SUCCESSION FULL TEXT

Art. 1100 Prescription of action for rescission

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39697 April 5, 1934
SERAFIN SANSON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABEL ARANETA, ALFREDO SANSON, EVA SANSON and her husband
ANTONIO YUSAY, defendants-appellants.
Ezpeleta and Zulueta and Feria and La O for appellants.
Treas and Laserna and Camus and Delgado for appellee.
GODDARD, J .:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, the dispositive part of
which, as amended by a supplementary decision, reads as follows:
Por todo lo expuesta, el Juzgado falla esta causa, como sigue:
Se declara que el convenio de reparticion, cuya copia certificada es el documento Exhibit D,
otorgado por los herederos del finado Roque Sanson el dia 10 de junio de 1927, no esta de
acuerdo con la voluntad del finado Roque Sanson manifestada en su testamento Exhibit A,
pues con dicho convenido de reparticion aparece lesionada y de hecho resulta lesionada en
mas de una cuarta parte la verdadera participacion de uno de sus herederos y legatarios, el
de-mandante Serafin Sanson.
Se declara rescindido dicho convenio de reparticipacion Exhibit D para todos los efectos
legales;
Se declara nulo legal el auto de este Juzgado de fecha 31 de agosto de 1928, obrante en el
expediente numero 1055 de este mismo juzgado, titulolado "Testamentaria del Finado
Roque Sanson", cuya copia certificada de dicho auto es el documento Exhibit D-2;
Se ordena a la demanda Isabel Araneta que, dentro del plazo de treinta dias, presente en
este asunto un inventario completo de todos los bienes inmuebles, muebles, alhajas,
creditos y acciones que pertenecieron en vida al finado Roque Sanson, con anotacion
completa de sus respectivos valores, segun consta probado en la vista de este asunto;
Se ordena a la misma demanda Isabel Araneta que, dentro de igual plazo de treinta dias,
presente un proyecto de particion de dichos bienes dejados los herederos del citado finado
Roque Sanson.
Sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas.
Asi se ordena.
The plaintiff in his complaint filed on August 23, 1932, prays for the rescission of the agreement of
partition of the property of his father Roque Sanson, approved by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
August 31, 1928, upon the grounds that it is not in accordance with the will of his father, executed
April 6, 1920, and that as a result of said agreement of partition the share he is entitled to receive
under his father's will has been reduced by more than one-fourth, both in area and in value. He also
prays that the defendant Isabel Araneta be ordered to prepare and present immediately a complete
inventory of all the property, real and personal, of his deceased father and include therein the
jewelry, credits, etc. and that she be ordered to prepare and present another project of partition of
said property in which an equitable division of the same shall be made between the plaintiff and
appellants Alfredo Sanson and Eva Sanson.
The defendants answered by a general denial and alleged three special defenses: That each and
every one of the signers of said agreement of partition renounced in favor of the others whatever
difference there might be in their respective shares; that the action of the plaintiff has prescribed and
that said agreement has been approved by a final order of the lower court.
The will of Roque Sanson, deceased, the husband of Isabel Araneta and the father of the plaintiff
Serafin Sanson and of the defendants Alfredo Sanson and Eva Sanson provides among other things
the following:
PRIMERA. Declaro que estoy casado en matrimonio legitimo con la seora Isabel Araneta
de Sanson, habiendo tenido nosotros dos los siguientes hijos, Alfredo Sanson y Araneta,
Serafin Sanson y Araneta y Eva Sanson y Araneta;
SEGUNDA. Instituyo por herederos a todos y cada unode mis hijos arriba nombrados, los
cuales se encuentran todavia en la minoria de edad. En caso de mi muerte, dispongo y
ordeno de una manera especial que mi esposa sea la tutora de nuestros citados hijos tanto
en las personas delos mismos como en sus bienes. Como tal tutora cuidarano solo de la
manutencion sino de la educacion de nuestros hijos forma que ella creyese conviente, y
administrara los bienes de los mismos;
TERCERA. Cuando todos mis hijos lleguen a la mayoria de edad, se hara una reparticion de
la herencia, no pudiendo verificar esta particion mientras alguno de ellos sea menor de
edad. Antes de ser repartida mi herencia, se sacara de la masa hereditaria bienes
equivalentes a la suma de diez mil pesos filipinos (10,000), cuya suma se dispondra en la
forma como dire mas abajo;
CUARTA. Despues de sacada la referida suma de diez mil pesos (P10,000), o su
equivalente del valor de los bienes, el remanente se distribuira por partes iguales a cada uno
de mis tres hijos arriba ya mencionados. La distribucion sehara en la forma mas equitativa,
armonica y satisfactoria y de conformidad con las disposiciones de este testamento;
x x x x x x x x x
SEXTA. Pasado el termino de diez aos consecutivos despues de la reparticion de los
citados herederos y resultase que no hubiere ningun heredero necesitado y pobre, segun el
criterio de mil albacea, entonces la cantidad separada de diez mil pesos (P10,000)
destinada para este efecto sera repartida por partes iguales entre mis tres herederos;
SEPTIMA. En caso de que la tutora de mis hijos que esmi citada esposa, muriese antes de
que todos llegaren a la mayoria de edad, seran entonces conjuntamente lassiguientes
personas: Agripina Sanson de Lacson, Celedonia Sanson, Lina Araneta y Concepcion
Araneta. Estas mismas personas, en la epoca de la reparticion de los bienes entre los
herederos, en la epoca de la reparticion de los bienes entre los herederos, veran y
aconsejaran juntamente con la tutora a fin de que la reparticion se haga entre mis herederos
en la forma mas satisfactoria y que en todo tiempo y ocasion hubiere buena armonia entre
todos mis herederos.
Roque Sanson died April 28, 1920, and on June 2 of the same year his widow presented his will for
probate in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo; the will was probated in case No. 1055 of that court,
entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Roque Sanson" and on July 10, 1920, the widow, Isabel Araneta,
was appointed executrix. On March 29, 1922, the executrix filed an inventory of the property of her
deceased husband in which she noted the value of each individual piece of property. The committee
of claims and appraisal found that this valuation was correct. On March 31, 1923, the executrix
presented an account accompanied by a project of partition, Exhibit 2. On April 28, 1923, the court
approved, that account and also the project of partition, but, as this project did not contain a
description of the property, on October 19, 1923, the same court ordered the executrix to present
another project of partition, within 30 days, in which the description of the property adjudicated to
each heir should appear. This order was not complied with. The executrix, on June 10, 1927, and a
few days before her son, the plaintiff Serafin Sanson, went to Manila to continue his studies, had him
and the defendants Alfredo and Eva Sanson appear in the office of an attorney before whom they
signed the agreement of partition in question in this case, Exhibit D. In 1928, during the school
vacation, the plaintiff went to the municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, and for the first time visited
the lands allotted to him and to his brother Alfredo by virtue of the agreement of partition, Exhibit D.
Upon this visit he found that there was a great difference in quality and area in favor of his brother. In
view of this he decided to visit the land allotted to his sister, Eva Sanson, situated in the municipality
of Banate of the same province. He found that her land was also greater in area and better in quality
than the land given to him by virtue of Exhibit D. The plaintiff thought of speaking to his mother about
these differences, but fearing that this might annoy and displease her he left for Manila to continue
his studies without saying anything to her at that time. After arriving in Manila the plaintiff wrote the
following letter to his mother:
1876 MANGAHAN, STA. CRUZ, MANILA
25 de agosto de 1928
Sra. ISABEL ARANETA,
Molo, Iloilo, I. F.
MI QUERIDA MADRE: Hace ya tiempo que deseaba escribirte, pero siempre me ha faltado
tiempo debido a que mis estudios de este ao son demasiado dificiles.
Madre, desearia hablarte de una cosa, pero me temo que lo tomes a mal, por lo que de
antemano te pido perdon y te suplico no te enfades de mi, porque de esto ya deseaba
hablarte cuando aun estaba alli pero temia que te enfadaras de mi.
Madre, cuando mi fui a Sara he visto que los terrenos que me habias dado eran de inferior
calidad que los demi hermano y hermana; y son muchos los que dicen que de nosotros tres,
la peor parte es la mia. Esto, madre, te lo pongo de manifiesto, porque tu tampoco has visto
aquellos terrenos. Madre, no tienes compasion de mi dandome la peor parte, teniedo en
cuenta que por nosotros tres sufristes por igual al darnos a luz. Madre, me da verguenza
hablarte de esto, porque eres libre de darme lo que quieras, porque fuisteis vosotros los que
habeis buscado dichos bienes; pero, madre, confio en el amor que me profesas, porque
muchas veces he oido de ti decir que a ninguno de nosotros tus hijos sientes preferencia
