David Doolittle

10/26/2014
HLS320 Navrkal
Midterm Paper
Red Cell Analysis: Domestic Terror Attack
AQIM FTO Profile


January 16
th
2013 the world was introduced to a new threat in the global war against
terrorism. Al Qaeda in The Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Maghreb meaning west, attacked and held
hostage nearly 800 people for four days at the Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas Southern
Algeria [1]. Suddenly an organization which had been operating for almost two entire decades
under the mainstream medias guise, filled the television sets on every news channel as the saga
continued in the remote part of Algeria. AQIM was formerly known as GSPC (The Salafist
Group for Preaching and Combat), an off shoot of the Algerian terror network GIA (Armed
Islamic Group) [2]. As of 1998 the group formally split from the GIA operating first primarily in
the capital Algiers then Southern Algeria until the last few years before becoming AQIM [2]. In
later years the organization expanded territorially across the length of the western Saharan Desert
and additional parts of Western Africa, an area of land known as the Sahel. In 2004 GSPC
pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda among many other terror networks[2]. Then it was still known as
GSPC, having contacts throughout Islamist extremist organizations across the Middle East and
Northern Africa. It was not until 2007 the GSPC would formally be known as Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb [2].
The terror group was networking quickly, shopping for a larger group to assimilate with.
One of GSPC's intents was to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Maghreb, specifically in the
land around Algeria [3]. The concept of a caliphate is not specific to GSPC, but a catholic calling
to extremist Islamist groups. These land claims substantiate from the middle age territories the
previous Caliphates held periodically until the end of world war one [4]. By joining with a larger
network of terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, GSPC would be able to facilitate easier the
transition to a universal caliphate for all of the Muslim ummah (people) ran by Sharia law.
Maybe this is what then second in charge of Al Qaeda Ayman Al-Zawahiri saw in GSPC in 2006
when he accepted their allegiance as a blessed union [2].
Al Qaeda was gaining momentum across the extremist muslim world to forming co
joined caliphates following the successful insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Al
Qaeda did this by establishing numerous affiliate groups. Notably some of these groups included;
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004, Al Qaeda in The Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and formally
accepting AQIM in 2006 [2].
During the middle ages the Umayyad caliphate at its peak held territory as far south as
Timbuktu in Mali, across the strait of Gibraltar, to the Pyrenees in northern spain [5]. If it was
not for the defeat of the caliphs armies at the battle of tours in 732 the caliphate probably would
have extended into western europe. The muslim Maghreb was extremely wealthy during 'the
golden age' of Islam [5] in relations to how wealth is distributed today among the Al Qaeda
affiliate 'mini caliphates'. A logistical factor adding into this equation was the overland trade
routes the caliphates controlled across the Sahara.
Thinking from a logical economic perspective, Islamic caliphates had complete control of
overland trade from sub saharan Africa. There market domination existed and what was the
commodity being sold? The most nearly sought after object for man's existence, precious gems
such as gold and diamonds[6]. These economic opportunities existed from antiquity until Europe
emerged from 'the dark ages' to explore the world. This substantiated time while exporting one of
the most valuable commodities allowed for the Maghreb to accrue tremendous wealth in addition
to founding trade routes the nomadic Tuareg Muslims still use today [6]. Does the path we walk
on this earth ever change? Or is the only difference what we carry along the way? AQIM uses
the sahara desert as the greatest caliphates did, only instead of gold they aid in the smuggling of
a modern precious commodity, drugs.
However the hostages captured during the oil field attack were not being held primarily
because trade routes could have been disrupted and the group was seeking grievances addressed
for that issue. AQIM's intent was to aid in another of its multiple fundraising platforms, ransom.
The Tigantourine gas facility is an internationally owned natural gas platform by the Statoil
company [7]. Statoil offers high wages to employees willing to work in dangerous environments
across the globe where they have invested interests. This creates an atmosphere drawing wealth
seeking individuals from across western civilization. It provides easier prey for large organized
terrorist groups looking to extort ransom from western countries and firms. During the evening
of the Amenas attack a tape was released to the associate press featuring the leader of AQIM
Mokhtar Belmokhtar. In the tape Mokhtar claimed responsibility for the attack and asking for a
substantial amount of money for each hostage [8].
