1

Pakistans Role in the War on Terror: Domestic and International

Implications

This study aims at understanding the domestic and international implications of Pakistans
role in the war on terror. Pakistan by virtue of its geopolitical location, and close relations
with the Taliban became a natural and key ally in the U.S led War on Terror. However,
Pakistans role in this war is a complex phenomenon in terms of its implications. The
relationship between the domestic and international implications of Pakistans role in the War
on Terror is paradoxical in nature. At international level Pakistans pro-active counter-
terrorism strategies have been praised. It has indeed improved Pakistans image as an
important player in the international politics. However, its adverse domestic consequences
have amplified the instability within Pakistan. The understanding of Pakistans role in the
War on Terror therefore, requires a comprehensive approach which involves different factors
of the domestic and international politics. The present study seeks to answers one basic
question: Why do the domestic and international implications of Pakistans role in the War on
Terror is paradoxical in nature?
The basic argument of this paper is that the domestic and international implications of
Pakistans role in the War on are paradoxical in nature. The explanation of this argument
requires addressing to the following questions: What were the reasons and constraints that led
Pakistan to join the international coalition against terrorism? What is Pakistans counter-
terrorism strategy? How far Pakistan is successful in combating terrorism? Why does
Pakistans role in the war on terror lead towards the radicalisation of its society? How far
U.S interests in South Asia are in consonance with Pakistans regional interests? Why anti-
Americanism is one of the most dominant trends in Pakistani society?

Pakistans decision to join the War on Terror has multiple implications. The happening of
9/11 had left Pakistan with no choice but to extend its unconditional support to the U.S led
war against terrorism. Internationally, Pakistan-US renewed relations have positive impacts
on Pakistans standing in the international system. However, the domestic backlash has
highlighted the conflicting perception of the state and society in Pakistan. This state-societal
divergence hence has undermined Pakistans efforts to combat terrorism. It has exposed
2
Pakistan to problems of home grown militancy and extremism. These domestic and
international implications are interlinked hence, reinforcing each other. Therefore, a synthesis
of the domestic and international politics can comprehensively explain the Pakistans role in
the War on Terror.

The present study approaches the issue analytically. The primary and secondary sources of
data collection will be relevant for this study. In primary sources the speeches, statements,
policy proclamations, and interviews of Pakistani decision makers will be evaluated. The
public polls and surveys are also helpful to understand the domestic perspectives on the War
on Terror. The direct and most recent publications, books, International Journals;
International Security, Foreign Affairs, The Washington Quarterly, National Journals;
Islamabad Policy Research Institute , Institute of Regional Studies, and Pakistan Institute of
Peace Studies, and foreign policy year books will be helpful to forge an analysis on the
subject. The news papers both English; Dawn, The News, and Daily Times, and Urdu; Nawa-
i-Waqt, Jang, Khabrain will be quite effective to infer public opinion for this study.
Moreover, the intellectual discussions, seminars, conferences, and lectures will also be
supportive for an astute understanding of the subject.

This study is divided into four sections. Section one will discuss the theoretical context, by
developing a synthesis between the factors of domestic and international politics, to
understand the subject. Section two will describe the national and international environment
that has shaped Pakistans counter-terrorism strategy. It will also evaluate the prospects of its
success or failure. Section three will explain the domestic implications of Pakistans role in
the War on Terror. It will address the issue of radicalisation of Pakistani society. Section four
will highlight the international dimension of Pakistans role in the War on Terror. It will
analyse the impacts of Pak-US strategic partnership on Pakistans standing in world politics.



3
Section One
Pakistans Role in the War on Terror: Theoretical Context

This study explains Pakistans role in the War on Terror in the context of international and
domestic politics. Pakistans decision to join the international coalition was the outcome of
the structural constraints. The terrorist attacks on U.S; the preponderant power in the unipolar
international system, resulted into a global war against terrorism. Moreover, Terrorism had
been declared as a threat to the stability of international system. This anti-terrorist global
trend forced the international community in general and Pakistan in particular to join the War
on Terror. However, the domestic backlash in Pakistan renders the domestic political
constraint relevant. The considerations of domestic politics, along with the systemic
constraint, have to be observed in understanding Pakistans role in war on terror holistically.
The role of state and society, as important factors in domestic politics are analysed for
explaining Pakistans behaviour in the Post-9/11 period.
This section seeks to address the following question: why neo-realism is a dominant school of
thought in international relations? What are the constraints of the explanatory value of neo-
realism? What is the explanatory value of the theories of domestic politics? Why and how a
synthesis of neo-realism and domestic politics best explain Pakistans role in the war on
terror?
This section is divided into three parts. Part one explains the dominance of neo-realism in the
study of international Relations. Part two highlights the constraints on the explanatory value
of neo-realism. Part three discusses about a synthesis of neo-realism and domestic politics to
understand Pakistans role in the war on terror.

1- Neo-Realism and its Dominance in International Relations
Realism has long been used to describe the concepts of anarchy, self help, and the balance of
power in international system. However these concepts have been overshadowed by other
concepts which explain the international system better. Neo Realism emerged in the 1970s as
a response to the challenges posed by the interdependency theory and also a corrective to
4
traditional realisms neglect of many aspects.
1
State behaviour has been interpreted by many
theories some of which have been modified with the changing international environment.
However, neo-realism is regarded one of the dominant schools of thought to explain the
international behaviour.

Kenneth Waltzs theory of international politics remains the most influential revision of
realist theory in the discipline of International Relations. The earlier theories of international
relations including classical realism have flaws that can be cured by applying a more
scientific approach. According to Waltz, the classical realism was restricted to explaining
international relations in terms of selfish human nature whereas his theory rested on the
understanding of the structure of international system. Waltz explains international behaviour
on the basis of systematic constraints rather than the internal composition of the states. He
contends that the systemic forces homogenize foreign policy behaviour by interposing
themselves between states and their conduct. Conversely, the classical realism was restricted
to explaining the behaviourlist tendencies and thus, the idea of interest defined in terms of
power, while ignoring systematic constraints.
2
The systemic account of state behaviour, thus
suggests the extensive explanatory capabilities of neo-realism.

For Waltz, the international system is invariable and permanent feature of international
politics. It is comprised of the ordering principle of the system, the character of the units in
the system, and the distribution of capabilities of the units in the system.
3
Changes in the
structure of the system are distinct from changes at the unit level. Thus changes in polarity
also affect how states provide for their security. However significant changes take place when
the number of great powers reduces to two or one. With more than two, states rely for their
security both on internal efforts as well as the alliances they make.
4
Nevertheless, the
structural changes affect the behaviour of states and the outcomes produced at the unit level
interaction, in terms of nature of distribution of power at international level. Summing up
Waltzs neo-realism, whenever the international system is characterized by the conditions of

1
ScoLL 8urchlll and Andrew LlnklaLer, !"#$%&#' $) *+,#%+-,&$+-. /#.-,&$+' (new ?ork: SL. MarLln's ress, 1996),
p. 83
2
lbld., pp. 83,86
3
lbld., p.87
4
Kenneth Waltz Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 25, No.1, (2002).
3
self help in an anarchic environment, there will be similar relative power pursuing behaviour
among and between the states. This explains why states act similarly despite their ideological
and political diversity.

