Karol Berger, A Theory of Art PDF

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A Theory of Art
Karo Berger
IrInt pubIIcatIon date. 1999
IrInt S-13. 9780195128604
IubIIshed to OxIord SchoIarshIp OnIIne. Iebruary 2006
O. 10.1093/0195128605.001.0001
Tte Pages
A Theory of Art A Theory of Art A Theory of Art
2000

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Iarts a and b oI chapter 4 orIgInaIIy appeared In The ]ourncl oj
Musicology 12(4)
IaII 1994, pp. 407-33. 1994 by the Iegents oI the !nIversIty oI
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A theory oI art / KaroI erger
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ncIudes bIbIIographIcaI reIerences and Index.
S 0-19-512860-5
1. Arts-IhIIosophy. 2. AesthetIcs. 3. IoetIcs. . TItIe.
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Preface
Page 1 of 5
A Theory of Art
Karo Berger
IrInt S-13. 9780195128604
O. 10.1093/0195128605.001.0001
Preface
"ThIs poet came Irom a country where the unIversaI ugIIness and vuIgarIty bothered hIm
even more than the crImInaI tyranny," wrItes CzesIaw MIIosz about a IeIIow exIIe Irom
utopIa, joseph rodsky.
1
Anyone who experIenced the Iong, gray, rezhnevIte wInter oI
the 1960s and 1970s In Moscow, Warsaw, or ast erIIn wIII ImmedIateIy see how exactIy
rIght thIs observatIon Is. ut how Is thIs possIbIe? Iow couId ugIIness bother one to such
an extent that It wouId InIIuence one's moraI and poIItIcaI decIsIons? Iow couId It push
one onto the road whIch ends wIth exIIe? Iave we not Iearned that the aesthetIc and the
ethIcaI are two separate reaIms?
And II there Is no exIt? IrImo IevI descrIbes how In AuschwItz a recoIIectIon oI a Iew IInes
Irom ante, the words oI !Iysses to hIs crew ("ConsIder your orIgIn. you were not made
to IIve as brutes, but to pursue vIrtue and knowIedge") aIIorded hIm a rare moment oI
exaItatIon. "As II aIso was hearIng It Ior the IIrst tIme. IIke the bIast oI a trumpet, IIke the
voIce oI God. Ior a moment Iorget who am and where am."
2
IevI was too sober a
partIcIpant not to observe that much oI the tIme a cuItIvated man was at a dIsadvantage In
the IobbesIan worId oI Iorced Iabor and barrack IIIe. And yet, the recoIIected verses
"made It possIbIe Ior me to re-estabIIsh a IInk wIth the past, savIng It Irom obIIvIon and
reInIorcIng my IdentIty."
3
Can poetry save IIves, then?
Preface
Page 2 of 5
The questIons oI the kInd that MIIosz's and IevI's observatIons raIse IIe at the orIgIns oI
thIs book. What, II anythIng, has art to do wIth the rest oI our IIves, and In partIcuIar wIth
those ethIcaI and poIItIcaI Issues that matter to us most? And wIII at Ieast some oI the art
created today, under the more cIement skIes, meet thIs most exactIng crIterIon oI vaIue
and oIIer any heIp when recoIIected by those drownIng In some Iuture deIuge?
IhIIosophIcaI theorIzIng about the arts Is aImost as oId as phIIosophy ItseII. ts
most dIstInguIshed exampIes, respectIveIy ancIent and modern, are ArIstotIe's Foetics
and IegeI's Aesthetics. Some oI the best phIIosophers have contrIbuted to the dIscIpIIne
oI aesthetIcs sInce It was estabIIshed In the mIddIe oI the eIghteenth century (Kant,
Schopenhauer, Ietzsche, ewey, IeIdegger come readIIy to mInd) and the dIscIpIIne
contInues to IIourIsh today (wIth such practItIoners on both sIdes oI the AtIantIc as anto,
Gadamer, Goodman, IIcoeur, Scruton, and WoIIheIm, among others). WhIIe my book
beIongs to the broad IamIIy oI phIIosophIcaI art theorIes, a combInatIon oI three Iactors
dIstInguIshes It Irom the other books In the IIeId known to me.
IIrst, ever sInce IIato phIIosophers have been much exercIsed by the questIon oI what
art Is, have IeIt ImpeIIed to take on the probIem oI gettIng art's ontoIogIcaI status rIght, oI
IIndIng a way to dIstInguIsh art Irom other entItIes. One way or another, thIs Is stIII the
guIdIng task oI most phIIosophIcaI work on art done today. (Arthur C. anto, Ior Instance,
wrItes. "n my vIew, the questIon oI what art reaIIy and essentIaIIy Is . . . was the wrong
Iorm Ior the phIIosophIcaI questIon to take. . . . |T|he reaI Iorm oI the questIon shouId be
. . .. what makes the dIIIerence between a work oI art and somethIng not a work oI art
when there Is no InterestIng perceptuaI dIIIerence between them?"
4
) do not thInk that
the task Is unImportant (and, In Iact, devote chapter 1 to It), just thInk that one shouId
not stop wIth It, that there are more InterestIng tasks ahead oI us. We mIght want to say,
In eIIect, Iet's not worry too much about the ontoIogIcaI status oI thIs object, Iet's even
concede In advance that It is art. What reaIIy matters Is what happens next (the questIon
pIck up In chapter 2). even II we grant to thIs object the status oI art, we stIII do not know
whether and why we shouId bother ourseIves wIth It. And to know thIs shouId be much
more useIuI to us than to know how to dIstInguIsh art Irom other entItIes. n short, am
tryIng to shIIt the Iocus oI aesthetIcs to the questIon, What shouId the IunctIon oI art be, II
art Is to have a vaIue Ior us?
Second, unIIke most phIIosophers today, who deIIne art prImarIIy In terms oI eIther
poetry or paIntIng, tend to prIvIIege musIc (wIthout, hope, doIng grave InjustIce to
eIther IIterature or vIsuaI arts). My musIcaI Iocus Is partIcuIarIy cIear In chapter 3, where
the questIonIng acquIres a more expIIcItIy hIstorIcaI character than eIsewhere In the book.
The reason Ior thIs Iocus Is my convIctIon that musIc represents the centraI Ieatures and
dIIemmas oI the socIaI and hIstorIcaI sItuatIon oI art today In a partIcuIarIy radIcaI, acute,
and cIear IashIon. Thus the dIagnosIs oI chapter 3 mIght be proIItabIy read agaInst the
background oI the current IarIsIan debate concernIng the crIsIs oI contemporary art, a
debate conducted aImost excIusIveIy wIth reIerence to the vIsuaI arts.
5
ThIrd, the range oI the questIons ask Is not IImIted to those tradItIonaIIy asked by
wrIters on aesthetIcs, but aIso IncIudes Issues In poetIcs and hermeneutIcs. The two
Preface
Page 3 of 5
areas oI InquIry that aII too oIten Ignore one another, the aesthetIcs oI phIIosophers and
what IIterary schoIars now grandIy caII Theory, are here brought together. The questIon
asked In the chapters devoted to poetIcs (chapters 4 and 5) Is, GIven the IunctIons oI art
IdentIIIed above, how does art IuIIIII them? n other words, whIIe aesthetIcs Is
about the aIms oI art, poetIcs Is about Its means. It attempts to show what the worId
represented In an artwork shouId consIst oI II It Is to IuIIIII Its IunctIons. n chapter 4
IdentIIy the eIements that constItute an artworId, then In chapter 5 show how these
eIements may be IormaIIy arranged. IInaIIy, the chapter devoted to hermeneutIcs
(chapter 6) asks, GIven the aIms and means oI art IdentIIIed above, how shouId art be
Interpreted?
n short, my book dIIIers Irom other books In the IIeId In that It shIIts the Iocus oI
attentIon Irom the questIon oI what art Is to the questIon oI what art Is Ior, It argues that
musIc oIIers the best InsIght Into the contemporary sItuatIon oI the arts, and It combInes
aesthetIcs wIth poetIcs and hermeneutIcs. The book addresses a heterogeneous
audIence, not onIy phIIosophers, but aIso IIterary schoIars, art hIstorIans, and
musIcoIogIsts, and not onIy academIcs, but aIso proIessIonaI artIsts as weII as art Iovers-
In sum, anyone wIth a serIous Interest In the arts. ThIs varIed potentIaI audIence accounts
Ior severaI styIIstIc, generIc, and dIscIpIInary Ieatures oI my text. StyIIstIcaIIy, have
attempted to keep the text Iree oI technIcaIItIes and wrIte In reIatIveIy pIaIn ngIIsh,
wIthout dumbIng It down In any way. GenerIcaIIy, the text IaIIs somewhere between a
schoIarIy treatIse and an essay. whIIe do not Ignore other wrIters In the IIeId and quote
Irom them aII too copIousIy, my maIn concern Is to deveIop my own posItIon rather than to
demoIIsh the arguments oI my predecessors. And the dIscIpIInary IdentIty oI the book Is
deIIberateIy vague. It InhabIts the no-man's-Iand between the phIIosophy oI art, IIterary
theory, art theory, and musIcoIogy.
have been Iortunate to be abIe InItIaIIy to test varIous Ideas deveIoped In thIs book In
conversatIons and semInars conducted wIth a number oI IrIends and coIIeagues over the
Iast decade or so and mentIon some oI these occasIons here wIth gratItude. Andrzej
IapaczynskI and WojcIech KarpInskI wIII IInd In these pages echoes oI the dIscussIon
conducted IntermIttentIy In the museums and gaIIerIes oI taIy, IarIs, and ew York.
have Iearned more about the nature oI poetry Irom StanIsIaw aranczak and Adam
ZagajewskI than Irom many a Iearned tome. The Iate CarI ahIhaus was most generous
wIth hIs tIme durIng my year In erIIn and was as dazzIIng and InspIrIng as a conversatIon
partner as he was as a wrIter. IIke so many others, have derIved great beneIIt Irom the
IacuIty SemInar on nterpretatIon whIch john ender and avId WeIIbery so abIy
dIrected at StanIord. SImIIarIy useIuI were severaI IacuIty semInars Ior IIterary schoIars,
art hIstorIans, and musIcoIogIsts organIzed at the StanIord IumanItIes Center by Ians
!IrIch Gumbrecht. have beneIIted aIso Irom the dIscussIons that accompanIed the
conIerence on musIc receptIon whIch co-dIrected wIth MIchaI rIstIger at the nstItut
Iur dIe WIssenschaIten vom Menschen In VIenna and the coIIoquIum on musIc and
narratIve whIch co-dIrected wIth Anthony ewcomb at the oreen . Townsend Center
Ior the IumanItIes oI the !nIversIty oI CaIIIornIa at erkeIey and the IumanItIes Center
oI StanIord !nIversIty. The generous sponsorshIp oI these events by the InstItutIons just
Preface
Page 4 of 5
mentIoned Is grateIuIIy acknowIedged. The Ideas deveIoped In chapter 3 were IIrst
presented as a Ianes-WIIIIs Iecture at the !nIversIty oI orth CaroIIna at ChapeI IIII and
as an Astor Iecture at the !nIversIty oI OxIord. am Indebted to the musIc IacuItIes oI
both InstItutIons Ior many hours oI proIItabIe dIscussIons and Ior theIr warm hospItaIIty.
The Iast sectIon oI chapter 4 was orIgInaIIy presented at the openIng sessIon oI the 1993
nternatIonaI Congress oI the GeseIIschaIt Iur MusIkIorschung at IreIburg and has
beneIIted Irom the reactIons oI the sessIon's organIzer, Iermann anuser, as weII as
those oI other partIcIpants. My StanIord students deserve partIcuIar gratItude Ior the
patIence and tenacIty wIth whIch they have Iorced me to cIarIIy my Ideas.
SeveraI sectIons oI thIs book have aIready appeared, or wIII shortIy appear, In prInt
eIsewhere. SectIons 3.b-c make use oI the materIaI presented In my "Concepts and
eveIopments In MusIc Theory, 1520-1640," IorthcomIng In The New Oxjord History oj
Music, voI. 4, ed. j. Iaar (OxIord. OxIord !nIversIty Iress). SectIons 4.a-b appeared In
The ]ourncl oj Musicology, 12 (1994), 407-33, and sectIon 4.c In I. anuser, ed., Musik
cls Text. Bericht uber den lnternctionclen Kongre der Gesellschcjt jur Musikjorschung,
Freiburg, 27.9.-1.10.1993 (KasseI, Germany. renreIter, 1998). SectIons 5.a-b appeared
In . K. aker and . I. IannIng, eds., Musiccl Humcnism cnd lts Legccy: Esscys in
Honor oj Clcude V. Fcliscc (Stuyvesant, . Y.. Iendragon Iress, 1992), pp. 451-70. am
grateIuI to the edItors and pubIIshers Ior aIIowIng me to use thIs materIaI here.
Two year-Iong research IeIIowshIps, one Irom the AIexander von IumboIdt IoundatIon
and another Irom the AmerIcan CouncII oI Iearned SocIetIes, have aIIowed me to devote
Iong perIods to the unInterrupted readIng, thInkIng, and wrItIng that a project oI thIs sort
requIres. acknowIedge theIr generous sponsorshIp wIth gratItude. am sImIIarIy
grateIuI to StanIord !nIversIty Ior provIdIng me wIth research support and, above aII, Ior
Its IncomparabIe InteIIectuaI envIronment.
couId not possIbIy express the IuII extent oI my gratItude and apprecIatIon to a number
oI my IrIends and coIIeagues who took the troubIe to read some or aII oI my manuscrIpt
and to share theIr reactIons wIth me. james McKInnon and IeInhard Strohm commented
on chapter 3, KendaII WaIton subjected chapters 1 and 4 to a detaIIed crItIque, Thomas
Grey, Stephen IInton, WojcIech KarpInskI, and Anthony ewcomb gave me theIr vIews oI
the compIete manuscrIpt, and receIved Iong Ietters evaIuatIng the whoIe project Irom
john averIo and Irom IydIa Goehr. am grateIuI to aII oI them Ior makIng me see where
and how the text shouId be Improved. am sImIIarIy grateIuI to my wIIe, Anna MarIa
usse erger, Ior her passIonate InvoIvement In thIs project through aII the stages oI Its
deveIopment. To Iaurence reyIus and IIchard TaruskIn owe most partIcuIar thanks
Ior havIng annotated vIrtuaIIy every page oI theIr respectIve copIes oI the entIre
manuscrIpt wIth InvaIuabIe comments. consIder myseII prIvIIeged and bIessed In the
generous InteIIectuaI companIonshIp oI so many IIne mInds.
Notes:
(1.) CzesIaw MIIosz, "asn," Fiesek przydrozny (Cracow. Znak, 1997), p. 223.
(2.) IrImo IevI, Survivcl in Auschwitz cnd The Recwckening. Two Memoirs, trans. Stuart
Preface
Page 5 of 5
WooII (ew York. SummIt ooks, 1985), p. 113. See aIso IrImo IevI, The Drowned cnd
the Scved, trans. Iaymond IosenthaI (ew York. SummIt ooks, 1988), pp. 139-40. The
recoIIected IInes come Irom ante's lnjerno, canto XXV.118-20, trans. CharIes S.
SIngIeton.
(3.) IevI, The Drowned cnd the Scved, p. 139.
(4.) Arthur C. anto, Ajter the End oj Art: Contemporcry Art cnd the Fcle oj History
(IrInceton, .j.. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1997), p. 35.
(5.) The debate, whIch has been ragIng sInce 1991, has been recentIy summarIzed and
deveIoped Iurther In Yves MIchaud, Lc crise de l'crt contemporcin: Utopie, dmocrctie
et comdie (IarIs. Iresses !nIversItaIres de Irance, 1997). See aIso jean CIaIr, Lc
responscbilit de l'crtiste: Les cvcnt-gcrdes entre terreur et rcison (IarIs. GaIIImard,
1997). On the margIn oI the debate, but wIth some dIstance the most substantIaI
contrIbutIon to It thus Iar, Is Marc IumaroII, LEtct culturel: une religion moderne (IarIs.
dItIons de IaIIoIs, 1992).
Prologue: The Function and Value of Art
Page 1 of 11
A Theory of Art
Karo Berger
IrInt S-13. 9780195128604
O. 10.1093/0195128605.001.0001
Proogue: The Functon and Vaue of Art
ConsIder a dIscIpIIne such as aesthetIcs. The Iact that there are works oI art Is gIven
Ior aesthetIcs. t seeks to IInd out under what condItIons thIs Iact exIsts, but It does
not raIse the questIon whether or not the reaIm oI art Is perhaps a reaIm oI
dIaboIIcaI grandeur, a reaIm oI thIs worId, and thereIore, In Its core, hostIIe to God
and, In Its Innermost and arIstocratIc spIrIt, hostIIe to the brotherhood oI man.
Ience, aesthetIcs does not ask whether there should be works oI art.
Max Weber, "ScIence as a VocatIon"
What Is art? One Is tempted to paraphrase St. AugustIne's answer to another InquIry.
"What Is tIme then? I nobody asks me, know. but II were desIrous to expIaIn It to one
that shouId ask me, pIaInIy know not."1 IavIng saId thIs, AugustIne went on to Iook Ior
an answer anyway, and so shouId we. ut IIrst shouId cIarIIy the questIon, make It more
precIse, show that It Is worth askIng, and thInk what a satIsIactory answer wouId have to
Iook IIke.
n a pragmatIc spIrIt, take the questIon, What Is x? to be equIvaIent to, What Is the
IunctIon oI x? or, What Is x Ior? We know what somethIng Is when we know what can be,
shouId be, or Is beIng done wIth It. When someone asks, What Is a hammer?, there Is
Page 2 of 11
nothIng better you can do than to take a hammer and drIve a naII Into a board wIth It. Our
pretheoretIcaI understandIng recognIzes In art a IamIIy oI socIaI practIces, sustaIned by
approprIate InstItutIons, and evoIvIng wIthIn the hIstorIcaI context oI contInuous tradItIons.
Art Is what those who wrIte poetry do, as weII as those who wrIte noveIs, and those who
compose strIng quartets (or perIorm them), and those who paInt Iandscapes, and many
others. CentraI to any understandIng oI a practIce must be to grasp Its poInt. We do not
know what someone Is doIng unIess we know what hIs purpose or IntentIon Is. {p.4) A
paInter's IdentIcaI actIons wouId be Interpreted In one way by an observer who thought
that the poInt oI the actIvIty In Iront oI hIm was to put a protectIve coat oI paInt over the
waII and In another by someone who Interpreted It as an eIIort to provIde the heavenIy
backdrop to the AssumptIon scene. I we are to understand what art Is, we have to grasp
the poInts oI the many practIces we commonIy subsume under thIs term and see what
these poInts have In common, or at Ieast In what way they constItute a "IamIIy" In
WIttgensteIn's sense oI the term.2
What Is, then, the IunctIon oI art? What are aII these scuIptures and paIntIngs, operas and
symphonIes, poems and noveIs, dramas and IIIms actuaIIy Ior? Why wouId heaIthy,
enterprIsIng, and InteIIIgent men and women want to devote theIr IIIe eIIorts to makIng
objects oI thIs sort, when they couId easIIy IoIIow so many other obvIousIy vaIuabIe and
satIsIyIng proIessIonaI paths In poIItIcs, busIness, or the army, Iaw, medIcIne, or
educatIon, engIneerIng, scIence, or schoIarshIp? Why shouId those oI us who dId choose
these other paths want to spend any oI our IeIsure tIme In the company oI artworks? Why
shouId prIvate patrons, cIvIc organIzatIons, and governments dIvert any part oI theIr
IInancIaI resources toward the support oI artIsts and artIstIc InstItutIons and away Irom
economIc growth, InIrastructure, heaIth care, educatIon, scIentIIIc and technoIogIcaI
research, or securIty? CIearIy, the questIon that wIII drIve our InquIry Is not a matter oI
IdIe curIosIty. The possIbIIIty oI a ratIonaI debate on the proper aIIocatIon oI resources,
whether pubIIc or prIvate, to the arts rests on our havIng an answer to the questIon oI
the IunctIon oI art.