Mokhtar Belmokhtar also know as the marlboro man . He received his nickname as a
result of his greater association with AQIM's lucrative cigarette carton smuggling business
across the sahara desert trade routes [9]. Before Mokhtar took the reign of AQIM, he fought in
the Soviet Afghanistan war [9]. Mokhtar is easily recognizable by a single eye patch he wears
over a scar received in combat. After taking charge of AQIM Mokhtar dedicated a large portion
of the groups activities to secular illicit fund raising. This included cigarette smuggling but may
have also been in harder substances including collaboration possibly with international
organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in their cocaine
smuggling operations through their west african territory into Europe. An inference such as that
merits little weight without evidence to suggest otherwise. Recent arrests of FARC members tied
exchanges of weapons the terror group may have procured in during Libya's recent revolution,
for cocaine the terror group attempted to sell to a large buyer in Essex England [10]. This
incident drew the attention of the shura council in charge of overseeing AQIMs operations in
the sahel. They condemned Mokhtar's sacrilegious behavior and ultimately disbanded Mokhtar
from the Al Qaeda affiliate organization in late 2012 [11]. Under Mokhtar's leadership AQIM
continued their smuggling practices and expanded into hostage taking.
Between 2012 and 2014 AQIM is thought to be responsible for 11 known incidents of
kidnappings aid workers and tourists along the senegal river, inland mauritania, throughout
Niger, across the country of Mali [12]. It is logical to assume most of these previous hostage
situations were handled by the aid organizations the kidnapped workers came from, to maintain
their firms as safe for the ignorant consumer to invest in. This is where the 'known' terminology
comes into play, as the actual number of kidnapping hostage situations is unknown from the facts
gathered. It is estimated by British government offices that the AQIM organization has raised
50$ million dollars [13] over the last decade due to ransoming hostages. Their monetary assets
also proved successful enough to fund the massive staged attack near In Amenas.
Dozens of militants attacked the Tigantourine gas facility heavily armed. They drove a
mini mechanized mobilized platoon of newer model, built for combat with mounted large
caliber machine guns and desert travel with sophisticated suspension systems, four wheel drive
trucks [14]. Their efforts failed though, heavily delayed militarized responses from the Algerian
military, due to the remoteness of the location. Took nearly four days to dissolve the hostage.
Despite their success at resolving the situation, nearly a third of the attackers escaped with a
small group of hostages. They were last seen heading west towards Mali by employees who
managed to hide at the facility [14]. If they did indeed head towards Mali, AQIM had close ties
to other extremist organizations at the time including; Ansar Dine and the Movement for
Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) [3].
Northern Mali became a safe haven for terrorist activity as a 2012 Coup D'Etat [3] drew
the martial attention of the instilled military junta towards the countries capital Bamako. This left
a political vacuum where the politically dissatisfied Tuareg population declared the Northern half
of the country a new state, Azawad [3]. This movement for reform and eventual failed state
conditions were sponsored by the Movement for Liberation and Nationalization of Azawad
(MLNA). The MLNA joined with MOJWA and Ansar Dine to declare Azawad a sharia law ran
islamic state. Human right violations were being reported from the onset of sharia law; beatings,
stonings, floggings [15]. The political environment also led to inclusion of AQIM in the
organizations operating in Azawad. As the islamic state expanded past the niger river and
Timbuktu it became apparent international intervention was needed to stop the whole of Mali
from falling. AQIM brought logistical and monetary support to the combined movement towards
this reality spreading towards Mali's capital Bamako.
Mali's land belonged to colonial france until its independence in 1960. Immigrants to
france increased as post french colonial governments failed to provide basic needs to the people
for the next 40 years [16]. This pressure from the African immigrant population, is possibly what
drew France into intervening in the conflict. France had already existed as historical inherited
enemy of AQIM. France's influence in Algeria and their refusal to leave colonial Algeria resulted
in over two hundred thousand deaths in a brutal 7 year long insurgent war [17]. The independent
government in 1992 dissolved the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) political party. The FIS was set
to win the party majority in the countries parliament after elections. Lacking satisfaction in the
states actions, Islamist groups like Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) Islamic Armed Movement
(MIA) and the GIA were formed. The MIA posted the primary amount of their forces in the
mountain ranges outside Algiers and the GIA controlled combat within the cities. A decade long
civil war was the result [18]. After the FIS stalled in negotiating with the independent
government the GIA declared war on the FIS and ISA as well. The GIA and AIS participated in
targeted killing of civilians known to be associated with each others groups. In 1998 the GIA
splintered into several smaller groups including the GSPC. The GIA mainly surrendered in 2002,
those who did not surrender were hunted down [19].
