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Bruce K. Rutherford: Egypt after Mubarak

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C HAP T E R ONE
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy
ON APRIL 30,2006,theEgyptianParliamentvotedbyalargemajority
torenewtheemergencylaw.Thislawgrantsthepresidentextraordinary
powers to detain citizens, prevent public gatherings, and issue decrees
withlittleaccountabilitytoParliamentorthepeople.Thevotewasafamil-
iarritual:theEgyptianParliamenthasroutinelyapprovedtheemergency
lawformostofthepastfortyyears.
1
However,thisacquiescencetopresi-
dentialpowerisnotuniversal.AfewmonthspriortotheAprilvote,the
SupremeConstitutionalCourtissuedarulingthatsubstantiallylimited
the scope of the presidents authority under the emergency law. The
Courtsdecisionprohibitedthepresidentfromusingtheemergencylaw
to assert government control over private property in non-emergency
situations,andadmonishedtheprimeministerforapplyingitinaman-
ner that disregarded the constitutional rights of Egyptians.
2
Many civil
society groups also challenged the law, especially the Muslim Brother-
hood. It organized several demonstrations to protest the parliamentary
voteandcriticizedthelawextensivelyinthemedia.Itsparliamentarydele-
gationdenouncedthemeasureascontrarytotheprinciplesofIslambe-
causeitignoredthewishesoftheEgyptianpeopleandfailedtoservethe
publicinterest.
3
TheseeventsillustrateagrowingcontradictionincontemporaryEgypt.
Anobservercouldeasilyconcludethatthecountryisaclassicexampleof
1
TheemergencylawwasinvokedduringtheJune1967war.Ithasbeeninforceever
since,withonlyabriefinterruptionfromMay15,1980untilOctober6,1981.Fordetails
oftheemergencylaw,seeA.SeifEl-Islam,ExceptionalLawsandExceptionalCourts,in
Egypt and Its Laws, ed. Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron and Baudouin Dupret (New York:
KluwerLawInternational,2002),36466.AmendmentstotheConstitutioninMarch2007
incorporatedmanyofthepowersoftheemergencylawintotheConstitution.Theseamend-
mentswillbediscussedinchapter6.
2
SCCdecision74forJudicialYear23,issuedJanuary24,2006.Thisdecisionsupple-
mentedearlierrulingsbytheadministrativecourtsthatnarrowedthepresidentsauthority
toarrest citizensunderthe emergencylawand furtherlimitedthe typesof propertythat
couldbeseized.SeeHighAdministrativeCourt,Cases675and797,JudicialYear22,issued
May27,1978;HighAdministrativeCourt,Case830,JudicialYear20,issuedDecember29,
1979;HighAdministrativeCourt,Cases1435,1310,1271,126,and810,JudicialYear28,
March12,1985.Thesecaseswillbediscussedingreaterdetailinchapter2.
3
Bayanal-Ikhwanal-MusliminanQanunal-Tawari(Cairo:n.p.,April2006).Also
seethecoverageoftheparliamentaryvoteinal-Misri al-Youm,May1,2006.
2 ChapterOne
stableauthoritarianism.Theregimecontrolsmuchofthemedia,domi-
natespoliticallife,andsuppressesitsopponentswithavastarrayoflegal
andextra-legaltools.Italsocarefullymonitorsandmanipulatescivilsoci-
etygroupsandpoliticalparties.Andyet,Egyptianpoliticallifeincludes
severalfeaturesthatsuggestadifferentpicture.Thecountryhasavibrant
andaggressivejudiciarywhoserulingsconstraintheregime.
4
Italsohas
anincreasinglyassertivejudgesassociation(theJudgesClub)thatopenly
confrontstheexecutiveandlobbiesforlegalandpoliticalreform.Inaddi-
tion,Egypthasalargeandwell-organizedIslamistorganization(theMus-
lim Brotherhood) that calls for increased governmental accountability,
greater respect for law, and improved protection of citizens rights. Al-
thoughtheBrotherhoodhasnoformalcapacitytoconstrainthestate,it
regularly challenges and delegitimizes abuses of power by invoking Is-
lamicprinciplesoflawandgovernance.
5
Someanalystsmaybeinclinedtodismissthesecriticsofexecutivepower
asmarginalactorswithlittlesubstantiveimpactonpolitics.However,this
viewneglectsafundamentalchangeinthecharacterofEgyptianpolitics
sincetheearly1990s.ThestatistordercreatedduringtheNassererahas
beenunderminedbyeconomiccrises,economicrestructuring,andinte-
grationintotheglobaleconomy.Thesechangeshaveweakenedkeyinsti-
tutionsofstatecontrol,particularlythepublicsectorandthesubsidysys-
tem.Theyhavealsoerodedtheideologythatlegitimatestheregime.This
doesnotmeanthatthestateisfadingaway.However,thestatenolonger
dominatestheeconomyandsociety.Thissituationhascreatedopportuni-
tiesforcompetingideologiesandinstitutionstoemergemostnotably,
aliberalconceptionoflawwithinthejudiciaryandanIslamicconception
of governance within the Muslim Brotherhood. These new approaches
to constitutional order have grown into meaningful alternatives to the
decliningstatismoftheregime.Furthermore,thesetwoalternativesshare
importantfeatures.Theiragendasconvergearoundacoresetofreforms
thatembodythekeyfeaturesofclassicalliberalism,includingconstraints
onstatepower,strengtheningtheruleoflaw,andprotectingsomebasic
rights.Thissetofreformshasalsogainedsupportfrompartsofthebusi-
nesscommunityandthereformistwingoftherulingparty.Thisdevelop-
mentsuggeststhatEgyptspoliticalfuturemayincludeasteadydeepening
ofliberalismand,possibly,democracy.
4
Forexample,EgyptscourtshaveissueddecisionsthatdissolvedtheParliamentontwo
occasions, reduced regime-sponsored electoral fraud, created twelve political parties, and
overturnedgovernmentorderstocloseoppositionnewspapersandsilencecriticaljournalists.
Thesecaseswillbediscussedinchapter2.
5
Eachofthesetopicswillbediscussedingreaterdepthinchapters2through4.
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 3
THE IMPERATIVE OF ARAB DEMOCRACY:
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PRIORITIES
Thepossibilityofsustainedliberalanddemocraticdevelopmentisnovel
intheMiddleEast.FormostofthepostWorldWarIIperiod,political
reformhasbeenalowpriorityforbothlocalleadersandtheinternational
community.TheUnitedStateshasaparticularlyundistinguishedrecord
inthisregard.OneofitsearliestinterventionsduringtheColdWaroc-
curredinIranin1953,whenAmericanagentsassistedacoupthatover-
threwapopularlyelectedleader(MohammadMossadeq)andrestoredthe
authorityoftheshah.TheUnitedStatesthenprovidedextensivemilitary
andeconomicaidtotheshahsregimeoverthenexttwenty-sixyears.The
UnitedStateshasalsoprovidedsubstantialsupporttoothermonarchies
intheregion,particularlyinSaudiArabia,Jordan,Kuwait,andMorocco.
Itswillingnesstobackautocracyreachedapeakinthe1980s,whenthe
United States provided military and intelligence assistance to Saddam
Husseins Iraq in order to strengthen its hand against Iran.
6
The U.S.
secretaryofstateatthetime,GeorgeShultz,candidlyexplainedthatthe
UnitedStatessimplycouldnotstandidleandwatchtheKhomeinirevolu-
tionsweepforward.
7
As Shultzs comment suggests, U.S. policy toward the region was
guidedbyitscorestrategicinterests,namely,accesstoadequatesupplies
ofoilatstableprices;thesecurityofIsrael;andtheminimizationofSoviet
inuence.WiththesuccessoftheIranianrevolutionin1979,thecontain-
mentofradicalIslaminitsShiaand,later,Sunnivariantswasadded
tothislist.Buildingstabledemocracieswasconsideredasecondaryobjec-
tive,atbest.Whenevertheissueofdemocratizationarose,theprevailing
viewwas,Whyrocktheboat?
8
Democratizationwouldalmostcertainly
produceaperiodoftransitionthatwouldincreaseinstability.Thisinstabil-
ity,inturn,mightjeopardizethesmoothowofoilandcouldprovide
opportunities for anti-American groups to expand their political inu-
ence.Itsimplymadelittlesensetojeopardizeglobaleconomicprosperity
inordertoembarkonanuncertainpathofpoliticalreform.Whenthere
6
AmatziaBaram,USInputintoIraqiDecisionmaking,19881990,inThe Middle East
and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, Fourth Edition,ed.DavidW.
Lesch(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,2007),352.Also,AlanFriedman,Spiders Web: The
Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq (NewYork:BantamBooks,1993).
7
George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York:
Scribners,1993),237.
8
WilliamB.Quandt,AmericanPolicytowardDemocraticPoliticalMovementsinthe
MiddleEast,inRules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society,ed.Ellis
Goldbergetal.(Seattle:UniversityofWashingtonPress,1993),166.
4 ChapterOne
wereopportunitiestopromotedemocracy,theywerepursuedeitherhalf-
heartedlyornotatall.Forexample,inlate1991andearly1992,Algerias
presidentmadethesurprisingdecisiontoallowrelativelyfreeparliamen-
taryelections.Theyledtowidespreadlossesfortherulingpartyandunex-
pected success for an Islamist movement, the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS).InordertoblocktheFISfromgainingcontroloftheParliament,
theAlgerianmilitaryintervenedbydeclaringastateofemergency,cancel-
ingtheelectionresults,andimprisoningtheleadersandactivistsofthe
FIS.TheUnitedStatesofferednoobjection.Speakingafewyearslater,
the U.S. secretary of state at the time (James Baker) recalled that the
UnitedStateschosenottodefendthedemocraticprocessbecauseitwould
haveproducedagovernmentwithviewshostiletowardtheUnitedStates.
Inhiswords,Wedidntlivewith[theelectionresults]inAlgeriabecause
wefeltthatthefundamentalistsviewsweresoadversetowhatwebelieve
inandwhatwesupport,andtothenationalinterestoftheUnitedStates.
9
TheUnitedStateshadanevenbetteropportunitytopromotedemocracy
duringtheGulfWarof199091.IraqunderSaddamHusseinhadinvaded
andannexedKuwaitinAugust1990.TheUnitedStatesanditsalliesinter-
venedwithover500,000troopstoexpelIraqiforcesandrestoretheKu-
waiti monarchy. Some American politicians and analysts argued that
AmericanmilitaryactionshouldbeconditionedonKuwaitsrulingfam-
ily,theal-Sabah,agreeingtoaspecictimetablefordemocratization.In
thisview,Americantroopsshouldnotrisktheirlivestodefendafeudal
monarchy.
10
SuchreasoningwasnotincorporatedintoAmericanpolicy.
PresidentGeorgeH.W.BushsspeechontheeveoftheAmericanairwar
againstIraqisstrikingforitslackofreferencetoanypoliticalgoalbeyond
therestorationoftheKuwaitimonarchy.
11
Aseniorpolicymakeratthe
timeobserved,IamamongtheunregeneratefewwhobelievethatAmer-
icanforeignpolicymustservethenationalinterestwhichisnotinevery
casetobeconfusedwiththefurtheranceofAmericanidealsoverseas.
12
Thisviewthatdemocratizationtakesabackseattocorestrategiccon-
cerns has played an important role in the U.S. relationship with Egypt.
9
LookingBackontheMiddleEast:JamesA.BakerIII,Middle East Quarterly 1,no.
3(1994):83.Interestingly,theAlgeriancoupisnotevenmentionedinBakersmemoirs.
SeeJamesA.Baker,The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 19891992 (New
York:G.P.PutnamsSons,1995).
10
Forexamplesofthisargument,seeDavidIgnatius,IntheComingNewGulfOrder,
WeMustHelptheArabWorldJointheGlobalDemocraticRevolution,Washington Post,
August26,1990;CaryleMurphy,GulfStatesNextTest:Democracy,Washington Post,
September15,1990.
