to further gains in
private consumption.
9
06
07
08
09
6
9
r-0
r-0
t-0
t-0
r-0
r-0
t-0
t-0
l-0
l-0
l-0
l-0
n-
n-
n-
n-
Oc
Oc
Oc
Oc
Ju
Ju
Ju
Ju
Ap
Ap
Ap
Ap
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
65
60
55
c
50
45
40
Mar-01
Sep-01
Mar-02
Sep-02
Mar-03
Sep-03
Mar-04
Sep-04
Mar-05
Sep-05
Mar-06
Sep-06
Mar-07
Sep-07
Mar-08
Sep-08
Mar-09
Sep-09
47
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Normally, the record-high EPS should sharply drive up their share prices. A number
of stocks with higher earnings in FY09 than FY07 indeed are trading above their
highs in 2007. We note that the companies in this group are mostly from auto,
consumer staple and healthcare sectors, which are all among the best performers
YTD.
Table 17: Companies with record-high share price and earnings in FY09E
That said, certain companies are still trading below the highs in 2007 even though
they are likely to report record-high earnings this year.
We believe the above discrepancy could be due to two reasons: (1) this is due to the
de-rating kicking in for companies that have seen worsening fundamentals since
2007; and (2) the equity market has not fully factored in the rising profitability for
companies that possess solid fundamentals and are benefiting from the strong
recovery.
Apparently, companies in the latter group could provide potential share price
appreciation for investors looking for under-valued companies. As such, we believe
it is a very valuable exercise to generate a list for this kind of under-valued
companies in the China universe.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
are expected to report higher EPS in FY09 than in FY07; and (3) companies are
trading at a discount to the share price as of 30 October 2007. Hence, we get a
shortlist of 19 MSCI-China components matching these criteria.
We then review these companies one-by-one, in order to remove the names with
large de-rating pressure as a result of their weak fundamentals. Among these, we
believe companies in industrials, materials, utilities and real estate sectors would
likely face more headwinds going ahead as their earnings visibility could be hurt by
the likely monetary tightening kicking in as of 2Q10 and a potential downshift in
FAI growth in 2011.
After taking out these names, we find 15 companies under our coverage fit into the
category (shown in Table 18). Most of them are from China banks, sport wear, coal
and retailing sectors. Among these, we believe banks and coal names may offer good
investment value. (For more detailed discussion, please see “Sector
recommendations.”)
While China’s sportswear sector in overall are being de-rated on the concern of a
slowdown in their growth rate, we still like the leaders within this sector, such as
China Dongxiang. We believe that China Dongxiang already offers good value at the
current level, as it is likely to see rising growth momentum in FY10.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Sector views
Table 19: Sector weighting matrix
Earnings Penetration Secular Affected by Affected by the
visibility FY10 rate growth tightening FAI slowdown in FY11 Affected by Inflation
OW
1, Banks High Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium
2, Coal names Medium N/A High Low Medium High (positively affected)
UW
1, Property Low Medium Medium High High Low
2, Telecom Low Medium Low Medium Medium Medium
3, FAI-related plays Low N/A Low High High Medium
4, IPP Low Medium Medium Medium Medium High (negatively affected)
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
(1) The prospective fund-raising by China banks are meant not to repair their
balance-sheet, but to fund their growth.
(2) We believe many China banks may choose to use rights issue rather than issuing
additional new shares to raise money, which would cause minimum dilution for the
existing shareholders, sharply reducing the amount of money to be raised from the
secondary market investors. The government-owned entities hold the lion’s share of
the major China banks, and are likely to come up with most of the fund-raising.
(4) Banks’ 1Q10 results are likely to surprise on the upside, given the benign asset
quality outlook and the potential NIM expansion.
Within the banking sector, we favor China Citic Bank, a growth play with the
strongest estimated earnings and ROE momentum; and CCB, which we believe has
attractive valuations on a P/E basis and strong dividend yield support.
Indeed, recent sector statistics show that coal prices have started to rally, with
Qinghuangdao coal prices up 30% as of the end of August 2009.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 57: China: Real industrial production and electric power usage
%oy a
40 Real IP
30
20
10
0
-10 Electric Power
-20
03 04 05 06 07 08 09
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
In our view, internet, gas, tissue and diaper companies, selected consumer staples,
and healthcare fulfill these defensive features well and offer a good risk-reward
profile for the investors.
Hence, we believe the leading companies in these sectors, with a low penetration rate
and strong secular growth, will offer investors good value in FY2010.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 59:China—Consumer staple names’ earnings growth over the last few years
Figure 60: Consumer staples have outperformed the MSCI China in the market downturns (basis
points = 30 Dec 2005)
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Dec-05 Jun-06 Dec-06 Jun-07 Dec-07 Jun-08 Dec-08 Jun-09 Dec-09
Hence, select staple names, with company-specific strength, could still deliver good
earnings next year, and therefore provide good value for investors.
(C) Healthcare
We believe leading healthcare stocks should benefit from the government’s
increasing public spending on this sector, given China’s current low spending per
capita on healthcare and the urgency for China to provide a better safety net to
Chinese households.
We note that the current spending per capita on healthcare is approximately US$92
per year in 2006, according to the World Health Organization, or just 1.5% of that of
the US. As a percentage of per capital GDP, the total healthcare spending in China is
about 5% or roughly a third of the proportion in the US.
Such an underdeveloped healthcare system reflects the necessity for the government
to increase its spending to foster greater access to healthcare by the population so as
to boost domestic consumption. It is against this backdrop that the government
decided to unveil the long-awaited healthcare reform in February this year. In the
final draft of healthcare reform, the government has planned to expand the medical
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
insurance network to cover 90% of the population and increase the annual subsidy
for each person covered by the system to Rmb120 by 2011. A total investment of
Rmb850 billion is expected to be spent on carrying out this reform.
Our top pick in this sector is Sinopharm due to its simple growth story, comprising
strong pharmaceutical sales growth in China and market share gains by the largest
operator.
Table 21: Low per capita healthcare spending and higher growth rates
(4) We continue to see short-term trading opportunities for media and airline
stocks and food inflation plays
(A) Media
As a late-cycle recovery play, media sector is likely to post robust earnings growth in
FY10, the second year of the ongoing economic recovery, after suffering severe loss
in FY09, the first year of the recovery. Consensus is looking for much higher
earnings growth from China’s leading advertising companies in FY10 than FY09.
This should provide an impetus for their share prices to move higher in the near term,
as the market is actively seeking companies with visible earnings.
Table 22: Revenue growth in China’s advertising market lagging China’s real GDP growth
2009E 2010E
Price movement since earnings earnings
Ticker Name 30 Oct 2007 growth growth
FMCN US EQUITY FOCUS MEDIA HOLDING-ADR -72% -66% 54%
SINA US EQUITY SINA CORP -20% -29% 34%
VISN US EQUITY VISIONCHINA MEDIA INC-ADR na -35% 39%
Source: Bloomberg. Note Vsionchina was listed on 5 December 2007.
(B) Airlines
We see trading opportunities for China’s airline sector, which stands to benefit from:
(1) the rising cargo and passenger traffic on domestic and international routes on the
back of the strong economic recovery; and (2) Rmb resuming appreciation in 2Q
FY10.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Even after such a notable run-up, we believe this trade should continue to perform
well in the near term, given the potential further rise in food prices in coming
months.
Indeed, the latest withdrawal of the preferential policy implemented late last year
suggests that the government is fine-tuning its accommodative policy stance on the
property sector.
Notably, Premier Wen recently noted that the policy focus for FY10 in property
market should be: (a) inhibiting the speculative demand; (b) accelerating the supply
of economic housing in the market; and (c) supporting the real residential housing
demand.
Within the property sector, we favor those companies with the most exposure to tier
2-3 cities, which stand to benefit from the government’s prospective relaxation of the
control over the so-called “Hukou” system in medium and small cities, as per
China’s Central Economic Work Conference, and those with exposure to commercial
property space.
2) FAI-related plays
While the strong earnings recovery momentum seen this year for FAI-related
companies, including downstream commodities (cement and aluminum), commercial
vehicles and construction, may be carried over to early next year, we recommend that
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
investors capitalize on the potential share price strength on the back of the likely
strong results to trim their exposure to these sectors.
This is because these companies could be negatively affected by two headwinds: (1)
the likely monetary tightening kicking in as of 2Q10, and (2) the potential downshift
in FAI growth in 2011.
Historical performance show their share prices seem to be correlated more closely
with China’s monetary and fixed investment cycles than their respective quarterly
earnings results.
Figure 62: FAI-related stocks performance and M2 growth (with 3-6 months leading)
% %, m/m, sa
60.0 4
50.0
40.0 3
30.0
2
20.0
10.0
1
0.0
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0
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p/
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p/
ar
ar
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ay
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Oc
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Oc
Ap
Ap
De
Ja
Ju
Ja
Ju
Fe
Au
Se
Fe
Au
Se
No
No
M
M
M
M
ALUMINUM CORP OF CHINA LTD-H (LHS) ANGANG STEEL CO LTD-H (LHS)
ANHUI CONCH CEMENT CO LTD-H (LHS) M2 growth (m/m, 4 months leading, RHS)
Figure 63: FAI-related stocks performance and FAI growth (with 3-6 months leading)
% % Y/Y
60.0 45
50.0 40
40.0
35
30.0
30
20.0
10.0 25
0.0 20
-10.0
15
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10
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Fe
Au
Se
Fe
Au
Se
No
No
M
M
M
4) IPPs
We believe IPPs are suffering from the rising market-based coal cost and the
government-regulated power tariff, which should weigh on the sector’s performance
in FY10.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
On the earnings front, consensus continues to revise up its 2010 earnings estimates,
which validates a trajectory toward our 2010 EPS forecast of HK$4.6, implying
around 21.8% earnings growth.
Currently, MSCI China trades at 17x 2009E P/E and 13.9x 2010E P/E.
Table 23: Valuation for Indices and sectors
Price MSCI P/E (x) EPS growth P/BV (x) Dividend yield
16-12-09 weighting 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E
MSCI China 64.25 17.0x 13.9x 14.68% 21.86% 2.4x 2.2x 2% 3%
H-share 12,691 16.2x 12.9x 23% 25% 2.4x 2.1x 3% 3%
3%
Sector (MSCI China):
Consumer Discretionary 280 5% 22.8x 19.5x 17% 17% 3.4x 3.0x 1% 2%
Consumer Staples 1,262 5% 21.4x 18.1x 54% 18% 4.3x 3.6x 1% 2%
Energy 657 18% 14.4x 11.8x -1% 23% 2.2x 2.0x 3% 3%
Financials 518 38% 16.2x 13.1x 23% 23% 2.6x 2.3x 2% 3%
Health Care 141 0% 38.2x 28.6x 28% 33% 8.2x 6.6x 1% 1%
Industrials 170 8% 23.8x 17.0x 36% 40% 1.8x 1.7x 2% 2%
Information Technology 105 6% 41.8x 29.1x 61% 44% 7.1x 5.8x 1% 1%
Materials 1,121 6% 27.1x 15.7x 45% 72% 2.4x 2.1x 1% 2%
Telecommunication Services 113 13% 12.2x 12.0x -7% 2% 1.9x 1.8x 4% 4%
Utilities 375 1% 12.8x 11.7x 817% 10% 1.4x 1.3x 3% 3%
Source: Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan estimates. Note: Updated as of December 16, 2009.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 64: One-month price movement Figure 65: Sector contribution to one-month MSCI China point change
IT 1% IT 0.1
-10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% -3.5 -3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5
Sources: Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan estimates. Note: Updated as of Dec 16, 2009.
Sources: Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan estimates. Note: Updated as of Dec 16, 2009.
Figure 66: 2009 YTD price movement Figure 67: Sector contribution to 2009YTD MSCI China point change
-50% 0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
Sources: Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan estimates. Note: Updated as of Dec 16, 2009.
Sources: Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan estimates. Note: Updated as of Dec 16, 2009.
As shown in figures above, we look at sectors which had the highest impact on
moving the market since January 1, 2009. We observe that cyclicals (IT, consumer
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 68: Top 20 YTD performers in MSCI China universe Figure 69: Bottom 20 YTD performers in MSCI China universe
CHINA AGRI-INDUSTRIES HLDGS 159% CHINA COMMUNICATIONS CONST-H -24%
AGILE PROPERTY HOLDINGS LTD 175% DATANG INTL POWER GEN CO-H -20%
JIANGXI COPPER COMPANY LTD-H 227% CHINA UNICOM HONG KONG LTD 9%
INNER MONGOLIA YITAI COAL-B 255% CHINA RAILWAY GROUP LTD - H 12%
HIDILI INDUSTRY INTL DEVELOP 283% CHINA TELECOM CORP LTD-H 14%
DONGFENG MOTOR GRP CO LTD-H 344% BEIJING CAPITAL INTL AIRPO-H 26%
0% 100% 200% 300% 400% 500% 600% 700% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Sources: Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan estimates. Note: Updated as of Dec 16, 2009 Sources: Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan estimates. Note: Updated as of Dec 16, 2009.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 70: J.P. Morgan China Portfolio vs. MSCI China since inception of J.P. Morgan China
%
500
450
JPM China Portfolio
400
350
300
250
200
150
MSCI China
100
50
Dec-04 Jun-05 Dec-05 Jun-06 Dec-06 Jun-07 Dec-07 Jun-08 Dec-08 Jun-09
Sources: Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan estimates. Note: Updated as of Dec 16, 2009.
Past performance is not indicative of future results.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
CMP adjustments
We adjusted our banking exposure in our China Model Portfolio by taking profit on
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank and Bank of
Communications, and reduced the weighting of BOC to 6.5% from 8%. We added
Citic bank with a weight of 1.5%. Our banking analyst initiated coverage on Citic
Bank with a Dec-10 PT of HK$8.6, which implies 2.4x FY10E P/B and 12.7x
FY10E P/E.
With the proceeds, we added to our weighting in the coal sector by 2% as we believe
coal names should be benefiting from the current coal price hike. We add China Coal
to CMP with a weight of 2%.
We continue to like gas sector with low penetration rate and strong secular growth.
Hence, we add China Gas with a weight of 1.5%.
We continue to reduce our exposure to telecom and utilities. We reduce the weight in
both China Telecom and China Resource Power to 1% from 1.5% and 3%,
respectively.
We reduce our exposure to consumer sector by taking profit on Parkson (-1%) and
Huabao (-1.5%) and reduce the weight of Yurun by 2.5% to 2%.
We take some profit on ZTE by cutting its weight to 1.5% from 3%, due to ZTE’s
less attractive valuations after its strong YTD price performance of 173%.
Meanwhile, we add China Southern Airline to our CMP with a weight of 1%. We
believe this company should benefit from 1) the rising cargo and passenger traffic on
domestic routes on the back of a strong economic recovery, and (2) Rmb resuming
appreciation as of 2Q10.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
weight of 3%. We like this name because its simple growth story, comprising strong
pharmaceutical sales growth in China and market share gains by the largest operator.
We also believe there is upside risk to the consensus forecast for the name.
Lastly, we add PICC to our portfolio with a weight of 5% because: (1) we expect its
core property insurance business to be lifted by the auto boom in China; (2) we
believe there is a possibility that its parent company might inject the life insurance
business into the listed vehicle.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
In order to get a deeper insight into our CMP performance, we also conduct a micro
performance attribution analysis. We categorize the active return into three parts: (1)
pure sector allocation; (2) allocation-selection interaction; and (3) within-sector stock
selection. The active returns contributed by pure sector allocation and by within-
sector stock selection over the last month, were 0.9% and 3.04%, respectively. This
breakdown indicates that the slight outperformance last month was mainly due to the
better portfolio components.
Besides ex-post measures, we can also forecast the new CMP return in an ex-ante
(prospective) way. By applying our analysts’ June-10/Dec-10 price targets to our
CMP components, we forecast our Dec-09 CMP monthly return of 0.6%.That
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Autos
Frank Li AC (Extracted from the note, “Auto WIN: Regional auto industry highlights",
(852) 2800-8511 published on 4 December 2009; please see the original note for pricing dates)
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Impact
We revised up our China vehicle sales forecasts for FY10 based on the following
factors:
In fact, we believe the government may well expand the scope of the vehicles that
will receive the preferential vehicle purchase for FY10 to boost car consumption.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Among others, we expect the vehicles with an engine size of 1.8 liters and below to
enjoy the 5% preferential vehicle purchase tax (versus the normal 10% tax rate).
Currently, only vehicles with an engine size of 1.6 liters and below qualify for a 5%
preferential vehicle purchase tax.