The need to answer the questIon oI art's IunctIon becomes more acute as the autonomy
oI the artIst grows. Autonomy Is wIdeIy seen today, especIaIIy among theorIsts and
hIstorIans oI a socIoIogIcaI bent, as the sIngIe most Important Ieature dIstInguIshIng
modern Irom premodern art. The commonIy heard cIaIm Is that untII quIte recentIy, as
recentIy perhaps as the mId-eIghteenth century, art In the strong, specIIIcaIIy modern,
sense oI thIs term-that Is, art as an autonomous practIce pursuIng goods oI Its own-dId
not exIst, or exIsted onIy on the margIns oI a Iarge IamIIy oI heteronomous artIstIc
practIces. Much oI what today wouId be cIassIIIed as art was produced to accompany,
embeIIIsh, and enhance the pubIIc and prIvate rItuaIs and ceremonIes oI reIIgIous, poIItIcaI,
and socIaI IIIe. Iremodern art was embedded wIthIn a wIder sphere oI socIaI practIces
and derIved Its sIgnIIIcance Irom them. t was predomInantIy heteronomous, sInce the
goods It pursued were not InternaI to the artIstIc practIces themseIves. nstead, art
served the goaIs oI the prIncIpaI socIaI InstItutIons. the church and the state, the guIIds
and corporatIons oI the cIvII socIety, the IamIIy. Thus, the questIon oI art's IunctIon, or
rather IunctIons, was not at Issue. A statue oI judIth sIayIng IoIoIernes pIaced on the
Page 3 of 11
centraI square oI a medIevaI cIty-state wouId serve to remInd the cItIzens oI the proud
repubIIc oI the Iate awaItIng usurpIng tyrants. An opera extoIIIng the cIemency oI a Ioman
emperor perIormed durIng the coronatIon IestIvItIes oI an absoIute monarch wouId
serve as a Iesson oI royaI vIrtue Ior both the ruIer and hIs subjects. A choraIe preIude
Ior the organ wouId remInd a Iutheran congregatIon oI both the meIody and the
sIgnIIIcance oI the {p.5) text they were about to sIng. A smaII crucIIIx wouId serve as the
Iocus oI prIvate domestIc devotIon. A representatIon oI a dog on a doubIe portraIt oI
newIyweds wouId remInd them and other onIookers oI the centraI roIe pIayed by the
vIrtue oI IIdeIIty In a weII-ordered marrIage. n aII such cases the artwork had a cIearIy
deIIned IunctIon. It served the goaIs oI the prIncIpaI socIaI InstItutIons, goaIs externaI to
the practIce oI art ItseII.
ut It Is a deIInIng Ieature oI modern art that It Is autonomous, that the goaIs oI Its
producers are InternaI to the practIces oI the varIous arts themseIves, and not Imposed
on them Irom wIthout. t Is precIseIy the autonomy oI modern art that gIves rIse to the
questIon oI the IunctIon oI art and makes the questIon so dIIIIcuIt to answer. Once art has
been emancIpated Irom the context oI socIaI practIces that gave It Its sIgnIIIcance, what Is
Its poInt? What Is the IunctIon oI IunctIonIess art? What are these goods InternaI to artIstIc
practIces, and are they good enough to repIace the oIder, externaI ones, to make the arts
worth botherIng wIth?
A good exampIe oI how a hIstorIcaI socIoIogIst deveIops the contrast between the
premodern and modern art Is provIded by orbert IIas's reIIectIons on Mozart.3 IIas
understands the contrast between the premodern and modern art (or rather, as he caIIs
them, "craItsmen's art" and "artIsts' art") In the manner oI the WeberIan IdeaI types. The
most dIstInctIve Ieature oI the premodern, or craItsmen's, art was Its heteronomy, the
Iact that the goods one pursued In workIng at It were prImarIIy not InternaI to the practIce
oI art ItseII, but rather InternaI to other, nonartIstIc socIaI actIvItIes oI art consumers. Art
was produced Ior a personaIIy known patron oI a Iar hIgher socIaI status than that oI the
art producer. Art was not as yet a specIaIIzed domaIn, moreover, but a IunctIon oI other
socIaI actIvItIes oI the consumers. n partIcuIar, It was an aspect oI the competItIve
spendIng on status. SInce art was created Ior specIIIc socIaI IunctIons, not the Ieast oI
whIch was the socIety's seII-dIspIay, the patrons were not IndIvIduaIIzed, but rather
represented socIaI groups. n other words, premodern art was addressed to groups oI
peopIe assembIed Ior purposes other than aesthetIc ones. These Iacts had Important
consequences. The IndIvIduaI artIst's ImagInatIon was subordInated to the canon oI taste
oI the socIaI group to whIch the patrons beIonged. ThIs resuIted In a weak IndIvIduaI and
the strong socIaI character (styIe) oI the artwork.
Modern art, by contrast, Is produced Ior a market oI anonymous buyers, wIth a socIaI
parIty exIstIng between the artIst and the buyer (democratIzatIon). t addresses not
groups, but a pubIIc oI IsoIated IndIvIduaIs, and Its IunctIon Is specIIIcaIIy aesthetIc. ThIs
changes the baIance oI power between the artIst and patron In Iavor oI the Iormer. The
resuIt Is the artIst's greater Independence Irom the socIety's taste (the artIst now moIds
the taste oI the pubIIc, Instead oI servIng It) and the greater IndIvIduaIIzatIon oI the
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artwork's character.
The probIem Ior a hIstorIcaI socIoIogIst Is to IInd the reasons Ior the change Irom the
premodern to modern Iorm oI art-that Is, the reasons Ior the change In the socIaI
sItuatIon oI artIsts. ot surprIsIngIy, IIas Iooks Ior expIanatIons In the {p.6) socIaI ascent
oI a weaIthy mIddIe cIass, In the dIspIacement oI the court arIstocracy by the proIessIonaI
bourgeoIs pubIIc as the upper cIass. One exampIe oI thIs Is IIas's awareness that the
transItIon Irom the craItsmen's to artIsts' art dId not happen sImuItaneousIy In aII artIstIc
IIeIds, that In German-speakIng Iands, Ior Instance, It occurred much earIIer In IIterature
(and phIIosophy) than In musIc or archItecture. The deveIopment oI the market Ior books
that aIIowed a wrIter a IreeIance exIstence, however precarIous, preceded by decades
the deveIopment oI comparabIe market InstItutIons-such as musIc pubIIshIng, copyrIght,
or pubIIc concerts-Ior musIc.
Iater, In chapter 3, shaII expIaIn why It Is pIausIbIe that varIous arts achIeved a sIgnIIIcant
degree oI autonomy Iong beIore the eIghteenth century. nstead oI the growIng
autonomIzatIon oI art, one shouId rather stress the growIng autonomIzatIon oI the artIst
as a Ieature oI the modernIzatIon process. Once an artIst stops workIng Ior a specIIIc
patron (a church, a court) and oIIers hIs products Ior saIe to patrons whose IdentItIes
cannot be IuIIy specIIIed In advance, that Is, once he begIns to IunctIon wIthIn the market,
he may be better abIe to produce works that embody hIs, rather than hIs patrons',
vaIues, thereby IncreasIng hIs autonomy (even II In practIce thIs autonomy Is IrequentIy
undermIned by the Increased economIc InsecurIty). n Iact, In urope and Its cuIturaI
extensIons It has been posItIveIy expected oI the artIst Ior more than two centurIes now,
that he wIII be autonomous and orIgInaI In thIs sense. t Is undenIabIe that the
modernIzatIon oI art InvoIves the autonomIzatIon oI the artIst, aIthough the IuII compIexIty
and the uneven character oI thIs deveIopment as It pertaIns to IndIvIduaI arts shouId not
be underestImated. unIIke paInters, who, wIth theIr artIsanaI tradItIons, Iound successIuI
ways to expIoIt market mechanIsms earIy on (thInk oI TItIan's, or Iembrandt's, studIos),
composers began to devIse strategIes Ior IunctIonIng wIthIn the market onIy In the Iate
eIghteenth century, and theIr success even today Is not unquaIIIIed. (Mozart's Is a
paradIgmatIc earIy case, and the extremeIy smaII number oI art musIc composers, as
compared to paInters or noveIIsts, who between hIs tIme and ours actuaIIy managed to
make a IIvIng as composers Is strIkIng.) AII the same, the autonomIzatIon oI the artIst and
Its coroIIary requIrement oI orIgInaIIty sureIy contrIbuted to the growIng urgency oI the
questIon concernIng art's IunctIon. ot surprIsIngIy, the process oI autonomIzatIon was
accompanIed by the bIrth oI a generaI art theory, the phIIosophIcaI subIIeId oI aesthetIcs.
When It comes to the socIaI sItuatIon oI art, and probabIy to much eIse as weII, we are stIII
IIvIng In the era that took shape decIsIveIy In the decades around 1800, the era oI
InexorabIy IncreasIng socIaI equaIIty and democratIzatIon, the earIy outIInes oI whIch were
grasped wIth partIcuIar cIarIty by TocquevIIIe. Today more than ever, the prIncIpaI
sources oI support Ior those paInters, composers, and wrIters who actuaIIy manage to
make a IIvIng Irom theIr art take the Iorm not oI the personaI patronage oI the rIch and
powerIuI, but oI the ImpersonaI market or the state (actIng eIther dIrectIy or through the
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medIatIon oI the tax code). o Iess today than In 1800, artIsts expect to be autonomous
and are {p.7) expected to be orIgInaI. And today, more than ever beIore, we IInd It hard
to agree on what It Is exactIy that we expect Irom them. We are stIII very much the
moderns.
To be sure, we are the postmodern sort oI moderns.4 jean-IranoIs Iyotard may weII
be onto somethIng when he cIaIms that we have Iost IaIth In any oI the grand overarchIng
"meta-narratIves" that gave earIIer moderns theIr sense oI IdentIty and dIrectIon,
narratIves that purported to make sense oI the totaIIty oI human hIstory.5 The sIow
InteIIectuaI dryIng-out and the subsequent rapId poIItIcaI demIse oI MarxIsm, the most
InIIuentIaI oI aII modern meta-narratIves, In partIcuIar, makes us wary oI any kInd oI
secuIar prophecy and ready to embrace a vIsIon oI a pIuraIIty oI coexIstIng IIIe Iorms and
partIaI, IocaI storIes that make sense oI these IIIe Iorms. ut two cautIonary remarks are In
order. IIrst, our worId remaIns as modern as It was Ior the Iast Iew centurIes. What Is
postmodern Is not the worId, but the pIuraIIst acceptance that there Is more than one
true story to be toId about It. Second, and more Important, the dIstInctIon Iyotard draws
between modernIsm and postmodernIsm Is Iar too stark.
t Is not true that the onIy choIce we have Is between a beIIeI In unIversaI hIstory grasped
by an aII-expIaInIng meta-narratIve and a beIIeI In a pIuraIIty oI equaIIy vaIId IIIe Iorms and
IocaI storIes that make sense oI them. A Iarge and IruItIuI terrItory IIes between these two
extremes, a vIsIon oI a pIuraIIty oI IIIe Iorms and storIes, Indeed, but not ones that coexIst
by poIIteIy IgnorIng one another, but rather ones that are engaged In a never-endIng
competItIon. Iyotard has got It rIght In so Iar as the demIse oI meta-narratIves Is
concerned. ut the vIsIon oI a pIuraIIty oI equaIIy vaIId coexIstIng IIIe Iorms may be
compeIIIng onIy to those whose outIook Is underpInned by one more meta-narratIve, that
oI a contInuous and rapId gIobaI growth oI prosperIty. The rest oI us postmoderns wIII
have to recognIze that varIous IIIe Iorms wIII contInue to compete Ior resources wIth one
another In any IoreseeabIe Iuture. The postmodern vIsIon remaIns pIausIbIe onIy so Iong
as we ImagIne that the onIy dIIemmas we shaII ever Iace are oI the order oI choosIng
between a cappuccIno or a caIIe Iatte, or decIdIng to buy a VoIvo or a MW. Once we
recognIze that we may aIso Iace other sorts oI questIons, such as, ShaII we tax the rIch, or
shaII we treat them as a separate cuIture pursuIng Its own IegItImate IIIe Iorm? or, ShaII
we Intervene In a dIstant country, or shaII we aIIow one trIbe to practIce Its IIIe Iorm by
engagIng In ethnIc cIeansIng?, postmodernIsm Ioses some oI Its pIausIbIIIty.
I the competItIon Ior resources among varIous IIIe Iorms Is not to take a vIoIent turn, II
choIces between conIIIctIng cIaIms are to be based upon the Iorce oI arguments rather
than arms, we have no aIternatIve but to engage the competIng IIIe Iorms In a ratIonaI
dIaIogue. A genuIne dIaIogue requIres not onIy that the two sIdes IIsten to one another,
but that each puts Its vIews In jeopardy by comparIng them wIth the vIews oI the dIaIogue
partner, and that each Is prepared to change Its vIews as a resuIt. WIthout acceptIng any
aII-embracIng unIversaI meta-narratIves, one must be prepared to exchange one's own
story, as weII as the story toId by one's InterIocutor, Ior a sIIghtIy Iess IocaI and parochIaI,
but stIII {p.8) Iar Irom unIversaI, story one wIII be abIe to teII together wIth one's
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InterIocutor as a resuIt oI the dIaIogue. ("The superIorIty oI one posItIon over another,"
wrItes CharIes TayIor, "wIII consIst In thIs, that Irom the more adequate posItIon one can
understand one's own stand and that oI one's opponent, but not the other way
around."6)
ThIs sort oI pIecemeaI IocaI pragmatIc negotIatIng, together wIth huge doses oI pIaIn
vIoIence, has characterIzed the practIce oI the modern age Irom Its begInnIngs a Iew
centurIes ago. t may weII turn out that the recourse to unIversaI meta-narratIves, Iar
Irom beIng the most centraI Ieature oI modernIty, has been an Important, but uItImateIy
atavIstIc, sIdeshow, a nostaIgIc search Ior a suItabIe secuIar repIacement Ior the grand
reIIgIous meta-narratIve oI the premodern era. On thIs account, the IabeI oI
"postmodernIsm" wouId be no more than an attempt by Iapsed MarxIsts to gIve theIr
dIsenchantment the dIgnIty oI an epochaI change. What am suggestIng, In short, Is that
perhaps postmodernIty Is not a new era at aII, but rather a state oI mInd oI the post-
MarxIst InteIIIgentsIa, unprecedentedIy aIIIuent (and hence ready to approach the worId
In the spIrIt oI cheerIuI pIayIuIness) and wary oI any new commItments.
e that as It may, whether we are postmoderns or sImpIy more than usuaIIy conIused
moderns, our daIIy dIsputes about such Issues as pubIIc IundIng Ior the arts, or
censorshIp, or unIversIty currIcuIum make It abundantIy cIear that we need a theory oI
art, an answer to the questIon concernIng the IunctIon oI art, no Iess than our ancestors
IIvIng around 1800 dId.
t shouId now aIso be cIear that the questIon we started wIth, What Is art?, consIsts reaIIy
oI two questIons rather than one. What Is the IunctIon oI art? and What Is the vaIue oI thIs
IunctIon? One mIght Iook Ior answers to the IIrst questIon In two ways. One mIght
InvestIgate It empIrIcaIIy-hIstorIcaIIy and IInd out what the IunctIon or IunctIons oI varIous
arts have actuaIIy been once these arts achIeved autonomy Irom theIr tradItIonaI
contexts. Or, one mIght expIore the probIem In a more specuIatIve-phIIosophIcaI IashIon
and ask not so much what the IunctIon oI the autonomous art wcs and is, but rather what
It should, or might, be. I we decIded to stop at our IIrst questIon, II aII we wanted to know
was what the IunctIon oI art actuaIIy Is, the IIrst IIne oI InvestIgatIon wouId be quIte
suIIIcIent. The kInds oI answers that thIs IIne Ieads to are weII IIIustrated by Martha
Woodmansee's weII-supported hIstorIcaI cIaIm that the Idea oI autonomous art was
Introduced In Iate-eIghteenth-century Germany to stem the commercIaIIzatIon oI
IIterature promoted by the new socIaI and economIc sItuatIon oI the arts In the
marketpIace,7 or by IIerre ourdIeu's socIoIogIcaI cIaIm that art today serves the
IunctIon oI perpetuatIng cIass dIstInctIons.8 (IascaI had aIready notIced that beauty mIght
be used to demonstrate power. "t Is not mere vanIty to be eIegant, because It shows
that a Iot oI peopIe are workIng Ior you. . . . t means more than superIIcIaI show or mere
accoutrement to have many hands In one's servIce. The more hands one empIoys the
more powerIuI one Is. Iegance Is a means oI showIng one's power."9) Such cIaIms may
be IIIumInatIng In theIr own way, partIcuIarIy, II one does not assume that they teII one aII
one needs to know {p.9) about the IunctIon oI art, but they do not IuIIy answer our
concerns. We need and want to know more, we want to know not onIy what the IunctIon
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oI art Is, but aIso whether thIs IunctIon justIIIes our eIIorts, whether art Is worth the
bother. To answer thIs Iurther questIon a more phIIosophIcaI IIne oI InquIry wIII be
necessary. A hIstorIcaI InquIry wouId Ieave us wIth Iots oI InterestIng Iacts, but by ItseII It
wouId not aIIow us to evaIuate them. VarIous actuaIIy proposed and practIced
understandIngs oI art wouId compete wIth one another bIIndIy, but theIr respectIve
cIaIms couId not be compared and ratIonaI choIces among them couId not be made.
AskIng not what the IunctIon oI art Is, but rather what It shouId or mIght be, has the
advantage oI aIIowIng us to evaIuate what actuaIIy Is and not onIy what mIght or shouId
be. t makes pubIIc deIIberatIon possIbIe. t opens room Ior debate, Ior the conIrontatIon
oI competIng vIews and proposaIs that mIght resuIt In choIces and preIerences supported
by ratIonaI arguments. Thus, the questIon want to pursue Is, What shouId the IunctIon
oI art be, II art Is to have a vaIue Ior us?
ut thIs does not mean that a phIIosopher can or shouId Ignore hIstory aItogether.
SpecuIatIon does not happen In a vacuum. WhIIe a hIstorIcaI or socIoIogIcaI InquIry can
perhaps Ignore phIIosophIcaI questIons and sImpIy InvestIgate what was, or Is, the case,
the reverse Is not possIbIe. Whoever wants to specuIate on what shouId be cannot Ignore
what Is. The reason Is that the pretheoretIcaI notIon oI art whIch must provIde the poInt oI
departure Ior any specuIatIon Is hIstorIcaIIy gIven. t makes sense to specuIate about
possIbIe IunctIons oI art onIy II the art In questIon Is recognIzabIy sImIIar to one that
actuaIIy exIsts. What we want Is not a compIeteIy new practIce, but rather an
understandIng, and at best an Improvement, oI what Is aIready current.
know oI no better descrIptIon oI the approprIate reIatIonshIp between a socIaI practIce
and Its theory than the one CharIes TayIor provIdes In hIs essay, "SocIaI Theory as
IractIce." TayIor captures the kInd oI reIatIonshIp between art and Its theory wouId IIke
to maIntaIn In my InquIry.
There Is aIways a pre-theoretIcaI understandIng oI what Is goIng on among the
members oI a socIety. . . . SocIaI theory arIses when we try to IormuIate expIIcItIy
what we are doIng, descrIbe the actIvIty whIch Is centraI to a practIce, and
artIcuIate the norms whIch are essentIaI to It. . . . The stronger motIve Ior makIng
and adoptIng theorIes Is the sense that our ImpIIcIt understandIng Is In some way
crucIaIIy Inadequate or even wrong. . . . |Moreover,| II theory can transIorm
practIce, then It can be tested In the quaIIty oI the practIce It InIorms. . . . A theory
whIch badIy mIsIdentIIIes the goods we can seek In a certaIn domaIn wIII ground a
practIce whIch wIII IaII to reaIIze these goods. . . . Good theory enabIes practIce to
become Iess stumbIIng and more cIaIrvoyant.10
The knowIedge oI the kInd St. AugustIne taIks about, the knowIedge have when nobody
asks me questIons but whIch dIsappears when an expIanatIon Is In order, Is oI the practIcaI
rather than theoretIcaI kInd. may not be abIe to expIaIn very cIearIy what art Is yet stIII
know, roughIy, what to do wIth the word and recognIze approprIate occasIons Ior Its use.
t Is onIy when thIs practIcaI knowIedge {p.10) begIns to IaII me In some ways, or, more
crucIaIIy, when the practIce ItseII runs Into dIIIIcuItIes, that a need Ior a more expIIcIt
theory artIcuIatIng the poInt and the norms oI the practIce arIses. Once born, a theory
Page 8 of 11
may acquIre an InternaI dynamIc oI Its own and deveIop more or Iess IndependentIy oI
any promptIngs Irom a staIIed practIce. ut It may aIso begIn to InIIuence the practIce, to
heIp It run more smoothIy by makIng Its norms more transparent and by correctIy
IdentIIyIng Its poInt.