11
SeethetextofGeorgeH.W.Bushsspeech,PresidentBushAssuresAmericanPeople:
WeWillNotFail,Washington Post,January17,1991.
12
TheofcialisquotedinThomasL.Friedman,ANewU.S.Problem:FreelyElected
Tyrants,New York Times,January12,1992.Thenameoftheofcialisnotgiven.
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 5
Thisrelationshipisshapedbythestrategicinterestsmentionedearlier
oil,Israel,theSovietUnion(until1991),andradicalIslam.Itisalsoinu-
encedbytheUnitedStateseagernessafter1979tosustaintheCampDavid
peace agreement and, if possible, to extend this peace to other Arab re-
gimes.
13
In pursuit of these goals, the United States began substantial
levelsofeconomicaidinthemid-1970s.
14
Theassistancestartedwith$370
millionineconomicaidin1975.By1978,thisgurehadrisento$943
million. It then rose further in 1979, to $1.1 billion, as a result of the
peaceagreementwithIsrael.Awhopping$1.5billioninmilitaryassistance
was also added to the package. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, U.S.
militaryandeconomicaidaveragedroughly$2.2billionperyear.In2000,
theUnitedStatesbegantocutbackoneconomicaidatarateof5percent
peryearwiththegoalofreducingeconomicassistanceby50percentover
tenyears.ThisreductionwaspartofabroaderstrategytoshifttheU.S.-
Egyptianeconomicrelationshipfromaidtotrade.In2006,economic
assistance hadfallento$490million.Militaryassistanceremainedatits
well-establishedlevelofroughly$1.2billionperyear.Bytheendof2006,
theUnitedStateshadsentover$62billionineconomicandmilitaryassis-
tancetoEgyptoverthepreviousthirty-oneyears(innominaldollars).
15
Despitethisextraordinarylevelofassistance,theUnitedStatesnever
used aid as a lever for accelerating political reform. Indeed, the United
Stateswasskepticalofthevalueofdemocratizationfromtheearliestdays
oftheNasserregime.AtthetimeoftheFreeOfcerscoupin1952,the
U.S.ambassadorconcludedthatEgyptwasnotreadyfordemocracy.
16
Hebelievedthatgreaterfreedomsandfreeelectionswouldmerelyprovide
opportunitiesforcommuniststoexpandtheirinuence,andmightpro-
ducesocialdisorderthatcommunistscouldexploit.
17
Thissentimentper-
13
RogerOwen,Egypt,inThe Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the
Developing World,ed.RobertChaseetal.(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1999),133;AlfredL.
Atherton,Egypt and U.S. Interests (Washington,DC:ForeignPolicyInstitute,1988),57.
14
TheimpetusforstartingthisassistancewasSadatsdecisionin1972toseverEgypts
militarytieswiththeUSSR.ItwasreinforcedbySadatswillingnesstoengageinadialogue
overEgyptian-Israelisecurityconcernsinthewakeofthe1973Arab-Israeliwar,particularly
withregardtotheorderlydisengagementofEgyptianandIsraelitroopsinSinai.
15
AllaidguresaretakenfromJeremyM.Sharp,Egypt:BackgroundandU.S.Rela-
tions(Washington,DC:CongressionalResearchService,January10,2007),3133.For
discussionofthestrategytoshifttheU.S.-Egyptianeconomicrelationshipfromaidtotrade,
seeStrategyIntroductioninUSAID-Egypt 20002009 Strategy,p.1.TheUnitedStates
hasannouncedplanstocontinuemilitaryaidatalevelof$1.3billionperyearthrough2017.
RobinWright,U.S.PlansNewArmsSalestoGulfAllies,Washington Post,July28,2007.
16
KirkJ.Beattie,Egypt during the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society (Boul-
der,CO:WestviewPress,1994),99.
17
Ibid.TheUnitedStatesalsobelievedthatamilitaryregimewasbetterabletoundertake
keysocialreforms(particularlylandreform)neededtostimulateeconomicdevelopmentand
6 ChapterOne
sistedoverthenextvedecades.Inthelate1980s,aformerU.S.ambassa-
dortoEgypt(AlfredAtherton)wroteacarefulandthoroughdiscussion
oftheU.S.-Egyptrelationshipwithoutevenmentioningdemocracypro-
motion.
18
Similarly,aformerNationalSecurityCouncilofcialwhospe-
cializesinEgypt(WilliamQuandt)wroteaseventy-seven-pageessayon
U.S.-Egyptianrelationsin1990withoutaddressingtheissuesofdemoc-
racyorpoliticalreform.
19
Democracy and human rights were sometimes mentioned in ofcial
documents.Forexample,theU.S.StateDepartmentissuedanannualre-
portonhumanrightsthatdrewattentiontotheEgyptiangovernments
recordoftorture,electoralfraud,andsuppressionofcivilsociety.
20
Italso
issuedperiodicstatementsthatencouragedEgypttodevelopmorerepre-
sentative and accountable government. It even allocated some USAID
funds for this purpose.
21
However, political reform was understood by
bothsidesasbeingsubordinatetothestrategicconcernsthatlayatthe
heartoftheU.S.-Egyptianrelationship.
ThisviewofdemocratizationinEgyptandtheArabworldunderwent
asignicantchangefollowingtheterroristattacksofSeptember11,2001.
PriortoSeptember11,U.S.policymakersassumedthatstableandfriendly
authoritarianregimesintheArabworldwerethebestguaranteeofAmeri-
cansecurityandeconomicinterests.Inthewakeoftheattacks,U.S.lead-
ers from both parties concluded that terrorism by radical Islamists was
partiallyaresultoftherepressionandeconomicstagnationofArabdicta-
torships.Thesesuffocatingconditionsproducedalargepooloffrustrated,
hopeless,andangryyoungmenwhoyearnedforgreaterdignityandpur-
poseintheirlives.Theywereeasyrecruitsforterroristideologuespromis-
inghonorandmartyrdominastruggleagainstinjustice.
22
prevent a peasant revolution. Ibid., 141. Also, Joel Gordon, Nassers Blessed Movement:
Egypts Free Ofcers and the July Revolution (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992),195.
18
HewrotebrieythatEgypthastodayagoodrecordintheeldofhumanrights...
Egypthasmadeimportantadvances,especiallyunderMubarak,towardestablishingdemo-
craticinstitutionsandreducingcorruption.Hemakesnomentionofwhetherdemocracy
promotionshouldbeagoalintheU.S.relationshipwithEgypt.Atherton,Egypt and U.S.
Interests,19.
19
The book focuses primarily on economic reform and the Arab-Israeli peace process.
WilliamB.Quandt,The United States and Egypt (Cairo:AmericanUniversityinCairoPress,
1990).
20
These reports were prepared by the Department of States Bureau of Democracy,
HumanRights,andLabor.TherecentreportsareavailableontheStateDepartmentsweb-
site:http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
21
Beginninginthe1990s,USAIDbeganallocatingfundstosupportinstitutionalre-
form. These programs focused on legal reform, judicial training, and strengthening the
Parliamentsadministrativecapabilities.SeeStrategicPlan19962001(Cairo:USAID/
Egypt,September1996),iiiiv.
22
PresidentBusharticulatedthisviewinaspeechtotheNationalEndowmentforDe-
mocracyinNovember2003.Hestated,AslongastheMiddleEastremainsaplacewhere
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 7
Foradvocatesofthisview,thekeytodefeatingterrorismlayinending
repressionandpoorgovernanceintheArabworld.Inthewordsofthe
secretaryofstate,forsixtyyearstheUnitedStatespursuedstabilityatthe
expenseofdemocracyintheMiddleEastandweachievedneither.Now,
wearetakingadifferentcourse.Wearesupportingthedemocraticaspira-
tions of all people.
23
In November 2003, President George Bush pro-
claimedthattheUnitedStateshadadoptedaforwardstrategyoffreedom
intheMiddleEastthatwouldbeacentralfeatureofAmericanforeign
policy.
24
Thisposturewaspartofabroaderplantopromotedemocracy
throughout the world. Theadministrations National Security Strategy,
issuedinMarch2006,statedinitsrstparagraph,Thegoalofourstate-
craftistohelpcreateaworldofdemocratic,well-governedstatesthatcan
meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in
theinternationalsystem.
25
Itfurtherarguedthatdemocraticregimesare
more stable, more economically prosperous, and more peaceful toward
their neighbors than any alternative form of government. As a conse-
quence,promotingdemocracyisthebestwaytoprovideenduringsecu-
rityfortheAmericanpeople.
26
Thisviewwassharedbyotherprominent
Republicans,particularlyJohnMcCain.
27
The MiddleEast was clearlythe primaryfocus of thisstrategy. From
2002 to 2006, the administration allocated over $400 million to the
freedom does not ourish, it willremainaplaceofstagnation, resentment, and violence
readyforexport.Andwiththespreadofweaponsthatcanbringcatastrophicharmtoour
countryandtoourfriends,itwouldberecklesstoacceptthestatusquo.GeorgeW.Bush,
SpeechonDemocracyandFreedomintheMiddleEast,presentedattheNationalEndow-
mentforDemocracy,November6,2003.
23
CondoleezzaRice,RemarksattheAmericanUniversityinCairo,June20,2005.The
UndersecretaryofStateforPoliticalAffairsreafrmedinApril2005thatTheU.S.plansto
makeasapermanentfeatureofitspolicyintheregionabroadandsubstantialprogram
tohelpthepeoplesoftheMiddleEastreachamoresecureanddemocraticfuture.R.Nicho-
lasBurns,ATransatlanticAgendafortheYearAhead,speechdeliveredattheRoyalInsti-
tuteforInternationalAffairs,London,April6,2005.
24
GeorgeW.Bush,SpeechonDemocracyandFreedomintheMiddleEast,presented
attheNationalEndowmentforDemocracy,November6,2003.
25
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington,DC:The
WhiteHouse,2006),1.Bushstruckasimilarthemeinhissecondinauguraladdress,where
heconcludedthatthesurvivaloflibertyinourlandincreasinglydependsonthesuccessof
libertyinotherlands.GeorgeW.Bush,InauguralAddress,January20,2005.
26
National Security Strategy of the United States, 1.
27
McCainwasacosponsoroftheAdvanceDemocracyActin2005.Whenintroducing
theAct,heproclaimedthatthepromotionofdemocracyandfreedomissimplyinseparable
fromthelong-termsecurityoftheUnitedStates.WhenthesecurityofNewYorkorWash-
ington or California depends in part on the degree of freedom in Riyadh or Baghdad or
Cairo,thenwemustpromotedemocracy,theruleoflaw,andsocialmodernizationjustas
wepromotethesophisticationofourweaponsandthemodernizationofourmilitaries.He
has also backed legislation supporting democraticreform in Iraq, Jordan, Russia, Central
America,Haiti,Fiji,Kosovo,Burma,andAfghanistan.SeeMcCainsofcialwebsite:http://
mccain.senate.gov.AccessedAugust15,2007.
8 ChapterOne
newlycreatedMiddleEastPartnershipInitiative(MEPI)thatseekstoin-
crease the fairness of elections, support civil society groups, strengthen
judiciaries, and improve protection of womens rights.
28
Another $250
million has been proposed by Congress under the Advance Democracy
Act,withmostofitearmarkedfortheMiddleEast.
29
USAIDsbudgetfor
democracypromotionintheMiddleEastalsoincreasedsharply,from$27
millionin2001to$105millionin2005.
30
And,theUnitedStatesinvaded
Iraq.Thewarwasjustied,inpart,asanefforttobringdemocracytothe
region.Theadministrationarguedthatthedemocratictransformationof
Iraqwouldserveasabeaconofliberty,inspiringdemocraticreformers
throughouttheMiddleEast.
31
ThegoalofbuildingdemocracyintheMiddleEasthasattractedbiparti-
san support. Democrats voted in large numbers to fund the democracy
promotionprogramsputforwardbytheBushadministration.
