CHAP TER 2.

7
ENGINEERING ETHICS:
APPLICATIONS TO INDUSTRIAL
ENGINEERING
Larry J. Shuman
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Harvey Wol f e
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
I ndust r i al engi neer i ng deci si ons may i nvol ve fact ors such as envi r onment al pol l ut i on, pr oduct
safety, and wor kpl ace hazards. I n addi t i on, such deci si ons may be ma de under cost and sched-
ul e pressures. These f act or s cont r i but e t o i ncr eased risks, whi ch in t ur n can l ead t he engi neer
and t he or gani zat i on i nt o an et hi cal di l emma. How such di l emmas can occur in pr act i ce is dis-
cussed and a f r amewor k f or bot h t he pr act i ci ng engi neer and t he engi neer i ng or gani zat i on t o
hel p avoi d t hese si t uat i ons is pr esent ed. The f r amewor k emphasi zes t he i mpor t ance of com-
pet ence, responsi bi l i t y, and avoi dance of har m ( r educi ng ri sk). A par t i cul ar emphasi s is pl aced
on r i sk assessment and t he need for i ndust r i al engi neer s t o add t he evol vi ng me t hodol ogy of
ri sk assessment , especi al l y pr obabi l i st i c ri sk assessment , t o t hei r t ool ki t .
WHY S HOUL D THE IE BE CONCERNED A B OUT ETHICS?
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Why shoul d an i ndust r i al engi neer ( I E) be concer ned about et hi cs? As St ewar t and Paust en-
back poi nt ed out 15 year s ago, engi neer s must make deci si ons t hat may i nvol ve such f act or s
as envi r onment al pol l ut i on, pr oduct safety, and wor kpl ace hazards. They not ed t hat t hi s t akes
manager s i nt o ar eas wher e even t he most car ef ul l y cons i der ed deci si ons ar e l i kel y t o be criti-
cized. Fur t her , t he dat a and even t he knowl edge bases t hey must r el y on may be i ncompl et e
or equi vocal . Hence, deci si ons wi t h et hi cal or mor al di mensi ons may pr ove to be mor e t r ou-
bl es ome t han deci si ons t hat pr i mar i l y i nvol ve i ssues of fi nance, mar ket i ng, or pr oduct i on. Yet,
i gnor e such issues and t he l ong- t er m survi val of t he f i r m can be j e opa r di z e d [1]. We cal l such
si t uat i ons et hi cal di l emmas, and t hey may ar i se in a number of ways, many unexpect ed.
2.101
2. 102 PRODUCTIVITY, PERFORMANCE, AND ETHICS
Four Examples of Ethical Dil emmas
Wha t ar e some exampl es? Her e ar e sever al t hat we f ound in t he Pittsburgh Post Gazette and
t he Ne w York Times over a t hr ee- day per i od in Nove mbe r 1997:
" Appa r e l Panel Badl y Di vi ded on Pol i ci ng of Sweat shops. " A pr es i dent i al t ask force t o
est abl i sh a code of conduct for appar el f act or i es f ound i t sel f fi ght i ng over how much t he
publ i c shoul d be t ol d when i nspect or s di scover l abor vi ol at i ons in fact ori es. The t ask force
( whose member s r epr es ent ed l abor uni ons, human ri ght s groups, and cor por at e giants) had
ear l i er agr eed t o l i mi t i ng t he wor kweek t o 60 hours and t he mi ni mum age t o 14. I magi ne
bei ng t he I E char ged wi t h desi gni ng or managi ng an of f shor e faci l i t y t hat uses child l abor
in or der t o mi ni mi ze costs. What mor al and et hi cal issues woul d you have t o st ruggl e wi t h?
"House Et hi cs Char ade. " Af t er t wo years of charges, t he House Et hi cs Commi t t ee has finally
got t en ar ound t o i nvest i gat i ng Congr essman Bud Shuster. Among t he issues is t he congress-
man' s habi t of combi ni ng official t ri ps and campai gn fund-raising, t hus creat i ng t he impres-
si on t hat Shust er' s suppor t for l ocal t r anspor t at i on proj ect s is for sale. Shoul d you, as a
manager with t he muni ci pal t r anspor t at i on aut hor i t y seeki ng federal funds for a new highway
proj ect , invite t he congr essman t o t own for one of t hese dual - pur pose t ri ps?
" Fi ber Opt i cs for Jets." An i nf or med l et t er wr i t er comment i ng on f aul t y wi ri ng bei ng t he
most l i kel y t r i gger i ng mechani sm for t he TWA Fl i ght 800 di sast er has cal l ed for a new
i nvest i gat i on: Why ar e ai rcraft desi gner s usi ng copper wi ri ng in what ar e supposed to be
st at e- of - t he- ar t ai r cr af t ? I nst ead, he pr opos e d t hat f i ber opt i cs be used t o r educe t he pr ob-
abi l i t y t o near zer o of cat ast r ophi c fai l ure f r om f r ayed and shor t ed copper wires. As a
desi gn engi neer on t hi s pr oj ect , under t i ght cost const rai nt s, what woul d you do?
"29 Nat i ons Agr e e t o Out l aw Br i bi ng For ei gn Officials." Af t e r year s of U.S. l obbyi ng, t he
wor l d' s i ndust r i al i zed count r i es f or mal l y agr eed t o a t r eat y t hat woul d out l aw bri bi ng for-
ei gn gover nment officials. For a l ong t i me, Amer i can compani es have compl ai ned about los-
i ng bi l l i ons of dol l ar s in busi ness ever y year t o ri val s t hat br i be offi ci al s in or der to win
cont ract s. The t r eat y woul d not out l aw payment s t o pol i t i cal par t y l eaders, many of whom
may be t he cent r al deci si on makers. In t he meant i me, t he Justice De pa r t me nt has beef ed up
its i nvest i gat i on i nt o devel opi ng mar ket s in As i a wher e br i bes ar e common. As t he overseas
manager for an Ame r i c a n company compet i ng for busi ness in Sout heast Asi a, woul d you be
willing t o vi ol at e U.S. laws in or de r t o obt ai n an i mpor t ant cont r act and t he pr omot i on t hat
woul d go with it?