In addition, Chinese auto producers are lobbying for the removal of the vehicle
purchase tax for vehicles with an engine size of 1.4 liters or below.
Table 28: The impact of preferential policies introduced in FY09 to boost vehicle sales
Policies Impact
(1) Reduction in vehicle purchase tax from 10% to 5% for cars with an engine This policy has driven a strong growth in the sale of passenger vehicles
size of 1.6 liters or below from January 20 to December 31, 2009 with an engine size of 1.6 liters or below. For instance, the sale of PVs with
an engine size of 1.6 liters or below rose 63% Y/Y in the first ten months
of 2009. On the other hand, the sale of PVs with an engine size of above 1.6
liters increased only 15% Y/Y in the same period.
(2) Providing a financial subsidy totaling Rmb5 billion to help farmers upgrade from This policy has driven a strong growth in China’s mini van sales and mini truck
three-wheel and/or low-speed agricultural vehicles to light trucks and mini vans sales. For instance, minivans’ sales volume grew 77% Y/Y and mini trucks’ sales
volume rose 80% Y/Y in the first ten months of 2009
(3) Providing a financial subsidy totaling Rmb5 billion to scrap old vehicles for new This has helped boost vehicle sale in FY09 through encouraging the consumers
ones. to scrap the old vehicles before their assessed usage life before replacing such
old vehicles with new ones. The policy is expected to add 1 million vehicle
replacement demand.
With the strong economic recovery, we expect China urban residents' disposable
income growth to remain robust in FY10, helping to set the stage for robust car
demand.
67
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 71: China urban residents’ per capita disposable income growth (quarterly)
17%
14%
11%
8%
5%
08
09
9
8
9
/08
/09
8
8
9
n/0
l/0
l/0
v/0
/0
/0
p/
p/
ar
ar
ay
ay
Ju
Ju
Ja
Se
Se
No
M
M
M
M
1-tier 2-tier 3-tier
Source: CEIC.
Figure 72: China urban residents’ per capita disposable income growth (yearly)
17%
15%
13%
11%
9%
7%
5%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: CEIC.
We see the above upward revision in China’s vehicle sales forecast as a positive for
China’s auto sector, and see upside risks to the sector's 4Q09E and 1Q10E results,
given the huge operating leverage of the sector.
On the other hand, we have identified the following key investment risks for China
autos:
1) The impact of negative wealth effect to rise from the possible volatilities in
China’s stock and property markets on China’s vehicles sales in FY10. With the
acceleration in China’s economic growth, we expect the Chinese government to
resort to tightening measures, such as window guidance for the banks to slow down
the lending as of 2Q FY10, raising the banks’ required reserve ratio, and possibly
cracking down on the high-end property sector in 2Q FY10, which could result in
volatilities in China’s stock and property markets. This, in turn, could hurt car sales
in FY10.
2) Valuations of China’s auto stocks look reasonable to us but not very attractive
after the strong performance this year.
3) The strong car sales growth this year could be partly attributable to the advanced
purchase by some consumers, who thought that the preferential tax policies might not
be renewed next year;
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
4) The supply of new paper. We believe a number of auto companies may capitalize
on the current cyclical upturn in China’s auto market to raise money in the secondary
market. We could see the existing listed auto companies raising money to expand
capacity and/or to do M&A activities. In addition, a number of unlisted auto
companies may also seek to do IPOs next year.
In conclusion, we now switch from a positive stance at the beginning of the year to a
neutral stance on China auto sector following the strong performance this year, and
recommend investors focus on those names that have company-specific strengths or
positive share price drivers. Among others, we like DongFeng Motor, a leading
company in China’s auto sector with a track record of expanding market share and
growing core earnings in both the upturn and the downturn of the cycle. Unlike
Denway, which is a red chip (i.e., Chinese company incorporated in Hong Kong),
DongFeng Motor is an H-share company (i.e., Chinese company incorporated in
China and governed by Chinese laws). DongFeng’s H-share status means that it is
much easier for the company to go for the listing in the domestic A-share market,
where stocks typically trade at a much higher multiple than that in the H share
market. It should help the sentiment of DongFeng Motor if the company decides to
do the A share listing.
The recent notable downward movement of the one-year Rmb NDF suggests
heightened expectations of Rmb appreciation over the past month.
7.2
7.1
7
6.9
6.8
6.7
6.6
6.5
6.4
1/1/2009
2/1/2009
3/1/2009
4/1/2009
5/1/2009
6/1/2009
7/1/2009
8/1/2009
9/1/2009
10/1/2009
11/1/2009
Source: Bloomberg.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
8.4
8.0
7.6
Forward
J.P. Morgan forecast: Consensus
7.2
end Dec 09: 6.75
6.8 end Mar 10: 6.70
end Jun 10: 6.65 J.P. Morgan
6.4
6.0
Sep 04 Dec 05 Feb 07 Apr 08 Jul 09 Sep 10
While Rmb was largely stable versus U.S.$ in 2H09, we expect Rmb shall resume
appreciation in FY10 (J.P. Morgan’s economics team forecasts Rmb/US$ will reach
6.5 by end-10) due to:
1) The ongoing recovery of exports should reduce the government’s concern over
Rmb appreciation on export-related jobs. Notably, the sequential trend growth for
China’s exports has come out of the negative territory entering 2H09 and currently
hovers around 20% 3m/3m, saar.
70
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
%3m/3m, saar
40
30
20
10
0
-10
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
On one hand, Chinese auto producers will benefit from their US$-denominated cost,
although the impact should be limited due to the high localization rate for most listed
71
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
vehicles, except for Brilliance China, whose BMW JV only has a 40% localization
rate.
On the other hand, medium and high-end auto producers will be subject to increased
competition from imports, in our view. Given an Rmb appreciation, imported
vehicles’ purchasing cost will be lower, thus increasing the pricing pressure on
medium- and high-end vehicles. Hence, Denway, which gets a large part of its
earnings from its upper-medium Accord models, and Brilliance China, which could
post around 60% of its FY10 earnings from BMW cars, will likely be negatively
affected.
Losers: Great Wall Motor, Sinotruk, Weichai and Qingling—as exports account for
7% of Great Wall Motor’s sales; 8% of Sinotruk’s sales; 8% of Weichai’s sales; and
3% of Qingling’s sales. None of these companies have US$-denominated costs to
hedge the negative impact of Rmb appreciation on their sales income.
On other hand, China’s gasoline consumption rose only 8% Y/Y in the first 10
months of 2009, well below the sales growth of new passenger vehicles.
This has caused many China bears to cast doubt over the authenticity of the new
vehicle sales in China. Some come up with the theory that maybe Chinese
government has bought a lot of cars this year before having them stored at
warehouses to boost the “nominal consumption”. We disagree with the above
cynical view, and help to explain the discrepancy between the sales growth of
passenger vehicles and that of gasoline consumption as follows
Impact
1) The change in sales mix toward cars with an engine size below 1.6 liters due to
the vehicle purchase tax cut for cars with an engine size below 1.6 liters.
The sales of cars with an engine size of 1.6 liters and below which qualify for the
preferential 5% vehicle purchase tax accounted for 70% of total passenger vehicle
sales in the first ten months of 2009.
On comparison, the sales of cars with an engine size below 1.6 liters accounted for
62% of total passenger vehicle sales in the same period of 2008.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 79: China autos—Sales of vehicles with an engine size below 1.6 liters as a
% of total car sales
Source: CEIC.
2) Gasoline consumption is driven by the vehicle fleet size rather than by the new
vehicle sales.
We believe it is reasonable to compare gasoline consumption growth with the car
fleet size increase rather than the new car sales growth,
The gasoline consumption, among others, is driven by the fleet size growth ( the old
fleet size plus the new vehicle sales minus the scrapped vehicles), and the average
cars’ mileage change.
Based on the new car sales of 8,190,293 in the first 10 months of 2009 and assuming
the average usage life of a passenger car be ten years, we estimate the total number
of cars running on the road rose 20% Y/Y in the first ten months of 2009. This is
apparently lower than the 45% sales growth of the new passenger vehicles during the
same period.
Figure 80: China autos—Cars on road vs. gasoline consumption per car
Source: CEIC.
73
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Table 29: China—Price change for gasoline and diesel year to date
Gasoline price change Diesel price change
(Rmb/ton) (Rmb/ton)
15-Jan-2009 -140 -160
25-Mar-2009 +290 +180
1-Jun-2009 +400 +400
30-Jun-2009 +600 +600
29-Jul-2009 -220 -220
2-Sep-2009 +300 +300
10-Nov-2010 +480 +480
Source: NDRC, J.P. Morgan.
Table 30: Retail price increase for gasoline and diesel in Shanghai as of November 10, 2009
Before price hike After price hike Change
(Rmb/liter) (Rmb/liter) (Rmb/liter)
93# gasoline 5.9 6.61 0.71
97# gasoline 6.27 7.03 0.76
98# gasoline 6.85 7.61 0.76
We believe the continuous increase in fuel prices has caused people to reduce usage
of cars. Instead of driving their cars on a daily, some people may choose to take
public transportation modes such as the subway during the weekdays and to drive on
weekends so as to save costs. This should bring down the average mileage of the
vehicles.
By our estimates, the recent fuel price hike could increase the fuel bill of the owner
of a small car (Fit), and an upper-medium-end car (Accord) by Rmb548 p.a. and
Rmb1,186 p.a., respectively.
Table 31: China autos—Impact of fuel price hike on the recurrent usage cost of car owners
Fuel consumption Gasoline Expense rise on per Monthly Annual expense Annual expense Recurrent
(97#) liter gasoline mileage before fuel price after fuel price hike usage cost
hike increase
74
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
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Change 4: China to expand the scope of vehicles that qualify for the preferential
vehicle purchase tax?
On November 28, 2009, Shanghai Securities News reported that China’s National
Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance had recently
reached an agreement to renew the preferential policies that were introduced this year
to boost car consumption, and that the government would consider expanding the
scope of vehicles that qualify for the 5% preferential vehicle purchase tax (versus
China’s normal vehicle purchase tax of 10%).
The report has brought about a strong rally for China auto stocks, with Denway up
21% and DongFeng up 10% since November 30, 2009, respectively.
Earlier this year, on November 17, FY09, Mr. Zhu Hong, the spokesperson for
China’s Industrial and Information Ministry, the direct governing authority of
China’s automotive industry, noted that China would consider renewing the
preferential policies introduced this year to boost car consumption.
Impact
We believe the positive impact should be very limited if the scope of preferential
vehicle purchase tax is only expanded to vehicles with an engine size of 1.8 liters and
below (versus the current scope of vehicles with an engine size of 1.6 liters and
below).
This is because:
1) The positive impact of the preferential vehicle purchase tax on China autos should
be through the boost in sales of the vehicles that receive the preferential vehicle
purchase tax. The vehicle purchase tax cut, which is charged at the consumer level,
will not directly affect the auto producers’ profitability.
On contrast, the change of the consumption tax, which is charged at the producer
level, will directly affect the auto producers’ profitability.
2) The medium-end cars (with an engine size of between 1.6 liters and 1.8 liters) sell
well in China even without the help of preferential vehicle purchase tax. Hence, the
marginal impact of applying the preferential vehicle purchase tax for this category is
rather limited, in our view.
3) The profitability of the medium-end cars and of low-end cars is well below that of
the upper-medium and high-end cars. For instance, Denway’s 50%-owned
Guangzhou Honda derived 84% of its 1H09 profit from its Accord and Odyssey
models, which are all fitted with engines of 2.0 liters and above. The low-end Fit
model and medium-end City model together accounted for 43% of its 1H09 sales
mix, but only 16% of its 1H09 profit.
Hence, the marginal impact of extending the preferential vehicle purchase tax to
include vehicles with an engine of 1.8 liters on Denway should be very limited.
Denway sold 7,158 City models with an engine size of 1.8 liters, and 42,389 City
models with an engine size of 1.5 liters in 1H09, accounting for 4% and 26% of its
1H09 total vehicle sales, respectively.
75
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Assuming the sales of its City model with an engine size of 1.8 liters would rise by
20% in response to the possible change in vehicle purchase tax to extend the
preferential vehicle purchase tax to vehicles with an engine size of 1.8 liters and
below, we could see only 1% upward revision in our FY10 earnings forecast for
Denway.
China autos should get a boost in profit only if China extends the scope of
preferential vehicle purchase tax to the upper-medium-end segment, i.e., vehicles
with an engine size of 2.0 liters to 3.0 liters.
We take Denway as an example: Accord with an engine size of 2.4 liters accounted
for 36% of Denway’s total Accord sales. We believe the likelihood of expanding the
scope of vehicles to receive preferential vehicle purchase tax to vehicles with an
engine size of 2.4 liters and below is small, as it conflicts with the government’s aim
of promoting fuel efficiency.
At most, we expect the government to expand the scope of vehicles that will receive
preferential vehicle purchase tax to vehicles with an engine size of 2.0 liters and
below. Under this scenario, Denway’s Accord model fitted with a 2.0 liter engine,
will benefit from the revised policy, in our view. Denway’s Accord model with 2.0
liter engine sold 51,108 units in 1H09, accounting for 31% of its 1H09 total sales and
around 42% of its 1H09 profit.
Assuming the sales of its Accord model with 2.0 engines and City model with 1.8
engines be given a 20% boost as a result of the possible extension of the preferential
vehicle purchase tax to vehicles with an engine size of 2.0 liters and below, we could
see a 7% upward revision in our FY10 earnings forecast for Denway
Table 32: J.P. Morgan forecasts: Vehicles with different engine sizes as a percentage of total vehicle sales of major auto producers in
China in FY10E
Denway DongFeng Great Wall Brilliance China
Cars with an engine size of 1.6 liters and below 41% 50% 57% 53%
Cars with an engine size between 1.6 liters and 1.8 liters (1.8 liters included) 3% 9% 0% 9.7%
Cars with an engine size between 1.8 liters and 2.0 liters (2.0 liters included) 32% 12% 0% 0.6%
Cars with an engine size above 2.0 liters 24% 29% 43% 36.8%
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
76
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
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Table 33: Impact on the FY10E earnings of major auto producers in China under two scenarios: 1) 20% rise in sales of vehicles with an
engine size between 1.6 liters and 1.8 liters; 2) 20% rise in sales of vehicles with an engine size between 1.8 liters and 2.0 liters
Denway DongFeng Great Wall Brilliance
Motor Motor China
Scenarios 1:
20% rise in sales of vehicles with an engine size between 1.6 liters and 0.5% 3% n.a. n.a.
1.8 liters (1.8 liters included)
Scenarios 2
20% rise in sales of vehicles with an engine size between 1.8 liters and 7% 5% n.a. n.a.
2.0 liters (both 1.8 liters and 2.0 liters included)
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates. Note: 21We expect Brilliance China to dispose of its Zhonghua sedan business in FY10. Thus, Brilliance China will not have models with engine sizes of 1.8 liters
and 2.0 liters. Scenarios 1 is based on the assumption that the vehicles with an engine size of 1.6 liter of 1.8 liters to 2.0 liters get a 20% growth in sales on the adoption of the assumed lower
vehicle purchase tax.
Information
Information 1: BMW JV expanding capacity in China
Brilliance China and BMW recently announced a plan to spend Rmb5 billion to
expand the capacity of their JV. According to the plan, the BMW JV will expand the
capacity of its first plant from 40,000 units currently to 75,000 units by the end of
FY10 before further expanding it to 100,000 units. Meanwhile, the JV plans to build
its second plant with an initial capacity of 100,000 units, which will further increase
to 300,000 units. Hence, the BMW JV will eventually have a total capacity of
400,000 units in China. In addition, the JV will also build an engine plant in China
for its BMW JV to help reduce the production cost of BMW cars in China. BMW
also confirmed Brilliance China as its sole and exclusive partner in China.
We expect the BMW JV to sell 42,000 units in FY09, which will likely rise to 50,000
units in FY10. We expect the profit contribution from its BMW JV to rise from
Rmb317 million in FY09 to Rmb514 million in FY11, driven by robust demand and
gradual improvement in its margins due to expanded economy of scale and reduced
production cost. In comparison, Brilliance China’s management has set a more
aggressive target of doubling the profit contribution from its BMW JV from FY09 to
FY11.
China exported 28,859 vehicles in October 2009, down 5.26% M/M and 26.86%
Y/Y. For the first 10 months, China exported 248,600 vehicles, down 54.5% Y/Y.
Among these, China exported 106,935 passenger vehicles, down 65.38% Y/Y, and
141,665 commercial vehicles, down 40.46% Y/Y. China’s top three auto exporters
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
this year are: Chery, Great Wall Motor, and Guangzhou Auto, which exported
31,899, 26,346, and 23,336 vehicles in the first 10 months of this year, respectively.