32
Thedem-
ocratsdeputyleaderintheSenate,RichardDurbinofIllinois,statedin
2004, I agreewholeheartedly with the president thatone of the most
important things this country can do to ght terrorism is to promote
democracy in the Middle East. The lack of democracy in many Middle
EasterncountrieshasleddirectlytoIslamicextremism.
33
HillaryClinton
assertedina2006speechthathumanfreedomandthequestforindivid-
ualstoachievetheirgod-givenpotentialmustbeattheheartofAmerican
approachesacrossthe[MiddleEast].Thedreamofdemocracyandhuman
28
A more detailed list of the MEPIs programs is available at http://mepi.state.gov/
c16050.htm.AlsoseeJeremyM.Sharp,The Middle East Partnership Initiative: An Overview
(Washington,DC:CongressionalResearchService,July20,2005).
29
Theprogram isdescribed ina pressreleasefrom oneof itsco-sponsors, SenatorJoe
Lieberman,at:http://lieberman.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=232762.
30
Roughly70percentofthisfundingwenttodemocracypromotionprogramsinIraq.
SeeTamaraCofman-WittesandSarahE.Yerkes,TheMiddleEastFreedomAgenda:An
Update,Current History 106,no.696(January2007):35.
31
Remarks by Stephen Hadley, assistant to the president for national security affairs,
before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 20, 2005. Hadley
further concluded that theresulting spread of democracy in the regionwould lead to a
Middle East that is more peaceful, more stable, and more inhospitable to terrorists and
theirsupporters.
32
FundingfortheMiddleEastPartnershipInitiativeencounteredsomeresistanceinthe
Congressbut,ironically,thisresistancecameprimarilyfromRepublicans.Theyobjectedto
what they considered the MEPIs lack of clear objectives. They were also concerned that
someofitsprogramsduplicatedexistingprogramsalreadysupportedthroughUSAIDfund-
ing.SeeJeremyM.Sharp,The Middle East Partnership Initiative;also,TheMiddleEast
PartnershipInitiative:PromotingDemocratizationinaTroubledRegion.Hearingbefore
theSubcommitteeontheMiddleEastandCentralAsiaoftheCommitteeonInternational
Relations,HouseofRepresentatives,March19,2003.
33
DurbinmadethesecommentsduringaoorstatementregardingtheSyriaAccount-
abilityActin2004.Thestatementisavailableathttp://durbin.senate.gov/issues/syria.cfm.
AccessedJune15,2007.
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 9
rightsisonethatshouldbelongtoallpeopleintheMiddleEastandacross
theworld...wemuststandonthesideofdemocracywhereverwecan
helpittakehold.
34
BarackObamaheldasimilarview,claimingthatthe
keytodefeatingradicalIslamlayinprovid[ing]thekindofsteadysup-
port for political reformers and civil society that enabled our victory in
theColdWar.
35
ObamawasalsooneofsixcosponsorsoftheAdvance
DemocracyAct,whichcalledfortheexpansionofdemocracypromotion
intheMiddleEast.
When the democrats gained controlof the House of Representatives
andtheSenatein2006,theysoughttobringsomeofthisrhetoricinto
reality.TheyincorporatedfundingforMEPIintotheirsignaturebillon
national security, the Real Security Act of 2006.
36
Several prominent
democrats also initiated an effort to withhold $100 million in military
assistance to Egypt, which provided further opportunity to voice their
supportforhumanrightsanddemocracyinEgyptandtheArabworld.
37
AmericascallsfordemocracyintheMiddleEastwerejoinedbyequally
convincedthough less effusiveEuropean allies. The German foreign
minister,forexample,agreedthattheghtagainstterrorismrequireda
muchbroaderconceptionofsecuritythatincludedsocial-culturalmod-
ernizationissues,aswellasdemocracy,theruleoflaw,womensrightsand
goodgovernance.
38
TheEuropeanSecurityStrategy,adoptedinDecem-
ber2003,statesthatthequalityofinternationalsocietydependsonthe
qualityofgovernmentsthatareitsfoundation.Thebestprotectionofour
securityisaworldofwell-governeddemocraticstates.
39
TheEuropean
UnionCommissionpresidentreiteratedthisview,
40
asdidotherEuropean
34
ChallengesforU.S.ForeignPolicyintheMiddleEastRemarksofSenatorHillary
RodhamClintonatPrincetonUniversitysWoodrowWilsonSchoolofPublicandInterna-
tionalAffairs,January19,2006.
35
Barack Obama, Renewing American Leadership, Foreign Affairs (July/August
2007),11.Alsoseepage14.
36
See the description of the Real Security Act at http://democrats.senate.gov/
newsroom/record.cfm?id=262588.
37
TheeffortwasinitiatedbyDavidObey,thechairoftheHouseAppropriationsCommit-
tee.Heproposedtheamendmentbecause,inhiswords,Iamincreasinglyconcernedthat
EgyptisheadedinadirectiondomesticallythatputsatrisknotonlyU.S.interestsinthe
regionbuttheverystabilityofEgypt.SeeObeysstatementattachedtotheHousereport
onbill109486ForeignOperations,ExportFinancing,andRelatedProgramsAppropria-
tions Bill, 2007. For a record of the debate on the bill in June 2007, see Congressional
RecordHouse,volume153,number100(110thCongress,1stSession).
38
TheremarksweremadebytheGermanforeignminister,JoschkaFisher,atthe40th
MunichConferenceonSecurityPolicy,February7,2004.
39
ASecureEuropeinaBetterWorld:EuropeanSecurityStrategy.IssuedDecember
12,2003.Availableonlineat:http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
40
TheCommissionpresident,JoseManuelBarroso,notedduringhisvisittotheWhite
HouseinOctober2005thattheUnitedStatesandEuropeshareastrategicpartnershipthat
10 ChapterOne
leaders such as Tony Blair.
41
The EUs efforts are carried out primarily
withintheframeworkoftheEuro-MediterraneanPartnership,whichin-
cludesfundingtostrengthencivilsocietygroups,humanrights,andthe
rule of law. The funding for these programs increased substantially
aftertheterroristattacksof2001.
42
IndividualEuropeancountrieshave
also undertaken bilateral efforts to promote the rule of law and human
rightsinArabcountries,withBritain,Denmark,France,andSwedentak-
ing thelead.
43
Inaddition, European nationshave cooperated withthe
UnitedStatesonanannualconferenceintheregion,theForumforthe
Future. This event brings together G-8 ministers, ministers from Arab
governments,businessmen,andcivilsocietyleaderstodevelopprograms
forpoliticalandeconomicreform.
44
Itiscurrentlytheonlysettingthat
allowsdemocracyadvocatestointeractdirectlywithgovernmentministers
andbusinessleaders.
Ofcourse,theUnitedStatesandEuropestilldefendthestrategicinter-
estsmentionedearlier.Democracypromotionhasnottrumpedthesein-
terests.Attimes,ittakesabackseattothem,whichleadstovariationsin
seekstopromotedemocracy,humanrights,theruleoflaw,andthemarketeconomyaround
the world. European Commission President Barroso meets U.S. President Bush at the
WhiteHouse,EUpressrelease,October15,2005.
41
See,forexample,TonyBlairsspeechbeforetheU.S.CongressonJuly17,2003.He
states that, The spread of freedom is the best security for the free. It is our last line of
defenseandourrstlineofattack.Justastheterroristseekstodividehumanityinhate,so
wehavetounifyitaroundanidea,andthatideaisliberty.
42
JohnCalabrese,FreedomontheMarchintheMiddleEastandTransatlanticRela-
tions on a New Course? Mediterranean Quarterly (2005): 4546. From 1995 through
2004,thetotalfundingforthePartnershipwas$1billionperyear.Thisfundingwasapplied
toprogramsinthreeareas:economicdevelopment,politicalreform,andculturaldevelop-
ment.ThePartnershipunderwentathoroughreviewonitstenthanniversaryin2005.Asa
resultofthisreview,totalfundingwasincreasedto$1.2billionperyearandprogramsfor
politicalreformweregivenhigherpriority.DanielDombeyandRoulaKhalaf,Euro-Med
LeadersLooktoBuildonBarcelonaProcess,Financial Times,November26,2005.
43
MichaelEmersonandothers,TheReluctantDebutanteTheEUasPromoterofDe-
mocracyinitsNeighborhood,inDemocratisation in the European Neighborhood,ed.Mi-
chaelEmerson(Brussels:CenterforEuropeanPolicyStudies,2005),2038.Also,Richard
Youngs,EuropesUncertainPursuitofMiddleEastReform,inUncharted Journey: Pro-
moting Democracy in the Middle East,ed.ThomasCarothersandMarinaOttaway(Washing-
ton,DC:CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,2005),23435.TheEUhasalso
undertakenbilateralagreementsforpoliticalreformwithJordan,Morocco,andthePalestin-
ianAuthority.ItisnegotiatingsuchagreementswithEgyptandLebanon.HaizamAmirah-
Fernandez,EU:BarcelonaProcessandtheNewNeighborhoodPolicy,Arab Reform Bul-
letin 4,no.1(2006),56.
44
TheseconferencestakeplaceundertheheadingoftheBroaderMiddleEastandNorth
AfricaInitiative,whichisalsocalledtheForumfortheFuture.Therstconferenceoccurred
inRabat,MoroccoinDecember2004.ThesecondwasheldinManama,BahraininNovem-
ber2005.ThethirdmeetingoccurredinJordaninDecember2006.
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 11
thestrengthofWesternadvocacyfordemocracyovertimeandbetween
countries.
45
However,thisnormalebb-and-owofinterestsshouldnotbe
construed asinsincerity. Since2001, democratizationhas beenelevated
fromanappealingafterthoughtamongpolicymakerstoastrategicobjec-
tiveinitself.True,itisonlyoneobjectiveamongmany.Butitnowcarries
signicantweightamongpolicymakersintheUnitedStatesandEurope.
MajorWesterngovernmentsnowarguewithincreasingconvictionthat
the absenceof democracyin the regionhas adirect impacton regional
andglobalsecurity.
46
Thischangeontheinternationalstagehasbeenmatchedbyaserious
effort amongArab intellectuals andactivists to promotedemocratic re-
form.ThemostsystematicworkinthisregardistheArabHumanDevel-
opmentReports(AHDR)of2002,2003,2004,and2005.
47
Thesereports
werepreparedbyateamofprominentArabintellectualsundertheaus-
picesoftheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram.Theyreceivedwide
distributionforexample,over1millioncopiesofthe2002reportwere
downloaded from the UNDPs website.
48
The reports focus on three
decitsthatplaguetheArabworld:alackoffreedom,insufcientrights
forwomen,andinadequateeducationalsystems.Theyemphasizethatall
peopleareentitledtothefullrangeofcivilandpoliticalrights,andthat
eachcitizenhastherighttoparticipateinhisowngovernance.Thereports
assertthattheseprinciplesarefundamentaltohumanfreedomwhich,in
turn,isthefoundationforeconomicgrowthandhumandevelopment.
49
45
Forexample,SecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRicevisitedEgyptinJanuary2007and
heldalongmeetingwithPresidentMubarak.Duringhervisit,shemadenoefforttoencour-
age politicalreform. Rather,she focused ongainingEgyptssupport forAmerican policy
towardtheArab-Israeliconict,Iraq,andIran.Thisstandsinsharpcontrasttohervisitin
June2005,whenshepubliclycalledformorerapiddemocratization.ForherspeechinJune
2005,seeCondoleezzaRice,RemarksattheAmericanUniversityinCairo,June20,2005.
For her remarks during her visit in January 2007, see Condoleezza Rice, Remarks with
EgyptianForeignMinisterAboulGheit,January15,2007.AvailableontheStateDepart-
mentswebsite:http://www.state.gov/.AccessedJune12,2007.
46
AsHenryKissingerputit,Theadvocatesoftheimportantroleofacommitmentto
democracy in American foreign policy have won their intellectual battle. Henry A. Kis-
singer,InterventionwithaVision,inThe Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq,
ed.GaryRosen(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005),53.