porque nos amas por igual. Si es asi, por que vas a disminuir mi parte? Tal vez, madre,
pienses que mi tia tiene algo y que dicho algo ira a parar conmigo. De esto, madre, no
puedo estar seguro, porque mi tia suele decir que ellas son unastres viejas que tambien
necesitan de dinero para cuando se enfermen. Aparte de esto, madre, siempre es diferente
lo que viene de nuestros padres, porque esto hace que los hijos puedan decir que sus
padres les aman por igual porque en la misma proporcion les reparte su patrimonio. Madre,
solo os expongo a vosotros tres para que no digais despues que no os habia hablado de
ello. Madre, si vosotros tres no teneis inconveniente yo os pediria que aumenteis mi porcion
con el terreno de Sibucao que es bienpoco. No teneis compasion de mi, hermanos mios.
Madre, si te parece mal esto que te pido y que te he manifestado, perdoname, igualmente si
tambien a vosotros os parece mal.
Recuerdos a todos vosotros, a ti y a mis hermanos.
Tu hijo qeu te ama como siempre.
(Fdo.) SERAFIN SANSON
This letter was received by the defendant Isabel Araneta on August 27, 1928, and on the following
day she had her daughter, the defendant Eva Sanson, who was a minor at the time Exhibit D was
signed, go before a notary public and sign a document, Exhibit 5, which confirmed the contents of
the agreement of partition, Exhibit D. On the 29th of the same month and year the defendant Isabel
Araneta, through her attorney, submitted the original of Exhibit D to the court for approval in an ex-
parte motion, Exhibit D-1, and the project of partition, Exhibit D, and Exhibit 5 were approved by an
order of the court, Exhibit D-2, dated August 31, 1928. Eighteen days after the order Exhibit D-2 was
issued and twenty-one days after she received the above letter, Isabel Araneta wrote a letter, Exhibit
4, to her son, the plaintiff, in which she refused to cede to him the land situated in Sibucao,
Occidental Negros. In view of this denial, plaintiff consulted a relative of his in Manila, Attorney
Ramirez, who advised him that he could enter his objection to Exhibit D when it was set for approval
by the court at Iloilo. Upon his return to Iloilo during the vacations of 1929 he asked his mother,
Isabel Araneta, if the court had approved the original of Exhibit D. She pretended to know nothing
about the matter. However the plaintiff learned through Attorney Geminiano Sanson that the court
had approved the original of Exhibit D on August 31, 1928. Upon his return to Manila, to continue his
studies, in 1929 he again went to Attorney Ramirez and told him that Exhibit D had been approved
by the court of Iloilo, and Ramirez advised him that the only thing for him to do was to ask for the
rescission of the agreement of partition, Exhibit D.
Another incident in this case which conclusively proves that Isabel Araneta favored her children
Alfredo and Eva to the prejudice of the plaintiff Serafin Sanson is the fictitious sale of lot No. 461 of
the Cadastral Survey of La Carlota, a description of which appears at the bottom of page 1 of the
inventory, to Herminio Maravilla for the alleged sum of P12,000. The document of sale is dated
October 15, 1932, and was acknowledged before C. M. Zulueta, the attorney for the defendants in
the trial of this case in the lower court. This same land was sold by Herminio Marvilla to the spouses
Antonio Yusay and Eva Sanson on October 18, 1932, three days later. This document was also
acknowledged before the same attorney, C. M. Zulueta. This was a round-about way of giving this
land to her daughter Eva Sanson. This particular parcel of land was not included in the division set
forth in the agreement of partition Exhibit D, but was reserved for the purpose set forth in the third,
fourth and sixth paragraphs of the will of Roque Sanson, copied above.
If we accept the inventory value of the property allotted to the heirs in Exhibit D as a basis of
partition, the share corresponding to the plaintiff, under the will of his father, would be P33,683.69.
The land allotted to him in said exhibit is valued at P14,615 in the inventory. As a result the portion
corresponding to the plaintiff has been reduced in value in the sum of P19,068.69. It is plain to be
seen that this reduction constitutes a lesion exceeding the forth part of the value of the property that
he should receive under his father's will.
If we take the assessed value of the property allotted to the heirs in Exhibited as a basis of partition,
the evidence shows that the value of the property adjudicated to the plaintiff in Exhibit D has been
reduced in the sum of P16,696. This reduction also constitutes a lesion exceeding the fourth part of
the value of the property that he should receive under his father's will.
If we take the market value of the land, as testified to by four witnesses, alloted to the heirs in Exhibit
D as a basis of partition, the value of the land which should have been adjudicated to the plaintiff in
Exhibit D would be P51,300, whereas the market value of the land actually adjudicated to him in
Exhibit D is only P25,050. It is plain to be seen that this reduction constitutes a lesion of much more
than one-fourth of the value of the property that he should receive under his father's will.
If we take the total area of the land allotted to the heirs in Exhibit D as a basis of partition , the
plaintiff should have received 467 hectares, 14 ares and 12 centiares, but the area of the land
actually adjudicated to him in Exhibit D is only 254 hectares, 10 are and 13 centiares or a reduction
of 213.0399 hectares. This also constitutes a lesion of more than one-fourth of the area of the
property that he should receive under his father's will.
Articles 1073 of the Civil Code read as follows:
ART. 1073. Partitions may be rescinded for the same causes as obligations.
ART. 1074. They may also be rescinded on account of lesion exceeding the fourth part,
taking into consideration the value of the things at the time they were awarded.
It is evident that the agreement of partition, Exhibit D, may be rescinded as provided in article 1074.
The defendants did not present any proof to the effect that Serafin Sanson had renounced in favor of
his co-heirs whatever difference there might be between his share and their shares of the property.
On the contrary, as we have seen, the plaintiff, as soon as he learned there was a difference, wrote
the letter of August 25, 1928, to his mother and consulted Attorney Ramirez as to the manner of
vindicating his rights.
There is no merit to the allegation of the defendants as to the prescription of plaintiff's action. The
agreement of partition was approved by the court on August 31, 1928. The four years provided in
article 1076 of the Civil Code should commence to run from that date. As stated above this case was
filed on August 23, 1932. It must be remembered that this is not an extrajudicial partition. "While it is
true that the partition agreement was made by all the heirs extrajudicially, in submitting it to the court
for approval, and in being approved by the latter after having announced the hearing through
publication in the newspapers, said extrajudicial agreement of partition became judicial, and the
order of the court approving it and declaring the respective testamentary proceedings involving the
estates of the deceased spouses closed, became final and absolute, and binding upon all the parties
who took part in the said partition agreement, and acquiesced therein." (Centeno vs. Centeno, 52
Phil., 322, 399.) It was submitted to the court for approval in case No. 1055 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Roque Sanson". That approval validated the
agreement partition Exhibit D. If it had not been approved by the court it would not have been valid
and the court after payment of the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, and the
allowances, if any, made for the expense of maintenance of the family of the deceased, would have
assigned the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same in the proportions or parts to
which each was entitled (section 753 of the Code Civil Procedure). Articles 1073 to 1079 of the Civil
Code are still in force. In the case of Salunga vs. Evangelista (20 Phil., 273), this court treats all of
these articles as being in full force and effect. This court in the case of Garcia vs. Tolentino (25 Phil.,
102), held that an action for rescission of the partition of an inheritance by reason of lesion can only
be exercised during the period prescribed in articles 1074 and 1076. In Tinsay vs. Yusay and
Yusay (47 Phil., 639), this court said: "We may say further that if a case of estoppel should not be
established, the appellants might Civil Code, be compelled to restore to the estate of Juana
Servando one-half of the amount received by them from the sale of lots Nos. 283 and 744, unless it
is shown that Juana's interest in the lot was transferred to them either by sale or by valid donation.
The registration of land does not necessarily extinguish obligations of that character."
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs in this instance against the appellants.
Malcolm, Hull, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her individual capacity and as judicial
guardian of the minors ANTONIO ALBERTO, JR. and LOURDES ALBERTO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J. ALBERTO, JR., assisted by his mother as
his natural guardian, ANDREA JONGCO, respondents.
Taada, Carreon & Taada for petitioners.

