VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNI VERSI TY

FACULTY OF POLI TICAL SCI ENCE AND DI PLOMACY

DEPARTMENT OF POLI TICAL SCI ENCE
Andrius varplys Vaidas Morkeviius
Political Sociology
DIDACTICAL GUIDELINES
Kaunas, 2013
ISBN 978-9955-21-362-8
Chapters 16. Andrius varplys, 2013
Chapter 7. Vaidas Morkeviius, 2013
Reviewed by Prof. Dr. Regina Jasiuleviien
Approved by the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Political
Science and Diplomacy at Vytautas Magnus University on 12 December 2012
(Protocol No. 7a)
Recommended for printing by the Council of the Faculty of of Political Science
and Diplomacy of Vytautas Magnus University on 7 January 2013 (Protocol
No. 54)
Edited by UAB Lingvobalt
Publication of the didactical guidelines is supported by the European Social Fund
(ESF) and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Project title: Renewal
and Internationalization of Bachelor Degree Programmes in History, Ethnology,
Philosophy and Political Science (project No.: VP1-2.2-MM-07-K-02-048)
3
Table of Contents
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Western Modernity: Classical Sociological Traditions on
Modern Society and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. 1. Te Marxist Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. 2. Te Durkheimian Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. 3. Te Weberian Tradition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2. Transformations of Modernity: Towards Postindustrial So-
ciety and Postmodernity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2. 1. Ulrich Beck: Risk Society in Second Modernity . . . . 26
2. 2. Zygmunt Bauman: Liquid Modernity . . . . . . . . . . 29
2. 3. Jean Baudrillard: Power and Politics in Post-Modernity.
Simulacra and Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3. Te State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3. 1. Rise and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3. 2. Political Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3. 3. Te Nation State and its Sovereignty in the European
Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4. Te Society. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4. 1. Te Class in Industrial Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4. 2. Social Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4. 3. Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5. Democratization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5. 1. Waves of Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5. 2. Capitalism and Democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5. 3. Value Change and Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6. Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transforma-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6. 1. Transition from Communism to Democracy: General
Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6. 2. Patterns of Political Transition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6. 3. Economic Transition from Central Planning to Market
Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6. 4. Nation-Building and National Minorities in Central
and Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6. 4. 1. Conditions of National Minorities . . . . . . . . 112
6. 4. 2. Western Solution to Minorities Claims and the
Particularities of Central Eastern Europe . . . . . . 114
6. 4. 3. Can Socioeconomic Modernization and Maturity
of Democracy Diminish the Claims of National Mi-
norities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6. 5. Post-Communist Transformations in Lithuania: Degra-
dation of State and Society? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7. Methodology of Political Sociology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7. 1. Secondary Data Analysis and Metadata . . . . . . . . . 133
7. 2. Data Sources and Repeated Major International Socio-
logical Surveys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7. 3. Principles of Data Analysis (On-Line) . . . . . . . . . . 141
7. 4. Eurobarometer Data Analysis in NESSTARWebview
Environment and Practical Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5
Introduction
What is political sociology?
Political sociology, as any other topic perhaps, can be discussed in a
simple or in a difcult way. To put it simply, political sociology primar-
ily analyses how politics and political processes depend on more gen-
eral social processes, moral attitudes of the society, and the way people
are used to think and behave. Te discipline of political sociology is
based on the belief that the political phenomenon is rooted in patterns
of society formation and therefore may be explained by those patterns.
Political sociology is not a classical discipline compared to other
disciplines of social and political sciences; however, in some cases the
identity of a scientifc discipline is not the most important subject nor
it is the primary task in order to study it. At the end of the 20
th
century
and at the beginning of the 21
st
century the political and social phe-
nomena are undergoing change and become more global; along with
this process the scientifc disciplines easily borrow ideas, methodolo-
gies, theories, and attitudes from other associated disciplines. Te best
example is European studies where diferent sciences such as political
sciences, sociology, law, economics, and history were interconnected
and diferent ideas of these disciplines were used in specifc studies.
In terms of the discipline of political science, traditional politi-
cal analysis will probably start with the distribution of the constitu-
tional powers of political institutions such as the Parliament, Presi-
dent, Government, and Courts. Te aim of the political sciences is
to reveal how real political institutions try to apply their powers and
are constrained to other institutions powers. While the main task
of political sociology is to describe political institutions in a wider
context of the society formation. For instance, despite the fact that
the whole Lithuanian political system is constitutionally based on
the principles that are commonly applied in the Western political
systems, social relations of the former nomenklatura; political, social
and moral characteristics of the society; the absence of civil society
forces the Lithuanian political reality to be re-interpreted according
to the society development peculiarities that possibly adjust the clas-
sical (Western) political concepts.
6
Political Sociology
Political sociology primarily deals with the analysis of the way
the politics depend on the development of the society when estab-
lished relations in the society become social and political norms and
begin the formation of a political culture; thus, it distinguishes po-
litical sociology from other associated disciplines such as sociology
and political science.
Didactical guidelines: purpose, structure, and usage
Te main purpose of this book is to render the knowledge about the
main aspects of the development of modern society and state to students
in order to enable them to analyse the observed political and social real-
ity on their own. Bearing in mind that the majority of readers will be
Lithuanian students, where it was possible, individual work was orient-
ed towards the refection of political and social processes in Lithuania.
It is impossible to discuss all signifcant topics in the frame of
these didactical guidelines, therefore, some topics are selectively
chosen. Te material of the didactical guidelines is divided into sev-
en chapters: Western modernity, transformations of modernity, the
state, the society, democratization, Central and Eastern Europe, and
methodology. Every chapter has the same structure: introduction
(explains the main topics, refers to the themes that need special at-
tention); presentation of a topic using authors thoughts or readings;
self-study tasks; obligatory and recommendable further readings.
Tese didactical guidelines do not replace the lectures; they are only
intended for students in order to study the taught material individu-
ally. We suppose that the main learning process takes place in lectures
where ideas, theories, and actual data are interactively debated and
political-social events and processes are discussed. Terefore the usage
of these didactical guidelines is based on the following principle: frst,
during the lecture the focus of the topic and contents is presented in
order to make the context of understanding and prepare students for
an individual reading and thinking; second, study of literature sources
that contain self-study tasks. Consequently, in these didactical guide-
lines strong emphasis is put on the readings in which students will rec-
ognize many worldwide famous experts in their felds. Te readings
will help students to verify the knowledge acquired in the lectures
and independently extend the analysis of the topics and problems.
77
1. Western Modernity: Classical
Sociological Traditions on Modern
Society and Politics
Te term modernity is very ofen met in nowadays social and po-
litical sciences. Te classical sociology (Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim,
and Max Weber) described this process as a transition from tradi-
tional society to modern (industrial) society. Te spread of the term
modernity was also infuenced by postmodernists contemplations
about postmodern condition (Jean-Franois Lyotard), i. e., the
depreciation of philosophical and emancipation (liberation) ideals
(grand narratives) that consequently lead Western society to the state
of postmodern society. Nowadays the concept of Western modernity
or, simply, modernity is used as a summary word that includes all
those political and social processes that contributed to the formation
of the contemporary society. In this case, the formal defnition of
modernity is not so important; more important is the knowledge of
those modern political and social processes.
Technically speaking, modernity is a historical period of the
Western society development. It lasted from the Age of Enlighten-
ment to the last decades of the 20
th
century when the most important
political and social institutions were established in the Western so-
ciety. During this period, the signifcant changes took place in the
felds of economics, politics, morality, authority, gender roles, and
the entire structure of the society.
Te most important processes of the formation of modern society
are the following:
Industrialization. Scientifc revolution and its discoveries appli-
cation in industry; development of industry (factories) that caused a
huge labour force movement from rural areas to towns and conse-
quently destroyed the traditional structure of the society that existed
for centuries (feudal economy, authority of the Church, patriarchy in
the family, immobility of a personal life).
Development of social classes. Te relationship between two
classes workers and capital owners became a moving force and
8
Political Sociology
the main social confict in the Western society; social classes had
changed the prevailing relationship between the aristocracy (large
landowners) and peasants.
Nationalism. National movements and formation of national col-
lective identities; establishment of the nation state by the principle
that the highest political authority stems from the nation only.
Social emancipation movements. Workers, womens, the civil
right movements with the aim to reform the Western political sys-
tem and to change social statuses, gender roles, and moral order and
stereotypes.
Democratization. Establishment of general election, voting rights
for workers and women, as well as the rise of new democratic states
afer the collapse of empires during the World War I.
Over the last two centuries, these processes had reformed the
Western societys morality and religion, economics and politics, the
structure of the society and the state, the social roles and identities of
a person and social groups. Te afer-efects of the processes are still
the object of the scientifc research, especially when it is compared
with the changes that occurred in the Western society during the
frst stages of industrialization till the last decades of the 20
th
century
when, as it is believed, the Western society had experienced signif-
cant changes and acquired the features of post-industrial society.
Terefore, the further material of this chapter is intended for clas-
sical sociological traditions that include the information about the
society and politics during the formation of industrial society.
Te way we understand the society and politics today is mainly
infuenced by the ideas of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max
Weber. Tey lived during the peak of social changes caused by the
industrial revolution and developed the fundamental principles of
Western society which became the basis for the 20
th
centurys social
sciences. Practically, any theorization of nowadays 21
st
century so-
ciety cannot manage without their refections on these crucial pro-
cesses in the Western world that were taken place during 19
th
20
th
c.
Naturally, there were more researchers than the three mentioned
above, but in this case, in the course of political sociology, the pre-
dominant traditions of mind that are still used in order to explain
the processes of nowadays society are more important than persons.
9
Western Modernity
Te aim of the chapter is to learn the most important ideas of
the classical sociological traditions, their attitudes towards modern
society and politics.
1. 1. The Marxist Tradition
TEXT 1. 1. 1.: Jessop, Bob (2012), Marxist Approaches to Power,
in Te Willey Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, edited
by Edwin Amenta, Kate Nash and Alan Scott, Blackwell Publish-
ing Ltd., p. 414.
Marxism difers from other analyses of power because of its primary
interest in class domination. In contrast, for example, Weberian analy-
ses give equal analytical weight to other forms of domination (status,
party); of, again, radical feminists prioritize patriarchy, its forms and
efects. But its distinctive interest in class domination is not limited
to economic class domination in the labour process (although this is
impor tant) nor even to the economic bases of class domination in the
wider economy (such as control over the allocation of capital to alterna-
tive productive activities). For Marxists see class powers as dispersed
throughout society and therefore also investigate political and ideo-
logical class domination. However, whereas some Marxists believe po-
litical and/or ideological domination derive more or less directly from
economic domination, others emphasize the complexity of relations
among these three sites or modes of class domination.

Economic Class Domination

Given the primacy of the relations of production in economic class
domination, some Marxists emphasize the power relations rooted in
organization of the labour process. Tis is considered the primary site
of the antagonism between capitalists and workers and is the crucial
site for securing the valorization of capital through direct control over
power-power. Various forms of control are identifed (e.g., bureaucratic,
technical, and despotic), each with its own implications for forms of
class struggle and the distribution of power between capital and la-
bour. Other Marxists study the overall organization of the production
process and its articulation to other aspects of the circuit of capital.
Tus emphasis is placed on the relative importance of industrial or
10
Political Sociology
fnancial capital, monopoly capital or small and medium enterprises,
multinational or national frms, frms interested in domestic growth
or exports.
Political Class Domination
Marxist accounts of political class domination typically begin with the
state and its direct and indirect roles in securing the conditions for eco-
nomic class domination. Te state is emphasized for various reasons:
frst, since market forces themselves cannot secure all the conditions
needed for capital accumulation and are prone to market failure, there
is a need for some mechanism standing outside and above the market
to underwrite it and compensate for its failures; second, economic and
political com petition between capitals necessitates a force able to orga-
nize their collective interests and limit any damage that might occur
from the one-sided pursuit of one set of capitalist interests; third, the
state is needed to manage the many and varied repercus sions of eco-
nomic exploitation within the wider society. Marxists argue that only
if the state can secure sufcient institutional integration and social co-
hesion will the extra-economic conditions for rational economic cal-
culation and, a fortiori, capital accu mulation be secured. Tis requires
a sovereign state that is relatively autonomous from particular class
interests and can articulate and promote a broader, national-popular
interest. Where this project respects the decisive economic nucleus of
the society and its capitalist character, then the state helps to secure
economic as well as political class domination. Tis is ofen held to be
more likely in bourgeois democratic political regimes than dictatorial
regimes (see Moore 1957; Barrow 1993; Gramsci 1971; Ofe 1984; Pou-
lantzas 1978; and Jessop 1990).

Te suggestion that the state is a social relation is important theo-

retically and politically. Seen as an institutional ensemble or repository
of political capacities and resources, the state is by no means class-neu-
tral. It is inevitably class-biased by virtue of the structural selectivity
that makes state institutions, capacities and resources more accessible
to some political forces and more tractable for some purposes than oth-
ers. ... It follows that political class struggle never ends. Only through
its continual renewal can a capitalist power bloc keep its relative unity
in the face of rivalry and fractionalism and maintain its hegemony (or,
at least, its dominance) over subaltern groups.
11
Western Modernity
Ideological Class Domination
Ideology (18451846) stated that the ruling ideas of any age are the ideas
of the ruling class and related this to the latters control over the means
of intellectual production. ... Marxist interest in the forms and modali-
ties of ideological class domination intensifed with the rise of demo-
cratic government and mass politics in the late nineteenth century and
the increased importance of mass media and popular culture in the
twentieth century. Various currents in so-called Western Marxism
have addressed the mechanisms and efects of ideological class domi-
nation especially whenever a radical socialist or communist revolu-
tion has failed to occur despite severe economic crisis or, indeed, during
more general periods of working-class passivity. Successive generations
of the Frankfurt School have been important here but many other ap-
proaches work on similar lines.
An inspirational fgure in this area is Antonio Gramsci, an Italian
communist politically active in the interwar period until his incarcera-
tion by the fascist regime, when he wrote his celebrated prison note-
books. He developed a very distinctive approach to the analysis of class
power. His chief concern was to develop an autonomous Marxist sci-
ence of politics in capitalist societies, to distinguish diferent types of
state and politics, and thereby to establish the most likely conditions
under which revolutionary forces might eventually replace capitalism.
He was particularly concerned with the specifcities of the political
situation and revolutionary prospects in the West (Western Europe,
United States) as opposed to the East (i. e., Tsarist Russia) believing
that a Leninist vanguard party and a revolutionary coup detat were
inappropriate to the West.
Gramsci identifed the state in its narrow sense with the politico-
juridical appa ratus, the constitutional and institutional features of gov-
ernment, its formal decision making procedures and its general policies.
In contrast, his studies focused more on the ways and means through
which political, intellectual and moral leadership was mediated through
a complex ensemble of institutions, organizations and forces operating
within, oriented towards, or located at a distance from the state in its
narrow sense. Tis approach is refected in his controversial defnition
of the state as political society + civil society and his related claims
that state power in Western capitalist societies rests on hegemony ar-
moured by coercion. Gramsci also defned the state as: the entire com-
12
Political Sociology
plex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class
not only justifes and maintains its dominance but manages to win the
active consent of those over whom it rules (1971: 244). He argued that
states were always based on variable combinations of force and hege-
mony. For Gramsci, force involves the use of a coercive apparatus to
bring the mass of the people into conformity and compliance with the
requirements of a specifc mode of production. In contrast, hegemony
involves the successful mobilization and reproduction of the active
consent of dominated groups by the ruling class through the exercise
of political, intellectual and moral leadership. Gramsci did not identify
force exclu sively with the state (e.g., he referred to private fascist ter-
ror squads) nor did he locate hegemony exclusively within civil society
(since the state also has important ethno-political functions). Over-
all, he argued that the capitalist state should not be seen as a basically
coercive apparatus but as an institutional ensemble based on a vari-
able mix of coercion, consent, fraud and corruption. Moreover, rather
than treating specifc institutions and apparatuses as purely technical
instruments of government, Gramsci examined their social bases and
stressed how state power is shaped by its links to the economic system
and civil society.
TEXT 1. 1. 2.: Communist Manifesto
Te source of quotation is http://www.marxists.org/archive/
marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm#007
Te history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-
master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in
constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now
hidden, now open fght, a fght that each time ended, either in a revolu-
tionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the
contending classes.
In the earlier epochs of history, we fnd almost everywhere a compli-
cated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation
of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians,
slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, jour-
neymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subor-
dinate gradations.
13
Western Modernity
Te modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of
feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but
established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of
struggle in place of the old ones.
Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this
distinct feature: it has simplifed class antagonisms. Society as a whole
is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two
great classes directly facing each other Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.
TASK 1. 1.:
) 0escrlbe how the class struggle ls reected ln hlstory.
z) what are the features of economlc class domlnatlon!
,) what ls the role of the state ln the polltlcal class struggle!
|) what was the prevlous role of ldeology and what has changed after a radlcal
soclallst or communlst revolutlon has falled to occur desplte severe economlc
crlsls or, lndeed, durlng more general perlods of worklng-class passlvlty!
,) Comment on Antonlo Cramscls denltlon of the state: the entlre complex of
practlcal and theoretlcal actlvltles wlth whlch the rullng class not only justles
and malntalns lts domlnance but manages to wln the actlve consent of those
over whom lt rules.
) 0ene the conlct ln the soclety wlth reference to the Varxlst tradltlon. ls lt
posslble to solve the conlct by any means, e. g., the prlnclples of llberal de-
mocracy and lnstltutlons!
)) Jhlnk about the consequences of the conlct (economlc or self-expresslon) to
nowadays democracy.
8) Apply the ldeas of the Varxlst tradltlon to llthuanlan (or your own country) so-
clety and polltlcs. low do you recognlze the classlcal (soclal groups) conlct ln
llthuanlan soclety! Referrlng to Cramscls ldeas, what are the publlc norms (prac-
tlces, ldeas, proposltlons) that are used to obtaln the consent of the soclety!
1. 2. The Durkheimian Tradition
TEXT 1. 2. 1.: Emile Durkheim: Collective Representation
Extract from the book Te Elementary forms of the Religious
Life by Emile Durkheim (frst published in 1912). Excerpt taken
from a book: Hall, Stuart; Gieben Bram (eds.) (1999). Formations
of Modernity. Oxford: Polity Press, p. 269270.
At the root of all our judgements there are a certain number of essential
ideas which dominate our intellectual life; they are what philosophers
14
Political Sociology
since Aristotle have called the categories of the understanding: ideas of
time, space, ... number, cause, substance, personality, etc, Tey corre-
spond to the most universal properties of things. Tey arp like the solid
frame which encloses all thought; this does not seem to be able to lib-
erate itself from them without destroying itself, for it seems that we
cannot think of objects that are not in time and space, which have no
number, etc. Other ideas are contingent and unsteady; we can conceive
of their being unknown to a man, a society or an epoch; but those oth-
ers appear to be nearly inseparable from the normal working of the
intellect. Tey are like the framework of the intelligence. Now when
primitive religious beliefs are systematically analysed, the principal cat-
egories are naturally found.
Tey are bom in religion and of religion; they are a product of reli-
gious thought. ... Up to the present there have been only two doctrines
in the feld. For some, the categories cannot be derived from experience:
they are logically prior to it and condition it. Tey are represented as so
many simple and irreducible data, imminent in the human mind by vir-
tue of its inborn constitution. For this reason they are said to be a priori.
Others, however, hold that they are constructed and made up of pieces
and bits, and that the individual is the artisan of this construction.
But each solution raises grave difculties. ...
... If reason is only a form of individual experience, it no longer ex-
ists. On the other hand, if the powers which it has are recognized but
not accounted for, it seems to be set outside the confnes of nature and
science. In the face of these two opposed objections the mind remains
uncertain. But if the social origin of the categories is admitted, a new at-
titude becomes possible, which we believe will enable us to escape both
of the opposed difculties.
... If ... the categories are, as we believe they are, essentially collective
representations, before all else, they should show the mental states of
the group; they should depend upon the way in which this is founded
and organized, upon its morphology, upon its religious, moral and eco-
nomic institutions, etc. ... there is all the diference ... between the indi-
vidual and the social, and one can no more derive the second from the
frst than he can deduce society from the individual, the whole from
the part, the complex from the simple. Society is a reality sui generis;
it has its own peculiar characteristics, which are not found elsewhere
and which are not met with again in the same form in all the rest of the
universe. Te representations which express it have a wholly diferent
15
Western Modernity
contents from purely individual ones and we may rest assured in ad-
vance that the frs
:
add something to the second.
Even the manner in which the two are formed results in diferen-
tiating them, Collective representations are the result of an immense
co-oper ation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as
well; to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, united and
combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have
accumulated their experience and their knowledge. A special intellec-
tual activity is therefore concentrated in them which is infnitely richer
and complexer than that of the individual.
TEXT 1. 2. 2.: Nash, Kate (2010), Contemporary Political Sociology.
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., p. 1520.
Durkheims work has not had the same degree of status and infuence
as that of Marx and Weber in political sociology. For Durkheim, the
state was of relatively little signifcance in creating and maintaining
social order, which is for him the key problematic of sociology. Dur-
kheims interests lay rather in questions of social solidarity, and es-
pecially with the possibility that the rise of individualism might give
members of modern societies a sense of belonging together rather than
resulting in a war of all against all. Te state does have an important
role to play in securing social order, but it can only do so by means of
a moral consciousness shared by all members of society even if the
state must sometimes take the lead in formulating it (Giddens, 1971: 102;
Lukes, 1973: 66874). For Durkheim, the state is an outcome of the divi-
sion of labor that creates modern societies, whilst at the same time it
contributes to the expansion of individual freedom. Most importantly,
it takes on the function of refecting on and refning societys collective
representations, the social symbols that express beliefs and values in
public rituals and ceremonies, and which guide individuals and con-
strain their behavior. Durkheim famously, and strikingly, likens the
state to the brain: its principal func tion is to think (Durkheim, 1992:
51). Modern societies can only be bound by organic solidarity, which
is experienced by those who fnd themselves interdependent because
they occupy diferent but equally essential roles in the collective en-
deavor that is society, and who are bound by common respect for the
rights of the individual. Tis is com pared to the mechanical solidarity
experienced in simpler pre-modern societies where a strong sense of
16
Political Sociology
community is generated out of the simi larities of members lives. Te
state fosters solidarity by creating and transforming collective repre-
sentations into binding decisions in law and policy for the good of all
(Vogt, 1993).
... his political sociology is intended to show how organic solidar-
ity might be achieved. Durkheim actually lived through times of great
confict in nine teenth century France, which he attributed to the dif-
fcult transition from an agrarian-corporatist to an industrial-capitalist
society (Muller, 1993: 95; see also Lukes, 1973). Unlike Marx or Weber,
however, Durkheim did not see confict as intrinsic to modern societ-
ies. On the contrary, where there is confict, this is attributable to lack
of proper social and normative integration. According to Durkheim, it
was necessary to reform French society, to prevent egoism triumphing
over moral individualism, by coordinating the democratic state, occu-
pational groups, and the indi vidualistic ideal. It also involved the fos-
tering of occupational associations, or guilds, to mediate between the
state and the individual, to protect the individual from the state if it
should become too strong, but above all to foster moral consciousness
for the common good. For example, Durkheim believed that individu-
als should vote as members of their professional associations rather
than according to where they happen to live, in order to encourage each
person to refect on their shared interests with others in their group
and, by extension, with others in the society. Associations are moral
communities intended to reshape self-interest for the good of all rather
than to further the aims of their members; though linked to occupation,
Durkheim seems to have imagined a guild as more like a civil rights
organization than like a trade union. Tis makes him some thing of a
pluralist, though in a rather limited sense, given his overarching con-
cern with harmony between members of society rather than confict
(see Cladis, 2005). Durkheim also seems to have something in common
with elite theorists of democracy insofar as he sees certain personages
or classes in society employed in the state as particularly well suited
to interpret societys moral consciousness on behalf of everyone else
(Parkin, 1992: 39).
Despite his proposals for democratic reform, Durkheims con cep-
tualiza tion of society actually has no place for politics at all. For Dur-
kheim, social conficts are inherently pathological, because he makes
no allow ance for valid disagreements over the interpretation of col-
lective repre sentations: not only must there be consensus on cultural
17
Western Modernity
norms for society to work harmoniously, to be morally healthy, but the
right norms for a particular form of society are identifable by the soci-
ologist. Te social confict Marx and Weber see as intrinsic to modern
societies, Durkheim sees as pathological, at best a result of difcult
transition to a properly functioning new society in which the science
of sociology, which Durkheim saw himself as discovering, has a special
legislative role. Tere is no place for politics in Durkheims sociology,
only for scientif cally informed social reform; politics is contingent and
partial, fundamen tally unnecessary to a properly functioning society,
and actually inherently immoral.
Neo-Durkheimian political sociology
Neo-Durkheimian political sociology is inspired by Durkheims work
on the importance of collective representations as both constraining
and enabling, and the way in which they are reinforced and elaborat-
ed in rituals, performances, and solidaristic passions. Tis work takes
Durkheims problematic of the moral basis of social cohesion as its ob-
ject of study, and especially the cultural conditions of democracy and
social justice.
...
In his work Te Civil Sphere, Jefrey Alexander builds on the later
work of Durkheim on religion to argue that, although contemporary
societies have been transformed by secular humanism, spiritual dimen-
sions are vital to the construction of social solidarity.
5
He argues that
there is an underlying consensus in American society that democracy
is sacred, and that it must be protected from profane counter-democrat-
ic persons, events, and activities. Te civil sphere is organized around
cultural codes that maintain this fundamental binary opposition and
which are available, and invariably drawn on, when concrete political
disputes arise. Te civil sphere exists alongside other spheres in dif-
ferentiated societies, as a solidary sphere, in which a certain kind of
universalizing community comes to be culturally defned and to some
degree institutionally enforced (Alexander, 2006: 31).
...
Te civil sphere may be expanded to include class and status groups
previously excluded from its terms where those stigmatized as counter-
democratic are able to claim, and to institutionalize, their membership
through its cultural codes. Te codes of the civil sphere may also be
used to invade the non-civil spheres of the economy, the state, the
18
Political Sociology
family, and religious interaction. Alexander gives detailed attention to
the social movements that have suc cessfully used the language of the
ideal community of the civil sphere to bring black Americans, women,
and Jews into the democratic main stream. Ultimately, this is possible
because the civil sphere is premised on moral individualism; it is the
rights of the person that are sacred in con temporary societies. Te civil
sphere therefore contains within it the pos sibility of expanding terms of
democratic and social justice.
TEXT 1. 2. 3.: Tompson, Kenneth (2012), Durkheim and Dur-
kheimian Political Sociology, in Te Willey Blackwell Compan-
ion to Political Sociology, edited by Edwin Amenta, Kate Nash
and Alan Scott, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., p. 2735.
Jefrey Alexander pinpoints the gap between Durkheims appreciation
of the importance of moral regulation for the coherence of modern so-
ciety and his rather empirically vague discussions of how modern mo-
rality is connected to institutions, social groups and movements in our
complex, fragmented and stratifed societies.
If the fullest statement of the theoretical basis of the neo-Durkheim-
ian political sociology is to be found in Alexanders massive work Te
Civil Sphere (2006), its most compelling empirical exemplifcation is to
be found in the more recent analysis of the Obama presidential cam-
paign (Alexander 2010). Whereas Habermas and others have conceptu-
alized confict in the public sphere as about truth claims and rational
justifcation, Alexander argues that while truth, honesty and fairness
do matter, it is less a matter of being these qualities than of seeming to be
them, of embodying truth, narrating honesty and projecting fairness,
and of doing it in a persuasive way. Being truthful, honest and fair are
discursive claims, and whether these claims take root and hold is held to
be a matter of performative success. Alexander shows that throughout
the 2008 presidential campaign, operatives and journalists alike spoke
of painting the other side. Te campaigners for each candidate sought
to project a picture/image of their man as the living embodiment of
the discourse of liberty, while painting the opposing candidate as em-
bodying the dark and brooding qualities that mark the discourse of
repression. Campaigning is then described as an aesthetic activity, not
a cognitive or moral one, and it depends on stagecraf rather than ethi-
cal worthiness or empirical accuracy. Political struggle achieves clarity
19
Western Modernity
and persuasive power by defning the diference between ones own and
the others side, connecting us to the sacred civil qualities that sustain
liberty, linking them to the anti-civil qualities that profane political
life, undermine liberty and open the door to corruption. Alexander
demonstrates, through specifc examples from the campaign, how each
of the candidates sought to paint the opponent in negative terms and
to cast doubt on the authenticity of the others performance, as in the
McCain efort to create a narrative that defned Obama as an arrogant
celebrity (Alexander 2010).
...[Durkheimian tradition] focuses attention on the ways in which
social-political facts are culturally constructed and given meaning
through their symbolical representations and the codes that enable us
to interpret the narratives or discourses in which they are presented.
Te particular contribution of Durkheimian cultural sociology has
been to analyze the binary nature of those cultural codes, building on
the kinds of fundamental dichotomies that Durkheim illustrated with
his contrast between the sacred versus profane. Whether the facts at
issue are about social inequalities of resources and power in relation to
class, gender and race, or about the qualities of politicians themselves,
their meaning is constructed (and can be analyzed) in terms of their
cultural coding.
TASK 1. 2.:
) what are collectlve representatlons and how are they related to the maln 0ur-
khelms ldea about soclal solldarlty!
z) 0lstlngulsh between mechanlcal and organlc soclal solldarlty or between a so-
clety and a communlty (Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft).
,) what ls the role of the modern state whlle creatlng organlc solldarlty!
|) 0ene moral lndlvlduallsm as an attrlbute of modern soclety. what ls the dler-
ence between moral lndlvlduallsm and egolsm!
,) low dld lmlle 0urkhelm comblne the pursult of general soclal solldarlty wlth
the exlstlng lnterest and class conlcts! Soclety cannot manage wlthout collec-
tlve representatlons that render a speclc solldarlty (general ldentlty), ln your
oplnlon, ls lt posslble to achleve general solldarlty ln such mlscellaneous socl-
ety as the western soclety ls!
) low were 0urkhelms ldeas applled ln order to analyse the llberal western so-
clety!
)) what are the codes of collectlve representatlons! low are the codes used by
nowadays democratlc socletles! Clve some examples from the text that you
have read and from the llthuanlan (or our own states) polltlcs.
20
Political Sociology
8) low do you understand the term clvll sphere!
) 0escrlbe the ways a subject (soclal groups) could be excluded from the clvll
sphere or lncluded ln lt. Clve some examples related to llthuanla or other
states.
o) Apply 0urkhelms proposltlons to the llthuanlan soclety. what klnd of collectlve
representatlons do you recognlze ln the llthuanlan (or your home) soclety!
1. 3. The Weberian Tradition
TEXT 1. 3.: Breiner, Peter (2012), Weber and Political Sociology,
in Te Willey Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, edited
by Edwin Amenta, Kate Nash and Alan Scott, Blackwell Publish-
ing Ltd., p. 1526.
Te autonomy of the political at the level of the state is central to We-
bers political sociology. In fact, Webers work stands at the beginning
of a tradition of thought that is explicitly anti-Marxist on just this is-
sue of the autonomy of the state and the importance of liberal demo-
cratic politics. As a liberal committed to the defence of individual free-
dom, which he saw threatened in modernity, Weber opposed his work
to Marxs economic determinism. He took the concentration of the
means of administration in the nation-state to be as important as the
concentra tion of the means of production in capitalism theorized by
Marx (Bottomore, 1993: 1011).
As we saw above, Weber defned power in such a way as to suggest
that it may be present in all social relations, so that politics need not
be seen as confned to the single arena of the state. In fact, his defni-
tion of politics is also very broad: [it] comprises any kind of indepen-
dent leader ship in action (Weber, 1948a: 77). Despite these defnitions,
however, Weber immediately narrowed the feld of his analysis to the
power and politics of the nation-state. He saw the state as the most pow-
erful institu tion in modern society since it has gained the legitimate
monopoly of force over a given territory, and, therefore, took politics to
involve striving to share power or striving to infuence the distribution
of power, either among states or among groups within a state (Weber,
1948a: 78). As David Held points out, Webers emphasis on territorial-
ity is crucial; the modern state is a nation-state in competitive relation
to other nation- states, rather than with armed segments of its own
population (Held, 1987: 150). Weberian sociology, therefore, explicitly
21
Western Modernity
shares the propen sity of sociology in general, and included Marxism in
the ways we have discussed, for taking total societies organized around
nation-states as the object of its analysis.
Weber describes the state as gaining its power in modernity by
concen trating the means of administration in the hands of an absolute
monarch, expropriating the ownership of the means of administra-
tion, in a way similar to that described by Marx in the case of workers
who are deprived of control of the means of production (Weber, 1948b:
812). Ofcials in modern, rational bureaucracies have little or no control
over what they do since the rules and procedures of bureaucracies take
on a life of their own, restricting the activities and decisions of those
who work in them to the functions of the ofces they fll. In this way,
bureaucracy forms a steel-hard housing within which most individu-
als in modern societies must live and work, since its efects are felt not
only by those who work in administration, but also by those who are
administered.
3
According to Weber, this form of life is the price that
must be paid for living in a highly complex and technically advanced
society. Bureaucratic administration is the only rational way of manag-
ing economically and politically diferenti ated societies since economic
enterprises need predictability above all; without it, they cannot calcu-
late in order to ensure proftability. Tis is why the socialist dream that
the state will wither away once the dominant class has been deprived
of its power in the ownership of the means of production is more like
a nightmare for Weber: to abolish private prop erty would increase the
power of the state since there would be no coun tervailing power of the
market, and management of the economy would come entirely under
the control of bureaucrats (Held, 1987: 1504).
Although Weber saw himself as a neutral social scientist, his politi-
cal sociology has a normative dimension. He is concerned to analyze
repre sentative democracy as it actually works in modern societies, ar-
guing that the ideal of participatory democracy cannot be practiced in
large-scale, complex societies. On the other hand, however, he is also
concerned that democracy may be the only way in which the steel-
hard housing of modern bureaucratic power can be broken. Clearly,
the elite administra tion that must run modern societies cannot be di-
rectly accountable to the masses; this would make for inefciency and
unpredictability, especially given what Weber sees as the irrational-
ity and ignorance of the general population. Democracy is important,
nevertheless, primarily because elec tions provide testing grounds for
22
Political Sociology
charismatic leaders who are then given the mandate of the people and
who can establish the goals the bureaucrats are to realize. Such leaders
ofer the only chance of overriding the bureau cratic machinery (Gid-
dens, 1972: 389). More conventionally, democracy is important because,
even if it only ofers the opportunity to dismiss the inefective from
ofce, it thereby provides a certain degree of protection for the people
(Held, 1987: 15460). In Webers view, democracy is less the rule of the
people than the rule of an elite which combines exceptional leaders
and bureaucratic experts. ... Despite his belief in democracy as a way of
mitigating the power of bureaucracy, Weber was generally pessimistic,
seeing the polar night of icy darkness in which individual freedom is
highly constrained by impersonal admin istration as a likely outcome of
the development of modern societies (Weber, 1948a: 128).