47
Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations
(NewYork:UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram,2002);Arab Human Development Re-
port 2003: Building a Knowledge Society (NewYork:UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram,
2003);Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World (New
York: United Nations Development Program, 2005); Arab Human Development Report
2005: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World (NewYork:UnitedNationsDevelopment
Program,2006).
48
Arab Human Development Report 2003,i.ThereportwascitedbyTime magazineas
themostimportantpublicationof2002.
49
Arab Human Development Report 2004,23.
12 ChapterOne
ThereportsalsoarguethattheArabworldconfrontsseveralacuteprob-
lems thatcan bemanaged onlythrough skilledand accountablegover-
nance.Themostformidableoftheseproblemsincludethefollowing:
A demographic youth bulge. Roughly38percentoftheregionspopu-
lationisundertheageoffourteen.Theregionwillneed50millionnew
jobsby2010inordertoaccommodatethem.Thisdemographicchallenge
draws attention to two core weaknesses of the current order: the poor
qualityofstate-ledeconomicmanagement,whichhasproducedweakeco-
nomicgrowth;andtheabsenceofpoliticalinstitutionsthatcanrepresent
theinterestsoftheseyoungpeopleandrespondtotheirconcernsquickly
andeffectively.IntheviewoftheAHDR,democratizationaddressesboth
oftheseproblems.Itincreasesthetransparencyandaccountabilityofgov-
ernmentdecisionmaking,therebyimprovingeconomicpolicyandperfor-
mance.Italsoprovidesanorderlyandreliablemechanismforincluding
citizensinpoliticallife.
The political repercussions of economic restructuring. Inordertoimprove
economicperformance,manycountriesintheregionhaveadoptedmar-
ket-orientedeconomicreformsthatshrinkthepublicsectorandreduce
statesubsidies.Intheshortterm,thesemeasurescauseseverehardship,
particularlytopublic-sectorworkersandunskilledlabor.Intheviewof
theAHDR,democraticreformsareessentialforcreatingpoliticalinstitu-
tionsthatcanrespondtotheneedsoftheseworkersandprovideapeaceful
avenueforexpressingandmanagingtheirdissent.
The growing power of Islamist groups. Throughout the Middle East,
Islamist groups have developed broad popular support, effective social
servicenetworks,and aformidablecapacityto mobilizetheirfollowers.
The appeal of these groups is likely to increase in the future. In the
view of the AHDR, democratic reforms are the only way to integrate
these groups into the political process and give them a stake in peace-
fulchange.
TheauthorsoftheAHDRbelievethatthecurrentpoliticalstructures
oftheArabworldaresimplynotuptothesechallenges.Iftheregionis
tocopeeffectively,democratizationisessential.Ifitdoesnotoccur,Arabs
facetheprospectofintensiedsocialconict...violentprotest...[and]
internaldisorder.
50
Supportfordemocratizationisnotlimitedtothesmallcircleofintellec-
tuals who wrote the AHDR. Opinion polls indicate signicant public
backingfordemocraticprinciples.ApollbytheWorldValuesSurveyin
Egypt,Jordan,Morocco,andAlgeriafoundthatover85percentofre-
spondentsconsidereddemocracybetterthananyotherformofgovern-
50
Ibid.,19.
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 13
ment.
51
The percentageofrespondentswho considereddemocracythe
bestformofgovernmentexceededthatofanyotherregioninthedevel-
oping world.
52
The Arab respondents also expressed the highest rate of
rejection (80 percent) of authoritarian rule.
53
A poll conducted by the
AHDR indicates that Arabs place a high value on freedom of thought,
expression,andbelief.
54
Additionalsurveyresearchreachessimilarconclu-
sionsandsuggeststhattheArabpublicsupportsmanydemocraticvalues,
withtheimportantexceptionofwomensequality.
55
Public advocacy of democratization has also become widespread and
forceful.Meetingsofintellectuals,civilsocietyorganizations,andbusiness
groups frequently include declarations of support for democracy.
56
The
Arab media also increasingly advocates democratization, with satellite
televisionstationsleadingtheway.Themostpopularsatellitestation,al-
Jazeera, hasmadepoliticalreformacentralthemeofitsprogramming.A
recentstudyofitsbroadcastssince1999foundthatroughlyone-thirdof
itstalkshowprogramsdealwiththistopic.Theyfrequentlyincludeharsh
attacksontheregimesoftheregionandvigorousdemandsfordemocratic
change.Intheviewofthestudysauthor(MarcLynch),al-Jazeera has
helped to transform Arab political discourse by creating an intellectual
climate where challenging political authority is not only tolerated, but
51
Respondentswerepresentedwiththestatement:Despiteitsproblems,democracyis
betterthananyotherformofgovernment.IneachofthefourArabcountriesstudied,over
85percentoftherespondentseitherstronglyagreedoragreedwiththisstatement.The
resultsofthesurveywithregardtotheMiddleEastaresummarizedinMarkTessler,Do
IslamicOrientationsInuenceAttitudesTowardDemocracyintheArabWorld?Evidence
fromEgypt,Jordon,Morocco,andAlgeria,inIslam, Gender, Culture, and Democracy,ed.
RonaldInglehart(Willowdale,ON:deSitterPublications,2003),13.
52
World Values Surveys Four-Wave Integrated Data File, 19812004.Downloadedfrom
theInter-UniversityConsortiumforPoliticalandSocialResearch.
53
The question involved asked whether the respondent would accept a strong leader
whodoesnothavetobotherwithparliamentandelections.Ibid.
54
ThesurveyissummarizedintheArab Human Development Report 2004,9899.
55
The 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World (Princeton,NJ:GallupOrganization,2002).
ThispollwasconductedinDecember2001andJanuary2002.Itincluded4,300Arabre-
spondentsfromJordan,Kuwait,Lebanon,Morocco,andSaudiArabia.Also,JamesJ.Zogby,
What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs, and Concerns (New York: ZogbyInternational, 2002),
especiallypp.3342.Thispollinvolved3,800Arabsineightcountries.Also,PewGlobal
AttitudesProject,Views of a Changing World: June 2003 (Washington,DC:PewResearch
CenterforthePeopleandthePress,2003),especiallypp.4770.Thispolldealswithonly
twoArabcountries,LebanonandJordan.AlsoseeAmaneyJamalandMarkTessler,Atti-
tudesintheArabWorld,Journal of Democracy 19,no.1(January2008):97110.
56
Themostprominentdeclarationsare:theSanaadeclarationofJanuary2004,which
wasproducedbytheRegionalConferenceonDemocracy,HumanRights,andtheRoleof
theInternationalCriminalCourt;andtheAlexandriaCharterofMarch2004,whichwas
theresultofaconferenceofArabcivilsocietyorganizationsentitledArabReformIssues:
VisionandImplementation.
14 ChapterOne
encouraged. It is building the foundation of a more democratic Arab
politicalculture.
57
In addition, civil society groups and activists increasingly undertake
demonstrationsandotheractsofpublicresistanceinsupportofpolitical
change. For example, the Kifaya (enough) movement in Egypt orga-
nizedthousandsofdemonstratorsinthespringof2005tocallforanend
toPresidentMubaraksruleandtheconveningofcompetitivepresidential
elections.TheMuslimBrotherhoodmobilizedthousandsofitsfollowers
toparticipateinthesedemonstrations.Italsoorganizedseparatedemon-
strationstosupportpoliticalandconstitutionalreform.InLebanon,the
March14thmovementbrought1.2millionpeopleontothestreetsin
2005toprotestSyriaspresence.Theyorganizedseveralsubsequentdem-
onstrationstoadvocatepoliticalreformandnationalreconciliation.
58
Sig-
nicantpublicmobilizationinfavorofpoliticalreformhasalsooccurred
inMoroccoandJordan,despitethethreatofimprisonmentandnes.
59
WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD?
Forthersttimeintheregionshistory,therearestrongindigenousde-
mandsfordemocracybackedbysignicantinternationalsupport.These
pressureshavenotyetledtodemocratictransitions.However,therehave
been some meaningful steps toward political reform. Improvements in
electoralprocedureandmonitoringhaveproducedmorecompetitiveelec-
tionsinAlgeria,Kuwait,Lebanon,Jordan,andMorocco.Judicialinde-
pendencehasincreasedinEgypt,Kuwait,Jordan,andMorocco.
60
Judges
inEgyptandKuwait,inparticular,haveshownawillingnesstochallenge
57
MarcLynch,ShatteringthePoliticsofSilence.SatelliteTelevisionTalkShowsand
theTransformationofArabPoliticalCulture,Arab Reform Bulletin 2,no.11(2004):3;
also,MarcLynch,Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics
Today (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2006).
58
PaulSalem, Lebanon at the Crossroads: Rebuilding an Arab Democracy (Washington,
DC:BrookingsInstitution,2005);OussamaSafa,LebanonSpringsForward,Journal of
Democracy 17,no.1(2006):2237.
59
ForfurtherinformationonMorocco,see:AndrewR.SmithandFadouaLoudiy,Test-
ingtheRedLines:OntheLiberalizationofSpeechinMorocco,Human Rights Quarterly
27, no. 3 (2005): 10691119; Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, Morocco: From Top-
Down Reform to Democratic Transition? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
InternationalPeace,2006).ForfurtherinformationonJordan,see:GeorgeJoffe,Jordan in
Transition (London:HurstandCo.,2002);RussellE.Lucas,DeliberalizationinJordan,
Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 13744; Anne Marie Baylouny, Jordans New
PoliticalDevelopmentStrategy,Middle East Report 35,no.3(2005):4043.
60
NathanBrown,ArabJudicialReform:BoldVisions,FewAchievements, Arab Re-
form Bulletin,October2004.
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 15
executivepower.
61
Parliamentshavegainedgreaterauthoritytoquestion
membersoftheexecutiveandremoveministersinJordanandMorocco.
Changesinlegislationandprocedurehavemadeiteasiertoformpolitical
partiesinMoroccoandEgypt.Strongcivilsocietygroupscallingforpolit-
icalreformhaveemergedinEgypt,Lebanon,Morocco,andJordan.And,
pressfreedomhasimprovedinBahrain,Morocco,andJordan.
62
Inaddition,severalcountriesintheregionhaveundergoneeconomic
restructuring that carries important repercussions for political change.
Themassivewelfarestatesthatenhancedregimelegitimacyinmanycoun-
trieshaveprovennanciallyunsustainable.Persistentbudgetdecitsand
scalcriseshaveforcedcutbacksinkeyinstitutionsofstatecontrolsuch
asthepublicsector,thesubsidysystem,andthecivilservice.Thisispartic-
ularlythecaseinEgypt,Morocco,andJordan.
63
Thestateinthesecoun-
triesiscertainlyinnodangerofcollapsing.However,itscapacitytocon-
trol the economy and society has declined.
64
At the same time, new
institutionsareemergingwithinthestate(suchasindependentjudicia-
ries)andwithincivilsociety(suchasIslamistgroups).Theseinstitutions
challengeandconstrainstatepower.Asnotedearlier,theymayalsooffer
an alternative conception of political order that competes with the re-
gimesideology.
Althoughthesedevelopmentsareencouraging,wemustbecarefulnot
to exaggerate their signicance. As one might expect, there have been
setbacks.Lebanon,inparticular,hassufferedfromarecentdescentinto
sectarian rivalries and violence. In addition, the autocrats of the Arab
worldhaveadoptedcountermeasurestoprotecttheirpowerandfrustrate
reform.Thestill-formidablerulingelitesoftheregionhaveasubstantial
61
Mostrecently, theKuwaiti ConstitutionalCourt voidedfteen clausesof thePublic
Gatherings Law, which restricts public gatherings that convene without prior permission
fromtheauthorities.Itheldthattheclausesviolatedtherighttofreedomofassemblyguar-
anteedbytheconstitution.Therulingmarkedthersttimethatacourthadchallengedthe
emergencypowersoftheemir.SeeArab Reform Bulletin,May2006(issue4).Fordiscussion
oftheEgyptianjudiciary,seechapter2.