BIDIN, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31, 1968 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 34750-R'* entitled "Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., thru his mother as his natural guardian,
Andrea Jongco, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, in her individual
capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors, Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.,
defendants-appellees", reversing the August 10, 1964. Decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila.
The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition filed on September 8, 1960
with the then Court of First Instance of Manila by the herein private respondent, a minor, 18 years of
age, assisted by his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural guardian, against the herein petitioners
(Record on Appeal, pp. 2-8). In the said Complaint, private respondent alleged, in substance, that in
1941 his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as
husband and wife and as a result of which, he was born on September 10, 1942; that during the time
that his alleged father and mother lived together as husband and wife and up to the time of his birth,
both were single and had no legal impediment to marry each other; that after his birth, his father and
mother continued living together as husband and wife, his father supporting them and introducing
him to the public as his natural child; that even the family of his father recognized him as such; that
on or about the year 1944, his father and mother separated, and subsequently, his father married
herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result of the marriage, two (2) children were born
herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.; that although his father was separated
from his mother, he continued to support him and recognized him as his own child; that on July 3,
1949, his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on
July 17, 1949, instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Manila an intestate proceedings
for the estate of his deceased father, docketed therein as Special Proceedings No. 9092; that in the
said intestate proceedings, petitioners deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs and for this
reason they succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and partitioned
among themselves; that the said intestate proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953; that
his father left properties valued at P74,963.81, and accordingly, as a natural child of his father, he is
entitles to at least P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate
proceedings and came to know about it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the
petitioners who refused to give him his share. Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be ordered
to acknowledge him as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned
over to him; and that petitioners be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fee and
the cost of suit (Record on Appeals, pp. 2-9).
On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the cause of
action is barred by prior judgment; and (2) that the cause of action is also barred by the statute of
limitation (Ibid, pp. 9-19). To this motion, private respondents filed an opposition on October 22,
1960 (Ibid, pp. 20-58).
On November 11, 1960, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss (Ibid, pp. 97-
98).
On November 18, 1964, petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint (Ibid, pp. 98-102).
On November 23, 1964, private respondent filed his Answer to Defendants' counterclaim (Ibid, pp.
102-104). On August 10, 1964, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners (Ibid, pp.
104- 123). The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders the dismissal of the complaint without
pronouncement as to the costs. The counterclaim is also dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision, appealed to respondent Court, and in a Decision
promulgated on August 31, 1968 (Ibid, pp. 61-75), respondent Court reversed the decision of the
trial court. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, reads:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and another
rendered declaring plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., an acknowledged Natural Child of
the deceased Antonio C. Alberto; declaring said plaintiff the owner pro indiviso of
one-fifth (1/5) of the hereditary estate of Antonio C. Alberto; and ordering the
defendants to deliver to plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., his one-fifth (1/5) share in said
estate, subject to the usufructuary rights of defendants Natividad del Rosario Vda. de
Alberto pursuant to Articles 834 of the Old Civil Code, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On September 24, 1968, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied in
a Resolution dated October 14, 1968 (Rollo, p. 77). Hence, the instant petition.
This Court, in a resolution dated November 27,1968, resolved to give due course to the petition
(Rollo, p. 91).
Petitioners assigned the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (TRIAL COURT) HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
OF THE INSTANT CASE.
II
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY
PRIOR JUDGMENT.
III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD NOT YET
PRESCRIBED.
IV
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., IN NOT BRINGING THE INSTANT ACTION
FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME, WAS GUILTY OF LACHES.
V
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY
ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT BY BASING ITS JUDGMENT ON
A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ANDREA
JONGCO AND OTHER WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., DESPITE THE SERIOUS
CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES AS
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CATEGORICALLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.
VI
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
A GROSS ERROR OF LAW AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ARBITRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDED PETITIONERS' EVIDENCE.
VII
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD
OF THE DECEASED ALBERTO AND IN DECLARING HIM OWNER PRO-INDIVISO OF ONE-
FIFTH OF THE HEREDITARY ESTATE OF THE DECEASED.
I.
It is the contention of petitioners that inasmuch as the instant case was filed on September 8, 1960,
almost five (5) years after the enactment of R.A. No. 1401 creating the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, the questions of paternity and acknowledgment fall beyond the jurisdictional pale of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and instead comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. While petitioners admitted that this objection to lack of
jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance of Manila over the subject matter of the present action had
not been raised either in the said court or in the Court of Appeals and is brought to this Court for
resolution for the first time on appeal, they contend that a party may object to the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the action at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on
appeal since lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter cannot be waived. Such
contention is untenable.
This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be
raised on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides,
a party who had voluntarily participated in the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot later on raise
the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction (Philippine National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
143 SCRA 299 [1986]; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 470 [1984]; Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]). Moreover, there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts today. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the functions of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court have been transferred to the Regional Trial Courts (Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143
SCRA 356 [1986]).
II.
Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of estate of the deceased
Antonio C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No. 9092) had already been terminated on November 9,
1953 by the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled thereto and that in said proceedings the court also declared who are the heirs of the
deceased. Consequently, the instant case which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio J.
Alberto, Jr. as an acknowledged natural child of the deceased in order to establish his rights to the
inheritance is already barred by prior judgment (Petitioners' Brief, p. 47) despite private respondent's
insistence that he had no knowledge or notice of the intestate proceedings of his alleged natural
father (Record on Appeal, p. 21).
Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit.
This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate
are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest
in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound (Philippine
Savings Bank vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons
interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed ... and any order that may be entered
therein is binding against all of them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled further that a final order of distribution of the estate of a
deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees; and that the only
instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening
of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action,
the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw
out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, supra; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres 45
Phil. 895).
III.
As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly provides:
Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four
years from the time the partition was made.
Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on November 9, 1953 so
that said four years prescriptive period expired on November 9,1957. Hence, the present action filed
on September 8, 1960 and which has for one of its objects the rescission of the agreement of
partition among the petitioners, as approved by the intestate court, is already barred by prescription.
That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a
compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested, which is what
the complaint in this case alleges in substance, is indicated in Article 1104 of the Civil Code as
follows:
Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be
rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the
other persons interested; ...
It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period provided in Article 1100 of the Civil
Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code) should commence to run from the approval of the
agreement of partition by the Court (Samson vs. Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36). Thus, in the case at bar, it
is evident that the action to rescind the Agreement of Partition which was approved by the Court on
November 9, 1953, had already prescribed when respondent filed the complaint in the case at bar
on September 8, 1960.
While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the
co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never
recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule
on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to
the case at bar.
Moreover, private respondent cannot claim exemption from the effects of prescription on the plea of
minority under the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against: (1) Minors and
other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal
representatives:
x x x x x x x x x
Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the
complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited provision.
Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the deceased Antonio Alberto, Sr., the action
for recognition of natural child may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parent. And if
the presumed father or mother died during the minority of the child, the latter may file the action
within four (4) years from the attainment of majority (Art. 285 [1]). However, if the minor has a
guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even during minority (Wenzel etc., et al. vs.
Surigao Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 [1960]). In such case, the action for recognition
must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father (Magallanes, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]). Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on July
3, 1949. The complaint for acknowledgment and partition was filed eleven (11) years later, on
September 8, 1960. Hence, prescription had set in.
Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one for recovery of property in order
to avoid the consequences of prescription, for as correctly stated by the petitioners, to be entitled to
the recovery of the property from the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and
distribution approved by the intestate proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the
petitioners is not possible. Be that as it may, such partition can no longer be rescinded having been
already barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not apply and there is an injury
to the rights of plaintiff, tills action would still not prosper under Articles 1146 and 1149 of the same
Code which provide that the action must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the
time the right of action accrues.
IV
Petitioners' claim of laches is likewise tenable. The trial court in its findings clearly and unmistakably
declared that respondent Alberto, Jr. is guilty of laches as follows:
About 1944, Andrea Jongco said she learned of Antonio Alberto's marriage to
Natividad del Rosario. Yet, she took no steps to protect the interests of her child,
Antonio, although she was already confronted with the incontrovertible proof of
Antonio's infidelity and the hallowness of his promises.
It might be that Andrea Jongco was then relying on Antonio Alberto's not denying
that Alberto, Jr. was his child, if such was the case. If this was so, however, how can
we explain her inaction even after the death of Antonio Alberto in 1949, or until
September 8, 1960, when she filed this action, Andrea kept silent, took no action to
have her child recognized as the son of the alleged father. Her laches, as well as the
inherent improbabilities in her testimony rendered it unworthy of belief.
... It is evident that the plaintiff's case is adversely affected by his long delay in
bringing this action. 'Undue delay in the separate enforcement of a right is strongly
persuasive of lack of merit in this claim, since it is human nature for a person to
assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or invaded. (Buenaventura
vs. David, 37 Phil. 435-440). (Record on Appeal, pp. 108-109).
This Court has consistently declared that laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Corro
vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 [1985]; Tendo vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78 [1985]; De Castro vs. Tan,
129 SCRA 85 [1984]; Medija vs. Patcho, 132 SCRA 540 [1984]; Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff,
Armed Forces of the Phil., 133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Gumonpin vs. CA, 120 SCRA 687 [1983]).
As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no explanation for the surprising delay in the
filing of the complaint in the case at bar except perhaps, the fact that during the lifetime of the
deceased Antonio Alberto, private respondents were receiving support until the latter died in 1949;
but thereafter, they allowed more than ten years to elapse or until September 8, 1960 before they
filed the present action to assert their rights despite Andrea Jongco's allegation that they stopped
receiving support after Alberto, Sr.'s death.
On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners' allegations that such delay is prejudicial to them.
Private respondents could have filed the action in 1944 when Andrea Jongco learned of the
marriage of the deceased with petitioner Natividad del Rosario instead of waiting for 16 years when
the supposed father's lips had been sealed by death and possible witnesses like Antonio Alberto,
Sr.'s mother had become too old to give coherent testimony.
On this point, the Supreme Court ruled:
The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be favored by the courts.
Time inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from the memory of witnesses, and
even where the recollection appears to be entirely clear, the true clue to the solution
of a case may be hopelessly lost. These considerations constitute one of the pillars
of the doctrine long familiar in equity jurisprudence to the effect that laches or
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only
persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be
destructive of the right itself. Vigilantibus non dormientibus equites
subvenit (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, reiterated in Edralin vs. Edralin, 1
SCRA 227 [1961]).
The other explanation might have been the minority of Antonio Alberto, Jr. at the time of his
supposed father's death. But such explanation as discussed earlier is unavailing even in case of
prescription under Article 1108 of the Civil Code where minority does not stop the running of the
prescriptive period for minors who have parents, guardians or legal representatives.
Thus, it is well established that "The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those
who sleep when the law requires them to act (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606, 610;
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. Villaluz, Sept. 29, 1951, 90 Phil. 154)." The law does not encourage
laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the
considerations of the courts, he... must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings
(Samson vs. Yateo, August 28,1958; 104 PMI. 378).
V.
Finally on the merits of this case, petitioners would have this Court review and reverse the
conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals. As a general rule, this is a function this Court does not
undertake. The established principle is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and
may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court; except: (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and
impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the
case, and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the apellant and the appellee; (6) when
the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings are
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Manlapaz vs. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-
239 [1987]; Guita vs. C.A., 139 SCRA 576 [1985]; Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA 593
[1986]).
It is readily evident that this case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule, specifically
that the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court.
At the trial, the lower court in evaluating the evidence presented by the complainants is of the view
that the testimony alone of Andrea Jongco is sufficient to totally discredit not only her testimony but
also her entire case. Aside from being inherently improbable and the merit of her claim being
adversely affected by her testimony and her long delay in bringing action, her testimony is
contradicted by the testimonies of Jose, Zoilo and Pilar who are brothers and sister of the deceased
Antonio Alberto and who have no pecuniary interest whatsoever in the outcome of the controversy.
They testified that during the period Andrea Jongco claimed that Antonio Alberto, Sr. lived with her,
the deceased in fact lived with his mother and brothers at the family residence except for his brief
stint with the army (Decision, Civil Case No. 44164; Record on appeal, pp. 111-112).
More than that, the trial court found among others, that Andrea Jongco has had five children (aside
from her son Antonio) with four different men. The assumption, therefore, is that she lived with at
least four different men without being married to any of them. Thus, the trial court aptly ruled that his
propensity to promiscuous relationship with different men, render it unjust to state with definiteness
that any particular person is the father of any one of her children." (Ibid, p. 121).
Other witnesses are Eufracia Cailan who allegedly took care of Antonio, the father, since the latter
was a child and then of Antonio, the alleged son, and Encarnacion Peralta, an alleged former lessor
of Andrea Jongco and Antonio Alberto. Their testimonies were, however, found by the trial court to
be inherently improbable, inconsistent with human experience and deliberately invented to conform
with the testimony of Andrea Jongco (Ibid, pp. 109-117).
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision gave more credence to the testimonies of
Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta and declared that their testimonies have sufficiently
established the fact that Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. is the son of the late Antonio C. Alberto and Andrea
Jongco which finds further proof in the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of Alberto, Jr.
(Rollo, pp. 6-11).
In this connection, it must be stated that in the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439
(1985), this Court, citing the cases of Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53; People vs. Villeza, 127
SCRA 349; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434; Vudaurrazaga vs. C.A., 91 Phil. 492; and Capistrano
vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135, ruled that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated,
like in the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity.
In casting doubt upon the credibility of petitioner Natividad's testimony, the Court of Appeals pointed
out her serious inconsistency on material points such as her claim that she was married to the
deceased in 1941 and her later admission in the answer that they were married in 1944.
The record shows, however, that both admissions were correct, the first marriage was a secret civil
marriage celebrated in Pililla, Rizal while the second was a religious ratification of the former. The
lack of marriage certificate as evidence was also considered by the Court of Appeals as an
impairment of credibility despite a certification to the effect that all pre-war records in the Municipality
of Pililla, Rizal were destroyed during the last war. Said Appellate Court is of the view that if they did
plan to marry secretly at that time, they could have chosen a city or municipality near Manila and that
Pililla must have been chosen as the place of the supposed marriage so that petitioners could have
an apparent good reason for the non-presentation of the marriage certificate.
As aptly argued by the petitioners, such conclusion is purely conjectural. Besides petitioners'
reasons for the choice of that place, the celebration of the marriage was positively confirmed by
Damaso Herrera, one of the sponsors thereof.
In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons
because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 29, 30
[19871; People vs. Grefiel, 125 SCRA 108 [1983]; Chase vs. Buencamino, 136 SCRA 381 [1985];
People vs. Fernandez, 124 SCRA 248 (1983]; Olangco vs. C.F.I. of Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA
338 [1983]; Minuchechi vs. C.A., 129 SCRA 479 [1984]).
After a careful review of the records and the evidence presented by the contending parties, no
cogent reasons could be found to justify the reversal of the findings of the trial court.
In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no need to discuss the last two assignments of errors.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and the decision of
the trial court is Reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

















