ALBANO vs. Judge GAPUSAN A.M. No.

1022-MJ May 7, 1976

FACTS:
1. In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench, respondent Gapusan notarized a
document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta.
2. It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage,
as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other.
3. Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in effect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary
action against Judge Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary.
ISSUE:
WON the stipulation in the separation agreement entered by the spouse is valid?
HELD: NO. The stipulation is void.

There is no question that the covenents contained in the said separation agreement are
contrary to law, morals and good customs (Biton vs. Momongan, 62 Phil. 7). Those stipulations
undermine the institutions of marriage and the family, "Marriage is not a mere contract but an
inviolable social institution". "The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes
and protects." (Arts. 52 and 216, Civil Code). Marriage and the family are the bases of human
society throughout the civilized world (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43; Ramirez vs.
Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, 864; Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254; Brown vs. Yambao, 102
Phil. 168).

To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any
contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement,
during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership" (Art. 221, Civil Code). Before
the new Civil Code, it was held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial sanction was void (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15).


Tenchavez v. Escao 1965 Reyes, J.B.L.:

FACTS:
1. Facts:
1. In February 1948 , Vicenta Escao, 27 y.o., exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 y.o., without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain; but
later on she admitted to her parents that she did get married
2. The Escao spouses sought priestly advice. A certain priest suggested a recelebration to
validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due
to the lack of authority of the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage; but it didnt
happen because there was rumor that Pastor Tenchavez was flirting around with their
common friend and matchmaker- Pacita Noel;
3. Because of that (Pastor-Pacita thing), Vicenta didnt want to remarry Pastor
4. Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila; but
theyd write letters to each other as Vicenta was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor, but her letters became less frequent as the days
passed.
5. As of June 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged.
6. Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her
marriage stirred in Cebu society, There, a lawyer filed for her a petition to annul her
marriage (thus Vicenta impliedly admits that marriage was valid). She did not sign the
petition. The case was dismissed.
7. She left for the US. In Aug 1950, she filed for divorce against Pastor in Nevada, on the
ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." It was granted.


8. In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul
their daughter's marriage to Pastor.
9. In September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage.
10. In September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children.
11. In 1955 Tenchavez filed a case which was led to THIS petition; he asked for legal
separation.
12. Vicenta acquired American citizenship only in 1955.
13. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to Russell.
ISSUE: WON the divorce decree obtained by Vicenta in Nevada dissolved her marriage to Pastor?
HELD: NO, her marriage to Pastor is still valid; the divorce decree is void in the Philippines. The
decree of Legal separation should be granted.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and
Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the
decree of absolute divorce obtained in Nevada.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad
vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive
policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on
grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband. Instead of divorce, the present Civil
Code only provides for legal separation, and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the
marriage bonds shall not be severed.

Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery.

Pilapil vs. Somera

Facts:
1. Husband: Erich Ekkehard Geiling (German) and Wife: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino)
were married: 7 Sep 1979 in Germany and had one daughter.
2. Since Apr 1982, they had been living apart. In Jan 1983, three and a half years after the
marriage, Erich initiated a divorce proceeding in Germany.
3. On 23 Jan 1983, Imelda filed a petition for legal separation, support separation of property
before the Manila RTC. Pending.
4. On 15 Jan 1986, Schoneberg Local Court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. Custody of the child was granted to
Imelda.
5. On 27 Jun 1986, five months after the issuance of the divorce, Erich filed two complaints for
adultery against Imelda. One with William Chia in 1982, and the other with Jesus Chua in
1983.
6. Assistant Fiscal recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. Upon review, city fiscal reversed and directed the filing of the complaints. The
complaints were then raffled to two branches of the RTC.
7. On 14 Mar 1987, Imelda filed a petition with the DOJ to reverse the resolution of the city
fiscal.
8. Imelda then filed a motion to suspend proceedings in both criminal cases. Judge Cruz
suspended proceedings but Judge Somera merely reset the date of the arraignment.
9. Before the date of arraignment, she filed a motion to quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction but was denied.


10. On the date of arraignment, Imelda refused to be arraigned. She was then cited for
contempt and detained. Later,a plea of not guilty was entered. On 27 Oct 1987, Imelda filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC. SC issued TRO.
12. On 23 Mar 1988, DOJ issued a resolution directing the city fiscal to move for the
dismissal of the complaints.