ThIs sort oI two-way traIIIc between practIce and theory Is to be expected In any area oI
socIaI actIon that has achIeved a certaIn degree oI maturIty. The aesthetIc domaIn Is no
exceptIon. AIasdaIr Macntyre poInts out that a practIce evoIves wIthIn the hIstorIcaI
context oI the reIevant tradItIon.
|W|hen a tradItIon Is In good order It Is aIways partIaIIy constItuted by an argument
about the goods the pursuIt oI whIch gIves to that tradItIon Its partIcuIar poInt and
purpose. . . . A IIvIng tradItIon then Is an hIstorIcaIIy extended, socIaIIy embodIed
argument, and an argument precIseIy In part about the goods whIch constItute thIs
tradItIon.11
ThIs book Is a contrIbutIon to the ongoIng argument about the poInt oI art, a contrIbutIon
In whIch pay cIose attentIon to what earIIer partIcIpants In thIs partIcuIar debate had to
say and try to keep In mInd the reIevant Ieatures oI the socIaI practIce oI art ItseII,
Ieatures oI the practIce as It Is pursued today and as It has evoIved over the past Iew
centurIes.
The argument about the poInt oI art Is partIcuIarIy tImeIy today, when pubIIc attItudes
toward art are ambIguous at best. GeneraI appetIte Ior certaIn, even IaIrIy eIIte, art Iorms
seems to be broader and sharper than ever. try to get a good seat at any major opera
house (II you can aIIord one) or to Iook at paIntIngs at an overcrowded MatIsse
retrospectIve. ut at the same tIme, In the !nIted States at Ieast, art Is not enjoyIng good
press, Its IunctIon Is much contested, and a consensus as to Its uItImate vaIue can no
Ionger be taken Ior granted. An unexpected and InvoIuntary aIIIance oI rIght-wIng popuIIst
poIItIcIans and IeIt-wIng popuIIst academIcs, unwIttIng IIatonIsts aII, suspects art oI
corruptIng the young, whether by seductIve Images oI moraIIy unconventIonaI behavIor,
or by the InsIdIous perpetuatIon oI socIaIIy and poIItIcaIIy undesIrabIe dIstInctIons and
attItudes. Art-bashIng has agaIn become sclonjchig.
ThIs rIse oI oId poIItIcaI and new academIc phIIIstInIsm Is sureIy an IndIrect prooI that art
stIII retaIns Its power to dIsturb and unsettIe comIortabIe bureaucracIes. ut It wouId be
unwIse and compIacent to dIsmIss current trends In thIs way and not to notIce that they
are based on some compeIIIng, even II conIused, IntuItIons. n partIcuIar, the suspIcIon
that art may be much more reIevant to our moraI, socIaI, and poIItIcaI concerns than the
IdeoIogy oI artIstIc autonomy seems to aIIow needs to be taken serIousIy and careIuIIy
examIned. The new antIaesthetIc attItude deserves attentIon, and not sImpIy because It
may endanger the survIvaI oI some artIstIc tradItIons and practIces, aIter aII, we do not
even know yet whether these tradItIons and practIces shouId be contInued and why. t
deserves {p.11) serves attentIon In the IIrst pIace because It Is so wIdespread, not just
among opportunIstIc poIItIcIans, but aIso among the very InteIIectuaI cIass whIch has a
proIessIonaI stake In art's survIvaI and whIch has tradItIonaIIy provIded arguments Ior Its
Page 9 of 11
deIense. The doubts oI thIs cIass Iorce us to do precIseIy what Intend to do In thIs book.
to consIder whether art stIII has a worthwhIIe roIe to pIay In our prIvate and pubIIc IIves.
The doubts have In mInd are perhaps nowhere more apparent than In the current
battIes over the currIcuIum and appoIntments at AmerIcan unIversItIes. The battIes have
a background whIch Is partIy IdeoIogIcaI and partIy economIc. We want, wIth good reason,
to Introduce Into the currIcuIum oI IIterature, art, and musIc departments as many oI the
prevIousIy excIuded voIces as possIbIe, voIces oI women, mInorItIes, cuItures deemed
perIpheraI, and so on. !nIversIty resources beIng IInIte, we cannot Introduce them aII, we
are Iorced to make choIces whereby a stronger department oI x studIes ImpIIes a weaker
or absent department oI y studIes. ut thIs Is precIseIy a dIstInctIon we do not IIke to
make, because oI a conIused egaIItarIanIsm whIch assumes that aII dIscrImInatIon Is
InherentIy unjust.
What Is unjust, however, Is onIy dIscrImInatIon based on Iorce or InherIted prIvIIege,
rather than on reasoned argument. Whether we IIke It or not, we are economIcaIIy
compeIIed to make choIces, and It Is better that we make them as a resuIt oI pubIIc
deIIberatIon based on ratIonaI argument than as a resuIt oI random Iottery or appIIcatIon
oI Iorce and poIItIcaI pressure. We shouId make as many voIces as possIbIe heard. ut
once they are heard, we shouId not assume that they are aII equaIIy vaIuabIe and we
shouId not be aIraId to dIscrImInate among them. A reasonabIe and just dIscrImInatIon
among the voIces, however, wIII be possIbIe onIy when we know what the purpose oI
speakIng Is. t Is onIy then that we shaII be abIe to compare the voIces wIth one another
and decIde whIch ones are doIng theIr appoInted job best.
t wouId be premature at thIs stage In the dIscussIon to oIIer any answers, however
preIImInary, to the questIons concernIng the IunctIon and vaIue oI art. ut certaIn
Ieatures oI a soIutIon to the probIem can be ImagIned In advance. I we are to be satIsIIed
that art Is a worthwhIIe pursuIt, we wouId have to IInd Ior It a IunctIon that IuIIIIIs the
IoIIowIng condItIons. IIrst, the IunctIon wouId have to be cuIturaIIy IndIspensabIe, or at
Ieast Important, In the sense that we couId not conceIve oI a cIvIIIzatIon worth havIng
wIthout thIs IunctIon beIng taken care oI. Art wouId have to be abIe to make an
IndIspensabIe, or at Ieast Important, contrIbutIon to the proper workIng oI a human
socIety worth strIvIng Ior. Second, the IunctIon wouId have to be oI such character that It
couId be IuIIIIIed onIy by art and nothIng eIse. Art wouId have to be shown to be
IrrepIaceabIe. ThIrd, It wouId aIso have to be demonstrated that the IunctIon In questIon
may be IuIIIIIed by much oI the exIstIng art. (The "exIstIng art" wouId cIearIy have to
encompass not onIy the art produced today, but everythIng that most peopIe concerned
wIth art at aII wouId consIder art today, whether produced recentIy or In a dIstant past.
ThIs Is a domaIn wIth admIttedIy bIurry edges, but so vast {p.12) that It provIdes us
wIth more than enough unambIguous materIaI.) As aIready stated, our task Is not to
Invent a new socIaI practIce, but rather to Improve or sImpIy cIarIIy the ongoIng one. I
most oI the art as we know It cannot do the job we thInk art shouId be doIng, our theory
wouId turn out to be not a theory oI art at aII, but a theory oI somethIng eIse, somethIng
Ior whIch we had IIIegItImateIy approprIated the name oI art.
Page 10 of 11
n short, we want to IInd out what the IunctIon oI art shouId be II art Is to be consIdered a
worthwhIIe occupatIon, and we know that thIs IunctIon wouId have to be cuIturaIIy
Important, or better yet, IndIspensabIe, one that can be IuIIIIIed onIy by art, and,
moreover, by much oI the art that aIready exIsts.
Notes:
(1.) St. AugustIne, Conjessions, trans. W. Watts, bk. 11, ch. 14.
(2.) IudwIg WIttgensteIn, Fhilosophiccl lnvestigctions (Iondon. MacmIIIan, 1953), .67.
(3.) orbert IIas, Mozcrt: Fortrcit oj c Genius, trans. dmund jephcott (CambrIdge,
Mass.. IoIIty Iress, 1993).
(4.) CI. WoIIgang WeIsch, Unsere postmoderne Moderne (WeInheIm. Acta humanIora,
1987).
(5.) jean-IranoIs Iyotard, The Fostmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Theory
and IIstory oI IIterature 10 (MInneapoIIs. !nIversIty oI MInnesota Iress, 1984).
(6.) CharIes TayIor, "nterpretatIon and the ScIences oI Man," In Fhilosophy cnd the
Humcn Sciences. Fhilosophiccl Fcpers 2 (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress,
1985), p. 53.
(7.) Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, cnd the Mcrket: Rerecding the History oj
Aesthetics (ew York. CoIumbIa !nIversIty Iress, 1994).
(8.) IIerre ourdIeu, Distinction: A Socicl Critique oj the ]udgement oj Tcste, trans.
IIchard Ice (CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1984).
(9.) IascaI, Fenses, no. 95 (ed. IaIuma) or no. 316 (ed. runschvIcg), trans. Ionor IevI
(OxIord. OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1995), p. 54.
(10.) CharIes TayIor, "SocIaI Theory as IractIce," In Fhilosophy cnd the Humcn Sciences,
pp. 93-111.
(11.) AIasdaIr Macntyre, Ajter Virtue: A Study in Morcl Theory, 2d ed. (otre ame,
nd.. !nIversIty oI otre ame Iress, 1984), p. 222.
Page 11 of 11
Aesthetics I. The Nature of Art
Page 1 of 54
A Theory of Art
Karo Berger
IrInt S-13. 9780195128604
O. 10.1093/0195128605.001.0001
Aesthetcs I. The Nature of Art
Karo Berger (Contrbutor Webpage)
DOI:10.1093/0195128605.003.0001
Abstract and Keywords
The cuIturaI medIa aIIow us to objectIIy and store away our ImmedIate experIences, wIth
the IundamentaI structure oI each medIum consIstIng oI the work, the reaI object
produced In the process oI encodIng an experIence In a medIum, and the ImagInary worId
so encoded. MedIa can be eIther vIsuaI (as In scuIpture or paIntIng), aIIowIng us to grasp,
represent, and expIore an outer, spatIaI, worId oI experIence, or auraI (as In musIc),
makIng It possIbIe to grasp, represent, and expIore an Inner, temporaI worId oI
experIencIng. t can be both, as In Ianguage, a medIum that possesses not onIy
representatIonaI but aIso IogIcaI powers, aIIowIng us not onIy to represent the objects oI
our desIre as weII as the desIre ItseII, but aIso to represent thInkIng about our aIms and
means, deIIberatIng on the questIons whether our desIre Is justIIIed, and II so, how can It
be reaIIzed. A work can be an endurIng object or an ephemeraI event, a worId can be a
representatIon or an argument. IepresentatIons subdIvIde Into those oI actuaI and those
oI IIctIonaI objects, whIIe arguments subdIvIde Into those about the worId as It Is and
Page 2 of 54
those about the worId as It shouId be. A pIace Ior art resuIts Irom the superImposItIon oI
these cIassIIIcatIons. art InvoIves representatIons oI IIctIonaI objects. WhIIe works In aII
medIa, Ianguage IncIuded, can evoke worIds that are representatIons, onIy a IInguIstIc
work can aIso evoke a worId that Is an argument that consIsts oI generaI InteIIectuaI
concepts and IogIcaI reIatIons among them.
leywords: medum, experence, work, word, scupture, pantng, musc, anguage, ob|ect, actua
a. The Meda of Cuture
AccordIng to GIovannI IIco deIIa MIrandoIa, God greeted Adam thus.
eIther a IIxed abode nor a Iorm that Is thIne aIone nor any IunctIon pecuIIar to
thyseII have we gIven thee, Adam, to the end that accordIng to thy IongIng and
accordIng to thy judgment thou mayest have and possess what abode, what Iorm,
and what IunctIons thou thyseII shaIt desIre. The nature oI aII other beIngs Is IImIted
and constraIned wIthIn the bounds oI Iaws prescrIbed by !s. Thou, constraIned by
no IImIts, In accordance wIth thIne own Iree wIII, In whose hand We have pIaced
thee, shaIt ordaIn Ior thyseII the IImIts oI thy nature.
1
IIco was on to somethIng. The essence oI humans consIsts In theIr not havIng any
essence, or rather not knowIng what thIs essence mIght be In advance. To be sure, we
appear on earth In cIrcumstances not oI our own makIng, cIrcumstances we do not
controI, and we come wIth sIgnIIIcant genetIc baggage, we may rIghtIy IeeI that God
exaggerated wIth thIs "constraIned by no IImIts." StIII, It Is the case that we come here
wIthout any Inborn, ImmedIate knowIedge oI ourseIves, wIthout knowIng who we are, or,
more precIseIy, wIthout knowIng what we shouId be doIng. ThIs knowIedge Is never
sImpIy gIven us, we have to IInd out Ior ourseIves. The questIon, Iow shaII IIve? has
guIded phIIosophIcaI reIIectIon on humanIty Irom Its begInnIng In ancIent Greece. Ior
IIato, thIs seems to have been the phIIosophIcaI questIon, sInce he has Socrates say In the
Republic: "our InquIry concerns the greatest oI aII thIngs, the good IIIe or the bad IIIe."
2
That the questIon needed to be asked and has been asked testIIIes ItseII to the Iact that
answers to It were not IeIt to be seII-evIdent and gIven, at Ieast not to those to whom IaIth
In a reIIgIous reveIatIon has not been granted. {p.16) An unavoIdabIe part oI the answer
to the questIon, Iow shaII IIve? Is that shaII have to seek an answer to thIs very
questIon myseII.
"mmedIacy" Is the key word here. As naturaI organIsms, we have ImmedIate awareness
oI pIeasure and paIn resuItIng Irom the IuIIIIIment, or Iack thereoI, oI our desIres and
Irom other Iorms oI InteractIon wIth the envIronment. ut even a very rudImentary
knowIedge oI the objects that satIsIy our desIres and those that do not, oI what to seek
out and what to avoId, requIres somethIng more than ImmedIate awareness. t requIres
the abIIIty to compare what Is beIore us, the content oI our ImmedIate experIence, wIth
our prevIous experIences, that Is, It requIres the abIIIty to objectIIy these prevIous
experIences In some way and to store them In memory, so that we may recaII them In
ImagInatIon when necessary. To be abIe to objectIIy our experIence, to stop Its IIow so as
to consIder Its contents at IeIsure, we need a medIum oI some sort, that Is, a materIaI
Page 3 of 54
(one that can actuaIIy be perceIved and hence aIso ImagIned) In whIch an ImprInt oI an
experIence can be preserved, and a representatIonaI code whIch aIIows us to transIate an
ImmedIate experIence Into thIs medIated ImprInt and the reverse, retransIate the ImprInt
Into an experIence.
(ncIdentaIIy, we shouId not conIuse the dIstInctIon between the ImmedIate and the
medIated wIth the dIstInctIon between the reaI and the ImagIned. As our cuIturaI
competence, our abIIIty to use medIa, grows, much oI our actuaI experIence, beyond the
most rudImentary sensatIons oI pIeasure and paIn, Is heavIIy medIated, that Is, InvoIves
makIng comparIsons between what Is reaIIy there and what we recaII In ImagInatIon. ut
thIs In no way obIIterates the dIstInctIon between a reaI object oI experIence, an object
that does exIst In the same space and tIme as our bodIes, and an ImagInary object that
does not. n a sense whIch Is reIatIveIy trIvIaI today but was a reveIatIon two centurIes
ago when Ierder put Iorward hIs conceptIon oI Ianguage as not a sImpIe representatIon
oI an Independent experIence but rather a medIum partIy constItutIve oI thIs experIence,
3
It may be true that "nothIng Is extra-textuaI," that aII experIence worth taIkIng about Is
medIated, that Is, a "text." ut thIs does not have to prevent us Irom makIng a dIstInctIon
between those "texts" that are about reaI objects and those about ImagInary ones.)
As humans, we have deveIoped a number oI such medIa In the processes oI bIoIogIcaI
and cuIturaI evoIutIon, the most sophIstIcated, powerIuI, and versatIIe oI these beIng, oI
course, Ianguage. Thanks to the medIa and our abIIIty to use them, the abIIIty to code and
decode, we are not ImprIsoned In the ImmedIacy oI current experIence as Ietzsche
ImagIned most anImaIs to be most oI the tIme.
ConsIder the herd grazIng beIore you. These anImaIs do not know what yesterday
and today are but Ieap about, eat, rest, dIgest and Ieap agaIn, and so Irom mornIng
to nIght and Irom day to day, . . . enthraIIed by the moment and Ior that reason
neIther meIanchoIy nor bored. . . . man says ' remember and envIes the anImaI
whIch ImmedIateIy Iorgets and sees each moment reaIIy dIe, sInk back Into deep
nIght extInguIshed Ior ever.
4
{p.17) We aIso have at our dIsposaI a repertory oI medIated experIence, our own as
weII as that oI other humans. ThIs repertory aIIows us to begIn to IInd out what we shouId
seek and what we shouId avoId. t aIIows us aIso to begIn to make choIces between
varIous objects oI our desIre (we cannot have them aII). At a Iater stage, It wIII aIIow us
even to make choIces between competIng or conIIIctIng desIres (we cannot have these aII,
eIther). As we Iearn to make choIces between varIous objects oI our desIre and even
between the varIous desIres themseIves, we may aIso Iearn to use our chIeI medIum,
Ianguage (logos), to oIIer reasons Ior our choIces, that Is, to justIIy our desIres and our
ensuIng actIons. GraduaIIy, we may thus raIse ourseIves above the naturaI order oI
causes (wIthout, oI course, ever IeavIng It entIreIy) Into the "IogIcaI" order oI reasons.
Once we get that Iar, we have aIso Iearned to oIIer reasons Ior our emotIons, that Is, to
justIIy our IeeIIngs.
A IuIIy deveIoped and mature ethIcaI IIIe wIII be constItuted by deIIberatIon on the
Page 4 of 54
questIon, Iow shaII IIve? and wIII aIm precIseIy at justIIIed actIon (at teIIIng me what
shouId do) and justIIIed passIon (what shouId IeeI). ut regardIess oI whether we get
that Iar or not, the cuIturaI medIa are IndIspensabIe, II we are to begIn to Iook Ior answers
to the questIon oI how to IIve. They are the medIa oI seII-representatIon, seII-dIscovery,
even seII-InventIon, and uItImateIy, oI seII-understandIng.
CuIturaI medIa have three Important Ieatures that have aIready been ImpIIed by the
descrIptIon above, but shouId be brought out more expIIcItIy. IIrst, suggested a
moment ago that the medIa can serve not onIy the aIm oI seII-representatIon, but aIso oI
seII-InventIon. Iow Is that possIbIe? t has been saId that a medIum aIIows us to transIate
an ImmedIate experIence Into a medIated ImprInt and the reverse, retransIate the ImprInt
Into an experIence. Thus the ImprInt, properIy decoded, becomes the source oI an
ImagInary experIence, that Is, oI an experIence the object oI whIch Is not reaI (exIstIng In
the same space and tIme as our bodIes do), but ImagIned. ut II we can have ImagInary
experIences oI thIs sort, we can aIso encode them In our medIa. That Is, the ImprInt does
not have to be a record oI actuaI experIence, It can aIso capture an ImagInary one. MedIa
users can be true creators, not just recreators oI experIence. can use the medIa not
onIy to record what has actuaIIy happened, but aIso to envIsage new possIbIIItIes, what
has not yet happened. Thus can not onIy represent, but aIso, to a certaIn extent at Ieast,
Invent myseII and my worId.