Elite theorists
Elite theorists are concerned with the question of how and why it is
that a minority must always rule over a majority, which they see as in-
evitable in any society. Political elite theorists are, above all, concerned
with the decision-makers in society, those they see as holding power
as a cohesive, relatively self-conscious group (Parry, 1969: 134). Mod-
ern elite theorists have been extremely infuential in political sociol-
ogy. Joseph Schumpeter, in particular, has been an important fgure as a
popularizer of Roberto Michelss ideas on political parties and Webers
theory of democracy. He infuenced the generation of sociologists and
political scientists involved in the professionalization of the discipline
in the 1950s, especially in the US. According to Bottomore (1993: 28), so
great was this infuence that, for some time aferwards, political scien-
tists in particular took electoral politics and voting behavior as the only
worthwhile topic of study, to the exclusion of the substance of political
conficts.
Michels took the concentration of power in the hands of an elite to
be a necessary outcome of complex organizations. He is responsible for
the emphasis in empirical political sociology on analyzing the dynam-
ics of party politics. His famous iron law of oligarchy states that, in
modern societies, parties need to be highly organized and so, inevita-
bly, become oligarchic, being hierarchically run by party leaders and
bureaucracy such that the bulk of members are excluded from decision-
making (Michels, 1962). Michels was critical of this process, although
he saw it as tragically inevitable. As a socialist, he was disappointed
23
Western Modernity
that socialist parties would be unable to realize their democratic ideals,
unlike Weber and Schumpeter for whom bureaucratic and hierarchical
parties are the only means by which political leadership in large-scale
societies can emerge (Scott, 1996a: 31718).
Developing Michelss thesis, Schumpeter saw democracy as nothing
but competition between political parties whose elite members deal in
votes, just as businessmen deal in commodities. It does not, and should
not, mean rule by the people; it is rather a method for arriving at politi-
cal decisions by means of a competitive struggle for the peoples vote.
Once elected, professional politicians must be allowed to rule, assisted
by a strong, independent bureaucracy of expert administrators, since
the stabil ity of the political system requires respect for the judgment of
elected representatives (Schumpeter, 1943).
A radical version of Weberian elite theory is the institutional elite
theory proposed by c. W. Mills. In Millss view, the elitism of the US in
the twentieth century is a serious hindrance to democracy rather than
the factor that makes it possible and viable. As he sees it, power has
become concentrated and unifed in the elites of three institutions in
the US: the military, the corporate, and the political; the connections
between them having been strengthened by the growth of a permanent
war establish ment in a privatized incorporated economy since World
War II. Tis concentration, combined with the one-way communica-
tion of the mass media as it is organized by elites, makes ordinary citi-
zens ignorant and rather complacent, although ftfully miserable, about
the extent to which they lack control over their lives (Mills, 1956).
Millss argument is similar to that of Marxist elite theorists, notably
Ralph Miliband, for whom the capitalist class assures its reproduction
by means of the close links it enjoys with the leaders of such power-
ful insti tutions as political parties, the civil service, the media, and the
military (Miliband, 1969). Tey difer, however, in that Mills refuses
to see the power elite as necessarily unifed by virtue of its economic
class position and social background, arguing that the shared interests
and perspectives of its members are the contingent product of particu-
lar historical develop ments. Marxists, of course, explain the unity of
the elite in terms of the interests of capitalism (Bottomore, 1964: 34).
However, a comparison of Milibands and Millss studies clearly reveals
the convergence of Weberians and Marxists on the issue of the relative
autonomy of the state. For Miliband, like other neo-Marxists, the state
must be able to separate itself from the immediate interests of ruling-
24
Political Sociology
class factions if it is to be efective in ensuring the interests of capital-
ism in the long run (Held, 1987: 207). For Mills, as for other Weberians,
however much it is conditioned by elite decisions taken elsewhere, the
political elite of the state has its own efectivity.
Te state-centric view of power and poli tics held by elite theorists
is linked to their understanding of mass society consisting of a passive,
ignorant, and apathetic population: technically incompetent to partici-
pate fully in politics, according to competitive elit ists; and continually
deceived as to its real interests, according to more critical versions.
Pluralism
In response to their critics, pluralists have revised what has been taken as
naive view of the openness of liberal democratic politics. Neo-pluralists
see elites, and especially corporate elites, as having a greater degree of
infuence than other groups on government policy; they take it that this
may not be openly and visibly exerted in the political process and that
it may constrain the efective infuence of other interest groups (Held,
1987: 202). In this respect, in neo-pluralism, there is a convergence be-
tween neo-Marxism, pluralism, and radical elite theory (Marsh, 1995).
However, neo-pluralists do not fully endorse the presuppositions of elite
theory; instead, they argue that the elite are not unifed, nor are they
capable of manipulating and deceiving the citizens into accepting elite
rule. On the pluralist view, elites must be seen as existing only insofar
as they are genuinely responsive to the interest groups they purport to
serve (Dowse and Hughes, 1972: 138). Neo-pluralists also depart from
the assumptions of neo-Marxists: although business may on occasion
subvert the democratic process, this is a contingent matter; politics at
the level of the state is primary and so it cannot be the case that the state
is ultimately driven by the interests of any particular group, including
the capitalist class.
... Tis limited pluralist defnition of politics is linked to a restricted
def nition of power which, although wider than that of other schools in
traditional political sociology, nevertheless makes it impossible to see
the construction and contestation of social identities as political. Fa-
mously, Dahl (1956: 13) defnes power as a realistic ... relationship, such
as As capacity for acting in such a manner as to control Bs responses.
Tis presupposes an already constituted social actor who is in posses-
sion of power such that he or she is able to control the efects produced.
As critics of pluralism have pointed out, the emphasis on observable
25
Western Modernity
efects means that they neglect ideas and the way in which the political
agenda may be shaped in such a way that direct manipulation of the
outcome of the political process is unnecessary (Lukes, 1974). Indeed,
we must under stand the very formation of the identities, capacities, and
concerns of social groups as efects of power. Te formation of identities
and the construction of political perspectives are much more funda-
mental ways in which the politics of politics is structured than by deci-
sions taken in a centralized bureaucracy.
Although pluralists do not take the interests of the social groups
they study as given, their defnitions of power and politics prevent them
from understanding the formation and contestation of political identi-
ties in the social feld and lead them to focus only on the way in which
individuals try to maximize their interests at the level of government.
In this respect, the pluralist perspective remains within the framework
of traditional political sociology. A theory of politics of this kind can-
not begin to grasp the asymmetries of power between groups in civil
society that have been politicized by the activities of new social move-
ments since the 1960s; pluralists were, in fact, extremely surprised by
this development (Held, 1987: 199200).
TASK 1. 3.:
) what are the maln factors that are lncluded ln V. webers concepts of polltlcs
and state!
z) what ls the role of bureaucracy ln the modern state and the soclety! what ls the
prlce for llvlng ln a hlghly complex soclety!
,) why does V. weber state that democracy ls less the rule of the people than the
rule of ellte whlch comblnes exceptlonal leaders and bureaucratlc experts!
|) wrlte down the maln polnts of the ellte theorles.
,) what ls the maln polnt dlstlngulshlng the concepts of neo-plurallst and neo-
Varxlst on polltlcs and democracy!
) ln your oplnlon, to what extent can the polltlcal eld (the system of polltlcal
partles) be lndependent or dependent on the economlc-class domlnatlon (ln-
uence of blg buslness) that was emphaslzed by Varxlsm! Compare wlth Chap-
ter ,. z.
)) Apply the ldeas of the weberlan tradltlon to the llthuanlan (or your home
countrys) polltlcal system. what types of leaders (tradltlonal, ratlonal, and
charlsmatlc) do you recognlze ln the llthuanlan soclety and polltlcal system!
26
2. Transformations of Modernity:
Towards Postindustrial Society and
Postmodernity?
Many famous social theorists discussed new changes from the time
when modern (industrial) society was undergoing the process of for-
mation. As you have read in the frst three sub-chapters, K. Marx, E.
Durkheim, and M. Weber observed and described the new phenomena
that were changing the human world at that time: capitalism, classes
of workers and capital owners, the formation of the political power in
the state, and new mechanisms of social solidarity in the industrial so-
ciety. All these phenomena developed during the period of their lives,
in the second half of the 19
th
c. and at the beginning of the 20
th
c.
Te processes of modernity did not stop afer the new structure
of the society was created. Terefore, it is worth looking into further
development of these processes: what were the new dynamics of pro-
cesses and what were the new consequences for the structure of the
society, politics, and the personal or collective identity? Tese ques-
tions were discussed by the new generation sociologists whose ideas
are presented in the following material and will be discussed bellow.
2. 1. Ulrich Beck: Risk Society in Second Modernity
As all other theories of modernity and post-modernity, Ulrich Becks
theory is primarily based on the comparison of the structure of the
industrial society and the new changes in Western society. According
to Beck, the modernization has reached the point when it becomes
possible to talk about the organizational principles and features of a
qualitatively new society. To describe these features he uses the con-
cepts of risk society, refective modernity, and second modernity.
Te meaning of that qualitatively new change in the development of
modern society was that the consequences of modernity became glob-
al, the institutions of the traditional modernity broke down, and the
nation states were not able to control the global challenges. Terefore,
it is true to say that the changes of modernity can be recognized in
27
Transformations of Modernity
the following three interconnected felds: a) breakup of social classes;
b) individualization and refectivity of a personal identity; c) global
dangers that exceeded the ability of a nation state to control them.
According to Beck, the class and the status can be treated as the
main social institutions of modern society. In the industrial soci-
ety the social system was clearly defned: the core of the society was
the family; families belonged either to the lower or the upper class.
Te institution of the family was related to gender roles which were
followed by the division of labour between men and women. Mans
career world was separated from womans family world. Industrial
society was based on the culture of diferences between classes and
genders. Te nation state and the political system determined the
model of the social order and turned the process of conficts to its
usual course.
Tere is no such hierarchical social order in risk society. Te sig-
nifcant changes appeared afer World War II when the standards of
living started changing. Since 1980, argues U. Beck, social inequal-
ity was disappearing from the discourse of political, academic, and
everyday life. Although social diferences remained and were stable,
the living conditions signifcantly improved and that, in his opinion,
contributed to systemic changes of the social structure. Nowadays,
the social class does not have the same stratifcation role as it had in
industrial society. With the improved economical conditions (secure
income) and the extension human rights the tendency of individual-
ization became dominant in the society. Te changes (improvement)
of living standards determined the disappearance of sub-cultural
class identities and the beginning of individualization and life styles
plurality. As a result of shifs in the standard of living, sub-cultural
class identities have dissipated, class distinctions based on status
have lost their traditional support, and process for the diversifca-
tion and individualization of lifestyles and ways of life has been set
in motion. As the result, the hierarchical model of social classes and
stratifcation has increasingly been subverted. It no longer corre-
sponds to reality. (Beck 1992: 9192) Te belonging to a class lost its
importance. People became able to secure their income and living
standards; they became more individual and able to independently
determine their identities and behaviour. Te matter of the societys
28
Political Sociology
individualization was the demand for control of ones own money,
time, living space, and body. (Beck 1992: 92) Te belonging to a class
was no more a social necessity or lifes requirement. Individualiza-
tion eliminated class diferences as a feature of the social identity.
On the other hand, individualization brought a risk and a person
became responsible for the creation of ones project of life, its failure
or success. It is similar to what was stated by Anthony Giddens, the
personal identity became individual and refexive, it means a con-
tinuous consideration of risks. Individualization therefore means
that the standard biography becomes a chosen biography, a do-it-
yourself biography (Ronald Hitzler), or, as Giddens says, a refexive
biography (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994: 15).
Also the status of the nation state has changed, now the nation
state loses control to manage all the challenges. We use the term
frst modernity to describe the modernity based on nation state
societies, where social relations, networks and communities are es-
sentially understood in a territorial sense. Te collective patterns of
life, progress and controllability, full employment and exploitation
of nature that were typical of this frst modernity have now been un-
dermined by certain interlinked processes: globalization, individu-
alization, the gender revolution, underemployment and global risks
(such as the ecological crisis, the crash of global fnancial markets
and the threat of transnational terrorist attacks). Te real theoreti-
cal and political challenge of the second modernity is the fact that
society must respond to all these challenges simultaneously (Beck
and Lau 2005: 526).
TASK 2. 1.:
) low dld the class, the famlly, gender roles, morallty, and the state structurallze
modern soclety!
z) why dld class soclety, whlch was one of the most lmportant soclal features of
modern soclety, collapse!
,) low would you descrlbe the concepts of lndlvlduallzatlon and reectlvlty of
the ldentlty!
|) what are the natlon state transformatlons that can be dlstlngulshed ln the sec-
ond and late modernlty!
,) ln your oplnlon, how does the transformatlons of modern soclety, mentloned
by u. eck, lnuence nowadays soclety and polltlcs!
29
Transformations of Modernity
2. 2. Zygmunt Bauman: Liquid Modernity
TEXT 2. 2.: Bauman, Zygmunt (2000), Liquid Modernity. John
Willey & Sons, p. 114.
Fluidity is the quality of liquids and gases. What distinguishes both
of them from solids, as the Encyclopaedia Britannica author itatively in-
forms us, is that they cannot sustain a tangential, or shearing, force
when at rest and so undergo a continuous change in shape when sub-
jected to such a stress.
... Tese are reasons to consider fuidity or liquidity as ftting met-
aphors when we wish to grasp the nature of the present, in many ways
novel, phase in the history of modernity.
... Modern times found the pre-modern solids in a fairly advanced
state of disintegration; and one of the most powerful motives behind
the urge to melt them was the wish to discover or invent solids of for a
change lasting solidity, a solidity which one could trust and rely upon
and which would make the world predictable and therefore manageable.
Melting the solids meant frst and foremost shedding the irrel-
evant obligations standing in the way of rational calculation of efects; as
Max Weber put it, liberating business enterprise from the shackles of the
family-household du ties and from the dense tissue of ethical obligations.
... Contrary to most dystopian scenarios, this efect has not been
achieved through dictatorial rule, subordination, oppression or en-
slavement; nor through the colonization of the private sphere by the
system. Quite the opposite: the present-day situation emerged out of
the radical melting of the fetters and manacles rightly or wrongly sus-
pected of limiting the individual freedom to choose and to act. Rigidity
of order is the artefact and sediment of the human agents freedom. Tat
rigidity is the overall product of releasing the brakes: of deregulation,
liberalization, fexibilization, increased fuidity, unbridling the fnan-
cial, real estate and labour markets, easing the tax burden, etc.
... If the time of systemic revolutions has passed, it is because there
are no buildings where the control desks of the system are lodged and
which could be stormed and captured by the revolutionaries; and also
because it is excruciat ingly difcult, nay impossible, to imagine what the
victors, once inside the buildings (if they found them frst), could do to
turn the tables and put paid to the misery that prompted them to rebel.
What prompts so many commentators to speak of the end of
history, of post-modernity, second modernity and surmodernity, or
30
Political Sociology
otherwise to articulate the intuition of a radical change in the arrange-
ment of human cohabitation and in social conditions under which life-
politics is nowadays conducted, is the fact that the long efort to acceler-
ate the speed of movement has presently reached its natural limit.
... Te prime technique of power is now escape, slippage, elision and
avoidance, the efective rejection of any territorial confnement with its
cum bersome corollaries of order-building, order-maintenance and the
responsibility for the consequences of it all as well as of the neces sity to
bear their costs.
Tis new technique of power has been vividly illustrated by the
strategies deployed by the attackers in the Gulf and Jugoslav wars. ...
Military force and its hit and run war-plan prefgured, embodied and
portended what was really at stake in the new type of war in the era of
liquid modernity: not the conquest of a new territory, but crushing the
walls which stopped the fow of new, fuid global powers; beating out of
the enemys head the desire to set up his own rules, and so opening up
the so-far barricaded and walled-of, inaccessible space to the opera-
tions of the other, non-military, arms of power. War today, one may say
(paraphras ing Clausewitzs famous formula), looks increasingly like a
promotion of global free trade by other means.
... For power to be free to fow, the world must be free of fences, bar-
riers, fortifed borders and checkpoints. Any dense and tight network
of social bonds, and particularly a territorially rooted tight network, is
an obstacle to be cleared out of the way. Global powers are bent on dis-
mantling such networks for the sake of their continuous and growing
fuidity, that principal source of their strength and the warrant of their
invincibility. And it is the falling apart, the friability, the brittleness,
the transcience, the until-further-noticeness of human bonds and net-
works which allow these powers to do their job in the frst place.
TASK 2. 2.
) low would you dene the sollds of modernlty that are mentloned by Z. au-
man! would the denltlon be slmllar wlth reference to Chapter z.! Clve some
examples from economlcs, polltlcs, and soclal structure (class soclety). where
does the solldlty and the determlnatlon of the modernlty lle!
z) Zygmunt auman analyses the breakdown of strong foundatlons of modernlty
and glves examples from economlcs, polltlcs, and war strategy.
use the text and nd the reasons mentloned by the author why modernlty
ls becomlng llquld. what ls the reason to destroy strong soclal bonds, espe-
clally the ones that are rooted ln the terrltory! (Please, quote):
31
Transformations of Modernity
,) low do you understand Z. aumans ldea that the tlme for revolutlon has passed
and thls sentence: there are no bulldlngs where the control desks of the system
are lodged and whlch could be stormed and captured by the revolutlonarles!
|) why has the war tactlcs changed! why ls lt not lmportant to occupy a partlcular
terrltory (one of the features of the modern soclety)!
,) ased to your current knowledge, explaln the term llquld modernlty.
2. 3. Jean Baudrillard: Power and Politics in Post-Mo-
dernity. Simulacra and Simulation
TEXT 2. 3.: Baudrillard, Jean (1994), Simulakra and Simulation.
Te University of Michigan Press, p. 117.
Te simulacrum is never what hides the truth it is truth that hides the
fact that there is none.
Te simulacrum is true.
Ecclesiastes
... Such is simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. Repre-
sentation stems from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and of
the real (even if this equivalence is utopian, it is a fundamental axiom).
Simulation, on the contrary, stems from the utopia of the principle of
equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign
as the reversion and death sentence of every reference. Whereas rep-
resentation attempts to absorb simulation by interpreting it as a false
representation, simulation envelops the whole edifce of representation
itself as a simulacrum.
... Disneyland is a perfect model of all the entangled orders of simu-
lacra. ... Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us be-
lieve that the rest is real, whereas all of Los Angeles and the America
that surrounds it are no longer real, but belong to the hyperreal order
and to the order of simulation. It is no longer a question of a false rep-
resentation of reality (ideology) but of concealing the fact that the real
is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle. ... But all the
sexual, physic, somatic recycling institutes, which proflerate in Cali-
fornia, belong to the same order. People no longer look at each other,
but there are institutes for that. Tey no longer touch each other, but
there is contactotheraphy. Tey no longer walk, but they go jogging, etc.
Everywhere one recycles lost faculties, or lost bodies, or lost sociality, or
32
Political Sociology
the lost taste for food. One reinvents penury, asceticism, vanished sav-
age naturalness: natural food, health food, yoga.
... Watergate. Te same scenario as in Disneyland (efect of the imagi-
nary concealing that reality no more exist outside than inside the limits
of the artifcial perimeter): here the scandal efect hiding that there is
no diference between the facts and their denunciation (identical meth-
ods on the part of the CIA and of the Washington Post journalists).
Same operation, tending to regenerate through scandal a moral and
political principle, through the imaginary, a sinking reality principle.
Te denunciation of scandal is always an homage to the law. And Wa-
tergate in particular succeeded in imposing the idea that Watergate was a
scandal in his sense it was a prodigious operation in intoxication. A large
dose of political morality reinjected on a world scale. One could say along
with Bourdieu: Te essence of every relation of force is to dissimulate itself
as such and to acquire all its force only because it dissimulates itself as such,
understood as follows: capital, immoral and without scruples, can only
function behind a moral superstructure, and whoever revives this public
morality (through indignation, denunciation, etc.) works spontaneously for
the order of capital. Tis is what the journalists of the Washington Post did.
But this would be nothing but the formula of ideology, and when
Bourdieu states it, he takes the relation of force for the truth of capital-
ist domination, and he himself denounces this relation of force as scan-
dal he is thus in the same deterministic and moralistic position as the
Washington Post journalists are. He does the same work of purging and
reviving moral order, an order of truth in which the veritable symbolic
violence of the social order is engendered, well beyond all the relations
of force, which are only its shifing and indiferent confguration in the
moral and political consciences of men.
All that capital asks of us is to receive it as rational or to combat it
in the name of rationality, to receive it as moral or to combat it in the
name of morality. Because these are the same, which can be thought of in
another way: formerly one worked to dissimulate scandal today one
works to conceal there is none.
Watergate is not a scandal, this is what must be said at all costs, be-
cause it is what everyone is busy concealing, this dissimulation masking
a strengthening of morality, of a moral panic as one approaches the
primitive (mise en) scene of capital: its instantaneous cruelty, its incom-
prehensible ferocity, its fundamental immortality that is what scan-
dalous, unacceptable to the system of moral and economic equivalence
33
Transformations of Modernity
that is the axiom of lefist thought, from the theories of the Enlighten-
ment up to Communism. One imputes this thinking to the contract
of capital, but it doesnt give a damn it is a monstrous unprincipled
enterprise, nothing more. It is enlightened thought that seeks to con-
trol it by imposing rules on it. And all the recrimination that replaces
revolutionary thought today comes back to incriminate capital for not
following the rules of the game. Power is unjust, its justice is a class jus-
tice, capital exploits us, etc. as if capital were linked by a contract to
the society it rules. It is the Lef that holds out the mirror of equivalence
to capital hoping that it will comply, comply with this phantasmagoria
of the social contract and fulfl its obligations to the whole of society (by
the same token, no need for revolution: it sufces that capital accom-
modate itself to the rational formula of exchange).
Capital, in fact, was never linked by a contract to the society that it
dominates. It is a sorcery of social relations, it is a challenge to society, and
it must be responded to as such. It is not a scandal to be denounced ac-
cording to moral or economic rationality, but a challenge to take up ac-
cording to symbolic law. ... Watergate was thus nothing but a lure held out
by the system to catch its adversaries a simulation of scandal for regener-
ative ends. In the flm, this is embodied by the character of Deep Troat,
who was said to be the eminence grise of the Republicans, manipulating
the lef-wing journalists in order to get rid of Nixon and why not? All
hypotheses are possible, but this one is superfuous: the Lef itself does a
perfectly good job, and spontaneously, of doing the work of the Right.
... Tat is, we are in a logic of simulation, which no longer has any-
thing to do with a logic of facts and an order of reason. Simulation is
characterized by a precession of the model, of all the models based on
the merest fact the models come frst, their circulation, orbital like that
of the bomb, constitutes the genuine magnetic feld of the event. Te
facts no longer have a specifc trajectory, they are born at the intersec-
tion of models, a single fact can be engendered by all the models at once.
Tis anticipation, this precession, this short circuit, this confusion of the
fact with its model (no more divergence of meaning, no more dialectical
polarity, no more negative electricity, implosion of antagonistic poles), is
what allows each time for all possible interpretations, even the most con-
tradictory all true, in the sense that their truth is to be exchanged, in
the image of the models from which they derive, in a generalized cycle.
... It is the secret of a discourse that is no longer simply ambiguous,
as political discourses can be, but that conveys the impossibility of a
34
Political Sociology
determined position of power, the impossibility of a determined discur-
sive position. And this logic is neither that of one party nor of another.
It traverses all discourses without them wanting it to.
TASK 2. 3.:
) Jhe author descrlbes the slmulacrum uslng 0lsneyland as an example. 0lsneyland,
as a ctlon of reallty, ls necessary ln order to show what ls not real (here 0lsney-
land Park) and what ls real (there are towns where people llve and real llfe ls hap-
penlng). what examples do you recognlze ln the soclety (the author mentloned
Callfornlas as an example) when the reallty ls lost and lts substltutlon ls created!
lets take an example. As there are no more posslbllltles to make a mass
productlon of natural food, the productlon of ecologlcal food has been started.
ln your oplnlon, ls lt the same! ls there any soclal dlerence between agrlcul-
tural products of pre-lndustrlal soclety and ecologlcal food of post-lndustrlal
soclety! ls nowadays soclety consclously trylng to create naturalness on the
remalns of lost naturalness!
what other examples could you glve! 0lscuss the consequences of the cre-
ated reallty and lost reallty to the soclety.
z) Study watergate scandal ln the uSA and answer the questlon: how does the
escalatlon of the scandal, accordlng to J. audrlllard, help to strengthen the
morallty of the polltlcal system!
,) lxplaln, why watergate ls not a scandal! And what ls the real scandal! uote
the authors text:
|) why lt happens so that the facts and reasonlng are not so lmportant ln slmu-
lacrum soclety where they are controlled by lnterpretatlons or publlc oplnlon
makers! what are your comments on thls sentence: each tlme for all posslble
lnterpretatlons, even the most contradlctory all true!
,) Comment on the followlng sentence by J. audrlllard: Capltal, ln fact, was ne-
ver llnked by a contract to the soclety that lt domlnates. lt ls a sorcery of soclal
relatlons, lt ls a challenge to soclety, and lt must be responded to as such.
) what are the consequences to the understandlng of polltlcs, power, and de-
mocracy referrlng to the analysls of slmulacrum and slmulatlon! Clve some
examples how the ldeals of llberal democracy are belng manlpulated or slmu-
lated. ls lt posslble to know the real motlves of soclal forces (groups) behlnd the
system of polltlcal representatlons of the people!
)) low ls the slmulatlon stlmulated by the tradltlonal morallty, the dlerence be-
tween good and evll or by the other codes of the llberal democracy that you
have studled ln Chapter z. . z. (the 0urkhelmlan tradltlon)! Clve some famlllar
to you polltlcal narratlves, slogans, prlnclples, lmages, and moral or polltlcal
lmperatlves from the polltlcs of llthuanla and the other countrles.
8) Jhlnk about what the source of slmulatlon ls or what are the causes for contem-
porary soclety to llve ln slmulacra!
35
3. The State
Anthony Giddens called the nation state a modern container of pow-
er (Giddens 1987: 13). Tis is a very accurate name because the na-
tion state was able to mobilize economic, administrative, militaristic,
technological, and human resources and to bound them in a solid,
functional, and hierarchic mechanism in such way that the highest
political power is still in the hands of nation states despite all the
challenges to the territorial state.
In the middle of the 17
th
c., a new political system a system of
territorial states appeared in Europe. It little by little replaced the
political, social, and world-view structure of the Christian empire.
Te 1648 Peace of Westphalia is considered to be the date when a
new order appeared because this European peace was confrmed by
sovereign territorial states. Some authors use the term Westphalian
state which defnes the establishment of this new form of power
with its characteristics.
Te modern territorial state created a system of economics, pub-
lic administration, militarism, collective identity, education etc. and
continuously competed with other territorial states that were centra-
lised in the same way. Te Western system of territorial states over-
came the remaining feudal states and established the domination of
Western modernity in the world.
All the most important social processes and achievements de-
mocracy, constitutional principles, civil society, human rights, po-
litical representation of peoples interests, social welfare are an in-
separable part of the nation states history. Also, the main concepts
of the society, political system, and democracy, relationship between
the political authority and society, and moral order are taken from
the nation state history and its developments. While studying the
modern history of Europe, you are actually studying the history of
nation states.
Tis chapter describes three stages of the modern state devel-
opment or three characteristics of the modern state. Te frst part
(3.1) is about the formation and building of the state when states are
forced to militarize and centralize because of the continuous wars.
36
Political Sociology
In the process of extraction of resources and consolidation the state
discovered its citizens.
Gradually, in the 20
th
c., democracy became prevalent in the West
and the mechanisms of political legitimacy and the relationship be-
tween the citizens and the government was established; therefore it is
worth to review the types of democracy and to point out the features
of democratic legitimacy (Chapter 3. 2.). Accompanied by the trans-
formations of modernity, as it was described in previous chapters,
the territorial states stepped into the epoch of global economy and
global threats; therefore, they were forced to cooperate for establish-
ing supranational institutions. Tus, Chapter 3. 3. analyses the most
advanced model of regional cooperation the European Union and
raises a question: what part of sovereignty do the territorial states
maintain or lose in the European Unions political system?
3. 1. Rise and Development
Te most famous researchers of the modern state agree that the main
factor in the development of the state was militarism.
According to the classical Max Webers defnition, an exclusive
feature of the state is a legitimate monopoly on violence in the de-
termined territory. Te state is a political organisation where the
administration successfully retains its claim to the monopoly on vio-
lence and legitimate use of force having an aim to achieve order in
the determined territory (M. Weber
1
). Webers defnition of the state
contains three elements: (i) the existence of a regularized adminis-
trative staf able (ii) to sustain the claim to the legitimate monopoly
of control of the means of violence and (iii) to uphold that monopoly
within a given territorial area (Giddens 1987: 18).
Te researchers who lived afer M. Weber emphasized the same
feature of violence in the development of the modern state.
Anthony Giddens practically repeats the Weberian concept of the
state when he says that I shall therefore defne the nation-state as fol-
lows. Te nation-state, which exists in a complex of the other nation-
states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an
1. Quotation from Smith 1998: 70.
37
The State
administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundar-
ies, its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means
of internal and external violence (Giddens 1981: 190).
Charles Tilly (1975: 42) states that, according to the principle of
mutuality, the war make states, the states make war. Te capitalist
economy was the fnancial source of the war between states.
According to Michael Manns theory (1986, 1995), the main factors
of the modern state formation were wars between states, and capital-
istic economy. However, the states involvement in war that burdened
the society with taxes was even more important than the capitalist
production and the internal social policy. M. Mann had made a de-
tailed analysis of the balance-sheets of the UKs Royal Treasury and
stated that according to the states fnance analysis, the state functions
were more militaristic and geopolitical than economical and oriented
towards internal policy. For more than seven hundred years, approxi-
mately 7090 percent of states fnancial resources were continuously
spent in order to purchase and use the military power (Mann 1986:
511). As of the end of the 17
th
c., the commercial capitalism and mili-
tarism had been the main forces that determined the formation of
states. Te commercial capitalism prevailed in England and the Neth-
erlands, the militaristic model dominated in Prussia and Austria, and
the mixed one was in France. Until 1792, a few European states had
sufered the fscal crises caused by the militarism. Te culmination
of the militarism was reached in the period of Napoleon wars; states
more than ever, except the Soviet Union and fascist Germany and
Italy, used to spend up to 35 percent of their GDP for war, i. e., more
than during any period of the modern epoch (Mann 1995: 4549).
Militarism was followed by two serious consequences for the de-
velopment of the state: centralization and democratization (discov-
ery of citizens).
Centralization is well described by David Held: Te ability to
wage war was dependent on a successful process of extraction; that
is, on a states capacity to extract resources whether these be men,
weapons, foodstufs, taxes or income substitutes in support of its
endeavours. Few subjects, however, were willing to sacrifce their re-
sources or lives without a struggle for some kind of return or recog-
nition, and conficts and rebellions against economic and political
38
Political Sociology
demands were rife. In response, state rulers built state structures
administrative, bureaucratic and coercive in order to aid the co-
ordination and control of their subject populations. In short, direct
connections can be traced between a growth in the requirement for
the means of waging war, an expansion in processes of extraction,
and a concomitant formation of state executive and administrative
ofces to organize and control these changes. Te development of
some of the key organizations of the modern state emerged at the
intersection of warfare and the attempt to pay for it. War and its
fnancial burdens promoted territorial consolidation, centralization,
diferentiation of the instruments of government and monopoliza-
tion of the means of coercion ... (Tilly, 1975, p. 42) (Held 1999: 95).
Other researches indicate the direct relationship between the
states administrative power to pursue the militaristic policy and de-
mocratization (formation of the political society). War loans, charges,
and states concern how to get the maximum proft from its economy
were the factors that helped to discover nation and people. Mili-
tarism helped to politicize society. For instance, M. Mann made a
conclusion that the fscal and militaristic pressure contributed to na-
tionalism much more than capitalism because it afected all states,
not only the ones that were more economically advanced. All social
groups went into the action against the state in more or less mobi-
lized way and protested. Conscious nations emerged from the strug-
gle for a government that would represent them in the future and the
struggle emerged under the pressure of state militarism (Mann 1995:
48). Capitalism provided the state with higher infuence on social co-
ordination: post, roads, channels, railroads, telegraph, and the most
important, schools. States became more and more homogeneous and
national; the political representation of people had increased.
David Held also states that Te more costly and demanding war
became, the more rulers had to bargain for and win the support of
their subjects. And the more people were drawn into preparations
for war and war-making, the more they became aware of their mem-
bership in a political community and of the rights and obligations
such membership might confer. But the expansion of citizenship,
or membership of an overall political community, was undoubtedly
bound up with the military and administrative requirements of the
39
The State
modern state and the politicization of social relations and day-to-
day activities which followed in its wake (cf. Giddens, 1985, ch. 8)
(Held 1999: 97).
Together with militarism, the main role in the development of the
modern state was played by capitalism. Te development of economy
based on the development of capitalism or free market provided the
Westphalian states with the resources for war. More information about
the relationship between capitalism and nowadays (democratic) state
is in Chapter 5. 2. From the point of states development, despite the
function of fnancial resources, another aspect of capitalist economy
should be emphasized. Capitalist trade that appeared and grew in the
16
th
c. (some historians point to the Late Middle Ages) supported an
autonomous and in its nature independent of the state sphere of public
life. Te class of capitalists (tradesmen) that replaced the shrinking
feudal class was one of the most important or even the most impor-
tant subject that claimed for political rights. Te struggle for laissez
faire in principal laid to a struggle for political representation. As you
will learn in Chapter 5.2, the nature of capitalist economy is not re-
lated to the nature of the state and even can be dangerous for democ-
racy; however, during the discussed period, the evolution of states and
capitalism supported one another, thus it had direct infuence on the
formation of the representative democracy and civil society.
Obligatory reading:
Held, David (1999), Te Development of the Modern State, in
Hall, Stuart; Gieben Bram (eds.), Formations of Modernity. Ox-
ford: Polity Press, p. 71104.
TASK 3. 1.
) Please analyse ln detall Vax webers denltlon of state and lndlcate what thls
denltlon says about a modern state!
z) low do you understand the concept legltlmate monopoly to use power!
Vore on legltlmacy please also refer to Chapter ,. z.
,) ln your oplnlon, why Vax weber dened the system of bureaucracy as an lron
cage! what was the slgnlcance of bureaucracy ln terms of state centrallzatlon
and persons freedom!
|) low do you understand the statement by Charles Jllly that war makes states
and states make war!
40
Political Sociology
,) low dld mllltarlsm contrlbute to state centrallzatlon!
) low dld mllltarlsm contrlbute to the dlscovery of cltlzens!
)) Please lndlcate the lmpact of capltallsm on the development of a modern state.
8) After readlng the publlcatlon by 0avld leld, please lndlcate why the type of
a terrltorlal natlonal state that developed ln the west establlshed throughout
the world!