62
ThesepointsaregleanedprimarilyfromareviewofthemonthlyArab Reform Bulletin
fromSeptember2003throughMay2006.TheBulletin ispublishedbytheCarnegieEndow-
mentforInternationalPeace.
63
TheEgyptiancaseisdiscussedinchapter5.Forfurtherinformationoneconomicre-
structuring in Morocco, see Fostering Higher Growth and Employment in the Kingdom of
Morocco (Washington,DC:WorldBank,2006).ForinformationonJordan,seeKatherine
Blue Carroll, Business as Usual? Economic Reform in Jordan (Lanham: Lexington Books,
2003);WarwickM.Knowles,Jordan since 1989: A Study in Political Economy (London:I.
B.Tauris,2005).
64
For further discussion of the changing character of the state in the Arab world, see
HassanHakimianandZibaMoshaver,eds.,The State and Global Change: The Political Econ-
omy of Transition in the Middle East and North Africa (Richmond:CurzonPress,2001).
16 ChapterOne
arsenal of tools at their disposal.
65
Autocratic institutions are not being
swept away in dramatic popular upheavals comparable to the people
powerofthePhilippinesorthecoloredrevolutionsofcentralEurope.
Rather,thetoolsofcentralizedstatepoweraregraduallyeroding.Asthis
unfolds, new institutions emerge alongside these weakenedbut still
functioningstateinstitutions.InEgypt,forexample,thecountryspow-
erfulsecurityinstitutionsandthelegalcodesthatempowerthemarenot
beingdismantled.Instead,increasinglyassertiveadministrativeandcon-
stitutionalcourtschallengetheirpowerandlimittheirauthority.
66
InJor-
dan,thestatessocialserviceinstitutionsandeducationalsystemarenot
shuttingdown.Instead,theycontinuetofunctioninafragmentaryand
incompletefashion,andaresupplementedbyindependentIslamicinstitu-
tionsthatperformthesamefunctions.
67
Someinstitutions(suchasinde-
pendentjudiciaries)maybeproductsoftheregimespolicies,butthisdoes
not mean they are controlled by the regime. Rather, they develop and
functionalongsidetheautocraticinstitutionsofthestateandoftenconsti-
tuteameaningfulconstraintonit.
Thenetpoliticalresultofthisprocessisneitherauthoritarianismnor
democracy.Rather,theoutcomeisahybridregimethatsharescharacteris-
tics of both an autocratic order (characterized by a powerful executive
withfewformalchecksonhisauthority)andademocraticorder(which
includes institutions thatconstrain the state andincrease governmental
accountability).Furthermore,thesedemocraticinstitutionsareoftensup-
portedbyIslamicthinkersandactivists.Islamicpoliticalandlegalthought
playsanincreasinglyimportantroleindeningandlegitimizingtheinsti-
tutionalalternativestoautocracy.
AfulltransitiontodemocracyisnotlikelyinanycontemporaryArab
regime.However,forregimeswiththesehybridcharacteristics,areversion
to fullauthoritarianism is equally unlikely. In order to understand the
futureofdemocracyintheArabworld,weneedtounderstandhowthese
hybrid regimes emerge, why they remain stable, and whether they will
transitiontowarddemocracy.Thetheoreticalliteratureonhybridregimes
providesavaluablestartingpointforthisanalysis.
65
ForfurtherdiscussionofthetacticsofArabauthoritarianism,seeEberhardKienle,A
Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (NewYork:I.B.Tauris,2001);
MayeKassem,Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule (Boulder,CO:Lynne
Rienner,2004);RussellLucas,Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic
Responses to External Challenges, 19882001 (Binghamton: State University of New York
Press,2005);EllenLust-Okar,Structuring Conict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Oppo-
nents, and Institutions (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005).
66
Thesecourtrulingswillbediscussedinchapter2.
67
JanineA.Clark,Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare
in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen (Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2004),82114.
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 17
HYBRID REGIMES AND POLITICAL CHANGE
Scholarsofauthoritarianismhavelongbeenawareofregimesthatcontain
bothautocraticanddemocraticinstitutions.Linzsclassicstudyofauthori-
tarianismdiscussesthistopicinsomedetail.
68
Diamond,Linz,andLipset
alsoexamineitintheirextensivemulti-countrystudyofdemocratization.
Theybeginbyobservingthatalldemocraciesfallshortofthedemocratic
ideal.However,someregimesfallsofarshortthattheycannotbedescribed
asdemocratic.Theauthorsidentifyseveraltypesofregimesthatfallwithin
thisgreyzonebetweendemocracyandautocracy:semidemocracy,in
which competitiveelectionsoccur among multiple partiesbut there are
seriousawsintheelectoralprocessorsharprestrictionsonthepowersof
representative institutions; low-intensity democracy, in which vibrant
andrelativelyfairelectionstakeplace,butgovernmentslackmeaningful
accountabilityduringtheperiodbetweenelections;andhegemonicparty
systems,inwhichfreeelectionsoccur,butonepartythoroughlydomi-
natestheelectoralprocessandprecludesanymeaningfulcompetitionfor
power.
69
Each of these is an example of a hybrid regime that exhibits a
differentmixofauthoritariananddemocraticinstitutions.
70
Ottawayde-
scribeshybridregimesinsimilarterms.
71
They maycontain legislatures,
independentjudiciaries,andcivilsocietyorganizations.However,theydo
notallowthetransferofpowerthroughelectionsand,therefore,arenot
fullyfunctioningdemocracies.
72
68
JuanJ.Linz,Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder,CO:LynneRienner,
2000),5861.
69
LarryDiamond,JuanJ.Linz,andSeymourMartinLipset,Introduction:WhatMakes
forDemocracy?inPolitics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy,
ed.LarryDiamond,JuanJ.Linz,andSeymourMartinLipset(Boulder,CO:LynneRienner,
1995),78.
70
Avarietyofothertermsappearintheliteraturetodescribethistypeofmixedregime,
including:virtualdemocracy,pseudodemocracy,illiberaldemocracy,semi-authoritarianism,
softauthoritarianism,electoralauthoritarianism,andpartlyfree.SeeStevenLevitskyand
LucanA.Way,TheRiseofCompetitiveAuthoritarianism,Journal of Democracy 13,no.
2(2002), 51.Also, ArielC.Armony andHector E.Schamis,Babel inDemocratization
Studies,Journal of Democracy 16,no.4(2005),113.
71
MarinaOttaway,Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washing-
ton,DC:CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,2003),3.
72
Thisdiscussionofhybridregimesdrawsattentiontotheimportanceofdistinguishing
betweenliberalismanddemocracy.Westernanalystsareaccustomedtoseeingthesetwoprin-
ciplesmergedintoasingleidealiberaldemocracy.However,theyaredifferentconcepts.
Liberalismisasetofinstitutionsandinstitutionalrelationshipsthatconstrainstatepowerand
protectcitizenscivilandpoliticalrights.Theseinstitutionsincludeaclearandunbiasedlegal
code, the separation of powers, checks and balances among these powers, an independent
judiciary,andeffectivelegalinstitutionsthatimplementthelaw.Democracyistheprocessof
selecting a countrys leaders through free and fair elections. In many hybrid regimes, the
18 ChapterOne
Hybridregimeshavebeenpartofthepoliticallandscapeforseveralde-
cades.
73
However, their number grew dramatically after the end of the
ColdWar.ThedemiseoftheSovietUnionledtothewithdrawalofexter-
nalsupportfrommanyoftheworldsdictatorships.Russiahadneitherthe
resourcesnorthewilltocontinuesupportingcommunistregimesaround
theworld.WiththeSovietmenacegone,theUnitedStateshadlittlerea-
sontosupportright-wingdictatorshipsthatcounterbalancedcommunist
inuence. This termination of external support precipitated severe eco-
nomic crises in many dictatorships in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Autocratshadlittlechoicebuttoopentheirpoliticalsystemsinorderto
retainpower,buttheydidsoinamannerthatfellshortoffulldemocratic
transition.
74
Theresultwasasharpincreaseinhybridregimes.
TheSovietUnionscollapsealsolefttheWestinapositionofpolitical
andeconomicpreeminence.Communistandsocialistmodelsofdevelop-
ment had lost their credibility and popularity. The Western democratic
model swept the global competition of ideas and became the natural
choiceforadvocatesofpoliticalreforminauthoritarianregimes.Further-
more,afterthecollapseoftheUSSR,theWestheldavirtualmonopoly
oneconomicassistance.Autocratswhowantedapieceofthispiewould
needtoshowatleastrhetoricalsupportfortheprinciplesofdemocracyand
accountability.SeveralWesterncountrieswentastepfurtherandexplicitly
incorporateddemocracypromotionintotheirforeignpolicies.Asnoted
earlier,thiswasparticularlythecasefortheUnitedStatesandthemem-
bersoftheEuropeanUnion.
75
Thesemeasureswerereinforcedbyagrowingnetworkoftransnational
civilsocietygroupsthatpromoteddemocracyandhumanrights.
76
These
institutionsofliberalismhaveemergedandconstrainsomedimensionsofexecutivepower.
However, the core institution at the heart of democracyfree electionsremainsweak or
nonexistent.Thisdistinctionbetweenliberalismanddemocracyisparticularlyimportantfor
understandingtheEgyptiancase.Itwillbediscussedinfurtherdetailinchapter6.
73
Particularlylong-livedexamplesincludeMexicobefore1997andpost-independence
Malaysia.ThefollowingdiscussionofthehistoryofhybridregimesdrawsonLevitskyand
Way,TheRiseofCompetitiveAuthoritarianism,6163.
74
BrattonandvandeWalleofferaparticularlycleardiscussionofthisphenomenonin
Africa.SeeMichael BrattonandNicolasvan deWalle, Democratic Experiments in Africa:
Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1997),97122.
75
ThomasCarothers,Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington,DC:
CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,1999),6;KaterinaDalacoura,U.S.Democ-
racyPromotionintheArabMiddleEastsince11September2001:ACritique,Interna-
tional Affairs 81,no.5(2005):96379;AnaEchagueandRichardYoungs,Democracy
andHumanRightsintheBarcelonaProcess,Mediterranean Politics 10,no.2(2005):233
38;RichardGillespieandRichardYoungs,eds.,The European Union and Democracy Promo-
tion: The Case of North Africa (London:FrankCass,2002).
76
MargaretE.KeckandKathrynSikkink,Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Marina Ottaway and
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 19
organizationsincludedhumanrightsgroups,internationalpartyfounda-
tions,andmediaadvocacygroups.Theydrewinternationalattentionto
humanrightsabusesandlobbiedWesterngovernmentstomonitorand
punish autocratic regimes.
77
Some of the groups also sought to protect
and strengthen pro-democracy forces through lobbying, funding, and
training.
78
In addition, international election observers became an im-
portantforceforidentifyinganddocumentingelectoralfraud.Theiref-
fortsledtosubstantialimprovementsinthefairnessandtransparencyof
elections.
79
These changes in the international setting dramatically increased the
incentivesforauthoritarianleaderstoadoptatleastthetrappingsofde-
mocracy.AsLevitskyandWayconclude,formostgovernmentsinlower-
andmiddle-incomecountries,thecostsassociatedwiththemaintenance
offull-scaleauthoritarianinstitutionsandthebenetsassociatedwith
adoptingdemocraticonesroseconsiderablyinthe1990s.
80
Diamond
reachesthesameconclusionandobservesthatoneofthemoststriking
features of the late period of the third wave [of democratization] has
beentheunprecedentedgrowthinthenumberofregimesthatareneither
clearlydemocraticnorconventionallyauthoritarian.
81
Heestimatesthat,
by2001,roughlyone-thirdoftheworldsregimescouldbedescribedas
hybrids.
82
Furthermore,theseregimeshaveshownremarkabledurabil-
ity. Manyhybrid regimes haveexisted forfteen years orlonger, which
exceedsthelifespanofmostbureaucratic-authoritarianregimesinLatin
America.