Issue: Is it necessary that the marriage still be existing upon the filing of the complaint for
adultery?
Held: Yes. They were already divorced when the complaints were filed. The criminal cases are
ordered dismissed.
1. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. It is a
jurisdictional matter.
2. It necessarily follows that the initiator has the status, capacity, or legal representation to do so
at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
3. Article 344 of the RPC [adultery] presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
4. American jurisprudence yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statue
provides that the innocent spouse shall gave the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery.
5. In adultery, the status of the complainant vis--vis the accused must be determined as of the
time the complaint was filed.
6. Since Erich obtained a divorce decree in Germany and thus no longer the husband of Imelda,
he had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the pretense that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The severance of the marital bond had the effect
of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of
one would not affect the other.


Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 242

FACTS:
1. Action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile
2. The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino,
3. Campos Rueda, one month after the contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of
her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs
4. plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act
other than legal and valid cohabitation her refusals resulted to his maltreatments by word
and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body
6. She was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
7. first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the
plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a
divorce or separation from the defendant.

ISSUE: Can the defendant be compelled to render support to his wife outside of the conjugal
domicile?
HELD Yes. Campos Rueda was held liable to support his wife.
1. Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905, that neither spouse can be
compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, would not necessarily control
in this jurisdiction


2. Article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a
preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of
the one entitled to support.
3. The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her
part, may maintain an action for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy,
notwithstanding Article 149 of the Civil Code (giving the person who is obliged to furnish
support the option to satisfy either by paying fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining
his own house).


Gandionco v. Penaranda, 155 SCRA 725
FACTS:
1. Teresita Gandionco filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against her hubby,
Froilan Gandionco, on May 1986. The complaint was based on the ground of concubinage,
and was accompanied with a petition for support and damages.
2. On October 13, 1986, she filed another concubinage case (this time a criminal case) with
the GenSan RTC.
3. A few months after, she filed an application for provisional remedy of support pendente lite
while the civil Leg-Sep case was
pending.
4. Judge Pearanda granted the pendente lite support on December 10, 1986.
5. The present case immediately followed when Froilan made this recourse to the SC. He
contended that the civil action for legal
separation (and all the other consequent actions that can follow from it, like pendente lite,
alimony, etc.) should be suspended in view of the pending criminal case. He relies on Art
111, Sec 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and the Jerusalem case in making this
claim. Froilan also contends that since the legal separation case is grounded on the basis
of concubinage, it follows that the judgment in the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him would have to be made before the civil action can continue.

IISSUE: Should the civil action for legal separation be suspended to give room for the criminal
action for concubinage?
HELD: NO. The petition was DISMISSED.

The contention made by Froilan is a misapplication of the goal of Art 111, Sec 3 of the 1985
ROCP. That provision is meant to cover only civil actions made during the pendency of a criminal
case, when the victim realizes that civil liability has also been incurred and would like to go after
the culprit for the said liability. That kind of civil action, which is to enforce the civil liability arising
from the offense, must be suspended because the criminal case has not been decided yet. Most
of the time it is used when the victim wants to invoke the right to live separately from the offender,
and to enforce all the other legal consequences. Art 111, Sec 3 was very explicit in the kind of civil
action to be suspended and no confusion must result from its application.

The present case is different from the one mentioned in Art 111, Sec 3. The case was filed
not to recover civil liability, but to dissolve the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to
each other.

The petitioner also cannot say that since the basis for the civil action is being determined in
the criminal action, the conviction for the criminal action must be first obtained. This is because a
decree of legal separation on the ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation, and no criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary.



The court also dismissed the claim that the judge was manifestly partial to his wife. Just
because there is divergence of opinion between his lawyer and the judge does not mean that
there is foul play.


Contreras, plaintiff v. Macaraig, defendant 33 SCRA 222 May 29, 1970

FACTS:
1. Contreras and Macaraig were married to one another.
2. Macaraig became a special agent for Malacaang. He began to be away so often and to come
home very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was out on a series of
confidential missions.
3. In September, 1962, The driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in
Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. Macaraig and Alcalas adulterous relationship bore a child.
4. Contreras sought the intervention of their family to persuade Macaraig to return to their family
but to no avail.
5. In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and
Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on
Espaa Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby
restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to
the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed
plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
6. On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. Defendant
has never appeared in this case.
7. The TC dismissed the case on the basis that the action to commence an action has
prescribed. according to it the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause for legal separation in

ISSUE:

The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article
102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September
1962 or from December 1963. Computing the period of one year from the former date, it is clear
that plaintiff's complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a little too late, while the reverse would
be true if said period is deemed to have commenced only in the month of December 1963.