Additional readings:
Poggi, Gianfranco (2012), Teories of State Formation, in Te
Willey Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, edited by Ed-
win Amenta, Kate Nash and Alan Scott, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
p. 95119.
3. 2. Political Legitimacy
As you have already learnt, Max Weber emphasized the autonomy of
the political authority in the development of the modern state. Tis
lead to a creation of the administrative apparatus (bureaucracy), that
controlled the territory and the society, also helped to centralise the
state and to secure the monopoly on violence. It was political author-
itys administrative and physical power resources. Still, what makes
the political authority legitimate? How and why is the centralised
state approved by the society? It guides you from the states develop-
ment issue to the issue about the legitimacy of the political authority.
Te ruling power of the centralised state in order to exercise its
power has to maintain the societys approval for its existence, i. e., to
secure the political legitimacy. It is worth mentioning that the spe-
cifc political authority may be changed or overthrown, however, the
states working principle, that is the legitimate monopoly on violence,
will remain unchanged. Tis principle will be used by the next politi-
cal forces that would have political power of the state.
Political legitimacy is the legitimacy of the political authority in
the eyes of the society. In order to secure the legitimacy, the author-
ity uses diferent rituals, signs, symbols, ideas, forms of violence that
would be recognized and approved by the society. Political author-
ity itself indicates the relationship between the power and the con-
trolled; therefore, there were no states and political authorities in the
history of the world that would have succeeded without the rules
41
The State
that validated and legitimated their power in the eyes of the con-
trolled. Political legitimacy is a continuous problem for the existence
of every political authority. Even the biggest tyranny and despotism,
for instance, Stalins Russia, had to make ideological myths in order
to justify its existence and to hide the crimes. (In case of Russia, a
pseudo-Marxist myth about the rule of Soviet people through the
Communist Party was created; under the shade of this myth entire
nations, including Lithuanian people, had sufered destruction). In
this chapter you will learn about the types of the political legitimacy
and the features of the legitimacy of the liberal democracy.
Te following is the extract from the article written by the famous
researcher of the political legitimacy, David Beetham. While read-
ing pay attention to the following topics: the features of legitimacy;
the typology of the political systems and regimes of the 20
th
c.; the
key features of the liberal-democratic legitimacy; the reasons for the
establishment of the liberal-democratic legitimacy; the problems of
the liberal-democratic legitimacy; the sovereignty of the nation state
and the standards of the international legitimacy.
TEXT 3. 2.: Beetham, David (2012), Political Legitimacy, in Te
Willey Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, edited by Ed-
win Amenta, Kate Nash and Alan Scott, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
p. 120129.
If there is a breach of the rules, we use the term illegitimacy; if the
rules are only weakly supported by societal beliefs, or are deeply con-
tested, we can talk of a legitimacy defcit; if consent or recognition is
publicly withdrawn or withheld, we speak of delegitimation.
Te most extreme example of illegitimacy is usurpation or coup
detat power attained in violation of the rules. Examples of legitimacy
defcit are enormously varied: from situations where changing societal
beliefs leave existing institutional arrange ments unsupported, or those
where people have widely diverging beliefs, say, about which state they
should belong to; to situations where government is chronically unable
to meet the basic purposes, such as welfare or security, which people
believe it should. Legitimacy defcits usually only become critical when
some performance failure of government exposes a fundamental doubt
about its rightful source of authority (see Coicaud 2002 and Gilley
42
Political Sociology
2009). Examples of delegitimation include acts of widespread public op-
position to a regime, of which revolutionary mobilization is the most
extreme example. Revolutions follow a typical course, from chronic
legitimacy defcit of the regime (doubtful or disputed source of author-
ity compounded by performance failure), through its delegitimation by
mass oppositional mobilization which splits the governing apparatus,
to an illegitimate seizure of power which heralds its reconstruction un-
der a new set of legitimating principles.
Tis overall framework can be used to construct a typology of
twentieth-century political systems or regime types.
keg|me
type
Porm of
|aw
Source of
author|ty
Lnds of
government
Mode of
consent
Jradltlonal Custom/
precedent
leredltary/the past well-belng wlthln
tradltlonal order
Assembly of
soclal ellte
lasclst Soverelgn wlll leadershlp prlnclple Natlonal purlty/
expanslon
Vass
moblllzatlon
Communlst Soverelgn wlll Varxlst-lenlnlst Jruth ulldlng
communlst future
Vass
moblllzatlon
Jheocratlc Sacred texts 0lvlne wlll lnterpreted
by the hlerarchy
Purlfylng moral
order
varlous
llberal
0emocratlc
Constltutlonal
rule of law
Jhe people through
competltlve electlon
lndlvldual rlghts
and protectlon
Competltlve
electlon
Vllltary
0lctatorshlp
0ecree None Restore order and
natlonal unlty
None
First, in liberal democracy the source of political authority lies with
the people, and the right to rule derives from electoral choice, rather
than from heredity and the past (traditional system), from the partys
monopoly of the truth (Marxist-Leninism), from religious authoriza-
tion (theocracy) or from the exceptional qualities of the leader (fascism).
the second key feature of liberal-democratic legitimacy, which is the
distinctive method through which consent is expressed to political au-
thority. It is ofen argued that consent as such is distinctive of liberal
democracy, but this is mistaken. All political authorities throughout
history have sought to bind in key subordinates through actions which
express consent to, and confer public recognition on, their authority,
and in so doing contribute to its legitimacy. Where systems difer is
in who among their subordinates is qualifed to give consent or confer
recognition, and through what kinds of action. In a traditional system it
is key notables who do so through swearing an oath of allegiance, kiss-
43
The State
ing hands, or some other public symbolic act. In post-traditional sys-
tems those who are qualifed include the population at large. In fascist
and communist regimes, however, consent is expressed through acts of
mass acclamation and mass mobilization in the regimes cause, which
have their counter part in the secret suppression of all dissent. What is
distinctive about liberal democracy is that the process through which
consent is conferred popular election is the same as that through
which political authority is appointed in the frst place, whereas in all
other systems the expression of consent follows the process of appoint-
ment to ofce, which is determined by other means (heredity, priestly
selection, inner-party choice, self-appointment etc.). So it would be
more accurate to say that it is the popular authorization of government,
rather than popular consent to it, that is the distinctive feature of liber-
al-democratic legitimation.
Why is it that the liberal-democratic mode of legitimacy, and form
of political system, has become globally prevalent by the start of the
twenty-frst century?
Liberal democracy has become prevalent, in contrast, because it has
proved the only sustainable legitimate order compatible with the condi-
tions of market capitalism, on the one side, especially in its most ad-
vanced form, and with the requirements of multicultural societies on
the other. Market capitalisms anti-paternalist principles individuals
are the best judge of their own interests, are responsible for their own
fate and are sovereign in the consumer market have over time led to the
demand for people to be sovereign in the political sphere also, and have
undermined all paternalist forms of legitimacy, especially as education
has become widespread. At the same time, the increasingly global di-
mensions of communication have made closed political systems, claim-
ing a monopoly of information and ideology, unsustainable. Finally, the
potential antagonisms between diferent communities cohabiting the
same state, which are normal for most contemporary states, can only
be peacefully resolved through the methods of dialogue and respect for
equal rights, such as are intrinsic to liberal-democratic procedures.
Te long-term superiority and survivability of liberal democracys
legitimating principles and procedures do not mean that they are
themselves unproblematic. Indeed, they contain their own inherent
crisis tendencies. One stems from the inescapable tension between the
economic and social inequalities that are as intrinsic to capitalism as
to pre-capitalist economic systems, and the equality of citizenship and
44
Political Sociology
political voice that democracy promises. Tis tension requires carefully
crafed institutional compro mises within the party and political system
if it is not to prove unmanageable... Te second recurrent problem lies
in the majoritarian procedure of democracy, which encourages politi-
cal mobilization along ethnic lines in divided societies, and threatens
the permanent exclusion of minorities from power and infuence, with
the prospect of consequent degeneration into civil war. Again, this re-
quires carefully crafed institutional procedures, such as a form of con-
sociational democracy, to resolve (Lijphart 1977).
Increasingly, however, states are now being required to meet ex-
ternally monitored legitimacy requirements if they are to achieve full
international recognition. At frst this has been a human rights require-
ment, according to the standards of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, as it has increasingly become accepted that
how a state treats its own citizens is no longer just an internal matter for
the state concerned (Rosas 1995). Since 1989, however, the requirement
that a state also meet liberal-democratic principles and procedures in
its mode of political organization has started to become generalized as
an internationally accepted norm.
Te liberal-democratic principle of legitimacy has become most
fully developed as an international norm within the European po-
litical space... Tese norms have also been used to legitimate external
military intervention in a sovereign European state the NATO war
against Yugoslavia over its treatment of the Albanian population in
Kosovo. Tis war serves to mark the decisive shif in international
norms away from the principle of unconstrained sovereignty on the
part of states over their own internal afairs, regardless of how they
treat their populations.
... the EU is simply the most developed example of what can be seen
as a more general feature of political legitimacy in the contemporary
world: it is no longer determined simply at the domestic level of the
individual state, as it has been for the past few centuries, but is increas-
ingly dependent also on the states conformity to norms defned at the
international level.
TASK 3. 2.:
) Please, descrlbe lllegltlmacy, legltlmacy declt, and dellgltlmatlon.
z) 0escrlbe the types of polltlcal reglmes accordlng to thelr dlstlnctlve features
that help to secure polltlcal legltlmacy.
45
The State
,) what are the key features of llberal-democratlc legltlmacy and why the llberal-
democratlc mode of legltlmacy, and form of polltlcal system, has become glob-
ally prevalent by the start of the twenty-rst century!
|) ln what ways do the lnternatlonal norms lnuence the polltlcal legltlmacy ln
nowadays world!
,) 0escrlbe the term polltlcal legltlmacy ln your own words.
3. 3. The Nation State and its Sovereignty in the
European Union
As you have read in Chapter 2. 2., in the middle of the 20
th
c., the
traditional political and social elements of modernity started break-
ing down. One of the most important bastions of modernity the
nation state also experienced threats from both: outside and inter-
nal processes. One of the internal threats could be individualization
that was emphasizes by U. Beck. Because of individualization, na-
tion states are not able to control collective identities as previously:
refexive, situational, mobile, ironic, and critical identities hold their
position and resist against political mythology that is supported by
the state and is used to secure its legitimacy. Territorial states do not
control the outside threats as well. Te outside threats such as the
crisis of international fnance system, environmental threats, terror-
ism, the nuclear threat, illegal migration of people etc. became global.
Tis endangers the sovereignty of the state because a state is not able
to protect itself and control those threats on its own. Some problems
are solved in bilateral or multilateral agreements or in collaboration
at regional and international levels.
Another very important challenge to the modern state is the pos-
sibility for a political system to function at the supranational level.
If there is a possibility to have a functional supranational political
system (i. e., that the political and social needs of the people are met
at the supranational level), it means the decrease of the importance
of the territorial nation state. Tere are optimists that praise the glo-
balization of democracy and the supranational protection of human
rights, and there are sceptics who do not see any reasons to write-of
the role of the nation state yet.
Te majority of analysts call the European Union a new form of
political governance. It is not yet another regime of international
46
Political Sociology
cooperation because, in the case of the EU, a state does not have
a control over the supranational institutions that have an inde-
pendent political freedom to act and even hold, in separate cases,
the supremacy of making decisions. Te European integration has
started in the 1950s as a project of international collaboration (es-
tablishment of an internal market); however, it gradually developed
into a relatively independent system of supranational institutions
that has the features typical to a political system: constitutional or-
ganization with the principle of the EU law supremacy, legislation
procedures, the rights for political initiatives, and a judicial insti-
tution (the European Court of Justice). In other words, a process
that is typical for the nation states political system takes place at
the supranational level: there are legislative, executive, and judicial
institutions. Various political centres and institutions are estab-
lished in order to directly meet the needs of citizens and bypass the
framework of the nation state. However, the system has its own par-
ticularities related to the organisation of institutions that cause the
defcit of democracy or the inefectiveness of the principle of politi-
cal representation: the European Parliament is not a real parliament
(the members of the European Parliament belong to national par-
ties, therefore no European parties exist); the non-elected Council
of the Europe Union is the main legislative institution; there is no
nation of the Europeans etc.
However, the fact that the member states have limited their sov-
ereignty in certain political areas on behalf of supranational insti-
tutions with the tendency to expand the transferred competence in
new areas is a proof that the political system can function at supra-
national level although it has some democratic defects.
Te following are the ideas of famous researchers from Euro-
pean studies, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks. Tey state that the
EU member states do not have the control over the whole political
process anymore; they became one of a few political actors in the
multi-level political system. While reading, pay attention to the role
of the nation state: how a nation states sovereignty is limited in the
multi-level European Union.
47
The State
TEXT 3. 3.: Hooghe, Liesbet; Marks, Gary (2001), Multi-Level Gov-
ernance and European Integration, Rowman & Littlefeld Publish-
ers, Inc., p. 229.
Te core ideas of the state-centric model are put forward by several au-
thors, most of whom call themselves intergovernmentalists (Hofmann
1966, 1982; Taylor 1991, 1997; Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1998; Garrett 1992, 1995;
Milward 1992; for an intellectual history, see Caporaso and Keeler 1995;
Caporaso 1998). Tis model poses states (or, more precisely, national gov-
ernments) as ultimate de cision makers, devolving limited authority to su-
pranational institutions to achieve specifc policy goals. Decision making
in the EU is determined by bargaining among national governments. To
the extent that supranational institutions arise, they serve the ultimate
goals of national governments. Te state-centric model does not maintain
that policy making is determined by national governments in every detail,
only that the overall direction of policy making is consistent with state
control. States may be well served by creating a judiciary, for example,
that allows them to enforce collective agreements, or a bureaucracy that
implements those agreements, but such institutions are not autonomous
supranational agents. Rather, they have limited powers to achieve state-
oriented collective goods (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Hofmann 1991).
EU decisions, according to the state-centric model, refect the lowest
common denominator among national government positions. Although
national govern ments decide jointly, they are not compelled to swallow
policies they fnd unac ceptable because decision making on important
issues operates on the basis of unanimity. Tis allows states to maintain
individual as well as collective control over outcomes. While some gov-
ernments are not able to integrate as much as they would wish, none is
forced into deeper collaboration than it really wants.
State decision making in this model does not exist in a political
vacuum. In this respect, the state-centric model takes issue with realist
conceptions of interna tional relations, which focus on relations among
unitary state actors. National governments are located in the domestic
political arena, and their negotiating po sitions are infuenced by do-
mestic political interests. But and this is an impor tant assumption
those arenas are discrete. Te core claim of the state-centric model
is that policy making in the EU is determined primarily by national
governments con strained by political interests nested within autono-
mous national arenas.
48
Political Sociology
One can envision several alternative models to this one. Te one
we present here, which we describe as multi-level governance, is drawn
from several sources (Scharpf 1988, 1994, 1999; Marks 1992, 1993; Schmit-
ter 1992, 1996a; Tarrow 2000; Sbragia 1992, 1993a; Hooghe 1995b, 1996c;
Jachtenfuchs and Kohllr-Koch 1995; Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Pierson
1996; Risse-Kappen 1996b; Borzel 1998; Tarrow 2000; see also Caporaso
and Keeler 1995, or Caporaso 1996a for an overview). Once again, our
aim is not to reiterate any one scholars perspective, but to elaborate es-
sential elements of a model drawn from several strands of writ ing, which
makes the case that European integration has weakened the state.
Te multi-level governance model does not reject the view that na-
tional gov ernments and national arenas are important, or that these
remain the most impor tant pieces of the European puzzle. However,
when one asserts that the state no longer monopolizes European-level
policy making or the aggregation of domes tic interests, a very diferent
polity comes into focus. First, according to the multi level governance
model, decision-making competencies are shared by actors at diferent
levels rather than monopolized by national governments. Tat is to say,
supranational institutions above all, the European Parliament, the
European Commission, and the European Court have independent
infuence in policy making that cannot be derived from their role as
agents of national executives. National governments play an important
role but, according to the multi-level governance model, one must ana-
lyze the independent role of European-level ac tors to explain European
policy making.
Second, collective decision making among states involves a sig-
nifcant loss of control for individual national governments. Lowest
common denominator out comes are available only on a subset of EU
decisions, mainly those concerning the scope of integration. Decisions
concerning rules to be enforced across the EU (e.g., harmonizing reg-
ulation of product standards, labor conditions, etc.) have a zero-sum
character and necessarily involve gains or losses for individual states.
Tird, political arenas are interconnected rather than nested. While
national are nas remain important arenas for the formation of national
government preferences, the multi-level governance model rejects the
view that subnational actors are nested exclusively within them. In-
stead, subnational actors operate in both na tional and supranational
arenas, creating transnational associations in the process. National
governments do not monopolize links between domestic and European
49
The State
actors. In this perspective, complex interrelationships in domestic poli-
tics do not stop at the national state but extend to the European level.
Te separation between domestic and international politics, which lies
at the heart of the state-centric model, is rejected by the multi-level
governance model. National governments are an integral and powerful
part of the EU, but they no longer provide the sole inter face between
supranational and subnational arenas, and they share, rather than mo-
nopolize, control over many activities that take place in their respective
territories.
Multi-level governance does not confront the sovereignty of states
directly. Instead of being explicitly challenged, states in the Europe-
an Union are being melded into a multi-level polity by their leaders
and the actions of numerous sub- national and supranational actors.
State-centric theorists are right when they argue that national states
are extremely powerful institutions that are capable of crush ing direct
threats to their existence. Te institutional form of the state emerged
be cause it proved a particularly efective means of systematically wield-
ing violence, and it is difcult to imagine any generalized challenge
along these lines. But this is not the only, or even the most important,
issue facing the state. One does not have to argue that states are on the
verge of political extinction to believe that their control of those living
in their territories has signifcantly weakened.
It is not necessary to look far beyond the state itself to fnd reasons
that might explain such an outcome. When we disaggregate the state
into the people and or ganizations that shape its diverse institutions, it
is clear that key decision makers, above all those directing the national
government, may have goals that do not co incide with projecting na-
tional sovereignty into the future. Te state is a means to a variety of
ends, which are structured by party competition and interest group
politics in a liberal democratic setting.
Even if national governments want to maintain national sovereignty,
they are ofen not able to do so. A government can be outvoted because
most decisions in the Council are now taken by qualifed majority.
Moreover, the national veto, the ultimate instrument of sovereignty, is
constrained by the willingness of other na tional governments to toler-
ate its use. But the limits on sovereignty run deeper. Even collectively,
national governments do not determine the European agenda because
they are unable to control the supranational institutions they have cre-
ated. Te growing diversity of issues on the Councils agenda, the sheer
50
Political Sociology
number of national principals, the mistrust that exists among them,
and the increased specialization of policy making have made the Coun-
cil of Ministers reliant upon the Commission to set the agenda, forge
compromises, and supervise compliance.
Te most obvious blow to Council predominance has been dealt by
the European Parliament, which has gained signifcant legislative pow-
er since the Single European Act. Indeed, the Parliament has become
a principal in its own right. Te Council, Commission, and Parliament
interact within a legal order, which has been transformed into a su-
pranational one through the innovative jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice.
Since the 1980s, these changes in EU decision making have crystal-
lized into a multi-level polity. With its dispersed competencies, con-
tending but interlocked institutions, and shifing agendas, multi-level
governance opens multiple points of access for interests. In this process
of mobilization and counter-mobilization, national governments no
longer serve as the exclusive nexus between domestic politics and inter-
national relations. Direct connections are being forged among political
actors in diverse political arenas.
Multi-level governance may not be a stable equilibrium. Tere is
no explicit constitutional framework. Tere is little consensus on the
goals of integration. As a result, the allocation of competencies between
national and supranational actors is contested. It is worth noting that
the European polity has made two U-turns in its short history. Overt
supranationalist features of the original structure were overshadowed
by the imposition of intergovernmental institutions in the 1960s and
1970s (Weiler 1991). From the 1980s, a system of multi-level governance
arose, in which national governmental control became diluted by the
activities of supranational and subnational actors. Te surreptitious de-
velopment of a multi level polity has engendered strong reactions. Te
EU-wide debates unleashed by the Maastricht Accord have forced the
issue of national sovereignty onto the pub lic agenda. Where governing
parties themselves have shied away from the issue, opposition parties,
particularly those of the extreme right, have raised it. States and state
sovereignty have become objects of popular contention the outcome
of which is as yet uncertain.
The State
TASK 3. 3.:
) 0ene the dlerence between the systems of lnternatlonal and supranatlonal
polltlcal systems of cooperatlon.
z) low ls the luropean lntegratlon controlled by natlon states accordlng to the
state-centrlc model!
,) Clve the reasons as to why the authors belleve that the luropean lntegratlon
has weakened the state and the natlon state does not control the polltlcal pro-
cess ln the luropean unlon nelther lndlvldually nor collectlvely.
|) what are the features of the lu as a multl-level pollty!
,) 0lvlde ln two groups and propose arguments for state-centrlc pollty and
multl-level pollty.
) ln your oplnlon, how lmportant ls legltlmacy to the supranatlonal polltlcal
system!
52
4. The Society
In this chapter we suggest analysing and understanding modern
society through three fundamental factors: class, social movements,
and civil society.
Te class confict that was emphasized by Marxism determined
the framework for the analysis of modern society and still used in
the social sciences. As you have already read in Chapters 1. 1. and 2. 1.
the societys division into classes was the main feature of organising
industrial society, politics and power. Its erosion helped to reconsider
the change to post-industrial society that we are living now.
Social movements refected class conficts, their nature changed
together with the formation of post-industrial society. Instead of the
previous fght for economic demands and institutional recognition it
now appeared as a fght for values and recognition of identities.
Civil society, in turn, indicates the aspect of modern society which
is the obtained autonomous and independent space from the state
where common principles of the society are debated and determined.
Civil (or public) sphere is inseparable part of democratic states life
where diferent groups of the society fght for collective representa-
tions, recognition, state resources, in sum, for the establishment of
the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.
During the analysis of the chapter try to understand the key path-
ways and its importance to the formation of modern society.
4. 1. The Class in Industrial Society
Te concept of class is fundamental in order to understand the pro-
cesses of the Western society that took place in the 19
th
c. and at
the beginning of the 20
th
c. Although class is a social concept that
indicates a group of people, the formation of the class society was
determined by industrialization, i. e., the development of capitalist
production. Class society is the society that was primarily formed
by capitalist forces. Although the term of class was already used in
the 18
th
c., the concepts of class and class society, as analytical con-
cepts, were introduced in the works of Karl Marx. By using class
53
The Society
category he explained the changes in the society, politics, and the
state. As you have read in Chapter 1. 1., the Marxist tradition states
a continuous confict between capital and labour, bourgeoisie and
workers. Te economic tension causes the further social, political
and cultural tensions in the society. Te workers movement for their
rights was one of the main social powers in the democratization of
the Western society. Te involvement of the workers class in the sys-
tem of political representation is treated as the feature of maturity of
both: capitalism and industrial society. Te further developments of
ambivalent relationships between capital and labour infuenced the
breakdown of class society and the rise of post-industrial society.
Tus, industrialization had a signifcant importance in the re-
grouping of the society. People moved to towns and in two-three
generations the number of people in towns grew by more than a
dozen times. Te table bellow indicates the urbanization rates in the
UK society.
Urbanization in England: populations of towns (in thousands)
2
:
1own 8o 8z 8 8 88 po pz p
lrmlngham ) oz zoz ,, ,| )o ,oo,
Cardl z | o ,, 8, | zoo zz|
Clasgow )) |) z8) ||, ), o| ,o,| ,o88
llverpool 8z ,8 z |)z z) 8, 8o, 8,
Vanchester ), ,, z,z , ,oz |, ),o )
Creater london ,) ,oo z,z, ,,zz) |,))o ,,8 ),|88 8,z
Te development of industries attracted a lot of labour force from
rural areas, therefore, towns as industrial centres expanded enor-
mously. Urbanization was a rapid increase in the number of people
in towns and it caused new social consequences. A new kind of social
relationship developed in towns, its basis was new classes of workers
and capitalists that were undergoing the process of formation. Te
golden literature of that age such as Charles Dickens Oliver Twist
or Mark Twains Adventures of Huckleberry Finn refects a new so-
cial relationship that proved the existence of inhuman living condi-
2. Cited form Hall and Gieben 1999: 192.
54
Political Sociology
tions and attempts to break the moral frames that were determined
by new social conditions.
In this chapter it is very important to understand that class is
not only a simple categorization of the society, class also determines
moral, cultural, life-style diferences, and the way diferent groups of
people live and behave. In other words, although the class division
has the economical roots, it is a social phenomenon. It means the
division of the society into the groups of capital owners (upper class)
and workers (lower class) that acquire a corresponding social sta-
tus. A social status is defned according to the diferences in income,
prestige, attitude, appearance, behaviour, morality, cultural taste,
manners, and world-view, thus encompassing the main parameters
of public life. For example, the relationship between genders is not
limited to biological diferences, it also has social and political sig-
nifcance, i. e., determines the role of a man and a woman in the so-
ciety and also establishes power relationship (it allows and prohibits
on behalf of the state, law, morality, and natural order).
Te fragmentation of class society, its causes and consequences, was
illuminated by Max Weber, whose ideas you will fnd in the text bellow.
Te following is the extract from the book that describes the class
society caused by industrialization. Read and perform the tasks.
Text 4. 1.: Bradley, Harriet (1999), Changing Social Structures:
Class and Gender, in Hall, Stuart; Gieben Bram (eds.), Forma-
tions of Modernity. Oxford: Polity Press, p. 177211.
Marx has provided us with the most infuential account of how all these
changes afected the class structure. For him, industrialization consoli-
dated the existence of the two new classes which had been developing
from, or to use his own words, maturing in the womb of, the old feudal
society. For Marx, the most important feature of the industrial society
he was analysing was that it was capitalist; that is, it was based on the
private ownership of the means of production (machines, factories, raw
materials) by non-labouring entrepreneurs. In his massive study Das
Kapital, Marx stated that capitalism exists when the owner of capital
meets the seller of labour in the free market. Tis defnition gives us
the three central elements of the new society: the capitalists, the wage
labourers and the market.
55
The Society
Marx called the two new classes the bourgeoisie and the proletariat,
although we might now prefer to use the terms capitalists and work-
ing classes. Like many nineteenth-century commentators, Marx also
used the more abstract terms capital and labour. (Tis reminds us that
in discussing classes we are not just talking about identifable groups of
individuals, but about a structured relationship between collectivities
which embody diferent functions within a specifc method of produc-
tion). Te bourgeoisie now became the major holders of wealth and the
social surplus, and thus the economically dominant class. In the frst
part of the nineteenth century they also attempted to consolidate their
social and political power. On the local level they established their lead-
ership in many towns, especially in the North and the Midlands, ofen
through acts of public philanthropy such as establishing schools and
leisure facilities. On the national level they challenged the old power
group, the aristocracy, through various processes of Parliamentary re-
form. Especially important was the overthrow of the Corn Laws which
kept agricultural prices artifcially high, thereby protecting the land-
lords from the free market and helping to ensure their wealth and power.
In political terms the bourgeoisie did not so much throw out the landed
classes, as come to share the governing of the country with them.
Facing the bourgeoisie was the new urban working class, dispos-
sessed of the means of producing their own livelihood and forced to sell
their only possession, their labour, in order to survive. For Marx these
two groups were locked in a relationship that was both dependent and
antagonistic. Te labourers needed the capitalists to provide them with
work, and the capitalists needed the labourers to make profts; but the
relationship was also one of inherent confict because of the exploitative
nature of these economic arrangements.
Like many other nineteenth-century commentators, Marx believed
that the wages paid to the working people did not represent the full
value of the goods they produced. During part of their working time,
labourers produced goods of a value equivalent to the costs of their own
subsistence needs (which would in turn be equivalent to a minimum
wage). In the rest of the time they worked, the goods they produced rep-
resented extra value. Some of this value, surplus value to use Marxs
term, was taken by the capitalists in the form of proft. It could be ar-
gued that the capitalists deserved to take the surplus because of the
risks they took in their investment and their initiative in deciding what
goods were needed by the market. Tis is an important argument, and
56
Political Sociology
is used by many people today. However, Marx took the opposing view:
that it was the labourers whose work had actually produced the goods
by their skill and efort and that they consequently had a right to the
surplus or, to use the nineteenth-century phrase, the full fruits of their
labour. However, the mechanism of the wage, apparently ofering a fair
reward for a fair days work, concealed from the workers the fact that
the surplus was indeed being taken from them. Tis was what Marx
meant by exploitation and it was the distinctive form by which surplus
was extracted in the capitalist mode of production. Moreover, it was in
the interests of the capitalists to try to increase profts by raising the
amount of surplus value they took from the workers, either through
cutting wages or by forcing the workers to make more goods for the
same wages (that is, raising productivity). Tis in turn would increase
the tendency to subdivision which I described earlier, so that, along
with exploitation, working-class people would experience ever greater
levels of powerlessness and meaninglessness at work, as they carried
out their repetitive and mindless labour.
Marx believed that when the working people came to understand
how they were being exploited, they would see the system as unjust and
seek to change it. Te shared experience and awareness of exploitation
would be the basis for unifed class action, whereby the proletariat would
eventually rise up to overthrow the whole economic order of capitalism,
replacing it with a just type of society in which the producers, not the
capitalists, would control the surplus. For Marx, then, the working class
was a class of revolutionary socialist potential.
... Marx recognized that other classes existed in society (for example,
landlords and peasants lef over from feudalism, or the growing inter-
mediate class of administrators and professionals), but they seemed to
him relatively insignifcant in terms of the great struggle for power de-
scribed above. It was lef to Weber, writing at a much later date, to grasp
the social importance of those intermediate classes, which sociologists
now usually refer to as the new middle classes. Tese are the various
groups of white-collar workers, from clerks to teachers to managers.
Weber noted how the growth of bureaucracy had led to vast increases
in their numbers. Like the industrial workers, these classes were rela-
tively powerless since they, too, did not own the means of production
within the bureaucracies but had to sell their labour; nevertheless, they
received high social rewards and therefore were placed in a situation of
competition and rivalry with the proletariat. Weber, like many later so-
57
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ciologists, believed that the growth of the new middle classes added so
greatly to the complexity of the class structure that the development of
the revolutionary class struggle described by Marx would be blocked.
Webers conceptualization of classes difered from Marxs in other
important ways. While he accepted that there was a major division in
society between the propertied and propertyless classes, he also empha-
sized very strongly that there were divisions within these groups. Not only
was there the cleavage between the middle and working classes which we
have described above, there were also splits within the working classes
themselves. All these divisions were generated by the market, which gives
diferent rewards to groups with diferent assets to sell. Skilled manual
workers, for example, will be more highly rewarded than unskilled la-
bourers because of their training and expertise, while the middle-class
groupings have various levels of qualifcation, education and training to
ofer. Te small propertied group, too, is split on the basis of diferent
types of properly held; one such division which still remains central to
our economy today is that between fnance capital (the city, bankers) and
manufacturing capital. While Marxs theory of exploitation and class
confict led him continually to emphasize the potential for unity within
the two major classes, Webers stress on the divisive role of the market
resulted in his view of a plurality of classes, or potential classes, all exist-
ing in a climate of competition and rivalry with one another; confict was
thus as great within the broader class groupings as between them...
Tis efect, which later sociologists have called fragmentation of
classes, was increased, in Webers view, because economic relations of
class were further complicated by overlapping with two other sources
of social division, which Weber called status and party. Status inequal-
ity refers to the difering amounts of prestige or social standing held by
various groups (status groups tend to be held together by common life-
styles and patterns of consumption). Weber argued that status divisions
within the working class (the old Victorian distinction between rough
and respectable is one example) worked against the development of
a unifed class identity as envisaged by Marx. Finally, Weber believed
that parties and other political organizations would ofen cut across
class and status divisions in their membership as they sought to mobi-
lize power to further the interests of their members. Te sale of council
houses to tenants by the Conservative party is a good example of how a
party traditionally identifed with bourgeois and middle-class interests
can also cater to working-class needs, thereby encouraging political di-
58
Political Sociology
visions within that class. In these ways, among others, Weber produced
a model of the class structure which allowed for infnitely more com-
plexity than Marxs polar model.
Weber did not, however, disagree with every aspect of Marxs think-
ing. Like Marx, he saw the capitalist entrepreneurs, the sellers of wage
labour and the market as three of the core elements of industrial soci-
ety. But as we have seen, Weber was particularly interested in motiva-
tion. He wanted to explain why people had initiated these new forms of
production and new ways of developing wealth. Tis made him more
interested in the capitalist class than in the labourers. He argued, as we
saw earlier, that capitalist motivation had a particular link with Prot-
estantism; what he called the Protestant ethic encouraged the kind of
behaviour necessary for capitalist success: hard work, systematic plan-
ning, saving and thrif, reinvestment of profts. In particular, certain
Protestant sects, such as Calvinism, espouse the doctrine of predesti-
nation, which holds that men and women are doomed from birth to
damnation or salvation. Te only way Calvinists could deal with this
depressing predicament was by demonstrating faith in the idea of being
among the saved rather than the damned. Tis was achieved in part
by steadily working away at their occupation or calling. Weber had a
gloomy view of the implications of this for peoples lives. As religious
motivations died away over the century, the capitalists would continue
their pursuit of proft as an end in itself, not as a mark of faith and
grace. Mankind would become trapped in the iron cage of capitalist,
bureaucratic society, which Weber believed posed a considerable threat
to human freedom, stifing creativity and ingenuity. Te importance,
for Weber, of religion and culture in the transition to early capitalism
forms one of the central themes of the next chapter.
Webers thesis of the Protestant ethic gains credibility from the fact
that capitalism developed frst in Protestant countries such as England.
It is also true that many of the frst capitalists were members, not of the
Church of England, which had become the religion of the landed classes
and gave support to the gentlemanly lifestyle, but of the various non-
conformists sects like the Baptists, Congregationalists and Unitarians,
which gave much more emphasis to the values of puritanism, thrif and
hard work. Historians have argued about the evidence for the Weber
thesis, but these debates about Webers historical accuracy are less im-
portant to us as social scientists than the emphasis he puts on the role of
ideas as a major infuence in promoting or retarding social change.
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Nevertheless, when I study the history of the early nineteenth cen-
tury I fnd myself thinking of Marxs ideas rather than Webers. Te
period between 1780 and 1850 was a time of constant upheaval, as work-
ing people struggled against the new industrial system and the hard-
ship and poverty industrialism brought in its wake. Tere were food
riots, hundreds of strikes and demonstrations in the industrial areas,
rick- burning and riots in the countryside over agricultural wage levels;
the Luddite movement smashed machinery as a result of its perceived
threat to the wages of skilled workers, and the great Chartist movement
of the 1840s sought political reforms, including universal male sufrage,
in order to gain a Parliamentary voice for working people and then use
it to address their economic grievances.
Tousands of ordinary men and women set up clubs, joined trade
unions, marched, went on strike, demonstrated and signed petitions.