Art 1104. Partition with preterition of compulsory heir
Art 1105. Partition which includes person who is not an heir
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128102 March 7, 2000
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS AYING, DEMETRIO SIDA, FELOMINO AUGUSTO, FEDERICO
ABING, and ROMEO AUGUSTO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the 26 March 1996 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals declaring the private
respondents the rightful possessors de facto of the subject lot and permanently enjoining Sheriff
Juan Gato or his representative from effecting the demolition of private respondents' houses.
Culled from the evidence proffered by petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Co. (hereafter AZNAR), it
appears that Lot No. 4399 containing an area of 34,325 square meters located at Brgy. Mactan,
Lapu-Lapu City, was acquired by AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an
Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 March 1964. This deed was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6 March 1964 as shown on the face
thereof. After the sale, petitioner AZNAR declared this property under its name for taxation purposes
and regularly paid the taxes thereon. Herein private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy
portions of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance provided that they leave the land in the event that the
company would use the property for its purposes. Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with
Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the development of the subject lot into a multi-million
peso housing subdivision and beach resort. When its demands for the private respondents to vacate
the land failed, AZNAR filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City a case for
unlawful detainer and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-1027.
On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that they are the successors and descendants of
the eight children of the late Crisanta Maloloy-on, whose names appear as the registered owners in
the Original Certificate of Title No. RC-2856. They had been residing and occupying the subject
portion of the land in the concept of owner since the time of their parents and grandparents, except
for Teodorica Andales who was not a resident in said premises. Private respondents claimed that
the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is void ab initio for being
simulated and fraudulent, and they came to know of the fraud only when AZNAR entered into the
land in the last quarter of 1991 and destroyed its vegetation. They then filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City a complaint seeking to declare the subject document null and void.
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2930-L.
On 1 February 1994, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering the private respondents to (a) vacate
the land in question upon the finality of the judgment; and (b) pay P8,000 as attorney's fees and
P2,000 as litigation expenses, plus costs.
2