In the neo-realist framework the following factors are basic and fundamental. Firstly, states
are the main actors in international relations; secondly, states are unitary and rational in their
behaviour and pursue power; defined as rational interest. Kenneth Waltz carries out his
analysis of states at a systematic level and claims that the international system is something
more than the sum of its constituents. The international structures are defined according to
the principal by which a system is ordered. States are centralized and hierarchical and in such
an anarchical environment and decentralized system, the units have the same function but
different capabilities.
5
Internally, states are disciplined, organised along hierarchic structures
and whilst they internationally compete in an anarchic system for survival and advantage in
relations to other units. Therefore, structure not units determines the outcome of international
politics. The international structure does three things: Firstly, it has the ordering principle
which determines the character of the units and distributes capacity among them. The
ordering principle for Waltz is anarchy; with no overwhelming authority above the states.
Secondly, the units, States must pursue self help to ensure their survival and security with the
help of military might and capabilities. The states are compelled by the ordering principle,
anarchy, to behave in a similar manner and seek security and power, thus perpetuates the
security competition in international system.

2- Neo-Realism: A Critique
Neo-realism is being criticised as a stagnant and status-quo oriented theory. It discusses about
the perpetuation of international system and thus rules out the possibility of change. It implies
that the system is permanent and that the powerful will continue to control the behaviour of
states. However, it does not explore how the system emerged in the first place? Moreover, it
does not address the international economic cooperation in the presence of anarchy in the
international system.

3
K.enneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 88-100
6
John Vasquez in The Power of Power Politics
6
provides multiple critiques on neo-realism.
John Ruggie
7
criticises Waltz that he has assumed an unchanging structure and internal
regularity in behaviour in International Politics. It uncovers the main lacuna in structural
realism the lack of a theory of change. Keohane
8
highlights that neo-realism ignores and
drastically underestimates the influence of institutions on behaviour. For him norms really
help in shaping the nature of system structure thus must be included in any systemic analysis.
Ashleys
9
telling critique on neo-realism is on treating the given order in international system
as the natural order. Robert Cox
10
further uncovers the status-quo orientation of neo-realism
and its ideological bias. This criticism hence discredits the neo-realists assumption as the
most explanatory of states behaviour.

The inability of a system level account of International Politics to provide the accurate
explanation of international behaviour is emphasised by Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis.
11

They contend that structuralist approach of international system has certain restrictions to be
the most explanatory of international behaviour. They argue that Waltz has produced a
theory too incomplete to account for the complexities of the international system. Bueno de
Mesquita and Lalman
12
also emphasise to open up the black box of domestic politics for its
ability in explaining the onset of war more comprehensively than the other levels of analysis.
The emphasis on the explanatory value of domestic politics thus, has generated a new debate
in the world politics.

Paul Schroeder in Historical Reality Vs Neo-Realist Theory,
13
highlights the restraints of
structural theory to explain the states behaviour. He criticises neo-realism on its two main
assertions: Firstly, the conduct of states in international politics has always been basically the

6
!ohn A. vasquez, !"# 0$1#% $) 0$1#% 0$.&,&2'3 4%$5 6.-''&2-. /#-.&'5 ,$ 7#$,%-8&,&$+-.&'5 (Cambrldge
unlverslLy ress, 1998
7
lbld., p. 192
8
lbld., p. 193
9
lbld
10
lbld
11
lbld., p. 194
12
8ruce 8ueno de MesqulLa and uavld Lalman, 9-% -+8 /#-'$+3 :$5#',&2 -+8 *+,#%+-,&$+-. *5;#%-,&<# =(?ale
unlverslLy ress, 1992)
13
aul Schroeder, PlsLorlcal 8eallLy vs. neo-reallsL 1heory," *+,#%+-,&$+-. >#2?%&,@= vol. 19, no. 1 (Summer
1994)
7
same; all states are guided by structural constraints and imperatives of anarchy, self help, and
balance of power and must be if they hope to survive and prosper. Secondly, states are not
functionally differentiated within the structure of international politics. Their common
primary function, structurally determined, is to survive and remain independent through self
help. What differentiates states is instead their position within the system, i.e., their power
relative to others. Domestic society, structured hierarchy and heteronomy, enforces upon its
units the mandate of specialisation in order to survive. The international society, structured
by autonomy and anarchy, imposes on its units the mandate not to specialise but to
concentrate their resources first and foremost on security.
14
Schroder refutes these neo-realist
assumptions for the following reasons: Firstly, states, most of the times, cannot afford a
strategy of self help. Other strategies such as, hiding from threats by ignoring or declaring
neutrality in a general crises, transcending that is overcoming the international anarchy to
solve problems; end the threat and prevent its recurrence through some institutional
arrangement, and bandwagoning which is to join the stronger side for the sake of protections
and pay-offs even by sacrificing certain aspects of state sovereignty, are also available and
often tried by the states. Waltzs self help; in the form of balancing against an actual and
potential hegemon thus, is relatively rare and often fall back policy or last resort.
15
States
strategies are based on their threat perceptions, and mostly aimed at balancing the threats not
power. Moreover, they do not unconditionally opt for a strategy but with a rational
calculation of costs and benefits.

Secondly, states position and status is not determined by its power but its specific function in
the international system recognised by the other states. The small and great states, both
ensure their survival in international system not only by balancing but also by specializing
in performing important international functions which no other state could do. Moreover, the
recognition of such functional roles, by other states, brings support or assistance, and even
the acceptance of their leadership in the international system. The questions of how functions
and roles were assigned to individual actors, whether those roles were necessary or justified,
and how well the actors were fulfilling them, became major issues in international politics.
16


14
lbld., p. 114
13
lbld., pp. 117,118
16
lbld., pp. 123,126
8
The successful specialisation therefore ensures the functional states survival while the failure
might be punishable and destructive.

It is therefore, observed that the systemic approach of international politics has certain
constraints in explaining the complexities of international behaviour. It does not suggest the
anachronistic nature of neo-realist school of thought. Conversely, it highlights the need and
importance of incorporating the factors of domestic politics also to understand international
relations holistically.

3- A Synthesis of International and Domestic Politics
The complexities of international politics require a synthesis of neo-realism and domestic
politics to understand the international behaviour. It is argued that the system level
explanations are inappropriate to give a comprehensive account of world politics. This study
therefore, aims at incorporating domestic politics along with the systemic explanations to
explain the states behaviour.

Gideon Roses Neo-Classical Realism
17
therefore, bridges up the domains of external and
internal politics. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a countrys foreign
policy is driven, first and foremost, by its place in the international system and specifically,
by its relative material power capabilities. However, the impact of such capabilities on
foreign policy is indirect and complex because systemic pressures must be translated through
intervening variables at the unit level.
18
A states foreign policy therefore, is elites
perception of its relative power in the international system.