Second, we do not Invent the medIa, but InherIt them. ThIs Is partIcuIarIy cIear In the case
oI Ianguage. We do not make up our IIrst Ianguage Irom scratch. We may and oIten do
extend the range oI the Ianguage we use. We Introduce new terms, propose new
metaphors, Iearn IoreIgn Ianguages, and even Invent new artIIIcIaI ones (IIke speranto).
ut aII oI these extensIons and InventIons buIId on the Ianguage we have InherIted. n a
sense, thIs Is true aIso oI our vIsuaI medIa. ThIs Is not to deny that someone dId In Iact
Invent photography or movIng pIctures, but rather to poInt out that these InventIons
were based upon, and extended, the IundamentaI practIce oI makIng Images oI the vIsuaI
worId on IIat {p.18) surIaces, a practIce that we InherIt just as we InherIt Ianguage. o
matter how InventIve, creatIve, and revoIutIonary we are, most oI the IundamentaI
Ieatures oI the medIa we use are not oI our own makIng. n other words, our medIa oI
seII-representatIon and seII-understandIng are IundamentaIIy and InescapabIy shared,
and, consequentIy, we are socIaI beIngs through and through. n order to IInd out who
am and what want, In order even to ask these questIons, have to use tooIs that are not
my own, tooIs that get Irom my ancestors and contemporarIes. ThIs Is not to say that
may never aspIre to genuIne IndIvIduaIIty, to beIng my own seII, dIstInct Irom other
seIves. ThIs Is to say, however, that even IndIvIduaIIty Is socIaI. cannot Invent myseII ex
nihilo, In totaI dIsregard oI, and Independent oI, others, sInce my onIy avaIIabIe means oI
IormuIatIng the aspIratIon to IndIvIduaIIty and oI reaIIzIng It, oI askIng and answerIng the
questIon, Iow shaII IIve?, are socIaIIy shared. Ierder was rIght. Ianguage does not
sImpIy represent my IndIvIduaI experIence, It aIso partIy constItutes It.
ThIrd, the medIa oI seII-representatIon are at the same tIme the medIa oI worId-
representatIon. I It Is the IunctIon oI the medIa to objectIIy experIence, they must encode
Page 5 of 54
not onIy the experIencIng subject, but aIso and In the IIrst pIace the experIenced object.
just as cannot represent IndIvIduaIs In totaI IsoIatIon Irom other IndIvIduaIs, Irom theIr
human envIronment, past and present, aIso cannot represent them In totaI IsoIatIon Irom
theIr envIronment In generaI, naturaI and human-made. cannot taIk about the seII
wIthout aIso brIngIng In In some way Its worId. The medIa aIIow us to consIder and expIore
ourseIves and our worId at the same tIme. More precIseIy, we expIore ourseIves onIy In
expIorIng our worId.
Iet us caII the physIcaI objects produced In the process oI encodIng an experIence In a
medIum "works." n thIs broadIy IncIusIve sense, a work does not have to be IInguIstIc, oI
course. Ioems and phIIosophIcaI dIaIogues have or are works, but so do scuIptures,
paIntIngs, photographs, pIeces oI musIc. ow what Is essentIaI about works Is that they
are physIcaI, reaI objects (that Is, objects exIstIng In the same space and tIme as we do),
the purpose oI whIch Is to be "read" or decoded, that Is, to aIIow us to experIence an
ImagInary object dIIIerent Irom the reaI one. Iet us caII thIs Iurther, ImagInary, object a
"worId." Works (reaI objects) are there to be read (decoded) and thus transIormed Into
worIds (ImagInary objects). The work whIch Is reaIIy out there In Iront oI us demands that
we ImagInatIveIy see or hear In It the worId whIch In reaIIty Is not out there. ("To be a
work means to set up a worId," says IeIdegger.
5
) Thus, the structure oI a medIum (In
the sense In whIch we use thIs term here) InvoIves two objects oI vastIy dIIIerent
ontoIogIcaI status, a reaI work and an ImagInary worId.
Works can be eIther vIsuaI or auraI. We are not normaIIy expected to ImagIne In the
objects oI smeII, taste, or touch somethIng eIse that Is reaIIy not there, aIthough thIs does
happen occasIonaIIy-Iroust's madeIeIne comes to mInd-and aIthough, when Iorced by
necessIty, we may substItute these senses Ior sIght or {p.19) hearIng, as when we use
the raIIIe aIphabet. ut It wouId be naIve to thInk that aII that Is expected In the
apprecIatIon oI Iood and wIne or In erotIc pIeasure Is a IIne-tuned dIscrImInatIon oI the
propertIes oI the object actuaIIy out there. Once they transcend mere naturaI hunger
and sexuaI appetIte, once they begIn to aIm at the pIeasures oI the tabIe and bedchamber
rather than seII-preservatIon and procreatIon, the gourmet and the IIbertIne (to say
nothIng oI the Iover) know IuII weII that the objects they desIre are shot through and
through wIth concepts and Images, are cuIturaI as much as naturaI. (I you have any
doubts on thIs score, thInk how quIckIy your pIeasure wouId be extInguIshed II you
reaIIzed that the deIIghtIuI dIsh, or erotIc partner, you were enjoyIng contaIned some
taboo IngredIents, that MIIady was branded.) We are beIngs capabIe oI transIormIng even
the most rudImentary Iacts oI physIoIogy Into poetry. n cuIInary and erotIc arts, the
ImagInary suIIuses and transIorms the naturaI object oI desIre.
6
ChamIort's bItter maxIm
to the eIIect that "Iove as It exIsts In socIety Is mereIy the mIngIIng oI two IantasIes and the
contact oI two skIns"
7
can be abundantIy IIIustrated by noveIIstIc descrIptIons Irom
StendhaI through IIaubert to Iroust.
b. Vsua Meda
The most IundamentaI cIassIIIcatIon oI vIsuaI works seems to be to dIvIde them Into three-
or two-dImensIonaI objects. Other ways oI cIassIIyIng them are, oI course, possIbIe too.
Page 6 of 54
We mIght want to emphasIze the dIstInctIon between works that are motIonIess and those
that move, Ior exampIe. ut the dIvIsIon based on the number oI dImensIons seems to be
both the most dependent on the basIc propertIes oI sIght and the most deepIy IngraIned
In our tradItIon oI thInkIng about the medIa (where It appears as the dIstInctIon between
scuIpture and paIntIng). o such cIassIIIcatIon seems to be possIbIe In the case oI auraI
works. n Iact, no useIuI or tradItIonaI way oI dIvIdIng auraI objects Is avaIIabIe to us.
The ontoIogIcaI Issues InvoIved In makIng the dIstInctIon between work and worId seem to
be sImpIer In the case oI the vIsuaI, more compIex In the case oI the auraI medIa. We can
readIIy understand that there Is a dIstInctIon to be made between the scuIpture as a
three-dImensIonaI work consIstIng oI a carved bIock oI marbIe and the same scuIpture as
a worId we are asked to recognIze In the carved marbIe, a worId consIstIng, say, oI a
human body. We ImagInatIveIy see human IIesh In the carved marbIe, even though we
know that what Is reaIIy there Is stone. Or rather, we see them both, the work and the
worId, the stone and the IIesh, and we know whIch one Is reaI and whIch ImagInary.
The same dIstInctIon Is maIntaIned even when the three-dImensIonaI work Is movIng and
IIvIng IIesh, rather than stone. What we are asked to recognIze In the body oI the actor Is
not the body oI the actor, but the body oI the character he represents, not IerruccIo
SoIerI, but ArIecchIno. When at the end oI the spectacIe SoIerI takes oII hIs mask to thank
the audIence Ior the appIause, the sudden transIormatIon oI the ImagInary character Into
the reaI actor has a startIIng eIIect. t Is the eIIect that an artIst may and oIten does put to
creatIve uses. thInk oI the "unIInIshed" (non jinito) quaIIty oI so much oI MIcheIangeIo's
scuIpture {p.20) that InevItabIy raIses the neo-IIatonIc thoughts oI the spIrIt attemptIng
to IIberate ItseII Irom the matter. Such thoughts are possIbIe precIseIy because we are
aware oI both the marbIe and the body.
ScuIpture presents theoretIcaI dIIIIcuItIes Ior an ontoIogIst onIy at Its extremes, when It Is
compIeteIy reaIIstIc or compIeteIy abstract, and It Is InstructIve to see that even though
the two extremes couId not be Iurther apart (what eIse couId one expect oI the
extremes), the dIIIIcuItIes they create are very sImIIar Indeed. t Is obvIous that the
dIstInctIon between work and worId remaIns vaIId no matter how reaIIstIc the scuIpture
and no matter whether It Is made oI bronze, marbIe, pIaster, or coIored wax. t ceases to
be vaIId onIy when the scuIpture repIIcates rather than represents a reaI object, that Is,
when It Is In every respect IdentIcaI to the object, or, what amounts to the same thIng,
when the object Is oIIered as the scuIpture In the manner oI uchamp's urInaI (and,
strIctIy speakIng, even thIs Is not a perIect repIIca, havIng been abstracted Irom the
context, such as pIumbIng, that made Its proper use possIbIe). A repIIca oI thIs sort makes
a poInt about the ontoIogIcaI structure oI scuIpture, and the poInt It makes Is,
paradoxIcaIIy, the very same one have made here. by reachIng the extreme where the
dIstInctIon between work and worId dIsappears, the urInaI emphatIcaIIy reaIIIrms the
vaIIdIty oI the dIstInctIon Ior any scuIpture In an even sIIghtIy Iess extreme posItIon. t Is
worth notIng that a poInt oI thIs sort does not have to be made vIsuaIIy at aII. nothIng Is
Iost when It Is made conceptuaIIy, whIch Is to say that, Ior the purpose oI makIng a poInt
about the ontoIogy oI scuIpture, the urInaI Is equaIIy eIIectIve as an object and as an Idea
Page 7 of 54
(In thIs respect, too, It does dIIIer Irom the reaI thIng). More ImportantIy, It makes a poInt
that can be InterestIngIy made thIs way onIy once. ThIs Is why the other extreme oI
scuIpture, that oI abstractIon, Is oI much Iarger sIgnIIIcance.
AbstractIon Is cIearIy a matter oI degree. As Iong as It Is not a repIIca, even the most
reaIIstIc scuIpture wIII omIt or sImpIIIy certaIn Ieatures oI the actuaI or possIbIe reaI object
It portrays. And as Iong as the abstractIon remaIns partIaI, the dIstInctIon between work
and worId remaIns Intact. The dIstInctIon coIIapses onIy when the abstractIon Is compIete,
when the three-dImensIonaI object In Iront oI us does not demand that we see In It
anythIng other than ItseII. There Is no reason to doubt that we are capabIe oI makIng such
objects, objects desIgned to be Iooked at, but not to represent any Ieatures oI the vIsuaI
worId. In the Iate twentIeth century, our pubIIc spaces are IuII oI them. And not onIy an
ImmobIIe, but aIso a movIng three-dImensIonaI work can remaIn abstract. When a baIIet Is
not narratIve or representatIonaI In any way, we are not asked to see In the body oI the
dancer anythIng other than ItseII.
ow It wouId appear that once scuIpture reaches the stage oI perIect abstractIon, It
ceases to be a medIum oI any kInd. ut our cuIturaI habIt oI vIewIng scuIpture as a vIsuaI
medIum Is so strongIy IngraIned that we tend to see even abstract scuIpture thIs way.
There Is no necessIty In thIs. we can resoIuteIy reIuse to see In an abstract scuIpture
anythIng other than the reaI object In Iront oI us. ut as a matter oI cuIturaI Iact weII
documented In crItIcaI wrItIng, very oIten we actuaIIy {p.21) treat abstract scuIpture as
II It were a medIum oI representatIon, an embodIment oI vaIues, worIdvIews, aspIratIons.
When ChrIsto wrapped the IeIchstag In erIIn, most commentators reIused to see In the
resuIt mereIy a huge buIIdIng eIegantIy and neatIy wrapped In whIte pIastIc. The taIk was,
rather, oI the recent German reunIIIcatIon, oI the two parts oI erIIn IInaIIy comIng
together.
The most naIve Iorm thIs kInd oI vIewIng can take Is to pretend, IIke IoIonIus, that the
scuIpture Is not IuIIy abstract and to see a vIsuaI representatIon In It. A seemIngIy more
sophIstIcated Iorm Is to acknowIedge vIsuaI abstractIon, but to cIaIm that the object In
Iront oI us represents somethIng nevertheIess, somethIng InvIsIbIe, typIcaIIy a state oI
mInd ("expressIon" Is the name we commonIy use Ior the representatIon oI an InternaI
state oI mInd rather than oI an externaI worId). ThIs, however, Is onIy seemIngIy a more
sophIstIcated stance. We can recognIze a person's state oI mInd vIsuaIIy onIy by
observIng the bodIIy behavIor, posture, gestures, IacIaI expressIon. Thus, II we are to see
an expressIon oI a state oI mInd In a pIece oI scuIpture, we must see In the object In Iront
oI us eIther a representatIon, ImperIectIy abstract, oI somethIng anaIogous to a human
body, or a trace oI a movIng human body that has Iormed the object whIch InvItes us to
reconstruct ImagInatIveIy thIs movIng body and to read the state oI mInd Irom It (a kInd oI
"actIon scuIpture" anaIogous to "actIon" paIntIng).
8
n the Iormer case, we stIII behave IIke IoIonIus. There Is nothIng shameIuI about thIs sort
oI response. t Is, to be sure, theoretIcaIIy naIve, but It testIIIes to a powerIuI need on the
part oI artIsts and audIences to IInd a suItabIe context oI human Interests Ior even a
perIectIy abstract scuIpture, to reIntegrate It Into the web oI our vItaI concerns. When
Page 8 of 54
rancusI caIIs hIs most ceIebrated scuIpture Bird in Spcce, he Is encouragIng us to take
what mIght easIIy be consIdered as a perIectIy abstract reaI object as a representatIon or
at Ieast a suggestIon oI soarIng IIIght, he wants our ImagInatIon to take oII. IeadIng an
abstract three-dImensIonaI work as an expressIon oI a state oI mInd Is somethIng we oIten
do not onIy when the work Is ImmobIIe, but aIso when It moves. ote that In InterpretIng
abstract dance thIs way, we transIorm the reaI body oI the dancer Into the ImagInary
body oI the character whose state oI mInd Is beIng expressed. aIter aII, we do not need
to suppose that It Is the dancer hImseII who Is exhIIarated when we take hIs Ieap as
expressIve oI exhIIaratIon.
What may be at work In the case oI a compIeteIy abstract scuIpture or dance beIng
Interpreted as a vehIcIe oI expressIon Is a more or Iess expIIcItIy artIcuIated suspIcIon that
a scuIpture or dance that Is pureIy abstract mIght be poIntIess and not worthy oI our
eIIort and tIme. The suspIcIon seems justIIIed. The onIy pIausIbIe aIternatIve can
envIsage Ior those who wouId want to avoId thIs sort oI theoretIcaIIy shaky
"expressIonIsm" wIthout gIvIng up the convIctIon that compIeteIy abstract scuIpture Is a
worthy pursuIt Is to see the scuIpture as a reaI object and nothIng but a reaI object
decoratIng and artIcuIatIng reaI spaces-squares, gardens, buIIdIngs, InterIors. The prIce
one pays In thIs case, however, Is that scuIpture Ioses Its autonomy and becomes an
eIement In the Iarger work by the desIgner oI pubIIc and prIvate spaces, whether
archItect, gardener, or InterIor decorator.
{p.22) The other strategy mentIoned above, that oI InterpretIng an abstract scuIpture
as "actIon" scuIpture, unIIke the "expressIonIst" one, does aIIow us to escape the charge
oI naIvete. ut In thIs case, scuIpture Is not a medIum. we are not seeIng In the object In
Iront oI us somethIng that Is not reaIIy out there. Iather, we see the reaI object and use
It to reconstruct the behavIor oI Its maker, whIch we then Interpret as a dIrect expressIon
oI hIs state oI mInd.
oth strategIes oI InterpretIng perIectIy abstract scuIpture have In common that, whIIe
hIghIy symptomatIc oI our cuIturaI needs, they are optIonaI. we may just as weII be tough-
mInded and reIuse to see In the scuIpture anythIng beyond the work. n thIs respect
abstract scuIpture dIIIers Irom representatIonaI scuIpture where we do not have thIs
choIce (or, what amounts to the same thIng, where the exercIse oI such a choIce wouId
be a mIsInterpretatIon). t Is InstructIve to reaIIze that we can aIso exercIse the same
choIce wIth naturaI or manmade objects that were not meant as scuIpture at aII (say, wIth
pIeces oI drIItwood Iound stranded on a beach). The same cuIturaI need to gIve an object
a meanIng by IntegratIng It Into a context oI human Interests and concerns Is aIso at pIay
here.
Many premodern uropeans tended to read the naturaI worId In thIs way, that Is, as a
work, a book wrItten by God. MIcheI IoucauIt proposed that sIxteenth-century
knowIedge was governed by the assumptIon that the worId Is a pervasIve web oI
correspondences or resembIances between thIngs, wIth each thIng beIng not onIy a thIng,
but aIso a sIgn poIntIng toward another, correspondIng thIng. When aII thIngs were aIso
sIgns, the worId was a book to be decIphered, and the task oI knowIedge was to trace the
Page 9 of 54
correspondences.
9
Modern scIence dIssoIved thIs worIdvIew wIthIn Its own domaIn, but
modernIst art gave It a curIous aIterIIIe. "the onIy reaIIy surprIsIng thIng wouId be that
sound couId not suggest coIour, that coIours couId not gIve the Idea oI meIody, and that
both sound and coIour together were unsuItabIe as medIa Ior Ideas, sInce aII thIngs
aIways have been expressed by recIprocaI anaIogIes" wrItes audeIaIre In hIs essay on
Wagner.
10
Ie goes on to quote hIs sonnet "Correspondances" Irom Les jleurs du mcl.
Ia ature est un tempIe ou de vIvants pIIIers
IaIssent parIoIs sortIr de conIuses paroIes,
I'homme y passe travers des Iorets de symboIes
uI I'observent avec des regards IamIIIers.
Comme de Iongs echos quI de IoIn se conIondent
ans une tenebreuse et proIonde unIte,
Vaste comme Ia nuIt et comme Ia cIarte,
Ies parIums, Ies couIeurs et Ies sons se repondent.
t may be that modernIsm Is tempted by such a revIvaI oI the premodern worIdvIew
because It needs to reIntegrate abstract art Into the web oI human concerns wIthout
denyIng Its abstractIon. ote that It Is precIseIy In hIs essay on musIc, on Wagner, that
audeIaIre Invokes anaIogIes and correspondences.
CIearIy, the dIIIerence between works and other reaI objects, whether naturaI {p.23)
or manmade, cannot aIways be recognIzed by examInIng the object aIone, In IsoIatIon
Irom the cuIturaI practIces In whIch It Is used. Arthur C. anto made thIs poInt wIth
reIerence to works oI art, rather than works In generaI, when he IormuIated hIs
InstItutIonaI theory oI art, whIch he recentIy summarIzed, wIth avowedIy "mIxed IeeIIngs,"
as IoIIows. "you cannot tell when somethIng Is a work oI art just by IookIng at It, Ior there
Is no partIcuIar way that art has to Iook." Iow, then, do you teII whether somethIng Is a
work oI art or a mere artIIact? "||n order to do so one had to partIcIpate In a conceptuaI
atmosphere, a 'dIscourse oI reasons, whIch one shared wIth the artIsts and wIth others
who made up the art worId."
11
And Iurther. "somethIng beIng a work oI art Is
dependent upon some set oI reasons. . . . The dIscourse oI reasons Is what conIers the
status oI art on what wouId otherwIse be mere thIngs, and . . . the dIscourse oI reasons Is
the art worId construed InstItutIonaIIy."
12
The same, It seems to me, mIght be saId oI
works In generaI, except that the dIIIerence between a work and a reaI object can be
recognIzed by just IookIng at the object In questIon when the work Is cIearIy
representatIonaI. ut when It Is eIther a repIIca or a perIectIy abstract work, we have the
choIce oI treatIng It eIther as a work or as a sImpIe artIIact (or naturaI object). t Is a
matter oI cuIturaI habIts and practIces whIch oI these two possIbIIItes wIII be entertaIned.