The GSPC continued the fight, reusing insurgency techniques typical of their experience
in the civil war, and denouncing the targeted killing of civilians as the GIA had done. Between
2002 and 2006 GSPC conducted many guerilla attacks on the security forces, in addition to
kidnapping mass groups of hostages for ransom on several occasions [19]. in 2007 the group was
able to successfully set off two car bombs near the prime minister of Algeria's residence, killing
30 and wounding 150 [19]. In exchange for sustained economic trade between France and
Algeria, the Evian Accords signed in 1962, ensured when Algeria was in need militarily France
would be there to aid [20]. The GSPCs terrorist acts, had the first president of Algeria since the
end of the civil war, call France to make good on the treaties provisions. The move bolstered anti
government presence for a short time in Algeria and the GSPC moved for the first time out of
Algiers urban conflict environment. The move took them to the mountains of southern Algeria to
re consolidate their forces as if they had stayed in Algiers they would have face the full weight of
the French counter terrorism forces [21]. It is not a surprise then that in late 2012 [3], when the
first french war planes flew over northern Mali to disrupt a native Tuareg rebellion, islamist
groups associated with the Algerian situation vowed retribution. These groups included the
former GSPC, now AQIM [19]. The Tigantourine gas facility attack was the start of the
consequences France faced for intervening in Mali from the terror group. In review then the
attack had two expressed intents; retribution and ransom.
As AQIM's allegiance to Al Qaeda central grew so did its knowledge of tactics Al Qaeda
employed in theaters such as Iraq Afghanistan and Yemen. Correspondence between AQAP and
AQIM indicates communication sent via carrier on paper as one methodology for moving ideas
to AQIM's front lines. It also offers a more reliable mode of transporting ideas, the internet
allows for extremely quick transfer of information but intelligence agencies are keen to most of
Al Qaedas tactics for online information transmission. A handwritten letter was found in a
manilla envelope by the associate press in Timbuktu Mali, The associated press recovered the
letter in an abandoned AQIM stronghold in the city, it is addressed to AQAP but is applicable to
fighters in the northern Mali. This letter is entitled Drones [22]. Under this ominous title is the
expectation this letter will be used to make fighters aware of the presence and use of drones
against themselves. The letter encompasses this topic, giving 22 sometimes technically savvy
tactics to disrupt US drone warfare.
Drones is more than a methodological update for Al Qaeda affiliates tactics though,
before describing the tactics to it delves into advanced knowledge AQAP has of American
business, foreign policy, and knowledge of US intelligence human intelligence source collection
methods. The fact AQIM has a copy of this letter is a testament to the networking and
communication abilities of Al Qaida central with AQIM as well as affiliates globally.
With this knowledge AQIM retreated with the remaining islamist movements from
Timbuktu, to the north central eastern shelter like landscape of Mali. Here in an area described
by French troops as Mars like [23], AQIM and other islamist fighters used tactics mentioned in
the letter to avoid drones from the secret CIA drone base in Niger as mentioned in the letter
[22] It is not known if Al Qaeda had disseminated this letter to all its affiliates in the same
manner.
AQIM has also used bomb making techniques in the northern Mali conflict made popular
in Iraq and Afghanistan for roadside improvised explosive devices (IED). Abandoned piles of
pre made IEDs and bomb making supplies found by French soldiers can be seen in the cited
video at 3:48 [24] As the video shows, the shoddily constructed bomb making sites in the
foothills of the northern town of Goa use tree shade military netting and plastic tarps to prevent
the materials overheating in the Saharan sun. Sadly this was not the last time IEDs would be seen
in Mali. Over the next year, several Chadian and nine French soldiers have been killed by suicide
vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) [25].
SVBIEDs have become increasingly popular tactic with suicide terrorist as the delivery
method usually involves a drop trigger component to the device. If the driver of the car is killed
or the car crashes the triggering device is held by the driver and the vehicle will explode if the
bomb is armed. The delivery method leaves little time for intervening forces to eliminate the
target and vacate the proximally relevant area before detonation if the driver is caught. Vehicles
used for SVBIED with any significant weight to the payload need to have reinforced suspensions
to handle the engineering stress explosives put on the cars chassis. This requires a shop to build
the vehicle as well as an asset with an engineering background to ensure the suspension can
handle the payload over the distance from the shop to the target. A large truck is often used but is
proving to be too slow to reach its target before being caught [26].