17
Cldeon 8ose, neo-Classlcal 8eallsm and 1heorles of lorelgn ollcy," 9$%.8 0$.&,&2'= vol. 31, no. 1 (CcLober
1998).
18
lbld., pp. 146-147
9
Fareed Zakriya,
19
highlights the relevance of the domestic and systemic factors,
simultaneously in explaining the expansionist behaviours of states. In reviewing Jack
Snyders domestic political model in Myths of Empire, he argues that:
The basic flaw in Myths of Empire is that it accords little weight to systemic causes....the
attempt at expansion may chiefly linked to a states domestic politics, but the success of
its expansionist policies is surely related to the international environment in which it was
tried. By failing to separate the domestic and systemic factors, Snyders treatment of his
cases remains incomplete.... A good theory of foreign policy should first ask what effect
the international system on national behaviour because the most powerful generalizable
characteristic of the state in international relations is in its relative position in
international system.
20

Zakriya, though recognises the importance of domestic political factors however, contends
that an international behaviour cannot be explained without recourse to the system level
factors, and the vice versa.

Interestingly, domestic political factors explain the international behaviours of small and
major states simultaneously. Miriam Fendius Elman in The Foreign Policy of Small States:
Challenging Neo-Realism in its own Backyard,
21
rejects the conventional wisdom in
international relations which suggests that the external factors are more likely to influence
the foreign policy of weak states. It is examined that even the most vulnerable states may
display foreign policies which are explicable only in terms of domestic politics.
22
She also
suggests that the explanatory power of neo- realism varies indirectly with the persistence of
a given political regime.
23
Therefore, newly independent states may get conscious of their
survival however; their behaviour may better be explained from a domestic perspective later
on.

The present study seeks to incorporate the external and internal factors of international
politics to explain Pakistans role in the War on Terror. In the Post-9/11 unipolar world,
Bandwagoning was the strategy of Pakistan to counter threats to its survival. Pakistans

19
lareed Zakrlya, 8eallsm and uomesLlc ollLlcs: A 8evlew Lssay," *+,#%+-,&$+-. >#2?%&,@, vol. 17, no. 1
(Summer 1992)
20
lbld., pp. 184,183,196,197
21
Mlrlam lendlus Llman, 1he lorelgn ollcles of Small SLaLes: Challenglng neo-8eallsm ln lLs Cwn 8ackyard,"
A%&,&'" B$?%+-. $) 0$.&,&2-. >2&#+2#, vol. 23, no. 2 (Aprll 1993)
22
lbld., p.212
23
lbld.
10
decision to join the U.S led international coalition against terrorism was the by-product of the
systemic constraints. Internationally, Pakistan had been declared as a Major Non-NATO Ally
in the War on Terror. Moreover, this specialised role had promised Pakistan the economic,
political, and diplomatic support from the international community. However, Pakistan had to
face many challenges at the domestic front. The state and societal factors of the domestic
politics therefore, have been analysed to account for such challenges. These internal pressures
have adverse consequences for Pakistans counter-terrorism strategy. This study hence, aims
at a holistic understanding of Pakistans role in order to evaluate the prospects of success in
the War on Terror.

Section two
International Coalition against Terrorism and Pakistans Counter-
Terrorism Strategy

This section explores the reasons for which Pakistan has decided to join the international
coalition against terrorism. The earth shaping tragedy of twin towers reflected U.S assertion
of its preponderant power and position in the international system. This tragedy had been
condemned by the international community at large and extended their support to eradicate
terrorism. Pakistans geopolitical environment and its close ties with Taliban regime; the
alleged hosts of Al-Qaeeda in Afghanistan, shaped its decision to join the U.S led War on
Terror. The section therefore, aims at addressing the following questions: Why did Pakistan
join International Coalition against Terrorism? Was there any other choice for Pakistan but to
join the War on Terror? What is Pakistans counter-terrorism strategy? How far Pakistan is
successful in combating terrorism? How do the military and democratic political regimes in
Pakistan have crafted its counter terrorism strategy?

This section is divided into three parts. Part one deals with the choices and compulsions to of
Pakistans engagement in the War on Terror. Part two describes Pakistans counter terrorism
strategy both, under military and democratic political set ups. Part three analyses the success
or failure of Pakistans anti-terrorism regime.
11

1- Pakistans Engagement in the War on Terror: The Choices and Constraints
There are multiple reasons for Pakistans decision to join the international coalition against
terrorism. In the Pre-9/11 period, Pakistan was facing multiple problems at domestic and
international levels. Fazal-ur Rehman in his article Pakistan and the War on Terrorism
24

accounted numerous reasons for the negative image of Pakistan. The charge sheet against
Pakistan was comprised of the corruption of the political elites, bad economic conditions,
nuclear explosions in 1998, alleged support to the Kashmiri Freedom Struggle, the Kargil
conflict, and the military coup against a democratically elected regime in 1999; and above all
its support to the Taliban since 1994.
25
However, its decision to join the War on Terror had
improved its image from a so called a failed state to a responsible player in international
politics.

Historically, the regional and international communities have long regarded the Pakistani
establishment as principal supporter of the Taliban and a sympathizer of Osama Bin Laden.
Pakistan was the second country, after Saudi Arabia, in the world which had recognised the
Talibans government as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Pakistans support to
Taliban was the outcome of its military strategy of strategic depth in case of any Indian attack
on Pakistan. Moreover, the Pakistani law enforcement agencies recorded that suspected
terrorist gangs involved in crimes on Pakistani streets were allowed to operate freely to and
from Afghanistan.
26
Oliver Roy in his essay The Taliban: A strategic Tool for Pakistan,
27

identifies two perspectives to understand Pakistans Pro-Taliban Policy: Firstly, the geo-
strategic perspective was aimed at asserting the regional influence of Pakistan by establishing
a kind of control in Afghanistan, through a fundamentalist Pakhtun-dominated movement.
Secondly, an ideological and religious connection provided by extending the informal
networks of Madrassas in Pakistan, not only challenged the Islamic credentials of Pakistani
Government but also provided a non-governmental tool of influence in the region.
28


24
lazal-ur-8ehman, aklsLan and Lhe War on 1error," >,%-,#C&2 >,?8&#', vol. xxlll, no. 3, (AuLumn 2003)
23
lbld., p.37
26
Syed Farooq Hasnat, and Tahmina Rashid, Implications of the 9/11: A Pakistani Perspective, IPRI Journal
Vol. IV, No.1 (Winter 2004), p. 97.
27
Cllver 8oy, 1he 1allban: A SLraLeglc 1ool for aklsLan" ln 0-D&',-+3 7-,&$+-.&'5 1&,"$?, - 7-,&$+, LdlLed by
ChrlsLopher !afferloL (new uelhl: Manohar ubllshers and ulsLrlbuLors, 2002)
28
lbld., p. 149.
12
Pakistans Pro-Taliban policy therefore, proved to be a disaster in the Post-9/11 period.
Taliban were declared terrorist for giving refuge to Osama bin Laden and the members of Al-
Qaeeda; the culprits of the Twin Tower tragedy. This ultimately led Pakistan towards a shift
from a policy of pro to anti-Talibanism.

It is significant as well as complex to figure out whether Pakistan had any other options but to
join the international coalition against terrorism. On the eve of 9/11, Pakistani government
and its people expressed their shock and grief on the happening of 9/11. Syed Farooq Hasnat
and Tahmina Rashid in Implications of the 9/11: A Pakistani Perspective, explain that in
response to the American demands either you are with us or with the terrorists, Pakistani
military regime was left with no choice but to join the international coalition against
terrorism.
29
The compulsions of international system left Pakistan with no choice but to join
the War on Terror. Moreover, Pakistani state, being conscious of its pro-Taliban policies,
offered its unconditional support in this war.