The Iact that the same choIce can be exercIsed wIth any reaI object, whether naturaI or
manmade, expIaIns why the boundary between works and other objects Is hIstorIcaIIy
changeabIe and cuIturaIIy contIngent. t expIaIns, In partIcuIar, why the same object can
be seen Irom these two dIstInct perspectIves. The status oI some artIIacts In our cuIture,
most notabIy buIIdIngs, Is practIcaIIy deIIned by thIs doubIe perspectIve. uIIdIngs, IIke
Page 10 of 54
other artIIacts we make, serve partIcuIar IunctIons and may be seen and evaIuated Irom
a strIctIy utIIItarIan poInt oI vIew In whIch what matters Is how weII gIven IunctIons are
served. ut, at the same tIme, buIIdIngs may be seen, and In many cuItures oIten are
seen, as vehIcIes oI sIgnIIIcance that transcend pureIy utIIItarIan consIderatIons, as
embodIments oI theIr owners' seII-Images, that Is, as works. A paIace or a vIIIa Is never
just a machIne to be InhabIted (though It Is aIso thIs). t Is, above aII, a symboIIc
embodIment oI Its owner's aspIratIons. VIIIa arbaro Incorporates an aspIratIon oI Its
owners to a Iorm oI IIIe IdeaIIzed by IIIny the Younger, that oI a part-tIme gentIeman-
Iarmer. The neocIassIcaI Iacades oI pubIIc buIIdIngs In WashIngton convey the modern
repubIIc's awareness oI Its ancIent Ioman ancestry. n other words, a buIIdIng may be
seen sImpIy as an artIIact desIgned, IIke any other artIIact, to perIorm a gIven set oI
IunctIons. ut It may aIso be seen In addItIon as a work, an object In whIch we may see
embodIed Its buIIders' and owners' aspIratIons, vaIues, preIerences as to the Iorms oI IIIe
worth cuItIvatIng. ThIs Is why Gadamer Is rIght to cIaIm that
the concept oI decoratIon must be Ireed Irom thIs antIthetIcaI reIatIonshIp to the
concept oI the art oI experIence and be grounded In the ontoIogIcaI structure oI
representatIon, whIch we have seen as the mode oI beIng oI the work oI art. . . .
Ornament or decoratIon Is determIned by Its reIatIon to what {p.24) It
decorates. . . . Ornament . . . beIongs to the seII-presentatIon oI Its wearer. . . . ut
presentatIon Is an ontoIogIcaI event, It Is representatIon. An ornament, a decoratIon,
a pIece oI scuIpture set up In a chosen pIace are representatIve In the same sense
that, say, the church In whIch they are to be Iound Is ItseII representatIve.
13
t mIght be objected that the embodyIng oI aspIratIons Is a IunctIon IIke any other, that It
does not suIIIce to mark the dIIIerence between an artIIact and a work, that there Is, Ior
Instance, no essentIaI dIIIerence between the IunctIon oI provIdIng a suItabIe space Ior
habItatIon and that oI projectIng the owner's power. ven In a sImpIe weII-desIgned
hammer may see more than an object, may see an endorsement oI the Iorm oI IIIe oI a
competent and eIIIcIent carpenter. The objectIon Is, Indeed, vaIId. ut the concIusIon that
It supports Is sImpIy that there Is no essentIaI boundary between works and other thIngs,
that any thIng can become a work, that Is, a reaI embodIment oI an ImagIned worId, once It
Is seen wIthIn the context oI human Interests. Once we pIace It wIthIn such a context, we
may see In any object somethIng eIse In addItIon to the object ItseII, nameIy, an ImagInary
worId oI human practIces and aspIratIons that the object ImpIIes, sInce It mIght IunctIon In
such a worId. (To avoId a possIbIe mIsunderstandIng, Iet me add that "ImagInary" does
not necessarIIy mean "IIctIonaI". we can ImagIne both actuaI and IIctIonaI objects, both
reyIus and CharIus.)
n short, an artIIact behaves IIke a repIIca or perIectIy abstract work. t aIIows us to
Interpret It eIther as a work, that Is, an embodIment oI a worId, or as a sImpIe artIIact.
may see a worId In It, but may aIso sImpIy use It. The dIIIerence between most works
(those that InvoIve neIther repIIcatIon nor perIect abstractIon) and artIIacts Is that a work
requIres beIng Interpreted as a worId, whIIe an artIIact Ieaves It optIonaI whether we shaII
so Interpret It. Works must be seen or heard as embodyIng worIds, artIIacts may be so
Page 11 of 54
seen or heard, but they may aIso sImpIy be used.
The ontoIogIcaI Issues InvoIved In makIng the dIstInctIon between work and worId are
IargeIy sImIIar, though not IdentIcaI, when the work Is two- rather than three-dImensIonaI.
n paIntIng as weII there Is cIearIy a dIstInctIon to be made between a stretched canvas
wIth paInt appIIed to Its surIace (the paInterIy work) and the human Iace emergIng agaInst
a background (the paInterIy worId) we are expected to see In the paInted surIace and In
addItIon to It. The same dIstInctIon can be made not onIy when the two-dImensIonaI work
Is ImmobIIe (as In paIntIng, drawIng, varIous prIntIng technIques, or photography), but
aIso when It moves, when It consIsts oI IIght movIng on a screen (as IIIm and vIdeo
technoIogIes made possIbIe). here It Is hardIy the screen and movIng IIght we are
expected to see, but the man on horseback rIdIng oII Into the sunset.
n paIntIng, just as In scuIpture, the dIstInctIon and tensIon between the work and the
worId may be put to a creatIve use by the artIst. The texture oI the work, whIch depends
on the way the paInt has been appIIed to the surIace, on the brush strokes-rapId and
IIght, or heavIIy Iabored, poIIshed and smooth, or deIIberateIy undIsguIsed-contrIbutes
to the expressIve character oI the worId. {p.25) There Is an unmIstakabIe reIatIonshIp
between Van Gogh's brush work and the worId oI IIeId Iabor concentrated In the peasant
shoes IeIdegger saw.
14
Moreover, the tensIon between work and worId can contrIbute
to the expressIve character oI the paIntIng even when the artIst's IntentIon Is not at aII
cIear, or when the eIIect Is unIntended. Irancesco GuardI's masterpIece, The Gondolc in
the Lcgoon (In MIIan's IoIdI IezzoII Museum), presents a worId consIstIng essentIaIIy oI
IIght dIsappearIng behInd a growIng curtaIn oI mIst, a WhIstIerIan study In grays, a worId
so InsubstantIaI as to threaten to dIssoIve at any moment, just as mIst, or VenIce,
eventuaIIy wIII. (GuardI Is the poet and prophet oI VenIce's end, oI the dIssoIutIon oI Its
soIId Iorms Into aIr, water, and IIght, Into a IIterary and pIctorIaI myth.) t Is ImpossIbIe
today to overIook the precarIous state oI the work. the support oI the stretched canvas,
wIth aII Its ImperIectIons, Is cIearIy vIsIbIe through the very thIn Iayer oI oII paInt, at pIaces
(the sky, In partIcuIar) extremeIy thIn and badIy cracked. And It Is hard not to notIce how
the IragIIe artIIact resonates In consonance wIth the ephemeraIIty oI the represented
worId.
n the case oI the two-dImensIonaI work, just as In the case oI scuIpture, theoretIcaI
dIIIIcuItIes emerge Ior an ontoIogIst onIy at the extremes oI compIete reaIIsm or compIete
abstractIon. When paIntIng repIIcates rather than represents a reaI IIat surIace, or, what
amounts to the same thIng, when a reaI IIat surIace Is oIIered as a paIntIng, Its ontoIogIcaI
structure dIIIers In no way Irom that oI compIeteIy reaIIstIc scuIpture. Whether cases oI
thIs sort can be oI much Interest Is doubtIuI, but they certaInIy can arIse. aII that one
needs to do Is, precIseIy, to oIIer any reaI IIat surIace as a paIntIng, or repIIcate one In
every respect.
The poIe oI compIete abstractIon Is much more InterestIng. verythIng we have saId
above about abstractIon In the case oI the three-dImensIonaI work pertaIns aIso to the
two-dImensIonaI one. We shouId not doubt that perIectIy abstract paIntIng Is possIbIe.
thInk, Ior Instance, oI a canvas evenIy covered wIth one coIor.
15
ut It Is strIkIng that
Page 12 of 54
compIete abstractIon Is much more dIIIIcuIt to achIeve when the work Is two-dImensIonaI
than when It Is three-dImensIonaI. The dIIIIcuIty Is wIttIIy engaged In Irank SteIIa's Tchkt-l-
Sulcymcn, Vcriction ll oI 1969 (at the MInneapoIIs nstItute oI Arts), a compIex pattern oI
squares and cIrcIes wIth contradIctory cIues that make a consIstent InterpretatIon
ImpossIbIe. on the one hand, the squares are "In Iront oI" the cIrcIes, and the cIrcIes
overIap so that a part oI one Is "In Iront oI" a part oI another, on the other hand, the
cIrcIes are not Ioreshortened, so that they can aIso be seen as a IIat pattern. SteIIa hImseII
makes hIs IntentIons seem straIghtIorward and unambIguous. "My paIntIng Is based on
the Iact that onIy what can be seen there is there. t reaIIy Is an object. . . . What you see
Is what you see."
16
What you see Is what you see, no doubt about It. ut what do you
actuaIIy see, a IIat pattern or IIgures In three-dImensIonaI space? What you actuaIIy see Is
Iar Irom straIghtIorward and unambIguous. Very oIten what passes Ior abstractIon In
paIntIng Is not compIete abstractIon at aII. magIne a paIntIng showIng two overIappIng
squares In two dIIIerent coIors agaInst a whIte background. t wouId be very dIIIIcuIt not
to see In thIs case that one oI the squares was In Iront oI the other and that both {p.26)
were seen agaInst, that Is, were In Iront oI, the background. n other words, It wouId be
very dIIIIcuIt to see the reaI work onIy and not the two ImagInary objects appearIng In an
ImagInary space.
t Is on the basIs oI MaIevIch-IIke exampIes oI thIs sort that one gets persuaded by
IIchard WoIIheIm's argument that much (though not aII) abstract paIntIng shouId be
consIdered a specIes oI representatIonaI paIntIng.
17
n both IIguratIve and abstract
paIntIng, we see not onIy the reaI object, the dIIIerentIated IIat surIace, but aIso ( wouId
preIer to say, prImarIIy) the ImagInary presented worId, the space wIth objects In It,
somethIng In Iront oI, or behInd, somethIng eIse. n thIs sense, IIguratIve and abstract
paIntIng are both specIes oI representatIonaI art. They dIIIer onIy In the kInd oI concepts,
IIguratIve ("woman") or abstract ("rectangIe"), under whIch we brIng what we see In the
paIntIng. More precIseIy, shouId preIer to say that they dIIIer In the degree oI
abstractIon oI the concepts under whIch we brIng what we see In the paIntIng. IuttIng It
thus aIIows us to see ImmedIateIy that the IIne dIvIdIng the abstract Irom the IIguratIve
paIntIng Is necessarIIy bIurred (somethIng we mIght aIso have Iearned Irom some
nIneteenth-century paInters, such as Turner), and to understand why thIs Is so.
What thIs suggests Is that, In paIntIng, It Is Important to dIstInguIsh the case oI the work as
a reaI abstract two-dImensIonaI object (our IIrst exampIe above, the one oI a canvas
evenIy covered wIth one coIor) Irom the case oI the work as representIng an ImagInary
abstract object (the second, MaIevIch-IIke, exampIe). Much oI what Is generaIIy
consIdered abstract paIntIng beIongs In Iact to the Iatter rather than the Iormer category.
Why Is genuIne abstractIon so much more dIIIIcuIt to achIeve In paIntIng than In scuIpture?
Why Is It that so much oI "abstract" paIntIng Is In Iact representatIonaI (representIng
abstract objects) whIIe no abstract scuIpture couId be representatIonaI In thIs sense? We
touch here on the most IundamentaI dIIIerence between the scuIpturaI and paInterIy
worIds, between what can be represented by three-dImensIonaI works and what by
means oI two-dImensIonaI ones. (ThIs was a subject oI much Interest to Ieonardo and
those sIxteenth-century taIIan art theorIsts who, IIke enedetto VarchI, were much
Page 13 of 54
exercIsed by the questIon oI the reIatIve merIts oI scuIpture and paIntIng.
18
)
A three-dImensIonaI work can represent the surIaces oI three-dImensIonaI objects oI the
vIsuaI worId. Iess obvIousIy, It can aIso represent the space In whIch these objects
appear, provIded the objects are ImagInary. magInary objects carry theIr ImagInary
space wIth them, so to speak. Take the smaII bronze Hercules cnd Antceus oI AntonIo
IoIIaIuoIo (at the !IIIzI). As a Hercules, a reaI object exIstIng In reaI space It Is, weII, smaII.
ut the IercuIes It represents Is by no means smaII. Ie Is, rather, a huge hunk. ThIs
shows that the space thIs ImagInary IercuIes appears In Is dIIIerent Irom the reaI space In
whIch the Hercules bronze appears. A two-dImensIonaI work can represent surIaces and
spaces too, but In addItIon It can aIso represent the IIght In whIch these represented
objects are seen. ThIs representatIon oI ImagInary IIght IIes beyond the reaIm oI what Is
possIbIe In IreestandIng scuIpture. The ImpoverIshment oI the work, or, II you {p.27)
wIII, Its Increased abstractIon, Irom three to two dImensIons entaIIs the enrIchment oI the
worId, or, II you wIII, Its Increased reaIIsm. The ImagInary vIsuaI worId that can be
represented by means oI paIntIng Is much rIcher than the one representabIe by means oI
scuIpture, sInce It IncIudes not onIy the ImagInary surIaces oI objects and the ImagInary
space, but aIso the ImagInary IIght In whIch the objects appear. ScuIpture makes use,
Instead, oI reaI IIght, that Is, In a scuIpturaI worId the ImagInary surIaces oI represented
objects (human IIesh, say) appear In the same IIght In whIch the observer appears.
ote that the appearance oI ImagInary space In scuIpture seems to be possIbIe onIy when
the scuIpture Is representatIonaI, that Is, when Its objects are aIso ImagInary. ThIs may
expIaIn why genuIne abstractIon Is so much rarer In paIntIng than In scuIpture. What
commonIy happens In "abstract" paIntIng Is that Its shapes and coIors InvIte us to see an
ImagInary space wIth ImagInary abstract objects In It, that Is, to read the work as
representIng objects that are abstract. ThIs does not seem possIbIe In IreestandIng
scuIpture unIess It Is representatIonaI to begIn wIth.
ote aIso that scuIpture meets paIntIng haIIway when It ceases to be IreestandIng and
takes the Iorms oI hIgh- or Iow-reIIeI, sInce In these Iorms It Increases Its potentIaI Ior
representIng ImagInary space. ThInk, Ior Instance, oI the ImagInary spaces In GIovannI
AntonIo Amadeo's vIrtuoso hIgh-reIIeIs embeIIIshIng the puIpIts oI the CathedraI oI
Cremona, whIch are created by IoreshortenIng In the archItecturaI backgrounds and the
use oI dIIIerent scaIes oI IIgures In Iront. (The Images are astonIshIngIy vIsIonary, by the
way, preIIgurIng and predatIng by some haII century the eIongated IImbs and contorted
postures oI the mannerIsts.) ut note that, whIIe In the reIIeI Iorm scuIpture goes In the
dIrectIon oI paIntIng, IncreasIng Its capabIIIty to represent space, It does not become
paIntIng, sInce It stIII cannot represent the IIght In whIch Its represented objects are seen.
Ior thIs, tonaI contrasts wouId be necessary.
Ior Its own part, paIntIng can move In the opposIte dIrectIon and approach the condItIon
oI scuIpture. ThIs happens when a IIat surIace Is paInted so as to create the IIIusIon that It
has been made oI a dIIIerent materIaI, when, Ior Instance, paInted pIaster Is made to Iook
IIke poIIshed marbIe, as oIten happens In IenaIssance InterIors. Iere we can dIstInguIsh
Page 14 of 54
the reaI work (the paInted waII) Irom the ImagInary worId (the poIIshed marbIe), but what
gets represented Is, as In the case oI scuIpture, no more than the surIace, and thIs Is
seen In reaI space and IIght. t Is precIseIy the absence oI the represented space and IIght
that makes thIs case dIIIerent Irom that oI a IuIIbIown paIntIng. t may be InstructIve to
thInk oI the Lcst Supper that Andrea deI Castagno paInted Ior the reIectory oI
Sant'ApoIIonIa In IIorence, where jesus and hIs dIscIpIes sIt wIth theIr backs to a waII seen
IrontaIIy and consIstIng oI marbIe paneIs represented wIth great reaIIsm. I most oI the
Iresco dIsappeared and onIy one paneI or Its Iragment survIved, It wouId be ImpossIbIe to
decIde by vIsuaI InspectIon aIone whether what we have In Iront oI us Is a Iragment oI a
waII paInted to Iook IIke It Is made oI marbIe, or the soIe survIvIng Iragment oI a
representatIonaI Iresco by Castagno {p.28) In whIch the work In Iront oI our eyes (the
reaI waII covered wIth reaI pIgments) has to be decoded as the ImagInary worId (the
marbIe waII In the ImagInary space behInd the dInIng IIgures).
c. Musc
The ontoIogIcaI Issues InvoIved In makIng the dIstInctIon between work and worId are
consIderabIy more compIex when the work Is auraI. We have aIready observed that,
contrary to the case oI vIsuaI works, whIch can be dIvIded Into three- and two-
dImensIonaI ones, there seems to be no useIuI or tradItIonaI way oI dIvIdIng auraI works
Into cIasses. We tradItIonaIIy have severaI Iarge cIasses oI vIsuaI medIa, such as
archItecture, scuIpture, and paIntIng (wIth Iurther subdIvIsIons possIbIe, oI course, when
addItIonaI cIassIIIcatory crIterIa, such as the absence or presence oI motIon, are
Introduced), whIIe there Is strIctIy speakIng onIy one pureIy auraI medIum, musIc.
Contrary to what some mIght at IIrst expect, and what may have hastIIy suggested
earIIer, the musIcaI work Is constItuted not by the wrItten "text," the score, but by the
actuaI sounds produced by the sIngIng or pIayIng musIcIans (or by the sound-generatIng
or -reproducIng machInes), sounds that, as physIcaI objects, exIst In the same space and
tIme that we do. The wrItten text, and notatIon In generaI, Is mereIy a tooI some musIcIans
use when they want theIr musIc to be pIayed by others, or when they want to pIay musIc
composed by someone eIse, or when they want to prop theIr own memorIes whIIe
composIng (whIch Is not to deny that In certaIn cIrcumstances, such as those that
attended the deveIopment oI the uropean art musIc tradItIon, thIs tooI can acquIre a IIIe
oI Its own and become IndIspensabIe to composers as they IormuIate Ideas oI
unprecedented power, depth, and compIexIty). A musIcaI work cIearIy can, and many
musIcaI works actuaIIy do, exIst wIthout any wrItten text.
What Is perhaps most strIkIng about musIc when compared wIth the vIsuaI medIa Is that It
Is much Iess Interested In representIng the outsIde worId. n most hIghIy deveIoped
cuItures, and certaInIy In the West, a degree oI representatIonaI reaIIsm has aIways been,
and contInues to be, centraI to the way one uses and understands vIsuaI medIa. ven
today, when abstractIon Is so Important to the practIce oI vIsuaI arts, we couId gIve up on
representatIonaI reaIIsm onIy at a tremendous Ioss to our vIsuaI cuIture. Ihotography,
IIIm, and teIevIsIon ensure that, more than ever, we are constantIy surrounded by
reaIIstIc portrayaIs oI the outsIde worId. ThIs Is not the case wIth musIc. A degree oI
Page 15 of 54
representatIonaI reaIIsm Is avaIIabIe aIso to the auraI medIum. We can use sounds to
represent the sounds oI our naturaI and manmade envIronment. Irds In partIcuIar have
been a much-Ioved subject oI musIcaI representatIon In urope Irom the Iourteenth
century through MessIaen. ut our auraI cuIture wouId not be sIgnIIIcantIy ImpoverIshed
II we gave up on thIs sort oI reaIIstIc representatIon aItogether, certaInIy It wouId not be
ImpoverIshed to anythIng approachIng the degree to whIch our vIsuaI cuIture wouId.
Over the centurIes, our abIIIty and wIsh to record specIIIc Ieatures oI the reaI worId have
been IncomparabIy greater when these {p.29) Ieatures were vIsuaI than when they
were auraI. Today, we very much want to know what IIIteenth-century IIorence or
nIneteenth-century IarIs Iooked IIke, and we do a Iot to IInd out, heIped In the process by
the reIevant ancestors. About how these pIaces sounded, we know much Iess. To be
sure, we do know more and more about how the musIc produced In those pIaces
sounded IIke. ut what was the cIty soundscape, the noIses made by human throats,
traIIIc, church beIIs? t Is not that we do not care to know. IecentIy, hIstorIans have been
more and more ImagInatIve about such thIngs (recaII AIaIn CorbIn's hIstorIes oI odor and
sonorous Iandscape, or IeInhard Strohm's IuIzInga-InspIred evocatIon oI the sounds oI
ruges).