The MTCC delved into the issue of ownership in order to resolve the issue of possession. It found
that petitioner AZNAR acquired ownership of Lot No. 4399 by virtue of the Extrajudicial Partition of
Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the Heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on on 3 March
1964, which was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6 March 1964 as
appearing on the face thereof. Private respondents' allegation that two of the signatories were not
heirs of the registered owners; that some of the signatories were already dead at the date of the
execution of the deed; and that many heirs were not parties to the extrajudicial partition is a form of a
negative pregnant, which had the effect of admitting that the vendors, except those mentioned in the
specific denial, were heirs and had the legal right to sell the subject land to petitioner. The fact that
some or most heirs had not signed the deed did not make the document null and void ab initio but
only annullable, unless the action had already prescribed. Since the private respondents occupied
the land merely by tolerance, they could be judicially ejected therefrom. That the Deed has not been
annotated on OCT RO-2856 is of no moment, since said title was reconstituted only on 25 August
1988, while the subject Deed was executed on 3 March 1964. Lastly, the reconstituted title has not
as yet been transferred to a purchaser for value.
Aggrieved by the decision of the MTCC, private respondents appealed to the RTC.
During the pendency of the appeal, or on 8 March 1994, the RTC, upon Aznar's ex parte motion,
issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of execution pursuant to Section 8, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Court in view of the failure of private respondents to put up a supersedeas bond. A
week later, a writ of execution was issued. The sheriff then served upon private respondents the said
writ of execution together with a notice to vacate. On 11 April 1994, the sheriff padlocked their
houses, but later in the day, private respondents re-entered their houses. Thus, on 6 May 1994,
AZNAR filed an omnibus motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition, which private respondents
opposed. This motion was set for hearing three times, but the parties opted to submit a consolidated
memorandum and agreed to submit the same for resolution.
3

