Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Argumentation
correcting them, or a parent thumbing through them). The truth of the premises does
not guarantee the truth of the conclusion, therefore the argument is not valid (notice that
the word "student" is present in the conclusion but not in the premises). The main task
of logic is to sort valid arguments from invalid arguments.
An argument is deductively valid if and only if it is impossible for the premises
to be true and the conclusion false. The crucial thing about a valid argument is that it is
impossible for the premises to be true at the same time that the conclusion is false.
Thats why argument [3] was valid, even though the talking of hobbits and unicorns
seems nonsense. Lets see a similar example [5]:
If you are reading these notes youre either a coconut or a palm tree
You are reading these notes and you are not a palm tree
You are a coconut
The conclusion of this argument is ridiculous. Nevertheless, it follows validly
from the premises. This is a valid argument. If both premises were true, then the
conclusion would necessarily be true. This shows that a deductively valid argument
does not need to have true premises or a true conclusion. Conversely, having true
premises and a true conclusion is not enough to make an argument valid. Consider this
example [6]:
(1) Real Madrid CF is a football team
(2) Atltico de Madrid is a football team
Rayo Vallecano is a football team
The premises and conclusion of this argument are, as a matter of fact, all true.
This is a terrible argument, however, because the premises have nothing to do with the
conclusion. Imagine what would happen if the Rayo Vallecano disappeared. Then the
conclusion would be false, even though the premises would both still be true. Thus, it is
logically possible for the premises of this argument to be true and the conclusion false.
The argument is invalid.
The important thing to remember is that validity is not about the actual truth
or falsity of the sentences in the argument, instead, it is about the form of the
argument: the truth of the premises is incompatible with the falsity of the conclusion.
Consider this new argument [7]:
In 2010 more than one third of the students failed the first exam of the year
In 2011 more than one third of the students failed the first exam of the year
In 2012 more than one third of the students failed the first exam of the year
In 2013 more than one third of the students failed the first exam of the year
One third of the students always fails the first exam of the year
This argument is an inductive argument, as an inductive argument it seems
more or less correct, but its not a valid one: it is possible for the conclusion to be false
even though the premises are true. "Inductive arguments do not guarantee the truth of
their conclusions, even if all the premises are agreed to be true. The most familiar form
of inductive argument is generalization from a number of particular cases as in
argument [7] or when noting, for example, that every animal we have seen with sharp
front teeth eats meat and concluding that all animals with sharp front teeth eat meat. But
3
notice that although we might be absolutely sure that we are correct about the particular
casesthat every such animal we have seen does in fact eat meatwe might still be
wrong in our generalization, our conclusion that all such animals are meat eaters. Thus,
it is essential in any inductive argument to begin with a well-chosen number of
particular cases and to make sure that they are as varied as possible. Inductive
arguments can be strong or weak, depending on the weight of the evidence for the
conclusion, the quality of the sample, and the plausibility of the generalization." (TBQ)
Inductive arguments are not evaluated as valid or invalid so in logic we will not be
interested in inductive arguments, logic is a deductive (formal) science, induction
belongs to empirical sciences which rely on evidence.
In considering arguments formally, we care about what would be true if the
premises were true. Generally, we are not concerned with the actual truth value of any
particular sentence (whether they are actually true or false). Yet there are some
sentences that must be true, just as a matter of logic. Consider these sentences:
1. It is raining.
2. Either it is raining, or it is not.
3. It is both raining and not raining.
In order to know if sentence 1 is true, you would need to look outside or check
the weather channel. Logically speaking, it might be either true or false. Sentences like
this are called contingent sentences.
Sentence 2 is different. You do not need to look outside to know that it is true.
Regardless of what the weather is like, it is either raining or not. This sentence is
logically true; it is true merely as a matter of logic, regardless of what the world is
actually like. A logically true sentence is called a tautology.
You do not need to check the weather to know about sentence 3, either. It must
be false, simply as a matter of logic. It might be raining here and not raining across
town, it might be raining now but stop raining even as you read this, but it is impossible
for it to be both raining and not raining here at this moment. The third sentence is
logically false; it is false regardless of what the world is like. A logically false sentence
is called a contradiction.