19
t Is rather that musIc Is oI IIttIe heIp when we try to IInd out. The eye Is by
Iar our most sensItIve and dIscrImInatIng Instrument oI expIoratIon oI the outer worId,
the worId beyond the conIInes oI our skIn. I we keep In mInd that our vIsuaI medIa
IncIude photography and IIIm, we reaIIze that even today a degree oI representatIonaI
reaIIsm remaIns the norm Ior them. n musIc, by contrast, It Is abstractIon that has been
the norm.
Another way oI brIngIng out thIs contrast between the vIsuaI medIa and musIc wouId be
to observe that, whereas paInters can use as theIr materIaI aII coIors vIsIbIe to the human
eye, untII very recentIy musIcIans In the West and eIsewhere couId use onIy a very smaII
seIectIon oI what Is audIbIe as theIr materIaI. ven today, when we no Ionger beIIeve that
there must be IImIts on the materIaI Irom whIch musIc may be made, most musIc
contInues to be made Irom an extremeIy narrow seIectIon Irom the range oI what Is
audIbIe. A tradItIonaI way oI makIng thIs poInt used to be to say that musIc Is made not oI
sounds (that we IInd readIIy avaIIabIe In the outer auraI worId), but oI tones oI deIInIte
pItch (that actuaIIy can be jound In nature, as opposed to mcde, onIy rareIy, II at aII). Ior
most musIc thIs cIaIm Is vaIId even today. ThIs In ItseII Is IndIcatIve oI how much Iess than
paIntIng Is musIc drawn by representatIonaI reaIIsm. WhIIe a paInterIy work oIten wants to
reIIect the IIght that strIkes our retIna In a way that resembIes how a reaI object, the
modeI oI the pIctorIaI representatIon, wouId reIIect the IIght, a musIcaI work Is not usuaIIy
aImIng at thIs sort oI resembIance. ConsequentIy, a musIcIan can aIIord to be much more
choosy about hIs materIaI.
ut II It Is true that musIc tends toward abstractIon rather than reaIIsm, what sort oI
abstractIon Is It? The kInd we have Iound to be typIcaI In scuIpture, where the work ItseII
may become an abstract reaI object, or the kInd oIten encountered In paIntIng, where
what Is abstract may be not the work but the represented ImagInary worId? oth kInds,
wouId IIke to cIaIm, are possIbIe In musIc, and most commonIy they are present
sImuItaneousIy. To put It brIeIIy, most musIc Is In part representatIonaI, but what gets
Page 16 of 54
represented In It are abstract objects. To be sure, as In scuIpture and paIntIng, In musIc,
It Is aIso possIbIe to create works In whIch we are asked to hear nothIng but what Is In Iact
presented to our ears. The musIc oI our own century, In partIcuIar, Is IuII oI reIevant
attempts. ndeed, the emergence oI a sIgnIIIcant repertory oI artworks that want to be
nothIng but reaI objects Is sureIy a centraI deveIopment In both vIsuaI arts and musIc oI
the past nInety years (and an aspect oI the tendency toward extreme abstractIon that
{p.30) wIII be descrIbed and Interpreted In chapter 3). evertheIess, much more
commonIy, we are expected to hear In the auraI work (whether vocaIIy or InstrumentaIIy
produced) not onIy the reaI soundIng object, but aIso somethIng that Is reaIIy not out
there, somethIng ImagInary. just as we do not see the worId oI paIntIng II aII we perceIve
Is a stretched canvas wIth paInt appIIed to Its surIace, we do not hear the worId oI musIc II
aII we perceIve are the sounds produced by the musIcIans or machInes. Ior the worId to
be perceIved, we have to hear In the reaI sounds aIso the ImagInary (and most oIten
abstract) content.
What Is, precIseIy, thIs ImagInary content? Most Western art musIc consIsts prImarIIy oI
meIodIc IInes, to IoIIow thIs musIc Is In the IIrst pIace to IoIIow Its IInes. At Its most mInImaI,
musIc can consIst oI nothIng but a sIngIe meIody (we caII thIs monophony), as In medIevaI
pIaInchant. More commonIy and artIuIIy, there wIII be severaI sImuItaneous meIodIes to
IoIIow (poIyphony), and these may aII be equaIIy Important, or they may come Into varIous
reIatIons oI domInatIon and dependence, as In the cIassIc vocaI poIyphony oI the IIIteenth
and sIxteenth centurIes. I the dependent materIaI does not Iorm contInuous IInes, or
Iorms them onIy IntermIttentIy, we have a meIody wIth accompanIment (homophony), as In
the earIy modern operatIc monody. Much oI the texturaI eIIort In the most artIstIcaIIy
ambItIous modern InstrumentaI musIc Irom the Iate eIghteenth to the earIy twentIeth
century went Into preservIng the dIstInctIon between meIody and accompanIment, whIIe
devIsIng varIous ways oI makIng the accompanIment meIodIcaIIy dIstInctIve, rather than
perIunctory. Thus, In generaI, one mIght say that the object to attend to In Western art
musIc wIII typIcaIIy consIst oI meIodIes In varIous reIatIons oI equaI or unequaI Importance,
wIth an optIonaI and more or Iess meIodIcaIIy dIstInctIve accompanIment.
ow, wIth two exceptIons, everythIng about thIs object Is reaI. There Is nothIng ImagInary
about meIodIes. we hear a meIody when we recognIze that Its successIve pItches beIong
together In a sIngIe temporaI shape, and what we perceIve In such a case Is a reaI object.
SImIIarIy, there Is nothIng ImagInary about the rhythmIc organIzatIon oI a meIody, nor
about Its tempo, nor about the tImbre and the dynamIc IntensIty oI Its pItches. The
ImagInary enters Into the perceptIon oI musIc onIy when the musIc Is In a very broad and
IncIusIve sense tonaI and metrIc, the ImagInary content oI reaI sounds depends on the
cIoseIy InterreIated phenomena oI tonaIIty and meter.
n the broadIy IncIusIve sense In whIch use the term here, musIc Is tonaI when Its
pItches are heard to be oI unequaI Importance, when some oI them are perceIved to be
reIatIveIy unstabIe, wantIng to move, or beIng puIIed, toward others, and when these
others are perceIved to be the reIatIveIy more stabIe goaIs oI tonaI motIon, or centers oI
tonaI gravIty that puII the Iess stabIe pItches toward themseIves. t was the eradIcatIon oI
Page 17 of 54
thIs sort oI InequaIIty among pItches that was the goaI oI ArnoId Schoenberg's two-stage
revoIutIon, IIrst In the Iree atonaIIty oI the seven years that preceded the IIrst WorId
War, and then In the more systematIc tweIve-tone organIzatIon oI the 1920s, a method
one oI the centraI aIms and the maIn eIIect oI whIch was to prevent tonaIIty Irom
reappearIng. {p.31) !ntII thIs revoIutIon, aII Western musIc, as weII as much oI the musIc
made outsIde oI urope, was In thIs broad sense tonaI, though the specIIIc shapes tonaIIty
took In varIous tImes and pIaces dIIIered wIdeIy.
(ote, by the way, that II my InterpretatIon oI the tweIve-tone method oI composItIon as
desIgned to prevent tonaIIty Irom reappearIng Is correct, the method cIoseIy paraIIeIs
cubIsm as Interpreted by rnst GombrIch. "CubIsm . . . Is the most radIcaI attempt to
stamp out ambIguIty and to enIorce one readIng oI the pIcture-that oI a man-made
constructIon, a coIored canvas. I IIIusIon Is due to the InteractIon oI cIues and the
absence oI contradIctory evIdence, the onIy way to IIght Its transIormIng InIIuence Is to
make the cIues contradIct each other and to prevent a coherent Image oI reaIIty Irom
destroyIng the pattern In the pIane."
20
Isewhere, GombrIch expressed hIs doubts
concernIng the tweIve-tone method ItseII. "t seems to me InescapabIe that neIther the
paInter nor the musIcIan can sImpIy swItch oII the IIeId oI Iorce |such as created by
tonaIIty| wIthout havIng hIs resources severeIy curtaIIed. Ie can stIII create patterns, but
he can no Ionger reIate them to our expectatIons. Much IngenuIty and ImagInatIon has
certaInIy gone Into aIternatIve systems IIke the creatIon oI serIaI orders composed oI 12
neutraI tones, but remaIn unconvInced that these experIments have justIIIed the
dIsmantIIng oI one oI the greatest InventIons oI mankInd, the tonaI system."
21
GombrIch
Is sureIy rIght that the dIsmantIIng oI tonaIIty severeIy curtaIIed musIc's resources. What
needs to be understood, however, Is the depth oI passIon that motIvated such voIuntary
seII-IImItatIon. n chapter 3, shaII oIIer an InterpretatIon oI the hIgh modernIst eIIort to
eradIcate IIIusIon.)
SImIIarIy, musIc Is metrIc when Its rhythms can be Interpreted accordIng to an underIyIng
puIsatIon oI beats oI equaI duratIon but heard to be oI unequaI Importance, when some oI
the beats are perceIved to be reIatIveIy unstabIe and to requIre a contInuatIon oI the
puIsatIon, whIIe others are perceIved to be reIatIveIy stabIe and capabIe oI brIngIng the
puIsatIon to a satIsIactory cIosure. A systematIc step-by-step chaIIenge to (though not yet
compIete eradIcatIon oI) thIs sort oI InequaIIty among beats, a chaIIenge accompIIshed
through the creatIon oI IrreguIar and unpredIctabIe beat patterns, Is one oI the reasons
why gor StravInsky's The Rite oj Spring (1911-13) Is one oI the key works In the canon
oI musIcaI modernIsm.
t shouId be cIear that the tonaI and metrIc phenomena are cIoseIy InterreIated. In each
case, a sImIIar set oI ImagInary meanIngs havIng to do wIth the opposItIon between
stabIIIty and InstabIIIty are attached to reaI objects, pItches In the case oI tonaIIty, and
beats In that oI meter. The two phenomena may be dIvorced Irom one another (musIc
may be tonaI wIthout beIng metrIc, and the reverse), but more typIcaIIy, In much oI
Western art musIc, they are correIated.
The tonaI and metrIc hearIng oI pItches and beats, the Iact that we hear some oI them as
Page 18 of 54
wantIng to move, or as beIng puIIed, toward others, means that what we hear In reaI
sounds Is somethIng ImagInary.
22
IeaI sounds do not, and cannot, move anywhere. n a
meIody, one sound does not move Irom one posItIon In the tonaI space, one pItch, to
another. Iather, It Is succeeded by another sound. {p.32) The ImagInary motIon Is
somethIng we hear In a meIody when we hear It tonaIIy. SImIIarIy, reaI sounds cannot be
endowed wIth a wIII to move, nor can they puII other sounds. TonaI motIon, wIII (the
Tonwille In IeInrIch Schenker's terms), and gravIty are not the attrIbutes oI reaI sounds,
but rather metaphors that descrIbe our experIence oI tonaI musIc, what we ImagInatIveIy
hear In It. To a certaIn extent, we may choose Irom among these metaphors. We may, Ior
Instance, thInk oI a sound as eIther wantIng to go somewhere, or as beIng puIIed In some
dIrectIon. ut some use oI metaphors oI thIs sort, metaphors oI motIon, dIrected tensIon,
reIaxatIon, gravItatIon, goaIs strIved Ior and achIeved, and so Iorth, Is InescapabIe, II we
want to descrIbe the experIence oI hearIng musIc tonaIIy. As duard IansIIck IamousIy
put It. "The content oI musIc Is tonaIIy movIng Iorms" ("er nhaIt der MusIk sInd tnend
bewegte Iormen").
23
We have estabIIshed that the reaI musIcaI work one attends to typIcaIIy consIsts oI a
meIody or meIodIes wIth an optIonaI accompanIment. The ImagInary worId we hear In thIs
work when we hear tonaIIy (and metrIcaIIy), then, consIsts oI IInes oI dIrected motIon,
ImagInary IInes traced by sounds that seem to want to move In specIIIc dIrectIons and
eIther do so, straIght on or wIth detours, or Irustrate the expectatIons they themseIves
aroused and move In new dIrectIons. These ImagInary IInes are, cIearIy, not IdentIcaI wIth
the reaI meIodIes oI the musIcaI work. They are, rather, what we hear In these meIodIes.
The same poInt Is expressed In more technIcaI Ianguage (that oI Iugo IIemann) when we
say that what we hear In the reaI tones oI tonaI musIc are theIr ImagInary harmonIc
"IunctIons" or meanIngs. we hear not just a tone, but, say, that thIs tone Is a Iourth above
the IocaI prIme, the IocaI tonaI center, and, consequentIy, we experIence It as a dIssonance
that wants to descend a step to the nearest consonance. (The harmonIc meanIng oI each
tone In a pIece oI tonaI musIc Is deIIned by Its reIatIonshIp wIth the IocaI tonIc, the IocaI
center oI tonaI gravItatIon, and the IocaI tonIcs themseIves may create Iarger gravItatIonaI
systems to whIch the more IocaI ones wIII be hIerarchIcaIIy subordInated.) t Is probabIy
because the harmonIc IunctIons oI tones are what truIy matter In any understandIng oI
tonaI musIc that the tonaI system we use Is to a consIderabIe extent Independent oI the
actuaI sounds that embody It. a tonaI work may be perIormed usIng varIous tunIng
systems and pItch standards (not to mentIon varIous Instruments), wIthout the IdentIty oI
the work beIng at rIsk.
n short, a musIcaI worId Is aIways at Ieast In part reaI, that Is, IndIstInguIshabIe Irom the
work. ut, II the musIc Is tonaI (and metrIc), Its worId Is aIso partIy ImagInary. ote by the
way that, In so Iar as the musIcaI worId Is ImagInary, Its ImagInary objects exIst In an
ImagInary, rather than reaI, tIme. magInary objects carry theIr own ImagInary space or
tIme wIth them. We have aIready seen thIs to be the case wIth scuIpture. SImIIarIy, the
ImagInary objects oI musIc appear In an ImagInary, rather than reaI, tIme. Susanne K.
Ianger has argued that "the sembIance oI thIs vItaI, experIentIaI tIme Is the prImary
Page 19 of 54
IIIusIon oI musIc. AII musIc creates an order oI vIrtuaI tIme, In whIch Its sonorous Iorms
move In reIatIon to each other-aIways and onIy to each other, Ior nothIng eIse exIsts
there."
24
Ior {p.33) Ianger, the essence oI aII musIc Is "the creatIon oI vIrtuaI tIme,
and Its compIete determInatIon by the movement oI audIbIe Iorms."
25
Ior Ioman
ngarden, the "quasI-tIme" Is what musIc has In common wIth IIterature, theater, and IIIm.
each phase except the Iast oI a musIcaI work contaIns a 'Iuture wIth respect to
Iurther phases oI the work that, by beIng antIcIpated, coIors In a specIIIc way the
phase beIng actuaIIzed. SometImes the work's IInaIe Is aIso antIcIpated In thIs way,
wIthout oI course openIng up perspectIves onto any Iurther phases. OnIy works
characterIzed by quasI-temporaI extensIon, that Is, musIcaI, IIterary, theatrIcaI, and
IIIm composItIons, can have such endIngs. The contInuum oI experIenced reaI tIme
does not have thIs type oI endIng. ven when reaI objects . . . come to the end oI
theIr exIstence, . . . a perspectIve aIways opens Iurther temporaI phases . . . , but no
such 'aIterward Is possIbIe once the musIcaI work has come to an end. . . . n the
same manner Its |the work's| content does not desIgnate any 'beIore. . . . The
organIzed quasI-tIme oI the composItIon Is compIete at both ends and does not
enter Into the tIme-contInuum oI the reaI worId.
26
t Is crucIaIIy Important to understand the mechanIsm whereby the musIcaI worId, the
ImagInary pattern oI IInes oI dIrected motIon, comes Into beIng. The tendency, or
harmonIc IunctIon, oI a tone Is not somethIng that we recognIze thanks to a specIaI traInIng
In musIc theory. Iather, It Is a phenomenon that we experIence dIrectIy, wIthout any
medIatIon oI theoretIcaI concepts. (To what extent thIs dIrect experIence Is unIversaI and
to what extent It Is cuIturaIIy acquIred Is stIII an open questIon. t Is not at aII unIIkeIy,
however, that we are aII born wIred to hear tonaIIy.
27
) That the IeadIng tone wants to
move a haII step up to, or Is puIIed up by, the tonIc, Is somethIng experIence dIrectIy
Iong beIore Iearn to use such concepts as the IeadIng tone, domInant, or tonIc. My
abIIIty to use such concepts depends on my abIIIty to experIence tonaI tendencIes oI
sounds, and not the reverse. A theory oI tonaI harmony Is successIuI to the extent that It
descrIbes my experIence oI the tonaI tendencIes oI sounds correctIy, and thIs Is aII we
shouId expect Irom It. We shouId certaInIy not expect It to teII us how to experIence tonaI
musIc. ThIs we can do competentIy wIthout any theoretIcaI equIpment.
ow, what actuaIIy experIence when experIence the tonaI tendency oI a sound Is the
dynamIcs oI my own desIre, Its arousaI, Its satIsIactIon, Its IrustratIon. t Is my own desIre
Ior the IeadIng tone to move up, the satIsIactIon oI my own desIre when It so moves, the
IrustratIon thereoI when It reIuses to budge or when It moves eIsewhere, that IeeI. (
mIght, at a dIIIerent IeveI so to speak, aIso desIre that the resoIutIon to the tonIc be
deIayed so as to make the musIc more InterestIng. ut beIore the questIon oI such a
second-IeveI desIre can even arIse, must IIrst experIence my cravIng Ior the tone to
move up.) Thus, the precondItIon oI my beIng abIe to hear an ImagInary pattern oI IInes oI
dIrected motIon In a tonaI work Is that IIrst experIence the desIres, satIsIactIons, and
IrustratIons oI thIs sort. n tonaI musIc, the dIrect experIence oI the dynamIcs oI my own
desIre precedes any recognItIon oI the represented object, oI IInes oI {p.34) dIrected
Page 20 of 54
motIon, and Is the necessary precondItIon oI such a recognItIon. must IIrst experIence
the desIre that the IeadIng tone move up, beIore can recognIze the representatIon oI an
ImagInary ascendIng IIne when It so moves. As KIerkegaard knew, "the sensuous-erotIc In
aII Its ImmedIacy . . . can be expressed onIy In musIc."
28
t IoIIows that tonaI musIc, IIke a vIsuaI medIum, may represent an ImagInary object
dIIIerent Irom myseII, an ImagInary worId, aIbeIt a hIghIy abstract one, consIstIng oI IInes
oI dIrected motIon. ut, unIIke a vIsuaI medIum, tonaI musIc aIso makes me experIence
dIrectIy the dynamIcs oI my own desIrIng, my own Inner worId, and It Is thIs Iatter
experIence that Is the more prImordIaI one, sInce any representatIon depends on It. WhIIe
vIsuaI medIa aIIow us to grasp, represent, and expIore an outer, vIsuaI worId, musIc
makes It possIbIe Ior me to grasp, experIence, and expIore an Inner worId oI desIrIng.
WhIIe vIsuaI medIa show us objects we mIght want wIthout makIng us aware oI what It
wouId IeeI IIke to want anythIng, musIc makes us aware oI how It IeeIs to want somethIng
wIthout showIng us the objects we want. n a brIeI IormuIa, vIsuaI medIa are the
Instruments oI knowIng the object oI desIre but not the desIre ItseII, tonaI musIc Is the
Instrument oI knowIng the desIre but not Its object. ThIs, IncIdentaIIy, Is what makes
Schopenhauer's understandIng oI musIc as the representatIon oI wIII so compeIIIng,
provIded one dIvorces It Irom hIs metaphysIcaI assumptIons-that Is, provIded one takes
the "wIII" to stand sImpIy Ior IndIvIduaI human wIII rather than Ior the uItImate noumenaI
ground oI reaIIty. (So Iong as hIs metaphysIcs Is IeIt In pIace, Schopenhauer hImseII has to
admIt that "the poInt oI comparIson between musIc and the worId, the regard In whIch It
stands to the worId In the reIatIon oI a copy or a repetItIon, Is very obscure."
29
I the
worId Is wIII, "It Is essentIaIIy ImpossIbIe to demonstrate thIs expIanatIon |oI the Inner
essence oI musIc|, Ior It assumes and estabIIshes a reIatIon oI musIc as a representatIon
to that whIch oI Its essence can never be representatIon, and cIaIms to regard musIc as
the copy oI an orIgInaI that can ItseII never be dIrectIy represented."