83
Thisdurabilitysuggeststhathybridregimescannotbecharac-
ThomasCarothers,eds.,Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Wash-
ington,DC:CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,2000).
77
KeckandSikkink,Activists Beyond Borders,1213.
78
Ibid.;ThomasRisse,StephenC.Ropp,andKathrynSikkink.,eds.,The Power of Human
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (New York: Cambridge University
Press,1999).
79
ThomasCarothers,TheObserversObserved,Journal of Democracy 8,no.3(1997):
1731.
80
StevenLevitskyandLucanA.Way,AutocracybyDemocraticRules:TheDynamicsof
CompetitiveAuthoritarianisminthePostColdWarEra.Paperpresentedattheconfer-
ence, Mapping the Grey Zone: Clientelism and the Boundary between Democratic and
Democratizing.(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2003),6.
81
LarryDiamond,ThinkingaboutHybridRegimes,Journal of Democracy 13,no.2
(2002):25.
82
Diamond identies three categories of hybrid regimes: competitive authoritarian
(inwhichcompetitiveelectionsexistwithinastableauthoritarianregime),hegemonicelec-
toral authoritarian (in which a single party dominates regular elections), and ambiguous
regimesthatstraddletheboundarybetweendemocracyandauthoritarianisminotherways.
Ibid.,26.
83
StevenLevitskyandLucanA.Way,Competitive Authoritarianism: International Link-
age, Organizational Power, and Hybrid Regimes in the PostCold War Era (NewYork:Cam-
bridgeUniversityPress,forthcoming),chap.1.
20 ChapterOne
terizedasstalledorprolongedorincompletetransitionstodemoc-
racy.
84
Rather,theyareadistinctregimetypethatneedstobeunderstood
onitsownterms.
85
Ashybridregimesbecamemorenumerousandlong-lived,scholarsof
comparative democratization began to study them with greater care.
LevitskyandWayundertookaprojectthatanalyzedthirty-sevenofthese
regimes.Theyfoundthattraditionalauthoritarianregimesassumeahy-
brid character through the emergence of four arenas where opposition
forces challenge autocratic incumbents: elections, in which opposition
candidatesrunsuccessfullyagainstmembersoftheregime;legislatures,
where opposition parliamentarians challenge and constrain the govern-
ment;thejudiciary,wherejudgesrepealrepressivelawsandlimitthescope
ofexecutivepower;andthemedia,whereindependentjournalistsinvesti-
gateandexposeabusesofpowerbytheregime.
86
Theircarefulstudyof
change in each of these arenas suggests that hybrid regimes emerge
throughthreeprocesses:
Elite calculations for survival:Rulingelitesinautocraticregimesoften
confrontperiodsofcrisisbroughtonbypooreconomicperformance,mil-
itary defeat, excessive repression, or a similar event. They may also face
externaldemandstodemocratizeasaconditionforeconomicaidormem-
bershipininternationalorganizations.Inordertocopewiththesepres-
sures,rulingelitesmayadoptlimitedreformssuchasreleasingpolitical
prisoners,expandingcivilandpoliticalrights,andallowingsomepolitical
competition.Thesemeasuresarecarefullycalibratedtoenhancethere-
gimes legitimacy and international stature without allowing genuine
competitionforpower.
Change in the relative power of institutions within the state and society:
Authoritarianregimesarebaseduponcontrolofseveralkeyinstitutions.
Themostobviousarethesecurityservicesandpolice,whichprovidethe
hardpowertomaintainorderandrepressopponents.However,these
regimesalsorelyonsoftpower,whichshapestheprioritiesofcitizens
byprovidingthemwithincentivestosupporttheexistingorder.Atthe
heart of this soft power are economic institutions such as the public
sector,thesubsidysystem,andthebureaucracy.Theseinstitutionsprovide
jobs,food,housing,education,andahostofotherimportantservices.A
successfulauthoritarianregimeutilizesthemtomaintaintheloyaltyand
cooperationofitssupporters.Theseinstitutionsarealsovaluabletoolsfor
co-optingorharassingtheregimesopponents.
84
LevitskyandWaystudy37casesofhybridregimesfrom1990through2005.Ofthese,
only14underwentatransitiontodemocracy.Ibid.,chap.1.
85
ThomasCarothers,TheEndoftheTransitionParadigm,Journal of Democracy 13,
no.1(2002):521.
86
LevitskyandWay,TheRiseofCompetitiveAuthoritarianism,5457.
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 21
Theseinstitutionsmaybeunderminedbyeconomiccrises,economic
mismanagement,oreconomicrestructuring.Whentheseinstitutionsare
weakened,the regimespatronage networkerodesand itcan nolonger
provide the services that are essential for preserving its legitimacy and
power. This can lead to two institutional outcomes that contribute to
thedevelopmentofahybridregime.First,governingelitesmayallowthe
emergenceofnew institutionswithinthestateinorder toenhancethe
regimeseconomicperformance.Theymay,forexample,allowthedevel-
opmentofanindependentjudiciaryinthehopethatitwillcreateamore
attractiveinvestmentenvironmentbyprotectingpropertyrightsanden-
suring reliable enforcement of contracts. Second, the weakening of the
institutionsthatprovidepublicservicescreatesanopportunityforprivate
service organizations to emerge and grow. These may take the form of
charitableorganizations,religiousgroups,orcommercialrms.Theyhelp
tomeetthebasicneedsofsocietyineldssuchashousing,medicalcare,
andeducation.Thus,ahybridregimemayemergethroughthecombina-
tionofautocraticinstitutionsweakeningandalternativeinstitutionsex-
pandingwithinthestateandcivilsociety.
Erosion of the political ideas that legitimate the regime:Autocraticregimes
oftenrelyonasetofideastojustifytheircentralizationofpowerandtheir
denialofcivilandpoliticalrights.Forexample,theInstitutionalRevolu-
tionary Party (PRI) in Mexico stressedthe goal of reordering society to
achievethejusticeandequitypromisedbytheMexicanrevolution.Tanza-
niaunderJuliusNyereretriedtoimplementAfricansocialism,whichwas
based on Nyereres unique mix of socialist and tribal principles. Egypt
underNassersoughttoadvanceArabnationalism,whichcombinedEgyp-
tiannationalism,anti-colonialism,andaspirationsforregionalleadership.
Politicalideassuchasthesemaynotbesufcientlyrigorousorsystematic
towarrantthelabelideology.Nonetheless,theymatterforlegitimating
anautocraticregimeandjustifyingitsmonopolyonpower.Theselegitimat-
ingideasoftenerodeduetothedeathofthefoundingleader,pooreco-
nomicperformance,excessiverepression,militarydefeats,andotherpracti-
calfailuresofgovernance.Astheseideaserode,alternativeviewsofpolitical
orderhavetheopportunitytodevelopandbuildsupportwithinthestate
andsociety.Thegrowthofthesealternativeconceptionsoflawandgover-
nanceisanotherimportantstepinthecreationofahybridregime.
Thus,hybridregimesemergethroughacombinationofelitecalcula-
tions, institutional change, and ideational competition. However, as
scholarlyinterestinhybridregimesincreased,researchtendedtoconcen-
trateonlyontheshort-termmaneuveringofautocraticelites.
87
Thelitera-
87
See,forexample,MaxwellA.Cameron,Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru: Polit-
ical Coalitions and Social Change (NewYork:St.MartinsPress,1994);WilliamCase,Can
the Halfway House Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast Asian
22 ChapterOne
turefocusedparticularlyontheroleofelectionsinauthoritarianregimes.
Works by Schedler, Magaloni, Geddes, Pripstein Posusney, Lust-Okar,
Lucas,Brownlee,andothersexaminedthetacticsandpoliticaldynamics
ofelectionsunderauthoritarianismwithcareandprecision.
88
However,
thisliteratureleavesseveralimportantaspectsofhybridregimesunderex-
ploredandunconceptualized.Whileprovidinginsightintotheshort-term
calculationsthatsustaintheseregimes,itneglectsthelonger-terminstitu-
tionalinteractionandideationalcompetitionthatproducethem,deter-
minetheirstability,andshapetheirdevelopment.Theseinstitutionaland
ideationalconsiderationsinclude:changesinthesizeandfunctionsofthe
state;deteriorationofthestatescapacitytomonitorandcontrolsociety;
erosionofthepoliticalideasthatlegitimatetheregime;andtheemergence
ofcompetingideasandinstitutionsthatconstrainthestateandfurther
weakenitslegitimacy.Theselonger-termprocessesaretheunderlyingex-
planation for the emergence of a hybrid regime. Elections are merely a
symptomoftheregimesweaknessandatacticformanagingit.Thisdoes
notrenderthemunimportant.However,analysisofthistacticforregime
survivaltellsusrelativelylittleabouttheunderlyinginstitutionalandide-
ationaldynamicsthatdeterminetheregimescharacterandstability.
Inasimilarvein,thefocusonelectionshastiltedtheliteraturetoward
studyofelitecalculationsatagivenmomentintimewithinaxedsetof
institutionalandideationalconstraints.Itdoesnotanalyzetheoriginsof
Countries,Comparative Politics 28,no.4(1996):43764;MichaelMcFaul,TheFourth
Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist
World,World Politics 54,no.2(2002):21244.
88
For examples from the literature on comparative authoritarianism, see Andreas
Schedler, ed., Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder,
CO:LynneRienner,2006);AndreasSchedler,TheNestedGameofDemocratizationby
Elections, International Political Science Review 23, no. 1 (2002): 103122; Andreas
Schedler, The Menu of Manipulation, Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 3650;
BeatrizMagaloni,Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico
(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006);BarbaraGeddes,WhyPartiesandElec-
tionsinAuthoritarianRegimes?PaperpresentedattheannualmeetingoftheAmerican
PoliticalScienceAssociation,Washington,DC,September2005;WilliamCase,Southeast
AsiasHybridRegimes:WhenDoVotersChangeThem?Journal of East Asian Studies 5,
no.2(2005):215238;ToddA.Eisenstadt,Courting Democracy in Mexico: Party Strategies
and Electoral Institutions (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003).Forexamplesdeal-
ingspecicallywiththeMiddleEast,see:MarshaPripsteinPosusney,MultipartyElections
intheArabWorld:ElectionRulesandOppositionResponses,inAuthoritarianism in The
Middle East: Regimes and Resistance, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner
Angrist(Boulder,CO:LynneRienner,2005),91118;JasonBrownlee,TheDoubleEdge
of Electoral Authoritarianism: A Comparison of Egypt and Iran. Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September
2001;BradfordDillman,ParliamentaryElectionsandtheProspectsforPoliticalPluralism
inNorthAfrica, Government and Opposition 35,no.2(2000): 21136;CurtisR.Ryan
andJillianSchwedler,ReturntoDemocratizationorNewHybridRegime?The2003Elec-
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 23
theinstitutionalandideationalcontextthatshapestheoptionsopento
elites,affectstheirchoices,andinuenceshowthosechoicesunfold.The
literaturealsoassumesthattheseinstitutionalandideationalconstraints
areconstantwhen,inreality,theyareundergoingsteadychangeinmany
hybridregimes.
Inaddition,theconcentrationonelectionshassteeredanalysisintoan
arenaofpoliticswheretheregimehasextensivecapabilitiestomanipulate
theoutcome.Inmosthybridregimes,thegovernmentcontrolseverydi-
mensionofhowelectionsunfold.Itdetermineswhomayregistertovote.