Non-consensus calls
Qingling Motors Co: Sacrificing margins for sales
(UW, 1122.HK, HK$2.26, PT: HK$1.95)
(Extracted from the note, “Qingling Motors Co: Sacrificing margins for sales,"
published on 13 November 2009; please see the original note for pricing dates)
78
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Among other things, our FY09 sales growth estimate of 22% Y/Y for Qingling
Motor is due to:
1) The rising demand for commercial vehicles in China due to robust fixed asset
investment growth and the Chinese government’s policy of providing Rmb5 billion
financial subsidy to help farmers upgrade from three-wheeled and/or low-speed
agricultural vehicles to light trucks and mini vans.
In the first 10 months of this year, China’s light truck sales have risen 20% Y/Y to
1,264,685.
79
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 82: Monthly sales of China’s light trucks in 2008 and 2009
180000
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2008 2009
Source: CAAM.
2) The hefty 20% price cut for its 100 horse power light trucks in the beginning of
2009.
The 100 horsepower light trucks normally account for one-third of its total sales
volume.
Going forward, we expect Qingling Motors to cut selling prices of its 600
horsepower light trucks if it wants to maintain its current small market share of
around 2% in China’s light truck market.
80
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Hence, we expect Qingling’s gross margin to continue to come under continued price
cut pressure due to increasing competition.
In fact, Qingling’s gross margin has already declined from 17.8% in FY07 to 17.2%
in FY08, which, we expect, to drop further to 15.3% and 15% in FY09 and FY10,
respectively.
The JV, with a registered capital of Rmb680 million and an investment of Rmb1.5
billion, is devoted to the production of engines for supply to Qingling and Isuzu and
other customers in China. According to its development plan, the engine JV should
boost its annual capacity from 100,000 units to 175,000 units by 2012.
In fact, its engine JV with Isuzu had contributed a profit of only Rmb9 million in
FY08.
The JV is expected to sell around 45,000 engines in FY09, which are mainly sold to
Qingling itself rather than exported to Isuzu’s other overseas operations. Given the
financial crisis, the export market remains rather weak.
Contrary to public belief, we do not expect the JV to become a major earnings driver
for the company in the foreseeable future, given the weak export market.
We do not expect its medium-sized trucks to become a major earnings driver for the
company, given its limited sales volume.
Meanwhile, its heavy truck sales continue to disappoint, with FY09 sales volume
expected to be flat at around 1,000. On comparison, its domestic competitors such as
Sinotruk and DongFeng Motor have started to see a sharp jump in heavy truck sales
due to rising fixed asset investment growth. We believe the weak sales of Qingling’s
heavy trucks are largely due to its high sales prices. While Qingling’s heavy trucks
81
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
are sold at prices between Rmb350,000 and over Rmb400,000, Sinotruk’s heavy
trucks are priced around Rmb230,000 per unit.
Going forward, we expect Qingling’s net profit to rise 13% Y/Y in FY10 before
rising 7% Y/Y in FY11.
Earnings-based valuation
At HK$2.26, Qingling’s stock is trading at 19.6x FY09E P/E, down to 17.3x in
FY10E, which still puts Qingling among the most expensive names in China’s auto
space.
Asset-based valuation
Meanwhile, on an asset basis, it is very cheap. A price of HK$2.26 puts it at 0.7x
FY09E P/B, declining to 0.684x in FY10E.
1) Its gross margin could continue to be under pressure from rising competition in
China’s truck sector.
Instead of focusing on one sector, such as the light truck sector, Qingling Motors has
adopted a diversified product strategy, i.e. producing light trucks, multi-purpose
vehicles, heavy trucks and pick-up trucks at the same time. We believe such a poor
capital management has made it difficult for the company to gain a competitive
advantage for its products.
For example, its heavy truck business, which accounts for 45% of its fixed assets, is
generating a very small investment return, given: i) its high selling price—heavy
trucks, which are based on Isuzu technology, are sold at prices between Rmb350,000
and over Rmb400,000, versus Rmb230,0000 for Sinotruk’s heavy trucks; b) its small
scale—Qingling’s market share in China’s heavy truck market is less than 1%.
b) Despite its strong balance with a net cash per share of Rmb1.69 by end-FY08, the
company is expected to return cash to shareholders, given its diversified product
strategy that entails continued investments in new areas of low investment returns.
Qingling’s stock is trading at a prospective P/B band of between 0.2x and 0.8x since
January 2002, with an average P/B ratio of 0.5x.
82
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
0.8
0.5
av erage
0.4
-1 standard dev iation
0.3
-2 standard dev iation
0.2
0.1
0.0
1
8
c-0
c-0
c-0
c-0
c-0
c-0
c-0
c-0
De
De
De
De
De
De
De
De
Source: J.P. Morgan.
As shown Figure 83, Qingling is noSure.Now already trading at the high end of its
historical prospective P/B band since January 2002 when the company increased its
shares outstanding by 22% to 2,482 million through the conversion of its CBs and
option exercise by its parent.
Our Jun-10 price target of HK$1.95 is based on 0.6x FY10E P/B, 20% above its
average 0.5x P/B since January 2002.
To put it in a nutshell, we believe, in the short-term, its share price may be boosted
by the abundant liquidity in the current capital market. Some investors may overlook
its problems of poor capital management, low investment return of only 4.1% in
FY10E, and poor liquidity, and decide to focus on is cheap asset-based valuation as
an excuse to drive up its share prices.
However, unless the company can undertake a restructuring to shed its low-return
businesses of heavy trucks and medium trucks to focus on the light truck sector,
and/or return excess cash to shareholders, we continue to see the stock to be in a
valuation trap and refrain from upgrading the stock.
Our key concerns on the stock include : 1) its poor capital management; 2) its
business could be negatively impacted by the expected slowdown in China’s fixed
asset investment growth in FY11; and 3) the expected further erosion in its gross
margins.
We will revisit our view if the company drastically boosts its ROE through measures
such as giving cash back to shareholders and sharply increases its operating margin
through effective cost control.
83
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Consumer
Jasmine Bai AC Huabao International Holdings Limited: New business
(852) 2800-8559
jasmine.d.bai@jpmorgan.com prospects
Vineet Sharma, CFA (This note was originally published on 4 December 2009; please see the original
(852) 2800-8523
vineet.k.sharma@jpmorgan.com note for pricing dates)
J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited
• 1HFY10 net profit in line with expectations; Revenue was 5% lower;
operating profit 2% higher than expectations. Results did not beat consensus
as in prior periods owing to fewer acquisitions. Management is still very
comfortable with previous guidance to double sales in three years.
84
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
EBITDA EPS
Huabao International is a leading tobacco Sales volume growth assumption
flavor manufacturer in China. As of 2008, it
was a key supplier to nine out of 10 top Impact of a 1% increase 0.58% 0.7%
tobacco brands and has about a 50% market Gross margin assumption
share among Top 10 brands. The company is Impact of a 1% increase 1.08% 1.3%
expected to benefit from consolidation of
Operating expense assumption
China’s tobacco industry and the reduction
of tar in Chinese cigarettes. Huabao also Impact of a 5% increase -1.33% -1.60%
entered the food flavor sector in 2004.
85
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Revenue growth was 22%, lower than the full-year guidance of 30% because only a
small acquisition occurred in August. The company expects higher growth in the
second half.
Operating margin improved 190bp owing to economies of scale. Results for tobacco
flavor and food flavor segments are not disclosed separately. Management indicated
at the analyst meeting that tobacco flavor sales grew 19.2%, gross margin was stable.
Food flavor revenue growth was around 40%, gross margin improved.
New material for cigarettes. Management estimates the market at Rmb20B. Growth
drivers of the market are: 1) High-end cigarette market is growing faster but high-end
tobacco leaves cannot meet the demand. New material can help to enhance the
quality. 2) Further cuts in tar content will necessitate new materials. Management
expects sales to kick in next year.
the EBIT of F&B flavor contributed 2% of total EBIT. We believe this percentage
will increase to around 3%.
Upstream aromatic material. Huabao already has two units in upstream. One is
Wuxi Fuhua and Wuxi jiahua established in 2004/2005. The other F&G (Botswana)
was acquired last week.
3) Larger portion of EBIT from the F&B flavor business. Among the current
business and new business prospects, F&B flavor has a more diversified client base
and a different distribution system. If Huabao delivers strong results from F&B and
restaurant–related flavor business, it will be evident that the company has a strong
capacity to expand its franchise in the flavor business.
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
• Rising raw milk prices are not a concern: Mengniu sources 60%-70% of
raw milk through long-term exclusive contracts signed for 30-50 years, and
the volume, quality, and price are reset every year. We do not expect
significant changes in contract prices. Even if the market price of raw milk
increases backed by a global milk powder rally, we believe Mengniu will be
better positioned than competitors due to low-cost pressure.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Risk-free rate: 4%
Market risk premium: 7%
Beta: 1
Debt/equity: 0%
Cost of debt: 6.00%
Terminal “g”: 2%
89
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
In our Note, Food For Thought: Why we think dairy sector margins likely to
improve”, published on October 12, 2009, we note that the change in competition
dynamics (more rational pricing strategy and less A&P spending), product mix
improvement, and less capex spending in liquid milk will be major drivers. Our
analysis and discussions with management suggest that the company is more
confident about improving the product mix. Meanwhile, we do not think a raw milk
price increase is a concern as Mengniu sources 60%-70% of raw milk through
contract supply.
For FY09, we leave our earnings estimates largely unchanged. However, due to the
potential for more share option expense, we lower our reported net profit estimate by
1%.
For FY10, we raise our estimates for revenue by 5%, EBIT margin ex-option
expense by 0.1%, net profit ex-option expense by 9%, but lower our reporting net
profit estimate by 1% due to the potential for more option expense.
We note that there is a trade-off between top-line growth and margin. Our top-line
growth estimate is lower, but our EBIT margin estimate is higher than Bloomberg
consensus. If Mengniu extends its distribution to lower-tier cities and rural areas with
low-end products, it could surpass our sales estimates. Its margin could get diluted a
bit, but top line and earnings could have upside from the market expansion.
In 1H09, Mengniu had about 10% of sales from low-end products, which are plain
milk with tetra packaging, with the retail price at around Rmb2/250ml pack. These
products have gone through price cuts and their gross margin is below 20%. The
company’s high-margin products are mostly in milk beverage and yogurt categories.
Mengniu has increased the share of high-margin products from c0% of sales to 15%
in 1H09. We expect high-margin products, mid-margin products, and low-margin
products to grow 25%/10%/6% in FY10.
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Since mid-09, Mengniu has taken more management initiatives for Menngiu Arla,
which we think is a positive. The operating environment of the dairy sector is very
different from that of developed countries. Numerous international dairy companies
have attempted but failed to penetrate the Chinese dairy market since the late 1990s.
Some of them have retreated entirely from the market. In our view, the slow progress
of Mengniu Arla was another example. Now, given Mengniu’s more management
initiatives, its strength in market development, and improved raw milk quality, we
believe the milk powder business could provide upside potential in two or three
years.
Mengniu’s milk powder business has the Mengniu Arla brand. The selling price is
about Rmb160/can (900g). The selling price is similar to Yili, and c50% lower than
international brands. Its gross margin is more than 40%. We assume Rmb900 million
and Rmb1.4 billion sales, respectively, for FY10 and FY11.
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
24. The strike price was HK$24.4, and will be vested in three batches with 20%, 40%
and 40% in three years, respectively.
We believe this is a positive for the company. After COFCO-HOPU became the
largest shareholder in Mengniu, there appeared to be investor concern over less
management incentive and earnings dilution. On July 17, the company had
announced that it would not go ahead with the proposed grant of an aggregate 88.8
million share options. On the next trading day, the share price dropped 2.3%, while
the HSI rose 3.7%. Now, with the grant of options, we believe these concerns should
ease somewhat.
The option granting will book a high option expense in the P&L. The company
estimates an additional option expense of Rmb20 million in 2009 and Rmb210
million/Rms210 million for 2010/2011. The potential high option expense is partly
because the share price volatility was high.
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Energy
China energy demand—picking up
Brynjar Eirik Bustnes AC
China’s economy has been picking up very strongly in recent months due to the
(852) 2800-8578
brynjar.e.bustnes@jpmorgan.com
stimulus package being put in place in response to the global recession. This has also
impacted energy demand, including petroleum products and natural gas.
J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited
YTD apparent demand, ensuing refinery throughput plus net product imports, is up
3.6% and current apparent demand has now crossed the 8-million BOPD mark.
Domestic crude production has been relatively flat in the past few years, while
imports have had to make up for the demand growth. China has also now definitely
crossed the 50%-import dependency mark.
Figure 84: China imports over 50% of crude—Domestic production flat for many years (MM ton)
35
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Crude production Crude import
Due to the build-up of new refining capacity in China, the country has been able to
lower the import level of products. China has actually become a net exporter of both
gasoline and diesel in recent months, adding additional pressure on international
refining margins. Most of the product import is fuel oil, followed by LPG and some
naphtha this year.
Figure 85: China imports less products due to refinery capacity build-up in 2009 (MM ton)
35 15%
30 10%
25 5%
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Gasoline demand
Car sales in China have had a very strong sales growth period in recent months due
to stimulus from the government. Stimulus comes in the form of cash refund if an old
car is scrapped for a new one as well as lower sales tax on buying smaller engine
cars. The growth is particularly strong in the passenger vehicle sales segment,
expected to reach almost 50% in 2009 (15% next year). Commercial vehicle sales are
expected to grow around 25% in 2009 (8% next year). Gasoline demand growth has,
however, not really reacted to the strong car sales, and is hovering around the +/-
10% level.
Figure 86: China imports less products due to refinery capacity build-up in 2009 (MM ton)
7.5 30%
6.0 20%
4.5 10%
3.0 0%
1.5 -10%
0.0 -20%
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Apparent Gasoline Demand Y/Y Grow th (RHS)
Gasoline as a proportion of total oil demand in China has been relatively constant at
20%. It has picked up slightly in recent months due to the lagging demand growth of
diesel. We expect gasoline demand to remain at around 20%.
2.00 9.00
1.75 7.75
1.50 6.50
1.25 5.25
1.00 4.00
Jan-04
Jul-04
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Jul-09
China gasoline demand (mn BOPD) Ov erall demand (mn BOPD - RHS)
Looking at total car fleet data rather than sales growth, the car fleet in China has
grown around 20% in recent years. This is similar to what we have so far this year.
Compared to gasoline demand growth, the current level of gasoline demand growth
doesn’t appear to be very different from historical levels.
We can, however, come up with a few reasons to explain the possibly slightly lower
gasoline demand relative to car fleet growth so far this year. The best explanation, we
think, is probably that these cars are sold in second- and third-tier cities, which are
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
smaller in size (i.e., less need to drive), owners are not as well off (drive less at
higher gasoline prices), some are second or third cars (again driven less), some cities
have limitations on when you can drive (odd/even number plates, which cause people
to buy another car without driving more), and finally more of the cars are smaller
(smaller than 1.6-litre engines), thereby consuming less gas.
Figure 88: Gasoline demand grows half of car fleet (MM vehicles)
50 40%
40 30%
30 20%
20 10%
10 0%
0 -10%
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Car grow th (RHS) Gasoline cons grow th (RHS) Cars on road
Looking at fuel efficiency in China is not easy considering the lack of data for car-
miles driven. Hence, we look at consumption per car per day. This efficiency
measure (prone to errors) shows that efficiency has doubled in the past five years
from 14 litre/car/day to less than 7 litre/car/day.
Figure 89: Efficiency doubled in China in past five years (MM cars)
50 14.0
40 10.5
30 7.0
20 3.5
10 -
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Diesel demand
Demand for diesel in China has not picked up as expected on the back of the strong
economic performance, including industrial production data so far this year. It is
generally believed that diesel demand should be well correlated to IP, both from the
production but more so from the transportation of goods. Infrastructure build-up
should also require diesel and generate demand growth.
95
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 90: Diesel demand growth still weak, but picking up (MM ton)
15 30%
12 20%
9 10%
6 0%
3 -10%
0 -20%
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Apparent Diesel Demand Y/Y Grow th (RHS)
As with power earlier this year, diesel did not show demand growth as expected. For
the power side, there were several explanations for this, including lower ramp-up in
the power intensive industry. Power has now, however, caught up with IP figures.
On the diesel side, demand growth has also started to catch up with IP figures,
although it is still looking a bit on the low side. This could be partially due to weak
exports, causing less need for the transportation of goods.