There were some other regional and domestic reasons which determined a key role for
Pakistan in the War on Terror. At the foremost, Pakistan was facing threat from religious
Islamic militancy. This threat of home grown militancy had been compounded by the spill
over efforts of the ongoing war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Moreover, the rising
possibility of war with India, on account of Islamabads perceived unwillingness to
discourage cross border terrorism in the Indian held Kashmir, was another important
concern of Pakistan in the Post-9/11 milieu. Syed Riffat Hussain in War against terrorism:
Pakistani Perspective
30
states that General Musharrafs decision to abandon the Taliban
was not only a national policy response to cataclysmic event of 9/11 but also a logical
outgrowth of his pre 9/11 reformist agenda to rebuild national confidence and morale,
strengthening federation, revive economy and ensuring speedy justice, depoliticise state
institutions, devolution of power to grass root level and accountability.
31
It manifests that
Musharrafs decision to join global War on Terror ensured his regimes perpetuation and
stability in return. The adverse impacts of domestic and regional instability on Pakistans

29
PasnaL, and 1ahmlna, Cp.ClL.
30
Syed 8lfaaL Pussaln, War AgalnsL 1errorlsm: aklsLanl erspecLlve," *0/* B$?%+-., Cp.ClL.
31
lbld., p. 33.
13
economy also determined its choices in the War on Terror. However, there were certain
dissenting opinions on the level of support offered by Pakistan in the U.S led War on Terror.

Robert Wirsing,
32
explores the dark sides of Pakistans role in the War on Terror. Pakistans
President Musharraf in his candid address to the nation stated that wrong decisions in the
countrys moment of crises can have threatening consequences for Pakistans critical
concerns. What Musharraf did not say, at least in public, was that Pakistans avoidance of
wrong decisions was going to be far from easy.
33
It suggests that the Pakistani decision
makers could not foresee or might have overlooked the following consequence of Pakistans
engagement in the War on Terror: Firstly, Pakistans abandonment of the Taliban meant that
Islamabad lost influence not only in Afghanistans potential for providing Pakistan with
greater strategic- depth but also vital access to the energy rich states of Central Asia.
Moreover, it had to worry about the Post-Taliban Afghanistans political alignment in
particular, where it might stand in relation to New Delhi, which indeed became a reality later
on.

Secondly, the War on Terror had a negative impact on the public opinion in Pakistan. It
ultimately pressurised Islamabad to break its ties from Washington. Thirdly, Islamic
extremist forces, which were well entrenched in Pakistani society, posed a great challenge to
the Pakistani state. The Islamic parties, which were the by product of state policies and got
out of control thus, constituted a major threat not only to the domestic stability of Pakistan
but also to its International reputation.
34
Fourthly, such an engagement had adverse impacts
on Pakistans Kashmir Policy, whereby India tried its level best to declare Pakistan a terrorist
state which harboured terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir. Fifthly, the pressures have also been
mounted on the security of Pakistans nuclear program. Anatol Lieven in The Pressures on
Pakistan: Allah, the Army, and America
35
has highlighted the possibilities of an Islamic
revolution in Pakistan. In such a situation, the international community in general and U.S in

32
8oberL Wlrslng, aklsLan's SLraLeglc opLlon: lrom Lhe Cold War Lo Lhe War on 1errorlsm," ln 7#1
0#%';#2,&<#' $+ 0-D&',-+3 E&'&$+' )$% ,"# 4?,?%#, edlLed by Saeed ShafqaL (Cxford unlverslLy ress, 2007)
33
lbld., p. 336.
34
lbld., p.339
33
Anatol Lieven, The Pressures on Pakistan: Allah, The Army, and America, 4$%#&C+ F))-&%', vol. 81, no. 1
(!anuary/leburary 2002)
14
particular were apprehensive of the Islamists control of the Pakistani nuclear weapons.
Pakistans decision to join international coalition was a consequence of the domestic and
international compulsions. However, a cautious approach towards deciding the terms of
Pakistans engagement could ensure a relatively more secure and stable Pakistan.

2- Pakistans Counter-Terrorism Strategy: A Continuity or Change?
Understanding Pakistans role in the War on Terror requires description and evaluation of its
counter-terrorism strategy. It is significant to an extent to unleash different myths and
realities about Pakistans performance in this war. It will also highlight the context in which
the present study seeks to explain the domestic and international implications of Pakistans
role in this war. For this study addresses the following questions: What is Pakistans counter-
terrorism strategy? Was Pakistans counter-terrorism strategy is a personal choice of
Musharraf? Is there continuity or change in Pakistans counter-terrorism strategy in the Post-
Musharraf democratic set-up? Is Pakistans strategy to combat terrorism a success or failure?
This part is further divided into the following three sub-parts. The first one discusses the
imperatives and choices of Musharraf while crafting Pakistans counter-terrorism policy. The
second evaluates the performance of Pakistans democratic regime in the war on terror, and
the third critically evaluates the prospects of success or failure of Pakistans counter-terrorism
strategy.

a) Musharrafs Regime and the Anti-Terrorism Strategy
President Musharraf himself was strongly committed to purging both Al-Qaeeda and the
Taliban. The imperatives of eliminating Al-Qaeeda were obvious: Pakistan was never directly
a sponsor of this group in Afghanistan, and destroying its network has been the prerequisite
the Pakistani counterterrorism partnership with U.S. Personally, Musharraf vehemently
opposed the political philosophy of Taliban. He had repeatedly declared that the
Talibanisation as the most pressing threat to Pakistan. He regarded Talibanisation as a state
of mind that require more comprehensive and long term strategy where military action must
be combined with the political approach and socio-economic development. Whether such
perceptions have translated into an effective strategy to eradicate terrorism, need to be
evaluated.
13

Ashelly Tellis in Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised
Performance
36
gives four categories to understand terrorism within Pakistan. Firstly, the
domestic sectarian groups in Pakistan such as: Sipah Sahaba, Laskkare Jhangvi, Tehrik-i-
Nifaz-i-Jafriya which have killed or injured hundreds of people each year. Confronting the
sectarian challenges to the writ of the state, Musharraf was content to exploit the
opportunities offered by the War on terror, to crackdown on these groups and suppress them
once and for all. He did so, however selectively.
37
He however, targeted only those groups
whose objectives were in contradiction with the militarys perception of the national interest
of Pakistan.

Secondly, the terrorist outfits operating with Pakistans army and intelligences support
against India and Kashmir are treated in a different way. These groups, Hizbul-Mujahideen,
harkatul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Muhammad, were financed, trained,
armed and launched and then exempted from this crackdown on the strategic rationale that
Pakistans participation in War on Terror was intended to protect its freedom of action in
Kashmir. These groups personified the legitimate Kashmiri struggle for self determination
against India.
38
Nevertheless, regional, and international factors forced Musharraf to isolate
these groups both physically and financially.

Thirdly, the Pashtun remnants of the Taliban regime which were ejected from power in
Kabul. Since Pakistani government was engaged in the creation of the Taliban before their
fall, Taliban cadres hastily returned to the regions of their origin after the defeat. Fourthly, it
was Al-Qaeeda which had taken up sanctuary in South Waziristan. The Pakistani army and
state had a consensus on destroying such Al-Qaeeda elements from Pakistan.
39
Therefore, a
number of foreign elements have been arrested and handed over to the United States.