Balancing Cost, Schedule, and Risk
I n our r ecent l y publ i shed book, Engineering Et hi cs--Bal anci ng Cost, Schedule and Risk:
Lessons Learned f r om the Space Shuttle, coaut hor ed wi t h Ros a L. Pi nkus and Nor man
E Hummon, we st udi ed how engi neer s per cei ved, ar t i cul at ed, and r esol ved et hi cal di l emmas
t hat ar ose when compl ex, advanced t echnol ogy was devel oped [2]. In doi ng this, we expl i ci t l y
chose not t o sol el y focus on what phi l os opher Mi chael Pr i t char d has t er med di sast er ethics
[3]. That is, t hose headl i ne event s exempl i f i ed by t he expl osi on of t he Chal l enger , the Thr ee
Mi l e I sl and nucl ear power pl ant mal f unct i on, or t he r ecal l of t he For d Pi nt o [4]. Rat her, we
concent r at ed on t he ever yday deci si ons made by engi neer s and ot her s t hat can l ead to t hese
et hi cal di l emmas. Thi s is par t i cul ar l y t r ue for t he Chal l enger di sast er, which, we have con-
cl uded, was not t he r esul t of a single event . I nst ead, it can be t r aced t o t he deci si on by Con-
gress t o fund t he Space Shut t l e pr ogr am at a cut - r at e pri ce and t he accept ance by NASA to
pr oceed wi t h pl ans t o bui l d t he shut t l e t hat set t he st age for i ndi vi dual engi neer s t o continu-
al l y st ruggl e t o bal ance safety, cost , and schedul e. What we obser ved was t hat safety, while
al ways a par t of t he equat i on, di d not consi st ent l y over r i de t he ot her vari abl es.
ENGINEERING ETHICS: APPLICATIONS TO INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 2. 103
We bel i eve t hat such l essons ar e especi al l y r el evant t o pr act i ci ng i ndust r i al engi neers.
Especi al l y because of t he nat ur e of t hei r work, I Es must not onl y deal wi t h pr essur es of cost
and schedul e, but of t en ar e t he ones r esponsi bl e for set t i ng t hose schedul e and cost con-
straints. I t is t he i ndust r i al engi neer who t ypi cal l y must deci de whi ch schedul e is f easi bl e and
at what cost. Once t he schedul e is frozen, t he I E must make sure t hat it is a dhe r e d to, and t hen
serve as t he first l i ne of r esponsi bi l i t y when cost s begi n t o i ncr ease or t he schedul e slips. I n
doi ng this, t he I E must make assumpt i ons about ri sk, and how t hat ri sk may be i ncr eased. Fur -
t her, he or she must det er mi ne when t hat i ncr eased ri sk is no l onger accept abl e. Al l t oo oft en,
such ri sk assessment s ar e done i mpl i ci t l y r at her t han explicitly. So, t he abi l i t y t o assess ri sk
becomes an i mpor t ant t ool for t he et hi cal i ndust r i al engi neer.
ENGI NEERI NG ETHICS A S AP P L IED ETHICS
Engi neeri ng Et hi cswA Ne w Field of Inqui ry
The f or mal fi el d of engi neer i ng et hi cs is r el at i vel y new. Al t hough it boast s a gr owi ng l i t er a-
t ure, t her e is no refl ect i ve anal yt i c vi ew of engi neer i ng et hi cs as a di sci pl i ne. I ndeed, Mar t i n
and Schi nzi nger, aut hor s of one of t he first and still a l eadi ng engi neer i ng et hi cs t ext , not e t hat
"as a di sci pl i ne or ar ea of ext ensi ve inquiry, engi neer i ng et hi cs is still young" [5]. They set its
f or mal begi nni ngs in t he l at e 1970s and ci t e sever al l a ndma r k event s: a fi rst i nt er di sci pl i nar y
conf er ence in engi neer i ng et hi cs at Rens s el aer Pol yt echni c I nst i t ut e and a schol ar l y bi bl i og-
r aphy in 1980; and t he first schol ar l y j our nal , Business and Professional Ethics, in 1981 [6].
"Thi s l at e devel opment of t he di sci pl i ne is i roni c, " t hey concl ude, gi ven t hat numeri cal l y, t he
engi neer i ng pr of essi on "affect s all of us in most ar eas of our l i ves" [7].
Our appr oach is t hat of appl i ed ethics. We wi sh t o sensi t i ze t he engi neer or engi neer i ng
st udent t o pot ent i al et hi cal di l emmas, especi al l y t hose t hat ari se in t he dai l y wor kpl ace. I n
par t i cul ar , we want t he engi neer t o be abl e t o r ecogni ze t hese devel opi ng et hi cal di l emmas
and t hen be abl e t o st r uct ur e t he i ssues in a way t hat fi rst bet t er cl ari fi es t hem and t hen facil-
i t at es r esol ut i on. A pr er equi s i t e t o this i dent i f i cat i on and st r uct ur i ng pr ocess is a def i ni t i on of
t er ms commonl y used in t he field. To do this, we have adopt ed t he fol l owi ng def i ni t i ons [8].
A f e w def i ni ti ons of t er ms
Ethics A gener i c t er m for sever al ways of exami ni ng t he mor al life (i.e., cri t i cal r ef l ect i on
on what one does and why one does it). Some appr oaches t o et hi cs ar e descr i pt i ve and ot h-
ers ar e nor mat i ve.
Descriptive Ethics (non-normative) Fact ual i nvest i gat i on of mor al behavi or and beliefs.
The st udy not of what peopl e ought t o do but how t hey r eas on and how t hey act.
Normat i ve Ethics (general) The fi el d of i nqui r y t hat at t empt s t o answer t he quest i ons,
Whi ch act i on gui des are wor t hy of mor al accept ance? and For what reasons? Types of act i on
gui des ar e t heori es, pri nci pl es, and rules. They ar e used t o assess t he mor al i t y of actions.
Normat i ve Ethics (applied) The act of appl yi ng act i on gui des t o nor mat i ve pr obl ems (i.e.,
pr of essi onal codes of e t hi c s - - r ol e nor ms/ obl i gat i ons t hat pr of essi ons at t empt t o enf or ce) .
Somet i mes et i quet t e and r esponsi bi l i t i es ar e spel l ed out . Typically, appl i ed nor mat i ve
et hi cs ar e not as i ncl usi ve as gener al nor mat i ve ethics.
Metaethics (non-normative) The anal ysi s of l anguage of cruci al et hi cal t er ms such as
vi rt ue, right, obl i gat i on. I t exami nes t he l ogi c and t he pat t er ns of mor al reasoni ng.
Tacit Ethics Unsai d, uns poken rul es of pract i ce.
2.104 PRODUCTIVITY, PERFORMANCE, AND ETHICS
The Engi neer' s Mul t i pl e Loyal ti es
I n addi t i on t o t he previously not ed cost and schedul e pressures, t he multiple loyalties of t he
practicing engi neer also lead t o ethical dilemmas. Ther e are at least f our constituencies t hat
t he practicing engi neer may be responsible to, and oft en t hey are in conflict. Clearly, t he engi-
neer has a loyalty t o his or her empl oyer (i.e., t he organization), but t he practice of engineer-
ing may also involve a client or cont ract or, and this creates a second level of loyalty. Then
t here is t he public, where t he "safet y of the public" as decl ared by Ci cero has been t he respon-
sibility of t he engi neer for over 2000 years. Finally, t he engi neer has a loyalty t o t he profession
and t o him- or herself.