To be precise, we can define a contingent sentence as a sentence that is neither a
tautology nor a contradiction.
A sentence might always be true and still be contingent. For instance, if there
never was a time when the universe contained fewer than seven things, then the
sentence At least seven things exist would always be true. Yet the sentence is
contingent; its truth is not a matter of logic. There is no contradiction in considering a
possible world in which there are fewer than seven things. The important question is
whether the sentence must be true, just on account of logic. Logical truths are true in
any possible world.
We can also ask about the logical relations between two sentences. For example:
A1. John went to the store after he washed the dishes.
A2. John washed the dishes before he went to the store.
These two sentences are both contingent, since John might not have gone to the
store or washed dishes at all. Yet they must have the same truth-value. If either of the
sentences is true, then they both are; if either of the sentences is false, then they both
are. When two sentences necessarily have the same truth value, we say that they are
logically equivalent.
Finally consider these two sentences:
B1. My only brother is taller than I am.
B2. My only brother is shorter than I am.
Logic alone cannot tell us which, if either, of these sentences is true. Yet we can
say that if the first sentence (B1) is true, then the second sentence (B2) must be false.
And if B2 is true, then B1 must be false. It cannot be the case that both of these
sentences are true. If a set of sentences could not all be true at the same time they are
said to be inconsistent. Otherwise, they are consistent. Sometimes, people will say that
an inconsistent set of sentences contains a contradiction. By this, they mean that it
would be logically impossible for all of the sentences to be true at once. A set can be
inconsistent even when all of the sentences in it are either contingent or tautologous.
When a single sentence is a contradiction, then that sentence alone cannot be true.
Summary of logical notions:
- An argument is (deductively) valid if it is impossible for the premises to be
true and the conclusion false; it is invalid otherwise.
- A tautology is a sentence that must be true, as a matter of logic.
- A contradiction is a sentence that must be false, as a matter of logic.
- A contingent sentence is neither a tautology nor a contradiction.
- Two sentences are logically equivalent if they necessarily have the same truth
value.
- A set of sentences is consistent if it is logically possible for all the members of
the set to be true at the same time; it is inconsistent otherwise.
III.2. Formalization
Why do we speak of formal logic? Formal logic is opposed to informal logic, which
is the one we use in our everyday life, that is, with a natural language (English,
Spanish). The problem with natural languages is that they hide the logical form of the
arguments, but validity relies on the logical form. Natural languages are not precise
enough, theyre ambiguous and may distract us from the relevant items of the argument,
the relation of the sentences. See for instance those two arguments [1] and [8]:
(1) All men are mortal
(2) Socrates is a man
Socrates is mortal
(1) All which is mortal kills
(2) Socrates is mortal
Socrates kills
5
The second argument seems weird and in fact it is not valid because we are
using mortal in two different senses in the premises (mortal as having the capacity
to die as in "no mortal has ever challenged the power of Zeus", and mortal as having
the capacity to kill as in "this poison is mortal"), but in the conclusion we are treating
mortal as if in both cases it meant the same. See also [9]:
All men are palm trees
Socrates is a man
Socrates is a palm tree
This argument might be less interesting than [1], because the first premise is
obviously false: there is no clear sense in which all men are palm trees. Yet the
argument is valid. To see this, notice that both arguments have this form [F1]:
(1) All Ms are Ps.
(2) S is M.
S is P.
In both arguments [1] and [9] S stands for Socrates and M stands for man. In [1]
P stands for mortal; in [9], P stands for palm trees. Both arguments have this form, and
every argument of this form is valid (as we will prove later on). So both arguments are
valid.
What we did here was replace words like man or palm tree with symbols
like M or C so as to make the logical form explicit. This is the central idea behind
formal logic, and that's exactly what Aristotle, the founder of logical science, did with
syllogisms (but he went no further in formalization). We want to remove irrelevant or
distracting features of the argument to make the logical form more perspicuous. Starting
with an argument in a natural language like English, we translate the argument into a
formal language. Parts of the English sentences are replaced with letters and symbols.