30
) And even
Schopenhauer dId not excIude the more empIrIcaI understandIng oI the musIc-as-
representatIon-oI-wIII theory when he dIscussed the nature oI meIody.
ow the nature oI man consIsts In the Iact that hIs wIII strIves, Is satIsIIed, strIves
anew, and so on and on. . . . Thus, correspondIng to thIs, the nature oI meIody Is a
constant dIgressIon and devIatIon Irom the keynote In a thousand ways, . . . yet
there aIways IoIIows a IInaI return to the keynote. n these ways, meIody expresses
the many dIIIerent Iorms oI the wIII's eIIorts, but aIso Its satIsIactIon by uItImateIy
IIndIng agaIn a harmonIous IntervaI, and stIII more the keynote.
31
When musIc Is neIther tonaI nor metrIc, the ImagInary worId does not arIse and aII we
hear Is the reaI soundIng object. ut even In thIs case, II we choose to make thIs abstract
object the vehIcIe oI Iurther Ideas about humans and theIr worId (and we aIready know
that we aIways have thIs optIon wIth any reaI object), the sphere In whIch we are IIkeIy to
Iook Ior successIuI anaIog oI what we {p.35) hear Is that oI Inner IeeIIng rather than oI
outer worId. VIsuaIIy presented worIds are spatIaI, they consIst oI spatIaIIy extended
objects. An auraIIy presented worId consIsts oI objects extended In tIme. Thus, It Is IIke
the temporaI Inner worId oI our experIencIng, not IIke the spatIaI outer worId we
Page 21 of 54
experIence.
As IegeI put It, musIc's "own proper eIement Is the Inner IIIe as such. . . . musIc's content
Is constItuted by spIrItuaI subjectIvIty In Its ImmedIate subjectIve Inherent unIty, the
human heart, IeeIIng as such."
32
IegeI captured the nature oI the medIum very cIearIy.
|S|ound In contrast to the materIaI oI the vIsuaI arts Is whoIIy abstract |In the sense
that It cannot portray the worId oI objects|. . . . On thIs account what aIone Is IItted
Ior expressIon In musIc Is the object-Iree Inner IIIe, abstract subjectIvIty as such.
ThIs Is our entIreIy empty seII, the seII wIthout any Iurther content. ConsequentIy,
the chIeI task oI musIc consIsts In makIng resound, not the objectIve worId ItseII,
but, on the contrary, the manner In whIch the Inmost seII Is moved to the depths oI
Its personaIIty and conscIous souI.
33
We have just estabIIshed that In the decodIng oI musIc the reIatIonshIp between the
cognItIve component, that Is, the recognItIon oI the represented ImagInary object, and the
component oI sensatIon, that Is, the experIence oI the dynamIcs oI desIre, Is the reverse
oI what It Is In the decodIng oI a vIsuaI work. n musIc, have argued, must experIence
the desIre that the IeadIng tone resoIves by movIng up a haII step as weII as the
satIsIactIon oI the desIre when It so moves, beIore can recognIze the ImagInary
ascendIng IIne. ThIs Is very dIIIerent Irom what happens In vIsuaI medIa where, on the
contrary, a recognItIon oI the ImagInary represented object must come beIore any
experIence oI the object can take pIace. must IIrst see a human Iace In the paInted
surIace beIore can experIence the expressIon oI the Iace. ThIs IundamentaI dIIIerence In
the reIatIonshIp between the cognItIve component and the component oI sensatIon In the
readIng oI vIsuaI and auraI works accounts, beIIeve, Ior the oIten-observed Iact that
musIc has a much more dIrect and powerIuI Impact on us than eIther scuIpture or
paIntIng. (As IansIIck put It, not wIthout mIsgIvIngs, "musIc works more rapIdIy and
IntenseIy upon the mInd than any other art. . . . The other arts persuade, but musIc
Invades us."
34
Kant shared these mIsgIvIngs. "|M|usIc has a certaIn Iack oI urbanIty
about It. Ior . . . It scatters Its InIIuence abroad to an uncaIIed-Ior extent . . . and thus, as It
were, becomes obtrusIve and deprIves others, outsIde the musIcaI cIrcIe, oI theIr
Ireedom. ThIs Is a thIng that the arts addressed to the eye do not do, Ior II one Is not
dIsposed to gIve admIttance to theIr ImpressIons, one has onIy to Iook the other way."
35
)
MusIc must experIence beIore can begIn to thInk about It, and can aIways Ieave the
thInkIng aItogether out. A paIntIng can begIn to exert Its emotIonaI Impact onIy aIter the
represented object has been recognIzed, and thIs even when the object Is abstract, that
Is, when the paIntIng approaches as cIoseIy as It can the ontoIogIcaI condItIon oI musIc. t Is
a contrast oI thIs sort that ArIstotIe may have had In mInd when he observed that {p.36)
the objects oI no other sense, such as taste or touch, have any resembIance to
moraI quaIItIes, In vIsIbIe objects there Is onIy a IIttIe, Ior there are IIgures whIch
are oI a moraI character, but onIy to a sIIght extent, and aII do not partIcIpate In the
IeeIIng about them. AgaIn, IIgures and coIors are not ImItatIons but sIgns oI moraI
habIts, IndIcatIons whIch the body gIves oI states oI IeeIIng. The connexIon oI them
wIth moraIs Is sIIght, but In so Iar as there Is any, young men shouId be taught to
Page 22 of 54
Iook, not at the works oI Iauson, but at those oI IoIygnotus, or any other paInter
or scuIptor who expresses moraI Ideas. On the other hand, even In mere meIodIes
there Is an ImItatIon oI character. . . . Some . . . make men sad and grave . . . , others
enIeebIe the mInd . . . , another, agaIn, produces a moderate and settIed temper. . . .
The same prIncIpIes appIy to rhythms, some have a character oI rest, others oI
motIon, and oI these Iatter agaIn, some have a more vuIgar, others a nobIer
movement. nough has been saId to show that musIc has the power oI IormIng the
character.
36
IIato aIso notIced the partIcuIar power oI musIc. "||ducatIon In musIc Is most sovereIgn,
because more than anythIng eIse rhythm and harmony IInd theIr way to the Inmost souI
and take strongest hoId upon It."
37
t shouId aIso be noted that musIc's abIIIty to have a dIrect Impact on our nerves and
bodIes Is not IImIted to the eIIects oI tonaIIty, though these are undoubtedIy the most
subtIe among the auraI medIum's expressIve means. n addItIon, and equaI In power
(though not In subtIety, sInce no ImagInary object emerges In thIs case), Is the dIrect
eIIect on our bodIes oI musIc's rhythmIc organIzatIon and tempo. Our bodIes react, our
Ieet dance, our hands cIap, our breathIng adjusts ItseII to the rhythm and tempo oI the
musIc beIore our mInds are abIe to teII us that they recognIze In the musIc a ponderous
march or a IIItIng waItz. As IansIIck observed, "It Is not because It Is dance musIc that It
IIIts the Ioot, rather, It Is because It IIIts the Ioot that It Is dance musIc."
38
Iere too the
experIence comes IIrst, the concept Iater. ven when the outward bodIIy expressIon oI
the musIc's Impact has been heavIIy suppressed and censored In what orbert IIas caIIs
"the cIvIIIzIng process," the body's reactIons to the musIc have been mereIy InternaIIzed,
but not obIIterated. An actIve IIstener, no matter how cIvIIIzed, IIstens wIth hIs muscIes as
much as wIth hIs ears and braIn. ven IansIIck, wIth hIs suspIcIon oI the body, prIggIshIy
took notIce. "t Is not to be denIed that dance musIc brIngs about a twItchIng oI the body,
especIaIIy In the Ieet, oI young peopIe whose naturaI dIsposItIon Is not entIreIy InhIbIted
by the constraInts oI cIvIIIzatIon."
39
Ietzsche, by contrast, was more aware oI the prIce
oI cIvIIIzatIon. "To make musIc possIbIe as a separate art, a number oI senses, especIaIIy
the muscIe sense, have been ImmobIIIzed (at Ieast reIatIveIy, Ior to a certaIn degree aII
rhythm stIII appeaIs to our muscIes), so that man no Ionger bodIIy ImItates and represents
everythIng he IeeIs. evertheIess, that Is reaIIy the normaI IonysIan state, at Ieast the
orIgInaI state. MusIc Is the specIaIIzatIon oI thIs state attaIned sIowIy at the expense oI
those IacuItIes whIch are most cIoseIy reIated to It."
40
There Is nothIng quIte IIke that dIrect engagement oI the body In our readIng {p.37) oI
vIsuaI works. We have aIready seen that In paIntIng a recognItIon oI the ImagInary
represented object must come beIore any experIence oI the object can take pIace. ote
that thIs Is the case not onIy wIth regard to the Impact oI the represented worId, but aIso
wIth regard to the Impact oI what sIxteenth-century taIIan theorIsts caIIed the "desIgn"
(disegno), that Is, the organIzatIon or composItIon oI the work, In the case oI paIntIng, the
arrangement oI coIors on two-dImensIonaI surIace by means oI IInes separatIng varIous
coIor patches. A desIgn mIght be expressIve the way any abstract reaI object mIght. ut a
Page 23 of 54
pIctorIaI composItIon achIeves Its expressIve eIIects In a manner that dIIIers In at Ieast two
basIc respects Irom that oI musIc. IIrst, whIIe a pIctorIaI composItIon can be expressIve
and thus have an emotIonaI Impact on us, It does not aIIect our bodIes dIrectIy, does not
make our muscIes move, the way rhythm and tempo do. And second, In representatIonaI
paIntIng at Ieast, the expressIon oI a composItIon, and oIten even the composItIon ItseII,
cannot be seen correctIy II the represented worId, the arrangement oI the ImagInary
three-dImensIonaI IIgures In the ImagInary space, Is not taken Into consIderatIon. WIthout
doIng that, we cannot know what comparatIve weIght we shouId assIgn to IndIvIduaI
patches oI coIor, nor-more crucIaIIy-can we know the reIatIve Importance and especIaIIy
the dIrectIon oI the IInes.
A partIy trIanguIar composItIon wIII be expressIve oI peaceIuI repose when the apex oI the
trIangIe Is Iormed by the Iace oI a caImIy sIttIng Madonna (as In GIovannI eIIInI's north-
waII aItar at S. ZaccarIa), or oI a sweepIng upward surge when at the apex there Is the
Iace oI the aIrborne VIrgIn In the process oI the AssumptIon wIth her gaze IIxed on her
heavenIy destInatIon (as In TItIan's maIn aItar oI S. MarIa deI IrarI). The expressIve eIIect
oI the composItIon In those cases depends not onIy on the reIatIve sharpness oI the angIe
the two sIdes oI the trIangIe make, but more crucIaIIy on the dIrectIon we attrIbute to
IInes, and thIs depends In turn on our recognItIon oI the represented bodIes, theIr
postures, and theIr movements. SImIIarIy, the expressIve character oI CaravaggIo's
IavorIte composItIon oI a dIagonaIIy dIvIded vertIcaI rectangIe Is vastIy dIIIerent dependIng
on whether the represented subject Is the Crucijixion oj St. Feter (In S. MarIa deI
IopoIo), where the raIsIng oI the heavy, dIagonaIIy pIaced cross wIth Its vIctIm Is
expressIve oI the IaborIous upward movement oI the recaIcItrant matter (perhaps to be
spIrItuaIIy compIeted by the reward awaItIng the martyred apostIe In heaven), or the
Deposition (at the VatIcan IInacoteca), where the movement Is downward, weIghted by
the dead body oI the CrucIIIed, or yet the Mcdonnc oj the Filgrims (In S. AgostIno),
where the movement goes both ways, up and down, wIth the dIagonaI IInes Iormed by
the represented bodIes, the exchanged gIances, and especIaIIy the IIght IaIIIng Irom the
upper-IeIt corner weavIng an umbIIIcaI cord that IInks the humbIe pIIgrIms wIth the object
oI theIr adoratIon, and, recIprocaIIy, the IovIng Mother oI God wIth humanIty. Thus, In
paIntIng, we have to recognIze the represented object (recognIze It as a human body,
say, though not necessarIIy as the body oI a specIIIc person or character, oI course)
beIore we can read the composItIon, and hence aIso be moved by It, correctIy. {p.38)
ThIs, agaIn, Is the reverse oI the reIatIonshIp between the cognItIve component
(recognIzIng) and the component oI sensatIon (experIencIng) In hearIng musIc.
That In representatIonaI paIntIng not onIy the expressIve character oI a composItIon but
on occasIon even Its very IormaI shape cannot be read IuIIy and correctIy unIess the
represented worId has been recognIzed Is suggested wIth great Iorce by those cases
where the desIgn Is partIcuIarIy compIex. Take that mannerIst masterpIece, Iontormo's
Deposition at the aItar oI the CapponI chapeI In S. IeIIcIta In IIorence, a work that
manages a Ieat oI great dIIIIcuIty and rarIty In art, the combInIng oI utmost reIInement and
artIIIcIaIIty oI desIgn, coIor, and IIght wIth a proIound expressIon oI the emotIon
approprIate to the subject-grIeI. The arrangement oI the IIgures suspends terrestrIaI
Page 24 of 54
Iaws (as Is proper In a depIctIon oI a drama whose unIversaI sIgnIIIcance transcends Its
partIcuIar hIstorIcaI and geographIcaI IocatIon), sInce most bodIes seem to IIoat In the aIr
Instead oI restIng IIrmIy on the ground ("as II a bunch oI IIgures hoverIng In the aIr more
than restIng on the ground," In the IeIIcItous phrase oI a popuIar guIde-book).
41
ven the
makIng oI the sImIIe oI a bunch oI grapes requIres that the ImagInary IIgures In the
ImagInary space be recognIzed. The need to concentrate on the represented worId as
weII as on the abstract arrangement oI IInes and coIors becomes consIderabIy more
pressIng II we want to go beyond that sImpIe sImIIe and read the composItIon In more
detaII and wIth greater precIsIon. The unusuaIIy compIex desIgn becomes IegIbIe when we
recognIze that the human IIgures are arranged to Iorm two vertIcaI bows that meet at
both ends, creatIng together the shape oI an aImond, the rIght-hand bow centered on the
body oI Mary, the IeIt-hand one on that oI jesus. We can then go on to notIce the
correspondence oI the two centraI IIgures, the way theIr arms and hands, theIr necks
and heads, and IInaIIy theIr bodIes, one IaIntIng, the other dead, echo one another-a
juxtaposItIon around whIch everythIng eIse revoIves. AII oI these compIex and subtIe
correspondences, juxtaposItIons, and echoes are centraIIy Important Ior the composItIon
oI the work, they cre Its composItIon. the IInes oI the pIctorIaI work acquIre theIr
dIrectIon, and the coIors theIr comparatIve weIght, Irom the IIgures they happen to
artIcuIate. The composItIon Is IuIIy IegIbIe wIthout our havIng to IdentIIy the IIgures as
Mary, jesus, Mary MagdaIen, john, and the rest. AII we need to do Is to go beyond the
reaI patches oI coIor toward the ImagInary represented worId. ut, oI course, a Iurther
IdentIIIcatIon oI the IIgures as the actors In the cosmIc drama oI the eposItIon endows
the composItIon wIth added sIgnIIIcance, sInce wIthout thIs knowIedge the
correspondence between the suIIerIng oI the Son and the grIevIng oI the Mother Is
devoId oI meanIng, or at Ieast puzzIIng.
n short, expIaIn the greater power oI musIc's Impact on us In part by the Iact that the
eIIects oI the most Important components oI the auraI medIum, the eIIects oI tonaIIty and
meter as weII as oI rhythm and tempo, are experIenced dIrectIy, wIthout the medIatIon oI
cognItIon (In part, sInce more wIII be saId on the subject oI musIc's power beIow). n
representatIonaI paIntIng (whether IIguratIve or abstract), by contrast, recognItIon Is the
precondItIon oI experIence, wIth {p.39) regard to the Impact oI both the represented
worId and the composItIon. (t probabIy goes wIthout sayIng that the comparIson Is
oIIered In a pureIy descrIptIve, neutraI spIrIt. those who exaIt cognItIon over other mentaI
actIvItIes wIII ascrIbe greater dIgnIty to vIsuaI medIa, whIIe those Ior whom sensatIon and
other noncognItIve mentaI actIvItIes deIIne humanIty more centraIIy wIII prIvIIege musIc.
There Is not much poInt In such InvIdIous comparIsons and contests, unIess we derIve
satIsIactIon Irom puttIng some mentaI actIvItIes-or some categorIes oI peopIe supposedIy
partIcuIarIy generousIy endowed wIth them-down.) n onIy one area Is the Impact oI
both the vIsuaI and auraI medIa sImIIarIy dIrect. The actuaI matter oI a vIsuaI or auraI
work, the matter abstracted Irom the way It has been Iormed by specIIIc spatIaI or
temporaI reIatIons, that Is, the coIor and texture oI stone or paInt (what sIxteenth-century
taIIan theorIsts used to caII the colorito, as opposed to the disegno), the tImbre and
dynamIcs oI sounds, are the object oI dIrect sensatIon, wIthout any medIatIng cognItIve
actIvItIes.
Page 25 of 54
d. Language
t mIght seem at IIrst gIance that Ianguage, IIke musIc, Is an auraI medIum. ThIs, however,
Is not quIte the case. !nIque among medIa, Ianguage may be embodIed In eIther audIbIe
or vIsIbIe materIaI.
The temptatIon to compare musIc wIth Ianguage Is very dIIIIcuIt to resIst not onIy because
among the arts IIterature has had, sInce ancIent tImes, the most hIghIy deveIoped
composItIonaI and crItIcaI theory (paradIgmatIcaIIy so In ArIstotIe's Foetics and Rhetoric),
and not onIy because untII IaIrIy recentIy musIc was symbIotIcaIIy IInked wIth Ianguage In
practIce (InstrumentaI genres IuIIy emerged as equaI In aesthetIc rank to those oI vocaI
musIc onIy In the eIghteenth century), but aIso-and perhaps prImarIIy-because the two
medIa seem at IIrst gIance to be sImIIarIy embodIed In sound. t Is, however, necessary to
observe how dIIIerent the sIgnIIIcance oI sound Is In Ianguage and In musIc.
The dIIIerence comes out most cIearIy when we reIIect on the roIe oI wrItten notatIon, oI
what we shaII caII the "text," In both medIa. n Ianguage and In musIc an InscrIptIon mIght
be understood as a set oI vIsuaIIy IIxed InstructIons Ior producIng specIIIc sounds. ut In
Ianguage an understandIng oI a wrItten notatIon can bypass the medIatIon oI sound. n
other words, Ianguage can be adequateIy embodIed not onIy auraIIy, but aIso vIsuaIIy. I
we know the Ianguage and can read It, we shaII understand the meanIng oI a wrItten
sentence In It, whether or not we bother to voIce It or to ImagIne how It sounds. We shaII
understand It even when the Ianguage Is Iong dead and we have no Idea whatsoever oI
how It was pronounced when It was spoken. saIah erIIn recaIIs how Anna Akhmatova
recIted Ior hIm two cantos Irom yron's Don ]ucn durIng theIr meetIng In 1945 In
IenIngrad.
|A|Ithough she read ngIIsh, her pronouncIatIon oI It made It ImpossIbIe to
understand more than a word or two. . . . Ierhaps, thought aIterwards, that Is
how we now read cIassIcaI Greek and IatIn, yet we, too, are moved by the {p.40)
words, whIch, as we pronounce them, mIght be whoIIy unInteIIIgIbIe to theIr
authors and audIences.
42
othIng oI thIs sort wouId be possIbIe In the case oI tonaI (as opposed to atonaI and
serIaI) musIc. n tonaI musIc an understandIng oI a wrItten notatIon cannot bypass the
eIIort to produce the sounds It Instructs us to make eIther In reaIIty or In ImagInatIon. n
other words, tonaI musIc's onIy adequate embodIment Is sound. The Idea that we mIght
resurrect a dead musIcaI repertory wIthout beIng abIe to know, at Ieast approxImateIy,
how It sounded Is absurd, as Is the Idea that we mIght deveIop a musIcaI sIgn Ianguage Ior
those deaI sInce bIrth (sIgn Ianguages oI the deaI are Independent vIsuaIIy transmItted
Ianguages, oI course, not vIsuaI representatIons oI auraI Ianguages such as ngIIsh or
Irench, as some mIght ImagIne). MusIcaI understandIng, unIIke IInguIstIc understandIng,
Is InescapabIy tIed to the one materIaI, sound, In whIch musIc Is embodIed. n thIs respect,
agaIn, musIc resembIes paIntIng (the understandIng oI whIch aIso cannot be dIvorced
Irom reaI or ImagIned perceptIon oI the materIaI In whIch It Is embodIed) more than
Ianguage.