Fr om our perspective, one cannot examine engi neeri ng ethics wi t hout considering these
multiple relationships and how t hey interact in various situations. How does t he engineer
relate t o t he organi zat i on and t he organi zat i on t o its engineers? How do t he organi zat i on and
t he larger society i nt eract ? To what extent does t he organi zat i on consi der itself t o be respon-
sible t o t he public at large? How do personal, professional, and organi zat i onal values affect
mor al decision maki ng in engi neeri ng practice? Engi neers must make decisions t hat involve
(either directly or indirectly) t he safety and well-being of the public. Hence, the question, To
what degree shoul d t hey be concer ned? Do practicing engineers perceive their decisions as
having an ethical component ? Can t he industrial engi neer include this ethical component in
an "objective funct i on" or as one of t he measures of effectiveness? This is not a trivial issue
since most engi neers have a technical educat i on that, until very recently, has typically avoided
explicit reference t o these val ue-l aden aspects of decision making. How he or she pursues
t hem in t he face of compet i ng demands such as cost/profit, deadlines, safety, and loyalty t o
empl oyer, client, public, and self is our concern.
We recogni ze t hat personal values and j udgment s affect t he individual' s engineering deci-
sions. I n addition, t here is a growi ng body of professional codes, federal regulations, rules, and
laws t hat provi de a framework t o help identify t he engi neer' s moral obligations. I n particular,
t he Institute of Industrial Engi neers endorses t he Canon of Ethics provi ded by t he Accredi-
t at i on Boar d for Engi neeri ng and Technol ogy ( ABET) [9].
ABET Canon of Ethics
The Fundamental Principles. Engi neers uphol d and advance t he integrity, honor, and dig-
nity of t he engi neeri ng profession by
1. Usi ng their knowl edge and skill for the enhancement of human welfare
2. Being honest and impartial, and serving with fidelity the public, their employers, and
clients
3. Striving t o increase the compet ence and prestige of the engi neeri ng profession
4. Support i ng t he professional and technical societies of their disciplines
The Fundamental Canons
1. Engi neers shall hold par amount the safety, health, and welfare of t he public in t he perfor-
mance of their professional duties.
2. Engi neers shall perform services only in t he areas of their compet ence.
3. Engi neers shall issue public st at ement s in onl y an objective and truthful manner.
4. Engi neers shall act in professional matters for each empl oyer or client as faithful agents or
trustees, and shall avoid conflicts of interest.
5. Engi neers shall build their professional reput at i on on the merit of their services and shall
not compet e unfairly with others.
6. Engi neers shall associate with onl y reput abl e persons or organizations.
ENGINEERING ETHICS: APPLICATIONS TO INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 2.105
7. Engi neer s shal l cont i nue t hei r pr of essi onal devel opment t hr oughout t hei r car eer s and
shal l pr ovi de oppor t uni t i es for t he pr of essi onal devel opment of t hose engi neer s under
t hei r supervi si on.
For a l i st i ng of a number of ot her codes of et hi cs i ncl udi ng t he ver y det ai l ed NSPE code,
pl ease see ht t p: / / onl i neet hi cs. or g/ codes/ codes. ht ml ( Se pt e mbe r 13, 2000).
A N ETHICAL F RA ME WORK
Three Core Concepts for t he Individual and t he Organization
I n exami ni ng a seri es of et hi cal di l emmas t hat engi neer s have had t o address, we have i dent i -
fi ed t hr ee cor e concept s t hat f or m a f r amewor k for et hi cal engi neer i ng deci si on maki ng.
Taken t oget her , t hese can be used t o def i ne an et hi cal engi neer. These pr i nci pl es ar e compe-
tence, responsibility, and safety (whi ch we have des i gnat ed as Cicero's Creed II). Hence, an et h-
ical engi neer is one who is (1) competent, (2) responsible, and (3) r espect f ul of Cicero's Creed
I I [10]. Each is def i ned in t he fol l owi ng sections. The fi rst t wo ar e mor e obvi ous; t he t hi r d
needs some expl anat i on.
Ci cer o' s Cr eed, engi neer i ng' s ol dest ethic, di r ect ed engi neer s t o pl ace t he safet y of t he pub-
lic above all else (t he first f undament al canon). We a dde d speci fi ci t y t o this cr eed by pr opos i ng
t hat an et hi cal engi neer, and cer t ai nl y an i ndust r i al engi neer, must be knowl edgeabl e r egar d-
ing ri sk assessment and fai l ure modes for a gi ven t echnol ogy or pr ocesa Fur t her , in mode r n
engi neer i ng pract i ce, no mat t er how ski l l ed, knowl edgeabl e, or mor al a single engi neer is, he or
she t ypi cal l y must funct i on as par t of a t eam and as a me mbe r of an or gani zat i on. Hence, our
f r amewor k must be ext ended t o r ecogni ze bot h t eam and or gani zat i onal r esponsi bi l i t i ea
Competence
The Principle o f I ndi vi dual Competence. An engi neer is a knowl edge exper t speci al l y
t r ai ned t o desi gn, t est , and assess t he per f or mance char act er i st i cs of component s or pr ocesses
wi t hi n his or her r eal m of expert i se. To at t ai n t he st at us of knowl edge exper t wi t h r espect t o a
gi ven pr obl e m ar ea, t he engi neer shoul d acqui r e t he r equi si t e i nf or mat i on t hat is r el i abl e, rel -
evant , and adequat e. To i nsuffi ci ent l y do so, or t o do so in a f aul t y manner , ei t her knowi ngl y
or unknowi ngl y, nul l i fi es t he posi t i on of bei ng adequat el y i nf or med. A competent engi neer
must al so acknowl edge what he or she does not know about a t echnol ogy or process.
Wi t hi n a t eam cont ext , its me mbe r s will br i ng di f f er ent component s of compet ence t o t he
pr obl em. The col l ect i ve knowl edge of t he t eam comes cl oser t o what is r equi r ed t o desi gn t he
t echnol ogy or syst em t han any one coul d pr ovi de al one.
The Pri nci pl e o f Organi zat i onal Competence. An or gani zat i on is competent if t he engi -
neer s i t empl oys col l ect i vel y have t he r equi si t e knowl edge t o desi gn t he t echnol ogy or syst em
of i nt er est . I n a competent organization, each t eam me mb e r cont r i but es speci al i zed knowl -
edge t o t he r esol ut i on of t he pr obl e m at hand.