Itdenesthenatureoftheelectoralcampaign,includingwhichcandidates
mayparticipate,theamountofmoneytheymayspend,thesizeandfre-
quency of their rallies, and their degree of access to the media. It also
controlsthepollingprocessitself,includingwhomayhaveaccesstothe
polls,whocountsthevotes,howtheresultsareannounced,andhowthe
electoral outcome is translated into political power (number of seats in
parliament,inmunicipalcouncils,etc.).Concentratingonlyonelections
producestwobiasesinourunderstandingofhybridregimes.First,ityields
anexaggeratedsenseoftheregimescapacitytocontrolthepolity.Itgives
theimpressionthattheregimecanmanipulateeverycornerofpolitical
lifeasthoroughlyasitcontrolstheelectoralprocess.Second,afocuson
electionsneglectsthoseaspectsofpoliticalcompetitionthatarenotpart
oftheelectoralprocess.Theseincludeinstitutionaldynamicsthatcancon-
strainthepowerofanautocraticstate(suchastheemergenceofaninde-
pendentjudiciary)andideationalcompetitionthatinvolvesactorswhoare
either excluded from elections or whose participation is tightly con-
strained(suchasIslamists).
Thisemphasisonelectionsislargelytheproductofscholarsassuming
thathybridregimesaretransitioningtowarddemocracy.Thisassumption
leadsmanyscholarstobasetheirresearchuponthetheoreticalliteratureon
democratization.Thisliteraturearguesthatdemocraciesemergethrougha
two-stagesequence.Therststageisademocratictransition,whichisde-
nedastheholdingoffreeandfairelections.Thesecondstageisapro-
tractedprocessofdemocraticconsolidation.Thisentailsforminginstitu-
tionsthatconstrainexecutivepower(suchasanautonomouslegislature),
increasetransparency(suchasindependentmediaoutlets),andestablish
theruleoflaw(suchasanindependentjudiciary).Consolidationalsoin-
volvesthewidespreadadoptionofdemocraticpoliticalideassuchaspopu-
larsovereignty,equalitybeforethelaw,andgovernmentalaccountability.
89
tionsinJordan,Middle East Policy 11,no.2(2004):13851;Lucas,Institutions and the
Politics of Survival in Jordan;Lust-Okar,Structuring Conict in the Arab World.
89
Thissequenceisexplained withparticularclarityinJuanJ. LinzandAlfredStepan,
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and
24 ChapterOne
Scholarsofhybridregimeshaveimplicitlyacceptedthissequenceand
focused tightly on elections, which are the rst step along the road to
democratictransitionandconsolidation.However,hybridregimesarenot
necessarily in transition. They occupy a stable middle ground between
democracyandautocracy.Theycombine theinstitutionsofautocracyand
democracy.Asaconsequence,institutionsthatscholarsofdemocratiza-
tiondefertolaterintheiranalysissuchasindependentjudiciaries,strong
civilsocietygroups,andindependentmediaoutletsassumeaprominent
andearlyroleintheanalysisofhybridregimes.Similarly,politicalideas
thataregenerallyassociatedwiththeconsolidationphaseofdemocratic
developmentsuchasregimeaccountability,popularsovereignty,andre-
spectforindividualrightsmayemergequiteearlyinahybridregimeand
developsupportwithinpartsofthestateandcivilsociety.
Thekeyfeatureofahybridregimeisthatthesedemocraticinstitutions
andideasemergealongsidetheinstitutionsandideasofanautocraticre-
gimeandco-existwithit.Furthermore,thisphenomenonisnotsimply
theoutcomeofcarefulcalculationsbyautocraticeliteswhomanipulate
thepoliticalarenatotheiradvantage.Itisalsotheresultofinstitutional
and ideational competition. It is the product of an autocratic regimes
decliningpoweramidtheemergenceofinstitutionalandideationalalter-
natives.Theregimemaytoleratethisdevelopment,oftenbecauseitlacks
thepowertostopitorthecostofstoppingitisunacceptable.But,this
acquiescencedoesnotmeanthattheregimecontrolsitorsupportsit.
Inordertomorefullyunderstandhybridregimes,weneedaframework
thatpaysdueattentiontotheshort-termcalculationsofelites.However,
itmustalsoplacethesecalculationswithinthebroadercontextofinstitu-
tionaldevelopmentandideationalcompetition.Historicalinstitutional-
ismoffersthebasisforsuchaframework.
UNDERSTANDING THE EMERGENCE OF HYBRID REGIMES:
A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH
Thedeningfeatureofahybridregimeisthedevelopmentofdemocratic
institutions alongside well-entrenched authoritarian institutions. This
phenomenon of a polity containing multipleand conictinginstitu-
tionshasreceivedconsiderableattentionfromscholarsofhistoricalinsti-
tutionalism, particularly Skowronek, Hall, Skocpol, Steinmo, Mahoney,
Pierson,andThelen.
PostCommunist Europe (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1996),315.Alsosee
LarryDiamond,Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins
UniversityPress,1999),123.
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 25
Oneoftheleadingscholarsofthisapproach,PeterHall,denesinstitu-
tionsastheformalorinformalprocedures,routines,normsandconven-
tionsembeddedintheorganizationalstructureofthepolityorpolitical
economy.
90
Thehistoricalinstitutionalistsregardthepolityasaninter-
locking set of institutions that were created at different times, often to
servedifferentpurposes.
91
Thismosaicofclashinginstitutionsisapersis-
tentfeatureofthepoliticallandscapethatpushesdevelopmentalongpar-
ticularpaths.Itcreatesastructuralcontextthatdenestherelativepower
ofactorsandtherangeofoptionsavailabletothem.
92
Inthehistoricalinstitutionalistperspective,politicalchangeoccursasa
result of critical junctures that weaken old institutions and strengthen
others.Therearedifferenttypesofcriticaljunctures,whichproducedif-
ferentopportunitiesforchange.Themajortypesincludethefollowing:
Military defeat:Lossofawarcansmasharegimeslegitimacyandrob
itoftheresourcesneededtogovern,therebysettingthestageforinstitu-
tionalchange.ArgentinasdefeatintheFalklandswarisagoodexample.
Succession crises: The legitimacy of newly established regimes is often
built around the charismatic appeal of a single national leader, such as
NasserinEgypt,KhomeiniinIran,orAttaturkinTurkey.Totheextent
thattheseleadersconstructinstitutions,theyareusuallydesignedtorein-
force and extend the personal power of the leader rather than create a
rational-legalbasisforauthority.Thedeathofthecharismaticleaderoften
90
PeterA.HallandRosemaryC.R.Taylor,PoliticalScienceandtheThreeNewInstitu-
tionalisms,Political Studies 44(1996):938.Practitionersofhistoricalinstitutionalismgen-
erallyacceptthisdenition.Foraslightlydifferentperspectiveonhowtodeneinstitutions,
seeThedaSkocpol,WhyIAmanHistoricalInstitutionalist,Polity 28,no.1(1995):105.
91
StephenSkowronek,OrderandChange,Polity 28,no.1(1995):95;KarenOrren
andStephenSkowronek,InstitutionsandIntercurrence:TheoryBuildingintheFullness
of Time, in Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York
UniversityPress,1996):11146;JamesMahoneyandDietrichRueschemeyer,Compara-
tiveHistoricalAnalysis:AchievementsandAgendas,inComparative Historical Analysis in
the Social Sciences,ed.JamesMahoneyandDietrichRueschemeyer(Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress,2003),340;PaulPiersonandThedaSkocpol,HistoricalInstitutionalism
inContemporaryPoliticalScience,inPolitical Science: The State of the Discipline,ed.Ira
KatznelsonandHelenV.Milner(NewYork:W.W.Norton,2002),693721.Historicalin-
stitutionalists also use the metaphor of layering of institutions. This results from new
institutions being established on top of existing institutions, rather than replacing them.
Theproductisanincreasinglycomplexsetofinstitutionsresemblingalayeredcakethat
oftenworkatcrosspurposeswitheachother.
92
Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, Annual Re-
view of Political Science 2(1999):369404;SvenSteinmoandKathleenThelen,Historical
InstitutionalisminComparativePolitics,inStructuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism
in Comparative Analysis,ed.SvenSteinmoetal.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1992), 132; Ira Katznelson, Structure and Conguration in Comparative Politics, in
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and
AlanS.Zuckerman(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),81112.
26 ChapterOne
leadstoaperiodofcrisis,aspotentialsuccessorscompeteforpowerand
asinstitutionsseektosecuretheresourcesandauthorityneededtosustain
theirinuence.
Economic decline:Rampantinationandunemploymentcanundermine
public condence in a political and economic order and produce social
despairthatfuelscallsforchange.Itcanalsosapthestateoftheresources
neededtosustainkeyinstitutions,patronagenetworks,andsocialservices.
ThecollapseoftheWeimarRepublicandtheriseofGermanfascismoc-
curredamidstthistypeofcriticaljuncture.
Technological change:Theintroductionofnewtechnologiescanweaken
the stateand strengthen oppositiongroups, thereby facilitatingthe de-
clineofapoliticalorderandstimulatingtheemergenceofnewinstitu-
tions.Forexample,improvementsincommunicationstechnologyinIran
inthe1970sgreatlyaidedthedispersionofradicalIslamicdoctrinethat
undermined the legitimacy of the shahs regime and contributed to its
overthrowin1979.Morerecently,thewidespreaddispersionofsatellite
television in the Middle East since the early 1990s weakens the states
monopoly on the dissemination of information and exposes citizens to
alternativeconceptionsofpoliticsandsociety.Thisdevelopmenterodes
statepowerandlegitimacyandcreatesopportunitiesforchange.
93
Thedirectionofchangeatoneofthesecriticaljuncturesisshapedby
twofactors:
1. The relative strength of major institutions, which is the result of
institutionalhistoriesandtheeffectsofthecriticaljuncture.Thestrength
of an institution is a function of its degree of adaptability, complexity,
autonomy,andcoherence.
94
2.Theconceptionofpoliticsembedded
95
ineachoftheclashinginstitu-
tions.
96
Therangeofpoliticalideasonofferataspeciccriticaljuncture
denesthemenuofchoicesavailabletopoliticalactors.Theamountof
inuenceexertedbyanideaisshapedbythestrengthoftheinstitutionin
whichitisembedded.
93
Lynch,Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today.
94
ThisapproachtoassessingthestrengthofaninstitutionistakenfromSamuelP.Hun-
tington,Political Order in Changing Societies (NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1968),
1223.
95
Byembedded,Imeanintegratedintothenorms andpoliciesoftheinstitutionas
reectedinitspublications,trainingprograms,andspeechesbyleadingofcials.Forauseful
discussionofhowideasbecomeembeddedinaninstitution,seeKathrynSikkink,Ideas and
Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press,1991),2627.
96
HallandSikkinkexploretheroleofideasinparticulardetail.See:PeterHall,The
MovementfromKeynesianismtoMonetarism:InstitutionalAnalysisandBritishEconomic
Policy in the 1970s, in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 27
Thus,inordertounderstandthedirectionofchange,weneedtoana-
lyzechangesinthestrengthofmajorinstitutionsandtheideasofpolitical
orderembodiedintheseinstitutions.
97
Itshouldbestressedthatthisap-
proach emphasizes the importance of both ideas and institutions. Ideas
exertasustainedimpactonpoliticsonlywhentheyareembeddedinan
institution that provides nancial resources, personnel, and an effective
organizationalstructure.
Thishistoricalinstitutionalistperspectivesuggeststhatanauthoritarian
regimecandevelopintoahybridregimethroughthefollowingscenario:
Criticaljunctures(suchasaneconomiccrisisoramilitarydefeat)weakenkey
institutions of state power. The institutions affected may include political
institutions(suchasthepresidency),securityinstitutions(suchasthearmed
forces),oreconomicinstitutions(suchaspublic-sectorcompaniesorthesub-
sidysystem).
Regime elites try to preserve their power under these new conditions by
adopting political, legal, and economic reforms. For example, they may
strengthenthejudiciaryandtheruleoflawinthehopethatthisstepwill
improvetheefciencyofthestateandattractessentialforeigninvestment.
Or,theymayadoptlawsthatexpandcivilandpoliticalrightsinthehopethat
these measures will enhance the regimes popularity. These reforms create
opportunitiesforcompetingconceptionsofthepolitytoemergeandgrow.