36
Ashley !. Tellis, Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,
(Washington:Carnegie Endowment, 2008)
37
lbld., p.4
38
lbld., p.3
39
lbld., p.9
16
Operationalizing Musharrafs strategy to combat terrorism, Charles Kennedy in Pakistans
Anti-Terrorism Regime, 1997-2003
40
unleashes that Pakistans anti-terrorism strategy had
been crafted by Nawaz Sharif in 1997. It was aimed at targeting the political opponents or to
address the ethno-national conflicts in Pakistan. In wake of the September tragedy, Musharraf
just had to amend this regime to apply against the terrorists. This regime defined terrorism as
doing of anything that causes death or endangers a persons life.
41
This definition
empowered Musharraf to proscribe an organisation if it has reason to believe that it a)
commits or participates in acts of terrorism; b) prepares for terrorism; c) promotes or
encourages terrorism; d) supports or assists any organistaion concerned with terrorism; e)
patronises and assists in the incitement of hatred and contempt on religion, sectarian or ethnic
lines that stir-up disorder; f) fails to expel from its ranks or ostracize those who commit acts
of terrorism and present them as heroic persons; or g) is otherwise concerned with
terrorism.
42
Such an amendment facilitated in proscribing the Lashkar-i-Jhangwi, Sipah-e-
Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkat-ul Mujahideen, and tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-
Jafriya Pakistan. Moreover, it led to the arresting of their leadership and freezing of their
bank accounts.

Musharraf also turned his attention towards reforming the Madrassa system in Pakistan.
There was an emerging worldwide consensus that Madrassa in Pakistan were directly
responsible for the creation of the Taliban. Responding to such pressures, Musharrafs had
placed Madrassas under the federal, provincial or district controls. The Madrassa curriculum
reforms were introduced to make it more modern and scientific. Moreover, additional
conditions on visa requirements and related matters concerning foreigners were
implemented.
43
In nutshell, Musharrafs counter terrorism strategy was holistic in nature. It
addressed the political, religious, and socio-cultural causes of terrorism in Pakistan.




40
Charles Kennedy, Pakistans Anti-Terrorism Regime, 1997-2003, New Perspectives on Pakistan, Op.Cit.
41
lbld., p. 340
42
lbld., p. 341
43
lbld., p.343
17
b) Democratic Regime in Pakistan and the War on Terror: A Continuity or Change?
In the Post-Musharraf democratic set-up, Pakistan continues its support in the U.S led War on
Terror. Ashley Tellis
44
argues that though Pakistans strategy to combat terrorism was shaped
and implemented by General Musharraf, it would be erroneous to conclude that this
prevailing strategy is owed simply to the whim of one man. Musharrafs counter-terrorism
strategy was publically perceived as personal dicta but reflected the perception of the army in
the military dominated state of Pakistan. In other words, even if Musharraf were to suddenly
exit from Islamabads political scene, the counter-terrorism strategy of Pakistan would
survive as long as the men on horseback continue to be the principle guardians of
Islamabads national security policy. Ian Talbot
45
takes up the same argument for the reasons
of geopolitics and the self interest of military as an institution in Pakistan. Therefore, one
may predict the continuity in Pakistans counter-terrorism strategy even in the democratic
political set-up.

Pakistans democratic regime shares militarys perceptions on the War on Terror. Shabana
Fayyaz
46
argues that the government in Islamabad whether led by Musharraf or by
Pakistans Peoples Party led Coalition, has remained committed to ensuring success in the
war on terror.
47
Since 2001, Pakistan has been pro-actively pursuing a policy of eliminating
the extremist elements either by force or political dialogue. In 2008 alone, Pakistan arrested
4,113 militants, launched 12 major military operations against Taliban, killing over 3,000 and
arresting more than 2000 militants including Afghan Taliban.
48
The Swats military operation
and the U.S Drone attacks within Pakistan, which has killed the supreme commander of
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan Baitullah Mehsud
49
therefore, manifest continuity in Pakistans
anti-terrorism strategy. However, by owning this war, the PPP government reflects an
anomaly in the Pakistani perception of this war since 2001. Such an ownership will help at
winning the support of people which is a sine qua non for success in the War on Terror.


44
1ellls. Cp.ClL. p. 12
43
lan 1alboL, uoes Army Shape aklsLan's lorelgn ollcy," 0-D&',-+3 7-,&$+-.&'5 1&,"$?, - 7-,&$+, (new
uelhl: Manohar ubllshers, 2002)
46
Shabana layyaz, osL-9/11 eace narraLlve ln aklsLan," 0*0> B$?%+-., vol.2, no.1 (!an-March, 2009)
47
lbld., p.68
48
lbld.
49
Peadllne news ln :-1+, AugusL 18, 2009
18
c) Is Pakistans Counter-Terrorism Strategy a Success?
Evaluating Pakistans success or failure in the war on terror is a relative and complex
phenomenon. According to Charles Kennedy,
50
success in the War on Terror depends on
a) how one defines success; b) whether one is approaching this question from the perspective
of domestic or International factors; or c) the motivations of the actors involved.
51
Philip H.
Gordon in Can the War on Terror Be Won?
52
contends that:
It is impossible to win a war without knowing its goal...Victory will come ...when the
ideology of terrorists espouse is discredited, when their tactics are seen to have failed,
and when they come to find more promising paths to the dignity respect, opportunities
they crave....Terrorism has been a tactic used by the weak in an effort to produce political
change...The goal of ending terrorism entirely is not only unrealistic but also
counterproductive-just as is the pursuit of other utopian goals.
53

Therefore, failure to define clear goals in the War on Terror will be counter-productive.
Moreover, the lack of consensus on the definition of terrorism may suggest the continuity of
this war for an indefinite period.

Interestingly, there was hardly any external pressure on the restoration of democracy in
Pakistan during Musharrafs regime. Pakistan has also resumed its security relationship with
U.S and has been promised the international economic assistance by the West. However,
Pakistan has become a victim of its own rhetoric with respect to Kashmir. In case Pakistan
continues to fight in the War on Terror, it will be hard to justify its continued support for non-
state actors in their struggle against India.
54
There have been negative societal, political and
legal consequences for Pakistans role in the War on Terror. Nevertheless, it has hardly
influenced the commitments of Pakistani state to continue its role as a key ally in the War on
Terror.




30
kennedy. Cp.ClL., p.347
31
lbld
32
hlllp P. Cordon, Can Lhe war on 1error 8e Won? Pow Lo llghL Lhe rlghL War," 4$%#&C+ F))-&%', vol.86, no.6
(november/uecember 2007)
33
lbld., pp. 34, 38, 39.
34
kennedy, Cp.ClL., p. 337
19
Section Three
Domestic Implications of Pakistans Role in the War on Terror

This section deals with the adverse domestic consequences of Pakistans role in the War on
Terror. This study explores the domestic resentment by analysing the nature and attitudes of
Pakistani society. The Pakistani society does not share states perceptions on the War on
Terror. Pakistans decision to join the international coalition against terrorism challenged
different social norms and values of a larger Pan-Islamic identity interpreted in terms of
Pakistans support for Kashmiris right of self determination and recognition of the Taliban
as the legitimate regime in Afghanistan. The Pakistans U-turn to its pro-Taliban policy had
domestic backlash specifically, from the so called Islamic factions in Pakistan. This study
explain the domestic consequences of Pakistans role in the War on Terror by addressing the
following question: Why does Pakistans role in the War on Terror lead towards the
radicalisation of its society? Why do the state and society in Pakistan have divergent
perspective on the War on Terror? Does Madrassa Culture denote radicalisation of Pakistani
society?

