Eparwa vs.

Liceo de Cagayan University

08/16/2013 G.R. No. 150402 November 28, 2006

Facts: Eparwa and Liceo de Cagayan University [LDCU], through their
representatives, entered into a Contract for Security Services.

Thereafter, 11 security guards whom Eparwa assigned to LDCU from filed a
complaint before the NLRC. The complaint was filed against both Eparwa and
LDCU for underpayment of salary, legal holiday pay, 13th month pay, rest day,
service incentive leave, night shift differential, overtime pay, and payment for
attorneys fees.

To protect its interest LDCU made a cross-claim and prayed that Eparwa should
reimburse LDCU for any payment to the security guards.
The LA found that claim of the Security guards meritorious and order the same to
be paid by Eparwa and LDCU. LDCU

Issue: Whether or not LDCU alone ultimately liable to the security guards for the
wage differentials and premium for holiday and rest day pay.

Held: No.

Adopting the ruling in Eagle Security Agency vs. NLRC which has the same facts
in this case, the SC ruled- this joint and several liability of the contractor and the
principal is mandated by the Labor Code to assure compliance of the provisions
therein including the statutory minimum wage [Article 99, Labor Code]. The
contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer. The principal,
on the other hand, is made the indirect employer of the contractors employees
for purposes of paying the employees their wages should the contractor be
unable to pay them. This joint and several liability facilitates, if not guarantees,
payment of the workers performance of any work, task, job or project, thus
giving the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution [See
Article II Sec. 18 and Article XIII Sec. 3].

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However, in the instant case, the contract for security services had already
expired without being amended consonant with the Wage Orders. It is also
apparent from a reading of a record that EAGLE does not now demand from PTSI
any adjustment in the contract price and its main concern is freeing itself from
liability. Given these peculiar circumstances, if PTSI pays the security guards,
it cannot claim reimbursement from EAGLE. But in case it is EAGLE that
pays them, the latter can claim reimbursement from PTSI in lieu of an
adjustment, considering that the contract, [sic] had expired and had not
been renewed.
For the security guards, the actual source of the payment of their wage
differentials and premium for holiday and rest day work does not matter as long
as they are paid. This is the import of Eparwa and LDCUs solidary liability.
Creditors, such as the security guards, may collect from anyone of the solidary
debtors. Solidary liability does not mean that, as between themselves, two
solidary debtors are liable for only half of the payment.

LDCUs ultimate liability comes into play because of the expiration of the Contract
for Security Services. There is no privity of contract between the security guards
and LDCU, but LDCUs liability to the security guards remains because of Articles
106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. Eparwa is already precluded from asking
LDCU for an adjustment in the contract price because of the expiration of the
contract, but Eparwas liability to the security guards remains because of their
employer-employee relationship. In lieu of an adjustment in the contract price,
Eparwa may claim reimbursement from LDCU for any payment it may make to
the security guards. However, LDCU cannot claim any reimbursement from
Eparwa for any payment it may make to the security guards.

Bitoy Javier vs. Fly Ace Corporation
08/16/2013 G.R. No. 192558 February 15, 2012

Who has the burden of proof to prove employer-employee relationship?

As the records bear out, the LA and the CA found Javiers claim of employment
with Fly Ace as wanting and deficient. The Court is constrained to agree.
Although Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows a
relaxation of the rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this rule of
liberality does not mean a complete dispensation of proof. Labor officials are
enjoined to use reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively
with little regard to technicalities or formalities but nowhere in the rules are they
provided a license to completely discount evidence, or the lack of it. The quantum
of proof required, however, must still be satisfied. Hence, when confronted with
conflicting versions on factual matters, it is for them in the exercise of discretion
to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of evidence received,
subject only to the requirement that their decision must be supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner needs to show by substantial
evidence that he was indeed an employee of the company against which he
claims illegal dismissal.
Expectedly, opposing parties would stand poles apart and proffer allegations as
different as chalk and cheese. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Court to
determine whether the party on whom the burden to prove lies was able to
hurdle the same. No particular form of evidence is required to prove the
existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant
evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. Hence, while no particular
form of evidence is required, a finding that such relationship exists must still rest
on some substantial evidence. Moreover, the substantiality of the evidence
depends on its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects. Although
substantial evidence is not a function of quantity but rather of quality, the x x x
circumstances of the instant case demand that something more should have been
proffered. Had there been other proofs of employment, such as x x x inclusion in
petitioners payroll, or a clear exercise of control, the Court would have affirmed
the finding of employer-employee relationship.

In sum, the rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on petitioner to
establish or substantiate such claim by the requisite quantum of evidence.
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his
or her right thereto x x x. Sadly, Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as
basis for the grant of relief.

In this case, the LA and the CA both concluded that Javier failed to establish his
employment with Fly Ace. By way of evidence on this point, all that Javier
presented were his self-serving statements purportedly showing his activities as
an employee of Fly Ace. Clearly, Javier failed to pass the substantiality
requirement to support his claim. Hence, the Court sees no reason to depart
from the findings of the CA.