The goal is to reveal the formal structure of the argument, as we did with these two.
Lets focus on [8]. When we are obliged to translate the argument to a formal
language, we realize that mortal does not mean the same thing in (1) and in (2), so we
could never use the same letter for both. The form of [8] is [F2]:
(1) All M are K.
(2) S is D.
S is K.
Argument [1] and [8] looked very much the same, a crucial difference of logical
form shows itself clearly only in formal language. In this case we translated mortal as
the capacity to kill with M and mortal as the capacity to die with D, the final
result is that clearly [F1] and [F2] are different, so the validity of one argument does not
imply the validity of the other one, they are not logically equivalent (and in fact [8] is
not a valid argument, because [F2] is an incorrect logical form).
When we translate an argument into a formal language, we hope to make
its logical structure clearer. We want to include enough of the structure of the English
language argument so that we can judge whether the argument is valid or invalid. If we
included every feature of the English language, all of the subtlety and nuance, then there
would be no advantage in translating to a formal language.
6
Symbol
Logic symbols
o Monadic. Negation () is used to deny any sentence, it means no
or it is not the case that. It is monadic because it accompanies
one atomic sentence or one molecular sentence, but it cant be used to
build complex sentences, to relate or connect different sentences.
o Diadic. The connectives () are used in various ways to
relate sentences or groups of sentences, they are dyadic because the
necessarily connect two atomic sentences or two molecular
sentences.
Name
conjunction
disjunction
conditional
biconditional
Meaning
both and, and, but, also, although
either or or both, or
if then, therefore, then
"if and only if... then...",
a, b, c,z
a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, h37, n456,
( , ), [ , ]
With those symbols we can form any expression in SL. We define an expression
of SL as any string of symbols of SL. Take any of the symbols of SL and write them
down, in any order, and you have an expression. Not any expression is valid, since any
sequence of symbols is an expression, many expressions of SL will be meaningless. A
meaningful expression is called a well-formed formula. It is common to use the
acronym wff; the plural is wffs. The following rules of formation of formulas specify
for each possible expression in SL whether it is a well-formed formula or not, that is,
whether it is a syntactically correct expression in SL or not.
1. Every lower case letter is a wff.
2. If A is a wff, then A is a wff of SL.
3. If A and B are wffs, then (AB) is a wff.
4. If A and B are wffs, then (AB) is a wff.
5. If A and B are wffs, then (AB) is a wff.
6. If A and B are wffs, then (AB) is a wff.
7. All and only wffs of SL can be generated by applications of these rules.
Those rules define recursively all wffs in SL. The possible combinations of
symbols are endless since there are infinitely many sentence letters. So there is no point
in trying to list all the wffs, the rules describe the process by which wffs can be
8
constructed and thereby establish the limits of SL with just a list of six rules. It is
important here that A is not a sentence letter, it is a variable that stands in for any wff at
all. The capital letters A and B are used because they stand for any possible sentence
letter, they are an expression of the metalanguage that allows us to talk about infinitely
many expressions of SL (because A and B are part of the metalanguage, they are called
metavariables). It is important to distinguish between the logical language SL, which
we are developing, and the language that we use to talk about SL. When we talk about a
language, the language that we are talking about is called the object language. The
language that we use to talk about the object language is called the metalanguage. The
object language is SL, the metalanguage is English supplemented with some logical and
mathematical vocabulary.
With those elements (symbols and rules of formation) we are ready to formalize
any expression of a natural language as English, only a few points have to be clarified
concerning the use of parentheses. A wff like (qr) must be surrounded by parentheses,
because we might apply the definition again to use this as part of a more complicated
sentence. If we negate (qr), we get (qr), if we just had qr without the parentheses
and put a negation in front of it, we would have qr, which has a very different
meaning. The sentence (qr) means that it is not the case that both q and r are true; q
might be false or r might be false, but the sentence does not tell us which. The sentence
qr means specifically that q is false and that r is true. As such, parentheses are crucial
to the meaning of the sentence. So, strictly speaking, qr without parentheses is not a
sentence of SL.