In one city alone, Nottingham, there were no fewer than thirty-nine
riots between 1780 and 1850, as people sought redress for a range of
social, economic and political grievances. Many of these riots caused
substantial damage to the property of the wealthy mill- and landown-
ers, including (in 1832) the looting and burning down of Nottingham
Castle. However, these movements of resistance tended to be localized
and small-scale, refecting the fact that the development of capitalist
industrialism was an extremely uneven process, which took diferent
forms and occurred with varying speed around the country. Responses
were far more militant in some areas than others, as, indeed, the degree
of sufering experienced by the people varied from region to region, al-
though the two were not necessarily linked. At times, however, as in
the case of Chartism, these fragmented activities of the working class
threatened to become a national movement.
TASK 4. 1.
) what ls a class! low do you understand the saylng that class and gender have
soclal and polltlcal meanlng! Clve some examples.
z) 0escrlbe the class soclety from K. Varxs polnt of vlew ln the
th
c.
,) lxplaln the concepts of capltal and labour, and the conlct between them.
|) 0escrlbe V. webers perceptlon of class soclety.
,) ln what way do the status dlvlslons and polltlcal partles dlerentlate the unlty
of the class ln V. weber theory!
) Accordlng to V. weber, how dld the capltallst motlvatlon appear!
)) lxplaln the term worklng class culture.
60
Political Sociology
Additional readings: Allen, John; Braham, Peter; Lewis G. Paul (eds.)
(1995). Political and Economical forms of Modernity. Cambridge: Po-
lity Press.
4. 2. Social Movements
In the development of modern society the signifcance of social
movements is immense. With the increase of peoples demands
from the bottom, the state had to reorganize and pay respect to the
requirements of social movements. A good example is the workers
movement in the second half of the 19
th
c. and at the beginning of the
20
th
c. Its involvement into a political system (the emergence of social
democratic parties as the result) is treated as one of the main source
of democratization of Western states.
Te neo-Marxist paradigm considers that social movements are
the expression of continuous confict in the society. In the original
theory of Marxism, the confict was indicated between the classes of
capitalists and workers in which the aim of the workers movement
was to infuence the state so that it would recognize their political
rights. Its success gave an argument for social analysis to regard each
social movement as the orientation towards the state for gaining the
political power. Politicalinstitutional approach became the main
point when explaining the established social movements, in other
words, every social movement was explained as an accumulation of
societys dissatisfactions in order to direct their demands to the state
government for political recognition.
However, in the 20
th
c., as the capitalism and society was still de-
veloping, the clear classical confict faded away because the workers
acquired political representation and the main social and cultural
needs became available. Together with the rise of post-industrial
society, the main social confict of modernity between capital and
labour started to shrink. Also the nature of social movements had
changed. Economic and political demands (that were oriented to-
wards the state) were changed by cultural demands that were more
related to the values of self-expression rather than economic troubles.
However, the demands did not lose their political nature because the
politics were even more important in post-modern society, since the
understanding of the political expanded.
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Politics as power relations rests in any kind of domination that
was usually based on the discourse, moral norms, images, narrative
etc. that establish social roles. Terefore, the new theories of social
movements emphasized the frame of understanding or cultural
descriptions that covered the conficts of post-industrial society.
Language and identifcation became instruments used to determine
social roles and domination. For example, homosexuality can be
identifed in two diferent ways: as an amoral behaviour that should
be condemned by society or as the right of a person that should be
protected by the state; these identifcations have two diferent politi-
cal and social consequences that depend on the way the society ac-
cepts homosexuality.
Tus, the issue of identities (to be recognized by the society) re-
placed the topics of economic survival and institutional recognition
(the need to be recognized by the state). Te main role in the de-
velopment of collective identities was performed by categorization
that is the language and discourse. Terefore, all post-modern and
neo-Marxist political and social theories state that the discourse is
inseparable from politics and politics is inseparable from social or
public discourses.
Te following text includes the main concepts of social move-
ments. While reading and analysing the text, try to apply the ideas
to the real social movements known to you.
Text 4. 2.: Nash, Kate (2010), Contemporary Political Sociology.
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., p. 87130.
Social movements see them selves, and they are analyzed in contempo-
rary political sociology, as involved in struggles over the defnition of
meanings and the construction of new identities and lifestyles, as well
as addressing formal political institutions.
Tey, therefore, bring the consideration of cultural politics to the
centre of sociological concerns with social change.
Social movements became a signifcant area of research in sociology
in the guise of new social movements. New here is indicative of the
way in which social movements seemed to erupt onto the social scene in
the 1960s, including the civil rights movement, the student movement
of that time, the womens movement, the gay liberation movement, and
62
Political Sociology
the environmental movement. Tey were seen as new in terms of their
orientation, organization, and style by comparison with the old labour
movement, from which they were distinguished as:
1 Non-instrumental, expressive of universalist concerns and ofen
pro testing in the name of morality rather than the direct interests
of particular social groups.
2 Oriented more toward civil society than the state:
(a) suspicious of centralized bureaucratic structures and oriented
toward changing public views rather than elite institutions;
(b) more concerned with aspects of culture, lifestyle, and participa-
tion in the symbolic politics of protest than in claiming socio-
economic rights.
3 Organized in informal, loose, and fexible ways, at least in some as-
pects, avoiding hierarchy, bureaucracy, and even qualifcations for
membership.
4 Highly dependent on the mass media through which appeals are made,
protests staged, and images made efective in capturing public imagi-
nation and feeling (Scott, 1990: chapter 1; Crook et al., 1992: 148).
In comparison, the labor movement was seen as directing its attention
toward the corporatist state with the aim of economic redistribution
and the extension of citizenship rights, as organized in bureaucratic
trade unions and parties which defend members interests, and as
showing very little concern with wider issues or more inclusive politi-
cal participation.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this sharp and rather simplistic contrast be-
tween old and new is not sustainable once it is looked into more closely;
there has, in fact, long been a multiplicity of diferent kinds of social
movements. As Craig Calhoun has shown, in the early nineteenth cen-
tury there were many movements, including the feminist movement,
national ist and religious movements, and even aspects of the a class
movement, such as the Utopian communitarianism of Robert Owen,
which were less like the conventionally defned labor movement than
they were like new social movements. Very much concerned with life-
style and identity politics, they were ofen organized in non-hierarchi-
cal ways in order to prefgure the social order they aimed to bring about,
and they used unconventional means, such as direct action, rather than
working through the normal political institutions of the state. As
Calhoun sees it, they tended to be ignored by sociologists because of
the rationalist, instrumen talist bias of sociology itself. Once the labor
63
The Society
movement was institutional ized in the late nineteenth century with the
extension of the vote, it came to be seen as the social movement of indus-
trialization and progressive social change. Other movements, at least as
much concerned with trans formations of the self, lifestyle choices, and
aesthetic criteria for judging personal and social arrangements, were
ignored as irrelevant to rational, material progress (Calhoun, 1995).
However, as Calhoun himself acknowledges, the institutionaliza-
tion of the labor movement also actually marginalized other social
movements from the mid-nineteenth century. As Charles Tilly has
shown, the labor movement and the modern state developed together.
Te extension of the franchise and the relative willingness of state elites
to respond to working mens concerns meant that the very form of the
state itself was shaped by the labor movement. Tis process culminated
in the corporatist welfare state, in the period following World War II,
in which negotiations between capitalists, workers, and government
were formalized (Tilly, 1984). For example, although it is true that the
womens movement never completely disappeared, following the exten-
sion of the vote to women in the early twentieth century it was absorbed
into mainstream politics.
...
Resource Mobilization Theory
Resource Mobilization Teory (RMT) is based on the liberal view that
social phenomena are the result of individual decisions and actions. It
was explicitly developed on the premises of rational choice theory, to
oppose previous explanations of social movements in American sociol-
ogy in which they were seen as psychologically motivated, as a more
or less irrational response to social conditions. In theories deriving
from the work of Le Bon and popularized in functionalist accounts like
that of Neil Smelser, collective action was understood as outbursts of
uncontrolled behaviour as a result of social dysfunctioning. Tis work
was driven by concern to prevent the rise of fascist and authoritarian
movements, but by the 1970s, sociologists were much more likely to be
sympathetic to the claims of new social movements, if not actively in-
volved in them, and could not subscribe to such a view (Ofe, 1987: 81;
Scott, 1990: 406). Te other popular theory against which RMT was
developed was that of relative deprivation; it was held that protest is the
result of expectations expanding more rapidly than real opportunities,
so that groups who experience themselves as marginalized and lacking
64
Political Sociology
in infuence students, civil rights protestors, women will turn to col-
lective action to redress their grievances. Resource Mobilization theo-
rists have a very simple and convincing rebuttal of any theory of social
movements in which they are seen as the result of social grievances:
since there are always grievances in a society, their mere existence can-
not explain participation in collective action (Zald and McCarthy, 1987:
1618). For Resource Mobilization theorists, what needs to be explained
is why individuals are purposefully involved in collective action as a
result of rational consideration of their own interests: social action is
not caused by structural conditions.
... It is not only its methodological individualism that makes RMT a
liberal approach, but also the way in which it implicitly takes the state
as the arena of politics proper. For Resource Mobilization theorists, al-
though social movements may initially have a problematic relation to
government insofar as their members do not see themselves as properly
represented in dominant political parties and institutions, success for
a social movement involves achieving routine access to the political
process.
... Te contribution to rational choice theory that has been most
infuential in RMT is Te Logic of Collective Action (1968) by Mancur
Olson. ... If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize
their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their common or
group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or un-
less some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the com-
mon or group interest, is ofered to the members of the group individu-
ally on the condition that they help bear the costs or burdens of the
group objectives. (Olson, 1968: 2).
Tilly argued [particularly in From Mobilization to Revolution
(1978)] that, as the most powerful political actor in modern industrial
societies, the state selectively represses or facili tates social movements
and/or their activities according to the perceived interests of state elites.
Tat the state represses certain movements and organizations is evi-
dent: terrorist organizations are to be repressed by defnition, for ex-
ample; those who take direct action in opposition to government poli-
cies are not usually tolerated; and even those organiza tions which act
within the limits of the law may fnd themselves outside it if a change
in policy is seen as desirable and practicable (as in the case of trade
unions in Britain in the 1980s, for example). By the same token, some
social movements are tolerated, even encouraged, to the point where
65
The Society
they become part of the polis, that is, where they gain routine access
to the government. Tilly suggests that the American state creates three
main destinations for a social movement: its dissolution (as a result of
repres sion); the merging of organized activists into an existing politi-
cal party (absorbing it into the polity this is how the labor movement
became established in the corporatism of post-World War II Western
Europe); or the constitution of an enduring pressure group working on
the govern ment and political parties (the most frequent outcome for
social move ments in the US). Tere is a fourth destination common in
countries in which there are single-constituency and single-issue par-
ties where the electoral system is based on proportional representa-
tion, for example: the creation of a new, possibly temporary, political
party (as in the case of the German greens) (Tilly, 1984: 31213).
In response to such criticisms of the atomistic, over-rationalist
model of the individual on which the approach has been premised,
those working within the RMT tradition have attempted to develop a
better account of subjectivity and culture. Te most infuential work in
this respect is that of David Snow, in association with various colleagues.
Tey draw on Gofmans ideas of framing to analyze how actors negoti-
ate meanings and commit themselves to social movements. Accord-
ing to Snow and his associates, it is through frames that social actors
defne grievances, forge collective identities, and create, interpret, and
transform opportunities in order to bring about social movements.
A frame works because it simplifes the world out there by se-
lectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experi-
ences, and sequences of actions in ones present or past environment
(Snow and Benford, 1992: 137). Frames enable the interpretation of what
would otherwise be a mass of complex data, feeting impressions, and
confusing ideas. Tarrow sees the American civil rights movement of
the 1960s as a good example of Snow and Benfords theory of framing,
arguing that its domi nant theme of rights was resonant with widely
shared values, both among black middle-class members of the move-
ment and the white liberal conscience constituents who supported
it. As Tarrow sees it, success depends on maintaining a delicate bal-
ance between the resonance of the movements message with existing
political culture and its promise of new departures (Tarrow, 1992: 197).
In the case of the revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989, for ex-
ample, the relaxation of state control in the wake of Gorbachevs re-
forms provided the conditions for mobiliza tion, but it only became a
66
Political Sociology
real possibility because already existing dissi dent groups had defned
regimes as illegitimate and were ready to act against the authorities. It
is the dynamic interaction between political opportunities, mobilizing
structures, and framing processes which pro duces the emergence of a
social movement.
... As Tarrow notes, social movement leaders do not have complete
control over how the collective frames of action they propose will be
received, nor over how far their supporters will be pre pared to follow
their lead. In his words, framing is less like a completed symphony
than like improvisational jazz: composers provide the initial head for
a jam session, but the improvisations depend on a group of players over
whom they have little control (Tarrow, 1992: 191).
New Social Movement Theory: Confict and Culture
In contrast to the liberal premises of RMT, New Social Movement Te-
ory has its roots in Marxism It is based on the centrality of confict to
society and, rather than beginning from the starting point of isolated
individuals, it takes the collective nature of that confict as given. In
par ticular, due to the infuence of Alain Touraine, the activity of social
move ments is seen as involving confict between dominators and domi-
nated which is inherent in all societies and which provides the motor of
social change. Te aim of a true social move ment is not to infuence
the political process, as in the RMT tradition, but to break the limits of
the current system and to lead the transforma tion of society.
By historicity, Touraine means the processes by which society
is produced as a result of conscious refection on social action and its
conditions.
In every society, according to Touraine, there is one key confict
between opposed social movements: the confict between the domi-
nant class which has appropriated historicity, changing it into order
through organization, and the dominated who attempt to re-appro-
priate it, to break down the status quo, reveal the confict it conceals,
and introduce innovatory ways of thinking, working, and living.
However, he argues that we are now living through the transition to a
post-industrial or programmed society: there has been a shif from
manufacturing toward knowledge-based industries in which educa-
tion, training, information, design, and so on are central to produc-
tion. In such a society, control over information and knowledge are the
immediate stakes of social confict, and technocrats are the domi nant
67
The Society
class to the extent that the interests of the society as a whole are iden-
tifed with the technological development and management of orga-
nizations they achieve. For Touraine, this leads to new forms of con-
fict which are more cultural than economic. Te opposing class is not
made up solely of workers, but of all those subject to technocratic con-
trol; for example, consumers or simply the general public. According
to Touraine, class struggle in post-industrial society is no longer in the
name of political or workers rights; it is not related to economic class
struggle, but for peoples right to choose and control their own lives.
However, he is sympathetic to what he calls Foucaults denunciation
of power as inherent in all social rela tions. He sees it as contributing
to critical social thought by revealing how apparently rationally orga-
nized social relations have actually been estab lished through conficts
and clashes between dominators and dominated. Moreover, although
Touraine criticizes Foucault for failing to consider the source of power
in society, arguing that it originates in the apparatuses of the ruling
class in post-industrial society, from centers of technocratic domina-
tion like Foucault, he sees power as operating in every social sphere
rather than as possessed or produced by the modern state (Touraine,
1981: 21). Te importance Touraine gives to struggles over interpre-
tations of norms and values in civil society allows us to see much social
movement activity as political in the widest sense, not just in rela tion
to the political process narrowly defned.
In Meluccis view, the most important point about collective ac-
tion is that a more or less stable, composite, collective identity a we
must be constructed out of very diferent ends, means, and forms of
solidarity and organization. It must be understood as an ongoing pro-
cess through which actors communicate and negotiate the meanings
that produce the social movement as such. Finally, Melucci breaks
with Touraine and with RMT by rejecting the view that it is commit-
ted militants or social movement organizations who are the principal
actors in collective action. For Melucci, social move ments are, above
all, sustained in invisible submerged networks in which experiments
in life are carried on, new experiences created, and collective identi-
ties forged in everyday life. For Melucci, post-industrial societies are
above all concerned with signs; even the production and distribution
of economic goods are symbolically mediated, through design, adver-
tising, the media, and so on. As a result, according to Melucci, unlike
their nineteenth-century coun terparts, new social movements are not
68
Political Sociology
concerned with struggles over the production of material resources, or
with their distribution or control through the state in citizenship rights,
but rather with access to informa tion (about the hazards of nuclear test-
ing, for example) and the contesta tion of symbolic resources (such as
sexist advertising or the aestheticization of violence in the media). Tis
is also the case, according to Melucci, because, again unlike working-
class politics, contemporary movements are concerned with forms of
organization and lifestyle which are ends in themselves rather than the
means to realize an end in the future.
In Meluccis view, the struggles of new social movements are
struggles over identity: to push others to recognize something which
they them selves recognize; they struggle to afrm what others deny
(Melucci, 1989: 46). Although any confict might be characterized in this
way, he argues that the issue of identity has become more central with
the increased refexivity of complex societies. In Meluccis view, there is
an ever-increasing control over every aspect of our lives in such matters
as health, sexuality, and our relations with the natural environment. In
this respect, he sees Foucaults understanding of power as important.
He sees identity as constructed by the manipulation of symbols which
are efective in par ticular social contexts. Tere is no clear separation
to be made between the way social life is defned and understood and
the way it is lived: both are implicated in ongoing social practices. Me-
lucci makes the implications of his work clearer in this respect in his
last work, putting forward the view that it is the development of post-
industrial society that increasingly makes symbols efective in reality.
He argues that to see information as mirroring or representing reality
is simplistic; information encoded in language and images increasingly
contributes to the construction of social reality:
Technological power has been accompanied by an exponential
growth of symbolic possibilities, by an increase in self-refective activ-
ity: by the height ened capacity to refect and represent reality through
a multitude of lan guages. Tis capacity seems to be gradually replacing
reality itself, so that we are in the process of coming to inhabit a work
constructed out of the images that we ourselves have created, a world
where we can no longer distinguish reality from the reality of the image.
(Melucci, 1996: 43). How and for what purpose should we use the
power of naming which allows us to fabricate the world and to subsume
it to the signs with which we express (or do not express) it? (Melucci,
1996: 131).
69
The Society
TASK 4. 2.
) what ls the dlerence between old and new soclal movements!
z) 0ene the slgnlcance of the workers soclal movement to the development of
the western state and polltlcs.
,) what ls a tradltlonal attltude of soclal and polltlcal sclences towards soclal
movements! why was the workers soclal movement taken as an example!
|) what klnd of soclal movements do you recognlze ln the text! Please, lndlcate.
,) what are the maln RVJs ldeas about the formatlon, alms, and potentlal of so-
clal movements!
) ln your oplnlon, what ls the role of culture ln soclal movements! what ls the role
of frames!
)) low ls the soclal movement descrlbed ln Alaln Jouralns theory! where and
why does the conlct take place ln the soclety!
8) low does Alberto Veluccl descrlbe the soclal movement! what ls the role of
the development of post-lndustrlal soclety!
) Compare Jean audrlllards ldeas about slmulacrum (Chapter z. ,.) and Veluc-
cls statements that slgns are the most lmportant ln soclal actlons.
o) Comment on A. Veluccls statement that the conlct ln the soclety appears be-
cause of the use of power of namlng. low do you understand thls statement!
) Read the whole chapter about soclal movements wrltten by Kate Nash. lndlcate
the partlcularltles of global movements and dlerences that separate them
from ordlnary soclal movements that took place ln the framework of the state.
4. 3. Civil Society
Living in post-communist states it is difcult to understand the mean-
ing, expression, and signifcance of civil society. Probably it is impos-
sible to fnd another case when the concept of civil society is perverted
and mocked more than it was done in political, social, and ideological
system of the Soviet Union. Although ideologically the whole system
was presented as a system that works for people and their interests,
the real dictatorship of the Communist Party brought the society un-
der control that was based on conscience (ideological) and physical
violence. Consequently the state (authority) and the society alienated
from one another, and the practise of double (public and private) mo-
rality had fourished. Te society acquired refexes and social habits of
being conformist, helpless, and dependent on the state.
3
What could
3. Of course, there were some exceptions such as dissident activities and estab-
lishment of Helsinki groups that, however, did not infuence and was not able
to infuence the critical mass of the society.
70
Political Sociology
be more contradictory to the real civil society and social solidarity
than these characteristics?
While in the West, the process of civil societys development last-
ed for centuries, therefore, it has strong historical, economic, ideo-
logical, moral, and social principles. Te beginning of civil society
in the West is related to the association of business based on private
property and autonomy from the state government in order to pro-
tect the property and free economic activities. Te main role in the
formation of civil society was performed by the public sphere that
helped to form and balance common and contradictory interests of
groups of the society.
As we have already mentioned in the book, the Western civil so-
ciety was formed during the confict of capital and labour. Tere-
fore, researchers pay special attention to the relationship between
the capital (in conjunction with political authority) and the biggest
part of the society (workers). When the society started to change into
post-industrial society and the workers class began to pluralize and
diferentiate, the confict also changed and a fght for expression of
cultural values began. Commercialization of the society, the domi-
nation of images, and establishment of consumerism and festival
culture was considered to be the reasons that struck the potency for
civil action, usurped the public sphere, and reduced the potential
of civil groups to resist the power of capital. Te hegemony of post-
industrial capital, mentioned by Antonio Gramsci, was expressed by
neutralization of the resistance inside the pluralized class of workers.
Satisfed, calm, and happy workers did not want any huge reforms.
In the 19
th
c. the workers did not have rights and were hardly able to
make both ends meet but in the second half of the 20
th
c. they be-
came consumers who spent their free time in diferent sports and lei-
sure clubs. All these transformations of the workers class from eco-
nomic interests to cultural and individualistic interests had changed
the principles of civil society organisation, characteristics of public
sphere, and the potential of civil society to resist the power of capital
and politics. We should have it in mind when making analysis of
nowadays civil society.
Te provided reading includes the topics that need special atten-
tion: various historical and philosophical concepts of civil society,
71
The Society
Marxist and neo-Marxist ideas about the development of civil soci-
ety, the experience of post-communist states that have to reconsider
the concept of civil society, and the factors of globalization that make
people to perceive civil society out of nation states boundary.
TEXT 4. 3.: Ray, Larry (2012), Civil Society and the Public Sphere,
in Te Willey Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, edited
by Edwin Amenta, Kate Nash and Alan Scott, Blackwell Publish-
ing Ltd., p. 240251.
Both the concepts of civil society and the public sphere are fuid, prob-
lematic and open to various, sometimes conficting interpretations. ...
For Habermas the public sphere, which emerges prior to civil society, is
a domain of civic communication and cultural contestation whereas
civil society refers to specifc forms of mobilization and citizen par-
ticipation which have some relation to the state (Delanty 2001). .... Cer-
tainly, civil society, like public sphere, originates in Greek and Ro-
man political philosophy (Aristotles politike koimonia and Ciceros ius
civile) but is more closely identifed with eighteenth-century political
philosophy. Te emphasis here was on the importance of a realm of pri-
vacy, economic exchange and association, and consequently the limita-
tion of the state. For many (though not all) theories of civil society the
freedom to enter into private contracts is important, which associates
the concept with the growth of the political power of the bourgeoisie
in Europe. Despite these diferent emphases, though, many theorists
understand civil society as a public realm of voluntary association es-
sential for the stability of democracy.
... Te concept of civil society refers to the processes of social dif-
ferentiation associated with the emergence of modern European soci-
eties. With the depersonalization of political power, separated from
the familial rights of monarchs, barons and landlords, the idea of the
state as the personal property of the sovereign and benefce of of-
cials slowly gave way to the idea of impersonal rule bound by rules. ...
Further, the development of trade, commerce and markets increased
the complexity of economic organization while establishing the dual
notion of social activity, divided into political and civil roles. ... Tus
civil society depicted a realm of contractual and voluntary relation-
ships independent of the state, which thereby became merely one area
of social activity among others. At the same time, political economy
72
Political Sociology
and philosophy began to address the question of the social context for
the existence of the state (political society), the nature of which was
no longer taken for granted. In particular, Enlightenment social theo-
ry (e. g., Montesquieu 1949; Rousseau 1963; Condorcet 1976) regarded
the despotic state as an enemy of human progress and well-being and
began to examine the social conditions for democratic or constitu-
tional forms of government.
Te origins of contemporary usage can be found in seventeenth-
century political philosophy. Tomas Hobbes theory of the sovereign
state (Leviathan) was premised on the existence of two branches of soci-
ety political and civil tied by a social contract between subjects and
the state. ... Although the political system was the dominant part, this
expressed the idea of diferentiated civil and political life as mutually
sustaining systems, in which the realm of private activity, while gov-
erned by sovereign laws, was otherwise bound only by conscience (in
foro interno) and the rules of civic association. In Hobbes and Locke
though, despite diferences between them, civil society was an aspect
of government (Locke used political and civil society interchangeably),
while in subsequent theorists, such as Adam Ferguson, it became an
autonomous sphere separate from the state. ... Again, civil society is
inseparable from good government, but more than this, the reference
to friends and cabals indicates an important point that is sometimes
missed in subsequent debates. Civil society does not refer to just any
kind of informal or private social relations, which exist in all societ-
ies, but to morally guided, rule-following relations that make possible
anonymous social exchanges.
Te implicit tension here between the new conficts of commercial
society and the moral demands of social peace appeared explicitly in
Hegel, for whom civil society was divided between ethical life (Sittlich-
keit) and egotistical self-interest. .... In the family, socialization towards
moral autonomy trans formed biological and psychological needs into
individual desires. But in complex societies, private life is transcended
through association in civil society, the sphere of production, distribu-
tion and consumption, which meets a system of needs that are modi-
fed and multiplied in the process. It has its own regulatory institutions
(Justice, Public Authority, Corporations) guided by morality, although
they remain instru ments for achieving personal, egotistical ends. ... the
confict between vast wealth and vast poverty steps forth, a poverty un-
able to improve its condition... [which] turns into the utmost dismem-
73
The Society
berment of will, inner rebellion and hatred (Hegel 1967: 149-151). How-
ever, this will be overcome if the consti tutional-legal state (Rechtsstaat)
synthesizes ethical life with the public domain of civil society while
transcending them. Diferences of class, rank and religion dissolve in
universal law and formal rights.
By regarding civil society simply as the equivalent of bourgeois so-
ciety, an arena of confict, class oppression and illusory emancipation,
Marx only partially echoed Hegels view and disregarded the latters
concept of civil society as Sittlichkeit. ... formal legal equality is merely
an illusory dissolution of diferences of class, rank and religion, which
masks their perpetuation within civil society. ... For Marx, the proletar-
ian victory would substitute for the old civil society a classless associa-
tion in which there would be neither political power nor the antago-
nisms of civil society (Marx 1978: 169). Marxs vision of communism
was radically de diferentiated, in which boundaries between the civil
and political, like those of class, nation and religious diference, wither
away. It drew on Rousseauian and radical Jacobin concepts of a public
sphere of equals, along with anti-modernist nostalgia for a lost unity
of humanity (Gellner 1994), rather than an organic concept of socially
diferentiated networks.
... [Civil society] revival in the later twentieth century was a result
frst of the attempts by Eurocommunist parties to devise new strategies
in the 1970s and second of its popularity among the anti-communist
movements in Eastern Europe. Eurocommunists (especially the Ital-
ian Communist Party), theoretically informed by writers like Gram-
sci, Bobbio, Althusser and Poulantzas, ofered an alternative to Soviet
Marxisms economist reductionism and simplistic polarization of so-
cial and political conficts. Gramsci had conceived of civil society as the
sphere of non-corporeal forms of class rule, a cultural space between
state and economy. Here the proletarian party could wage a cultural
and ideological war to undermine the hegemony of the ruling class,
creating a counter-hegemony of workers clubs, social and educational
organizations, assisted by the activity of organic intellectuals. Tis re-
stated the centrality of processes of social diferentiation and situated
civil society within a cultural and institutional realm rather than the
economy. Despite the efectiveness of this strategy in bringing various
social movements and parties into loose coalition and debate, it already
pointed towards a post-Marxist politics in its abandonment both of ma-
terialism and centrality of proletarian class struggle.
74
Political Sociology
Te second revival of civil society theory was encouraged by the col-
lapse of communism and its use by writers such as Vajda (1988), Konrad
(1984), Feher and Heller (1986) and Havel (1988) to capture the essence
of dissident politics. Teorists such as Rodel, Frankenberg and Dubiel
(1989), Arato (1981) and Cohen and Arato (1992) excavated the concept
of civil society during the disintegration of state socialism... Te central
idea of these theories was to identify a social space for public discussion,
of voluntary citizens associations that was neither narrowly merged
with the market, nor an adjunct to the state. Again with Eastern Europe
in mind, Sztompka (1993: 73) argued that civil society was the key to
closing the chasm between public and private realms, involving plural-
ism of voluntary associations, interest groups, political organizations,
local communities, markets and representa tive democracy as institu-
tional arrangements linking the public and personal choices of active
and informed citizens. But this kind of analysis assumes that civil so-
ciety necessarily creates an active public sphere when the assumptions
underlying the two ideas may difer signifcantly.
... Habermass (1989) well-known critique of the erosion of the public
sphere in late capitalism claims that the commercialization of mass me-
dia replaced rational and unconstrained debate by public opinion re-
search, through which political parties extract loyalty from publics in
an instrumental fashion. At the same time, increasing state intervention
and the growing interdepen dence of research and technology resulted
in a process of technicization whereby questions of moral value and
political controversy were converted into managerial technical or plan-
ning processes (see Ray 1993: 5153). Tis critique can be extended to the
erosion of public space by post-Fordist urban restructuring and fexible
accumulation (see for example Brenner and Teodore 2002). As physi-
cal space is privatized and occupied by city-centre and out-of-town con-
sumption complexes the publicness of urban space is eroded. Voyce
(2006) argues that One of the spatial consequences of globalization is
the tendency of public space to come increasingly under the control
of private corporations. Te classic example, he continues, is the shop-
ping mall where public amenities are subsumed within private space,
ofen no political activity is allowed, charities must pay daily rates to
collect, and surveillance and regulation replace public discourse and
activity. At the same time cultural space is increasingly eroded by me-
dia networks interested only in advertising revenue. So in the place of
democratic public participation we have reality TV that creates a pub-
75
The Society
lic spectacle of voyeurism and humiliation. Tese shows mobilize vot-
ing, which ofers the promise of participation, but is actually a medium
of surveillance since the act of voting provides demographic data about
voters (Andrejevic 2003: 161). Commercialization thus further under-
mines the public sphere.
... Further, with the decline of a constitutional public sphere there
is a danger, as a number of commentators have noted, that local social
loyalties can lead to the fragmentation of civic groups into warring fac-
tions that actually increase the risk of public violence (see for example
Mennell 1995; Foley and Edwards 1996). Ethnic and religious solidari-
ties that undermine multinational and secular states are ofen cited in
this context (e. g., Kaldor 1993 and Sivan 1989, respectively). However,
civil society theorists would generally counter this by stressing what
Cohen and Arato (1992: 421) regard as essential to civil society, namely
refection on the core of collective identities and their articulation with-
in democratic politics. In particular, following Habermas, the crucial
factor here is that we inhabit a world of morally mature post-traditional
ethics, in which public debate is constrained by procedural rules. So-
cial integration requires not that we agree over substantive matters of
identity and opinion but on the rules through which public debate and
confict will be conducted.
... A second approach to the relationship between state and civil so-
ciety (Civil Society II) is associated particularly with the anti-commu-
nist movements in the 1970s and 1980s, where the role of civil society
is explicitly normative. Rather than embedding political processes in
supportive but constraining civic networks, this conception regarded
civil society as a harbinger of a new type of society anti- political, au-
thentic, and based on informal social solidarity. Te spaces of civil soci-
ety and public sphere here were ofen fused in that the private realm of
autonomous self- organizing groups was to become an authentic public
sphere alternative to the state. For Arato (1981) the seeds of new civil so-
ciety germinated in samizdat, self-defence movements (such as the Pol-
ish KOR), the idea of self-managing democracy and permanent rights
theory (Feher and Heller 1986). Tus social movements such as Solidar-
ity aimed to limit the state, or bypass it altogether through alternative
networks, but not to seize it as an instrument of coercion, and in this
sense they were quite diferent from earlier and more traditional revolu-
tionary movements (Pelczynski 1988). Te early Solidarity programme
of podmiotowosc (self-management) was a radical alter native to West-
76
Political Sociology
ern democracy as well as to Soviet-type socialism. Te democratization
of the economy was understood as part of a decentralized social order
of autonomous subsystems, managed along the lines of professional
self-government (Glasman 1994). Tese notions of self-government
transcend the liberal dichotomy of public/private by bringing rational
democratic procedures into everyday life, through extrapolating the
networks and practices of intellectuals in the parallel polity. Cohen and
Arato (1992) argue that the new public spheres in Eastern Europe could
provide a model for a more general idea of civil society that is appropri-
ate in the West too. However, they also warn against an overly polarized
view of civil society vs. the state that was derived from a particular
historical context. In contrast to the highly diferentiated view outlined
above, the eastern European model over-unifes civil society in a false
solidarity and risks blocking the emergence of societal and political
pluralism (1992: 67).
Te Marxist critique [of civil society] is echoed in various ways.
Feminist critics have argued that the gender-neutral language of civil
society and public sphere conceals how the role of citizen has been
linked to the capacity to bear arms, which has been predominantly a
masculine role (Fraser 1989b). Tis fusion of citizenship, milita rism and
masculinity reinforces the male occupation of the public sphere that is
inscribed into the public/private dichotomy, resulting in a civil contract
amongst brothers combined with the feminization of the private sphere
(Pateman 1988; Okin 1991). Habermasian distinctions between public
and private roles treat the family as a black box in which patriarchal
power remains invisible. Te male citizen- speaker role links the state
and the public sphere to the family and the ofcial economy while the
worker-breadwinner role integrates the family with the econ omy and
the state, confrming womens dependent status in each. Tus the exclu-
sion of the family from the realm of civil society is interpreted by some
feminists as the exclusion of women from this sphere, although the sub-
ordination of women in the family means that this is not a voluntary
society but is (or at least in the past was) rather based on obligations that
were enforced through patriarchal power (Himmelfarb 2000). Te ex-
clusion of the family from civil society then renders women invisible in
civil life while occluding the enforced subordination of women within
what are apparently voluntary associations
... Another line of critique addresses the rediscovery of civil soci-
ety in anti-communist social movements. Afer the fall of communism
77
The Society
some of the enthusiasm for civil society dissipated in the wake of the
political demobilization and the emergence of new elites. ... Indeed, for
Lomax (1997) the early popular enthusiasm was betrayed by the post-
communist intellectual elite, who appropriated the term civil society
but demobilized society and failed to develop civil initiatives and popu-
lar participation. A similar point is addressed in Ray (1996: 20028).
Hann sees no evidence to support the notion that an efective civil soci-
ety in the sense of public sphere has been able to develop in Hungary
in recent years. Rather, like Lomax he suggests that the term was appro-
priated by urban intellectuals to bemoan the fact that (especially rural)
people were less willing than previously to display deference to cultural
elites. ... Adam Michnik, who says: We thought that our revolution... in
the name of freedom and normalcy, will be not only velvet and blood-
less but also free from... superstition. But the collapse of communism
brought ethnic chauvinism, bloody wars and religious intolerance...