The largest known SVBIED was captured before the vehicle reached its target November
2013 in Afghanistan, luckily this driver did not have the device armed. The payload was 61,500
pounds [27] and was being orchestrated by the Haqqani network in Pakistan. The Haqqani
network is believed to be a close ally of Al Qaeda central and be responsible for the most deadly
car slash truck bombings in the Afpak region over the last couple years [27]. AQIMs SVBIED
was delivered from a support location in either eastern Mauritania or far central western Mali.
The payload traveled in a small vehicle. It was capable of leveling the vehicle as well as the
intended target, a french military convoy. Even if the payload was a twentieth of the Haqqani
mega truck bomb, to have a 2,500 to 3,000 pound bomb in a small vehicle without having
noticeable effects on the outward appearance takes mechanical engineering skills. The simple
weight would reduce the speed of the car, which reports indicate never slowed down [25] and
made the rear end sink onto the wheel well.
Then after the payload had been delivered, a spokesperson for a mysterious Al-
Murabitoun organization claimed responsibility. According to the IHSs Janes Terrorism and
Insurgency Center Al-Murabitoun formed in August 2013 as a merger between MOJWA and
Katibat al-Muqaoon bil-Dumaa [25] Katibat al-Muqaoon bil-Dumaa is an organization said to
have been led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. It is difficult to distinguish if Katibat al-Muqaoon bil-
Dumaa, Al-Murabitoun, MOJWA, and Ansar Dine were ever their own separate terrorist
organizations or just grouped elements of AQIM. Regardless of the classifications for the
organizations AQIM or Al-Murabitoun the group could now be headquartered in Mauritania.
The press release claiming the SVBIED attack on French troops was released to a Mauritanian
news agency [25].
Mauritanias government claims to be an Islamic republic. The history of Mauritania is
another fascinating subject altogether, but in summation Mauritania currently is a stratocracy.
There are elections but since the countries founding these have been periled by severe corruption
or quick dismissal of the government by the military leadership [28]. Corruption of officials may
allow AQIM to regroup under the name Al-Murabitoun in remote areas of Mauritania.
Geographically the south eastern side of Mauritania presents a logical distance for small load
SVBIEDs to be constructed then deployed into Mali to conduct suicide attacks on French foreign
legion forces. Despite a major withdrawal of French military from Mali, the French foreign
legion remains to continue the operation now named Operation Serval now in the second year
of the conflict. Politically AQIM can likely influence with money Mauritanian officials to keep
their wanted presence unknown. In addition to influence a middle class population at odds with
the government granting fishing contracts to allied nations ideologically to accept their extremist
interpretation of Islam.
Fishing is the largest industry in Mauritania, but soon fisherman may not be able to catch
more than a few fish. The Guardian Newspaper of the United Kingdom wrote Mauritania is at
risk of becoming another Somalia [29]. Somalias once rich fishing coast was overfished by
government contracted commercial interests and the coastal environments destroyed by pollution
from continuous industrial water travel [30]. This created an environment with no food causing
massive famine in the early 1990s when droughts affected already poor agricultural growth.
When someone is dying of hunger they do strange things, and turn to those willing to offer them
food. Whether this be food for their groaning stomachs, or nourishment for their souls.
Strategically Al-Murabitoun is in a position to soon have the materials, personnel, and logistics
planning to launch attacks on western targets in Europe and the United States. If Al-Murabitoun
is in fact AQIM as some evidence suggests, Al-Murabitoun is a vital threat to US national
security in the not distant future. Both Mokhtar and other members of Al-Murabitoun are
actively recruiting fighters returning back from fighting Jihad in Syria [25]. Official defense and
security sources officials are convinced these recruits will be used to commit acts of terrorism
perpetrated against Europe and the United States [25].
The next part of this presentation will be a red-cell analysis scenario, where a figurative
journey will be taken in the shoes of a member of the terrorist organization to complete a
successful attack on the United States mainland. The attack will be on a series of explosions
targeting soft infrastructure on east coast port cities.

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