Figure 91: Power has caught up with IP, while diesel demand is still lagging
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
Oct-04
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It is primarily on the naphtha side that demand has picked up strongly. Naphtha is the
feedstock for most petrochemicals and china has gone from being a net exporter last
year to a net importer this year.
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Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 92: Naphtha, LPG and jet kerosene have seen strong demand growth in 2009 (MM ton)
20 30%
15 20%
10 10%
5 0%
0 -10%
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Apparent Other Products Demand Y/Y Grow th (RHS)
Until 2006, China has had no means of importing natural gas and relied upon
domestically-produced natural gas. This limited supply also limited demand growth.
Domestic production has over the past few years seen strong growth, and since the
opening of CNOOC’s LNG terminal in 2006, additional natural gas has been made
available. This, strong domestic growth and imported LNG have allowed relatively
stronger demand growth in the natural gas segment in recent years.
Figure 93: Recent LNG import levels at close to 10% of domestic production (BCM)
10 50%
40%
8
30%
6 20%
4 10%
0%
2
-10%
- -20%
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The first LNG terminal received LNG from NWS in Australia on a contract signed
many years ago, with CNOOC Ltd getting a stake in the upstream aspect, on top of
it. The second and third terminals which CNOOC has opened are also taking LNG
from relatively low-priced supply (Tangguh and MLNG Dua), but have also recently
added a contract (from Qatar) at a higher contract price. Incidentally, CNOOC
reportedly had problems marketing these Qatari volumes at prices around US$10-
12/mmBTU.
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There are generally little details available on contract pricing for Chinese LNG, but
import data give an indication of where the price levels are. In mid-last year,
CNOOC brought in quite a bit of spot LNG, which caused the average import price
to increase. Due to the recent cold weather in northern China, this is again happening
with PetroChina by leasing capacity from CNOOC and taking in spot.
10 1.4
1.2
8
1.0
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4 0.6
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2
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LNG unit price (US$/mmBTU) LNG imports (RHS - BCM)
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Financials: Banks
Little clarity on capital raising a short-term overhang, but
Samuel Chen AC overreaction has created a good buying opportunity
(852) 2800-8557
samuel.s.chen@jpmorgan.com Change 1: Largely sufficient internal capital generation, but CBRC asked for
more capital
Cindy Xu
(852) 2800-8502
cindy.p.xu@jpmorgan.com Extracted from the note, “China Banks: Little clarity on capital raising a short-term
overhang, but overreaction created a good buying opportunity," published on 30
Sunil Garg
November 2009. Please see the original note for pricing dates.
(852) 2800-8519
sunil.garg@jpmorgan.com
Higher ROE largely sufficient to support slower loan growth
J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited
In our view, theoretically most H-share banks will not see further drop in their capital
Improved internal capital ratios in 2010 or even 2011 in some cases. The abnormally high loan growth rate in
generation should largely be 2009 is very unlikely to repeat due to a much bigger base. We expect 2010 year end
sufficient to fund a slower but
still very strong loan growth in
tier-1 and CAR ratios should be flattish compared with their respective capital ratios
2010, estimated at c18% for as of 2009 year end. This of course depends on ultimate loan growth. However, we
system. believe there will be no major surprise as seen in 2009 and that our loan expectation
of around Rmb7.5trn (18% in the system) reflects the government’s tone of an
“appropriately loose monetary policy".
Table 39: Improved internal capital generation in 2010 would largely be sufficient to fund about 18% loan growth in the system
ICBC CCB BOC BoComm Citic Minsheng Huaxia SPDB SZDB
2010E ROAE 23.3% 24.2% 21.3% 22.7% 20.5% 14.9% 16.7% 22.3% 19.3%
09 final & 10E interim divd payout as of 10E earnings 38.4% 38.8% 35.3% 29.7% 16.4% 12.2% 12.6% 7.5% 15.3%
Tier-1 growth 16.3% 17.5% 15.4% 19.6% 17.5% 13.7% 14.6% 23.5% 18.3%
10E Loan growth 13.3% 16.0% 17.7% 19.4% 21.2% 20.7% 18.0% 19.8% 24.0%
10E RWA growth 15.7% 16.0% 16.9% 17.0% 18.5% 20.9% 20.3% 23.5% 22.8%
Tier-1 ratio 09E 10.2% 9.2% 9.7% 8.0% 9.0% 8.9% 6.6% 6.9% 8.1%
Tier-1 ratio 10E 10.3% 9.3% 9.5% 8.1% 9.0% 8.4% 6.3% 7.0% 7.9%
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
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Table 40: Breakdown of annual loan increase by segments: medium & long-term loans may still
be a key loan growth driver in 2010 due to still high financing needs from existing projects.
Rmb bn 2007 2008 1H09 YTD 2009 2009E 2010E
Personal 1,139 794 1,075 2,008 2,458 1,550
Consumer 867 498 666 1,400 1,750 1,100
Personal business 272 296 409 607 707 450
Corporate 2,495 4,137 6,323 6,939 7,042 5,950
ST working capital 1,277 1,190 1,341 1,454 1,392 1,400
Discounted bills (448) 646 1,707 677 600 200
MLTM loans 1,681 2,188 3,169 4,562 4,800 4,200
Others (14) 113 106 246 250 150
Total Rmb inc 3,634 4,931 7,398 8,947 9,500 7,500
Source: PBOC, J.P. Morgan estimates.
Growth capital in medium-term, but definitely not balance sheet repair capital
In our view, CBRC’s push for Although CBRC repeatedly highlighted the importance of credit risk control and
higher capital, by far, does not discourages excess growth, such message is routine warning and it’s CBRC’s
reflect CBRC's fear or concern
on potential ballooning of NPLs
primary task to ensure strong balance sheet strength including asset quality of the
arising from exceptionally high banking system. In fact, one can also see CBRC did mention the importance of
loan growth this year “internal capital generation”, which implicitly refers to its expectation for higher
profitability.
Since 2008 we have been arguing that the high pre-provisioning operating ROA and
relatively low loan to assets ratios means many Chinese banks, especially most H-
share banks can indeed afford a very high credit costs before their equities suffer. As
seen below, even if annual NPL formation rate surged to above 300bps, or in other
words, nearly 13-15% of new corporate loans made in 2009 going bad all suddenly
in a single year of 2010, earnings for some larger banks should still decline by 20%,
and ROE in most cases would be still at mid-teen percentage. Clearly, we believe
there is no need for balance sheet repair.
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Table 41: NPL formation rate needed in various 2010E earnings Figure 95: NPL ratios needed in various 2010E earnings growth
growth scenarios. scenarios.
% of 09E down Down Down Down 10.0%
loans Flat 20% 30% 50% 100% 8.0%
BoCom-H 2.2% 3.1% 3.5% 4.2% 5.9% 6.0%
BOC-H 2.6% 3.6% 4.0% 4.7% 6.7% 4.0%
CCB-H 2.3% 3.7% 4.2% 5.2% 7.6% 2.0%
ICBC-H 2.3% 3.9% 4.4% 5.4% 8.0% 0.0%
Citic-H 2.3% 2.9% 3.2% 3.8% 5.3% BoCom-H BOC-H CCB-H ICBC-H Citic-H Huax ia Minsheng SPDB SZDB
Huaxia 1.8% 2.5% 2.7% 3.0% 3.8%
Base Case Flat earning in 2010 2010 fall by 20%
Minsheng 1.2% 1.9% 2.2% 2.8% 4.1%
SPDB 1.4% 2.4% 2.7% 3.3% 4.8% 2010 fall by 50% zero profit in 2010 (breakev en)
SZDB 1.8% 2.0% 2.3% 2.8% 4.1%
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
We believe there are see some needs for capital in longer-term, especially as
banks expands into other non-banking financial services, such as insurance, and
brokerage. From this perspective, this may still be regarded as growth capital. For
some banks, equity raising is still needed to fund balance sheet and loan growth, thus
may even enhance shareholders’ value. In such case, as we will discuss later, given
timing is some time away, we believe current share price largely are quite not valid
reference points for the pricing of future capital raising.
That said, should equity capital raising happens around 2010 year end or 2011, we
believe such new capital largely will not be used to fund lending, since internal
capital generation is already sufficient to fund an expected 18% system loan growth.
From this perspective, it may not be immediate growth capital indeed.
Change 2: Long time ahead, capital raising plan will reflect shareholders’
interest
Extracted from the note, “China Banks: Little clarity on capital raising a short-term
overhang, but overreaction created a good buying opportunity," published on 30
November 2009. Please see the original note for pricing dates.
While there are preliminary and initial talks and discussion among CBRC and bigger
banks, we believe and actual capital raising could be largely a 2010 end or 2011
event at earliest, in most cases. Some banks such as BoComm that have slightly
Noise may persist for long time, lower tier-1 may lead the progress but still could be a 2H2010 event.
and investors may be tired and
would refocus back to • Banks just started considering various options and need time to communicate
fundamentals in three-month
time
with various relevant parties to make preliminary proposal. At this point, CBRC’s
threshold on capital ratios is also quite unclear.
• Once an equity raising plan is decided, it takes a minimum of 5 months or so
from any announcement to actual completion, including 1-2 month for
shareholder approval at minimum typically, and another 2-3 month for regulatory
approval, and time for actual deal completion.
• Importantly, in our view, the whole capital raising issue would be beyond
CBRC’s control. We believe any final plan needs to take consideration of
various interests of the central government that are represented and guarded by
various ministries. Thus it needs a higher level (State Council or politburo) to
balance and decide on final plans. This will take some time.
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Figure 96: Political landscape of key ministries relevant to capital raising issues by state banks
State
State Council
Council
Regulators Shareholders
PBOC
PBOC CBRC
CBRC CSRC
CSRC MOF
MOF
MOF
MOF Hui
Hui Jin
Jin SSF
SSF
Other
Other State-
State-
ICBC
ICBC CCB
CCB BOC
BOC BoComm
BoComm Owned
Owned Banks
Banks
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At this point, there is little clarity on the capital requirement threshold CBRC are
comfortable with. While CBRC denies the Reuter’s report that it may ask bigger
banks to raise capital ratio to 13% and says there is no change to current 10% CAR
requirement, in various speeches by senior officials from CBRC, clearly CBRC
would like to see higher capital ratios, and particularly tier-1 ratios too. Moreover,
CBRC also does not make clear what tier-1 capital ratios bigger banks need to
achieve. We believe CBRC also need time to communicate with other relevant
ministries on this issue.
Possible short-fall to total regulatory capital is not equal to size of equity raising
While generally referred as "capital raising", what market really fears is indeed
equity raising. Given unclear threshold and possible objection from CSRC and
government shareholders, it’s too early to determine the size of equity raising indeed.
This is particularly the case given that larger banks indeed do have strong buffer to
issue tier-2 debts.
Below we illustrate the calculation on shortfall in regulatory capital (tier-1 and tier-2)
in various total CAR requirements.
• As seen, if CBRC really raises the total CAR requirement to 13%, the banks
under our coverage may need to raise around Rmb370B through equity or tier-2
debts.
• If this CAR requirement reduces by 1% to 12%, size of shortfall would
substantially decline to around Rmb160bn. The shortfall in some bigger banks
mainly in CCB and BOC would be substantially lower.
Even if total CAR is raised to • As we can also see, in fact, the shortfall in regulatory capital even in the case of
13%, there is still ample room to
13% can be covered through tier-2 debt issuance. We believe most H-share banks
issue tier-2 debts. In particular,
we believe the regulators should (except BoComm) still have room to issue sub-debt, and other tier-2 debts
allow more issuance of (hybrid capital debt and convertibles, which largely have never been issued).
convertibles, which is non-
existent • Even though sub-debt is more costly and demand may be much less now due to
restriction of cross-holding, we believe banks can still improve CAR through
convertibles and hybrid capital debt (though hybrid capital debt is also more
costly).
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(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Table 42: Calculation of regulator capital shortfall to various total CAR thresholds
Rmb bn ICBC CCB BOC BoComm Citic Minsheng Huaxia SPDB SZDB Total
10E RWA 6,953 6,044 6,118 2,326 1,351 1,275 528 1,225 450 27,840
memo: 10E RWA growth 15.7% 16.0% 16.9% 17.0% 18.5% 20.9% 20.3% 23.5% 22.8% 17.4%
Deductions 48 16 66 2 0 1 0 1 1 147
As discussed, however, clearly CBRC is focusing more on equity capital. The table
below highlights the size of potential equity raising in three scenarios. In our view,
however, investors may look at second and third scenario. In the third scenario, a
10% tier-1 ratio is more than enough to boost total CAR to above 13%. Investors
should not forget Chinese banks have a good amount of general provision on their
balance sheet.
Although quite unlikely in our view, should CBRC also allow full utilization of tier-2
buffer, Chinese banks can increase their total CAR quite significantly by
approximately 3.5ppt on weighted average, boosting total CAR to about 15% on
weighted average. This is particularly the case for the few largest banks. As seen in
the figure 3 below, this would also probably make the sector’s total CAR as high as
some other very well capitalized banking sectors in the region which are also among
the highest globally.
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Table 44: Theoretical maximum total CAR reachable through tier-2 debt issuance
ICBC CCB BOC BoComm Citic Minsheng Huaxia SPDB SZDB
10E Tier-1 Ratio 10.3% 9.3% 9.5% 8.1% 9.0% 8.4% 6.3% 7.0% 7.9%
10E General provisions/other reserves 1.8% 1.3% 1.5% 1.5% 0.6% 1.1% 1.6% 1.2% 1.4%
Existing tier-2 debts as % if 10E RWA 1.1% 1.0% 1.2% 2.3% 0.9% 0.9% 1.9% 1.5% 2.1%
10E CAR without more tier-2 debt issue 13.0% 11.5% 11.6% 11.8% 10.5% 10.3% 9.8% 9.6% 11.3%
Additional max tier-2 buffer 4.3% 3.7% 3.8% 1.8% 3.6% 3.3% 1.2% 2.0% 1.9%
Theoretical max 10E CAR reachable 17.3% 15.2% 15.4% 13.6% 14.1% 13.7% 11.0% 11.6% 13.1%
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
• It helps boost banks' tier-1 and total Capital ratios that CBRC is looking for.
• Given participation of government majority shareholders, the majority of funds of
new capital would come from the government, thus reducing the needs from
market. This substantially alleviated the pressure of new share supply and thus
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may be a positive surprise to the market which has worried about new papers.
This option thus could also be acceptable to CSRC.
• In rights issue, importantly, all shareholders including the government majority
shareholders such as Huijin, SSF, and MOF are not diluted, and importantly,
given this is not balance sheet repair capital, it may not change or at least will
minimize the impact on the upside to EXISTING shareholders or investors. Note
in the case of rights issue, although fair value per share will be lower, given
rights issue typically are priced at a big discount to market price, it also lowers
the existing shareholders’ holding costs. (see below a detailed analysis)
• Similar to government majority shareholders, minority shareholders and market
investors' interests are also protected: 1) There is no dilution to their percentage
stake. 2) The pressure on market will also be much lower given that government
participation means much less need for money from the market. 3) There is also
largely no material change to upside in medium-term, after adjusting their current
holding costs and number of shares held.
Rights issue: Hypothetical scenario analysis for BoComm
We illustrate below in detail why in the case of a hypothetical rights issue scenario,
medium/longer-term investors’ interest are largely protected, despite some short-term
impact which has been more than reflected through the share price decline.
Given already lower tier-1 ratios and relatively high tier-2 in total capital, we believe
BoComm does not have much room to boost capital through tier-2 debt issuance.
Assuming no change in dividend policy, and assuming our expected loan growth of
19% (Rmb360bn), we estimate it needs around Rmb30bn to get total CAR to
assumed target of 13%. This implies a tier-1 of 9.4% from otherwise 8.1% estimated
for 2010 year end. Such money would be split between A-share and H-shares.