...their legacy has been (in diferent measure) radicalism of revenge
(seeking out former communists), nostalgia for the past in the face of
corruption and uncertainty, and crass commercialism (2001: 3).
Te concept of civil society discussed so far exists within the
boundaries of the nation- state, which many argue has been under-
mined by the process of globalization. ... However, there may be a gen-
eral trend towards de-statization of the political system, refected in
the shif from government to governance (Jessop 1999) where the states
role is increasingly one of coordinating multiple agencies, institutions
and systems coupled through reciprocal interdependence. According
to this account, the state becomes one agent among others operating
in sub-national, national and international domains. If this is the case
then the notion of a state-civil society polarity is clearly not complex
enough to grasp current intersections between the governmental and
non-governmental.
Te realm of the state, which was formerly exterior to civil society,
is becoming localized and hence interior to the realm of private inter-
ests (civil society), which becomes global, through transnational capital.
Tus the local state may lose its cohesion and become a set of disaggre-
gated agencies rather than the centre of distributional politics (Miller
1993: 222). At the same time, identity and lifestyle politics, community
orientations and movements supersede instrumental class and welfare
politics. Since civil society was symbiotically located between institu-
tions of the state, corporations and everyday life, globalization weakens
Political Sociology
the civic sphere as it dislocates the pattern of these relations. One con-
sequence of this is that the nation-state cannot sustain social welfare,
and peoples vulnerability to efects of the market is increased. Te role
of civil society as intermediary between state and individual weakens
while processes taking shape in the global arena impact on everyday
life. Capital gains maximum mobility across national boundaries, tak-
ing command of space in a way that voluntary organizations rooted
more in locality and place cannot do (Harvey 1994: 238). Delanty (2001)
concludes that there is potential for a global public sphere of commu-
nication and public contestation while remaining more sceptical of the
possibility of global civil society.
TASK 4. 3.
) what are the ways ln whlch the system of the Sovlet unlon destroyed the back-
grounds for clvll soclety to emerge! ln your oplnlon, what are the consequences
of thls to post-communlst soclety, for example, the contemporary llthuanlan
soclety!
z) what ls consldered to be the orlglns of western clvll soclety!
,) what ls the lnuence of class conlct on clvll soclety! low dld the change of
class conlct lmpact clvll soclety!
|) what are the descrlptlons of publlc sphere and clvll soclety! low do they relate
to one another!
,) Characterlse the maln phllosophlc ldeas about clvll soclety.
) what are the two challenges to clvll soclety lndlcated by theorlsts!
)) what new ldeas about clvll soclety do you recognlze ln femlnlst crltlcs!
8) what valuable contrlbutlon to the understandlngs of clvll soclety could be
made from the experlence of post-Sovlet states!
) low does globallzatlon lnuence our perceptlon of clvll soclety!
o) low do you lmaglne clvll soclety ln llthuanla after you have read the glven
materlal! what could be treated as a proof of lts exlstence! what lmportant
problems would you lndlcate ln the development of clvll soclety ln llthuanla!
) ln your oplnlon, are there any features of clvll soclety ln the case regardlng pae-
dophllla scandal ln llthuanla (zoo ) ! Apply the materlal you have already
read and make an analysls of thls extraordlnary case that lnuenced llthuanlan
soclety and polltlcs.
79
5. Democratization
In this chapter we ofer three diferent topics for your analysis:
1) the way in which democracy spread in the world over the last
two hundred years; those historical, economic, political, and
social conditions that explain the increasing and decreasing
spread of democracy;
2) interaction between capitalism and democracy. It could be
generally believed that these two processes support one an-
other and that the states which implemented the reform of
free market will sooner or later become democratic. However,
the relationship between capitalism and democracy is much
more delicate in comparison with one-way positive mutual
infuence. In this section you will learn about the main dif-
ferences between capitalism and democracy and the threat to
equal political representation of people that is caused by the
infuence of business on politics;
3) the relationship between mass beliefs and democracy where
the main role, at least in Ronald Ingleharts theory, is per-
formed by factors of socioeconomic development and emanci-
pative values.
5. 1. Waves of Democracy
TEXT 5. 1.: Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (2009), Long Waves and Con-
junctures of Democratization, in Haerpfer W. Christian; Bern-
hagen, Patrick; Inglehart F. Ronald, Democratization. Oxford
University Press, p. 4154.
Processes of worldwide democratization have been analysed and de-
scribed with a great number of approaches and metaphors. Most com-
mon among the latter has been the concept of waves. Samuel Hun-
tington (1991) distinguishes three major ones, and two reverse waves.
Tese he dates as follows:
First, long wave: 18281926
First, reverse wave: 19221942
Second, short wave: 19431962
80
Political Sociology
Second, reverse wave: 19581975
Tird wave: 1974
Renske Doorenspleet challenges this periodization and, instead,
speaks of a distinct fourth wave beginning in 1989/90 with the fall of
the Berlin Wall and concurrent and subsequent events in Central and
Eastern Europe leading to the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, the end of
the Cold War and its reper cussions in many parts of the world. Tese
classif cations and the historical factors lying behind them thus have
been disputed (Berg-Schlosser 2004a).
The First Long Wave, 17761914
Te major ele ments of this transformation were a republican tradi tion
of appointed or elected rather than hereditary rulers (as in ancient
Rome or the Renaissance city- states), the development of representa-
tive govern ments in large-scale political units (beginning in England,
USA, and France),and the idea of the politi cal equality of all citizens
which was strongly pro moted by the American and French Revolutions
but which had its earlier proponents in the writings of such authors as
John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rous seau. Te European enlightenment,
as expressed in the writings of Immanuel Kant for example, also greatly
contributed to a non-transcendental, secu lar orientation of politics and
a new legitimization based on the power of the people.
Te paths taken to more democratic forms of government varied
somewhat and were either evo lutionary (as in UK) or revolutionary
as in the USA (breaking with the colonial past) or France (abolish ing
the inefcient ancien rgime). Te factors at work were both highly
motivating new ideas and slo gans like no taxation without representa-
tion in the North American colonies or libert, galit et. frater nit
in France and the basic human and civil rights derived from them as
well as social movements and classes which became their main protago-
nists. Lib eration movements of this kind were the anti-slavery move-
ment in some of the colonial powers and former colonies, and (initially)
national sentiments among late-comers of European nation-states as
Germany and Italy, and in the newly independent republics of Latin
America (Markof 1996).
At a later stage, the labour movement, newly founded trade unions and
socialist or social-demo- cratic political parties, and the womens move-
ment engaged for an extension of the sufrage became the main carriers.
Te urban bourgeoisie and mid dle classes played a more ambiguous role.
81
Democratization
In early instances, they favoured liberal ideas and an exten sion of the
sufrage, for example in the movements leading to the (mostly failed)
revolutions of 1848, when it served their own interests. Later, however,
they sometimes formed alliances with the remaining aristocratic forces
against the labour movements as in imperial Germany.
At the same time, this long wave which lasted more than a century
was accompanied by increasing levels of literacy, urbanization, and sig-
nifcant tech nological advances as railways, the telegraph, etc. which
greatly facilitated communications over large areas. In terms of the
international environment, the sovereign nation state became the uni-
versally accepted model, even though what a nation was, who was in-
cluded and whether it corresponded with the demos of active citizens
remained a subject of debate (Anderson 1991).
The First Positive Conjuncture, 19181919
Te war led to the frst major conjuncture of politi cal forces, actors
and events in a short period of time. As a result of the war the major
continental empires (the Ottoman, the Habsburg, the Tsarist in Russia,
and the German) were dismantled, and a new form of regime, a new
international movement and (later) a major contender in international
politics emerged: the communist Soviet Union.
Te peace treaties at the end of the war also cre ated a new politi-
cal landscape with the newly inde pendent states of Finland, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, the Baltic states, etc. which all,
initially, had democratic constitutions, and democratized others, as
Austria and Germany, or led to a signifcant extension of the sufrage as
in Bel gium, the UK, and the Scandinavian countries. On the interna-
tional level, the newly founded League of Nations, following President
Woodrow Wilsons proposals, should secure collective security, nation-
al self-determination and open economies. In retrospect, only a few
of these new democracies became sufciently consolidated, and even
some of the older ones were greatly shaken by subsequent events.
the major factors considered to be favourable for democracy, or
their absence, are listed. First, a secure statehood and pre-war existence
of democracy (Rokkan 1975). Simply put: no (or a fragile) state, no de-
mocracy. Second, the absence of a powerful landed upper-class or ma-
jor feudalis ts remnants as emphasized by Barrington Moore (1966: 418):
No bourgeoisie, no democracy. Tird, a relatively high level of socio-
economic develop ment as expressed by gross national product (GNP)
82
Political Sociology
per capita or various indicators of industrialization, urbanization, or
literacy (Lipset 1983). Fourth, rela tive cultural, linguistic, or religious
homogeneity or, if segmented along such lines, some elite consocia-
tional arrangement as in Switzerland to bridge such cleavages (Lijphart
1977). Fifh, a democratic politi cal culture as opposed to more parochi-
al or sub ject non-democratic and authoritarian orientations (Almond
and Verba 1963). Sixth, the absence of high levels of political unrest and
strong anti-system forces both from the political lef and right or some
funda mentalist groups (Linz 1980). Seventh, civil control of the violent
means of coercion and subordination of the military and other armed
forces to legitimate political authorities. Eighth, a respect for civil and
political rights, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary
(Dahl 1989: 24464).
It can be seen, that all of the pre-war democracies had mostly fa-
vourable conditions and remained sta ble, whereas in countries like
Poland, Portugal, Spain, or Romania the recently created democratic
systems met with very unfavourable circumstances and col lapsed
fairly soon, leading to military dictatorships or traditional authori-
tarian regimes.
Even more interesting are the cases in the middle where, in spite
of mixed conditions, the new democ racies in Czechoslovakia, Ireland,
and Finland were sustained, whereas they broke down in Estonia, Ger-
many, Hungary, and a number of others. Here, in addition, the impact
of the great world economic cri sis afer 1929 was strongly felt, now
leading to a nega tive conjuncture or reverse wave of democratization.
Tis encouraged antidemocratic and fascist move ments and distinctive
moves by major actors which led to the downfall of more democracies,
the Weimar Republic in Germany being the most spectacular one.
In Latin America, the deteriorating world econom ic situation also led
to more protectionist authori tarian regimes as in Argentina and Brazil
afer 1930. In Turkey, the new republic founded by Kemal Atatiirk, in
spite of some secularizing and modern izing reforms, maintained an au-
thoritarian regime. In the Japanese monarchy, some initial liberalizing
reforms with universal sufrage for men afer 1920, the Taisho democ-
racy, were reversed by the military. Te League of Nations turned out
to be inefective, and the international situation became increasingly
antagonistic.
... Te victorious World War II allies, with the US, UK, France, and
the Soviet Union as the major powers, created economic and political
83
Democratization
systems following their model in the defeated countries occupied by
them. In this way, in Central and Eastern Europe peoples democra-
cies emerged which, however, as this oxymoron already suggests, were
democratic by name only. Renewed attempts of democratization in
Austria, (West-) Ger many, Italy, and Japan should, however, prove to
be more fruitful.
The Second Long Wave (with some intermittent turbulences),
19451988
In spite of being on the side of the victors, World War II had also shaken
the dominance of the remaining colonial powers, in particular the UK
and France but also, in a lesser role, the Netherlands and Belgium. In
the inter-war period already, nationalist independ ence movements had
emerged in a number of over seas territories, in particular in Asia. Afer
the war, the European powers were not able to hold on to their colonies
much longer, and India and Pakistan (now separated) became indepen-
dent in 1947, Indo nesia in 1949. French eforts to keep their territories by
military force were in vain, and afer protracted bloody wars they had
to leave Vietnam in 1954 and Algeria in 1963. In Sub-Saharan Africa,
Ghana and Sudan were the frst countries to become independ ent in the
mid-1950s, followed by a great wave of independence in 1960 or shortly
thereafer for most of the former British, French, and Belgian colonies.
Only Portugal held on to its territories until the mid- 19 70s, and South
Africa, with its Apartheid regime ruled by a minority of European de-
scent, remained a special case.
Initially, in most of the newly independent states democratic con-
stitutions were adopted, usually craf ed afer the model of the previous
colonial power, i. e., a Westminster type parliamentary system for the
former British territories and a presidential system not unlike the Fifh
Republic in France in the franco phone states. Only a few of these, how-
ever, actually became consolidated. Tis was most notably the case in
India, still today the worlds largest democracy, but neighbouring Paki-
stan and later, afer another separation, Bangladesh soon succumbed
to military regimes. In Africa, only Botswana and tiny Mauritius re-
mained continuously democratic. Most of the other African states
showed a mixed picture of military dic tatorships and authoritarian
single-party regimes.
In Latin America, in the early years afer the war a number of
countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Boliv ia, etc., re-democratized and
84
Political Sociology
sufrage was extended to women in most of them. Here, too, however,
the situation remained precarious and many returned to (ofen quite
bloody) military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s, most spectacularly in
Brazil in 1964 and Chile in 1973. Only Costa Rica, afer 1948, and Ven-
ezuela, afer 1958, consistently kept their democratic constitutions (see
also Ch. 19).
Elsewhere, in Turkey the frst multi-party elections were also held
afer the war bringing the opposition into power. Here, too, the military
later intervened, and similar situations were found in the Philippines,
which turned into an authoritarian regime under President Marcos
afer 1966, and Greece, following a military coup in 1968. Teentire
North African and Middle Eastern region had remained untouched by
democratic movements and maintained either, as in Saudi Arabia, Jor-
dan and Morocco, traditional mon archies or had turned into military
dictatorships, as in Iraq or Syria, or authoritarian single party systems,
as in Egypt or Tunisia.
But these hope ful signs were soon overshadowed by what came
to be called the Cold War when the victorious World War II alliance
broke apart and the Western powers now faced a reinvigorated Soviet
Union, a victorious communist revolution in mainland China and simi-
lar movements in other countries. Attempts to con tain communism
sometimes also turned into hot wars as in Korea (195053) or Vietnam
(195975). In all these cases and beyond the super-powers most ly fol-
lowed their perceived strategic and economic interests rather than the
newly agreed upon princi ples of international law, human rights, and
demo cratic rule.
Nevertheless, in the course of de-colonization and the Cold War pe-
riod the total number of democracies worldwide has steadily increased,
with some of the ups and downs just mentioned. In Southern Europe,
the authoritarian regimes in Portugal (by a coup in 1974) and Spain (by
a negotiated transition afer the death of Franco in 1975) democratized
and military rule was ended in Greece in 1978. Te bureaucratic- au-
thoritarian (ODonnell 1973) military regimes in Latin America also
felt increasing economic difcul ties and resentment by growing num-
bers of their populations. Almost all of them returned to some form of
democratic rule by the end of the 1980s (ODonnell etal. 1986). Tis also
applies to the Phil ippines, afer the fall of Marcos, and South Korea (see
also Ch. 23).
85
Democratization
The Latest Conjuncture, 19891990
... In Europe, too, a rapprochement took place between East and West
and a number of treaties were signed and economic cooperation in-
creased in the course of the new ostpolitik. Most signifcant were the
1975 Final Act of the Conference on Secu rity and Co-operation in Eu-
rope (CSCE) which led to the founding of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In these accords, the respect of
basic human rights and civil liberties was guaranteed, a clause to which
political dissenters in East European countries such as Czechoslovakia
and Poland increasingly referred. At the same time, with the oil cri-
ses of the 1970s and the over-centralized economies of Central and East-
ern Europe and the Soviet Union reaching some of their inherent limits,
living conditions deteriorat ed in a number of them, further fuelling the
increas ing political discontent. In the meantime, afer the occupa-
tion of Afghani stan by the Soviet Union in 1979, the arms race between
the superpowers had resumed momentum, putting an additional strain
on the economies of the Eastern bloc. When the Afghanistan invasion
also turned out to be a failure, reformist groups in the Soviet Union re-
alized that both militarily and eco nomically the Eastern bloc had over-
stretched itself. Te new secretary general of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbatchev, therefore initiated a new period
of detente and abandoned the doctrine of his predecessors...
... Te break-up of the Soviet Union led to a vari ety of new regimes.
While some new democracies emerged, as in the Baltic States, a merely
electoral or faade democracy had taken hold in Russia. Outright au-
thoritarian regimes were established in Belarus and most of Central
Asia, in some cases with the pre vious leaders re-emerging in a new
guise. Compared to 57 countries classifed as free by Freedom House
before 1989, almost 80 were thus classifed towards the end of the 1990s
and another 40 could be regard ed as electoral democracies, i. e., al-
most two-thirds of all states now claimed to be some kind of formal or
efective democracy. Tis really now appeared to have become the only
(legitimate) game in town (Di Palma 1990).
TASK 5. 1.
) lndlcate the three polltlcal prlnclples that appeared ln the Age of lnllghten-
ment and were typlcal of modern democracy.
z) what soclal movement has contrlbuted to the rst wave of democracy! low
dld lt happen!
86
Political Sociology
,) lndlcate and explaln the factors or absence of the factors that are consldered to
be the basls for democracys vltallty.
|) what was the status of democracy ln lurope and the remalnlng states of the
world durlng the lnterwar perlod!
,) what were the features of decolonlzatlon durlng the second long wave! what
were the reasons that dlsturbed democratlzatlon!
) what were the reasons that lnuenced the latest conjuncture of democratlza-
tlon!
5. 2. Capitalism and Democracy
TEXT 5. 2.: Bernhagen, Patrick (2009), Democracy, Business,
and the Economy, in Haerpfer W. Christian; Bernhagen, Patrick;
Inglehart F. Ronald, Democratization. Oxford University Press,
p. 107125.
In historical perspective, democra tization and the rise of capitalism
have accompanied each other. But their common path has been far
from smooth and the relationship between the travelling companions is
frequently not a very harmonious one. Te main reason for this is that
the two sys tems operate according to distinct mechanisms and embody
diferent normative ideals. Democracy has already been defned in
Chapter 2 as a political sys tem in which rulers are held accountable to
citizens by means of free and fair elections. Following Adam Przewor-
ski (1991: 101), capitalism is defned as any economic system in which (1)
the optimal division of labour is so advanced that most people produce
for the needs of others, (2) the means of production and the capacity to
work are owned privately, and (3) there are markets in both.
While capitalism and democracy equally rest on the enlightenment
principles of individual free dom, rationality and equality, capitalist
democ racy entails a fundamental tension between the property rights
of owners and the personal rights of citizens owners and non-owners
alike (Bowles and Gintis 1986: 32). Tis is evident with respect to de-
mocracys normative principles of equal par ticipation and the account-
ability of leaders (see Ch. 3). First, democracy entitles citizens to equal
political rights by virtue of their being citizens. In democratic doctrine,
it does not matter if someone is male or female, black or white, or rich or
poor. All that matters for the entitlement to efective and equal demo-
cratic participation is for a person to be a citizen and, usually, to be
87
Democratization
above a certain minimum age. Entitlement according to capitalist doc-
trine is also independent of race or sex. But it is fundamen tally linked to
money and private property, which in capitalist systems are unequally
distributed as a matter of principle: if income, wealth, and owner ship
in productive assets were to be kept as equal as the right to vote, any
capitalist economic system would instantly grind to a halt.
Second, democracy demands that leaders are held accountable to
citizens, typically through some form of free and fair elections. Capi-
talism makes no such pretence. With very few exceptions, decisions
in business enterprises are made by the owners or by their appointed
managers. At most, leaders of business enterprises are accountable to
sharehold ers. But unlike in the democratic state, the subjects to mana-
gerial decisions, employees, are not nor mally entitled to elect the deci-
sion-makers. Similar to leadership change in stable autocracies, control
of business enterprises changes hands through deci sions made by an
oligarchic clique. Tis leads to the paradoxical situation that political
democracy is occupying new territory in more and more countries
around the globe, while business enterprises con tinue to be governed
like command economies in miniature (Moene 1993: 400).
Tese contradictions between the way political and economic mat-
ters are organized in capitalist democracies have important implica-
tions for politi cal, economic and social life in general and for the suc-
cess of democratic transformation and consoli dation in particular.
According to a central claim of modernization theo ry, economic
development and democratization are both part of the advance of mo-
dernity (see Ch. 6). Once a society reaches sufcient levels of wealth,
technology, education, bureaucratic capacity, and a proliferation of in-
dividual social and political skills, its citizens become dissatisfed with
paternalistic political authority and demand popular sovereignty (Ros-
tow 1961). Tis leads to the erosion of traditional political institutions
and, eventually, to democrati zation. In this view, the global spread of
democracy is an historical inevitability; its driving force is capital ist
development. Indeed, historically, when market economies have
been successful over a peri od of time, pressure for democratization has
ofen followed soon. And if newly democratized coun tries continue to
prosper economically, democracy is likely to survive. In the words of
Seymour Martin Lipset (1959: 75): the more well-to-do a nation, the
greater the chances that it will sustain democracy. Tis assigns capi-
talism a pivotal role in the global spread of democracy, as no other so-
88
Political Sociology
cioeconomic sys tem appears to be equally capable of producing social
wealth. While modernization theory suggests a rather harmonious
relationship between the expansion of economic liberties and demo-
cratic political rights, others have emphasized the importance of class
confict in the connection between capitalism and democracy. For
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), capitalist development
favoured democratization primarily because it transformed the class
structure, strengthening urban labourers, small business owners, and
middle-class profession als, while weakening the landed upper class.
But of the former, the working classes were the last to gain political
representation, and they had to wrest it of the more privileged groups
in protracted and ofen violent struggles. Sometimes these were related
to inter-state confict. According to Goran Terborn (1977: 1723), both
world wars ofered the politi cally excluded classes opportunities to
gain political representation, either in the form of external allies or be-
cause the ruling elites traded political conces sions to the lower classes
in exchange for support for the national war efort. ... In Britain, and
elsewhere in Europe, this process [the gradual wid ening of participa-
tion in politics to the majority of the adult population] took another
two centuries to eventually secure the expansion of civil and politi cal
rights for the beneft of substantial groups of the population. All along,
capitalist entrepreneurs and liberal philosophers and statesmen have
watched with scepticism, and ofen with outright hostility. And they
had good reasons to be sceptical. Te grad ual extension of the fran-
chise from propertied men to all adults went hand in hand with sig-
nifcant cur tailments of capitalist property rights, redistribution, and
the emergence of the welfare state (Macpherson 1973: 148). Nonetheless,
capitalist development ultimately contributed to democratization, if
only to de-radicalize the lower classes and avert violent revolution and
threats to private property. In this view, capitalist elites traded political
concessions for continued con trol over the economy. Daron Acemoglu
and James Robinson (2000) demonstrate how wealthy elites in Britain,
France, Sweden, and Germany acceded to extensions of the franchise
to ordinary people, even though doing so led to higher taxation of their
wealth and incomes. In this view, conceding democ ratization was a
price elites found worth paying to ward of the threat of a more violent
overthrow of the still nascent capitalist order.
While the positive relationship between capitalist development and
democracy is quite robust, there are a number of notable exceptions.
89
Democratization
First, countries like Botswana and India, as well as more recently Gha-
na and Namibia, sustain consolidated democ racies without signifcant
capitalist development. India, for example, has enjoyed stable democra-
cy for over half a century but has only recently begun to develop a more
advanced capitalist economy. ... Tis exception is some times being ex-
plained by reference to the British colonial history. ... Tus, it can be
argued that former British colo nies were institutionally better prepared
for dem ocratic rule than territories controlled by other colonial powers
such as France, Portugal or Spain (Bollen and Jackman 1985: 4445). ...
While French, Portuguese, and Spanish colonial empires trans planted
their own feudal and absolutist structures into their colonies, British
colonialism was inex tricably interwoven with the countrys own tran-
sition to capitalism (Wood 2003). Te settlers, merchants, and traders
who colonized North America were entrepreneurs, for whom self-gov-
ernment and parliamentary representation were ideal means of protect-
ing their markets and property from the arbitrary rule of colonial gov-
ernors and rulers in the metropolis.
... Second, there are numerous countries that combine highly suc-
cessful capitalist economies with the par tial or complete absence of
democratic institutions. Te famous economic tigers of the 1980s
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are cases in point,
as are the Brazilian dictatorship between 1964 and 1985, or China from
the 1990s onward. Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan eventually became
democracies, although democratization did not fol low smoothly on
economic development. In fact, political liberalization in Brazil only
set in when eco nomic development began to slow down. However, in
the light of modernization theory it makes sense that countries frst
modernize economically. Only when economic development has gener-
ated suf cient levels of educated, urban-dwelling citizens will pressure
for democratization build up and eventual come to the boil an image
that has been projected vividly on to TV screens around the world by
South Korean student protesters in the 1980s.
But the successful combination of authoritarian rule and market
capitalism in some countries also suggests that the relationship be-
tween economic development and democratization implied by mod-
ernization theo ry, although overall positive, may not be linear. Among
other things, this has to do with the triangular relation ship between
economic development, inequality, and democracy. According to Ro-
bert Dahl (1971), democ ratization is inhibited by high economic in-
90
Political Sociology
equality for two reasons. First, economic resources can be trans lated
into political resources. Concentrated econom ic power may thus en-
able elites to prevent political reforms that extend rights and liberties
to others. Sec ond, economic inequalities can generate resentment and
frustrations among the disadvantaged, thereby eroding the sense of
community and legitimacy upon which democracy is ofen thought to
rest. Contemporary democratic theo rists such as Robert Dahl (1989:
3248) continue to be concerned that capitalists political power might
undermine political equality, democratic account ability, and the legiti-
macy of public policy.
TASK 5. 2.
) what are the prlnclpal dlerences between capltallsm and democracy!
z) what does the modernlzatlon theory state about the hlstorlcal relatlonshlp be-
tween capltallsm and democracy!
,) what exceptlons could be mentloned wlth regard to the statement that eco-
nomlc (capltallstlc) development leads the state to democratlzatlon!
|) low would you explaln the fact that authorltarlanlsm and capltallsm can suc-
cessfully co-exlst!
Additional readings:
Please, read the article: Bernhagen, Patrick (2009), Democracy,
Business, and the Economy, in Haerpfer W. Christian; Bernhagen,
Patrick; Inglehart F. Ronald, Democratization. Oxford University
Press, p. 107125.
And fnd out more about the mutual impact of capitalism and
democracy, then answer the following questions.
Additional questions:
1) What is the infuence of capitalism on democracy in nowa-
days democratic states? Indicate and explain.
2) What is the infuence of democracy on business?
3) What is the political role of business actors in the transition of
democracy?
91
Democratization
5. 3. Value Change and Democracy
Mass beliefs or public opinion is one of the main channels through
which the politics is rooted in the society. In this section you will learn
about the ways the democracy is infuenced by mass beliefs and values.
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzels theory is based on the analy-
sis of the Worlds Values Surveys that will be described in this sub-
chapter. Te analysis might be criticized because of the linear concep-
tion of modernization and democratization and because of eforts to
formulate the processes in a deterministic way as a universal law that
involves the societies and states from the entire world. Despite that,
it ofers valuable material on socioeconomic and cultural reasons to
understand the establishment and the development of democracy. It
is very important in order to explain the post-communistic develop-
ment patterns in Lithuania that belongs to Central and Eastern Eu-
rope region. Terefore, the aim of this chapter is not only to explain
the main principles of democratization theory but also to apply them
during the interpretation of political culture in your country.
While reading the extract, pay attention to the following: political
culture, relationship between mass beliefs and levels of democracy,
instrumental versus freedom preferences for democracy, emancipa-
tive values and its relevance to political legitimacy, relationship be-
tween emancipative values and socioeconomic development.
TEXT 5. 3.: Welzel, Christian; Inglehart F. Ronald (2009), Po-
litical Culture, Mass Beliefs, and Value Change, in Haerpfer
W. Christian; Bernhagen, Patrick; Inglehart F. Ronald, Democra-
tization. Oxford University Press, p. 126144.
Te idea that a societys political order refects its peo ples prevailing
beliefs and values that is, its politi cal culture has a long tradition.
Aristotle (1962 [350 BC]) argued in Book IV of Politics that democracy
emerges in middle-class communities in which the citizens share an
egalitarian participatory orienta tion. And many subsequent theorists
have claimed that the question of which political system emerges and
survives in a country depends on the orientations that prevail among
its people. Tus, Charles- Louis de Montesquieu (1989 [1748]: 106) ar-
gued in De LEsprit des Lois that the laws by which a society is governed
92
Political Sociology
refect its peoples dominant mentality: Whether a nation is constituted
as a tyranny, mon archy or democracy depends, respectively, on the
prevalence of anxious, honest or civic orientations. Likewise, Alexis de
Tocqueville (1994 [1835]: 29) postulated in De la Dmocratie en Amrique
that the fourishing of democracy in the USA refects the lib eral and
participatory orientations of the American people. In this vein, Har-
old Lasswell (1951: 473, 484, 502) claimed that whether democratic re-
gimes emerge and survive largely depends on mass beliefs. Simi larly,
when Seymour Martin Lipset (1959: 859) analysed why modernization
is conducive to democ racy, he concluded that modernization changes
mass orientations in ways that make people supportive of democratic
principles, such as political pluralism and popular control over power.
More recently, Sam uel Huntington (1991: 69) argued that rising mass
desires for freedom provide the intervening mecha nism that explains
why modernization has given rise to democratizing movements in
scores of countries in recent decades.
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963: 498) and Eckstein (1966:1)
introduced the term congruence claiming that political regimes be-
come stable only in so far as their authority patterns meet peoples, au-
thority beliefs regardless of regime type, as Eck stein (1998: 3) notes.
According to this congruence thesis, authoritarian regimes are stable
when the people believe in the legitimacy of dictatorial pow ers, just as
democratic regimes are stable in so far as people believe that political
authority ought to be subject to popular controls.
Since this debate, the World Values Survey has gathered sufcient
data to demonstrate that there is a strong and systematic relationship
between mass beliefs and levels of democracy. Over a global sample of
more than 70 societies, the extent to which a public holds emancipa-
tive values corre lates at r=.85 with a countrys subsequent level of de-
mocracy, using the broad measure of democ racy shown in Figure 9.2.
Te measure of democ racy used here is the average of four of the most
widely-used ways of measuring democracy: using this broad measure,
one fnds a strong relationship. As the strength of emancipative values
in a society rises, the level of democracy also rises and the relationship
is remarkably strong and statistically highly signifcant.
popular preferences for democracy do not automatically translate
into mass pressures to democratize.
Preferences for democracy are ofen superfcial or purely instrumen-
tal (Schedler and Sarsfeld 2006). Because Western democracies are
93
Democratization
obviously prosperous, some people believe that if their country becomes
democratic, it will become rich. Tis is an instrumental preference for
democracy (Bratton and Mattes 2001): people seek democracy for other
reasons than the political freedoms that are its defning qualities.
Mass preferences for democracy are widespread almost everywhere,
but if these preferences are super fcial or instrumental, they will not
motivate people to struggle or risk their lives to obtain democracy. Peo-
ple are most likely to do so if they give high prior ity to the freedoms
that democracy provides. Only when democracy is valued as a good in
itself, are strong mass pressures likely to be brought to bear on elites
whether to attain democratic freedoms when they are absent, or to
defend these freedoms when they are endangered. Tus, the values
motivating democracy emphasize equality, liberty, tolerance and em-
powering people to govern themselves, in both private and public life.
People who value these goals over others, emphasize emancipative val-
ues. If they support democracy (as most people do), they are more likely
to be moti vated by the fact that democracy provides freedoms, than by
the belief that it provides prosperity or other instrumental motivations.
Peo ple may give lip service to democracy for shallow or instrumen-
tal reasons. Only if peoples preference for democracy refects the fact
that they place a high value on freedom and self-expression, they are
relatively likely to pursue democratization active ly. Hence, in order to
know whether people prefer democracy intrinsically that is, for its
defning freedoms one needs to fnd out how strongly they emphasize
emancipative values.
Emancipative values give priority to equality over patriarchy, tol-
erance over conformity, autonomy over authority, and expression over
security, as shown in Table 9.1. Emancipative values are closely related
to self-expression values as described by Inglehart and Welzel (2005),
who demonstrate that their measure of self-expression values has an
inherently emanci pative impetus and use the terms self-expression val-
ues and emancipative values interchangeably.
... Evidence from the World Values Surveys and other cross-national
surveys indicate that emancipative mass beliefs vary dramatically cross-
nationally, and when these beliefs are weak, people give priority to au-
thority and strong lead ership over freedom and expression. Even
dissatisfed people can continue to prefer strong leaders and authori-
tarian rule. Tey might wish to have one dictator replaced by another
without rejecting authoritarian rule. In fact, when emancipative values
94
Political Sociology
are weak, people are more likely to accept limitations on democratic
freedoms for the sake of national order or other goals.
Another important factor is that the absence of emancipative values
biases peoples understanding of democracy in an authoritarian direc-
tion. As evidence from the World Values Surveys demonstrates, when
emancipative values are weak or absent, people may consider authori-
tarian regimes to be democratic: their underlying values emphasize
good economic performance and order, rather than political rights and
civil liberties.
Te theory of intergenerational value change advanced by Ingle-
hart and Welzel (2005) holds that virtually everyone likes freedom,
but they do not necessarily give it top priority. Peoples priorities
refect their socioeconomic conditions, placing the highest subjec-
tive value on the most pressing needs. Since material sustenance and
physical security are the frst requirements for survival, under condi-
tions of scarcity, people give top priority to safety goals; while under
conditions of prosperity, they become more likely to emphasize self-
expression and free dom. During the past 50 years, rising economic
and physical security have led to a gradual intergenera tional shif in
many countries placing rising empha sis on emancipative values. At
the same time, rising levels of education and changes in the occupa-
tional structure have made mass publics increasingly artic ulate and
increasingly accustomed to thinking for themselves. Both processes
encourage the spread of emancipative values that give priority to
equality over patriarchy, tolerance over conformity, autono my over
authority, and expression over security. As these beliefs spread, dicta-
torial regimes tend to lose their legitimacy.
With low levels of emancipative values, people tend to view de-
mocracy as meaning that the economy prospers, unemployed people
receive state aid, criminals get punished, and other instrumental views.
With rising emphasis on emancipative values, they increasingly come
to defne democracy as meaning that people choose their leaders in
free elections, civil rights pro tect peoples liberties, women have equal
rights, and people can change the laws. With each additional step on
the ladder of progressing emancipative val ues, peoples understanding
of democracy takes on a more liberal character, focusing on the free-
doms that empower people. Both the meaning of democracy and the
priority it holds, refect mass values that vary according to a societys
level of socioeconomic development.
Democratization
Te impact of both socioeconomic modernization and emancipa-
tive mass beliefs drop considerably when one con trols for the efect of
the other variable. Tis is so because these two phenomena overlap con-
siderably, and the overlapping variance has a stronger efect on subse-
quent democracy than either of its parts. Tus, socioeconomic modern-
ization is conducive to democracy mainly insofar as it is conducive to
eman cipative values among the public. Conversely, eman cipative values
are conducive to democracy mainly insofar as they are rooted in socio-
economic modern ization. Socioeconomic modernization gives people
the action resources that enable them to struggle for democratic free-
doms; and emancipative values give them the motivation that makes
them willing to do so. And both variables have their greatest impact
when they act together, making people both moti vated to seek democ-
racy and able to exert efective pressures to obtain it.