Lets see some examples of formalization of reasoning.
(a) If you study and come to class, then youll pass.
p = you study
q = you come to class
r = youll pass
Formalization: (pq)r
This sentence states that in order to pass two conditions have to be met: coming
to class and studying. This means that it has both to be true that you come to class and
you study for you passing to be true also.
(b) It is not true that I abandoned my cat and that I hate onions
p = I abandoned my cat
q = I hate onions
Formalization: (pq)
This sentence states is that it is not true simultaneously that I abandoned my cat
and I hate onions, but one of those sentences could still be true alone, it is not each
atomic sentence which is denied but the conjunction of both.
(c) If you get caught copying the exam youll fail, and either youll be expelled
or punished with extra homework.
p = you get caught copying the exam
q = you pass
r = you will be expelled
s = you will be punished with extra homework
Formalization: pq(rs)]
B AB
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
10
This table means that a conjunction is true only when all of the conjuncts are
true, and false under any other circumstance. Each truth table works as a definition of a
connective, and we can build a characteristic truth table for any connective. Here is the
truth table for disjunction:
A
1
1
0
0
B AB
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
A disjunction is true when either one or both of the disjuncts are true. This truth
table allows us to see clearly that the disjunction we are using is an inclusive disjunction
(or means this or that or both) and not and exclusive disjunction (this or that but
not both), whose symbol is
The truth table for conditional:
A
1
1
0
0
B AB
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
This truth table is not obvious, but it is important to remember that when we say
If it rains, then the pavement will be wet we are only asserting that it is not possible
that it was the case that it rained and the pavement wouldnt be wet, the sentence affirms
that rain entails necessarily a wet pavement. Nevertheless the pavement could be wet for
any other reason (it was hosed down), so it is possible for the consequent (the pavement
is wet) to be true if the antecedent (it rains) is false, and also both could be false. What
the conditional establishes is that it is not possible for the antecedent to be true and its
consequent be false, so it is false when this happens and true under any other
circumstance.
The truth table for biconditional:
A
1
1
0
0
B AB
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
11
q (pq)p
1
0
1
0
q (pq)p
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
q (pq)p
1
1 1
0
0 1
1
0 1
0
0 1
The column of 1s underneath the conditional tells us that the sentence (pq)p
is true regardless of the truth-values of p and q. They can be true or false in any
combination, and the compound sentence still comes out true. It is crucial that we have
considered all of the possible combinations. If we only had a two line truth table, we
could not be sure that the sentence was not false for some other combination of truthvalues. The truth-value of the sentence on each row is just the column underneath the
main logical operator of the sentence; in this case, the column underneath the
conditional.
A complete truth table has a row for all the possible combinations of 1 and 0 for
all of the sentence letters. The size of the complete truth table depends on the number of
different sentence letters in the table. A sentence that contains only one sentence letter
requires only two rows, as in the characteristic truth table for negation. This is true even
if the same letter is repeated many times, the complete truth table requires only two
lines because there are only two possibilities. A sentence that contains two sentence
letters requires four lines for a complete truth table, as in the characteristic truth tables
12
and the table for (pq)p. A sentence that contains three sentence letters requires eight
lines. A complete truth table for a sentence that contains four different sentence letters
requires 16 lines. Five letters, 32 lines. Six letters, 64 lines. And so on.
In order to fill in the columns of a complete truth table, begin with the rightmost
sentence letter and alternate 1s and 0s. In the next column to the left, write two 1s, write
two 0s, and repeat. For the third sentence letter, write four 1s followed by four 0s. For a
16 line truth table, the next column of sentence letters should have eight 1s followed by
eight 0s. For a 32 line table, the next column would have 16 1s followed by 16 0s. And
so on.