(49%) 4.5 3.97 0.99 0.76 4.30 7.56 15.4% 30.0 4.39 2.32 2.07 5.0 4.2 3.1 2.5 21.2 4.00 5.20 0.79 0.94 9.4% 13.0%
(43%) 5.0 4.41 1.09 0.84 4.30 6.81 13.9% 30.0 4.39 2.32 2.07 5.6 4.6 3.4 2.7 21.2 4.05 5.27 0.79 0.95 9.4% 13.0%
(38%) 5.5 4.85 1.18 0.91 4.30 6.19 12.6% 30.0 4.39 2.32 2.07 6.1 5.1 3.7 3.0 21.2 4.10 5.32 0.80 0.96 9.4% 13.0%
(32%) 6.0 5.29 1.28 0.98 4.30 5.67 11.6% 30.0 4.39 2.32 2.07 6.6 5.5 4.0 3.3 21.2 4.13 5.37 0.80 0.97 9.4% 13.0%
(26%) 6.5 5.73 1.37 1.06 4.30 5.24 10.7% 30.0 4.39 2.32 2.07 7.1 5.9 4.3 3.5 21.2 4.17 5.42 0.80 0.98 9.4% 13.0%
(21%) 7.0 6.17 1.47 1.13 4.30 4.86 9.9% 30.0 4.39 2.32 2.07 7.6 6.3 4.7 3.8 21.2 4.20 5.46 0.81 0.98 9.4% 13.0%
(15%) 7.5 6.61 1.57 1.20 4.30 4.54 9.3% 30.0 4.39 2.32 2.07 8.2 6.7 5.0 4.0 21.2 4.22 5.49 0.81 0.99 9.4% 13.0%
(9%) 8.0 7.05 1.66 1.28 4.30 4.26 8.7% 30.0 4.39 2.32 2.07 8.7 7.1 5.3 4.3 21.2 4.24 5.52 0.81 0.99 9.4% 13.0%
(4%) 8.5 7.49 1.76 1.35 4.30 4.00 8.2% 30.0 4.39 2.32 2.07 9.2 7.5 5.6 4.5 21.2 4.26 5.54 0.81 1.00 9.4% 13.0%
2% 9.0 7.93 1.85 1.42 4.30 3.78 7.7% 30.0 4.39 2.32 2.07 9.7 7.9 5.9 4.8 21.2 4.28 5.57 0.82 1.00 9.4% 13.0%
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
Assuming a Rmb30B rights issue, and assuming a worst-case scenario, this is largely
also not growth capital, then its fair multiple would decline given a lower ROE. We
estimate this would decline from our current fair terminal PB value of 2.47x to 2.17x,
as sustainable ROE would decline to 17.4% from 19.6% due to lower leverage. As a
result, its fair value per share would decline depending on rights offering price.
However, if there is no such capital raising, for existing investors who already held
BoComm as of Monday last week (when news [source: Reuters] started to circulate),
then the upside as of that date to our Dec-10 fair value would be nearly 33%.
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As subsequent days’ share price declines, if an investor got in the stock at Friday’s
close price, after adjusting for hypothetical rights issue, an existing investor indeed
would have slightly more total return than he/she would have by Monday, taking into
account of lower holding costs and more total number of shares after rights issue.
In fact, the investors would have the same upside by Thursday close (HK$9.18) if a
rights issue is confirmed, as compared with his/her potential return as of last
Monday’s close HK$9.8 and no capital raising is planned.
Table 46: Comparison of upside for shareholders, prior to announcement and current level
Fair Return for
Offering % of current Sustainable terminal Holding total
size Price New shares SO ROE PB Fair value cost % upside holding
Rmb bn HK$ bn % HK$ HK$ HK$
Prior to news - - - 0% 19.6% 2.47x $13.0 9.8 32.7% 3.20
Rights issue 30 4.5 7.56 15.4% 17.4% 2.17x $11.3 8.2 36.7% 3.49
Rights issue 30 6.0 5.67 11.6% 17.4% 2.17x $11.6 8.5 36.6% 3.48
Rights issue 30 7.0 4.86 9.9% 17.4% 2.17x $11.8 8.6 36.5% 3.47
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
In the above BoComm’s case, assuming they raise Rmb30B at around current price
(1.85x 10E PB, and 8x 2011E PE), then without additional growth, fair value per
share would be still HK$12. The decline from Tuesday to end of Thursday largely
already reflected such change in fair value.
Information
China Minsheng Banking H-share offering
On November 18, 2009, China Minsheng Banking Corp (600016 CH/1988 HK)
raised US$3.86 billion in its Hong Kong initial public offering, priced at HK$9.08
per share. We believe Minsheng is a volume growth opportunity, but in line with
medium-sized peers. While it was one of the fastest growing banks in China, growth
has stabilized since 2006. We expect its volume growth to be in line with key
medium-sized banks peers, though still above state banks.
Investment case and risks: Key positives: (1) Commercial culture and tradition for
changes—“Business units reform” is ahead of other banks and shall improve revenue
generation and credit pricing; (2) rapid growth in retail banking and strong cross-
selling to its SME customers; and (3) benign credit quality trend and centralized
credit risk management/loan management. Key challenges: (1) a high cost base that
is unlikely to improve materially in next 2 years; and (2) need to keep strong deposit
growth.
Key comparable should be Citic and SPDB, not other H-share banks. Minsheng is
very different to most H-share banks in terms of size, branch network, funding
franchise, retail penetration and more importantly underlying profitability. Even
compared with Citic and SPDB, to which Minsheng is similar in above aspects,
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Minsheng is slightly inferior due to lack of parent support, less retail penetration than
Citic and less favorable funding mix and less favorable operating/credit cost profile
than SPDB.
Stock recommendations
We believe China Citic Bank is one of the banks with the strongest earnings and
ROE momentums in the sector with a 30% upside potential. We initiated coverage
with an Overweight rating and our Dec-10 PT of HK$8.60 and added it to our Asia
Analysts’ Focus List. Our price target is based on DDM. We use a fair P/BV-based
multiple of 2.15x, with a normalized ROE of 16.6%, assuming a risk-free rate of
5.3%, cost of equity of 11.2%, and a terminal growth rate of 6.5%. Key risks to PT
are unexpected significant equity capital raising and a substantial slowdown in
deposit growth. We believe the earnings leverage potential in Citic-H is not fully
discounted. Although the shares have nearly tripled YTD, we believe more re-rating
lies ahead, given a >500bp gain in ROE in FY10E—the highest ROE uplift in the
sector based on our forecasts. Our FY10/FY11 EPS estimates are 25%/28% above
consensus, and we peg FY09-FY11E EPS CAGR at 38%. The stock is one of our top
2 picks for 1H10.
Investment positives: 1) NIMs are relatively more leveraged than many peers to
rising interest rates. 2) Underlying profitability has improved significantly and is
now in line with some state-controlled banks and higher than most medium-sized
banks. 3) Rapid growth in retail banking, with particular success in wealth
management and credit cards. 4) Strong support from the parent’s integrated
financial services platform, which has led to more cross-selling and a larger client
base. 5) Potential stake increase by BBVA should support confidence in Citic’s
earning prospects.
Major weakness and challenges: 1) Lower exposure to mortgages, and medium- and
loan-term project loans. The portion of collateralized loans has traditionally been
lower. 2) Deposit franchise is still mainly based on corporate accounts—needs to be
diversified. 3) Since 1H09, credit card delinquency has picked up notably. While the
amount of NPLs remains small relative to total loans, further delinquencies in the
card portfolio could postpone an overall recovery in credit costs.
Our Dec-10 PT of HK$8.6 implies 30% upside: We believe Citic-H should trade at a
slightly lower P/BV than most H-share banks (except for BOC-H). However, our
Dec-10 PT still suggests 30% upside from the current level. Our DDM-based Dec-10
PT of HK$8.6 implies 2.4x FY10E P/BV and 12.7x FY10E P/E.
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Michael Chan AC
Financials: Insurance
(852) 2800-8592
michael.cf.chan@jpmorgan.com China Insurance Sector: Premium growth, VNB and
Joseph Leung investment returns have room for positive surprise in 2010
(852) 2800-8517 (This note was originally published on November 16, 2009; please see the original
joseph.mj.leung@jpmorgan.com
note for pricing dates)
Sunil Garg
(852) 2800-8518 • Accumulate at “three lows”: The China insurok.ance sector is currently
sunil.garg@jpmorgan.com operating in a “three-low” environment – low premium growth, low equity
J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited investment, and low interest rates, which caused the underperformance relative to
banks YTD. We expect investment yields and premium growth to largely bottom
out in 2009. Our positive bias remains on life insurance in 2010, with China Life
as our top pick.
• Key catalysts in 2010: We expect life premium growth, particularly for China
Life, to return to c15% in 2010, driven by an increase in individual agents and as
a result of the premium restructuring campaign this year. This should drive VNB
growth by 24%-27% in 2010. In the next 12-18 months, the LT investment
assumption could be revised up to 6.0% (from 5.0%-5.5% now) if the investment
scope is broadened to real estate and other sectors. A 10% increase in investment
assumption would increase EV by 8.1% for China Life and 12.2% for Ping An,
by our estimates.
• Valuations premium likely to persist: Chinese insurers are never cheap, in our
view, and they will remain “not cheap” given their smaller market representation
(7% of financial assets only versus 17% in developed markets) and faster
premium growth (than loan growth). Insurers in Asia ex-Japan have consistently
traded at a higher P/Es and P/BVs than banks. We believe there is still upside to
the current 2.5x EV for Chinese life insurers.
• We raise our price targets: We increase our Dec-10 PT for China Life
Insurance to HK$45.0 (from HK$35.1), for Ping An Insurance to HK$81 (from
HK$64), and for PICC Property & Casualty to HK$4.6 (from HK$3.9) by rolling
over our revised EV and VNB forecasts. We also revise our 2010 EPS forecasts –
up by 11.0% for China Life and 0.5% for Ping An, but down by 4.6% for PICC.
• Key risks to our PTs: China Life: lower-than-expected premium growth and
major regulatory changes. Ping An: slower-than-expected premium growth, and
execution risk in integrating SZDB. PICC: stronger-than-expected underwriting
income and premium growth.
Table 47: China insurance sector's valuation summary
Price Dec-2010 P/EV P/AV Implied new biz P/E P/BV
Reuters Rating 16-Nov-09 Price target FY09E FY10E FY09E FY10E FY09E FY10E FY09E FY10E FY09E FY10E
HK$ HK$ x x x x x x x x x x
China Life 2628.HK OW 39.10 45.0 3.2 2.6 1.2 1.0 36.6 25.4 31.0 26.4 4.4 3.7
Ping An 2318.HK N 73.60 81.0 3.0 2.5 1.1 0.9 26.9 19.2 45.2 33.9 4.6 3.9
PICC 2328.HK UW 6.03 4.6 NA NA NA NA NA NA 278.8 50.8 2.4 2.0
Source: Bloomberg, Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates.
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Key risks to our PTs: China Life: Lower-than-expected premium growth and major
regulatory changes. Ping An: slower-than-expected premium growth, and execution
risk in integrating SZDB. PICC: stronger-than-expected underwriting income and
premium growth.
Ping An 1) Starting to be more active in Tier-2 and rural markets. 1) Top line premium growth is likely to weaken in 2010.
2) Positive earnings momentum in 2010. 2) Compression in new business margins due to competitive rates.
3) Acquisition of SZDB will boost banking exposure. 3) Potential share placements.
4) Early mover advantage in real estate investments. 4) Execution risk in SZDB acquisition.
5) A diversified financial model. 5) Re-classification of insurance premium.
PICC 1) Improved capital position after the Rmb5 billion sub-debt issue. 1) Potential competition from alternative distribution channels.
2) Continued regulation on solvency should restrain excessive competition. 2) The stake owned by AIG remains an overhang.
3) Strong car sales will continue to drive premium growth. 3) Volatile earnings track record and poor underwriting results.
4) Potential restructuring of parent and group companies. 4) Lowest ROE but highest valuation in the region.
Valuation summary
Table 51: Chinese insurance sector valuations
China Life Ping An PICC
2009E 2010E 2011E 2009E 2010E 2011E 2009E 2010E 2011E
P/EV (x) 3.2 2.6 2.1 3.0 2.5 2.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
P/E (x) 31.0 26.4 23.3 45.2 33.9 26.4 278.3 50.8 16.2
P/B (x) 4.4 3.7 3.2 4.6 3.9 3.3 2.4 2.0 1.8
Implied new business multiple (x) 36.6 25.4 18.1 26.9 19.2 13.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
ROE (%) 15.6 15.2 14.7 11.3 12.4 13.5 -1.1 4.5 11.9
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
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Table 52: Key operating trends for China Life and Ping An
2008 2009E 2010E 2011E
Value of 1-year sales, Y/Y %
China Life 15.6% 30.2% 26.7% 18.8%
Ping An (Life) 18.8% 36.6% 23.9% 22.3%
45.0
40.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
2006 2007 2008 2009E 2010E
Loan growth Premium growth
Source: CIRC, Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates.
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AXA 16.46 CS FP N 55,728 0.9 9.1 10.4 0.9 0.9 0.0 2.4 10.9 8.3
GENERALI 18.25 G IM NR 42,337 1.0 15.1 11.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 3.3 11.0 14.2
Canada Manulife 20.07 MFC CN NR 31,067 0.7 23.7 9.5 1.2 1.1 3.8 2.6 5.4 12.4
Source: Bloomberg, Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates. Bloomberg consensus estimates for non-rated companies.
We expect life premium growth to pick up in 2010 in China due to the following:
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Table 55: Premium growth trends for China Life and Ping An
Year-on-year, %
2008 2009E 2010E 2011E
Based on PRC GAAP:
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individual agents. The total number of individual agents in China Life has only
increased by approximately 15% since 2005, while that of Ping An Life has risen by
almost 100% during the same period. This also explained traditionally faster
premium growth at Ping An.
Figure 98: Total number of individual life agents Figure 99: Number of agents as a percentage of total pool
No. of agents % of total
355,852 60%
2008 716,000 15% 15%
50%
315,000 17%
1H08 676,000 16%
40% 16% 17%
301,801 30%
2007 638,000
48% 47%
205,437 20% 36%
2006 650,000 32% 35% 31%
10%
200,193
2005 640,000
0%
2005 2006 2007 1H08 2008 1H09
0 500,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 2,500,000
Life industry China Life Ping An Life China Life Ping An Life
Source: CEIC and company reports. Source: Company reports and J.P. Morgan.
Based on first-year premiums (FYP), China Life appears to have higher productivity
per agent than Ping An. This is also true if we take the total premium income per
agent.
Figure 100: Agent productivity (based on FYP) Figure 101: Agent productivity (based on total premium income)
Rmb Rmb
450,000 600,000
400,000
500,000
350,000
300,000 400,000
250,000
300,000
200,000
150,000 200,000
100,000
100,000
50,000
0 0
2005 2006 2007 1H08 2008 1H09 2005 2006 2007 1H08 2008 1H09
Source: Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates. Source: Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates.
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the long-term investment assumption has the potential to increase to 6.0% from
4.5%-5.0%, at present. This would have a notable positive impact to their embedded
value (see next section for more details).
Figure 102: Real estate investment in Asia Figure 103: Potential investment in real estate by Chinese insurers
% of total investments Rmb in billions
4,000
12%
3,342
3,500
10%
3,000
8% 2,400
2,500
6% 2,000
4% 1,500 5% of total assets,
2% 1,000 7% of total inv estment
0% 500 167
0
FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Total assets in sector, FY08 Total inv estment in sector, FY09E Real estate as % of total assets
Taiw an Korea Australia
Figure 104: China Life's investment assumption Figure 105: Ping An Life's investment assumption
% %
6.5 6.5
6.0 6.0
5.5 5.5
5.0 5.0
4.5 4.5
4.0 4.0
3.5 3.5
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
2008 assumption 2007 2006 2005 2004 2008 assumption 2007 2006 2005 2004
We expect in the long run the investment return can improve further from the current
levels assumed when more asset classes are added to the investment portfolio. We
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estimate that the long-term sustainable investment returns can reach approximately
6% for Chinese insurers from 5.0%-5.5% at present.
EV sensitivity to investments
Insurance companies’ embedded value (EV) is sensitive to changes in investment
assumption. We estimate that a 10% increase in investment assumption would
translate into an 8.1% increase in EV for China Life and 12.2% increase for Ping An.
Based on our estimated potential long-term investment assumption of 6%, if the
property sector is included and an increase in infrastructure investment, the
investment returns would be roughly 20% higher than the investment yield assumed
at present. This would result in significant enhancement to the embedded value
estimates (Table 57).
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Figure 106: Recurring investment yield Figure 107: Total investment yield
% %
6.0% 15.0%
5.0%
10.0%
4.0%
3.0%
5.0%
2.0%
1.0% 0.0%
0.0% 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009E
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009e -5.0%
China Life Ping An PICC China Life Ping An PICC
Source: Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates. Source: Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates.
Figure 108: Equity investments by Chinese insurers Figure 109: China insurers used to have the lowest equity investments
% of total investments % of total investments
30.0% 40%
35%
25.0%
30%
20.0%
25%
15.0% 20%
15%
10.0%
10%
5.0%
5%
0.0% 0%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009E 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009E
China Life Ping An PICC China Australia Taiwan Korea
Source: Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates. Source: Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates. Note: Australia is based on total
shareholders' funds only. The ratio on a like-with-like basis would be a lot lower.