After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only
time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part
of December 1963.


Matubis v. Praxedes, 109 Phil. 709 October 25, 1960

FACTS:
1. January10,1943-H/Wwere married but decided to live separately later on.
April3,1948,H/W entered into an agreement that allowed hem:
1. To freely get any mate and live with them without the interference of the other.
2. To be protected from any suit against them that may include one of them from filing a case
of support of benefits.
2. April24,1956 Socorro Matubis claims her husband abandoned her and has a concubine. She
thus, filed a complaint for Legal separation and change of surname against her
husband, Zoilo Praxedes.
3. January1955, Praxedes cohabited with someone, and that someone gave birth to a child. The
two of them were recognized as H/W in their community.



ISSUE: Should the case of concubinage and abandonment continue?
HELD: No.
Condonationandconsentonthepartoftheplaintiffareclearlyexpressedintheagreementtheymad
e.
The law (Art100CivilCode) provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no consent ot the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned
and or consented to it in writing, the plaintiff can no longer bring such case forward.


Yangco v. Rohde, 1 Phil. 404 October 13, 1902

FACTS:
1. A complaint filed Victorina Obin against petitioner which prayed that she be declared the
lawful wife of Luis R. Yangco and that she be granted a divorce, an allowance for alimony,
and attorneys fees.
2. Petitioner is now filing a case of prohibition against the said order because he claims she is
not his wife and that there is insufficient evidence to prove it.
3. Respondent says that the SC has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter and that the
petition does not state facts sufficient to create a cause of action.
4. Respondent claims that Victorina, as a married woman, by reason of divorce pending
litigation, she should be granted the said allowance.

ISSUE:
Should the alimony be granted to the person who claims to be his wife?

HELD: No
1. Respondent judge was in error when he enacted judgment for alimony because of lack of
evidence.
2. There is no law or reason that allows the granting of alimony to a person who merely claims to
be a spouse, without supporting such a claim with evidence.


Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709 July 31, 1956

FACTS:
1. Luis filed legal separation against Emma (his wife)
2. Ground: adultery
3. Emma therein filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a
monthly support of P5,000 for herself
and said children, and the return of her passport
4. Luis opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that
Defendant had abandoned the children;
alleging that conjugal properties were worth only P80,000, not one million pesos as alleged
by Defendant; denying the taking of
her passport or the supposed vexation, and contesting her right to attorneys fees.
5. Luis filed the present petition for certiorari against said order and for mandamus to compel
the Respondent judge to require
the parties to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge is correct for not proceeding on the question of custody and support
pendente lite because of Article 103.



HELD: No, judge is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite

1. It may be noted that since more than six months have elapsed since the filing of the petition the
question offered may not be
allowed. It is, however, believed that the reasons for granting the preliminary injunction should be
given that the scope of the article cited may be explained.
Cooling-off period:
2. It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently
intended as a cooling off period to
make possible a reconciliation between the spouses.
3. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already
inflamed passions against one another,
and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate
reflection.
4. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the
effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children
and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil
Code.)
5. The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the
circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in
justice may be caused.


Lerma v. CA., 61 SCRA 440 December 20, 1974

FACTS:
1. May 19, 1951 Teodoro Lerma and Concepcion Diaz got married, and had children
(Gregory, being the youngest).
2. August 22, 1969 Teodoro filed a complaint for adultery against his wife and a certain
Teodoro Ramirez.
3. November 18, 1969 Concepcion filed with the lower court, a complaint against the
Teodoro for legal separation and/or
separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for
support pendente lite for her and
Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody.
4. Her complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt
against her life.
5. He filed his opposition to the application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the
adultery charge he had filed.
6. The application for support pendente lite was granted, amended to the following effect: (1)
He was declared entitled to
support pendente lite from the date of the filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of such
monthly support was reduced
from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.
7. Teodoro opposed the amendment, filing an appeal for grave abuse of discretion, and an
injunction to stop the enforcement.
The CA granted it, but then it decided to dismiss the petition after Concepcion moved for
reconsideration.
8. With the SC: It granted the TRO to stop the enforcement pendente lite. This was addressed
to the judge and her
representatives.


9. Among those that he alleged in his appeal with the SC were: 1) that new adultery charges
were filed against her and her 2
nd

paramour that made him seek custody of their son, 2) that in connection with the first
adultery charge, she and her co-accused,
Teodoro Teddy Ramirez, had been convicted, and was pending appeal in the Court of
Appeals.
10. The respondent filed an opposition. One of her arguments was: Article292 of the
NewCivilCode-during the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage,
the spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property ...,"
such support is mandatory even if there be a showing that the wife is guilty of adultery.
11. The SC then denied the urgent motion for TRO.