The interest of truth tables is to find valid arguments, and more specifically
to recognise formal truths (sentences which are true regardless its content). With a
complete truth table, we consider all of the ways that the world might be. If the sentence
is true on every line of a complete truth table, then it is true as a matter of logic,
regardless of what the world is like. As was said before: logical truths are true in any
possible world.
So a sentence is a tautology in SL if the column under its main connective is 1
on every row of a complete truth table.
Conversely, a sentence is a contradiction in SL if the column under its main
connective is 0 on every row of a complete truth table.
A sentence is contingent in SL if it is neither a tautology nor a contradiction; i.e.
if it is 1 on at least one row and 0 on at least one row.
Also, we can use truth tables to find logically equivalent sentences or to prove
the validity of an argument.
Two sentences are logically equivalent in SL if they have the same truth-value
on every row of a complete truth table.
An argument is valid if it is logically impossible for the premises to be true and
for the conclusion to be false at the same time. An argument is valid in SL if there is no
row of a complete truth table on which the premises are all 1 and the conclusion is 0; an
argument is invalid in SL if there is such a row.
Argument B
pq
p
q
pq
p
q
13
Clearly, these are valid arguments. You can confirm that they are valid by
constructing four-line truth tables. Argument A is [(pq)p]q and Argument B is
[(pq)p]q. Argument A makes use of an inference form that is always valid: given
a disjunction and the negation of one of the disjuncts, the other disjunct follows as a
valid consequence. This rule is called disjunctive syllogism (DS). Argument B makes
use of a different valid form: given a conditional and its antecedent, the consequent
follows as a valid consequence. This is called modus ponens (MP).
When we construct truth tables, we do not need to give names to different
inference forms. There is no reason to distinguish modus ponens from a disjunctive
syllogism. For this same reason, however, the method of truth tables does not clearly
show why an argument is valid. If you were to do a 1028-line truth table for an
argument that contains ten sentence letters, then you could check to see if there were
any lines on which the premises were all true and the conclusion were false. If you did
not see such a line and provided you made no mistakes in constructing the table, then
you would know that the argument was valid. Yet you would not be able to say anything
further about why this particular argument was a valid argument form.
The aim of a proof system is to show that particular arguments are valid in a way
that allows us to understand the reasoning involved in the argument. We begin with
basic argument forms, like disjunctive syllogism and modus ponens. These forms can
then be combined to make more complicated arguments, like this one, Argument C:
[(l(jl))l]j
The proof system we will develop is called a natural deduction system.
Formally, a proof is a sequence of sentences. The first sentences of the sequence are
assumptions; these are the premises of the argument. Every sentence later in the
sequence follows from earlier sentences by one of the rules of proof. The final sentence
of the sequence is the conclusion of the argument. For natural deduction Argument C
would be presented in this way to be proved (were - marks the premises and
marks the conclusion):
-1 l(jl)
-2 l
(MP 1,2)
(DS 2,3)
14
operator and an elimination rule that allows us to prove something given a sentence that
has it as the main logical operator. When we add a line to a proof, we write the rule that
justifies that line and we also write the numbers of the lines to which the rule was
applied (as weve made with Argument C).
BASIC RULES
Conjunction Introduction (I or Conjunction (Conj.)
Since a conjunction is true if both conjuncts are true, knowing the truth of a conjunction we can
assert the truth of each of the conjuncts.
what it means AB), and they also tell us that now happens A,
15
In order to derive p
q, for instance, you must
be able to prove q by
assuming p and prove p by
assuming
q.
The
biconditional
introduction
rule (I) requires two
subproofs. The subproofs
can come in any order, and
the second subproof does not
need to come immediately after the first. The rule can be simplified
like this:
If we know that Its Thursday we also know that Its Thursday or cows can fly, Its
Thursday or Friday, or even Its Thursday... or not. All of them are true since we are using an inclusive
disjunction which is true as far a one of the disjuncts is true.
C
This is the most complicated rule, mainly because if we
are given a phrase with "or", like Its Thursday or Friday, what
can we deduce from it? That its Thursday? No, it may be Friday.