Not e t hat t he st at us of knowl edge wi l l change t hr oughout t he desi gn process. I ndi vi dual
engi neer s expand t hei r c ompe t e nc e wi t h r es pect t o t he par t i cul ar i ssue of concer n as t hey
pr ogr es s t hr ough t he pr obl em- s ol vi ng process. Organizational competence changes wi t h
bot h t he i ncr eas ed knowl edge of t eam me mbe r s and t hr ough t he a ddi t i on of ot her engi -
neer s t o t he pr oj ect t eam. Dur i ng t he i ni t i al st ages of an engi neer i ng pr oj ect , we woul d
expect t hat gaps exi st at bot h t he i ndi vi dual and or gani zat i onal levels. As t he pr oj ect pr o-
gresses, t he engi neer s, bot h i ndi vi dual l y and col l ect i vel y as t eam member s , shoul d fill in t he
mi ssi ng knowl e dge gaps.
2.106 PRODUCTIVITY, PERFORMANCE, AND ETHICS
Responsi b i l i t y
The Principle o f I ndi vi dual Responsibility. To pl ay t he r ol e of knowl edge exper t in t he
deci si on- maki ng pr ocess i mpl i es t hat one must ma ke i nf or mat i on r eadi l y avai l abl e to t he
ot her par t i ci pant s and t o t ake a cri t i cal at t i t ude t owar d assessi ng deci si ons (i ncl udi ng t hose of
management ) f r om an engi neer i ng perspect i ve. That is, t he et hi cal engi neer must be abl e t o
devel op and t hen effect i vel y communi cat e evi dence t o suppor t j udgment s. Equal l y i mpor -
t ant , t he responsible engi neer must i nf or m t he appr opr i at e i ndi vi dual s about t hose part s of
t he knowl edge base t hat he or she knows ar e def i ci ent (i.e., all known knowl edge gaps shoul d
be put on t he t abl e) .
The Principle o f Organi zat i onal Responsibility. The count er par t t o t he pr i nci pl e of indi-
vidual responsibility is t he pr i nci pl e of or gani zat i onal ( and t eam) responsi bi l i t y. I f t hi s princi-
pl e is t o wor k on t he i ndi vi dual l evel , t he or gani zat i on must be responsive t o t he engi neer who
communi cat es a concern. This does not mean t hat t he or gani zat i on must act on ever y concern
r ai sed by a r esponsi bl e engi neer , but it does mean t hat t he or gani zat i on must have a process
for l i st eni ng t o and consi der i ng r e por t e d concerns. Wi t hout such an avenue, t he et hi cal engi-
neer may be f or ced t o go t o t he wor st case s ol ut i on- - whi s t l ebl owi ng.
Cicero' s Creed II
Cicero's Creed I I - - Th e I ndi vi dual . As not ed, Ci cer o' s ori gi nal cr eed obl i gat ed t he engi -
neer "t o i nsur e t he safet y of t he publ i c. " Phi l osopher s descr i be this in t he posi t i ve form as
benef i cence (i.e., doi ng good) but it al so covers t he negat i ve aspect ( do not har m, or non-
mal evol ence) . " Ha r m" as under s t ood f r om t he per spect i ve of t he i ndi vi dual engi neer refers t o
his or her abi l i t y t o assess t he pot ent i al ri sks of t he t echnol ogy. Hence, Cicero's Creed II: The
engineer should be cognizant o f sensitive to, and strive to avoid the potential f or harm and opt
f or doing good. Wi t h r espect t o a gi ven proj ect , in an ef f or t t o acqui r e i nf or mat i on t hat is reli-
abl e, r el evant , and adequat e, an engi neer shoul d i ncl ude an assessment of t he safety, risk, and
possi bl e f ai l ur e mechani sm for t he t echnol ogy or pr ocess of concern.
The or gani zat i onal et hi c for Ci cer o' s Cr eed I I i nvol ves managi ng t echnol ogy so as not to
bet r ay t he publ i c t rust . The concept of st ewar dshi p for publ i c r esour ces is i ncl uded here, and
embodi es t he i nt ent of Ci cer o' s or i gi nal ethic. It is not coi nci dent al t hat t he Col or ado School
of Mines, as par t of its mi ssi on st at ement , "has dedi cat ed i t sel f t o t he r esponsi bl e st ewardshi p
of t he ear t h and its r esour ces" [11].
Cicero's Creed l l - - Th e Organization. A t eam may be r equi r ed t o assess t he ri sks associ-
at ed wi t h a t echnol ogy. Yet, t he et hi cal or gani zat i on assesses ri sk, and wher e pot ent i al har m
may exist, makes t hose ri sks known and seeks al t er nat i ves to r educe t hem. By cont rast , t he
unet hi cal or gani zat i on fails t o assess risks or, havi ng det er mi ned a ser i ous risk, i gnores its
pot ent i al for harm.
E NGI NE E RI NG A S A RISK -L ADEN HEURI STI C
Deci si on Maki ng Under Uncer t ai nt y
The pr act i ce of engi neer i ng has been def i ned as a heuri st i c r at her t han an appl i ed science.
Usi ng t r adi t i on, exper i ence, sci ent i fi c knowl edge, and j udgment , engi neer s are asked to
"i mpr ove t he human condi t i on bef or e all sci ent i fi c facts ar e i n" [12]. Br oome has r ef er r ed t o
this as t he engi neer ' s i mper at i ve [13]. Pract i ci ng engi neer s must addr ess many si t uat i ons t hat
ar e of t en poor l y under st ood. Consequent l y, t he knowl edge base f r om which deci si ons ar e
ENGINEERING ETHICS: APPLICATIONS TO INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 2.107
made is of t en i ncompl et e and ma r ke d by uncert ai nt y. Cer t ai nl y t he l ast l aunch of t he Chal -
l enger i l l ust r at es this t ype of si t uat i on and t he consequences when t he l evel of uncer t ai nt y
and ri sk ar e not gi ven t hei r pr ope r consi der at i on.
Pet r oski has expanded on t he view of engi neer i ng as i nher ent l y ri sk l aden, citing f our fac-
t ors or "desi gn er r or s" t hat i nevi t abl y l ead t o desi gn fai l ures [14]. Pet r oski l ooks to bot h t he
engi neer i ng pr of essi on and t o t he l egal syst em t o cont r ol acci dent s The engi neer ' s responsi bi l -
i t y is t he compet ent design of t echnol ogy in or der t o pr event er r or s I n cont rast , t he l egal sys-
t em' s r esponsi bi l i t y is t o pol i ce wr ongdoi ng and met e out puni shment . The desi gn pr ocess can
be conduct ed t o pr event failures. The causes of fai l ure i ncl ude (1) condi t i ons t hat appr oach
desi gn l i mi t st at es (e.g., over l oads) , r andom or unexpect ed hazar ds t hat have not been consi d-
er ed in desi gn (e.g., ext r eme weat her condi t i ons), human based er r or s (e.g., mi st akes, carel ess-
ness), and at t empt s to economi ze in desi gn sol ut i on or mai nt enance.