Huntington vs. NLRC
08/15/2013 G.R. No. 158311. November 17, 2004

Facts: This case stemmed from the illegal dismissal complaint with claim for
damages initiated by respondent Jaime Orbase and eleven others against
petitioners Huntington Steel Products, Inc. and its President, Serafin Ng. Private
respondents filed an amended complaint to include Everson Metal Works as a
party, being the original employer of private respondents before it changed its
business name to Huntington Steel Products, Inc. Thereafter, private
respondents filed their position paper.

Petitioner in their position paper seeks the dismissal of the complaint filed by the
private respondents since the complaint they filed in the NLRC Arbitration branch
does not have a certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Under a Supreme Court's
circular, all initiatory pleadings filed in courts and other quasi-judicial agencies
must contain a Certificate of Non-forum Shopping.
In this case the complaint was filed in the NLRC, a quasi-judicial body hence it
must comply with directives of the circular.

Thus, the LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no Certificate
of Non-forum Shopping. The NLRC reversed the decision of LA. It ratiocinated
that rules of procedure must be liberally applied in labor cases pursuant to Article
221 of the Labor Code, which provides that- decisions in labor cases must be
supported by substantial evidence, and disregarding technical rules of procedure,
will not sacrifice the fundamental requisites of due process. The Ca affirmed the
decision of NLRC.

Issue: whether the case should be dismissed for failure to comply with Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 on certification of non-forum shopping.


Held: No
As a rule, the certificate of non-forum shopping as provided by this Court Circular
04-94 is mandatory and should accompany pleadings filed before the NLRC.
Court Circular No. 04-94 is clear and needs no further interpretation.

However, in the case of Melo v. Court of Appeals, the court said that in those
cases where it excused non-compliance with the requirements of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, there were special circumstances or compelling
reasons that made the strict application of said Circular clearly unjustified. The
rule is crystal clear and plainly unambiguous that the certification is a mandatory
part of an initiatory pleading, i.e., the complaint, and its omission may be excused
only upon manifest equitable grounds proving substantial compliance therewith.

In the present case, the respondents reasoned that they failed to comply with the
Circular because the complaint form supplied by the Labor Arbiter did not contain
the required undertaking. They simply filled up the blanks therein. Hence, we
agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondents should not be
faulted for not having the certification of non-forum shopping in their complaint.

The strict application of the Circular in the instant case, in our view, would be
contrary to the goals of the Rules of Civil Procedure that is, just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Technical rules of
procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would be
detrimental to the working-man.[24] Thus, the NLRC did not err in ordering that
the corrections be made at the Arbitration Branch, since the NLRC has also the
power to order corrections in case of irregularities in the proceedings before it.

Pollo vs. Constantino-David; Termination of Employment
06/24/2013 G.R. No. 181881; October 18, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner Briccio Pollo is an employee of the Civil Service Commission is the
Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the
Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the
Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC. An anonymous letter
charging petitioner of misfeasance and malfeasance in his work prompted the
said investigation. The anonymous letter charges that an employee of the CSC
particularly the head of the mamayan muna hindi mamaya na is lawyering for
people who have pending cases in the CSC. In response, respondent
commissioner, created a commission composed of IT experts, takske to search
and directed to make back-up files of all computer files in the office of the CSC.

Recovered in Petitioners computer are drafts of pleadings and other letters
relative to pending cases in the CSC.
In defense petitioner asserted that it is not him who drafted the said
pleadings, rather he was authorized by his acquaintances to store their files in his
computer and that he often let the clients of the said office use his computer.

Moreover, petitioner alleges that his right to privacy was violated when his
employer [the government] searched his computer without his knowledge and
permission.

Issue:
(1) Whether or nor the search made by the employer violated the right of
petitioner to privacy.

(2) Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner was valid.

Ruling:
Relative to the case, the Supreme Court stressed that the following matters
must be considered as objective and subjective prongs of reasonableness of
inquiry:
1. the employees relationship to the item seized;
2. whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it
was seized; and
3. whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item.

As to the first and second test, the Court ruled: "we answer the first in the
negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his
personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office
which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not
open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used
passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his
computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance
office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends,
associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer
which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as full of people,
his friends, unknown people and that in the past 22 years he had been
discharging his functions at the PALD, he is personally assisting incoming clients,
receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment
report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name,
accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he
stays in the office as a paying customer. Under this scenario, it can hardly be
deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would
recognize as reasonable.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof
of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a
subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by
the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers."

As to the third test, the CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they
create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may
monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human
means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the
computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.

Moreover, the search of petitioners computer files was conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an
anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies
in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na
division is supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending cases in the CSC.
A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

As to the dismissal of petitioner, since the evidence warranting his misconduct
was not illegally seized, it is valid pursuant to the rules of CSC