On 22 July 1994, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC and ordered the issuance of a writ of
demolition directing the sheriff to demolish private respondents' houses and other improvements
which might be found on the subject premises.
4

On 29 July 1994, a writ of demolition was issued, and notices of demolition were served upon private
respondents. Per Sheriff's Report,
5
private respondents' houses were demolished on 3 August 1994,
except for two houses which were moved outside the premises in question upon the plea of the
owners thereof.
On appeal by the private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC; declared the private respondents as the rightful possessors de facto of the land in
question; and permanently enjoined Sheriff Juan Gato or whoever was acting in his stead from
effectuating the demolition of the houses of the private respondents.
In arriving at its challenged decision, the Court of Appeals noted that at the time AZNAR entered the
property, the private respondents had already been in possession thereof peacefully, continuously,
adversely and notoriously since time immemorial. There was no evidence that petitioner was ever in
possession of the property. Its claim of ownership was based only on an Extrajudicial Partition with
Deed of Absolute Sale, which private respondents, however, claimed to be null and void for being
simulated and fraudulently obtained. The Court of Appeals further held that where not all the known
heirs had participated in the extrajudicial agreement of partition, the instrument would be null and
void and therefore could not be registered.
6
Moreover, AZNAR was estopped to assert ownership of
the property in question, since it had admitted in a pleading in the reconstitution proceedings that the
property had never been conveyed by the decreed owners. Additionally, from 1988 up to the filing of
the ejectment case on 4 August 1993, AZNAR never registered the extrajudicial partition despite
opportunities to do so. Its allegation that private respondents occupied the property by mere
tolerance was not proved. Pursuant to the ruling in Vda. de Legazpi v. Avendano,
7
the fact that the
right of the private respondents was so seriously placed in issue and the execution of the decision in
the ejectment case would have meant demolition of private respondents' houses constituted an
equitable reason to suspend the enforcement of the writ of execution and order of demolition.
AZNAR then elevated the case to this Court, via this petition for review on certiorari, contending that
respondent Court of Appeals erred in
1. . . . reversing the judgments of the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court of
Lapu-Lapu City despite the finality of the judgments and the full implementation thereof;
2. . . . invoking lack of prior physical possession over the land in question by the petitioner as
one ground in its Decision sought to be reviewed;
3. . . . holding that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale was null and void;
4. . . . holding that petitioner was in estoppel in pais when it made the allegation that the
property was not sold or encumbered in its petition for reconstitution of title;
5. . . . applying the ruling in the case of Vda. de Legazpi vs. Avendano (79 SCRA 135
[1977]).
We shall jointly discuss the first and fifth assigned errors for being interrelated with each other.
In its first assigned error, petitioner argues that the decision of the MTCC of Lapu-Lapu City had
become final and immediately executory in view of the undisputed failure of the private respondents
to post a supersedeas bond as required by Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We do not agree. Since the private respondents had seasonably filed an appeal with the RTC of
Lapu-Lapu City, the judgment of the MTCC of Lapu-Lapu City did not become final. And for reasons
hereunder stated, the perfection of the appeal was enough to stay the execution of the MTCC
decision.
Under the former Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
8
if the judgment of the municipal trial court
in an ejectment case is adverse to the defendant, execution shall issue immediately. To stay the
immediate execution of the judgment, the defendant must (1) perfect his appeal; (2) file a
supersedeas bond to answer for the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of
the appeal.
9