To t hi s ext ent , Pet r oski , among ot hers, urges engi neer s and engi neer i ng st udent s t o st udy
past fai l ures in or de r t o ant i ci pat e what can happen agai n i f pr ope r pr ecaut i ons ar e not fol-
l owed. " One of t he par adoxes of engi neer i ng is t hat successes don' t t each you ver y much"
[15]. The Tacoma Nar r ows Br i dge is ci t ed as an exampl e of this. The br i dge desi gn was bas ed
on desi gns of sever al successful bri dges, yet wi nds des t r oyed t he br i dge a few mont hs af t er i t
opened. The i nvest i gat i on of t he acci dent r eveal ed t hat , whi l e unant i ci pat ed, t her e had been
pr ecedent s for br i dge f ai l ur e under wi nd act i on. Pet r os ki has ci t ed 10 si mi l ar suspensi on
br i dge acci dent s t hat occur r ed in t he ni net eent h cent ur y [16].
To Pet r oski , comput er si mul at i on is a mode r n- da y count er par t t o t he same r el i ance on past
successes and excl usi on of past fai l ures f ound in desi gni ng t he Tacoma Nar r ows Bri dge.
"Ther e is cl ear l y no guar ant ee of success in desi gni ng new t hi ngs on t he basi s of past successes
al one, and this is why art i fi ci al i nt el l i gence, exper t systems, and ot her comput er - bas ed desi gn
ai ds whose l ogi c fol l ows exampl es of success can onl y have l i mi t ed appl i cat i on, " Pet r os ki
war ns us [17]. This is cer t ai nl y an omi nous caut i on t o t he i ndust r i al engi neer i ng communi t y,
especi al l y t he gr owi ng par t of it t hat r el i es on mat hemat i cal model i ng and si mul at i on.
RI S K A S S E S S ME NT A S A N I MP OR T A NT I E TOOL
A Br i ef Ov e r v i e w of Ri sk As s e s s me n t
What can t he compet ent , r esponsi bl e i ndust ri al engi neer do about ri sk? Since engi neeri ng is
never ri sk free, we pr opos e t hat par t of t he I E' s t ool ki t shoul d be t he abi l i t y to assess risk. These
ri sk analysis t echni ques range f r om qual i t at i ve hazar d analysis and fai l ure modes and effects
analysis ( FMEA) t o pr obabi l i st i c ri sk assessment ( PRA) i ncl udi ng faul t t r ee analysis ( FTW) . A
compr ehensi ve ri sk analysis for a compl ex syst em mi ght ut i l i ze t he full r ange of t echni ques, wi t h
t he resul t s f r om t he qual i t at i ve stages becomi ng t he i nput for t he mor e quant i t at i ve st ages [18].
Bel l has pr ovi ded defi ni t i ons of some of t he basi c t er ms in ri sk assessment and analysis as well
as an over vi ew of some of t he t echni ques [19]. Vol and pr ovi des an overvi ew of t he qual i t at i ve
t echni ques i l l ust r at ed wi t h a number of short case st udi es [20].
A f or mal hazar d anal ysi s is a t op- down appr oach in whi ch all pot ent i al l y unsaf e condi t i ons
or event s pos ed by t he envi r onment , machi ne i nt erfaces, human er r or , and so on ar e enumer -
at ed and t he f r equency and sever i t y of each hazar d est i mat ed. As used by NASA, t he pot en-
t i al sources of t hese condi t i ons ar e al so i dent i f i ed, and a pr ocedur e for t hei r mi t i gat i on and/ or
accept ance of t he ri sk is expl i ci t l y pr ovi ded [21]. That is, i dent i f i ed hazar ds and t hei r causes
ar e anal yzed t o fi nd ways t o el i mi nat e ( r emove) or cont r ol t he hazar d (desi gn change, safet y
or war ni ng devices, pr ocedur al change, oper at i ng const r ai nt ) . An y hazar d t hat cannot f easi bl y
be el i mi nat ed or cont r ol l ed is expl i ci t l y t er med an " accept ed ri sk" [22]. Whi l e hazar d anal ysi s
can be used ear l y in t he desi gn phase in or de r t o i dent i f y pot ent i al hazar ds [23], t he met hod-
ol ogy is al so r e c omme nde d as a means of f ur t her anal yzi ng t he f ai l ur e modes i dent i f i ed in
F ME A pr ocess [24].
2. 108 PRODUCTIVITY, PERFORMANCE, AND ETHICS
The F ME A empl oys a bot t om- up appr oach. St ar t i ng at t he component l evel for each sub-
syst em, t he anal yst det er mi nes how t he devi ce or par t mi ght fail and what woul d be t he effects
and consequences of such a f ai l ur e on t he component and all ot her i nt erfaci ng, i nt er act i ng
component s. The consequences of each i dent i f i ed f ai l ur e mode ar e t hen cl assi fi ed accordi ng
t o its severity. I n t he case of t he space shuttle, f ai l ur e modes t hat coul d l ead t o t he loss of crew
and/ or vehi cl e have been cl assi fi ed as Cri t i cal i t y-1 (CRIT-1) or 1-R i f t he i t em of concer n is
r edundant . CRIT-1 i t ems ar e t hen col l ect ed on a cri t i cal i t ems list ( CI L) , whi ch serves as a
ma na ge me nt t ool t o focus at t ent i on on t he mi t i gat i on or cont r ol of t he f ai l ur e mode t hr ough
r edesi gn, use of r edundant component s, speci al i nspect i ons, or t est s [25]. Each i t em on t he
cri t i cal i t ems list r equi r es a f or mal , wr i t t en r at i onal e for its r et ent i on on t he shut t l e. In this
manner , engi neer s and manager s wer e r equi r ed t o expl i ci t l y wai ve NAS A pol i cy agai nst fly-
i ng wi t h such i t ems pr esent pr i or t o each shut t l e l aunch [26]. For r easons t hat ar e di scussed in
det ai l el sewhere, such a syst em f ai l ed to pr event t he loss of t he Chal l enger [27].