ISSUE:
WON adultery is a valid defense against the claim of the respondents for support pendente lite?

Ruling:
1. In Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285, which was an action by the wife against the husband for
support, based upon a written
contract, this Court held that adultery is a good defense. This ruling was reiterated in
subsequent cases.
2. Article 292, which was cited by Concepcion, is not in itself the source of the legal right to
receive support. It merely states that
the support, not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be taken from the
conjugal property during the pendency of the legal separation proceeding. Also, the said
article contemplates the pendency of a court action and, a prima facie showing that the
action will prosper. For if the action is shown to be groundless the mere filing thereof will not
necessarily set Article 292 in operation.
3. Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that "the legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage ... (and) where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be
claimed by either of them ..." It is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the
Court of Appeals, but the same satisfies the standard of provisional showing. If legal
separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action
for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obtain
support pendente lite.
4. This is not meant to be a prejudgment of either the legal separation proceeding pending in
the lower court or the criminal case for adultery pending in the Court of Appeals. It is to be
understood only in the light of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, which specifically
governs the subject of support pendente lite.

People v. Sansano, 58 Phil. 73

FACTS:

1. Ursula Sansano and Mariano Ventura married on April 29, 1919 and had a child. The
husband left for Cagayan and remained there for three years without a word or support to
his wife and child.
2. Ursula struggled to survive until the accused Marcelo took her and her child to live with him.
3. Upon the husbands return he filed adultery charges to which they were convicted and
served 4months and 1day of arresto
mayor. After serving her sentence she went to plead for her husband to take him back but


instead he sent her away to do
whatever she wanted.
4. She then returned to live with Marcelo while her husband left for Hawaii and stayed there
for seven years. Upon his return he
filed another adultery case in order to obtain a divorce under Act no. 2710.
5. They were again convicted for adultery to which they appeal.

ISSUE:
Could they be liable for another case of adultery to be used obtain a divorce decree by Mariano?
HELD: No. The conduct of the husband warrants the inference of consent.
1. Art.344 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crimes of adultery shall not be
prosecuted when the offended party consented to the act. The conduct of the husband
warrants that he consented to the adulterous relationship and is not authorized to institute
the criminal proceeding.
2. The husband knew even before he left for Hawaii that his wife is living again with Marcelo
after he sent her off and he kept silent for seven years only instituting a case of adultery
posing that he was an offended spouse and to obtain a divorce cannot be appreciated
because he could have taken an action anytime during that period.


Bugayong v. Ginez, 100 Phil 616 December 28, 1956

FACTS:
1. 1949 - Couple got married
2. 1951 Leonila (Ginez) left Bugayong (and went to Pangasinan then Dagupan.)
3. Bugayong would receive letters about infidelity acts of Leonila
4. Finally he decided to look for his wife; he found her and for 2 nights and 1 day they made
love.
5. He asked her about these unfaithful acts but she didnt answer, she just left... again! Poor
guy.
6. He finally filed for legal separation.
7. As for Leonilas answer, of course she vehemently denied the allegations.

ISSUE:
Can Bugayong file for legal separation despite his making love to Leonila which constitutes
CONDONATION?

HELD: No, he cant. Condonation bars him.
1. The husband's attitude of looking for his wife and sleeping with her for 2 nights despite his
alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation
2. Under the Civil Code, one cant file for legal separation when there has been condonation
or consent to the adultery or concubinage


Ocampo v. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35 February 23, 1960

FACTS:
1. April 5, 1938: Jose de Ocampo (Jose I) and Serafina Florenciano got married in Nueva
Ecija, and had children.
2. Serafino committed adultery twice: (1951) with Jose Arcalas (Jose II), and (1955) with
Nelson Orzame.
3. First adultery: Having discovered this, he sent her to Manila to study beauty care. While in
the city, he went out with several other men, aside from Jose II.


4. When she had finished studying her course, she left her husband and since then they had
lived separately.
5. Second adultery: Jose I caught Serafina in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson.
Jose I signified his intention of filing
legal separation, to which she manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery.
6. July 5, 1955: Jose I filed a complaint for legal separation on the ground of adultery.

ISSUE:
WON the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by
the Family Code?