The public in Pakistan has suspicions on Pakistans role in the War on Terror. According to
the Pew Global Attitudes Opinion Survey of over 38,000 people in 44 nations, conducted
roughly a year after 9/11, the majority in Pakistan showed their resentment against the
Governments decision to fight U.S led war on terror, and disliked the U.S ideas and
customs.
55
However, according to the Gallup Opinion Survey 2002, when asked whether
terrorist attacks on the WTC were morally justified, 61% of Pakistanis said no. This clearly
shows that while expressing their opposition to the U.S led War on terror, most Pakistanis
strongly opposed the killings of innocent civilians by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeeda in
the name of Islam.
56
The public sentiment, therefore predominantly reflect the perceptions
about U.S in the Pakistani society.

33
kennedy. Cp.ClL., p.338
36
Pussaln. Cp.ClL., p. 33
20
Anti-Americanism has emerged as a dominant trend in Pakistani society. It has been
explained under the following three models: Firstly, the Friendship-Betrayal Model based on
the historical experiences of engagement and estrangement in Pak-U.S relations, secondly,
Anti-Imperialism which reflects the capitalist, resource oriented U.S policies in the
developing countries, thirdly, Anti-Islamism based on the pro-Israeli and pro-Indian U.S
policies in the world. The election results 2002 also manifest the anti-Americanism a decisive
factor in Mutahida Majlis-i-Amals success in NWFP and Baluchistan. However, MMAs
success had other reasons of economic dislocation, and the absence of mainstream political
parties from the elections.
57
Paradoxically, these Islamic parties lend their support to protect
Musharrafs actions and policies by facilitating a constitutional amendment in Pakistan.

Pakistans counter terrorism strategy is another instance of diverging state-societal
relationship. The U.S drone attacks in the tribal belt of Pakistan have been regarded as a
violation of sovereignty of Pakistan. Moreover, the killings of innocent people in such
incidents have resulted in a collateral damage in terms of rising extremism and suicide attacks
within Pakistan. However, the majority in Pakistan have expressed reservations about
religious extremism and have condemned the suicide bombings. Moreover, they have
shunned the extremist interpretations of Islam to be identified as moderate and progressive
Muslims. Phlilip Gordon
58
maintains that there are signs of Muslim backlash against al-
Qaeedas use of wanton violence as a political tool. Muslims reaction has followed Al-
Qaeeda attacks in Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Saud-i-Arabia....Militants will keep
pushing the envelope and committing more atrocities to the point that the dream will no
longer be attractive to young people.
59
Stephen Philip Cohen in The Jihadist Threat to
Pakistan
60
holds that with little mass support in this deeply Islamic, yet still moderate
country, radical Islamists have not been able to successfully conduct an Islamic coup to seize
the levers of government.
61
Therefore, the emerging consensus within Pakistani society to
reject fundamentalist and extremist ideologies is a good omen in Pakistans struggle to
against terrorism.

37
lbld
38
Cordon. Cp.ClL.
39
lbld., p. 62
60
SLephen hlllp Cohen, 1he [lhadlsL 1hreaL Lo aklsLan," !"# 9-'"&+C,$+ G?-%,#%.@, vol.26, no.3 (Summer
2003)
61
lbld., p.7
21
In order to comprehend the radicalisation of Pakistani society, one must understand the
phenomenon of radicalisation. There is a consensus between the Pakistani intellectuals that
radicalisation is not necessarily a religious phenomenon but depends on the political
contexts.
62
According to Dr. Tariq Rehman,
63
radicalism is not necessarily a religious
phenomenon. It can occur in any ideological or secular leaning. Mumtaz Ahmed
64
suggests
that the definitions of moderate and radicals continue to change depending on the political
context or ones ideological perspective. Form the above definitions one can infer that
radicalism in Pakistan is not a primordial but an instrumentalist attitude which is determined
by the external regional and global environments. Its origins in Pakistan can be traced in the
states policies in Afghan Jihad, the establishment of the Taliban, and the Pakistans Kashmir
policy during the 1980s and the 1990s.

In the context of militarisation of Pakistani society, the role of army is dubious in character.
Hasan Abbas in Pakistans Drift into Extremism
65
highlighted the Pakistani militarys
historical practice of courting the Mullahs. Hussain Haqqanis Pakistan: Between Mosque
and Military
66
emphasises the historical alliance between Islamists and Pakistan military
which has the potential of frustrating anti-terrorist operations, radicalising the key segments
of the Islamic world, and bringing India and Pakistan yet again to the brink of war. Therefore,
However, Hussain Haqqani in his article The Role of Islam in Pakistans Future
67
holds
that Pakistans all powerful military can be persuaded to cede the power gradually to secular
civilians and allow the secular politics of competing economic and regional interests to
prevail over religious sentiments, the countrys vulnerability to radical Islamic politics will
not wane.
68
It suggests that the lack of democracy and communication may perpetuate the
extremist attitudes in Pakistan.


62
ueflnlng Lhe henomenon of 8adlcallsaLlon ln aklsLan: A 8eporL," 0*0> B$?%+-.H Cp.ClL., p.3
63
lbld., p.7
64
lbld., p.9
63
Passan Abbas, 0-D&',-+I' :%&), &+,$ JK,%#5&'53 F..-"= ,"# F%5@= -+8 F5#%&2-I' 9-% $+ !#%%$% (new uelhl:
enLagon ress, 2oo3)
66
Pussaln Paqqanl, 0-D&',-+3 A#,1##+ L$'M?# -+8 L&.&,-%@ (vanguard, 2003)
67
Pussaln Paqqanl, 1he 8ole of lslam ln aklsLan's luLure," !"# 9-'"&+C,$+ G?-%,#%.@, vol.28, no.1 (WlnLer
2004-03)
68
lbld., pp. 83-86
22
The above discussion fosters the interest in exploring whether the Madrassa culture is a
factor in the radicalisation of Pakistani society? Muhammad Amir Rana takes up this
argument in his article Mapping the Madrassa Minset: Political attitudes of Pakistani
Seminaries,
69
and identifies different perspectives on Madrassas role in the radicalisation of
Pakistani society. However, most of the Madrassas surveyed, condemn terrorism as an evil.
They hold that Pakistan should support the anti-terror campaign only when it is not directed
against Muslims or Islamic Countries.
70
Moreover, the majority of Madrassas have rejected
the possibility of offering any political support to the Taliban movement. There was almost a
consensus on the pseudo-Islamic justifications for committing suicide attacks. Moreover, it is
suggested that the Madrassas are not confined to religious issues only and their views are in
line with the general public perceptions.
71
This is an insightful study about the prevailing
Madrassa attitudes in Pakistan. However, the survey findings reflect an oversimplification of
the matter. Madrassas, as boarding schools, depict the philanthropist attitude of Pakistani
society. However, one has to be mindful of the controlling and then training capabilities of
these religious seminaries. Moreover, they provide an opportunity to the external financers to
intervene into the internal politics of Pakistan.