That its Friday? No, it may be Thursday. That its Thursday or
Friday? Well, yes, but we already knew that... We need more
information besides the AB. If, luckily, we happen to know AC,
and also BC, then we do know what happens when AB: both
one option and the other drive us to C, so C is true. This derivation
rule is called proof by cases, since we have to check each possible
case to see that they all involve the same conclusion.
16
that both B and B are true, youre not lost, since you just
discovered another truth: that its not possible for A to be true,
thats it, A its true. This procedure is called reduction to the
absurd (reductio ad absurdum): suppose something to achieve a
contradiction and be able to assert that what we supposed is false.
Its specially useful if you start supposing the contrary of what you
want to prove: if any contradiction can be discovered, then its
almost all done.
If after supposing A,
you achieved the conclusion
DERIVED RULES
Modus Tollens
(MT)
Hypothetical
Syllogism (HS)
Disjunctive
Syllogism (DS)
Ex
Contradictione
Quodlibet
(ECQ)
A
Unlike the method of truth tables, there is no (simple) method for constructing a
derivation of a valid sequent. Constructing derivations requires a certain amount of
imagination and creativity. (There is, in fact, a method, but it requires listing all possible
derivations in a mechanical way, and then selecting the one which works. This is very,
very inefficient, but possible.) However, Paul Tomassi in his textbook Logic presents the
following strategy, which he calls The Golden Rule:
You are presented with a sequent of the form:
A1, ., An B
where A1, , An are the premises and B is the conclusion.
Golden Rule:
1. Is the main connective of the conclusion the conditional ? If so, apply the strategy
for CP. I.e., assume the antecedent and try to derive the consequent. If not, ask:
2. Is the main connective of one of the premises the disjunction ? If so, apply the
strategy for Cas. I.e., assume each disjunct separately, and try to derive the conclusion
B. If not:
3. Try Abs. I.e., assume the negation of the conclusion and attempt to derive a
contradiction.
Tomassi adds never lose sight of the fact that each and all of the above
strategies can work together in a single proof. I.e., the pursuit of an overall strategy may
necessitate a sub-proof which itself requires a different strategy. Hence, apply the
Golden Rule at the outset to identify an overall strategy, and then reapply as necessary
throughout the process of proof construction.
17
The second premise of a modus ponens asserts the antecedent. Affirming the
consequent, though, yields an invalid form. A true conclusion is not guaranteed even if
the premises are true. For example:
When the roads are icy, the mail is late.
The mail is late.
Therefore, the roads are icy.
Although the mail would be late if the roads were icy, it also may be late for
other reasons. This argument overlooks alternative explanations.
Denying the antecedent: a deductive fallacy of the form
pq
p
q
The second premise of a modus tollens denies the consequent. Denying the
antecedent, however, yields an invalid form. A true conclusion is not guaranteed even if
the premises are true. For example:
When the roads are icy, the mail is late.
The roads are not icy.
Therefore, the mail is not late.
Although the mail would be late if the roads were icy, it also may be late for
other reasons. This argument, again, overlooks alternative explanations.
III.5.2. Informal fallacies
18
Informal fallacies are a matter of unclear expression, they deal with the logic of
the meaning of language and cant be formalized properly. Informal fallacies involve
such things as the misuse of language, ambiguity, misstatements of fact or opinion,
misconceptions due to underlying presuppositions or just plain illogical sequences of
thought.
Ad hominem (against the man): attacking the persons authority rather than his or her
qualifications or reasons.
The philosophy teacher claims that its important to study philosophy and to live an examined
life because otherwise we would just follow previously set tracks without ultimate freedom, but what
would you expect a philosophy teacher to say?
St. Thomas defends that God exists because the Universe needs a first cause without which
there would be an infinite regress, but he was a monk.
Ad ignorantiam (appeal to ignorance): arguing that a claim is true just because it has
not been shown to be false.
Nobody has ever proved that there is no life outside the Earth, therefore aliens exist.