As a rule, the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory and if not filed, the plaintiff is entitled as a
matter of right to the immediate execution of the judgment. An exception is where the trial court did
not make any findings with respect to any amount in arrears, damages or costs against the
defendant,
10
in which case no bond is necessary to stay the execution of the judgment. Thus,
in Once v. Gonzales,
11
this Court ruled that the order of execution premised on the failure to file a
supersedeas bond was groundless and void because no such bond was necessary there being no
back rentals adjudged in the appealed judgment.
Similarly, in the instant case, there was no need for the private respondents to file a supersedeas
bond because the judgment of the MTCC did not award rentals in arrears or damages. The
attorney's fees of P8,000 and the litigation expenses of P2,000 awarded in favor of the petitioner
need not be covered by a bond, as these are not the damages contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 70
of the Rules of Court. The damages referred to therein are the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the property which are generally measured by its fair rental value and cannot refer
to other damages which are foreign to the enjoyment or material possession of the
property.
12
Neither were the private respondents obliged to deposit the rentals falling due during the
pendency of the appeal in order to secure a stay of execution because the appealed judgment did
not fix the reasonable rental or compensation for the use of the premises.
13
Hence, it was error for
the RTC to order the execution of the judgment of the MTCC.
At any rate, pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, the decision of the
RTC affirming the decision of the MTCC has become immediately executory, without prejudice to the
appeal before the Court of Appeals. The said Section repealed Section 10 of the Rules of Court
allowing during the pendency of the appeal with the Court of Appeals a stay of execution of the RTC
judgment with respect to the restoration of possession where the defendant makes a periodic
deposit of rentals. Thus, immediate execution of the judgment becomes a ministerial duty of the
court. No new writ of execution was, however, issued. Nevertheless, the writ of demolition thereafter
issued was sufficient to constitute a writ of execution, as it substantially complied with the form and
contents of a writ of execution as provided for under Section 8 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, private respondents were duly notified and heard on the omnibus motion for the issuance
of the writ of demolition and were given five days to remove their houses.
14

Invoking Legaspi v. Avendao, 15 the Court of Appeals held that there was an equitable reason to
suspend the enforcement of the writ of execution and order of demolition until after the final
determination of the civil case for the nullification of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute
Sale.
In Legaspi, this Court held:
Where the action . . . is one of illegal detainer . . . and the right of the plaintiff to recover the
premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and
just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its
concomitant inconvenience and expense [f]or the court in which the issue of legal
possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for
preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful
detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal
possession or ownership.
In the instant case, private respondents' petition for review with prayer for the immediate issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction was mailed on 2 August 1994 but was
received by the Court of Appeals only on 30 August 1994. Meanwhile, on 3 August 1994, the writ of
demolition was implemented, resulting in the demolition of private respondents' houses. Hence, any
relevant issue arising from the issuance or enforcement of the writ had been rendered moot and
academic. Injunction would not lie anymore, as the acts sought to have been enjoined had already
become a fait accompli or an accomplished or consummated act.
Now on the applicability to unlawful detainer cases of the requirement of prior physical possession of
the disputed property. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, prior physical possession by the
plaintiff of the subject property is not an indispensable requirement in unlawful detainer cases,
although it is indispensable in an action for forcible entry.
16
The lack of prior physical possession on
the part of AZNAR is therefore of no moment, as its cause of action in the unlawful detainer case is
precisely to terminate private respondents' possession of the property in question.
17

We now come to the issue of the validity of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale.
In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de facto. However, when the issue
of possession cannot be decided without resolving the issue of ownership, the court may receive
evidence upon the question of title to the property but solely for the purpose of determining the issue
of possession.
18

In the instant case, private respondents have set up the defense of ownership and questioned the
title of AZNAR to the subject lot, alleging that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale
upon which petitioner bases its title is null and void for being simulated and fraudulently made.
First, private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on participated in the
extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who participated and were made parties thereto were not
heirs of Crisanta. This claim, even if true, would not warrant rescission of the deed. Under Article
1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be
rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested;
but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to
him." In the present case, no evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to the two
parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is in point; it provides: "A partition
which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to
such person." In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not render the partition void in its
entirety but only to the extent corresponding to them.
Private respondents also allege that some of the persons who were made parties to the deed were
already dead, while others were still minors. Moreover, the names of some parties thereto were
misspelled, and others who knew how to read and write their names were made to appear to have
affixed only their thumbmark in the questioned document. Likewise, the signatures of those who
were made parties were forged.
The foregoing are bare allegations with no leg to stand on. No birth or death certificates were
presented before the MTCC to support the allegations that some of the parties to the deed were
minors and others were already dead at the time of the execution of the deed. What private
respondents adduced as evidence was merely a family tree, which was at most self-serving. It was
only when the case was on appeal with the RTC that the private respondents presented as Annex
"B" of their Memorandum and Appeal Brief a photocopy of the certificate of death of Francisco
Aying,
19
son of Crisanta Maloloy-on, who reportedly died on 7 March 1963. This certificate was
allegedly issued on 17 January 1992 by the Parish Priest of Virgen de Regla Parish, Lapu-Lapu City.
The fact remains, however, that this photocopy was not certified to be a true copy.
It is worthy to note that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized
document.1wphi 1 As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.
20
It is admissible in evidence without
further proof of authenticity
21
and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
22
He who denies its
due execution has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the Acknowledgment he never
appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be his voluntary act.
23
It must also
be stressed that whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same. Forgery cannot be
presumed but should be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
24
Private respondents failed to
discharge this burden of proof; hence, the presumption in favor of the questioned deed stands.
Private respondents contend that there was violation of the Notarial Law because the lawyer who
prepared and notarized the document was AZNAR's representative in the execution of the said
document. Under Section 22 of the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889, a notary public could not
authenticate a contract which contained provisions in his favor or to which any of the parties
interested is a relative of his within the fourth civil degree or second degree of affinity; otherwise,
pursuant to Section 28 thereof, the document would not have any effect. This rule on notarial
disqualification no longer holds true with the enactment of Act No. 496, which repealed the Spanish
Notarial Law.
25
Under the Notarial Law in force at the time of the notarization of the questioned deed,
Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code, only those who had been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude were disqualified to notarize documents. Thus, a representative of a person
in whose favor a contract was executed was not necessarily so disqualified. Besides, there is no
proof that Atty. Ramon Igaa was a representative of petitioner in 1964; what appears on record is
that he was the Chief of the petitioner's Legal Department in 1993. Additionally, this alleged violation
of the Notarial Law was raised only now.
Anent the non-annotation of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale in the
reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2856, the same does not render the deed legally
defective. It must be borne in mind that the act of registering a document is never necessary to give
the conveyance legal effect as between the parties
26
and the vendor's heirs. As between the parties
to a sale, registration is not indispensable to make it valid and effective. The peculiar force of a title
is exhibited only when the purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the land described in the
conveyance. The purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a
given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed evidencing said
transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder.
27
Here, no right of
innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the subject lot is involved; thus, the conveyance
executed in favor of AZNAR by private respondents and their predecessors is valid and binding upon
them, and is equally binding and effective against their heirs.
28

The principle that registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien
upon the land "refers to cases involving conflicting rights over registered property and those of
innocent transferees who relied on the clean title of the properties."
29
This principle has no bearing
on the present case, as no subsequent transfer of the subject lot to other persons has been made
either by private respondents or their predecessors-in-interest.
30