Recent l y, t her e has been consi der abl e i nt er est in using r el i abi l i t y analysis t o det er mi ne t he
pr obabi l i t y of failure. One such set of t echni ques is pr obabi l i st i c ri sk assessment ( PRA) , also a
t op- down t echni que in whi ch t he possi bl e fai l ure mode of t he compl et e syst em is i dent i fi ed
first, and t he possi bl e ways t hat t he fai l ure mi ght occur ar e enumer at ed. A faul t t r ee is devel -
oped by t raci ng out and anal yzi ng t he cont r i but or y faults, or chai ns of faults for each event,
unt i l t he basi c faul t (e.g., single component fai l ure or human er r or ) is r eached. Pr obabi l i t i es are
t hen assi gned t o t he vari ous basi c faults or e r r or s This enabl es pr obabi l i t i es for t he vari ous fail-
ures t o be est i mat ed, and t hei r r el at i ve cont r i but i on t o t ot al risk assessed. In t heory, t he fai l ure
modes wi t h t he hi ghest pr obabi l i t i es shoul d be addr essed first. When used correctly, PRA
yi el ds a measur e of ri sk f r om a chai n of event s and an est i mat e of uncer t ai nt y [28]. Faul t t r ee
analysis was first devel oped by Bel l Labor at or i es and l at er used ext ensi vel y by NASA [29].
El i sab et h Pat e- Cor nel l ' s Co n t r i b u t i o n t o PRA
The most prol i fi c and creat i ve use of PRA model s has been by M. El i sabet h Pat 6- Cor nel l (pro-
fessor and chair, De pa r t me nt of Indust ri al Engi neer i ng and Engi neer i ng Management ) and
her col l eagues at St anford. They have used t hi s t echni que r et r ospect i vel y and pr ospect i vel y t o
bot h est i mat e ri sk and to i dent i fy t he or gani zat i onal fact ors t hat wer e t he r oot cont r i but or s to
t he fai l ure of critical engi neer i ng systems, For exampl e, by i nt r oduci ng or gani zat i onal aspects
i nt o pr obabi l i st i c risk assessment of several offshore oil pl at f or m failures, Pat 6-Cornel l was
abl e t o der i ve coar se est i mat es of t he benefi t s of cert ai n or gani zat i onal i mprovement s, and
r esul t ant r el i abi l i t y gains. In t he case of j acket - t ype offshore pl at forms, t he cost of t hese gains
ar e t wo or der s of magni t ude less t han t he cost of achi evi ng t he same resul t t hr ough st ruct ural
changes [30].
Pat 6- Cor nel l and Paul Fi schbeck used P RA t o model t he f ai l ur e ri sk associ at ed with each
of t he 25,000 t her mal t i l es on t i l e space shuttle. Thei r model is t hen used to set pr i or i t i es for
mai nt enance of t he tiles. Thei r pa pe r pr ovi des an out st andi ng case st udy in t he use of PRA
model s [31]. I n a second paper , t hey show how t hei r PRA model was used as a management
t ool t o i dent i f y t he r oot - cause or gani zat i onal f act or s of t he var i ous f ai l ur e modes for the shut -
t l e' s t her mal pr ot ect i on syst em [32].
A l at er pa pe r with Mur phy codi fi es her ear l i er wor k i nt o t he SAM appr oach (system-
act i on- management ) to mor e f or mal l y l i nk t he pr obabi l i t i es of syst em fai l ures to human and
ma na ge me nt factors. Her e t hey al so pr ovi de i nsi ght s i nt o t he i mpor t ance of i nf or mal r ewar d
systems, t he di ffi cul t i es in communi cat i ng uncer t ai nt i es, t he pr obl ems of managi ng resource
const rai nt s, and t he safet y i mpl i cat i ons of t he shor t cut s t aken t o deal wi t h t hese fact ors [33].
I n short , t hey demons t r at e how such fact ors as we have not ed previ ousl y, if uncor r ect ed or
unchecked, l ead to et hi cal di l emmas and ser i ous consequences for t he i nvol ved part i es.
I n r ecent wor k, Pat 6- Cor nel l and Di l l on ar e usi ng PRA t o anal yze NASA' s "fast er, bet t er ,
cheaper " ( FBC) mode of oper at i on of its unmanned space pr ogr am. I f FBC is t o be success-
ENGINEERING ETHICS: APPLICATIONS TO INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 2.109
ful, t hen expl i ci t t r adeof f s among risks, costs, and schedul es will have t o be made. This r equi r es
NAS A manager s t o be cogni zant of t he ri sks i nvol ved. Pat 6- Cor nel l and Di l l on pr opos e t hat
P RA can be a val uabl e t ool in t hi s appr oach. They al so pr opos e ways t hat P RA can be used
t o do t hi s and pr ovi de exampl es and an over vi ew [34, 35].
S UMMA R Y
We have t r i ed t o show how t he pr essur es of t he engi neer i ng wor kpl ace combi ned wi t h t he
confl i ct i ng l oyal t i es of t he pr of essi onal engi neer can l ead t o si t uat i ons t hat can be t e r me d et h-
i cal di l emmas. We have done t hi s by ci t i ng some exampl es. To hel p r educe pot ent i al et hi cal
di l emmas, we have pr ovi ded a f r amewor k of behavi or for t he et hi cal engi neer . I n short , t hi s
f r amewor k t hat we devel oped wi t h t wo c ol l e a gue s - - Ros e Pi nkus and Nor ma n Hu mmo n - -
r equi r es t he engi neer t o be compet ent , r esponsi bl e, and t o under s t and and mi ni mi ze t he r i sk
i nvol ved in his or her engi neer i ng endeavor s. To us, this l ast poi nt is especi al l y r el evant . I n fact,
we pr opos e t hat t he moder n i ndust r i al engi neer must under s t and ri sk assessment and ut i l i ze
pr obabi l i st i c ri sk assessment wher e appl i cabl e and war r ant ed.
En gi n e e r i n g Et hi cs on t h e We b
For t hose r eader s who wish t o pur sue t hi s subj ect furt her, t her e is a r api dl y devel opi ng body
of l i t er at ur e i ncl udi ng cases on engi neer i ng et hi cs and much of t hi s can be f ound on t he Wor l d
Wi de Web. Some exampl es follow.
The Nat i onal I nst i t ut e for Engi neer i ng Et hi cs (www. ni ee. org/ i ndex. ht m) cr eat ed by t he
Nat i onal Soci et y of Pr of essi onal Engi neer s ( NSPE) in 1988 and now an i nde pe nde nt not -
f or - pr of i t educat i onal cor por at i on. The mi ssi on of NI EE, l i ke t hat of its pr edecessor , is t o
pr ovi de oppor t uni t i es for et hi cs educat i on and t o pr omot e t he under s t andi ng and appl i ca-
t i on of et hi cal pr ocesses wi t hi n t he engi neer i ng pr of essi on and wi t h t he publ i c.