TASK 5. 3.
) what ls a polltlcal culture!
z) low do mass bellefs aect the level of democracy!
,) why are so lmportant the peoples motlves that explaln the dlerence between
supportlng democracy and belng just generally posltlve to democracy!
|) what are the emanclpatlve values and how are they related to the support for
democracy and legltlmacy of authorltarlanlsm!
,) low the spread of emanclpatlve values ls related to socloeconomlc condltlons
of the soclety! what goes rst: socloeconomlc modernlzatlon or emanclpatlve
values!
) low would you apply the acqulred knowledge ln the analysls of llthuanlan (or
your home countrys) soclety and democracy! ln reference to the text, what
crlterla would you suggest as the most necessary for the analysls!
)) ln reference to the materlal you have read, ln your oplnlon, ls there democratlc
polltlcal culture ln llthuanla! Clve arguments for your answer.
96
6. Central and Eastern Europe:
Post-Communist Transformations
Tere are a few reasons why the post-communist region of Central
and Eastern Europe is included into the analysis of political soci-
ology and the subject teaching in a Lithuanian university. Te frst
reason is that the region has already attracted a lot of attention from
political sciences as it is connected to the post-communist past in
geographical, historical, and, most important, political and social
ways. Te similarities and diferences that appeared in the develop-
ment of post-communist states are already the object of compara-
tive political sociology (Norkus 2008). Another reason is the factor
of the European Union. Te European Unions eastern enlargement,
especially in 2004, increased an interest in newcomers from this re-
gion. It helped to raise interest in the level of preparation and po-
litical and social characteristics of newcomers that were coming
back to Europe, including the issue of national minorities, and of
national collective identities. Also, the EU member states from this
region were included into the literature on europeanization in order
to understand the infuence of the European Union to domestic and
foreign policies of the new-coming states. Above all, probably the
most important reason is that the research of post-communist trans-
formations is vitally important to the Lithuanian society in terms of
self-understanding.
For a long time and even now, the development of Lithuanian so-
ciety and politics is analyzed academically with the help of academic
instruments and concepts taken from the traditional (Western) po-
litical sciences. One of the main instruments is normative democracy
or the image of neutral, pluralist political process. According to it, po-
litical parties represent the society, they compete in general elections,
the winning party or coalition forms the government and represents
the will of people through implementation of policies, the judicial
branch of power (the courts) supervise the other branches, mass me-
dia performs watch dog function etc. Looking from these glasses,
Lithuania appears as an ordinary Western democratic country with
97
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
some problems to be fxed. However, if the Lithuanian society and
politics are considered still to be post-communist instead of western,
the object of political analysis might change. In this case post-com-
munist means the aspect of political corruption and traumatic so-
ciety instead of introducing free market reforms or establishment of
democratic institutions (what originally was thought as the ultimate
goal of post-communist transition). Te term post-communist does
not refer only to the chronological criterion and the period that be-
gan afer the Soviet empire. It also refers to corruption, social habits
and mental characteristics, factors of political culture, the infuence
of the criminal element, the origins of economic capital, continu-
ations of nomenclature, the absence of civil society, collective and
individual traumas and frustration. Tis refers to neo-Marxist and
psychoanalytic academic paradigms instead of tradition of pluralist
democracy. Unfortunately, we still do not have a neo-Marxist and
psychoanalytic approach to Lithuanian post-communist society and
politics, with very few exceptions (Rubaviius 2011, liogeris 2012).
As long as the situation remains the same, the traditional com-
parative analysis of economic, political, and social tendencies will
have to be used.
Tis chapter is divided into four parts: general patterns of tran-
sition in post-communist countries (6. 1.); political (6. 2.) and eco-
nomic (6. 3.) transitions; the problem of national minorities (6. 4.);
and a critical review of Lithuania as a post-communist country (6. 5.).
Only Chapter 6. 4. perhaps needs a separate explanation for being
included in the book.
Te problem of national minorities might be attributed to the
most important problems for democracy consolidation in post-
communist countries (Kymlicka 2001). Te states politics towards
national (or any other) minorities indicates its political culture and
the maturity of post-industrial society and democracy. Lithuania has
some unsolved problems with Polish minority that was clearly dem-
onstrated by the Polish mobilization and protests in 2011 because
of the reforms in education system. Tis problem has infuence on
the bilateral relationships between neighbour states as well, at least
with regard to the ofcial attention that are paid from both coun-
tries. With regard to the issue of national minorities, our region is
98
Political Sociology
a typical post-communist region because the observed tendencies
show that the national minorities are perceived (reasonably or not)
as a threat to the state. As we can see the issue of national minorities
is neither simple, nor usual, nor temporary in the development of
post-communist societies.
Terefore, we suppose that it is worth including the experience of
Western multiculturalism into the didactical guidelines for political
sociology, especially when the experience is rendered by one of the
most famous expert in the feld, Will Kymlicka. Moreover, the analy-
sis of national minorities in the context of Western multiculturalism
is a rather rare case in Lithuanian political sciences.
6. 1. Transition from Communism to Democracy:
General Features
TEXT 6. 1.: Wolchik L. Sharon, Curry L. Jane (2011), Democracy,
the Market, and the Return to Europe: From Communism to the
European Union, in Wolchik L. Sharon, Curry L. Jane (eds.), Cen-
tral and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy.
Rowman&Littlefeld Publishers, Inc., p. 327.
Despite the many ways in which they difered from each other and the
diferent ways com munism developed in each of their countries, the
leaders of Central and Eastern Europe had to resolve a number of simi-
lar crises afer the end of communist rule. Te most vis ible of these were
summarized by the election slogans of most political parties in the frst
free elections in these countries: Democracy, the market, and a return
to Europe. In the frst area, the new elites had to create or re-create
democratic political institutions, values, and practices. Te process
involved dealing with the economic and political power of the Com-
munist Party and revising the legal system and constitutional struc-
tures to make them compatible with democracy, the establishment of
a multiparty system, the repluralization of associational life, and the
recruitment and training of new leaders. Tey also had to coun teract
the infuence of communism on the political values and attitudes of the
population and foster new values supportive of democracy.
Te economic aspect of the transition was equally daunting. In addi-
tion to privatiz ing state assets and fostering development of new private
99
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
enterprises, the new leaders in the region also had to devise redistribu-
tion policies to restore property confscated by the state to its rightful
owners or heirs. Tey needed to redirect trade patterns, particularly af-
ter the disbanding of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and
the end of the Soviet Union, and begin to deal with the environmental
devastation that communist patterns of development created. Tey also
had to deal with the requirements of international fnancial institutions
and the economic and social consequences of the dramatic drop in pro-
duction that accompanied the shif to the market.
Tese policies had their counterparts in the arena of foreign policy.
In addition to asserting their independence on the world stage and ne-
gotiating the withdrawal of So viet troops when necessary, the new elites
undertook a series of actions to reclaim what they perceived to be their
rightful place in Europe. Many of these focused on eforts to join Eu-
ropean and Euro-Atlantic institutions, with particular emphasis on the
European Union and NATO. As of this writing, most of the postcom-
munist states of Central and East Europe have achieved these goals. In
the remaining countries, political elites con tinue to push for inclusion.
Te transition from communist rule has also had social and psy-
chological dimensions. In the frst area, there has been a major change
in the social structures of these countries. New (or old, previously pro-
hibited) groups, such as entrepreneurs, and numerous occupa tions as-
sociated with the rapid development of the previously neglected service
and fnancial sectors have emerged. Te status of diferent social groups
has also changed. With the shif to the market, restitution of property,
and the end of most state subsidies, visible income diferentials, which
were previously small, increased. Social inequality, poverty, and unem-
ployment also increased substantially. While some people were able to
take advantage of the new opportunities available in politics, the econ-
omy, and society, many others were not. For the latter group, the end of
communist rule entailed largely new hardships, particularly in the ear-
ly postcommunist period when production and the standard of living
fell dramati cally in most countries. Te division of society into winners
(those who were young, well educated, and urban) and losers (older, less
skilled workers, those living in rural areas, and single parents, as well as
many women) in turn had important political repercussions.
Te end of tight political control and the opening of borders, cou-
pled with the un certainty and disruptions created by the transition
itself, exacerbated old social pathologies and problems, such as alco-
100
Political Sociology
holism, juvenile delinquency, prostitution, violence in the home, drug
use, and street crime, and allowed new problems to emerge. Organized
crime, trafcking in persons, smuggling, and the sex trade are among
the most visible of these. Certain social issues, such as tensions between
various ethnic groups, the widespread discrimination against and mar-
ginalization of the Roma, and the xenophobia and anti- Semitism that
ofen poison political discussions, all had existed in the communist era
but were taboo. Now they are recognized as problems and discussed
openly,
10
although they all too ofen continue to serve as sources of vio-
lence and repression. Support for extreme nationalist parties and the
development of skinhead movements, particularly in economi cally de-
pressed regions, are further refections of these trends.
Te experience of living in a time in which most aspects of life, from
political choices to the organization of daycare, were in fux also had
predictable psychological consequences in the region. Although these
efects were most widespread among those for whom the transition
brought largely new hardships, they also afected those who could be
seen as winners. As one Czech student put it soon afer communism
fell in that country, Under communism, it was a question of whether I
was allowed to do things; now it is a question of whether I will prove ca-
pable of doing them. Greater uncertainty as well as far greater choices,
coupled with new pressure to perform well at work, increased competi-
tion, and the specter of unemployment, all contributed to the stress in-
dividuals and families experienced, even among those groups fortunate
enough to be able to take advantage of new opportunities.
The Role of International Organizations and Outside Actors
In contrast to the interwar period in which outside actors either largely
ignored the region (the United States, Great Britain, France) or had de-
signs on it (Italy, Germany, at times the USSR), the international cli-
mate has been far more favorable to the success of eforts to create stable
democracies and market economies and engineer a return to Europe
in the postcommunist period. All of these countries have received sub-
stantial economic and democracy-building assistance from the United
States, the EU, and many individual Eu ropean countries. Te postcom-
munist states have also been the recipients of economic as sistance and
loans as well as a great deal of advice from international fnancial in-
stitutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank. Te latter, as well as the European Union, have exerted signifcant
101
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
infuence not only on the policies adopted by successive governments in
the region, but also, in many cases, on the institutional de sign of these
societies and polities.
11
In the case of the successors to former Yugosla-
via, the international community intervened with negotiators, military
force, and peacekeepers to resolve or prevent confict. It has, in the form
of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia at Te
Hague, set standards of cooperation that have delayed or sidetracked
the beginning of negotiations for EU accession and NATO membership
for several of these countries.
At the same time that joining European and Euro-Atlantic institu-
tions has brought many benefts to the countries involved, the asym-
metrical nature of the relationship be tween these countries and these
institutions, as well as powerful Western countries, has also led, pre-
dictably, to resentment and skepticism on the part of certain segments
of the population in all of these countries, who ask whether they have
traded rule by Moscow for rule by Brussels, the seat of the European
Union and NATO headquarters.
12
Te impact of this backlash on poli-
tics in the region should not be underestimated, as is clear from the vic-
tory of populist Euroskeptics in Poland, the demonstrations in Hun-
gary in 2006, and the growth of small, but radical antisystem parties on
the far right in a number of these countries since that time.
TASK 6. 1.
) what were the challenges that the states of Central and lastern lurope had
to face ln the areas of democracy, economlcs, and forelgn pollcy! what were
psychologlcal and soclal problems!
z) what was the lnuence of lnternatlonal organlsatlons to the states of the re-
glon durlng the post-communlst perlod!
6. 2. Patterns of Political Transition
TEXT 6. 2.: Bunce, Valerie (2011), Te Political Transition, in
Wolchik L. Sharon, Curry L. Jane, Central and East European
Politics: From Communism to Democracy. Rowman&Littlefeld
Publishers, Inc., p. 3151.
By 1996, one could identify three types of political regimes in postcom-
munist Central and Eastern Europe.
1
Te frst, which included Poland,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, and less perfectly
102
Political Sociology
Estonia and Latvia (because of some political dis crimination against
their Russian minorities), was a democratic orderpolitical arrange-
ments that combine free, fair, and competitive elections that are regu-
larly held; rule of law, or rules of the political game that are accepted
by both elites and publics and that are applied consistently across time,
space, and circumstances; and extensive civil liberties and political
rights guaranteed by law. Because of all these features, democracy in
general and in these cases in particular can be understood as a way
of organizing politics that rests on accountable government.
2
What is
striking about Poland, the Czech Republic, and the other countries list-
ed above at this time, therefore, was that they managed to move quickly
to full-scale democracy.
Te second type of regime in the region at this time was authoritar-
ian. In authoritar ian states political arrangements lack the characteris-
tics noted above, thereby producing governments that have neither the
incentives nor the capacity to be accountable to their citizens. Authori-
tarian regimes, in particular, lack the institutionalized competition,
indi vidual rights, and procedural consistency that translate individual
preferences into public policy through elections and representative
government. Tis combination of traits de scribes the politics at this
time in two of the successor states of Yugoslavia (Croatia and Serbia-
Montenegro). Here, it is interesting to note that, despite the eforts of
their dicta tors, Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic in
Serbia-Montenegro, some political pluralism was in evidencemost
notably in the capitals of Zagreb and Belgrade, where oppositions had
a presence and where publics, even in the face of fraudulent elec tions,
still managed to deny their dictators decisive electoral support.
Finally, the remaining countries in the region, Albania, Bosnia (but
only afer the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 had demilitarized the coun-
try and provided a skeletal form of government), Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine a group of countries roughly equal
in number to the full-scale democracies at this time, fell in between the
extremes of dictatorship and democracy. Tey were what can be termed
hy brid regimes. Hybrid regimes are political arrangements that feature
some of the formal characteristics of democracy, such as representative
institutions and political competition, but that fall short of the liberal
standard as a result of unfair elections, extensive corrup tion, irregular
recognition of civil liberties, signifcant biases in the media, opposition
parties that are poorly organized in comparison with parties in power
103
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
that are led by authoritarians, and weak ties between political repre-
sentatives and the citizenry. Also common in this category are several
other characteristics that undermined the develop ment of accountable
governmentin particular, rapid turnover in governments (a char-
acteristic that Poland also shared), an inability of citizens to counteract
the power of the state through associational ties with each other (or
what has been termed civil society), and a sharp divide between urban
and rural politics, with the latter more consistently supportive of au-
thoritarian rule.
3
It is safe to conclude, therefore, that the Baltic countries, Poland,
the Czech Repub lic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Roma-
nia fully meet democratic standards and, given their political stability
as well as the support of the European Union (either as new members
as of May 1, 2004, or, in the fnal two cases, as members who joined the
EU three years later), are very likely to continue as democratic regimes
in the future. At the same time, Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia,
Serbia, Montenegro, and Ukraine have all made signifcant progress
since 2000 in building more democratic polities.
A democratic Central and Eastern Europe, therefore, has fnal-
ly come into being. In this sense, the pessimists were proven wrong,
whereas the optimists seem to have been validatedbut with one im-
portant qualifcation. As our division of this chapter suggests, democ-
ratization in Central and Eastern Europe has come in two stages. Te
frst wave, as already oudined, featured an immediate and sharp break
with the communist past, or a process wherein massive demonstrations,
a large and unifed opposition embracing liberal politics, and commu-
nists who were marginalized (as in the Czech Republic), ideologically
sympathetic to the goals of the opposition (as in Hungary and Slove-
nia), or sufciently self-interested in the face of a powerful opposition
to recognize the logic of defecting from dic tatorship (as in the Baltic
countries) combined to end the old order and lay the groundwork for
competitive elections that the forces in support of democratic politics
then won handily. While this scenario describes what happened with
most of the early democratizers in the region, there were some varia-
tions on these dynamics that should be noted. Tus, in both Poland and
Hungarythe two countries that in efect jump-started the collapse of
cornmunism in 1989the critical political turning point was in fact a
roundtable between the communists and the opposition forces (with
the roundtable following signifcant protests in Poland in fall 1988, and
104
Political Sociology
the roundtable in Hungary strongly infuenced by the surpris ing po-
litical outcome of the Polish precedent). In both cases, the roundtable
set the stage for subsequent elections, which were semicompetitive in
Poland and fully competitive in Hungary. However, in both cases, non-
communist governments were formed, with their predictable impact
on deepening the democratic momentum.
Te second wave, or developments that took place in Albania, Bul-
garia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and
Ukraine from 1996 to 2009, shared one overarching similarity. Found-
ing elections in all of these cases had compromised the transition to
democracyeither through the victory of the ex-communists, who
were divided in their commitments to democratic politics, or through
the victory of nationalist oppositions, who were ofen more illiberal
than their ex-communist counterparts. However, subsequent elections
changed the political balance in ways that, in contrast to the earlier pe-
riod of transition, better served a democratic outcome. In this sense, a
key issue in all of these countries was the growth of political competi-
tion during the transitiona pattern that we also fnd in the frst de-
mocracies and that, because it produced turnover in govern ing parties
and coalitions, contributed to the deepening of democratic politics.
Explaining the Second Wave: Domestic Factors
... Indeed, what is striking is the importance of both domestic and
international factors, both of which pushed in a similar liberalizing di-
rection. On the domestic side, we can point to two infuences. One is
suggested by the fact that, if we look at postcommunist Eurasia as a
whole (or add to our Central and Eastern European group the remain-
ing twelve Soviet successor states), we fnd a high correlation between
contemporary political arrangements and the duration of Communist
Party rule. All of the states of interest in this volume are democratic,
and they all became communist afer World War II. By contrast, the
record of democracy in those Soviet successor states where commu-
nism was in place since World War I is far more mixed, featuring, for
example, clear-cut dictatorships, as in Belarus and Uzbekistan; low-
quality democracies, as with Ukraine prior to the Orange Revolution
in 2004; and formerly relatively democratic orders that have moved de-
cisively in a dictatorial direction, such as those in Armenia and Russia.
What makes this comparison even more instructive is the durability,
albeit continued fragility, of democracy in Moldovathe only Soviet
successor state, aside from the Baltic countries and the western part
105
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
of Ukraine, which was added to the Soviet Union afer World War II.
Just as striking, given the Armenian, Russian, and Belarusian cases, is
that there have been no cases of democratic breakdown in Central and
Eastern Europe since the end of Communist Party hegemony (though
the period of Vladimir Meciars rule in Slovakia afer the breakup of
the Czechoslovak federa tion certainly compromised Slovak democratic
performance in the short term).
Why is the length of Communist Party rule so important? Two
plausible factors come to the fore. First, a longer experience with com-
munism means deeper penetration of communist ideology, institutions,
and practices penetration that was secured in part by the number of
generations that lived under communist rule. Tis could make a transi-
tion to democracy more difcult, because of the absence of democracy-
supporting institutions and values and because of the constraints on
the development of a viable political opposi tion. Te second reason is
also historical in nature, but asks us to think in broader terms about
what this correlation means. Te countries of concern in this volume
all have a long history of close connections to Western economies, cul-
tures, and political ideas a history that was abruptly ended by the rise
of communism during and immediately afer World War II. Te geo-
graphical proximity to the West, therefore, may have been important
in laying the groundwork, once opportunities for political change pre-
sented themselves, for subsequent democratic development. Te ability
of these countries to withstand the challenge of communism, of course,
was aided by the brevity of the com munist experience especially, for
example, the unusually brief duration of Stalinization, when the most
antidemocratic aspects of state socialism were imposed.
17
Te second domestic factor focuses particularly on those countries
where illiberal nationalists came to power afer the deregulation of the
Communist Partys monopoly: that is, Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia.
What happened in all three cases is that the lib eral opposition, having
been divided and demobilized by the struggle over the national ques-
tion, fnally managed to regroup and remobilize and thereby win elec-
tions. Te literature on both nationalism and democratic transitions is
in fact silent about these kinds of questions, focusing far more on why
illiberal nationalist leaders either lose or win during regime change
than on why, having won for a time, they then lose power and political
agendas are freed to move in a more liberal direction. What is striking
about our three cases is that there are in fact two commonalities. One
106
Political Sociology
is that the opposition was able to focus on the threats and costs of one
leader in particular (Meciar, Tudjman, and Milosevic), and the other
is that international actors, including the EU, the United States, and
transnational networks of nongovernmental organizations, played an
im portant role in providing support to the oppositionfor example,
training them in the art of resistance, providing electoral monitors,
and helping them organize campaigns to increase voter registration
and electoral turnout.
TASK 6. 2.
) what were the three types of polltlcal reglmes ln the post-communlst Central
and lastern luropean countrles! lnumerate the states that belonged to these
types.
z) 0escrlbe the dynamlcs of the polltlcal development ln the states of reglon after
they regalned thelr lndependencles.
,) what are the two lnternal factors that explaln polltlcal dynamlcs after !
6. 3. Economic Transition from Central Planning to
Market Economy
TEXT 6. 3.: Fisher, Sharon (2011), Re-Creating the Market, in
Wolchik L. Sharon, Curry L. Jane, Central and East European
Politics: From Communism to Democracy. Rowman & Littlefeld
Publishers, Inc., p. 5382.
Transforming the economies of Central and Eastern Europe was prob-
ably the most com plicated aspect of the transition from communism.
At the start of the reform process, there was no single model for how
the changes should be carried out. Te postcommunist transition was
unique. Unlike the transitions in Latin America and elsewhere in the
world, there was no real market economy on which to build, so the old
state economy had to be dismanded as a market economy was devel-
oped. Tus, reforms happened in a rather haphazard way, and most
knowledge of the transition process was formed afer the fact.
In retrospect, the two most important factors in determining the
economic success of Central and East European countries seem to have
been initial conditions and the strength of commitment of successive
governments to reforms (1). Te Central and East European countries
began the transition from communism from somewhat disparate start-
107
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
ing points. Some, such as Hungary and Poland, had a head start: they
had begun reforms during the fnal years of the communist era. Others,
such as the Czech Republic, benefted from a strong manufacturing tra-
dition. Te more advanced countries in the region were generally those
with close proximity to Western markets, whether because of historical
traditions or the ease of trade and investment ties with the EU. Tis sit-
uation made it easier to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and turn
from trade with the East (the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) to the
West. For example, despite being substantially behind the Central Eu-
ropean countries at the end of the communist era, the three Baltic states
benefted in the transition period from cooperation with their Nordic
neighbours. Te countries that experienced the bulk of their industrial-
ization during the communist era ofen had a more difcult economic
transition, especially when they were far from Western markets.
Te other key factor determining the success or failure of the ini-
tial economic re forms was the policy approach of the new governments.
While the political developments in each individual country had a
substantial impact on the way market-oriented reforms were carried
out, the economic situation also had a major efect on politics, as fckle
populations frequently shifed their support from government to op-
position depending on which side was promising prospects of greater
well-being. It is important to keep in mind that frequent changes in
government, ofen brought on by popular dissatisfaction with how the
economic reforms worked, contributed to a lack of continuity in the
reform process throughout the region.
Te way communism ended in the various countries of Central and
Eastern Europe also had a signifcant impact on the approach govern-
ments took to economic reforms. ... Communists or former commu-
nists initially remained in control in Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and
Albania but were ousted in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the
three Baltic states. As a result, reforms were considerably faster in the
latter countries in the early 1990s. Once the pace was set, successive
governments generally continued with the reform process, even when
the reformed communists came to power. By the mid to late 1990s,
prospects for EU accession also helped push them along.
... Formally, communist economic policy was based on a protection
of workers interests through a dictatorship of the proletariat. In prac-
tice, however, the Communist Party leadership controlled all social and
economic organizations and made all major decisions about the econo-
108
Political Sociology
my. All appointments, including the managers of enterprises, had to be
approved by the party, whether by the Central Committee or local or-
gans. Tose who were part of the party nomenklatura (defned as a list of
people from which high-level government appointments were selected)
were provided with special rights and privileges to motivate them.
... Central planning was another important aspect of communist
economic policy, with a focus on quantity rather than on quality or
proft. Te measure of success was the level of production rather than
personal consumption. Prices in this system were regu lated, and fxed
prices at both the wholesale and retail levels meant that open infation
was never a problem. In regard to labor, the communist system ofered
full employment. Tose who did not work were considered parasites.
A balanced budget, on the surface at least, was another element of the
communist economic program.
Foreign trade was regulated by the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) trading bloc, which was established by the Soviet
Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hun gary, Poland, and Romania in
1949, in response to the United States ofer to some of these countries
of aid through the Marshall Plan (and the Soviet Unions insistence
that they refuse). Within CMEA (also known as Comecon), a system
of international specialization was laid out so that diferent goods were
produced in diferent pans of the region to meet Soviet needs (and also
those of the bloc as a whole). Tis policy ensured that no state could
stand alone economically. It did not work like a common market; in-
stead trade was negoti ated and conducted bilaterally, with oversight
from the Soviet Union.
... Afer all, decisions were made at the Central Planning Commis-
sion based on political goals. Citizens relied on their personal connec-
tions to obtain goods and services. Tis meant that corruption was
rampant, a trend that has continued to the present day.
Privatization was a crucial aspect of the restructuring process be-
cause most signifcandy it improved the efciency of resource allocation
and contributed to stronger budget constraints on enterprises. Private
frms divested themselves of unproftable sectors and laid of excess em-
ployees. Privatization also had positive spillover efects throughout the
economy. It helped to spur the development of entrepreneurial spirit.
Moreover, receipts from privatized enterprises improved the states fscal
position as it struggled with reforms. Finally, although the privatization
process itself was ofen plagued by corruption, the sale of state-owned
109
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
frms eventually contributed to a reduction in the power of government
policy makers by establishing new, private owners. ... Te privatization
process across Central and Eastern Europe began through the sale of
small-scale enterprises, typically through auctions, direct sales, or give-
aways, or through restitution schemes that returned properties to their
precommunist owners. ... Despite these very diferent starting points,
small-scale privatization was accomplished with rela tive ease and was
close to completion within one to two years in most countries. ... Priva-
tization agencies were created to choose which frms should be sold and
establish the rules and regulations for the sales. Te main methods used
were manager-employee buyouts (MEBOs), voucher schemes, direct
sales, initial public oferings (IPOs), and public tenders. Te strategies
varied be tween countries. Countries would typically choose one main
method and combine it with a mix of other approaches.
Privatization through MEBOs involved selling the enterprise to the
current manage ment and employees at discounted prices or sometimes
simply transferring ownership without a cash payment. Tat is why the
approach is ofen referred to as an insider model. While MEBOs are
relatively quick, simple, and popular with the workers, they are also
Transparency Internationals Corruption Ratings for Central and
East European States, 20052009
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Vontenegro ,. ,.| ,., ,.o z.8
ulgarla ,.8 ,. |. |.o |.o
Romanla ,.8 ,.8 ,.) ,. ,.o
Vacedonla ,.8 ,. ,., z.) z.)
Serbla ,., ,.| ,.| ,.o z.8
Albanla ,.z ,.| z. z. z.|
osnla and lerzegovlna ,.o ,.z ,., z. z.
ukralne z.z z., z.) z.8 z.
110
Political Sociology
inefcient. Use of the MEBO method slowed the restructuring of the
enterprises management and operations; required continued state sup-
port, given the dearth of funds the employees and managers had for
investment; failed to bring in the required market expertise; and lef the
state with little or no monetary compensation for the sale of the enter-
prise. Slovenia is the only country from the Central and East European
region that had real success in using the MEBO approach, probably
because its economy was already well integrated with Western Europe
when the transition started.
Te voucher or coupon method involved the transfer of shares in
state-owned com panies to citizens. When using this method, citizens
are given coupons for nominal sums (or sometimes for free). Tey trade
these coupons for shares in frms or investment funds. Te main advan-
tages of the coupon method have been its speed, relative ease of admin-
istration, and equitability. In Central and East European countries,
coupon privatization was presented as a way of garnering public sup-
port to continue market reforms by turn ing citizens into shareholders.
Nonetheless, like the MEBOs, coupon programs failed to bring in the
funds needed for enterprise restructuring. Another downside was that
the difusion of ownership translated into weak corporate governance,
which narrowly defned refers to the relationship between a company
and its shareholders. Both the coupon and MEBO methods allowed for
the transfer of property in capital-starved economies, but state budgets
did not beneft from the temporary boost in revenues that privatization
can bring. Te coupon method was frst launched in Czechoslovakia in
1992 and was soon copied in other countries.
Direct sales and public tenders were among the most common
forms of privatization in Central and Eastern Europe. Tese were usu-
ally managed by the state privatization agency. In theory, direct sales go
to the highest bidder. However, in practice, corruption can be rampant
in direct sales due to the lack of transparency. Unlike direct sales, pub-
lic tenders are not based solely on the level of privatization proceeds
but rather on the premise of achieving the highest long-term economic
growth potential.
Te private sectors share of GDP has been closely correlated with
the success of a countrys overall reforms. In countries that implement-
ed rapid economic reforms, over 70 percent of the economy was in pri-
vate hands a decade afer the transition began. Tat share was generally
at less than 50 percent in the gradual reformers.
111
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
GDP per Capita, 20002009
Country zoop zoo8 zoo zooo
Slovenla 8 8 8o
Czech Republlc 8o 8o ), 8
Slovakla )z )z ,) ,o
Croatla | , , |
lungary , | , ,,
lstonla z ) ,) |,
Poland , , |8
llthuanla ,, z ,o ,
latvla | ,) | ,)
Romanla |, |) ,| z
Vontenegro |, |, n.a n.a.
ulgarla | | ,| z8
Serbla ,) , n.a. n.a.
Vacedonla ,, ,| z) z)
osnla and lerzegovlna ,o , n.a. n.a.
Despite the challenges still faced throughout the Central and East
European region, many countries have managed to emerge from the
shadow of communism. In economic terms, the transition is deemed
complete when sof-budget constraints are eliminated and for merly
state-owned companies begin performing like competitive enterprises.
Tus, the end of the transition is defned as the point when the wide
diferential in the productivity of labor and capital among new versus
old frms that exists at the start of the transition has eroded. It marks
a time when there are no more distinctions between old, restructured,
and new companies.(19) Policy makers are no longer focused on issues
that are specifc to the postcommunist transition, but instead are facing
problems shared by more advanced, Western economies.
TASK 6. 3.
) 0escrlbe the two most lmportant factors that contrlbuted to the success of eco-
nomlc reforms ln the countrles of Central and lastern lurope.
z) low adequate was the declaratlon of Sovlet ldeology that states economy
served to the worklng people (proletarlat)! what ls nomenclature!
,) what ls planned economy!
|) 0n what prlnclples (methods) was the prlvatlzatlon based! what was the rela-
tlonshlp between prlvatlzatlon and corruptlon!
,) when ls an economlc transltlon perlod consldered to be over!
112
Political Sociology
Additional readings:
Please, read the full article Fisher, Sharon (2011), Re-Creating the
Market, in Wolchik L. Sharon, Curry L. Jane, Central and East Eu-
ropean Politics: From Communism to Democracy. Rowman & Little-
feld Publishers, Inc., p. 5382.
Tere you will fnd out more about the reforms in others felds
such like social policy, tax reforms, and labour market reforms.
6. 4. Nation-Building and National Minorities in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe
6. 4. 1. Conditions of National Minorities
TEXT 6. 4. 1.: Kymlicka, Will (2001), Western Political Teory
and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, in Kymlicka, Will;
Opalski, Magda (eds.) Can liberal pluralism be exported?: Western
Political Teory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. Oxford
University Press, p. 6062.
So in terms of the frst half of the nation-building/minority rights dia-
lectic, we certainly see that states in ECE [East Central Europe] are us-
ing various tools of nation-building to protect and difuse a dominant
societal culture.
I have already mentioned one important diference in the response
of minorities in ECE. Unlike the West, the option of mass emigration is
a serious one for some groups. We can see several examples of minority
fight. In some cases, virtually the entire minority popula tion has lef.
For example, virtually all ethnic Germans and Jews have lef Central
Asia for Germany or Israel. (50) In other cases, there has been sizeable
migration, sometimes into the hundreds of thousands. Tis is true of
the ethnic Russians leaving Kazakhstan for Russia; ethnic Hungarians
leaving Transylvania and Vojvodina for Hungary; or ethnic Greeks
leaving southern Albania for Greece. (56) In all of these cases, there
has been a sizeable migration, although most members of the minority
group have stayed behind.
In most cases, however, the option of mass migration is neither fea-
sible nor desirable for minorities. And where minorities are staying,
we might expect that they respond to state nation-building policies by
113
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
demanding various kinds of minority rights. And that indeed is what
we see. In Moldova, for instance, both the demands of the Gagauz and
of the Slavic community of Trans-Dniestr refected, at least initially, a
reactive nationalism, responding to the assertive nation-building poli-
cies of the Moldovan majority (Chinn and Roper 1995; Ethnobarometer
1999: 627; Kaiser 1994: 3647; Tompson 1998). Most of the cases of
minority separatism which emerged between the end of the 1980s and
the beginning of the 1990s in the former Soviet Union in Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine were initially a response to major-
ity nation-building pro jects initiated in the republics (Ethnobarometer
1999: ch. 2). Similarly, the demands of the Turks in Bulgaria were a re-
sponse to the pressure they faced to assimilate to the Bulgarian major-
ity (Tomova 1998). Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia also reacted
in the early 1990s to radical nationalizing policies (Ethnobarometer
1999: ch. 3). More generally, whenever a majority attempts to defne the
state as uninational, national minorities have responded by demanding
recogni tion as a distinct society or constituent nation. (57)
In all of these cases, claims for minority rights are not necessar-
ily evidence that minorities have become aggressive and assertive, but
rather can be seen as defensive responses to the threats posed by asser-
tions of majority nation-building. In this sense, the basic framework
which Western political theorists are now using to understand minor ity
rights seems broadly applicable to ECE. Tat is, we should view minor-
ity rights as a response to actual or perceived injustices that arise in the
course of majority nation-building. (58)
... In some cases, pre-existing forms of minority autonomy were
scrapped: Serbia revoked the autonomy of Kosovo/Vojvodina; Georgia
revoked the autonomy of Abkhazia and Ossetia; Azerbaijan revoked
the autonomy of Ngorno-Karabakh. Indeed the revoking of minority
autonomy was ofen one of the frst things that these countries chose
to do with their new-found freedom afer the collapse of Commu-
nism. (60) In other cases, requests to restore historic forms of autonomy
were rejected Romania refused to restore the autono my to Transyl-
vania which had been revoked in 1956. In yet other cases, requests to
create new forms of autonomy were dismissed Estonia rejected a ref-
erendum supporting autonomy for Russian dominated Narva; Kazakh-
stan rejected autonomy for ethnic Russians in the north; Ukraine re-
jected a referendum supporting autonomy for ethnic Romanian areas;
Lithuania rejected requests for autonomy by ethnic Poles; Macedonia
114
Political Sociology
rejected a referendum for autonomy for Albanian-dominated Western
Macedonia in 1992. (61) And in yet other cases, countries have redrawn
boundaries to make it impossible for autonomy to be adopted in the
futureSlovakia redrew its internal boundaries so that ethnic Hungar-
ians would not form a majority within any of the internal administra-
tive districts, and hence would have no platform to claim autonomy;
Croatia redrew internal boundaries in Krajina and West Slavonia to
dilute Serbian-populated areas. (62)
TASK 6. 4. 1.