The Madrassas however, do not directly pose any threat to world peace and security. Peter
Bergan and Sawati Pandey in The Madrass Scapegoat
72
explores that
Madrassas should not be a national security concern for Western countries because they
do not provide potential terrorists with the language and technical skills necessary to
attack western targets. This is not to say that Madrassas do not pose problem to the
extent they hinder development by failing properly to educate students in Asia, Arab, and
African countries and that they create sectarian violence, particularly in Pakistan,
Madrassa should remain on Policy makers mind as a regional concern. A national
security policy focused on Madrassas as a principle source of terrorism, however, is
misguided.
73

It suggests that combating terrorism requires more than the eradication of Madrassa culture.
Under the state control, these religious seminaries can be best utilised for the welfare of the
poor in society. A religious ideology may breed terrorism but terrorism is not all about

69
Muhammad Amlr 8ana, Mapplng Lhe Madrasa MlndseL: ollLlcal aLLlLudes of aklsLanl Madarls," 0*0>
B$?%+-.H Cp.ClL.
70
lbld., p.32
71
lbld., p.39
72
eLer 8ergen, and SwaLl andey, 1he Madrassa ScapegoaL," !"# 9-'"&+C,$+ G?-,#%.@= vol.29, no.2 (Sprlng
2006)
73
lbld., pp.118-119
23
religion. One must be mindful of the root causes of terrorism that lie in the social, economic
and political exploitations and injustices worldwide.

In nut shell, Pakistans role in the War on Terror has exposed it to numerous domestic
challenges however, they are not exclusively the by product of it. Pakistan had been facing
the problems of militancy, sectarianism, and fundamentalist ideologies since the 1980s. In the
presence of hostile regional environment, such issues have been ignored by the Pakistani
state. Nevertheless, Pakistan must learn to address these problems by ensuring continuity in
its democratic set up. Moreover, the ideologies of social, economic, religious and political
exploitations must be eliminated.

Section Four
International Implications of Pakistans Role in the War on Terror

This section deals with Pakistan-U.S relations to explain the international dimension of
Pakistans role in the War on Terror. Pakistans pro-active counter terrorism strategy has
positive implications for its image at international level. The U.S has also promised its
assistance and support to ensure socio-economic and political stability in Pakistan. However,
there are certain adverse dimensions of this renewed US-Pak alliance which has negative
consequences for Pakistan. The present study therefore, explains the multifaceted Pak-US
relations by responding to the following questions: What is the nature of Pakistan-US
relations in the Post-9/11? What are the U.S interests in forging partnership with Pakistan?
How does U.S perceive Pakistans role in combating terrorism? How far U.S interests in
South Asia are in consonance with Pakistans regional interests? Why anti-Americanism is a
dominant emerging trend in Pakistani society?
24

There are multiple perspectives to understand Pak-US relations. Noor-ul Haq in his article
Unipolarism and Pak-US Relations
74
views at the imperialistic aspect of Pak-US relations.
He argues that:
The US imperialistic behaviour denotes specific forms of aggressive behaviour on the
part of certain states against others.it is also often equated with the exercise of any
form of political control or influence by one political community over another. Pressure
and political control can be exercised through peaceful practices such as financial and
economic transactions, cultural activities, diplomatic arrangements or through outright
violence such as economic sanctions, military intimidation or through outright violence
such as show of arms or actual use of force, conquest and repression. The US has already
gone in for some of these options and if and when deemed appropriate, seems capable of
using all.
75

The U.S response to Twin Tower tragedy manifests its preponderant position in the
international system. U.S declared terrorists as a menace to the world civilization hence, a
threat to the international peace and security. It presented before the world a stark choice
either to be with U.S or with terrorists. Therefore, U.S dominated international politics left
the world community, in general and Pakistan in particular with no choice but to combat
terrorism.

The Pakistan-U.S engagement has changed much for Pakistan domestically and
internationally. Robert Wirsing
76
has viewed the renewed Pak-US relation as shaped by many
factors. These factors include Pakistans confrontational relationship with India, the
implementation of the principles of free market and democracy, the role of Islam, and the
nuclear program of Pakistan. Above all, what always impacted most heavily on Pakistans
standing in Washington was its strategic utility or fit- whether and to what extent, its leaders
seemed able and willing to meld Pakistans national interests to US policy imperatives. In
this transparency dependant relationship, it was always Washingtons perception of strategic
necessity, in company with Pakistans capacity for adapting to it that drove the US-Pakistan
relationship.
77
Therefore, Pak-US relations can best be explained as marriage of
convenience. Both have forged the alliance for the fulfilment of their short term strategic
interests.

74
ur. noor ul Paq, unlpolarlsm and ak-u.S 8elaLlons, *0/* B$?%+-., vol. vl, no.1 (WlnLer 2006)
73
lbld.,p. 94.
76
Wlrslng. Cp.ClL. pp. 334,333
77
lbld., pp. 334-333
23
The U.S interests in South Asia are national as well as global in nature. Hasan Askari Rizvi
78

suggests that Pakistan-US have reinvigorated their relations thrice. The first bilateral
cooperation begins in the mid-1950s, primarily as a security arrangement based on U.S policy
of Soviet containment and Pakistans security problems with India. The second phase of
revived Pak-US relations covers the decade of the 1980s, against the backdrop of the Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan. He infers that on both occasions, the relationship ran
into trouble with the change of regional and international political and security
environments.
79
Therefore, the third revival in US-Pak relations raises questions about its
credibility and endurance in the context of the War on Terror. Musharraf in an interview with
Larry King on CNN in October 2001 stated:
Whether Pakistanis, once the moment of their countrys immediate strategic utility has
passed, would experience once again the sense of betrayal and abandonment that had
been there in past encounters with the United States of America.
80

It suggests that the periods of friendship and betrayal best explain the history of Pak-US
relations. However, this lack of trust may have adverse impacts on their efforts in combating
terrorism.

Pakistans role in the War on terror has multiple dimensions. Pakistans choice to join the US
led War on Terror required to offer immediate tangible aid-including military bases, over-
flight privileges, and intelligence cooperation-in Washingtons impending war on
Afghanistan. Pakistans support in this war was an attempt to safeguard its strategic interests
in a context of growing Washingtons intimacy with New Delhi, suspicions on Pakistans
nuclear program, lurching economic conditions and diplomatic isolation for the military coup
of 1999 and the persistent support to Taliban in Afghanistan were perceived imminent threats
to Pakistan. Bob Woodward in Bush At War
81
gives a credible narrative of the exchanges
between Washington and Islamabad. He explained in detail what followed the September 12
meeting between General Mehmood and Richard Armitage where the later handed over a
non-negotiable list of U.S demands to Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan, in this partnership has to
say less and do more.