HELD:
Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the
existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment
disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a
confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery
independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of
separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence
presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants
confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet
prescribed.


Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng, 103 Phil. 255 March 29, 1958
FACTS:

Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married on May 1951 in Zamboanga City. After
their marriage, they went to Manila and live with Chua's parents. In October 1951, the couple went
to Zamboanga to visit Pilars parents. Chua returned to Manila with the understanding that Pilar
would follow him, but she did not.

In 1953, Pilar filed a complaint for support against Chua alleging that they have been living
separately for two years due to constant fights and Chua's inability to provide a home for
themselves apart from his parents.

Chua stated that he was willing to support his wife but only if she lives in Manila with him. He was
also willing to establish a conjugal dwelling separate from his parents.

Meanwhile, Pilar filed a petition for alimony pendente lite. Based on a stipulation of facts agreed
upon by the parties, the court rendered judgment granting the Pilars allowance after finding that
the latter's refusal to return was caused by her aversion to stay with the parents of Chua after she
had experienced some previous in-law troubles.

Chua filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus fixed by the court by receiving and
maintaining Pilar at his residence in Pasay, which was, apart, from that of his parents and that if
the Pilar refuses, he will not be compelled to remit allowance to her in Zamboanga.

His petition was denied, thus this case.

ISSUE:
WON Pilar is entitled to support when she refused to live with Chua




HELD:
The court found that while the wife strongly wanted to be separated from the husband, the
husband was open to fix the problem, acknowledging his obligation to support her and even
expressing his willingness to abide by her wishes to have a conjugal dwelling apart from his
parents, although this might be financially taxing for him to sustain. The defendant acknowledges
that the Art. 111, CC imposes on the husband the responsibility of maintaining and supporting his
wide and family but he insists that under Art. 209, CC he is given the option to fulfill said duty
either by paying the allowance as fixed by the Court or by receiving and maintaining the person
entitled thereto in his house. He has thus elected to perform his obligation by the second means
allowed by the law. The law affords moral and legal obstacle as aground to compel husband to
provide separate maintenance for the wife. However, misunderstanding with in-laws is not a valid
moral and legal obstacle. Art. 110 does not preclude the husband from fixing the conjugal
residence at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized norm of morality.

Although the husband and the wife are, obliged to live together, observe mutual respect
and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109), and that the wife is entitled to be
supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband where even
without legal justification she establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the
former, yet and in such event We would see no plausible reason why she should be allowed any
support from the husband.

Judgment was modified. Chua was given the option of supporting his wife at their conjugal
dwelling apart from the home of his parents, and should Pilar refuse to abide by the terms, then
Chua would be relieved from the obligation of giving any support.


Ramirez-Cuaderno v. Cuaderno, 12 SCRA 505 November 28, 1964

FACTS:
1. Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno, petitioner and Angel Cuaderno, respondent are married to one
another.
2. Petitioner filed a claim of support against her husband after a fight.
3. The wife claimed maltreatment and abandonment by the husband as basis therefor, whereas
the husband, in resisting her demand for maintenance, contended that it was she who left the
conjugal dwelling and, consequently, is not entitled thereto.
4. The TC granted to claim for support. The CA on appeal reversed the TC decision and were
admonished to live as husband and wife. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner is entitled for support? YES.
WON the amount was sufficient? YES.

HELD:
We recognize the wisdom of the exhortation

that in the interest of society, and perhaps of
the parties, courts should move, with caution in providing separate maintenance for the wife, a
situation which would be an acknowledgement of the de facto separation of the spouses.
However, it would be taking an unrealistic view for us to compel or urge them to live together
when, at least for the present, they specially the husband are speaking of impossibility of
cohabitation. For while marriage entitles both parties to cohabitation or consortium, the sanction
therefor is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order. This is due to the inherent characteristic and nature of marriage in this
jurisdiction.



In the instant case, it is not disputed that the infliction of physical injuries on the wife, by the
husband gave rise to their separation. It is likewise shown it was the husband who took his wife to
her parents' home where he left her. The fact that the wife allegedly accepted money from her
husband and desisted from accepting any later, because according to the latter, she was
demanding for more, only indicates that even before the filing of the present case, the defendant-
husband was already providing something for the separate maintenance. Considering that the wife
has no income of her own, while the husband has an employment, the sum of P150.00 fixed by
the trial court for the wife's monthly support does not seem to be unreasonable. Needless to state
that, as the separation has been brought about by the husband and under the circumstances
established during the trial, the same shall subsist until a different situation between the parties
shall take place.