) Vake a revlew on how dlerent states treated natlonal mlnorltles.
z) low do you understand the problem of natlonal mlnorltles ln post-communlst
states! ls lt natlonal mlnorltles aggresslon or the consequence of natlonal
pollcy!
6. 4. 2. Western Solution to Minorities Claims and the Particularities
of Central Eastern Europe
TEXT 6. 4. 2.: Kymlicka, Will (2001), Western Political Teo-
ry and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, in Kymlicka, Will;
Opalski, Magda (eds.) Can liberal pluralism be exported? Western
Political Teory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. Oxford
University Press, p. 1666.
As I noted earlier, Western theorists have had little explicit to say about
how a democratic state should deal with ethnocultural diver sity. But in
so far as they had an answer at all, it was that the state should be neutral
with respect to ethnocultural diferences. Liberal states should be neu-
tral with respect to the ethnocultural identities of their citizens, and in-
diferent to the ability of ethnocultural groups to reproduce themselves
over time. Tere is growing recognition, however, that this idea of
ethno cultural neutrality is simply a myth. Indeed, the claim that lib-
eral- democratic states or civic nations are ethnoculturally neutral
is manifestly false, both historically and conceptually. However, at
one point or another, virtually all liberal democracies have attempted to
difuse a single societal culture throughout all of its territory. Tey have
all engaged in this process of nation-building that is, a process of
promoting a common language, and a sense of common membership in,
and equal access to, the social institutions operating in that language.
4

Decisions regarding ofcial languages, core curriculum in education,
115
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
and the requirements for acquiring cit izenship, have all been made with
the express intention of difusing a particular culture throughout soci-
ety, and of promoting a particular national identity based on participa-
tion in that societal culture. Other common tools of nation-building in
the West have included the development of a national media, the adop-
tion of national symbols and holidays, the renaming of streets, towns,
and topographic fea tures, such as rivers or mountains, in the majority
language to memo rialize majority heroes or events, and so on. (5)
we see the emergence of various quasi-federal forms of territorial
autonomy. For example, Britain has recently adopted a quasi-federal
system of devolution to Scotland and Wales, which now have their own
legislative assemblies. And while Puerto Rico is not part of the Ameri-
can federal system that is, it is not one of the ffy statesit has a
special self-governing status within the United States as a Common-
wealth. Similarly, while Italy and Finland are not federations, they have
adopted special forms of terri torial autonomy for the German-speakers
in South Tyrol; and for the Swedes in the Aland Islands. In all of these
cases, territorial auton omy enables national minorities to establish and
govern their own public institutions, ofen operating in their own lan-
guage, including schools, universities, courts, and regional parliaments.
Following Philip Resnick (1994), I will call these multination fed-
erations. Tey are not all federations in the technical sense, but they all
embody a model of the state in which national minorities are fed erated
to the state through some form of territorial autonomy, and in which
internal boundaries have been drawn, and powers distributed, in such
a way as to ensure that each national group is able to main tain itself as
a distinct and self-governing societal culture.
Tis trend towards multination federalism is very widespread in the
West. Amongst the Western democracies with national minorities, only
France and Greece have frmly rejected any notion of territorial autono-
my for their historic minorities. Most national minorities have substan-
tially more autonomy than they had 30 or 50 years ago, and few if any?
national minorities have had their autonomy reduced over that period.
Tis trend is, I believe, one of the most important developments in
Western democracies in this century. We talk a lotand rightly so
about the role of the extension of the franchise to Blacks, women, and
the working class in democratizing Western societies. But in its own way,
this shif from suppressing to accommodating minority nation alisms has
also played a vital role in consolidating and deepening democracy. (21)
116
Political Sociology
However, the adoption of multination federalism in ECE coun-
tries is complicated by two factors not present in the West. First, there
is the legacy of the pseudo-federalisms of the Communist regimes in
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. Te constitution of
these federations contained a division of powers between the central
and local levels of government, but in reality all power was centralized
in the hands of the Communist Party which imposed its will on the
subunits. As Dorf puts it, these countries were federal in structure, but
entirely lacking in federalist procedures that is, lacking any tradition
of partnership, negotiated co-operation and open bargaining concern-
ing the accommodation of ethnic diversity (Dorf 1994: 1001). Feder-
alism of this sort was not adopted as a way of encouraging people to
understand and accept the enduring diversity of interests and identities,
but rather as a mechanism of centralized control over the expression of
ethnicity, so as to remove any potential for any ethnic mobilization that
was independent of the central state and Communist Party (Lynn and
Novikov 1997: 1878).
Second, and more important, many national minorities in ECE
have a kin-state nearby that they might hope to join or rejoin, and so
are potentially irredentist. Tis is quite diferent from national minori-
ties in Western Europe, most of whom do not have a neigh bouring kin-
state. Te Catalans, Basques, and Scots might occasion ally entertain
the thought of secession, but it would not be in order to join some larger
state to which they feel tied by bonds of ethnic ity. Many of the most
difcult ethnic conficts in ECE involve national minorities that have a
neighbouring kin-state. Te problem in such cases is not just that the
minority may have a longing to rejoin their kin-state, but also the po-
tential for political and even military intervention by the kin-state in
order to protect the inter ests of their people. Te paradigm example
of this was the way the Nazis encouraged ethnic Germans in Czecho-
slovakia to lodge com plaints about their treatment, and then used these
complaints as grounds for invasion.
Many people in ECE fear that a similar situation may arise today.
Tis fear arises in the context of ethnic Russians both in Crimea (Jawor-
sky 1998; Marples and Duke 1995) and in the Baltics (Pettai 1998; Mitro-
fanov 1998); the Russifed Cossacks in Kazakhstan and the Northern
Caucasus (Opalski 1998); the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Roma-
nia (Mihalikova 1998; Nelson 1998; Andreescu 1997); the ethnic Alba-
nians in Macedonia (Strazzari 1998); the ethnic Romanians in Ukraine
117
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
(Jaworsky 1998); and the ethnic Serbs in Bosnia or Croatia (Crnobrnja
1998). It seems to me that there is a further factor at play here
namely, the historical relation between the minority and external pow-
ers. In many cases, minorities are seen, rightly or wrongly, as allies or
col laborators with external powers that have historically oppressed the
majority group. Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia are a relatively
small and powerless minority 1015 per cent of the population in each
country but Slovakians and Romanians perceive them as the embodi-
ment of centuries of oppression under the Habsburgs. Te Russians in
Estonia and Latvia are not seen as a weak and disenfran chised minority
group, but as a reminder and manifestation of former Soviet oppression.
Te Muslim Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia, or the Muslim Turks
in Bulgaria, are seen as a reminder of centuries of oppression under the
Muslim Ottomans. (70)
In short, the problem is not just that the minority has a kin-state,
but rather the historical fact that the minority collaborated with this
kin-state in oppressing the majority group. Tis, I think, is truly dis-
tinctive to Eastern Europe, not found in the West except perhaps in
Ireland and Cyprus. (71)
TASK 6. 4. 2.
) ls lt true that western llberal democracles are neutral ln regard to ethnlc plural-
lsm because they respect the rlghts of mlnorltles!
z) low does the multlnatlonal federallsm work ln the west! why does the authors
call lt one of the most lmportant developments ln western democracles ln thls
century that had an lmportant role ln the consolldatlon of democracy!
,) what are the two reasons that do not let the model of multlnatlonal federatlon
to be applled ln the states of Central and lastern lurope!
|) what ls the role of a kln-state ln lnternatlonal relatlonshlps and ln the lssue of
natlonal mlnorltles wlthln the country! Clve some examples regardlng Russlan
mlnorlty ln latvla and lstonla and Pollsh mlnorlty ln llthuanla or the other ex-
amples you know.
,) Apply the materlal you have read to the analysls of your own country. ln your
oplnlon, what are the reasons to refuse cultural and natlonal autonomy to na-
tlonal mlnorltles ln your country!
) Vake the analysls and polnt out the advantages and dlsadvantages of glvlng
autonomy to Pollsh mlnorlty ln llthuanla. what solutlons and why would you
oer ln order to solve thls problem!
118
Political Sociology
6. 4. 3. Can Socioeconomic Modernization and Maturity of Democracy
Diminish the Claims of National Minorities?
TEXT 6. 4. 3.: Kymlicka, Will (2001), Western Political Teo-
ry and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, in Kymlicka, Will;
Opalski, Magda (eds.) Can liberal pluralism be exported? Western
Political Teory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. Oxford
University Press, p. 8284.
Western countries have learned some hard lessons over the years about
the management of ethnic relations in a democracy Yet there are
many ways in which the problems in former Communist countries are
unique, and for which the West ofers no models or solutions.
But there is one more lesson which Western democracies have
learned which I have not yet discussed, although it is perhaps the
most important of all namely, that controversies and conficts over
the management of ethnocultural diversity wont go away, or sponta-
neously resolve themselves. Tey are a permanent and enduring feature
of liberal democracies that must be tackled head-on.
Tis is an important point, so Id like to conclude by clarifying it.
Until very recently, many Western liberals hoped and expected that eth-
nocultural cleavages would disappear, and they blamed the per sistence
of ethnocultural conficts on temporary factors that they assumed
would fade over time. Western liberals used to argue that ethnocultural
confict was really a by-product of some other, deeper problem, and
would fade once this deeper problem was resolved.
For example, some liberals argued that the real problem was incom plete
democratization and the rule of law, and that conficts over these issues
were displaced onto ethnocultural conficts. On this view, once democratic
rights and institutions were efectively established and accessible to all citi-
zens, people would stop mobilizing on the basis of ethnocultural afliation.
Other liberals argued that ethnocultural confict was a substitute for
modernization and economic well-being. On this view, the real problem
was that some people felt lef behind in the process of mod ernization.
and once a certain level of economic development was achieved and
accessible to all citizens, people would stop mobilizing on the basis of
ethnocultural afliation.
Yet other liberals argued that ethnocultural confict was due to the
persistence of irrational personal stereotypes and prejudices, based on
ignorance of the other. On this view, once people acquired and inter-
119
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
nalized democratic habits of tolerance and mutual respect, there would
be no need to mobilize on the basis of ethnocultural afliation.
Or, fnally, some liberals argued that ethnocultural confict was the
result of foreign meddling in domestic politics, and the use of foreign
agents provocateurs who spread lies and distortions to encour age oth-
erwise satisfed minorities to complain about their treatment. On this
view, once accurate information was available, and foreign interference
was exposed, then ethnocultural mobilization would fade away.
All of these various explanations for ethnocultural confict implied
that once a prosperous democracy was frmly established, both insti-
tutionally and in terms of the larger public culture, then the strength
and political mobilization of ethnocultural identities would disappear
or at least substantially decrease.
But we now know that these predictions were wrong. Tere is not a shred
of evidence from Western democracies that the achievement of democracy,
economic prosperity, and personal tolerance will lead to an abatement of
ethnocultural mobilization. On the contrary, ethnocultural demands have
increased, not decreased, throughout the West even as these goals were
being achieved. Te achievement of democratization, prosperity, and toler-
ance has gone hand in hand with increased ethnocultural mobilization.
Consider relations between the French and English in Canada. Forty
years ago, the Qubcois were poor and politically quiescent, governed
by autocratic political lites in collusion with the Catholic Church, and
were subjected to great discrimination and prejudice from English-
speaking Canadians. Today, they have the same stand ard of living as
English-speaking Canadians, have a vibrant democ racy within Quebec,
and are more than proportionately represented in the federal govern-
ment and bureaucracy. Public opinion polls show that English prejudice
against the French has virtually disappeared as has French prejudice
against the English. On a personal level, there is virtually no animosity,
dislike, or discomfort between members of the two groups. For example,
the overwhelming majority of both groups would be happy if someone
from the other group moved next door, or married into the family.
One might expect, then, that Qubcois nationalism would have
abated over the last forty years. In fact, just the opposite has occurred.
Support for Quebec nationalism has grown steadily. Tis is not unique
to Canada. We see the same phenomenon in Belgium, where democrati-
zation and economic development in Flanders have gone hand-in-hand
with increased Flemish nationalism; and in Spain, where democratiza-
120
Political Sociology
tion and economic prosperity in Catalonia have been accompanied by
increased Catalan nationalism. And we can see the same trend amongst
many immigrant groups, which fght tena ciously for recognition of
their ethnic identity even as they gain the same level of economic well-
being and political representation as the majority group.
Democracy, economic prosperity, and personal tolerance are all
great goods, of course valuable in and of themselves. But they are not
by themselves, or even when taken together, an answer to the issues of
ethnocultural diversity. Te accommodation of ethnocultural diversity
will remain a powerful source of confictand may indeed increase in
strengtheven when all of these other goods are in place. Tis is the most
important lesson that the West has had to learn. It was only when Western
governments accepted this fact that they were able to begin learning about
how to manage ethnocultural relations in a peaceful and democratic way,
and to make the sort of progress which I discussed in sections 3 and 4.
I see no reason to think that ECE will difer in this respect. Tere
are many people in ECE countries today who argue that ethnic con-
ficts are really just a substitute for, or displacement of, conficts over in-
complete democratization and inadequate economic development, and
that we should therefore ignore the demands of ethnocultural groups
and focus all our energies on the real problem. Tey say that we can
set aside the demands of the Albanians in Macedonia, for example, or
of Hungarians in Slovakia, since these demands will fade once real de-
mocracy, economic development, and the rule of law are established.
Tese demands are simply a by-product, not the real issue.
Tis denial or denigration of the seriousness of ethnocultural iden-
tities is precisely the mistake which Western democracies have made
again and again, ofen with terrible consequences. It is a mistake that
I hope ECE countries will not repeat. If nothing else is learned from
the Western experience with ethnocultural relations, I hope that ECE
countries recognize the importance of tackling head-on issues of ethn-
ocultural pluralism.
TASK 6. 4. 3.
) what were the maln attltudes ln the west towards the problem of natlonal ml-
norltles!
z) what was the experlence ln the west! ls lt posslble that the problem of natlonal
mlnorltles would be solved by ltself because of the lmproved socloeconomlc
condltlons, democratlc maturlty, and tolerance!
121
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
6. 5. Post-Communist Transformations in Lithuania:
Degradation of State and Society?
TEXT 6. 5.: liogeris, Arvydas (2012), Apie vien kit grsm
Lietuvai, in Nerimas. Svarbiausi humanitarini ir socialini
grsmi bei j pasekmi Lietuvai valgos. Vilnius, p. 7489.
Tis is what I can tell you about Lithuania: there are so many threats
that it is difcult to enumerate them all but the worst is that we are
helpless in their presence. Bigger and stronger states are able to struggle
against the oncoming anthropological catastrophe; more intellectual
and clever nations are able to perceive those threats and make at least
linguistic barriers that, of course, will not stop the food of barbarism
but at least will slow down that inevitable collapse for a moment; in
this situation Lithuania has no technological, military, economic, po-
litical, intellectual, raw, emotional, moral, and, fnally, anthropological
resources at all. Tose twenty years of independency revealed our help-
lessness in almost all areas of life: economic, technological, adminis-
tration, political, cultural, and intellectual. Finally, a pseudo-state that
is wasted by kleptocratic pseudo-political structures and bureaucratic
terror was established. Lithuania is under the demoralizing infuence of
the so-called European project that should bring recovery and fantastic
future which is worthless money from the West and superfcial loans
(that, in fact, are welfare). A long time ago it was well known that the
increase of worthless money is directly proportional to the increase of
the number of demoralised people. Every second worthless currency
unit produces a thief, a bandit, a pretender or a bureaucrat, in one word,
a parasite focused on a single project a way to use worthless money at
the lowest cost. Tis kind of business perfectly works in Lithuania by
means of mechanisms of direct and indirect corruption, the so-called
projects, various non-governmental organizations, municipalities, and
even by means of the so-called business. No matter how paradoxical it
may sound, in my opinion, the biggest threat to Lithuania is the Euro-
pean Union benefts and loans that in a few years have created the entire
caste and even generation of parasites. Only by means of a parasites
psychology it is possible to explain such a catastrophic and incompre-
hensible level of emigration. In this case, we can formulate a symbolic
rule: if I am able to use euro electronic money (pseudo-money), I stay
in Lithuania, if not, I emigrate. Te ideological equivalent of pseudo
122
Political Sociology
food is the all-embracing sweet vision of life created with the help of
show business stars and propagated by the all-fooling media that is for
some reason called the mass media. Te two imperatives 24-hour en-
tertainment! and Beer and victories bring us together! have already
became a norm and perfectly describe the propagated vision; and those
who implement the imperatives are called elite that is mainly com-
prised of commoners who were able to use the fows of pseudo-money.
And one more remark. In Lithuania, for twenty years the efort was
put into consistent, methodical, and even cynical obstruction in order
to prevent the uprise of a real upper caste which is responsible, aristo-
cratic, public-spirited, is distinguished by high intelligence, noble spirit,
statesmanlike thinking, and follows a code of honour and cannot be
eliminated from any normal nation or community; the history does not
recall a case when the state was successfully ruled by the commons or
the so-called the populace or commoners.
I would like to discuss in detail two factors that have disastrous
infuence on Lithuanians soul and consciousness and demoralize not
only the youth but also mature people of weak character; according to
Aristotle, this type of people makes up the majority. Te frst destruc-
tive factor is the so-called mass media or, to be more specifc, the means
of mass communication, primarily television and computerized infor-
mation system that has already become global, including Lithuania; fol-
lowed by, in terms of infuence or, to be more precise, weaker infuence
on human soul, newspapers, magazines, and other traditional means
of mass communication. Tere is no doubt that the biggest infuence
on the majority of Lithuanians is done by television and computers, in
short, the Screen; it is like a concentrate of nowadays ideology or even
religion, it forces this ideology upon more or less every person, and it
is done directly, secretly, irrationally, crafily, and insensibly by means
of discussions, rumours, remainder of values, educational system and
structure. Te magic word that briefy but wrongly conveys the way to
render the Screens ideology is well-known to everybody, it is the so-
called information. As a matter-of-course, the information is presented
not only as a necessary thing but a praiseworthy, targeted, and even de-
sirable way for an individual to learn about the meaning of the present
world, to accumulate as much and as accurate information as possible,
and to become, as it is said, an aware, educated, and well-versed in every
topical issue character who is able to adjust to the rhythm of present
existence, and even to become a creative person who manages to re-
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Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
sponsibly participate in ones career, state or national life, and to follow
the communitys moral order. Tis naive fetishism of information is
perfectly conveyed by the same naive slogan Who owns the informa-
tion, owns the world! which has changed the moral code of traditional
societies and became the most important categorical imperative of the
present. However, this is a naive and even infantile view that actually
hides a terroristic imperative Disorient a character, make chaos in his
soul in order to manipulate him as you wish! As any ideology, the ide-
ology of the Screen directly or secretly seeks only one goal to enslave a
person; and, in our country, the goal is to have an absolute control over
the public life, to make an individual disappear in the unarticulated
hoministic environment, to disorient and demoralize. Te so-called in-
formation and the way it is provided on the Screen is, actually, disinfor-
mation, in other words, it is a total lie or, as nowadays philosophers say
(for example, Jean Baudrillard), it is a simulation of information that
is comprised of units of disinformation; Baudrillard (and others) call
these units simulacrum, i. e., information simulacrum is the accumu-
lation of lies that fools a common villein of the Screen. Te nowadays
global machine of propaganda performs the job of complete fooling in
a really straightforward way; it constantly thrusts heaps of megaloma-
niac information on us. It is silently told or even loudly shouted that the
more information, the better. It means that a person who has the most
information (in a quantitative sense, too) becomes an example. However,
it is nonsense. Te fundamental state of a human being in this world is
defned in a very simple way and is a well known truth: a human being
is a complete being not only as a body but as a soul, too. To put it simply,
every individuals soul is very small and limited, therefore, it cannot
take inside the information that fows from the Screen; the fow of in-
formation destroys individuals soul and the individual becomes a liv-
ing dead, a zombie who lost all the guidelines of mortal life and cannot
make sense of any, even the most simple real life situation that is outside
the Screen. A surplus of the Screen information destroys a persons soul,
demoralizes, cuts the ground from under persons feet, makes a person
into a cosmic or global trump who has no homeland and roots, who
has lost civil responsibility, the feeling of honour, afection, loyalty, who
do not care about social or moral obligations and who becomes a slave
of lowest instincts and an accumulation of physiological processes and
reactions. It is well recognized in Lithuania because the fow of global
information fooded us in a very short time; we were not prepared and
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Political Sociology
had no protectors. However, most importantly, it is strange to us, it is
like incomprehensible demonic and even satanic power that destroys or
maybe has already destroyed the foundation of an inborn Lithuanian
world-view: worm feelings for the land, respect to inhuman nature, sed-
entary life, attachment to familiar, perceptible or visible things, dili-
gence, material-oriented fundamentalism, contempt for abstractions
that are not related to the real materialistic environment, detachment
from ideological fanaticism, healthy irony towards any abstract images.
To my mind, Lithuanian emigration that has reached enormous rates
and is naively believed to be infuenced by the so-called economic rea-
sons as poverty and unemployment is actually infuenced by the fow of
demoralising and disorienting information which almost literally foats
Lithuanians to blessed islands and to the heaven of luxury and mate-
rialism surplus that actually is slavery. Slavery to pseudo-information
images of the Screen becomes a real slavery in plantations, private lands,
factories, public conveniences, whorehouses, projects of technological
pyramids, megalopolis ghettoes for foreigners, gangsters businesses, in
short, in the bottom of technological hell of the so-called developed
countries. I do not know how to escape from the Screens ideology that
has a killing efect and, to my mind, is the biggest threat to Lithuania.
Te only way to survive the informational avalanche or the dragon of
informational lie is to destroy the Screen or at least to turn away from
it. How to do it? If we wanted to try at least to limit the terror of the
Screen and to give that Pseudo-informational Dragon a bridle, for in-
stance, to impose strict censorship, our present masters, the members
of the European Commission in Brussels, would instantly start yelling
about disruption of democracy, violence of human rights and other
bugaboos of the Screens ideology and local protagonists and fanatics
would overload our masters ofces and propaganda centres at Brussels
with complaints. Terefore, to my mind, there is only one solution to
resign ourselves to inevitable faith, self-destruction of Lithuanian peo-
ple, in other words, collective suicide. Tat would be our amorfati that
would warrant, of course, a very short but relatively comfortable and,
for some people, even sweet life.
Another factor that destroys Lithuania and souls of Lithuanians
(thus, it is a threat to the survival of Lithuania) is also related to the
Screen; however, in this case, it is related to the matter of ideological
information instead of the formal structure of informational ideology.
Te matter of ideological information is based on three very important
125
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
factors: apotheosis of luxury and parasite, propaganda of pornography
and violence, and the so-called phantom of equal opportunities. If the
Screens idolatry had its own Decalogue, the frst commandment would
sound like that: You have to (and you can) live in luxury! Te main
topic of Lithuanian Screen, according to our show stars, is 24-hour
entertainment. Te axis of the entertainment is the open, cynic, na-
ive, and even low-level vulgarity which is propagated in the most nasty
ways; pornography is openly propagated or, usually, is covered with fg-
leaves, the central image is sexuality that can be compared to a global
hood which is polled not only on hominids but on inhuman things and
events that have nothing to do with it, too: starting from the rump of the
Screens whore and fnishing with a cow and a bulldozer. Pornographic
plague bacilli that were spread from pornography factories in Califor-
nia (ref. San Antonio Valley) across the whole Earth had caused a real
epidemic in Lithuania: the majority of people, especially young ones,
accepts the epidemic of pornography (that has already started spread-
ing through smart phones) as a natural phenomenon and even idolises
it, for instance, a heroic achievement is uncovering your body that is
a must to everybody starting from a few years old child and fnishing
with a dotard or a bony crone. Pay attention to Lithuanian internet sites
and you will notice that two thirds of informational content consist of
pornography that is covered with a fg-leaf or is completely open. Te
mask of fght against sexual perversions covers even the most pervert-
ed forms of pornography, for example, paedophilia has already become
a day-to-day subject of the Screen and is followed with some kind of
perverted passion. Te pornography itself has become a central image
of an ostensible luxury life style and luxury itself: it seems as if only
those who are unrestricted by sexual immorality or even abnormality
live a good life; in this way, the so-called elite takes over the seeming
values of dregs. Of course, a sweet life can be warranted only by money;
since the already mentioned mass of worthless European money is not
related to job or production, there is another silent imperative estab-
lished: take the money at any price, steal, cheat, fool others, kill, take
bribes or the so-called loans and become a millionaire immediately; in
this way corruption becomes a rule instead of an exception. Te lead-
ers of corruption have already become the elite of the society, so-called
politicians, strictly speaking, the bureaucrats of the upper echelon be-
cause at least once it should be loudly stated that there are no politicians
in the classic sense of this word in Lithuania. Sweet life and luxury is
126
Political Sociology
propagated recklessly and at any price, therefore the Parasite becomes
a model fgure and its image becomes an example to every child in
Lithuania; a small child already knows that only the uneducated (Lith.,
slang runkeliai) work hard and s/he will defnitely become a lawyer,
a manager, a banker, a gangster, a Screens whore, a participant of por-
nographic sessions, or a zombie that howls, dances or shows him or
herself in some other way. By the way, it has another more accurate and
popular name Lithuanian jargon of the Screen elite. Te Screen is
able to turn even the noblest words that once defned a life and mindset
of a noble and honourable man into dirty, vulgar, and pornographic
words. Once, the elite, as Greeks and Romans had it, was the critical
mass of the best most gifed, honourable, noble, brave, respectable, re-
sponsible, educated, noble-minded, noble-behaving, and noble self-pre-
sentation members of the society and the existence of any society was
impossible without the elite. Moreover, to be precise, for instance, in a
Greek pole, in the republic of Rome, and even in the Western European
monarchies, the main right of a person who belonged to the elite was a
right to death because only a noble person had a right to keep and use
a gun primarily as a soldier who protected the country in the cruellest
battles until death. Te real elite consisted of Patricians, eupatrids, and
blood and language aristocracy. Nowadays elite (not only in Lithuania)
is opposite to classical elite; it consists of low-level hominids who have
directed their existence and thinking towards the already mentioned
vulgar forms of human and communitys life that are sex, orgies, cloth-
ing, expensive toys, fashion, pornography, and fnally towards apotheo-
sis of the most vulgar demonstration of luxury, catwalk syndrome (a
star, a celebrity), and rufanly perceived power that is demonstrated
through a cynic wastefulness, corruption, and shaking ones fsts. Te
image of our elite is a Hollywood-style star who diligently imitates a
whores or a gangsters life style, gestures, behaviour, and even the way
of speaking. It is not a coincidence that the main slogan of this concen-
tration of vulgarity pseudo-elite is a glorious phrase a right to live;
of course, the life is understood only biologically or even zoologically as
a fulflment of the lowest instincts. Te ostensible luxurious life is fa-
voured with another drug that originated in Hollywood; it is violence,
constraint, sadism, various cruelty, terror, and slaughter, bloody meat
that is shown at close range, sessions of vomiting, scattered guts, drug
taking, demonstration and idolisation of excrements and other abomi-
nations. Violence is spice and peppers of pornographic elites sweet
127
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
life; unfortunately, it is thrust on the population of the Earth including
Lithuanians in every possible way, in the most vulgar forms, and by the
most sophisticated means of dissemination of information. Keep your
ears open to relatively harmless names of the Screens shows: Choir
Wars, Brain Battle. We fell so low than we cannot even be sick; today
nobody is sick, we fght against sickness. Te territory of the Screen is
completely occupied by the American television and flm production;
words are not enough to describe its intellectual level, it is some kind
of apocalyptic debility or debility as apocalypse, unfortunately, it is not
Christian apocalypse but porno-apocalyptic one.
Lithuanians are obedient slaves to Americans, the teachers and mas-
ters of porno debility. In our Screen porno kings and porno princes, por-
no queens and porno princesses, the howling and roaring imbecile be-
came the so-called wunderkinds, talents, and, naturally, stars. All in all,
violence, corruption, and pornography have already become the main
images propagated by Lithuanian mass media, they demoralize not only
children or the youth but mature people as well; the vision of Luxury
and Sweet Life is the only efective vision of Future Lithuania. However,
the majority of Lithuanians, as more or less all normal people, want to
live now and not in the future, therefore they implement the magnif-
cent vision of pornographic luxury by scampering away to Blessed Is-
lands in the so-called developed Western states that for a hundred years
has been seeking for pornographic luxury and achieved... a threshold
of total bankruptcy. I do not know how to resist the orgies of apoca-
lyptic abomination, sadomasochistic pandemic that infected not only
the Screen and art and propagated the so-called nastiness aesthetics,
infected the feld of ideals and values and the wing of everyday life that
is behind the Screen. Maybe we should try to establish a Chief Censor
Institution for the Screens Morality. Te Censors power should not be
less than the power of a censor who served in the Republic of Rome; the
censor should be elected by the civil society and be independent of Sei-
mas (a supplement to the empire of the Screen) and executive; it would
be dependent only on Constitutional Court. Today (it is the main pass-
word used by the Screens imbeciles) I have no other suggestions.
A community cannot exist normally and expect to survive if it does
not have two fundamental things: unwritten code of honour (not so-
called legislation or codes) and the critical mass of people that embody
the code, protect and defend it by their attitude, behaviour, and lan-
guage. Greeks called this kind of people arista, Romans called them
128
Political Sociology
nobiles, patricians, other nations called them diferently, despite that
the rule has no exceptions: if the critical mass of these people is de-
stroyed, dwindle by itself or degenerate, the community is sentenced to
fail, it slowly festers or disappears because of some catastrophic event
or the sequence of such events. Without arista the community gets in-
fected by immunodefciency syndrome or simply loses the instinct of
self-defence; it thirstily drinks poison and naively think that it is vine.
It is very easy to defne a person who belongs to arista; this person is
brave, noble, kind-hearted, free, proud, independent, highly intelligent,
educated, s/he also consciously distinguishes between egoistic interests
and general (community) interests and knows that he cannot excessive-
ly sacrifce general interests in order to satisfy egoistic ones because he
understands that by destroying the community he destroys his or her
own opportunities to survive, it means, s/he does harm to himself and
his ofspring. I dear not speculate on whether Lithuania, the country
that has an exceptionally sad history, has ever had such high-ranking
people as arista; if we believed in historians, our gentleman were more
like fools and mean-spirited fellows than aristas. Twenty years of inde-
pendency has shown that we do not have a mass of such kind of people
and single individuals are powerless and usually destroyed or changed
by the mass of obscurant elite. Our present elite is obscurant, cowardly,
foolish, cruel, aggressive, greedy, crafy, wily, demoralised, and egoistic;
these people completely misunderstand the idea of the state and the so-
called statehood is treated only as an instrument to satisfy ones own
egoistic interests. If there are people in our state who still believe in
bright future of Lithuania (because I have already lost this belief), they
must put all their efort in order to establish the educational institute for
arista (that would be similar to, for instance, Eton College in England).
However, there is one completely obligatory condition: the institute for
arista must be independent of the existing pseudo-education system
and pseudo-universities because that system has already failed as well.
Te terror of obscurant bureaucrats becomes more and more powerful
every day: the bureaucratic system became centralised, professors were
turned into villeins and marionettes that blindly follow every absurd
decree of ministries, departments, so-called managers, experts or busi-
nessmen, the mass higher education turned the pseudo-universities
into a factory of obscure people with diplomas and the education itself
was turned into simulation of education of arista. Any reforms (actually,
further destruction of high education) and the simulation of reforms
Central and Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Transformations
that is already in the process for twenty years cannot rebuild the uni-
versity; on contrary, every step of pseudo-reform anticipates the com-
plete collapse of the university; to tell the truth, the absolute majority of
pseudo-universities are already collapsed and, as it was said by Plato, it
exists only in our heads or, as it was said by Jean Baudrillard, it is noth-
ing more than dead bodies moving in a spiral. However, my own sad
experience shows that the existing pseudo-universities contribute to
mass demoralisation that is propagated by the Screens ideology and by
porno giants (all of them seemingly have diplomas, except a few) who
appear on that Screen. Te institute for arista must be independent of
any bureaucratic institutions and dependent only on the Censor of the
Republic of Lithuania. Probably, the professorship must be hired and
invited from other countries that still have a political backbone, for in-
stance, Norway. If such kind of institute for arista is not established, we
can already state that in ffy years there will be no community called by
the name of Lithuania; there will be a few American-Indian style reser-
vations lef where Lithuanian girls who will not be able to speak Lithu-
anian will be dressed in national costumes and will be dancing national
dances for knuckleheaded tourists and another type of service will be
provided to global boars with pockets full of money in rustic houses.
TASK 6. 5.
) ln your oplnlon, what ls the authors maln ldea!
z) what are the maln threats to llthuanla mentloned by the author!
,) what are your comments on worthless pseudo luropean money, mentloned
by the author, and lts consequence to llthuanla!
|) what ls the role of mass medla ln post-communlst llthuanla!
,) Vake a comment on the authors statement about the new ldeology of the
Screen: apotheosls of luxury and paraslte, propaganda of pornography and
vlolence, and the phantom of so-called equal opportunltles.
) low do you understand the authors statement that that there are no polltl-
clans, ln the classlc sense of thls word, ln llthuanla!
130
7. Methodology of Political Sociology
Introduction
To put it simply, political sociology is a science about the social fun-
damentals of politics or the relationship between the society and the
state (relationship between people and politics). Terefore, political
sociology deals with two very important issues:
if and how politics (political phenomena) form social conditions;
if and how social conditions infuence the politics (political phe-
nomena).
Questions of this type are usually related to an attempt to explain
the conditions that infuence some kind of phenomena or, in other
words, they are related to the search of causalities. For instance, does
economic welfare have an infuence on democratic stability, is social
confdence (peoples trust in other people) considered to be a very
important factor that infuences the quality of democracy, or why do
the people in Eastern and Central Europe mistrust political institu-
tions more than the people in the West? Tus political sociologists
are interested not only in facts (there is a relatively low participation
level in election in Lithuania), they are also interested in reasons and
the processes that infuence the reasons (why the participation level
in election is low in Lithuania). For this reason diferent theories of
political sociology are created; the theories try to explain what and
for what reason exist in the feld of politics (positive theories) rather
than how the political feld should be working (normative theories
4
).