By and large, it appears on the face of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale that the
same was registered on 6 March 1964. The registration was under Act No. 3344 on unregistered
lands allegedly because at the time, no title was existing in the files of the Register of Deeds of
Lapu-Lapu City, as it was allegedly lost during the last world war. It was only on 8 August 1988 that
the title was reconstituted at the instance of the petitioner.
As to the fourth assigned error, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals and the private
respondents that petitioner is in estoppel to assert ownership over the subject property because of
petitioner's own allegation in the petition for reconstitution, to wit:
That certificates of title were issued thereto but were lost during the last world war. That the
same were not conveyed much less offered as a collateral for any debt contracted or
delivered for the security of payment of any obligation in favor of any person or lending
institution.
The words "the same" in the second sentence of the afore-quoted paragraph clearly refers to the
certificates of title. This means that the certificates of title, not necessarily the subject lot, were not
conveyed or offered as a collateral but were lost during the last world war. Indeed, as petitioner
contends, it would be very absurd and self-defeating construction if we were to interpret the above-
quoted allegation in the manner that the Court of Appeals and the private respondents did, for how
could petitioner, who is claiming ownership over the subject property, logically allege that the
property was not sold to it?
It bears repeating that petitioner's claim of possession over the subject lot is anchored on its claim of
ownership on the basis of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale. Our ruling on the
issue of the validity of the questioned deed is solely for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession and is to be regarded merely as provisional, without prejudice, however, to the final
determination of the issue in the other case for the annulment or cancellation of the Extrajudicial
Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of public respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35060 is hereby REVERSED, and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City, is REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi 1. nt
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.













Art 1105. Partition which includes person who is not an heir
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982
MARIA LANDAYAN, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGEL BACANI, et al., respondents.
Anastacio E. Caoayan for petitioners.
Felipe V. Avenojar for respondents.

VASQUEZ, J .:
In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
and a house and lot in Manila. The said properties were all covered by Torrens Titles in his name.
He died intestate in Urdaneta, on March 20, 1948.
On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse of Teodoro
Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document, entitled "Extra-Judicial Agreement of
Partition" whereby they adjudicated between themselves the properties left by Teodoro Abenojar.
Severino Abenojar represented himself in said document as "the only forced heir and descendant" of
the late Teodoro Abenojar.
On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
presided over by the respondent Judge seeking a judicial declaration that they are legal heirs of the
deceased Teodoro Abenojar, and that private respondents be ordered to surrender the ownership
and possession of some of the properties that they acquired under the deed of extra-judicial
settlement corresponding to the shares of the petitioners and that the said deed of extra- judicial
settlement and the subsequent deed of donation executed in favor of private respondents, spouses
Liberata Abenojar and Jose Serrano, in consequence thereof be declared nun and void.
In their complaint, petitioners Maria, Segundo, Marcial and Lucio, all surnamed LANDAYAN (the rest
of the petitioners being their respective spouses), alleged that they are the legitimate children of
Guillerma Abenojar, then already deceased, who was the only child of Teodoro Abenojar with his
first wife named Florencia Bautista; and that while Teodoro Abenojar contracted a second marriage
with Antera Mandap and a third with private respondent Maxima Andrada, he did not have any
offspring in any of the said second and third marriages. They aver that private respondent Severino
Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar. They accordingly pray that they be declared as
among the legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar entitled to share in his estate.
Private respondents, on the other hand, have alleged in their pleadings that Teodoro Abenojar
married only once, and that was with private respondent Maxima Andrada. They claimed that private
respondent Severino Abenojar is an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar with Florencia
Bautista. They disclaimed the allegation of the petitioners that their mother Guillerma Abenojar was
a legitimate daughter of Teodoro Abenojar and Florencia Bautista, the truth being allegedly that
Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of the Landayans, was Teodoro Abenojar's spurious child with
Antera Mandap who was then married to another man.
As their affirmative and special defense, the private respondents alleged that the action of the
petitioners had already prescribed, the same having been filed more than 18 years after the
execution of the documents that they seek to annul.
After a preliminary hearing on said affirmative defense, the respondent Judge issued an Order
sustaining the contention that the action is barred by prescription and dismissing the case as a
consequence thereof.
The finding that prescription had set in was rationalized on two main considerations, namely; (1) the
action for the annulment of the deed of extra-judicial partition and the deed of donation is based on
fraud, the prescriptive period of which is four years from the discovery of the fraud, such discovery
being presumed to have taken place upon the registration of the documents in the Office of the
Registry of Deeds and the issuance of new titles in the names of the transferees which, in this case,
had occurred on November 21, 1951; and (2) the deed of extra-judicial partition is not an inexistent
and void contract the action for the declaration of which does not prescribe, the said document being
at most a voidable contract, subject to the operation of the statute of limitations.
We find the dismissal of the action filed by the petitioners to be precipitious and erroneous. Although
the principles relied upon by the respondent Judge are legally correct, he had unqualifiedly assumed
the extra-judicial partition to be merely a voidable contract and not a void one. This question may not
be resolved by determining alone the ground for the annulment of the contract. It requires an inquiry
into the legal status of private respondent Severino Abenojar, particularly as to whether he may be
considered as a "legal heir" of Teodoro Abenojar and as such entitled to participate in an extra-
judicial partition of the estate of said deceased. This is a most material point on which the parties
have asserted conflicting claims. Understandably so, inasmuch as the question of whether the
question document is void or merely voidable depends largely on such determination.
As stated above, petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar,
he being only an acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of petitioners, whom
they claim to be the sole legitimate daughter in first marriage of Teodoro Abenojar. If this claim is
correct, Severino Abenojar has no rights of legal succession from Teodoro Abenojar in view of the
express provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on the
truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledged
natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar is
recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code). He even claims that he is the sole legal heir of Teodoro
Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who are admittedly the children of the deceased
Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their mother being a
spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar.
Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino Abenojar is an
illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. The right of
representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of Ms father. (Art. 992, Civil Code). On this supposition, the
subject deed of extra- judicial partition is one that included a person who is not an heir of the
descendant whose estate is being partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105 of the Civil
Code, reading as follows:
Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not,
shall be void only with respect to such person.
It could be gathered from the pleadings filed by the petitioners that they do not seek the nullification
of the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but only insofar as the same deprived them of their
shares in the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro Abenojar; Should it be proved, therefore, that
Severino Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, the portion of the deed of extra-
judicial partition adjudicating certain properties of Teodoro Abenojar in his favor shall be deemed
inexistent and void from the beginning in accordance with Articles 1409, par. (7) and 1105 of the
Civil Code. By the express provision of Article 1410 of the Civil Code, the action to seek a
declaration of the nullity of the same does not prescribe.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent
Judge is ordered to try the case on the merits and render the corresponding judgment thereon. The
private respondents shall pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.