The Mur dough Cent er (ht t p: / / www. coe. t t u. edu/ murdough/ defaul t . ht m), Col l ege of Engi neer -
ing, Texas Tech, has, as a pr i mar y goal, t o i ncrease t he awar eness of an engi neer ' s pr of essi onal
and et hi cal responsi bi l i t i es by encour agi ng and pr omot i ng pr of essi onal pr ogr ams and activi-
t i es emphasi zi ng engi neer i ng ethics. The cent er conduct s symposi a, workshops, and semi nars
t hr oughout t he st at e and nat i on for industry, pr of essi onal societies, and academi c institutions.
Wi t h t he rat i fi cat i on of t he Nor t h Ame r i c a n Fr ee Trade Agr e e me nt (NAF-FA), t he cent er has
begun wor ki ng wi t h engi neers in Canada and Mexi co t o devel op a basi c under st andi ng and
appr eci at i on of mut ual i nt erest s in pri nci pl es of conduct and ethics as t hey r el at e t o pr of es-
si onal engi neeri ng pract i ce.
Unde r fundi ng f r om NSF, Pr of essor s Mi chael J. Rabi ns ( De pa r t me nt of Mechani cal
Engi neer i ng) and Pr of essor Ed Har r i s ( De pa r t me nt of Phi l osophy) devel oped and t est ed
11 st udent handout s and i nst r uct or ' s gui des in 11 di f f er ent courses in t he agr i cul t ur al , chem-
ical, civil, and mechani cal engi neer i ng depar t ment s at Texas A&M Uni versi t y. A number of
t hese cases ar e avai l abl e for use by st udent s at ht t p: / / l ower y. t amu. edu/ et hi cs/ .
The WWW Et hi cs Cent er f or Engi neer i ng and Sci ence was est abl i shed i n t he fal l of 1995
under a gr ant f r om t he Nat i onal Sci ence Foundat i on. It s mi ssi on is t o pr ovi de engi neers, sci-
entists, and sci ence and engi neer i ng st udent s wi t h r esour ces useful for under s t andi ng and
addr essi ng et hi cal l y si gni fi cant pr obl ems t hat ari se in t hei r wor k life. The cent er is al so
i nt ended t o serve t eacher s of engi neer i ng and sci ence st udent s who want t o i ncl ude di scus-
si on of et hi cal pr obl ems cl osel y r el at ed t o t echni cal subj ect s as a par t of sci ence and engi -
neer i ng courses, or in f r ee- st andi ng subj ect s in pr of essi onal et hi cs or in r esear ch et hi cs for
2.110 PRODUCTIVITY, PERFORMANCE, AND ETHICS
such st udent s. The Et hi cs Cent er and its mi r r or si t e ar e l ocat ed on t he campus of Case West-
er n Res er ve Uni ver si t y ( CWRU) ( ht t p: / / onl i neet hi cs. or g/ i ndex. ht ml ) .
An o t h e r ver y val uabl e and wel l - or gani zed si t e is t he Web Cl ear i nghouse for Engi neer i ng
and Comput i ng Ethics, Di vi si on of Mul t i di sci pl i nar y St udi es, Nor t h Car ol i na St at e Uni ver-
sity, whi ch is mai nt ai ned by Joseph He r ke r t and cos pons or ed by Resour ce Gui des Com-
mi t t ee of t he Nat i onal I nst i t ut e for Engi neer i ng Et hi cs (ht t p://www4. ncsu. edu/uni t y/users/j!
j her ker t / et hi ci nd. ht ml / ) . A hel pful , over vi ew paper is al so avai l abl e [36].
Thr ee Hel pf ul Books
Finally, we woul d r ef er t he i nt er es t ed r eader t o t hr ee ot her par t i cul ar l y val uabl e books. The
fi rst , by Harri s, Pr i t char d, and Rabi ns, Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases, may be t he
most wi del y used engi neer i ng et hi cs text; it i ncl udes a number of ver y good cases as well as a
pr ocess for resol vi ng et hi cal di l emmas [37]. Johnson' s Ethical Issues in Engi neeri ng pl aces
pr of essi onal ethics i ssues in cont ext [38]. She has s epar at e sect i ons deal i ng wi t h t he vari ous
l oyal t i es of t he pr of essi onal engi neer . For t hose i nt er est ed in et hi cs as appl i ed t o mat hemat i -
cal model i ng, Wal l ace has edi t ed a col l ect i on of ver y pr ovocat i ve paper s t hat r esul t ed from a
conf er ence hel d at RPI in 1989 [39]. I n par t i cul ar , such i ssues as t he pr oper r el at i onshi p
bet ween t he model bui l der and t he model user, t he ext ent t o whi ch t he model bui l der s assume
pr of essi onal r esponsi bi l i t y for t he resul t s of t hei r model s, and t he r esponsi bi l i t y of t he model
bui l der s t o t he publ i c (as oppos ed t o t he cl i ent ) are addr essed. I t shoul d be r ead by anyone
who devel ops model s for ot her t han r ecr eat i onal purposes.
A CK NOWL E DGME NTS
This chapt er has been s uppor t ed in par t by Nat i onal Sci ence Foundat i on gr ant DUE - -
9652861, "Engi neer i ng Int erfaces. " Par t of this mat er i al has been adapt ed f r om Pinkus, R. L.,
Shuman, L. J., Hummon, N. R, and Wolfe, H. , Engineering Ethics: Bal anci ng Cost, Schedule and
Ri s k ~Le s s o n s Learned f r o m the Space Shuttle, Cambr i dge, Engl and: Cambr i dge Uni versi t y
Press, 1997, Chapt er s 1, 2, and 13. We gr at ef ul l y acknowl edge t he val uabl e assi st ance and
i nsi ght pr ovi ded by our col l eagues Ros a L. Pi nkus and Nor man P. Hummon.
REFERENCES
1. Stewart, WT., and Dennis J. Paustenback, "Analysis Techniques Help IEs Evaluate Ethical Dimen-
sions of On-the-Job Decisions," IE, April 1984, pp. 69-76. (article)
2. Pinkus, Rosa L., Larry J. Shuman, Norman R Hummon, and Harvey Wolfe, Engineering Ethics--
Balancing Cost, Schedule and Risk: Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, England, 1997. (book)
3. Pritchard, Michael, "Beyond Disaster Ethics," Centennial Review, Spring 1990, 34(2), pp. 295-318.
(article)
4. These examples have received extensive attention in the engineering ethics literature. Martin, Mike
W., and Roland Schinzinger in Ethics in Engineering (3rd ed., McGraw-Hill, 1996; book) have specific
cases and study questions on Three Mile Island and Chernobyl (pp. 167-182); and the Challenger (pp.