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Figure 110: P/BV multiples: China vs. Asia vs. Developed markets
x
10.0
9.0
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Chinese insurers are not cheap, but they could get very
expensive
One of the common concerns about the insurance sector is that it is not a cheap
sector, by almost all valuation yardsticks. Insurers are trading at higher P/E and P/BV
multiples than banks which are presumably more transparent and easier to
understand. In terms of P/EV, Chinese insurers are the most expensive ones in Asia
and when compared to insurers in the developed markets. In fact, the valuations of
the Chinese insurers are only reaching the levels achieved at the beginning of 2007,
and still far off from the peak. Although the conditions are somewhat different right
now than they were in 2007, the sector has underperformed the market and the
banking sector this year.
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80.0
6
70.0
5 60.0
50.0
4
40.0
3
30.0
2 20.0
10.0
1
0.0
0 -10.0
Dec-03 Jun-04 Dec-04 Jun-05 Dec-05 Jun-06 Dec-06 Jun-07 Dec-07 Jun-08 Dec-08 Jun-09 Dec-03 Jun-04 Dec-04 Jun-05 Dec-05 Jun-06 Dec-06 Jun-07 Dec-07 Jun-08 Dec-08 Jun-09
China Life Ping An China Life Ping An
Source: Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates. Source: Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates.
Figure 113: P/BV multiples: China vs. Asia vs. developed markets Figure 114: Premium growth in key Asian markets
x %, y/y
10.0 50.0%
39.1%
8.0 40.0%
2.0 10.0%
0.0 0.0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
China Asia ex -China US/UK/JP China Korea Taiw an
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In Korea, listed insurance stocks are mainly non-life companies and therefore P/E
and P/BV multiples are more relevant to compare with the banking stocks. In Korea,
insurance companies have higher ROE and trade at slightly higher P/BV multiple
than banking stocks.
Figure 115: P/BV multiples: Insurers vs. Banks; Asia vs. Developed market
x
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Asia Pac Banks Asia Pac Insurance
Dev eloped market Banks Dev eloped market Insurance
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Figure 116: P/E multiples: China banks vs. insurance Figure 117: P/BV multiples: China banks vs. insurance
x x
120.0 CH banks CH ins 12.0 CH banks CH ins
100.0 10.0
80.0 8.0
60.0 6.0
40.0 4.0
20.0 2.0
0.0 0.0
Nov-03
May-04
Nov-04
May-05
Nov-05
May-06
Nov-06
May-07
Nov-07
May-08
Nov-08
May-09
Nov-03
May-04
Nov-04
May-05
Nov-05
May-06
Nov-06
May-07
Nov-07
May-08
Nov-08
May-09
Source: Bloomberg, company reports, and J.P. Morgan estimates. Source: Bloomberg, company reports, and J.P. Morgan estimates.
Figure 118: P/E multiples: Korea banks vs. insurance Figure 119: P/BV multiples: Korea banks vs. insurance
x x
20.0 KR banks KR ins 3.5 KR banks KR ins
18.0
16.0 3.0
14.0 2.5
12.0
2.0
10.0
8.0 1.5
6.0 1.0
4.0
2.0 0.5
0.0 0.0
Nov-03
May-04
Nov-04
May-05
Nov-05
May-06
Nov-06
May-07
Nov-07
May-08
Nov-08
May-09
Nov-03
May-04
Nov-04
May-05
Nov-05
May-06
Nov-06
May-07
Nov-07
May-08
Nov-08
May-09
Source: Bloomberg, company reports, and J.P. Morgan estimates. Source: Bloomberg, company reports, and J.P. Morgan estimates.
Figure 120: P/E multiples: Taiwan banks vs. insurance Figure 121: P/BV multiples: Taiwan banks vs. insurance
x x
900.0 TW banks TW ins 3.5 TW banks TW ins
800.0
3.0
700.0
600.0 2.5
500.0 2.0
400.0 1.5
300.0
200.0 1.0
100.0 0.5
0.0 0.0
Nov-03
May-04
Nov-04
May-05
Nov-05
May-06
Nov-06
May-07
Nov-07
May-08
Nov-08
May-09
Nov-03
May-04
Nov-04
May-05
Nov-05
May-06
Nov-06
May-07
Nov-07
May-08
Nov-08
May-09
Source: Bloomberg, company reports, and J.P. Morgan estimates. Source: Bloomberg, company reports, and J.P. Morgan estimates.
123
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 122: Market cap of financial sector (ex-property) Figure 123: Total assets of financial sector (ex-property)
% of total % of total
40% 40%
22% 22%
14% 17%
20% 7% 20% 11%
6% 7% 4% 4%
0% 0%
0% 0%
Banks Insurance Others Banks Insurance Others
China Asia Pac US/UK/Japan China Asia Pac US/UK/Japan
Source: FactSet and J.P. Morgan. Source: FactSet and J.P. Morgan.
124
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 124: Penetration rate (Life premium-to-GDP) Figure 125: Life insurance density (Premium per capita)
% US$
14 12.8 13.3 6,000
12
10.3 9.9 5,000
10 8.9 8.4 8.0
7.6 4,000
8
3,000
6 4.8
4.2 4.1 4.0 3.6
4 2,000
2.2
1.0 1.4
2 1,000
0
0
USA Japan UK PRC Korea India Taiwan Hong Kong
USA Japan UK PRC Korea India Taiwan Hong Kong
Overseas Chinese stocks Jun 2005: Invest up to 10% of total foreign investment quota permitted by SAFE.
Also allow to invest through QDII and RMB conversion.
Infrastructure Allow indirect investment in selective infrastructure projects since March 2006.
Non-publicly traded entities Allow to invest in non-publicly traded commercial banks since Sep 2006. Likely to
extend to other sectors including resources, telecom and energy.
Others including property Investment in commercial property sector may open up.
Source: CIRC.
125
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009E
-5.0%
-10.0%
China Australia Taiw an Korea
-15.0%
Source: Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates. Note: investment yield for Australia represents investment returns on
shareholders’ funds only.
Insurance companies should not compete head on with the banks, in our view. Banks
are conducting largely short-term businesses (with the exception of mortgage loans
and some medium-term financing). Customer deposits are ‘sticky’ and tend to stay
with the banks for a long period of time. In contrast, insurance business is more long
term, especially in the life business, where policies can last for a few decades. In our
view, Chinese insurers have focused too much on short-term business (single and
three-year regular premiums) in the past, and in doing so have competed head on
with the banks, which have a natural competitive advantage on customer deposits. In
China, short-term insurance policies are mainly distributed through the
bancassurance channel and it involves insurers paying high commissions to their
banking partners. We believe insurers are better off using their strengths by selling
long-term regular premium policies through the individual agents because this is the
business the banks find it hard to compete with without a dedicated insurance sales
force.
126
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Traditional insurers:
AIA 4.3% 11.4% -7.1%
Manulife 4.3% 5.7% -1.4%
AXA China 4.4% 4.5% -0.1%
Other insurers 47.2% 61.7% -14.5%
Source: OCI.
An insurance-led financial group in China is a new concept
Ping An is adopting what it calls a “three-pillar” strategy to develop insurance,
banking, and asset management in order to build an integrated financial services
provider in China. Given that insurance is already quite well established (second-
largest in market share in China) relative to the other two businesses, the group is
still predominantly an insurance-led financial institution, in our view. Although Ping
An plans to enhance its banking platform by acquiring a 30% stake in Shenzhen
Development Bank, it is too early to judge whether such an insurance-led banking
model will work in China. Based on our understanding, there are not many leading
insurance-led financial institutions in the world (e.g., AIG in the past), and some
European banks are actually disposing of their insurance subsidiaries following the
recent financial crisis in order to preserve capital.
Capital is adequate but not excessive
Chinese insurance companies do not strike us as having excessive capital, with the
exception of China Life. Both Ping An Life and PICC have a solvency margin that is
slightly above the minimum requirement. Both companies have resorted to raising
subordinated debt to increase their capital ratios, but the setback of this is that the
closer to the expiry date of these debts the less it will be counted as capital in the
solvency calculation. Fund raising through equity issuance is another possibility but
given the relatively high volatility and low-return of the listed insurance companies
in China, the dilution effect is likely to deter potential investors. We believe the
insurers should work harder to deliver a more stable return to shareholders, but this
may imply a reduction in equity exposure and much improved risk management.
Table 63: Solvency above statutory requirement
Actual solvency Excess solvency
Margin, 1H09 above min.
% (Rmb mm)
China Life 324% 99,744
Ping An Life 221% 24,572
PICC* 118% 2,408
Ping An P&C 161% 2,386
Source: Company reports. Note: PICC solvency margin has improved to 157% after the recent issuance of Rmb5 billion sub-debt.
127
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Healthcare
Leon Chik AC We prefer pharmaceuticals and distribution now and
(852) 2800-8590
leon.hk.chik@jpmorgan.com
suggest waiting for medical equipment and consumables
We believe that investments in the healthcare sector will continue to be strong even
J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited
after the current round of stimulus-related spending because healthcare is one of the
few industries in China with no excess capacity, very little demand for resources, and
can employ a large number of skilled workers. Therefore, we believe that the
investment in new healthcare facilities to continue to be strong even after other
stimulus-related spending in infrastructure (rail, roads, subways, etc) starts to fade
away as the government focus less on stimulus and more on containing inflation and
asset prices. We also see government policies fostering more private investments,
consolidation in the industry, and the promotion of enterprises that can become
global leaders.
Figure 127: China’s healthcare-related fixed asset investment Figure 128: China—Government expenditure in healthcare
80% 80%
60% 60%
Pct Chg Y/Y
40% 40%
20% 20%
0%
0%
Mar-08
Jul-08
Sep-08
Jan-09
Mar-09
Jul-09
Sep-09
May-08
Nov-08
May-09
07
07
08
08
09
09
7
8
7
9
v-0
v-0
-0
-0
-0
b-
g-
b-
g-
b-
g-
ay
ay
ay
Fe
Au
Fe
Au
Fe
Au
No
No
M
In the meantime, the focus on capital spending, combined with credit tightening, has
ironically resulted in more subdued expenditure in healthcare by the government as
well as public hospitals. We believe this has contributed to a lull in spending in 2H09
which we believe to be temporary (see the falling Y/Y growth in overall government
expenditure in healthcare in the right-hand side figure above). Typically, credit
availability improves in the first half of the year and we expect demand from new
hospitals should start in 2H10. If this is the case, then the slowdown in 2H09 should
result in pent-up demand for 2010.
128
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
In the next three-six months, we believe the best opportunity would be in the
pharmaceutical distribution sector and traditional Chinese medicines as well as low-
cost western medicines. These sectors can participate in the long-term secular growth
of the healthcare industry in China but not suffer the risk of falling demand for
bigger ticket items such as medical equipment and medical consumables that may see
demand being temporarily delayed from 2009 until 2010, due to the government’s
huge commitments to construct hospitals and other infrastructure projects in 2009.
Longer term, we suggest that investors look towards the increase in demand that the
new hospitals should bring over the next two years. We expect the pent-up demand
for healthcare products (equipment and consumables) to resume once the stimulus-
related spending slows down, perhaps in late 2010 or early 2011.
Company highlights: Our top pick in this sector is Sinopharm (1099HK, OW) due
to its simple growth story, comprising strong pharmaceutical sales growth in China
and market share gains by the largest operator. We also see good value in China
Shineway (2877HK, OW), China’s leading maker of traditional Chinese medicines
(TCM) that is doubling its sales force over two years to sell its products to the rural
population. Shandong Weigao (8199HK, OW) is one of China’s leading medical
consumables makers, which is growing slower than normal due to hospitals cutting
back on purchases due to a lack of credit, but we see this as a buying opportunity
before sales pick up again in 2010E. We have a Neutral rating on Mindray (MR US)
because more than half of its sales are in overseas markets which have contracted in
2009, and we prefer to wait for more evidence of an export recovery.
129
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Real estate
AC
Raymond Ngai, CFA
(852) 2800-8527 We expect near-term stable policy for the property sector
raymond.ch.ngai@jpmorgan.com
Monetary policy likely to remain accommodative
Lucia Kw ong, CFA After the CPC meeting, investors are relieved that the central government intends to
(852) 2800-8526
maintain its pro growth policy stance; hence, the accommodative monetary policy is
lucia.yk.kwong@jpmorgan.com
unlikely to be reverted soon. Homebuyers expect some of the incentives provided at
Sunny Tam, CFA local government level to expire by end of this year, but property prices should
(852) 2800-8524 remain firm in FY10. Hence, the secondary markets in Beijing and Shanghai were
sunny.wy.tam@jpmorgan.com
J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited
buoyant in the past few weeks.
We expect stable policy in the near term but more risk in the medium term
We expect relatively accommodative policies to stay in the near term, although in the
medium term, we believe the risk may emerge from the implementation of property
tax on high-end residential. Shenzhen was cited to be one of the first pilot cities to try
implementing property tax, and the key risk lies in the fact that the tax rate of
property tax might be high so as to deter speculative demand and hoarding of
properties. We would probably get more details around the next National People’s
Congress (NPC) meeting in around March/April next year.
130
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Information
Primary sales fell only 5% M/M in November, a traditionally slow season
Property sales volumes in the eight major cities we track were down around 5/% in
November, after strong sales in October during the Golden Week holidays and also
trade fairs held in the same month. We believe this was not bad at all, given that
November is a traditionally slow season.
131
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
132
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Non-consensus calls
Gaining market share is key for 2010
While we expect an overall slowdown in sales in 2010, and a possible softening in
prices, we believe some developers can still achieve sales growth via more new
project launches in more cities and capturing larger market share. Most developers
have locked in 50%-70% of their FY10 earnings through pre-sales already; in our
view, the winners will be those who are able to achieve good sales in 2010 and
secure strong growth for 2011. We believe mid-caps will offer more upside than
large caps, as they should be able to deliver higher growth on a lower base.
133
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
and heavy weight of Shanghai Bay assumptions in our EPS forecasts and NAV
estimate.
134
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 129: China property—Sector P/E ratio (all stocks under Figure 130: China property—Sector P/E ratio (ex-NWCL and Vanke)
coverage) 56
52
50 48
44
45 40 +2 Std dev
40 +2 Std dev 36
32
35
28 +1 Std dev
30 +1 Std dev 24
20
25
Average = 18.7X 16
20 12
15 8
-1 Std dev 4 -1 Std dev
10 0
5 -4 -2 Std dev
-2 Std dev -8
0
Jan 03 Jan 04 Jan 05 Jan 06 Jan 07 Jan 08 Jan 09
Jan 03 Jan 04 Jan 05 Jan 06 Jan 07 Jan 08 Jan 09
A
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
Figure 131: China property—Sector NAV prm/disc Figure 132: China property— Sector NAV prm/disc (ex- Vanke)
100% 60%
80% 40%
60%
+2 Std dev 20%
40% +2 Std dev
20% 0%
+1 Std dev
0% -20% +1 Std dev
-20%
-40%
-40%
Long Term Avg: -5% -60%
-60%
-80% -80% Long Term Avg: -25%
May -103Std Mar 04 Jan 05 Nov 05 Sep 06 Jul 07 May 08 Mar 09 -100%
May 03 Mar 04 Jan 05 Nov 05 Sep 06 Jul 07 May 08 Mar 09
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
Figure 133: China property—Sector P/B ratio (all stocks under Figure 134: China property—Sector P/B ratio (ex-NWCL and Vanke)
coverage) 5.0
5.0 4.5
4.5 4.0 +2 Stdev
4.0 3.5
+2 Stdev
3.5 3.0 +1 Stdev
3.0 2.5
+1 Stdev
2.5 2.0
Mean
2.0 1.5
135
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Transportation
Corrine Png A C Summary
(65) 6882-1514
corrine.ht.png@jpmorgan.com The transport sector is highly leveraged to a global recovery. We have forecast a
moderate 7% and 8% rebound in passenger and shipping volumes in 2010,
J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited respectively. However, upside surprises are possible as passenger and cargo demand
have historically grown at 1.7x and 2.0x real GDP growth, respectively, and J.P.