78
Pasan Askarl 8lzvl, aklsLan, Lhe unlLed SLaLes and SouLh Asla," L-N$% 0$1#%' -+8 >$?," F'&-, (lslamabad:
lnLernaLlonal lnsLlLuLe of SLraLeglc SLudles, 2004)
79
lbld., pp. 67-68.
80
Larry klng of Cnn on CcLober 23, 2001
lslamabad: MlnlsLry of lorelgn Affalrs, CcLober 23, 2001), aL www.forlsb.org/ce-017.hLml
81
8ob woodward, A?'" F, 9-% (London: Slmon and SchusLer, 2003), p. 47
26
Exploring convergence or divergence in renewed Pakistan-US relations requires the
understanding of their perceptions. Stephen P. Cohen in his article The United States and
South Asia: Core Interests and Policies and their Impact on Regional Countries
82
articulates
important US interests which are to counter Al-Qaeeda, and not to allow Pakistani territory to
be used for terrorist activities, the security of Pakistans nuclear program, democratization,
the need for improved Indo-Pak relations, and the de-radicalization of Pakistani society.
83
On
the other hand, Pakistani interests in this renewed partnership are by Musharraf in his address
to the nation on September13, 2001 as:
We, in Pakistan facing a very critical situation, perhaps as critical as in 1971.If we make
the wrong decisions, our vital interests will be harmed.Our critical concerns, are our
sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and
fourth our Kashmir cause. All four will be harmed, if we take a wrong decision. Pakistan
comes first, everything else is secondary.
84

It signifies that the Pak-US strategic partnership is the outcome of the regional, and
international compulsions however, is in the national interest of Pakistan.

The trust and personal dimensions are another interesting factor in Pak-U.S renewed
friendship. Craig Cohen, and Derek Chollet in their essay on When $10 Billion Is
Not Enough: Rethinking U.S strategy towards Pakistan
85
describes:
What is truly unique about this arrangement is that no formal agreement or user fees
were negotiated, nor was a repayment mechanism created.The reality is that U.S
assistance since September 11 attacks is not money intended to transform the nature of
the Pakistani state or society or to strengthen Pakistans internal stability but a thank
you to Musharrafs regime for the critical role Pakistan has played in Operation
Enduring Freedom.
86

Musharraf earned great respect and praises during his visits to the United States in 2002 and
2005 respectively. When President George Bush met with Musharraf at the White House in
September 2006, he stated: When (Musharraf) looks me in the eye and says...there wont be

82
SLephen hlllp Cohen, 1he unlLed SLaLes and SouLh Asla: Core lnLeresLs and ollcles and Lhelr lmpacLs on
8eglonal CounLrles," ln L-N$% 0$1#%' -+8 >$?," F'&-. Cp.ClL.
83
lbld., pp. 31-32
84
hLLp://www.lnfopak.gov.pk/resldenL_Addresses/presldenLlal_addresses_lndex.hLm
83
Cralg Cohen, and uerek CholleL, When $10 8llllon ls noL Lnough: 8eLhlnklng u.S. SLraLegy 1oward aklsLan,"
!"# 9-'"&+C,$+ G?-%,#%.@ vol. 30, no. 2, (Sprlng 2007)
86
lbld., pp. 10-11
27
a Taliban and wont be Al-Qaeeda, I believe him.
87
This personality factor also rendered a
democratic set-up in Pakistan at lowest in U.S policy agenda. However, the change of regime
in Pakistan does not suggest a compromise on U.S interests. The Pakistans role in the War
on Terror reflects a continuity which is a linchpin in Pak-U.S relations.

The U.S stance on India and Kashmir reflects a divergence in Pak-US interests.
Teresita C. Schaffer in her article U.S Influences in Pakistan: Can Partners have
Divergent Priorities
88
highlights the divergence of interest between the U.S and
Pakistan in case of dealing with India. In the wake of attacks on the Indian
Parliament in December, 2001, India was trying to highlight Pakistans role in
Kashmir as the supporter of terrorism. Pakistan, on the other hand, hoped that its
support for U.S policy in Afghanistan would lead the U.S to turn a blind eye to
Pakistans support for militancy in Kashmir. Moreover, U.S will provide support to
settle the Kashmir issue but all hopes went in vain. Instead Musharraf promised to
end the infiltration.
89
Moreover, the Indo-U.S nuclear deal has dashed down the
Pakistani hopes to forge a long term strategic partnership with the U.S.

Domestically, the alliance between Washington and Islamabad has negative
consequences for Pakistan. Anti-Americanism has emerged as one of the dominanat
trends in Pakistani society. Touqir Hussain, in U.S-Pakistan Engagement: The War
on Terrorism and Beyond
90
suggests four concentric circles as reasons to anti-
Americanism in Pakistan which are general reaction to U.S might and power,
Americas current International conduct, relations between Islam and the West, and
the history of U.S-Pakistan relations.
91
Such problems have a negative impact on the
ongoing partnership between Washington and Islamabad. However, the glue that
makes such a partnership effective comes from joint commitment to prevail in the
War on Terror.

87
lbld, p. 8
88
1ereslLa C. Schaffer, u.S lnfluence on aklsLan: Can arLners have ulvergenL rlorlLles?" !"# 9-'"&+C,$+
G?-%,#%.@, vol. 26, no. 1, (WlnLer 2002-03)
89
lbld.,pp. 173-176
90
1ouqlr Pussaln, u.S-aklsLan LngagemenL: 1he War on 1errorlsm and 8eyond," aL
www.uslp.org/pubs/speclalreporLs/sr143.hLml. (accessed on May26, 2007)
91
lbld., p.9.
28
Conclusion

The domestic and international implications of Pakistans role in the war on Terror are
paradoxical but at the same time reinforcing each other. Pakistans unconditional support in
the War on Terror is significant. Internationally, it has improved Pakistans image from an
alleged failed state to a responsible and key member in the U.S led War on Terror. Pakistan-
US renewed partnership has positive impacts on the socio-economic and political stability of
Pakistan. However, Pak-US convergence of interests in the War on Terror has failed to
promise an improved regional position to Pakistan, in the context of its relations with India,
its influence in future Afghan political set up, and the resolution of Kashmir dispute.
Moreover, there are suspicions and lack of trust in the Pak-US partnership. In nut shell, Pak-
US need based and short term relationship is losing its charm in the context of US-India long
term strategic partnership.

Domestically, Pakistans role in the War on Terror has widened the gap between its state and
society. The state-societal perceptions on the War on Terror are contradictory in nature.
Therefore, the radical extremist and militant forces have been identified as primary threat to
Pakistans survival and stability. The Pakistani society at-large is moderate and progressive.
The emerging consensus between state and society is observed where the later has rejected
the fundamental interpretations of Islam to improve Pakistans image internationally.
However, the anti-Americanism has been established as an emerging trend in Pakistans
domestic politics.

Most of the literature on the subject deals with the systemic compulsions in understanding
Pakistans role in the War on Terror. The factors of domestic politics as an explanation of
Pakistans domestic and international implications have therefore, been ignored. The
systemic explanations may highlight Pakistans significance in the War on Terror. However,
they cannot explain the consequences of such a decision on the polity of Pakistan. The
present study has developed a fusion of international and domestic political factors to give a
comprehensive account of the impacts of Pakistans role in the War on Terror. Moreover, it
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describes the domestic and international paradoxes and explains how they reinforce each
other. The present study therefore, is an original contribution to the knowledge.