96-105). For the Ford Pinto, see Cullen, Francis T., William J. Maakestad, and Gray Cavender, Corpo-
rate Crime Under Attack: The Ford Pinto Case and Beyond, Anderson, Cincinnati, OH, 1987 (book);
Gioia, Dennis A., "Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed Opportunities," Jour-
nal of Business Ethics, May 1992, 11(5-6), pp. 379-389 (article); for Three Mile Island, see Wood, M.
Sandra, and Suzanne Shultz, Three Mile Island: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography, Greenwood
Press, New York, 1988 (book). Also for the Challenger, see Pinkus, et al.
ENGINEERING ETHICS: APPLICATIONS TO INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 2.111
5. Martin, Mike W., and Rol and Schinzinger, Ethics in Engineering, 3rd ed., McGraw-Hill, New York,
1996, p. 12. (book)
6. The field of business ethics is compl ement ary to that of engineering ethics and has much relevance
for industrial engineers.
7. Martin and Schinzinger, op. cit., p. 13.
8. Beauchamp, Thomas L., and James E Childress, Principles o f Biomedical Ethics, 3rd ed., Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York, 1989, pp. 9-11. (book)
9. See www.IIIE.org, Sept. 23,1998. (webpage)
10. Pinkus, et al., op. cit., pp. 33-42.
11. Hendley, Vicky, "The Import ance of Failure," ASEE PRISM, Oct ober 1998, p. 23. (article)
12. Broome, Taft H., Jr., "Engi neeri ng Responsibility for Hazardous Technologies," Journal o f Profes-
sional Responsibility in Engineering, Apri l 1987, 113(2), p. 142. (article)
13. Ibid., p. 143.
14. Petroski, Henry, To Engineer Is Human: The Role o f Failure in Successful Design, St. Martin' s Press,
New York, 1985. (book)
15. Hendley, Vicky, "The Import ance of Failure," ASEE PRISM, Oct ober 1998, pp. 19-23.
16. Petroski, Henry, Design Paradigms: Case Histories o f Error and Judgment in Engineering, Cambridge
University Press, 1994. (book)
17. Hendley, op. cit., p. 20.
18. Ibid., p. 24.
19. Bell, Trudy E., "Managing Murphy' s Law: Engineering a Minimum-risk System," I EEE Spectrum,
June 1989, pp. 23-25. (article)
20. Voland, Gerand, Engineering by Design, Addi son Wesley, New York, 1999, Chapter 9.
21. Williams, Walter C., Chairman, Report o f the SSME Assessment Team, National Aeronaut i cs and
Space Administration, January 1993, p. 7. (report)
22. Commi t t ee on Shuttle Criticality Revi ew and Hazard Analysis Audit of the Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board, p. 56. (report)
23. Bell, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
24. Commi t t ee on Shuttle Criticality Revi ew and Hazard Analysis Audit of the Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board, p. 56.
25. Williams, op. cit., p. 8.
26. Commi t t ee on Shuttle Criticality Revi ew and Hazard Analysis Audit of the Aeronaut i cs and Space
Engineering Board.
27. Pinkus, et al., op. cit., Chapt er 14.
28. Lerner, Eric J., "An Al t ernat i ve to ' Launch on Hunch, ' "Aer ospace America, May 1987, pp. 40-44.
(article)
29. Vorland, op. cit., pp. 323-325.
30. Patr-Cornell, M. Elisabeth, "Organizational Aspects of Engineering System Safety: The Case of Off-
shore Platforms," Science, November 1990, 250, pp. 1210-1217. (article)
31. Patr-Cornell, M. Elisabeth, and Paul S. Fischbeck, "Ri sk Management for the Tiles of the Space Shut-
tle," Interfaces, January-February 1994, 24, pp. 64-86. (article)
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BIOGRAP HIES
Larry J. Shuman is As s oci at e Dean for Ac a de mi c Affai rs, School of Engi neer i ng, Uni versi t y
of Pi t t sbur gh and pr of essor of I ndust r i al Engi neer i ng. Hi s cur r ent i nt er est s ar e i mpr ovi ng t he
engi neer i ng educat i onal exper i ence, and st udyi ng t he et hi cal behavi or of engi neer s and engi-
neer i ng managers. He is a coaut hor of Engi neeri ng Et hi cs: Bal anci ng Cost Schedul e and
Ri s k - - Le s s o n s Le ar ne d f r o m t he Space Shut t l e ( Cambr i dge Uni ver si t y Press, 1997). Pr i or t o
t hat , Dr. Shuman in col l abor at i on wi t h Dr. Wol fe wor ked ext ensi vel y in t he fi el d of heal t h
car e delivery. Dr. Shuman has been pr i nci pal or copr i nci pal i nvest i gat or on over 20 sponsor ed
r esear ch pr oj ect s f unded f r om such gover nment agenci es and f oundat i ons as t he Nat i onal Sci-
ence Foundat i on and t he U.S. De pa r t me nt of Heal t h and Huma n Services. He hol ds a Ph.D.
in Oper at i ons Res ear ch f r om t he Johns Hopki ns Uni versi t y, and a B.S.E.E. f r om t he Uni ver-
si t y of Ci nci nnat i . He will be t he academi c dean for t he " Semes t er at Sea" for t he spring 2002
semest er .
Har vey Wol f e has been a pr of essor in t he De pa r t me nt of I ndust r i al Engi neer i ng at the Uni -
ver si t y of Pi t t sbur gh si nce 1972 and de pa r t me nt chai r si nce 1985. He r ecei ved his Ph.D. in
Oper at i ons Res ear ch f r om t he Johns Hopki ns Uni ver si t y in 1964. He is a Fel l ow of t he Insti-
t ut e of I ndust r i al Engi neer s and ser ves as me mbe r at l ar ge of t he Pr of essi onal Enhancement
Boa r d of t he I nst i t ut e of I ndust r i al Engi neers. He is cur r ent l y pr es i dent of t he Council of
I ndust r i al Engi neer i ng Ac a de mi c De pa r t me nt Heads. He is servi ng his second si x-year t er m
as an ABET eval uat or . Af t e r many year s wor ki ng in t he ar ea of appl yi ng oper at i ons research
met hods to t he heal t h fi el d, he is now act i ve in t he devel opment of model s for assessing engi-
neer i ng educat i on. He is a coaut hor of Engi neeri ng Et hi cs: Bal anci ng Cost Schedul e and
Ri s k - - Le s s o n s Lear ned f r o m t he Space Shut t l e ( Cambr i dge Uni ver si t y Press, 1997).