Speaking about the theory of political sociology it is important
to emphasize that, unlike in natural sciences, it is impossible to es-
tablish some kind of law in social sciences. Usually it is about social
regularities or tendencies that are not too specifc in regard to time or
space. Terefore, the aim of political sociology is to feel more general
tendencies and processes in the feld of politics and to reveal more
general causalities. For instance, political sociologists consider that it
is more important to talk about the causes of revolutions in general
4. Te subject of political philosophy.
131
Methodology of Political Sociology
than to analyse one specifc revolution. On the other hand, from the
empirical point of view, deep knowledge about causes and processes
of a specifc revolution is an essential condition in order to develop
and improve general theories. Tus, deep empirical knowledge about
many revolutions allows us to make a conclusion that usually (or in
all the cases that we know) the main cause of revolutions is fnancial
turmoil in the state. So, the names of states are changes into vari-
ables
5
and the main issue in the literature about causalities scientifc
analysis is the search for the relationship between dependent and in-
dependent variables
6
.
Te search for causalities between social and political phenomena
infuences specifc logic of scientifc studies that is called deduction:
the primary attempt is to conceptualize the formulated prob-
lem of the research while making an analysis of academic lit-
erature, i. e., to defne concepts and hypothetic relations be-
tween them;
the defned hypothetic relations between concepts let us formu-
late more or less specifc and empirically verifable hypotheses;
hypotheses are verifed by the means of empirical data: if the
data confrm the hypothesis, the postulates of theories are ver-
ifed and analyzed as well; if the data deny the hypothesis, the
theory is rejected or modifed;
hat is the way how scientifc knowledge is created, modifed,
and developed.
Of course, inductive and abductive reasoning is also used in scien-
tifc researches. Tey are the main ways to perform a research in the
so-called quantitative approach
7
. In this case, at frst the separate po-
5. Przeworski A., Teune H. 1970. Te Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New
York: Wiley.
6. Relationship between variables (they are called variables because they defne
phenomena or characteristics (e. g., identifying oneself with a party) that has
more than one meaning (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, Patriotic Union,
Liberal Movement, the Labour Party etc.); every event (in this case a human)
acquires a meaning (one or another)) is analysed with the help of diferent tech-
niques (usually statistical ones). Te relationship is defned when the signif-
cance of one variable (usually, the dependent one) systemically corresponds to
signifcance of another (or others) variable (usually, independent).
7. Scientifc logic is typical for so-called quantitative researches.
132
Political Sociology
litical phenomena are analysed, afer that the data is generalised and
the result is an abstract (though it is small extent) model or theory of
how a political feld works. Qualitative research allows us to see into
specifc cases or make a deep research of a specifc problem or topic.
Tis kind of analysis is an invaluable source of data for further and
more general research studies because in the process of research you
can verify the already existing theories (every case that verifes or
denies the postulates of the theory is valuable).
In the following discussion we will limit ourselves to deductive rea-
soning and quantitative methodological approach because a qualita-
tive methodology is difcult and requires intensive and universal
analysis of phenomena. In order to demonstrate and teach political
methodology, special courses and didactical guidelines are prepared.
Meanwhile the basic
8
quantitative analysis of political phenomena
can be easily demonstrated in a short introduction because it is easy
to understand and learn. Moreover, the entire course is intended
for topical analyses of political sociology and it is not intended to
introduce political methodology; therefore, an excessive interest in
methodological problems should not overshadow the main topics of
the course.
As it was already mentioned, scientists of political sociology or other
social sciences (following the quantitative methodological approach)
look for regularities or, in other words, general causalities in the feld
of politics, therefore, in order to establish such tendencies it is neces-
sary to perform a large-scale data analysis. It is impossible that a stu-
dent would accumulate a large-scale data qualitatively (on his own)
because it requires high level methodological preparation and huge
organizational and material resources
9
. Terefore, the best alterna-
tive is to use the already accumulated accessible data and to make a
8. Special courses and text books are needed in order to teach more complex
quantitative methods.
9. E. g., in order to make a survey which results would be the base for tendencies
in the feld of Lithuanian politics, the number of participants from the whole
territory of Lithuania should be 3000 5000 and they should be chosen by
chance and representatively. Moreover, the task to make an international com-
parison would be almost impossible.
133
Methodology of Political Sociology
secondary analysis. Tis kind of resources and the secondary analy-
sis will be discussed in the remaining part of this chapter.
7. 1. Secondary Data Analysis and Metadata
Secondary data analysis (hereinafer the SDA) has been widely used
and is still used in social sciences. Usually the SDA is performed
with statistical data. Emile Durkheim, a pioneer of social sciences,
also used statistical data in order to proof that social control has an
infuence on the number of suicides
10
. All in all, the SDA can be de-
fned as the analysis of data and information that was accumulated
by other people (researchers, institutions, NGOs, and etc.) and for
other purposes than the research.
Usually, every (especially, a large-scale) research has a compre-
hensive description that includes the idea and the process of the re-
search, the description of the accumulated data and other informa-
tion that is necessary in order to perform the SDA. With the spread of
nowadays ICT, data is presented in a digital form and kept in digital
archives and is available in the Internet. Terefore, the descriptions
of data and research were related to metadata. Metadata is structur-
ally defned information that describes a document or a source of
information and indicates its place. In this way the fnding, usage,
and control of a document or other source of information becomes
easier. To put it simply, it is data (information) about data. It is nec-
essary to emphasize that the SDA would not exist without this kind
of data about data because pure data usually is a source of encoded
information that cannot be understood by a person who does not
have a description and, therefore, cannot be used.
Te main standard of long-term storage and comprehensive de-
scription of the data of social sciences is DDI (ref. www.ddialliance.
org)
11
. It is used by data archives, statistical ofces, universities, the
10. Durkheim E. 2002. Saviudyb: sociologinis etiudas. Vilnius: Pradai.
11. Te physical expression of DDI is the XML fle. XML is a descriptive language
that describes General data structures and its content. Te main purpose of this
language is to make the exchange of data between diferent systems that are
usually connected via Internet. Te advantage is that it is easy to read for a per-
son and computer. Moreover, with the help of this language it is easy to make
complex data structures, e. g., one fle that contains data and its description.
134
Political Sociology
World Bank, research centres and etc. DDI (version 2.1), together with
data and other technical information, provides you with a detailed
description of a research (or the creation of data) and detailed infor-
mation about the data. If it is available, other documentation and its
description is also provided. For instance, the user is provided with
references to information that is related to the research, i. e., infor-
mational sources that were used by the authors, original documenta-
tion of the research, questionnaires and case-records of the research,
publications based on the data of the research and etc.
Disadvantages of the SDA:
the data not always completely fts the problem at hand be-
cause it was accumulated for some other reason;
it is possible to perform only an abstract intercultural or his-
torical analysis because in order to compare the data on the
basis of time and space, you need to have comparable data and,
as you already know, the political feld is diverse and subject to
change;
it requires a relatively high level of researchers knowledge, es-
pecially in the area of quantitative (statistic) analysis, that is
not always possible;
social (ofcial) statistics is not objective because, as any other
data, it is accumulated by researchers and, therefore, it is sub-
jective; moreover, because of subjectivity the data always con-
tain mistakes and coding defects.
Advantages of the SDA:
if it is performed carefully, it may (quickly and efectively) give
you the answers to general questions of the research;
relatively low expenses;
relatively easy to perform intercultural and historical re-
searches;
available high-quality data;
only intercultural or/and historical research allows us a better
view into the topic;
as it was already mentioned, the repetition of researches and
data analysis is secured by means of the SDA;
135
Methodology of Political Sociology
the SDA helps students to learn the subject because the ma-
jority of statements become clearer (students understand how
something happened) and, also, it helps a lecturer to explain
various topics.
In summary, the SDA secures the principle of accumulation of scien-
tifc knowledge because further development of researches may be
based on secondary data or the new data of the research may be com-
pared with previous ones.
7. 2. Data Sources and Repeated Major International
Sociological Surveys
In order to present the main data sources that may be used to per-
form the SDA, we will start with data types:
the most comprehensive, of course, is the data of population
census (ref. www.stat.gov.lt), however, the census is performed
rarely and usually the information is sociodemographic. More-
over, the access to the data is limited because of confdentiality;
Ofcial statistics (ref. www.stat.gov.lt) that are accumulated
in other ways (usually, representative and probability surveys)
and data of institutions (e. g., data.ukmin.lt/apie.html) are
used more ofen;
Te data from large-scale international or national (organized
by scientists or international institutions) social researches
(usually, surveys) are available and normally used in scientifc
researches. Tese surveys normally are longitudinal (repeated,
panel) or follow-up surveys;
International repeated comparative researches (surveys) will be
discussed in more detail because the analysis of its data let us
make various comparative analyses in the feld of internation-
al history. For instance, we can make a research on how much
Lithuanians trust political institutions afer the restoration of
independence and how their trust has changed in comparison
to other European countries;
A repeated international sociological survey is a research when
the same questionnaire is periodically (every half a year, a year,
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Political Sociology
two years and etc.) given to respondents from many diferent
countries who are selected randomly, by chance or representa-
tively. Te highest possible scientifc standards are applied to
this kind of researches. Te comparison of countries is impor-
tant because diferent societies are treated from the perspective
of general context, therefore, the processes that take place in dif-
ferent countries can be compared and evaluated (for instance,
the research of the whole EU or any other region can be made).
Meanwhile, repeated researches are used to reveal the develop-
ment tendencies of the society. From this point of view, the gold-
en standard is a so-called international panel research (when
the survey is performed repeatedly with the same people in dif-
ferent countries). Tis kind of data analysis is suitable for theo-
ries construction, verifying and development, also for teaching
and learning. Moreover, it may be useful to the implementation
of public policy (lately, the concept of evidence-based public
policy became very popular). On the other hand, this kind of
research is expensive and performed by a huge team of research-
ers (of course, smaller researches are also organised). Also, this
research requires high-level qualifcation. However, the main
data of the researches are available for the secondary analysis;
therefore, the issue of data accumulation is not topical.
A good few of repeated international sociological surveys take place
in the entire World, however, a few of them are of a wide profle (thus
it involves the issues that are topical to political sociology) and are
usually used in serious scientifc publications
12
:
In 1973, an ofcial research for the European Commission has
begun. It is called the Eurobarometer (ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
index_en.htm). It also includes the Eurobarometer of Eastern and
Central Europe (that was performed in 1990-1997) and the Euroba-
rometer of newcomers to-be (that was performed in 2001-2004 m.).
Tis survey is performed during every wave every half a year and has
a part of standard questions.
12. Note that all of them were initiated in Europe; two of them were performed in
European countries.
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Methodology of Political Sociology
In 1981, the European scientists initiated the European Value Study
(www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu). Later on it developed into the World
Value Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), hereinafer the EVS /
the WVS, that is managed by the USA political scientist, Ronald In-
glehart. Tese surveys are performed every 5 10 years (every 9 years
in Europe) and always have more or less the same questionnaire.
In 1984, the scientists from Europe and the USA initiated the
International Social Survey Programme (www.issp.org), hereinaf-
ter the ISSP. Te survey is exceptional because the questions are
diferent in every wave that is performed every year. Every year the
questionnaire is composed of a new group of thematic questions and
these questions are repeated every 510 years.
In 2001, the European Social Survey (www.europeansocialsurvey.
org), hereinafer the ESS, has been started in Europe. Te survey is
performed every two years, a part of questions is the same, another
part is diferent (23 groups of questions are prepared for a new wave
but, if there is a need, the questions may be repeated).
Besides that the surveys are of a wide profle, the most qualitative
and strict methodological standards of comparative researches are
applied to them. Tis characteristic is exceptionally felt in the ISSP
and the ESS. Other international researches that are of exceptionally
high quality and may be interesting to Lithuanian political sociolo-
gists are the following:
Since 1979, together with every election to the European Parlia-
ment the European Election studies (hereinafer the EES, www.ees-
homepage.net) are performed;
Since 1991, the Barometer Surveys (www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/cata-
log13_0.html) are performed by the Centre for the Study of Public
Policy (managed by Richard Rose, a political scientist) of Strathclyde
University in Glasgow (Scotland); the survey of Te New Baltic Ba-
rometer (hereinafer NBB) that was performed in 19932004 in the
Baltic States
13
is the most topical to Lithuania.
13. Moreover, the last survey in 2004 was performed not only in the Baltic States
but in East and Central Europe, as well.
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Political Sociology
We have already discusses the main data types that may be used
in the SDA in the feld of political sociology. Te following informa-
tion is about where to fnd the mentioned researches and data. Te
research and data may be found in:
Worlds (Europes) online archives:
Te UN archive of statistics and researches UN DATA (data.
un.org);
Te EU archive of statistics and researches Eurostat (ec.eu-
ropa.eu/eurostat);
Te OECD archive of statistics OECD.StatExtracts (stats.
oecd.org)
Te biggest data archives of social sciences are in the USA (at
this time the biggest institution in the world that stores data
about empirical social sciences is the Interuniversity Consor-
tium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), www.icpsr.um-
ich.edu, that was established in the University of Michigan,
the USA, in 1962), in Germany (GESIS-Leibniz Institute for
the Social Sciences in Mannheim, www.gesis.org/en, together
with other researches the data of the ISSP, the EVS, and Eu-
robarometer are stored there, as well), in Norway (Norwegian
Social Science Data Services (NSD), www.nsd.uib.no/english,
that was established by the University of Bergen and stores the
data of the ESS and every election that took place in Europe
since 1990 ,www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database), in
the UK (the UK data archive, www.data-archive.ac.uk; the ac-
cess to the data of social sciences is provided by the special
service, the ESDS, www.esds.ac.uk), and in the online data
guide Te MacroDataGuide (www.nsd.uib.no/macrodatagu-
ide) that contains information about diferent data sources
and references to the places where they are stored)
Lithuanian online archives:
Te Database of Indicators of the Department of Statistics of
the Republic of Lithuania (db1.stat.gov.lt);
Te archives of Lithuanian authorities (e. g., data.ukmin.lt/
apie.html);
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Methodology of Political Sociology
Lithuanian humanities and social science data archive (here-
inafer LiDA, www.lidata.eu) that will be discussed later in
this chapter
14
.
As it was already mentioned, the analysis of statistics is a standard ap-
proach of the SDA; however, it is less suitable for the researches in the
feld of political sociology because the stored data are usually related
to economic, social, and demographic tendencies. More suitable for
political sociology are the data of repeated (onetime) international
surveys. Tis kind of data is usually stored and available in the online
archives of social sciences; the most important ones have already been
introduced. In this context it is very important to mention another
one institution that stores the data about social sciences, the CESS-
DA. Tis organisation is the Council of European Social Science Data
Archives and has a united search system in its data archives, www.
cessda.org/accessing/catalogue. On this web, a Lithuanian researcher
fnds data in the Swedish archive and a German researcher fnds data
in the French archive. Te CESSDA catalogue allows the search
15
ac-
cording to a phrase, topic, keyword
16
or an archive.
As of 2006, Lithuania also has its humanities and social science data
archive LiDA (www.lidata.eu). Te main functions of LiDA are to
acquire, process, and archive diferent data (especially from surveys).
On the other hand, LiDA provides the research methodology teaching
programmes for PhD students and scientists (also, for students) and
performs methodological and sample thematic research in Lithuania
(e. g., the ESS and the ISSP). From the data point of view, at this mo-
ment LiDA catalogue consists of surveys (www.lidata.eu/apklausos)
and historical statistics (www.lidata.eu/istoriniai). In the catalogue
of surveys the groups of public opinion surveys and research data
14. Moreover, diferent state institutions and public organizations make research-
es and put their reports and data in their web sites.
15. Te result is a list of researches, groups of questions or variables that contain
the phrase that was typed in the search box. If you clicked on the reference, you
would get into the web site of the archive that contains the data. Terefore the
CESSDA archive is a metadata archive because the data is stored in the archives
of participating countries.
16. Te search according to a keyword is done with the help of multilingual ELSST
thesaurus, ref. elsst.esds.ac.uk.
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Political Sociology
is kept that make the biggest and the most used collection of data
archives. Te biggest part of LiDA collection consists of the data of
the already completed research studies that were performed by other
scientists and researchers; the data may be used by other users that
perform the SDA. Te data from more than 250 surveys is divided
into two groups (www.lidata.eu/apklausos/rinkiniai): the set of data
on international research performed in Lithuania and was provided
in English is divided into 8 thematic groups; a few of them are the
already mentioned ESS, ISSP, and EES.
Te data in LiDA catalogues are completely available; if the purpose
is not commercial (scientifc researches, self-education, and teach-
ing), it is free. It also provides comprehensive data descriptions,
other documentation (questionnaires, reports and etc.), and ordered
and clean data in diferent formats (SPSS, Stata, Excel etc.). You
can browse the information about data groups according to a) au-
thor, b) topic, c) source, d) groups of data and researches, e) depositor,
f) source of fnance g) and newness by using NESSTAR catalogue
or the site of LiDA. If the data of surveys is browsed in the site of
LiDA, the summary of the research, its methodology, and availabil-
ity conditions is provided. Also, a person can have a look at addi-
tional information, the list of variables, and the primary informa-
tion about variables. Finally, you can download the data or make the
analysis online (see further). LiDAs online catalogue of data analysis
(LiDAKAT, www.lidata.eu/webview) provides you with an opportu-
nity to fnd the data, read their descriptions, and to perform diferent
procedures (from the most simple percentage frequency distribution
to correlation tables and trends) of the SDA. In order to make data
analysis, you will have to use NESSTAR sofware WebView (www.
nesstar.com). Te results of data analysis that are found in LIDAKAT
can be turned into convenient formats (Excel, PDF etc.).
LiDA catalogue allows a search for data groups (standard or with
thesaurus) and variables (standard or with thesaurus). Te standard
search for data groups is done with the help of diferent search pa-
rameters (Figure 1) and search phrases that are typed in the search
page of LiDAKAT catalogue (www.lidata.eu/paieska). Te result of
the search is a list of data groups.
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Methodology of Political Sociology
Figure 1. Example: the standard search in LiDA catalogue.
Also, LiDA catalogue allows a search for variables. In this way, you
will fnd more specifc information because the search is performed
on a deeper level by asking a question; therefore, the results are more
precise than the ones that you get afer the search for data groups.
Te Standard search for variables is done with the help of diferent
search parameters and search phrases that are typed in the variables
search page (www.lidata.eu/kintamuju_paieska). Te result of the
search is a list of variables.
Te search for data groups can also be done with the help of con-
trolled dictionaries of keywords. Te base for LiDA bilingual thesaurus
is the Humanities and Social Science Electronic Tesaurus (HASSET,
www.data-archive.ac.uk/fnd/hasset-thesaurus)
17
of the UK Data Ar-
chive (UKDA) that is pre-digested to the Lithuanian language. If the
search is performed with the help of thesaurus, at frst it searches for
a keyword, afer that it searches for data groups or variables that are
related to the keyword.
7. 3. Principles of Data Analysis (On-Line)
As it was mentioned, in the data archives of social sciences you can
make a basic data analysis that does not require specifc sofware
that is used for the statistical analysis; you will only need the updat-
17. Te thesaurus contains a comprehensive description of the following felds of
social sciences: politics, sociology, economics, education, law, crime, demog-
raphy, health, and employment. Te terms of thesaurus indicate scientifc con-
cepts, physical objects, characteristics of objects, processes, actions etc..
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Political Sociology
ed web browser. It is enabled by the specialized data storage system
NESSTAR (www.nesstar.com)
18
. Te system consists of three parts:
the programmes of NESSTAR Publisher and NESSTAR Server and
the sofware environment NESSTAR WebView that enables the web
browser to search for data and metadata, to perform the basic SDA,
view its results, and use trend tools. Te main functions of Nesstar
WebView online data analysis are:
review of descriptions and data;
download of documents in various formats;
numerical characteristics of data;
introduction of new variables and recoding of the existing
variables;
ability to make data sections;
ability to make multidimensional data tables;
data representation in trends;
export of results in a convenient format (Excel or PDF);
linear correlation analysis and multiple linear regression anal-
ysis;
variable weighting (if needed).
Te following paragraphs describe the main functions of Nesstar
WebView, except the linear correlation analysis, multiple linear re-
gression analysis, and variable weighting. Te application of these
functions in the SDA requires deeper knowledge of statistical meth-
odology; there are special courses and textbooks in order to learn it.
Terefore, we will discuss only the basic functions.
Usually, NESSTAR catalogues that can be found in archives are
integrated into a common web page; therefore, there is no special
access. You just need to know the catalogues Internet address. For
instance, the address of LiDA NESSTAR catalogue is www.lidata.
eu/webview, the address of GESIS is zacat.gesis.org/webview, and
the address of the ESS research is nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview.
Note that in order to perform the SDA, you have to register in the
18. Of course, there are alternative NESSTAR systems. Te mentioned SDA: Sur-
vey Documentation and Analysis (sda.berkeley.edu) and Dataverse Network
(thedata.org) systems have more functions to make data analyses but are less
user-friendly.
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Methodology of Political Sociology
online archives. Registration data is collected in order to have us-
ers statistics.
In the middle of the frst page of NESSTAR catalogue you will usu-
ally see the general information about the catalogue and on the lef
there are tree views of data groups that are spread by clicking on
cross marks. Also, there you will fnd the tool bar of NESSTAR We-
bView and other additional information. When you browse the tree
views and get into a data group (the example presents the data group
of the 4
th
wave; the main and additional questionnaire of the ESS
will be discussed), the two main catalogues open (fgure 2): Metada-
ta (there you can have a look at researches or/and data descriptions)
and Variable Description (where you can browse the data and make
their analysis). On the lef of the tool bar you can make a search, in
the middle you can choose to view the data (DESCRIPTION) and
make tables (TABULATION) or to make a more complex analysis
(ANALYSIS). On the right of the tool bar, there are diferent tools for
data ordering and presentation of the results.
Figure 2. Te main browsing places in LiDA NESSTAR catalogue.
When you browse the variables of a data group and check one of
them, NESSTAR WebView shows the whole description of the vari-
able. If it is the results of surveys, the comprehensive information
about the question wording, the way it was asked, and the context
(Figure 3) is provided.
144
Political Sociology
Figure 3. Example: comprehensive information about a variable in
LiDA NESSTAR catalogue.
Tabulation is the frst and the main way to analyse data in the on-
line NESSTAR WebView catalogue. In order to do that, you have to
choose the TABULATION button in the tool bar and type the desir-
able variables into the pop-up table. Te variables (by clicking the
lef-hand mouse button on their names) are added as rows (Add to
row) or columns (Add to column) to the table or as a quantitative
measurement to a cell of the table (Add as measure). Te structured
table can be exported as an Excel or PDF fle or its data can be turned
into a trend (fgure 4). It is important to note that the position of
variables can be changes in the variable menu which is above the
table, e. g., to move from a row to a column or vice versa (Move to
row/column) or to remove from the table (Remove from table). Type
menu allows you to indicate what should be show in the table: per-
centages in columns (Column percentage), percentages in rows (Row
percentage), percentages in both columns and rows (Row and column
percentage) or raw numbers (Raw numbers). It is important when the
results are discussed and the frequency per unit of categories is com-
145
Methodology of Political Sociology
pared. Another frequently used function is selection of categories
that are show in the table (or trend). To do that, you have to click
on Choose categories in the variable menu (in the updated version
of NESSTAR WebView 4.0.8 click on Change selection) and tick the
categories that you want to see in the table.
Figure 4. LiDA NESSTAR catalogue: exportation of a table and trend
making.
Quantitative variables are added to the cells of the table as measures
(Add as measure) because the measures describe quantitative vari-
ables (average, median, quartiles, minimum, maximum, standard
deviation and etc.). When a single quantitative variable is added to
the table as a measure, the statistical information about that variable
is provided. NESSTAR WebView also allows diferent functions in
order to graphically depict (Figure 5) the data in cross-tables. In this
case it is important to note that the best way to show the results is
by lining them in descending or ascending order. It is done by click-
ing lef-hand mouse button on a variable or its value in the existing
table. Choose the order in the drop down menu: Sort ascending or
Sort descending.
An important NESSTAR WebView function is data (re)order-
ing. Without this function the data analysis would be inefective or
sometimes even impossible. First of all, NESSTAR WebView allows
you to make data sections (click the funnel button in the right-hand
tool menu), e. g., to analyse only the data from a specifc region (or
regions) or to analyse the opinions or behaviour of those people who
have certain social or demographic characteristics. In the drop down
146
Political Sociology
box you have to add variables (Add to subset)
19
; the section
20
will be
formed according to their values. Afer that you have to add one
or two values (when the variable value is chosen, click on the ADD
button; the second, third and other values are added by clicking the
MORE button). If a few section making conditions are added, the
19. If you choose the View documentation option, the programme will show the
description of a variable.
20. Te section can be formed only according to the values of qualitative variables
if they have names.
Figure 5. Graphical representation of data tables in LiDA NESSTAR
catalogue.
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Methodology of Political Sociology
connecting operator (or or and) has to be chosen carefully in order
to get the desirable results in the table.
Another important function is data recoding (Compute). With the
help of this function the values of variables can be joined or recalcu-
lated. In this way NESSTAR WebView allows you to change the re-
search data according to the purpose of the research (if needed) and
to make tables and trends with Lithuanian names of variables and
their values. Te recoding of data is done by clicking the hammer
button in the tool bar. Ten you have to choose the desired action.
Te choices are the following:
Addition (Add), substraction (Subtract), multiplication (Multiply),
division (Divide), average (Average) are other functions are used in
order to form the index from quantitative variable.
Recode function is used in order to make a direct recoding of
qualitative and quantitative variables and their values.
In order to form the index of quantitative variables (e. g., general
trust in political institutions that is calculated from variables of trust
in Seimas and variables of trust in political parties), usually the aver-
age of the variable values that make the index have to be calculated.
To do that, you have to choose Average in the recoding menu (Create)
and add variables that will be used for index calculation (Add vari-
able to compute) to the drop down box. Ten type the short name
(Name) and the long name (Label) of the index and click OK. Please
note that the newly created variable (index) will be added at the end
of the variable list in the catalogue User defned variables.
In order to directly recode quantitative or qualitative variables
ant their values, you have to choose the Recode option in the recod-
ing menu (Create) and type the variable that is going to be re-coded
(Recode variable) in the pop-up window. Ten you have to make
a recoding algorithm (click the Add button) by indicating the old
values (Old value) and the way the values have to be recoded (New
value). Do not forger to appropriately recode the missing values (the
best way is to assign the values with the code of missing system-
atic values; to do that, tick the Recode to Sysmis option in the All
other values menu). Finally, you have to give a short (Name) and long
(Label) name to a new variable and click OK. Please note that the
newly created variable will be added at the end of the variable list in
148
Political Sociology
User defned variables. Also, the new variable and its values can have
Lithuanian symbols.
Te newly created or recoded variables can be involved in further
analytical actions in every way that is allowed in NESTAR WebView
environment. Finally, NESSTAR WebView environment, if needed,
allows you to perform a more complex analysis and calculations and
to save the data in popular formats (SPSS, Stata, Excel etc.). Also, it
allows you to save or review full data descriptions (metadata) as an
XML fle or in HTML format in your Internet browser. Te data is
saved by clicking on the foppy disk button that is in the right-hand
tool bar. In summary, it is worth mentioning that with the help of
the above mentioned functions of NESSTAR WebView environment
you can perform the majority of the SDA basic actions that help to
make an empiric analysis in the feld of politics.
7. 4. Eurobarometer Data Analysis in NESSTAR
Webview Environment and Practical Tasks
Tis chapter contains an example how to make an analysis with the
help of data from one of the main repeated international surveys, Euro-
barometer, in NESSTAR WebView environment. As it was mentioned,
the data of Eurobarometer are stored in ZACAT catalogue in German
archive (GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences), zacat.gesis.
org/webview. We will use the data from Eurobarometer and try to
analyse trust in political institutions, i. e., how trust in political insti-
tutions is similar and diferent in diferent European countries and
what tendencies can be recognized. While answering the questions we
will compare trust in members of the Parliament in the Baltic States in
the period of 2001 2009. Terefore, we will have to use the data from
the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001. 1. and the EU standard
Eurobarometer 2009 (Eurobarometer 72.4). In this case, we have to
make an analysis of every year separately and then to compare them.
At frst we have to fnd the necessary variables for the analysis
of year 2001 and look through their descriptions. Tis allows us to
evaluate the relevance of variables, to choose the way of analysis,
and to evaluate the possibility to compare the data (e. g., if the ques-
tions were formulated in the same way in both waves of the research).
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Methodology of Political Sociology
Terefore, we need two variables from the data of the Candidate
Countries Eurobarometer 2001:
TECHVAR that is in the variables catalogue Nation ID variable:
the Country variable (because we will compare trust in diferent
countries);
TREND that in the variables catalogue Trust in institutions: Trust:
the Parliament variable.
When the variables are found we can see the number of respon-
dents and the general level of trust in members of Parliament in dif-
ferent countries.
As we are more interested in diferences between the trust levels
in diferent countries we have to make a cross-table. Click the TABU-
LATION button in the tool bar and the countrys variable (TECH-
VAR: Country), add it as a row variable (Add to row); click on the
variable of trust in Parliament (TREND: Trust: Parliament), add it
as a column variable (Add to column). When making a comparison
of trust in members of Parliament in diferent countries, we need to
calculate the percentages in rows, not in columns; therefore, choose
Figure 6. States trust levels in Parliaments. Te data is taken from the
Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001.
150
Political Sociology
the Row percentage option in the Type menu. Also, do not forget to
order the data. In this case, for trust in Parliament (fgure 6) the best
order is a descending order (Sort descending).
As you see, in 2001 the highest level of trust was in Cyprus and the
lowest was in Lithuania. NESSTAR WebView environment of online
data analysis allows you to add additionally modulated categories to
the existing tables. For instance, in this case we can add the average
value of trust in Parliaments in all the countries. To do that, choose
the Insert calculation option and Average in the menu of a countrys
variable. Te newly added category must be named, then click OK and
it will appear in the table. Te table can be shown in a trend, as well. It
may be depicted as a column chart (fgure 7 on the lef) or a component
bar chart (fgure 7 on the right). In the frst case, do not forget to indi-
cate the full percentage scale; otherwise, the results may be deviated. To
do that, you have to indicate the frst (0 percent) and the last (100 per-
cent) value of the scale under the chart and click the CHANGE button.
When comparing the rates of the Baltic States, we notice that Es-
tonians trust their Parliament much more than Latvians of Lithu-
anians (the rate in Estonia is above the average and the rate in Latvia
and Lithuania is below the average). Always try to make the analysis
so that the results would refect the problem as much as possible. We
analyse only the tendencies of the Baltic States, therefore, the rates of
other countries are not important; it is enough to mark the average
that would refect the general tendency and the rates of the Baltic
States in tables and charts. In order to do that, choose the Change
selection option (in older NESSTAR WebView version choose Choose
categories) in a countys variable menu, tick the categories that are
needed for a simplifed trend and click OK. Moreover, together with
the average value, the average value of the Baltic States can be added
to the same table or trend. To do that, add (Insert calculation) the
Aggregate category in the countrys variable menu; it would count
only the average of the Baltic States (therefore, when forming a new
category tick only the Baltic States).
Now we see the fnal results. According to the results, in 2001 Esto-
nians trusted in their Parliament more (37.8 % of respondents trusted
151
Methodology of Political Sociology
Figure 7. Charts: trust in Parliaments in diferent states. Te data of
the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001.
152
Political Sociology
Figure 8. Trust in members of Parliaments in the Baltic States. Te
data is taken from the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001.
Figure 41. Trust in members of Parliaments in the Baltic States. Te
data is taken from the Standard EU Eurobarometer 2009.
153
Methodology of Political Sociology
in their Parliament) than other Baltic States (Latvia 25.3 %, Lithu-
ania only 16.5 %). Estonias rate was a little higher than the average
rate (34.1 %) of all the countries that participated in the research, the
rate in Latvia and Lithuania was below the average. Te overall rate
of people who trust their Parliament in the Baltic States was below
the average 26.4 % (fgure 8).
Te analogous actions were taken with the data of the Standard
EU Eurobarometer 2009 (in this case, the countrys variable NA-
TION ALL SAMPLES is Nation ID variables in the catalogue of
variables; the variable for trust in Parliament QA10 TRUST IN INSTI-
TUTIONS: NAT PARLIAMENT is Trust in institutions (V207-V219)
in the catalogue of variables). Te results are shown in fgure 41.
According to the result, trust in Parliament in the Baltic States
in the period of 2001 2009 had decreased until 17.3 %. It happened
because of decreased trust in Parliament in Latvia (7.6 %) and Lith-
uania (5.8 %); trust in Parliament in Estonia remained almost the
same (39 %).
Individual work tasks
1. Use the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001. 1. and the
data of the Standard EU Barometer 2009 (Eurobarometer 72.4)
(zacat.gesis.org/webview) and compare the peoples trust in po-
litical parties in the Baltic States in 2001 and 2009. Te coun-
trys variable in the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001
is TECHVAR: Country and can be found in Nation ID vari-
able in the catalogue of variables; and the variable of trust in
Parliament is TREND: Trust: Political parties which is found
in Trust in institutions in the catalogue of variables. While the
countrys variable in the Standard EU Eurobarometer 2009
is NATION ALL SAMPLES and can be found in Nation ID
variables in the catalogue of variables; the variable of trust in
Parliament is QA10 TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS: POLIT PAR-
TIES and can be found in Trust in institutions (V207-V219) in
the catalogue of variables.
2. Use the data of the integrated EVS data group (EVS 1981-2008
Longitudinal Data File) (zacat.gesis.org/webview) and compare
how the people in the Baltic States evaluated the importance of
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Political Sociology
religion to their lives in 1990, 1999 and 2008 m. Te countrys
variable in the integrated EVS data group is country_year and
is found in the Archive/ID Variables catalogue of variables,
the variable of the importance of religion is how important in
your life: religion and can be found in the Perceptions of Life
catalogue of variables. Do not forger to recode the variables in
order to make the interpretation of the results easier.
3. Use the data of the integrated ISSP data group of 2010 (Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme: Environment III ISSP 2010)
(zacat.gesis.org/webview) and compare Russians and Latvians
perception (if it is diferent and how diferent) of the most impor-
tant problems in Latvia in 2011, also compare Lithuanians (who
live in diferent regions) perception of the most important prob-
lems in Lithuania in 2011. Te countrys variable in the ISSP
data group of 2010 (Country ISO 3166 Code) is Archive and ID
variables and can be found in the catalogue of variables, the
variable of problems perceptions is Q1a Most important issues
for [Rs COUNTRY] today? Substantial variables and can be
found in the catalogue of variables. In case of Latvia, you have
to include the variable of nationality (Country specifc: origin
country/ ethnic group/ ethnic identity/ family origin: Latvia)
that is in the Ctry specifc: ethnic catalogue, in case of Lithu-
ania, include the variable of region (Country specifc region:
Lithuania) that is in the Ctry specifc: region catalogue.
4. Use the data of the ESS data group of 2010 (ESS5-2010, ed.2.0)
(nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview) and compare how people from
diferent European countries evaluated corruption in courts in
2010 and 2011. Te countrys variable in the ESS data group of
2010 is Country and can be found in the Country catalogue
of variables, the variable of courts corruption is How ofen
judges in country take bribes and can be found in the Justice
catalogue of variables. Do not forget that the corruptions vari-
able is a quantitative variable.
155
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