Morgan Economics team forecasts a 7.2% real GDP growth for Asia ex-Japan in
2010. We are more bullish on the airline and land transport sectors’ earnings
recovery than shipping, as the former does not face structural overcapacity once
demand normalizes. We believe the slew of deliveries will delay the shipping
sector’s return to sustainable profitability to 2H10 at the earliest. However, as this is
already widely known, a smaller supply-demand gap (especially for dry bulk) could
drive an earlier re-rating. Rebounding fuel prices are less of a concern when demand
recovers as surcharges help to offset this impact—the transport sector’s record-high
profits in 2007 testify to this. Most transport stocks are beneficiaries of a weaker US
dollar, given their large US$ capex and debt. This downturn will likely drive
consolidation, but cross-border M&A is more difficult due to regulatory restrictions
and political sensitivity.
How much of the recovery has been priced in?
Transport stocks are early cyclicals and have started to price in part of the recovery.
Most are near their historical average valuations, partly because huge losses have
significantly eroded their book values. Although the stocks could trade range-bound
in the near term or correct when they announce weak 2H/4Q results, we see any
weakness as a good opportunity to accumulate airlines and select shipping and land
transport companies as they have historically provided large absolute and relative
returns in a cyclical upturn.
Recommendations
We prefer airlines to shipping in the Chinese transport sector and our top pick is Air
China, which we expect to outperform more than the domestically-focused China
Southern and the restructuring China Eastern. We remain cautious on the shipping
sector but are incrementally more positive in 2010 than we were in early 2009 and
our top pick is China Shipping Container Lines, given its backend-loaded vessel
deliveries and capex.
136
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
20.0
20.0
15.0
15.0
10.0
10.0
5.0
5.0
0.0
0.0
-5.0
-5.0
-10.0
-10.0
-15.0
-15.0
2200 EE
2200 EE
2200 EE
EE
9911
9922
9933
9944
9955
9966
9977
9988
9999
0022
0033
0044
0055
0066
0077
0088
0000
0011
0099
1100
1111
1122
1199
1199
1199
2200
2200
2200
1199
1199
1199
1199
1199
1199
2200
2200
2200
2200
2200
2200
2200
Source: AAPA, IATA, company reports, CEIC, J.P. Morgan estimates.
137
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Telecom
Jimmy Cheong AC
(852) 2800 8566
jimmy.j.cheong@jpmorgan.com
We remain cautious on the Chinese telecom sector going
into 2010
Michelle Wei
(852) 2800-8562 We do not have an Overweight rating on the sector. Our top pick on a relative
michelle.z.wei@jpmorgan.com basis is China Mobile and our top stock to avoid is China Unicom.
J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific)
Limited • Capex leading itself to overcapacity: We believe all three operators will spend
high capex budgets in 2009. China’s telecom sector will spend its highest annual
capex on record this year of close to Rmb400 billion. This could be the highest
annual capex spend on record, representing a rise of 72% in 2009 from 2007
levels and 33% from 2008 levels. This compares with 2002- 2007, when the
capex CAGR was only 1.6%. Operators have aggressive network expansion and
3G rollout plans for 2009. We believe there could be a plethora of capacity
coming on board in 2010.
• Previous capex bubbles saw underperformance: Previous capex humps have
led to several years of industry overcapacity. Being SOEs, we feel the three
telecom operators are being asked by the government to do their part in
stimulating the domestic economy via infrastructure spend on telecom equipment.
It also reflects more fundamentally the worsening competitive position for the
industry over the next 1-2 years, as all new capex could turn into empty capacity,
in our view. Fundamentals will likely be steered by this capex issue which keeps
us cautious. This impact has just started to hit financials.
• Industry restructuring leading to more credible competition: In the past
several years CM has been enjoying a very comfortable competitive environment
whereby it captured most of the industry’s new subscribers, revenues and
profitability. Industry restructuring changed all that. There are now two credible
competitors to challenge CM’s dominance. Both CT and CU have intentions to
significantly lift their mobile market share. We think price competition could
accelerate.
• 3G earnings risk: 3G rollouts and associated high sales and marketing costs are
likely to depress margins and profitability, affecting earnings over the next
several quarters. As we conclude that the 3G service plan take-up is likely to
remain lackluster due to high pricing, stocks riding on the success of 3G
subscriptions (i.e. China Unicom) have the highest risk to disappoint, in our view.
• Shenzhen Analyst Day: CM’s Analyst Day showcased what they believe to
be the next major area of growth. With penetration at 55%, continued tariff
pressures, declining elasticity and lower ARPU from new rural customers,
CM admitted that it will be challenging to maintain growth. However,
management is confident future growth will come from 3G-4G value-added
138
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Industry news
(Extracted from the note, “China Telco Monthly: Oct-09 MIIT industry data
highlights: Slight revenue drop, capex still high and the mobile net adds momentum
continues”, published on 27 November 2009; please see the original note for pricing
dates)
139
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
140
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
141
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 138: Guangdong GDP : Signs of economic recovery Figure 139: Guangdong: Monthly avg. rainfall differential (in mm) *
15% 1,200 100
Guangdong’s rainfall in Jul-Oct09 was much
1,000 80 drier than historical avg., while Jul-Oct08 had
13%
60 higher rainfall. We believe Nov09 will also
800
11% 40 record low rainfall figures
600 20 -30 +25 -140
9% -30
400 0
7% -20
200
-40
5% - -60 2008 2009
1Q072Q073Q074Q081Q082Q083Q084Q081Q092Q093Q09 -80
Real GDP grow th % (LHS) Nominal GDP (RHS in Rmb B) Jul Aug Sep Oct
Source: CEIC * Avg. monthly rainfall differential represents the difference between (1) average rainfall in a given
month in Guangdong vs. (2) the long term historical average rainfall in Guangdong in that month.
I.e. a negative value represents a dry month while a positive value indicates a wet month.
** Figures shown in the chart represent the rainfall difference between 2008 vs. 2009
Source: China Weather Observatory Bureau
Our calculations suggest that every 10% increase in China water sales will lead to a
potential 3-4% 2009E EPS upside. While that might not sound like a lot, we believe
it will surprise investors given that the stock has only delivered ~11% core earnings
growth over the past 2-3 years.
142
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 140: Power production in Guangdong Province Table 70: GDI’s power business profit & loss position (in HK$ MM)
1H07 2H07 1H08 2H08 1H09
Y/Y Pow er dmd grow th % (LHS) 30.0 Segmental profit / losses 94 (383) (101) (180) (33)
10% during the period
Pow er produced (RHS in Bln Kw h)
25.0 Attributable profits (losses) 12 16 (32) (3) (10)
0%
from associates / JCE
-10% Total profits (losses) after 106 (367) (133) (183) (43)
20.0 impairment losses
-20% Of which: Impairment losses - (469) (55) (134) (75)
15.0 recorded
-30% Total profits (losses) 106 102 (78) (49) 32
incurred before impairment
-40% 10.0
losses
Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr- May - Jun- Jul- Aug- Sep- Oct- Source: Company
09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09
Source: CEIC (Note: We use the power production in Guangdong as opposed to power
consumption in Guangdong because ALL of GDI’s power plants are located in the Guangdong
Province. Hence, power supplied from other areas (e.g. 3 Gorges) are not as relevant
While it might be too simplistic to draw the conclusion that GDI’s investment
property assets are recorded at a lower valuation level in Jun 2009 than in Dec 2006
(due to constant changes in its property asset portfolio from period to period), it is
conceivable that there is room for further upward revision on property values in
2H09. Our calculations suggest that every HK$100MM property revaluation gain
might lead to a potential ~5% 2009E EPS boost.
143
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Figure 141: Power production in Guangdong Province Table 71: Sensitivity analysis on increased China power business
Impact on 2009E pre-
100% Total net loss position of 600 tax profits
80% HK$216MM from 1H07 400 HK$400MM revaluation gain in 2H09 19.6%
60% to 1H09 (RHS) 200 HK$300MM revaluation gain in 2H09 14.7%
40% HK$200MM revaluation gain in 2H09 9.8%
-
20% HK$100MM revaluation gain in 2H09 4.9%
(200) Base case (no revaluation gain in 2H09) 0%
0%
-20% (400) Source: J.P. Morgan estimates
-40% (600)
-60% (800)
1H07 2H07 1H08 2H08 1H09
Property rev al gain (loss) (RHS in HK$MM)
As a % of core profits (LHS in %)
Source: Company data
Asset injections unlikely in near term, but gearing falling fast: Our recent
discussions with management lead us to believe that any potential asset injections
will not be likely over the next 3-6 months. But with its strong FCF position, we
expect GDI’s gearing to fall to <15% by 2010YE from 33% in 1H09A.
Impact: Low risk, reasonable return pick: While investors might remain
disappointed over the continued delay in potential asset injections, we reiterate OW
due to (1) its expected strong 2H09E earnings (including the expected non-core
property revaluation gain) and (2) undemanding valuation at 11x 2010E PER, 3%
dividend yield & ~11% 2009-11E EPS CAGR. GDI is one of the cheapest stocks in
our China utility / infrastructure space (other than Huaneng / Harbin / Huadian /
CCCC) while having one of the lowest risk profile & highest earnings visibility, in
our view. The stock might appeal to investors who are concerned about (1) potential
macro tightening, (2) margin squeeze & (3) demanding valuation in other sectors.
144
Frank Li Asia Pacific Equity Research
(852) 2800-8511 19 December 2009
frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
Information
Information 1: China wind—Expect strong 2H09 results
Extracted from the note, “China High Speed Transmission: Riding the wave;
reiterate OW,” published on 11 November 2009. Please see the original note for
pricing dates.
Our recent discussions with CHSTE’s management indicated that operations in 2H09
remained strong. We believe this implies that the company’s core businesses are in
line to deliver the full-year target in FY2009, in particular the wind gearbox business
(6,000MW, vs. 2,055MW in 1H09).
Strong YTD addition in new installed wind capacity, potentially surpassing US
The potentially strong performance of CHSTE is consistent with our understanding
in the wind sector. In Jan-Sep’09, China’s total new installed wind capacity reached
4.1GW (vs. 4.7GW for FY2008). And according to china5e.com, China is expected
to double its wind capacity from ~13GW in 2008YE to 26GW in 2009YE.
Considering that new wind capacity addition in the US will be <9GW this year,
China might rank #1 in new wind capacity addition in 2009 (vs. #2 in 2008).
Table 72: Global wind annual new installed capacity addition & o/s installed wind capacity
2008 Installed
2008 Annual capacity Y/Y capacity, EOY Y/Y
Country add'n (MW) % Country (MW) %
It is expected that China 1 USA 8,358 137% USA 25,170 50%
(13GW) will surpass the 2 China 6,300 278% Germany 23,903 7%
USA (<9GW) to be #1 3 India 1,800 4% Spain 16,754 11%
country in new installed 4 Germany 1,665 -68% China 12,210 102%
wind capacity in 2009E 5 Spain 1,609 -53% India 9,645 21%
6 Italy 1,010 67% Italy 3,736 37%
7 France 950 119% France 3,404 39%
8 UK 836 96% UK 3,241 36%
9 Portugal 712 84% Denmark 3,180 2%
10 Denmark 77 -91% Portugal 2,862 33%
ROW 3,739 117% ROW 16,686 28%
Total 27,056 35% Total 120,791 0%
Source: GWEA
145
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Figure 142: China’s renewable target (excluding hydro, in MW) Figure 143: Upward revision on 2020 wind target by the Government
2,000 2% 160 10%
140 w ind capacity (LHS MW)
1,500
2020E: Total renewable target 1% 8%
= 290GW, vs. 18GW in 2008A 9% 5% 120 As a % of total cap. (RHS %)
100 6%
~0%
1,000 80
1% ~0% 4%
83% 60
500 1% 40
98% 2%
20
- 0 0%
2008A 2020E 2008A 2020E target 2020E target 2020E target
Coal+hydro Wind Nuclear Solar Biomass (2005) (2008) (now )
Figure 144: Wind turbine sales revenue for GW & DF (in Rmb MM) Figure 145: Wind turbine gross profit for GW & DF (in Rmb MM)
8,000 8000
+198% GW DF 25% GW DF
7,000 7000
6,000 6000
+168% 16%
5,000 5000
4,000 +178% 4000 27%
3,000 3000 26%
13%
2,000 +320% 2000 19% 23%
1,000 1000 6%
0 0
1-3Q09 1-3Q08 3Q09 3Q08 1-3Q09 1-3Q08 3Q09 3Q08
Source: Company. % Figures represent Y/Y % growth. Source: Company. % Figures represent % gross margin.
We believe the strong 3Q09 performance by Dongfang and Goldwind also helped
alleviate market concerns about CHSTE and the sector on (1) margin pressure due to
over-capacity in downstream wind turbine producers, (2) bottleneck created by grid
connection.
146
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Table 73: Recent price cuts by Goldwind on key component suppliers Figure 146: Capacity ramp-up by major Chinese WTG producers (MW)
Remarks
Supplier 1 14,000 Windey
Date of company 12,000 JPM 2010E new wind capacity Baoding
announcement 18 Sep 2009 addition in China
Name of supplier Zhuzhou CSR Electric Corp 10,000 Xiangtan
Key component supplies 1.5 Permanent magnet direct drive power 8,000
generator stator SHE
Original contract amounts Contract 1: Rmb 240MM 6,000
Huay i
Contract 2: Rmb 960MM 4,000 ~45% 2008-
Revised contract amounts Contract 1: Rmb 198MM (18% cut) 10E CAGR DFE
Contract 2: Rmb 878MM (9% cut) 2,000
GW
Supplier 2 -
Date of company Sinov el
announcement 9 Sep 2009 2008E
2008A 2010E
China National Building Materials Blades
Source: CWEA, China Electricity Newspaper, JPM estimates
Name of supplier Corp
Note: The above analysis exclude capacity for foreign players (e.g. Suzlon / GE / Vestas),
Key component supplies Wind turbine blades implying that overcapacity situation might be more severe than expected.
Original contract amount Rmb 630MM
Revised contract amount Rmb 595MM (6% cut)
Source: Company reports
Source: Hansen
147
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1-3Q2009 despite the bottleneck situation and (2) the NDRC has already identified
this as one of the major problems in the development of the sector and hence more
remedies will likely be remedies from Grid Companies going forward.
In addition, upstream component suppliers like CHSTE will likely have less direct
impact on the issue than downstream players such as wind turbine producers / wind
farm operators, as the former do not need to deal with Grid Companies directly.
Information 2: China city gas—New gas pricing policy still under review
Extracted from the note, “China City Gas Distributors: Maintaining our bullish
stance,” published on 06 November 2009. Please see the original note for pricing
dates.
Our latest understanding of the impending gas pricing policy is that it is still under
review by various involved parties. As reported by Bloomberg on 2 Nov 2009,
management of the ENN Group (Xinao’s parent) “received a proposal of the price
reform from the government about two months ago. The Chinese government was
seeking feedback on potential changes to the (gas) pricing”. China City Gas
Association (26 Oct 2009) also reported that the oil majors have received gas pricing
proposals from the Government authorities for feedback. We maintain our view that
the policy will likely be in place by 1H10, given that more gas will be imported into
China next year (e.g. Turkmenistan).
148
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Table 75: Potential key terms of proposed gas pricing policies as quoted by industry participants
Pricing methodology JPM Comments
ENN Upstream gas prices to Hard to tell which “base” gas price they are referring to.
Group increase by 20-30% and retail But if we use Xinao’s 1H2009 average gas purchase price of Rmb
(Xinao’s prices may rise about 10 %, 1.72 / m3, gas price might increase to Rmb 2.06-Rmb 2.23 / m3 under
parent) accordingly. the new policy.
Still, it is lower than the >Rmb 3/m3 for Turkmenistan / Qater LNG.
Future gas prices might be We already have similar mechanism under the current regulatory
linked to products including regime, except that the annual increase is capped at 8%.
coal and crude oil
Downstream natural gas Similar in nature to the automatic pass through mechanism
prices will more closely
reflect upstream price
movements
Petro- Standardized (across the If a standardized price is used, there will be no problem in dealing
china country), blended & weighted- with the amount of gas price increment for each gas source (e.g.
average principle between (1) WE1, WE2, etc).
domestic and (2) imported gas. As a reference, China’s total natural gas consumption in 2008 was
80.7B m3, of which 4.4B m3 (5%) were from imports.
Under this method, natural gas price will only be able to rise gradually
given that the imported portion will likely remain small over the next 3-
5 years. We believe there will be certain "one-off" increment (say Rmb
0.4 / m3 hike) first before such method is adopted.
One potential issue to deal with will be how to align end-user tariffs
amongst different cities if input gas prices were adjusted to a
standardized price.