Institutions that espouse alternative conceptions of the polity (such as the
judiciaryorIslamistgroups)exploittheseopportunities.Theymaybejoined
by other actorssuch as lawyers, human rights activists, intellectuals, and
businessmenwhosupportpoliticalchangeduetotheirnormativebeliefsor
theirself-interest(orboth).Thisinteractionbetweenreformistinstitutions
andkey actorsin civilsociety broadensand deepenstheconstituencies for
politicalchange.Italsodenestheagendaforreformanddetermineswhich
institutionscommandthegreatestinuenceasthereformprocessunfolds.
Thegovernmentpermitsthisprocesstoproceedeitherbecauseitisunable
tostopit,orbecausethereformsitproducesprovidebenetstotheregime.
Thesebenetsmightincludeeconomicgrowthstemmingfromastrengthen-
ingoftheruleoflaw,orenhancedregimelegitimacyproducedbyimprove-
mentsincivilandpoliticalrights.
Analysis,ed.SvenSteinmoetal.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992),90113;
Sikkink,Ideas and Institutions.
97
For further discussion of the sources of institutional change, see Kathleen Thelen,
TimeandTemporalityintheAnalysisofInstitutionalEvolutionandChange,Studies in
American Political Development 14 (2000): 1029; Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions
Evolve:InsightsfromComparativeHistoricalAnalysis,inComparative Historical Analysis
in the Social Sciences, ed. JamesMahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cam-
bridgeUniversityPress,2003),20840;KathleenThelen,How Institutions Evolve: The Polit-
28 ChapterOne
The resulting hybrid regime not only tolerates multiple conceptionsof the
polity.Itsoperationisgroundedintheregularinteractionofthesecompeting
ideasandtheinstitutionsthatembodythem.Inthisenvironment,political
entrepreneurscanpursueseveralstrategies:theymaylookforopportunities
tobroadentheirsupportbycooperatingwithmajorinstitutionsandco-opt-
ingtheirideas;theymayregardexistinginstitutionsandideasasthreatsto
theirpowerandseektoisolateandweakenthem;or,theymaytrytocreate
entirelynewinstitutionsthatbreaknewconceptualgroundandmobilizenew
groupsintothepoliticalprocess.Themixofcooperation,conict,andinnova-
tiondeterminesboththestabilityofthehybridregimeandthetrajectoryof
changefromit.Inordertounderstandthedevelopmentofthisregime,we
musttracethechangesintherelativestrengthofmajorinstitutions,theideas
thattheseinstitutionsembody,andthebehaviorofpoliticalentrepreneurs.
Thisisananalyticalapproachthatnotonlyexamineskeyactorsandthe
tacticsthattheyemploytomaximizetheirinterests.Italsoconsidersthe
institutionalsettingthatconstrainstheseactorsandtheideasthatthese
institutionsespouse.Itexplicitlyanalyzestheinstitutionalandideational
contextthatshapestheinterests,options,anddecisionsofthemajoractors
withinthepolity.
Thisperspectivesuggeststhefollowingstrategyforstudyingtheemer-
genceofahybridregime:
1.Delineatethemajorconceptionsofpoliticalorderthatcompetefor
preeminenceinthepolity.Theseconstitutedistinctschoolsofconstitu-
tionalismthatofferalternativevisionsofthecountryspoliticalfuture.
98
Inordertounderstandthesedistinctconceptionsofpolitics,theanalysis
willfocusoneachschoolsideasintwoareas:
Itsapproachtogovernance,whichincludesitsviewsregardingconstraints
onstatepower,governmentalaccountability,protectionofcivilandpolitical
rights,andpublicparticipationinpoliticallife.
Itsconceptionoflaw,whichconsistsofitsideasregardingthreeissues:the
institutionsthatareempoweredtodraft,interpret,andimplementlaw;the
sourceoflawslegitimacy(whetheritlieswiththepeople,thestate,orGod);
andthepurposeoflaw.Thislastpointasks:islawintendedprimarilytopro-
tectcitizens fromthestateand regulatetheirinteractionwith eachother?
ical Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (NewYork:Cam-
bridgeUniversityPress,2004).
98
This project utilizes the denition of constitutionalism put forward by Stephen
Holmes.Hedenesconstitutionalismasamethodoforganizinggovernmentthatdepends
onandadherestoasetoffundamentalguidingprinciplesandlaws.StephenHolmes,Con-
stitutionalism,inThe Encyclopedia of Democracy,ed.SeymourMartinLipset(Washington,
DC:CongressionalQuarterly,1995),299.
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 29
Or,isitprimarilyaninstrumentofstatepowerthataidstheimplementation
of policy?Or, is it areection of divine willthat aims to createa divinely
guidedcommunityonearth?
2.Identifytheinstitutionsthatespousethesecompetingconceptions
ofconstitutionalismandanalyzetheirdevelopment.
3.Studythecriticaljuncturesthatweakentheautocraticinstitutionsof
thestate.Theseincludemilitarydefeats,successioncrises,economiccri-
ses,andmomentsofdisruptivetechnologicalchange.
4. Examine the regimes efforts to adapt to these critical junctures
throughpolitical,legal,andeconomicreforms.
5.Assesshowthesereformsstrengtheninstitutionsthatcompetewith
theregimeandcreateopportunitiesforalternativeconceptionsofconsti-
tutionalismtobroadentheirsupportwithinthestateandsociety.
6.Examinehowthesecompetingconceptionsofconstitutionalismpro-
duceadistinctivetrajectoryofpoliticalchange.Thisentailsstudyingtheir
points of convergence and difference regarding the character of gover-
nanceandthesourceandpurposeoflaw.Interactioninthesetwoarenas
determinesthenatureofthehybridregime,itsstability,andthetypeof
regimeitwilltransitiontoward.
THE PATH AHEAD
The following volume applies this analytical framework to Egypt. This
countryisaparticularlyinsightfulandimportantcaseforunderstanding
theprospectsfordemocracyintheMiddleEast.Allthreeconceptionsof
politicalorderthatcompeteforpreeminenceintheArabworldliberal,
Islamic,andstatisthavedeephistoricalandinstitutionalrootsinEgypt.
Furthermore,thecompetitionamongthemhasbeenrelativelyopen.It
canbeexaminedthroughstudyofsourcesthatareeasilyaccessibleand
throughinterviewswithrelevantactors.Thus,theEgyptiancaseprovides
anopportunitytoanalyzethecompetitionamongideasandinstitutions
thatshapestheentireregion.Furthermore,Egyptisthekeytopromoting
democracyintheMiddleEast.IthastheArabworldslargestpopulation
(81millionin2008),largestmilitary,andsecondlargesteconomy.Itis
theculturalleaderoftheregionandanimportantsourceofSunnireligious
thought and tradition. The country also serves as a model for political
developmentinotherArabstates.Itspoliticalandlegalinstitutionshave
beenemulatedtovaryingdegreesinKuwait,theUnitedArabEmirates,
Jordan,Iraq,andSyria.AllofthesefactorsgiveEgyptuniquestatureand
inuence.Itsexperiencewithliberalism,Islam,anddemocracywillexert
30 ChapterOne
aprofounddemonstrationeffectonitsneighbors.Itwillshapethetiming,
character,andsuccessofdemocratizationthroughouttheArabworld.
TheanalysisofEgyptbeginsinchapter2,whichstudiestheemergence
of liberal constitutionalism. It examines the historical foundations of
Egyptianliberalisminthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,
and observes that this conception of governance became tightly inte-
grated into the development of the legal profession. As a consequence,
lawyersandjudgesbecamethemostdedicatedadvocatesofliberalreform.
TheBarAssociationplayedaleadingroleinpromotingtheliberalcause
formostofthetwentiethcentury.However,changesinitsmembership
andsteadyregimerepressioneventuallyfragmentedtheBarandunder-
mined itseffectiveness. Thejudiciary, in contrast,has retained astrong
senseofliberalidentityandhasdevelopedarobustconceptionofliberal
constitutionalism.Inordertounderstandthisapproachtolawandpoli-
tics, the chapter studies the decisions of Egypts major courts (the Su-
premeConstitutionalCourt,theadministrativecourts,andtheCourtof
Cassation). It uses this body of jurisprudence to analyze the judiciarys
views with regard to four core elements of constitutionalism: the rule
oflaw,constraintsonstatepower,protectionofbasicrights,andpublic
participationingovernance.
Chapter 3 examines the development of Islamic constitutionalism,
whichisbasedintheMuslimBrotherhood.Thechapterbeginsbystudy-
ing the re-emergence of the Brotherhood since 1970 and the political
pressures that have pushed it toward a moderate conception of Islamic
governance.Itthenanalyzesthewritingsoffourcontemporarythinkers
whoplay acriticalrole indening theBrotherhoodsview ofconstitu-
tionalorder:Yusufal-Qaradawi,MuhammadSalimal-Awwa,KamalAbu
al-Majd, and Tariq al-Bishri. The analysis focuses on their positions re-
gardingthesamefouraspectsofconstitutionalismdiscussedintheprevi-
ouschapter:theruleoflaw;constraintsonstatepower;protectionofcivil
andpoliticalrights;andpublicparticipationinpolitics.
Chapter4beginswithaconcisesummaryofthestatistconceptionof
political order that underlies Egypts current autocratic regime. It then
documents the economic contradictions that brought this order to the
point of crisis in the early 1990s. In response to this crisis, the regime
adoptedreformsthatenabledliberalconstitutionalismandIslamicconsti-
tutionalismtobroadentheirinuenceandsupport.Theanalysisexamines
the growth of these two alternative views of constitutionalism through
theactionsoftheirmostdeterminedadvocates:thedefactoprofessional
associationforjudges(theJudgesClubNadi al-Quda) andtheMuslim
Brotherhood.TheanalysisndsthatpoliticalcompetitionunderEgypts
repressive regime has pushed advocates of liberal constitutionalism and
Islamicconstitutionalismtowardcommonground.Theirpoliticalagendas
HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 31
convergeinseveralareas,particularlywithregardtokeyelementsofliber-
alismsuchasconstraintsonstatepower,strengtheningtheruleoflaw,and
protectionofcivilandpoliticalrights.
Chapter 5 observes that the implementation of market-oriented eco-
nomicpoliciessince1991hasstrengthenedthepoliticalinuenceofthe
businesscommunity.Egyptsmostpowerfulbusinessmenhaveusedthis
opportunity to articulate a distinctive conception of market liberalism
throughthepublicationsofaprominentthinktank,theEgyptianCenter
forEconomicStudies.Thechapterdocumentsandanalyzesthisviewof
thestate,law,andtheeconomy.Italsonotesthatthisapproachtomarket
liberalismhasbeenadoptedbytherulingNationalDemocraticPartyand
implementedbythereformistprimeministerwhoassumedpowerin2004
(AhmadNazif).
Chapter6observesthatthepathofinstitutionalchangeadvocatedby
thesemarketliberalssharesimportantareasofagreementwiththereforms
advocatedbysupportersofliberalconstitutionalismandIslamicconstitu-
tionalism.Eachofthesegroupsfavorsthecreationofamoreliberalstate
witheffectiveconstraintsonitspower,aclearandunbiasedlegalcode,
andprotectionofcivilandpoliticalrights.However,thereisnocompara-
bledegreeofconsensusonthevalueofbroadeningpublicparticipation
inpolitics.Thisfactsuggeststhatliberalismanddemocracyhavebecome
de-linkedintheEgyptiancase.Liberalismislikelytoprogresssteadilyin
thefuture,whiledemocracyislikelytoadvanceslowlyandunevenly.This
trajectorymayeventuallyleadtodemocracyatsomepointinthefuture,
particularlyifliberalismenhancestheprivatesectorsindependencefrom
the state and leads to a more autonomous and politically active middle
class.However,thisoutcomeisnotinevitable.Recentamendmentstothe
Constitutionin2007wereparticularlydisappointingtodemocrats.They
suggestthatEgyptislikelytoremainahybridregimethatcontainssome
legal and institutional constraints on executive power, but which falls
shortofWesternnormsofdemocracy.