To defend the claim that the Bible is true, the arguer claims that God wrote it.
But, obviously, if God wrote the Bible, God exists. Thus the argument assumes just
what it is trying to prove.
19
Complex question: posing a question or issue in such a way that people cannot agree
or disagree with you without committing themselves to some other claim you wish to
promote. A simple example:
"Are you still as self-centered as you used to be?"
Answering either "yes" or "no" commits you to agreeing that you used to be
self-centered. More subtle example:
"Will you follow your conscience instead of your pocketbook and donate to the cause?"
Saying "no," regardless of their real reasons for not donating, makes people feel
guilty; saying "yes," regardless of their real reasons for donating, makes them noble.
Equivocation: using a key term or phrase in an argument in an ambiguous way, with
different meanings in different portions of the argument.
The laws imply lawgivers. There are laws in nature. Therefore there must be a cosmic
lawgiver.
Is creation by an intelligent life force the only other possibility? False dilemmas
often include loaded language; they also, obviously, overlook alternatives.
Loaded language: making an argument look good by mocking or distorting the other
side, using language whose only function is to sway the emotions (loaded language).
So, you defend eugenics so did the Nazis.
Pro-choicers defend assassination which is contrary to Human Rights.
Non sequitur: drawing a conclusion that "does not follow", that is, a conclusion that is
not a reasonable inference from the evidence. Very general term for a bad argument.
The "person who" fallacy: using reports of a few friends or one or two experiences of
our own to outweigh the careful summary and comparison of thousands records or
experimental research. To judge a set of examples, then, we often need to consider
background rates.
20
"I know a person who smoked three packs of cigarettes a day and lived to be 100..
More subtle:
No sensitive person thinks that
Post hoc, ergo propter hoc (literally, "after this, therefore because of this"): assuming
causation too readily on the basis of mere succession in time, establishing a necessary
connection where there is none.
I passed the exam wearing my red shoes, so they give me luck.
Usually the red herring is an issue about which people have strong opinions, so
that no one notices how their attention is being diverted. In a discussion of the relative
safety of different makes of cars, for instance, the issue of which cars are made in your
country is a red herring.
Straw man: caricaturing an opposing view so that it is easy to refute.
A. Sunny days are good.
B. If all days were sunny wed never have rain, and without rain wed have famine and death.
Or:
"Leftists want to steal all of your properties."
Weasel word: changing the meaning of a word in the middle of your argument so that
your conclusion can be maintained, though its meaning may have shifted radically.
Usually a maneuver performed under the pressure of a counterexample.
A. All studying is torture.
B. What about studying argument? You love that!
A. Well, that's not really studying.
21
Here "studying" is the weasel word. A's response to B's objection in effect
changes the meaning of "studying" to "studying that is torture." A's first statement
remains true, but only at the cost of becoming trivial ("All studying that is torture is
torture.").
III.5.3. The naturalistic fallacy
There are two fundamentally different types of statement: statements of fact
which describe the way that the world is, and statements of value which describe the
way that the world ought to be. The naturalistic fallacy is the alleged fallacy of inferring
a statement of the latter kind from a statement of the former kind.
Arguments cannot introduce completely new terms in their conclusions. The
argument, (1) All men are mortal, (2) Socrates is a man, therefore (3) Socrates is a
philosopher is clearly invalid; the conclusion obviously doesnt follow from the
premises. This is because the conclusion contains an ideathat of being a philosopher
that isnt contained in the premises; the premises say nothing about being a
philosopher, and so they cannot establish a conclusion about being a philosopher.
Arguments that commit the naturalistic fallacy are arguably flawed in exactly the
same way. An argument whose premises merely describe the way that the world is, but
whose conclusion describes the way that the world ought to be, introduce a new term in
the conclusion in just the same way as the above example. If the premises merely
describe the way that the world is then they say nothing about the way that the world
ought to be. Such factual premises cannot establish any value judgement; you cant get
an ought from an is as shown in this example:
Feeling envy is only natural.
Therefore theres nothing wrong with feeling envy.
22