Source: Bloomberg, China City Gas Association
149
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Figure 148: Fuel cost competitiveness in Shanghai for residential Figure 149: Fuel cost competitiveness in Beijing for residential users
users (in Rmb / GJ)
(in Rmb / GJ)
140 +128% 127 %
180 +140%
120 +83%
+ 54%
160 +70%
140 + 67% 100
120 80 +20%
100 +32% 0%
0% 60
80
60 40
40 Nat Gas Nat Gas Nat Gas Nat Gas LPG Electricity
Nat Gas Nat Gas Nat Gas LPG Electricity (Current) (CTG) * (SJ3) * (int'l price) (Current) (Current)
(Current) (SEP) * (int'l price) (Current) (Current) **
**
Source: NDRC. China Gas Association.
Source: NDRC. China Gas Association. Note: % figures represents % premium on natural gas at current price levels.
Note: % figures represents % premium on natural gas at current price levels. * Assume 100% pass-thru on end-user tariffs when gas costs increase from current level to CTG
* Assume 100% pass-thru on end-user tariffs when gas costs increase from WE1 level to SEP. and SJ3 respectively.
** Same principle as *, except that gas cost increase from WE1 level to int'l level ** Same principle as *, except that gas cost increase from WE1 level to int'l level
(US$12/mmbtu) (US$12/mmbtu)
150
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Appendix I:
Following text used by permission from Professor Robert D. Fiala of Concordia
University, Nebraska, USA--as excerpted from www.orientalarchitecture.com
The Bund (Waitan) is one of the most recognizable architectural symbols of
Shanghai. "Bund" derives from an Anglo-Indian word for an embankment along a
muddy waterfront and that is what it was in the beginning when the first British
company opened an office there in 1846. Located on the west bank of a bend
(running north and south at this point) in the Huangpu River and just south of Suzhou
Creek, the Bund became the site of some of the earliest foreign settlements after
Shanghai was opened as one of five "Treaty Ports" in the Treaty of Nanjing that
ended the Opium War in 1842. Because of its proximity to the Yangtze (Changjiang)
River--the path into central China, Shanghai grew rapidly as the economic center of
foreign interests.
Jardine Matheson & Company bought its first land here in 1848 and the river front
soon became vital to the interests of the entire foreign settlement. In the latter 19th
early 20th century the Bund became the financial and political center of the
international community and (indeed of much of China). It was China’s Wall Street,
as Shanghai's financial market became the third largest in the world (behind London
and New York). Nearby were located a number of important consulates, including
the British, American, Russian and Japanese.
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 the old tenants
were gone. They had already been impacted by the wartime crises. Many of the
structures were subdivided into government offices, department stores or storage
areas, furnishings were sold off or destroyed, and architectural features covered. The
Bund, one might say, was moribund.
151
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The area does have a new vitality. Zhongshan Dong Lu has been widened to ten
lanes to accommodate the increased Shanghai motor traffic, and the promenade along
the banks of the Huangpu has also been elevated and enhanced as a place to view the
ever-changing skyline of Pudong across the water. It actually is part of a new dike to
protect the city. One only need look at a few images of this area taken in 1980 that
are on this site to gain an appreciation of this new vitality. A decade ago there was
little in Pudong besides warehouses, shipping facilities and small shops. Now it is the
most extensive construction site in the world. Both sides of the Huangpu River
reflect important aspects of Shanghai's heritage—its past, present and future.
152
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Companies Recommended in This Report (all prices in this report as of market close on 18 December 2009, unless
otherwise indicated)
Air China (0753.HK/HK$5.44/Overweight), Alibaba.com Limited (1688.HK/HK$16.32/Neutral), Anhui Conch Cement
Company Limited - H (0914.HK/HK$47.25/Overweight), Baidu.com (BIDU/$415.84 [17-December-2009]/Overweight),
Bank of China - H (3988.HK/HK$4.03/Overweight), Bank of Communications Co (3328.HK/HK$8.73/Overweight),
Beijing Enterprises Holdings Limited (0392.HK/HK$51.85/Overweight), Brilliance China Automotive
(1114.HK/HK$2.29/Overweight), China Citic Bank - H Share (0998.HK/HK$6.18/Overweight), China Coal Energy
(1898.HK/HK$13.40/Overweight), China Construction Bank (0939.HK/HK$6.36/Overweight), China Cosco Holdings, Ltd.
(1919.HK/HK$9.23/Neutral), China Dongxiang Group Co Ltd. (3818.HK/HK$5.28/Neutral), China Gas Holdings Limited
(0384.HK/HK$3.68/Neutral), China High Speed Transmission (0658.HK/HK$18.32/Overweight), China Life Insurance Co.
Ltd (2628.HK/HK$37.80/Overweight), China Mengniu Dairy Co. Ltd. (2319.HK/HK$27.45/Overweight), China Merchants
Bank - H (3968.HK/HK$19.56/Neutral), China Minsheng Banking (600016.SS/Rmb7.50/Neutral), China Mobile Ltd
(0941.HK/HK$71.30/Neutral), China Mobile Ltd (CHL/$45.55 [17-December-2009]/Neutral), China Overseas Land &
Investment (0688.HK/HK$16.32/), China Resources Power Holdings (0836.HK/HK$14.68/Neutral), China Shenhua Energy
(1088.HK/HK$37.15/Neutral), China Shineway Pharmaceutical Group Limited (2877.HK/HK$14.74/Overweight), China
Shipping Container Lines (2866.HK/HK$2.65/Overweight), China Southern Airlines (1055.HK/HK$2.47/Neutral), China
Telecom Corporation Ltd (0728.HK/HK$3.16/Neutral), China Telecom Corporation Ltd (CHA/$41.20 [17-December-
2009]/Neutral), China Unicom (0762.HK/HK$9.86/Underweight), China Unicom (CHU/$12.74 [17-December-
2009]/Underweight), China Yurun Food Group (1068.HK/HK$20.05/Overweight), CNOOC (0883.HK/HK$11.84/Neutral),
DongFeng Motor Co., Ltd. (0489.HK/HK$10.62/Overweight), Franshion Properties (China) Ltd.
(0817.HK/HK$2.67/Overweight), Glorious Property (0845.HK/HK$3.50/Overweight), Great Wall Motor Company Limited
(2333.HK/HK$8.46/Neutral), Greentown China Holdings (3900.HK/HK$12.06/Neutral), Guangdong Investment Limited
(0270.HK/HK$4.25/Overweight), Guangzhou R&F Properties (2777.HK/HK$13.40/Overweight), Hengan International
Group Ltd (1044.HK/HK$55.05/Neutral), Huabao International Holdings Limited (0336.HK/HK$7.87/Neutral), Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China - H (1398.HK/HK$6.20/Overweight), Li Ning Co Ltd (2331.HK/HK$25.50/Neutral),
Maanshan Iron and Steel - H (0323.HK/HK$5.66/Overweight), Mindray Medical (MR/$33.89 [17-December-
2009]/Neutral), Netease (NTES/$37.51 [17-December-2009]/Overweight), PetroChina (0857.HK/HK$9.19/Underweight),
PICC Property & Casualty Co. Ltd (2328.HK/HK$6.84/Underweight), Ping An Insurance (2318.HK/HK$66.50/Neutral),
Qingling Motors Co (1122.HK/HK$1.89/Underweight), Shandong Weigao Group Medical Polymer Co. Ltd.
(8199.HK/HK$25.40/Overweight), Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (600000.SS/Rmb20.73/Overweight), Shenzhen
Development Bank (000001.SZ/Rmb23.93/Overweight), Sina Corp (SINA/$44.86 [17-December-2009]/Neutral), Sinopec
Corp - H (0386.HK/HK$6.66/Overweight), Sinopharm (1099.HK/HK$26.95/Overweight), Sinotruk
(3808.HK/HK$9.36/Neutral), Sohu.Com (SOHU/$53.97 [17-December-2009]/Overweight), Towngas China Company
Limited (1083.HK/HK$2.99/Neutral), Tsingtao Brewery (0168.HK/HK$39.15/Underweight), Weichai Power
(2338.HK/HK$60.35/Neutral), Xinao Gas (2688.HK/HK$18.62/Overweight), Yanzhou Coal Mining - H
(1171.HK/HK$16.12/Neutral), ZTE Corp (0763.HK/HK$43.65/Neutral)
Analyst Certification:
The research analyst(s) denoted by an “AC” on the cover of this report certifies (or, where multiple research analysts are primarily
responsible for this report, the research analyst denoted by an “AC” on the cover or within the document individually certifies, with
respect to each security or issuer that the research analyst covers in this research) that: (1) all of the views expressed in this report
accurately reflect his or her personal views about any and all of the subject securities or issuers; and (2) no part of any of the research
analyst’s compensation was, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed by the
research analyst(s) in this report.
Important Disclosures
• Market Maker: JPMSI makes a market in the stock of Baidu.com, Brilliance China Automotive, Netease, Sina Corp, Sohu.Com.
• Market Maker/ Liquidity Provider: JPMSL and/or an affiliate is a market maker and/or liquidity provider in Alibaba.com Limited,
Bank of China - H, Bank of Communications Co, Brilliance China Automotive, China Coal Energy, China Construction Bank, China
Cosco Holdings, Ltd., China High Speed Transmission, China Merchants Bank - H, China Overseas Land & Investment, China
Shenhua Energy, China Shipping Container Lines, Hengan International Group Ltd, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China - H,
Li Ning Co Ltd, Sina Corp, Sinotruk, Sohu.Com, Yanzhou Coal Mining - H, ZTE Corp.
• Lead or Co-manager: JPMSI or its affiliates acted as lead or co-manager in a public offering of equity and/or debt securities for
China Dongxiang Group Co Ltd., China Overseas Land & Investment, Glorious Property, Huabao International Holdings Limited
within the past 12 months.
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• Director: A senior employee, executive officer or director of JPMorgan Chase & Co. , JPMSI, and/or its affiliates is a director
and/or officer of China Resources Power Holdings.
• Analyst Position: The following analysts (and/or their associates or household members) own a long position in the shares of Bank
of China - H: Adrian Mowat. The following analysts (and/or their associates or household members) own a long position in the
shares of China Citic Bank - H Share: Cindy Xu. The following analysts (and/or their associates or household members) own a long
position in the shares of China Construction Bank: Robert Smith. The following analysts (and/or their associates or household
members) own a long position in the shares of China Cosco Holdings, Ltd.: Adrian Mowat. The following analysts (and/or their
associates or household members) own a long position in the shares of China Life Insurance Co. Ltd: Adrian Mowat. The following
analysts (and/or their associates or household members) own a long position in the shares of China Overseas Land & Investment:
Robert Smith.
• Beneficial Ownership (1% or more): JPMSI or its affiliates beneficially own 1% or more of a class of common equity securities of
Alibaba.com Limited, Anhui Conch Cement Company Limited - H, Bank of China - H, Bank of Communications Co, China Coal
Energy, China Construction Bank, China Life Insurance Co. Ltd, China Merchants Bank - H, China Mobile Ltd, China Shenhua
Energy, China Shipping Container Lines, China Telecom Corporation Ltd, DongFeng Motor Co., Ltd., Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China - H, PetroChina, PICC Property & Casualty Co. Ltd, Sina Corp.
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• Client of the Firm: Air China is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the
company non-investment banking securities-related services and non-securities-related services. Alibaba.com Limited is or was in
the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. Anhui Conch Cement Company Limited - H is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI.
Bank of China - H is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company
investment banking services, non-investment banking securities-related services and non-securities-related services. Bank of
Communications Co is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company
non-investment banking securities-related services and non-securities-related services. Beijing Enterprises Holdings Limited is or
was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. Brilliance China Automotive is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. China
Citic Bank - H Share is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company
non-investment banking securities-related services and non-securities-related services. China Construction Bank is or was in the past
12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company investment banking services, non-
investment banking securities-related services and non-securities-related services. China Cosco Holdings, Ltd. is or was in the past
12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company investment banking services. China
Dongxiang Group Co Ltd. is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the
company investment banking services. China Life Insurance Co. Ltd is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the
past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company investment banking services and non-investment banking securities-related
services. China Merchants Bank - H is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to
the company investment banking services, non-investment banking securities-related services and non-securities-related services.
China Minsheng Banking is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the
company non-investment banking securities-related services and non-securities-related services. China Mobile Ltd is or was in the
past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company non-investment banking securities-
related services. China Overseas Land & Investment is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months,
JPMSI provided to the company investment banking services. China Resources Power Holdings is or was in the past 12 months a
client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company investment banking services. China Shineway
Pharmaceutical Group Limited is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. China Shipping Container Lines is or was in the
past 12 months a client of JPMSI. China Southern Airlines is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. China Telecom
Corporation Ltd is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. China Unicom is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI;
during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company investment banking services. China Yurun Food Group is or was in the
past 12 months a client of JPMSI. CNOOC is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI
provided to the company non-investment banking securities-related services. Franshion Properties (China) Ltd. is or was in the past
12 months a client of JPMSI. Glorious Property is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI
provided to the company investment banking services and non-investment banking securities-related services. Great Wall Motor
Company Limited is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. Greentown China Holdings is or was in the past 12 months a
client of JPMSI. Guangzhou R&F Properties is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. Hengan International Group Ltd is or
was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. Huabao International Holdings Limited is or was in the past 12 months a client of
JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company investment banking services. Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China - H is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company investment
banking services, non-investment banking securities-related services and non-securities-related services. Li Ning Co Ltd is or was in
the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. Mindray Medical is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. Netease is or was in the
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is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company non-investment
banking securities-related services and non-securities-related services. Ping An Insurance is or was in the past 12 months a client of
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Weigao Group Medical Polymer Co. Ltd. is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI
provided to the company investment banking services. Shanghai Pudong Development Bank is or was in the past 12 months a client
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months, JPMSI provided to the company non-investment banking securities-related services and non-securities-related services.
Sinopec Corp - H is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. Sinotruk is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI;
during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company investment banking services. Sohu.Com is or was in the past 12 months
a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company non-investment banking securities-related services
and non-securities-related services. Towngas China Company Limited is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the
past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the company non-investment banking securities-related services. Tsingtao Brewery is or was in
the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. Yanzhou Coal Mining - H is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI. ZTE Corp is or
was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI.
• Investment Banking (past 12 months): JPMSI or its affiliates received in the past 12 months compensation for investment banking
services from Bank of China - H, China Construction Bank, China Cosco Holdings, Ltd., China Dongxiang Group Co Ltd., China
Life Insurance Co. Ltd, China Merchants Bank - H, China Overseas Land & Investment, China Resources Power Holdings, China
Unicom, Glorious Property, Huabao International Holdings Limited, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China - H, Shandong
Weigao Group Medical Polymer Co. Ltd., Sinotruk.
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• Investment Banking (next 3 months): JPMSI or its affiliates expect to receive, or intend to seek, compensation for investment
banking services in the next three months from Alibaba.com Limited, Bank of China - H, Bank of Communications Co, China
Construction Bank, China Cosco Holdings, Ltd., China Dongxiang Group Co Ltd., China Life Insurance Co. Ltd, China Merchants
Bank - H, China Minsheng Banking, China Overseas Land & Investment, China Resources Power Holdings, China Shineway
Pharmaceutical Group Limited, China Shipping Container Lines, China Telecom Corporation Ltd, China Unicom, CNOOC,
Glorious Property, Great Wall Motor Company Limited, Greentown China Holdings, Guangzhou R&F Properties, Huabao
International Holdings Limited, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China - H, Mindray Medical, PICC Property & Casualty Co.
Ltd, Ping An Insurance, Shandong Weigao Group Medical Polymer Co. Ltd., Sinopec Corp - H, Sinotruk.
• Non-Investment Banking Compensation: JPMSI has received compensation in the past 12 months for products or services other
than investment banking from Air China, Bank of China - H, Bank of Communications Co, China Citic Bank - H Share, China
Construction Bank, China Life Insurance Co. Ltd, China Merchants Bank - H, China Minsheng Banking, China Mobile Ltd,
CNOOC, Glorious Property, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China - H, PICC Property & Casualty Co. Ltd, Ping An Insurance,
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Bank of China - H, Bank of Communications Co, China Citic Bank - H Share, China Construction Bank, China Life Insurance Co.
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Coverage Universe: Frank Li: Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (2600.HK), Angang Steel Company Limited - A
(000898.SZ), Angang Steel Company Limited - H (0347.HK), Baoshan Iron & Steel - A (600019.SS), Brilliance China
Automotive (1114.HK), China Coal Energy (1898.HK), China Shenhua Energy (1088.HK), Denway Motors (0203.HK),
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(3808.HK), Weichai Power (2338.HK), Yanzhou Coal Mining - A (600188.SS), Yanzhou Coal Mining - H (1171.HK),
Zijin Mining Group Co Ltd (2899.HK)
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frank.m.li@jpmorgan.com
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