Page 26 of 54
The reIatIve IndIIIerence oI Ianguage to the specIIIc materIaI In whIch It Is embodIed must
sureIy be IInked to Its reIerentIaIIty. Words, whether spoken or wrItten, reIer to
concepts. I we understand the Ianguage, we get that to whIch a sentence reIers
regardIess oI whether the sentence Is embodIed In sound or In Ink. ConverseIy, the Iack
oI reIerence makes thIs Independence Irom a specIIIc materIaI ImpossIbIe In musIc (as weII
as In vIsuaI medIa). The auraI materIaIs oI musIc, as weII as the vIsuaI materIaIs oI paIntIng,
do not normaIIy reIer to concepts. To be sure, the ImagInary objects they represent may
be brought under concepts, just as any reaI object may, but thIs "beIng brought under a
concept" Is not the same as "reIerrIng to a concept." A generaI concept brIngs together
("grasps") a great number oI partIcuIar objects, whether reaI or ImagIned (we shaII caII
such ImagIned partIcuIar objects "Images"). When a word reIers to a generaI concept,
these partIcuIar objects remaIn unspecIIIed and aII we get Is the concept (whIch we may
cash ImagInatIveIy In a number oI ways by brIngIng a number oI Images under It). ut
when a partIcuIar object, reaI or ImagIned, Is brought under a concept, we get both the
concept and the object. I It Is the case that a musIcaI "voIce" or a paInted "personage"
(the terms wIII be dIscussed at Iength In chapter 4) may be brought under concepts but
do not reIer to concepts, present nothIng but themseIves, the specIIIc materIaI In whIch
they are embodIed matters crucIaIIy, sInce they have no exIstence outsIde oI theIr
embodIment.
n IegeI's aesthetIcs, Ianguage's Independence Irom a specIIIc materIaI Is the reason why
"poetry" (IIterature) Is the "most spIrItuaI" oI the arts.
Yet thIs sensuous eIement, whIch In musIc was stIII ImmedIateIy one wIth
Inwardness, Is here |In poetry| cut Iree Irom the content oI conscIousness, whIIe
spIrIt determInes thIs content on Its own account and In ItseII and makes It Into
Ideas. To express these It uses sound Indeed, but onIy as a sIgn In ItseII wIthout
vaIue or content. The sound, thereIore, may just as weII be a mere {p.41) Ietter,
sInce the audIbIe, IIke the vIsIbIe, has sunk Into beIng a mere IndIcatIon oI spIrIt. . . .
Ioetry Is the unIversaI art oI the spIrIt whIch has become Iree In ItseII and whIch Is
not tIed down Ior Its reaIIzatIon to externaI sensuous materIaI.
43
To be sure, IegeI's cIaIm Is somewhat dIIIerent Irom mIne. Ior hIm, the materIaI oI
IIterature Is neIther sound nor Ink, but the ImagInatIon ItseII. n IIterature the ImagIned
takes the roIe oI marbIe In scuIpture, paInt In paIntIng, or sound In musIc.
Granted the wIthdrawaI oI the spIrItuaI content Irom sensuous materIaI, the
questIon arIses at once. What, In deIauIt oI musIcaI notes, wIII now be the proper
externaI object In the case oI poetry? We can answer quIte sImpIy. t Is the inner
ImagInatIon and IntuItIon ItseII. t Is spiritucl Iorms whIch take the pIace oI
perceptIbIIIty and provIde the materIaI to be gIven shape, just as marbIe, bronze,
coIour, and musIcaI notes were the materIaI earIIer on.
44
n short, poetry's "proper materIaI Is the ImagInatIon ItseII."
45
IegeI's concIusIon Is
conIusIng and unIortunate. The ImagInary pIays no Iess centraI a roIe In the constItutIon oI
a musIcaI or paInterIy worId than It does In the constItutIon oI the IIterary worId. n
Page 27 of 54
IIterature, no Iess than In musIc and paIntIng, the aesthetIc object, the worId, Is
constructed when the ImagInatIve conscIousness gets InvoIved wIth the reaI, materIaI
object, the work.
46
To be sure, the IInguIstIc work can be ImagIned rather than reaI.
when we thInk rather than communIcate wIth others, we do not need to use reaI auraI or
vIsuaI sIgns, we can ImagIne them Instead. (n IIato's ceIebrated Image, "what we caII
thInkIng Is, precIseIy, the Inward dIaIogue carrIed on by the mInd wIth ItseII wIthout
spoken sound."
47
) ut there Is no essentIaI dIIIerence here Irom musIc and vIsuaI
medIa. n those, too, the work can be ImagIned and need not be turned Into a reaI object
II we are not Interested In communIcatIng. !nIess we are prepared to beIIeve that IegeI
antIcIpated those contemporary IInguIsts accordIng to whom we thInk not In naturaI
Ianguages but In a sIIent Ianguage oI thought, a "mentaIese,"
48
the source oI the
phIIosopher's cIaIm that Ianguage's "proper materIaI Is the ImagInatIon ItseII" Is perhaps
the Iact that, whIIe musIcaI or paInterIy worIds consIst oI auraI and vIsuaI Images, ImagIned
objects, a IInguIstIc worId consIsts oI concepts whIch may be ImagInatIveIy cashed. ut
these concepts are components oI the IInguIstIc worId, not work. Whereas paInterIy and
musIcaI worIds are sensuous, IInguIstIc worIds are conceptuaI.
Whatever the source oI the conIusIon, the materIaI oI Ianguage Is not the ImagInatIon, but
sound or Ink. ut thIs "or" Iocuses an Important kerneI oI truth In IegeI's argument and
aIIows us to reIIne Iurther our thesIs oI Ianguage's Independence Irom the specIIIc
materIaI. What matters here Is not sImpIy that Ianguage maIntaIns a certaIn degree oI
Independence Irom the materIaI In whIch It Is embodIed, sInce a certaIn degree oI such
Independence can aIso be cIaImed Ior musIc and even Ior paIntIng. ach tIme a pIece oI
musIc Is reaIIzed In an actuaI perIormance Its materIaI embodIment Is new and dIIIerent,
to say nothIng {p.42) oI such common phenomena oI musIcaI practIce as the use oI
dIIIerIng pItch standards, the transposItIon oI a pIece to a dIIIerent pItch aItogether, or Its
transcrIptIon to a dIIIerent vocaI or InstrumentaI medIum. And even In the case oI
paIntIng, where the actuaI embodIment oI the work Is truIy unIque, we have to reckon
wIth such phenomena as copyIng, reproductIon, and transposItIon to a dIIIerent medIum
(Irom oII paIntIng, say, to copper engravIng). What Is unIque In the case oI Ianguage,
however, Is Its abIIIty to get embodIed In eIther auraI or vIsuaI materIaI, Its Independence
Irom the specIIIc sense modaIIty Its materIaI addresses.
t must be noted though, that thIs apparent Independence comes at a steep prIce. t Is,
nameIy, the more compIete, the more we suppress the nonreIerentIaI aspect oI Ianguage.
n Iact, however, there Is more to Ianguage than Its reIerrIng IunctIon. When speak
about anythIng, my speech presents (reIers to) thIs somethIng, but It does more than
that. It aIso presents myseII, reveaIs somethIng (however IIttIe or much) about the
speaker, my Interests, prIorItIes, prejudIces, temperament, mood. nvarIabIy, more Is
saId In Ianguage than what It reIers to. Any actuaI use oI Ianguage InvoIves not onIy
rejerence, but aIso the selj-presentction oI the speakIng subject. ow It Is precIseIy thIs
IunctIon oI seII-presentatIon that gets suppressed when we thInk oI Ianguage as
compIeteIy Independent Irom the specIIIc materIaI, auraI or vIsuaI, In whIch It Is embodIed.
Ior the reIerentIaI IunctIon, the actuaI embodIment oI the sIgn(IIIer) may not matter. Ior
the seII-presentIng IunctIon, a transIatIon Irom one embodIment Into another aIways
Page 28 of 54
matters and sometImes It may be IataI (that Is, ImpossIbIe). The bIg dIIIerence between
Ianguage, on the one hand, and paIntIng and musIc, on the other, Is that whIIe the Iormer
can, In some (nonartIstIc) uses, be reduced aImost compIeteIy to reIerence, the Iatter
cannot, because they (unIIke, say, the vIsuaI and auraI traIIIc sIgns) do not have the
reIerentIaI IunctIon, they are nothIng but seII-presentatIon. MusIc is what wouId get
reduced In such cases, what gets Iost In transIatIon. And whIIe we can get away wIth
dIsregardIng the seII-presentIng IunctIon oI Ianguage In some oI Its uses, In scIence, Ior
Instance, we certaInIy cannot aIIord It when Ianguage becomes an artIstIc medIum. Iere
the dIIIerence between Ianguage In generaI and IIterature In partIcuIar (the dIIIerence
IegeI Ignored In the passage quoted above to the detrIment oI hIs argument) becomes
reIevant.
n Oj Grcmmctology, jacques errIda argues agaInst the assumptIon that there Is such a
thIng as a sIgnIIIed that escapes "the pIay oI sIgnIIyIng reIerences that constItute
Ianguage."
49
n the InIInIte chaIn oI reIerences, every sIgnIIIed turns out to be yet
another sIgnIIIer, wIth no IInaI, "transcendentaI," sIgnIIIed at the end. The sIgnIIIed,
errIda stresses In hIs de Saussurean-cum-IeIdeggerIan IdIom, "Is clwcys clrecdy in the
position oj the signijier."
50
The assumptIon that the transcendentaI sIgnIIIed Is possIbIe
IIes, Ior errIda, at the root oI what he caIIs the "Western IogocentrIsm" (or
"phonocentrIsm") whIch maIntaIns that "the voIce Is cIosest to the sIgnIIIed, whether It Is
determIned strIctIy as sense (thought or IIved) or more IooseIy as thIng" and that the
wrItten sIgnIIIer Is derIvatIve.
51
{p.43) IogocentrIsm, In turn, supports "the hIstorIcaI
determInatIon oI the meanIng oI beIng In generaI as presence,"
52
what errIda caIIs the
"metaphysIcs oI presence." "The IormaI essence oI the sIgnIIIed |In the Western tradItIon|
Is presence, and the prIvIIege oI Its proxImIty to the Iogos as phon |voIce| Is the prIvIIege
oI presence."
53
n short, II there Is no transcendentaI sIgnIIIed at the end oI the chaIn oI
reIerences, or-to put It Into another IdIom-II no meanIng can appear unmedIated and
dIsembodIed (and errIda wouId sureIy be rIght, though hardIy orIgInaI, to stress thIs
poInt), there Is no reason to prIvIIege one kInd oI sIgnIIIer (medIum, embodIment) over
another, to beIIeve that "IIvIng voIce" Is cIoser to the meanIng oI what Is saId than "dead
wrItIng" (because one assumes, say, that the Iormer captures the "spIrIt" oI what Is saId,
whIIe the Iatter onIy IIxes Its "Ietter").
The argument Is persuasIve, but one has to recognIze that It crucIaIIy depends on the
prIor assumptIon that Ianguage Is nothIng but "the pIay oI sIgnIIyIng reIerences," on
dIsregardIng that sIde oI Ianguage whIch InvoIves the seII-presentatIon oI the speakIng (or
wrItIng, or thInkIng) subject, the sIde that errIda, Iar Irom "deconstructIng," mereIy
suppresses. One mIght aIso say that the argument depends on takIng as one's modeI
scIentIIIc rather than artIstIc uses oI Ianguage (and, Indeed, the wrItten symboIIsm oI
mathematIcs pIays the roIe oI a prIvIIeged exampIe In Oj Grcmmctology). ut once we gIve
up thIs one-sIded and reductIve pIcture oI Ianguage, once we recognIze the sIde oI seII-
presentatIon, we cannot keep dIsregardIng-as we have seen-the specIIIc medIum In
whIch an utterance Is embodIed, we cannot assume that It mIght be transIated wIth
compIete ImpunIty. ThIs rIcher pIcture oI Ianguage does not commIt us to assumIng In
advance that sound Is aIways and everywhere prIor to Ink, or hand-wrItIng prIor to
Page 29 of 54
typewrItIng or -settIng, aIthough It Is In generaI the case that the voIce presents the
Ianguage-usIng subject more rIchIy than wrItIng. (As Iousseau observed, by and Iarge
wrItIng aIters Ianguage, "substItutIng exactItude Ior expressIveness. IeeIIngs are
expressed In speakIng, Ideas In wrItIng. n wrItIng, one Is Iorced to use the words
accordIng to theIr conventIonaI meanIng. ut In speakIng, one varIes the meanIngs by
varyIng one's tone oI voIce."
54
) t mereIy asks oI us to take the orIgInaI embodIment oI
the utterance serIousIy and to keep In mInd that a transIatIon to a dIIIerent medIum may
make a dIIIerence. And neIther does thIs rIcher pIcture oI Ianguage commIt us to any
"metaphysIcs oI presence," IncIudIng the earIy modern CartesIan metaphysIcs oI the
unmedIated seII-transparency oI the subject. t certaInIy can (and perhaps even must)
coexIst perIectIy wIth the beIIeI that there Is no such thIng as an unmedIated,
dIsembodIed meanIng. To pay attentIon to the seII-presentatIon oI the speakIng (wrItIng,
thInkIng) subject InvoIves no specIIIc metaphysIcaI commItments.
n short, my cIaIm Is that Ianguage, unIque among the medIa, can be embodIed In eIther
vIsuaI or auraI materIaI, though, pcce IegeI, and sImIIarIy to other medIa, It must be
embodIed somehow, and, pcce errIda, Its specIIIc embodIment matters II Ianguage's
IunctIon oI the seII-presentatIon oI the Ianguage user, the IunctIon Ianguage shares wIth
other medIa, Is not to be entIreIy suppressed {p.44) In Iavor oI Ianguage's reIerentIaI
IunctIon, the IunctIon whIch Is unIque to It. t Is a coroIIary oI thIs cIaIm that whereas In
tonaI musIc the auraI work Is necessary and prImary whIIe the wrItten text Is optIonaI and
derIved, In Ianguage eIther the auraI work or the wrItten text can take the necessary-
prImary or optIonaI-derIved posItIon. To put It more precIseIy, In Ianguage, the necessary
and prImary work as weII as the optIonaI and derIved text that represents the work may
be eIther auraI or wrItten. Thus, whIIe ArIstotIe couId pIausIbIy argue that, oI the sIx
"parts" or components oI tragedy, the "spectacIe," or stagIng and enactIng, Is the Ieast
Important one, an InessentIaI "pIeasurabIe accessory,"
55
no such cIaIm couId pIausIbIy be
made about tonaI musIc, where perIormance (whether actuaI or ImagInary) Is oI the
essence.
Ianguage dIIIers Irom other medIa radIcaIIy not onIy In the character oI Its embodIment,
but aIso In the nature oI Its code. n Ianguage, unIIke In other medIa, work and worId can
be In a dIIIerent sense-modaIIty, that Is, an auraI work, say, can reIer to a worId that Is not
auraI. ut, II the work Is In a dIIIerent sense-modaIIty than the worId, the Iormer cannot
resembIe more or Iess cIoseIy the Iatter. t sImpIy cannot resembIe the Iatter at aII. Thus,
In spIte oI such margInaI phenomena as onomatopoeIa, IInguIstIc codes by and Iarge are
unIIormIy abstract, or, to put It Into de Saussure's terms, they are "arbItrary." The Iatter
term Is better chosen, because II a work cannot resembIe a worId more or Iess cIoseIy, It
makes IIttIe sense to taIk oI "abstractIon" (abstractIon Irom what?). ConsIder the
dIIIerence between a compIeteIy abstract vIsuaI work and a compIeteIy arbItrary IInguIstIc
one. the Iormer Is nothIng but a reaI object, It does not represent anythIng eIse, but caIIs
IuII attentIon to ItseII, the Iatter, however, Is a reaI object that Iocuses IuII attentIon on
somethIng other than ItseII, nameIy, on the meanIng to whIch It reIers.
ThIs brIngs us to the IundamentaI dIIIerence between the constItutIon oI the vIsuaI and
Page 30 of 54
musIcaI works, on the one hand, and the IInguIstIc ones, on the other. German thInkers oI
the tIme oI Goethe made current a useIuI dIstInctIon between sIgn and symboI. IegeI
presents It as IoIIows.
The sIgn Is some ImmedIate IntuItIon, representIng a totaIIy dIIIerent Import Irom
what naturaIIy beIongs to It. . . . The sign Is dIIIerent Irom the symbol: Ior In the
symboI the orIgInaI characters (In essence and conceptIon) oI the vIsIbIe object are
more or Iess IdentIcaI wIth the Import whIch It bears as symboI, whereas In the
sIgn, strIctIy so-caIIed, the naturaI attrIbutes oI the IntuItIon, and the connotatIon oI
whIch It Is a sIgn, have nothIng to do wIth each other.
56
The dIstInctIon between sIgn and symboI turns on the reIatIonshIp between the sIgnIIIer
and the sIgnIIIed, arbItrary In the Iormer case, based on resembIance In the Iatter.
wouId IIke to adapt the dIstInctIon and cIaIm that onIy the IInguIstIc work consIsts oI sIgns,
other kInds oI works consIst oI symboIs. As Iong as we consIder excIusIveIy the reIerentIaI
IunctIon oI Ianguage, the specIIIc materIaI used to make a IInguIstIc work does not matter.
we may agree to use any reaI object to reIer to a mentaI content (the arbItrarIness oI
sIgn). t Is not so wIth {p.45) nonIInguIstIc medIa, In whIch a reaI object, In so Iar as It Is
to represent mentaI content, must resembIe thIs content to a certaIn extent (the
nonarbItrarIness oI symboI). ote, however, that the IInguIstIc work can be saId to consIst
oI sIgns onIy II we excIusIveIy consIder the reIerentIaI IunctIon oI Ianguage. As soon as we
recaII that Ianguage aIso has Its other, seII-presentIng, IunctIon, the IInguIstIc work wIII
have to be seen as consIstIng aIso oI symboIs, just as other kInds oI works do. My tone oI
voIce, or my handwrItIng, can suggest that am angry onIy II they resembIe the sounds
and gestures an angry man usuaIIy makes.
One Important way In whIch sIgns dIIIer Irom symboIs Is that the Iormer are InIInIteIy
transIatabIe Into-that Is, repIaceabIe by-other sIgns. A symboI's capacIty to be
transIated Into, repIaced by, another symboI Is severeIy IImIted. t Is precIseIy because
the sIgn Is arbItrary that It Is so IIexIbIe In thIs respect. SInce the worId oI a vIsuaI (or
auraI) work Is aIso vIsuaI (or auraI), and sInce the work must resembIe to a certaIn extent
the worId It represents, a symboI can be repIaced by another onIy II the Iatter resembIes
the Iormer and addresses the same sense as the Iormer dId. The ngIIsh word "cross"
can be repIaced by a word havIng the same meanIng In any Ianguage, spoken or wrItten,
a scuIpted or paInted cross on a church waII can be repIaced onIy by another scuIpted or
paInted cross.
CIoseIy reIated to the Iact that onIy IInguIstIc work consIsts oI sIgns, and that onIy sIgns
are InIInIteIy transIatabIe, Is another, nameIy, that, whIIe there are many Ianguages, aII
transIatabIe Into one another, It wouId be mIsIeadIng to taIk, even metaphorIcaIIy, oI
dIIIerent mutuaIIy transIatabIe Ianguages oI paIntIng or musIc. To be sure, we have
aIready seen that It Is possIbIe to present the worId oI a paIntIng by means oI an
engravIng, or to pIay a musIcaI work on a dIIIerent Instrument. ut transcrIptIon Is hardIy
transIatIon. n aII cases oI transcrIptIon, vIsuaI or musIcaI, the sImIIarIty between the
orIgInaI and the transcrIbed work remaIns very great and anyone who knows how to
decode the orIgInaI wIII aIso be abIe to decode the transcrIptIon. y contrast, when the
Page 31 of 54
same worId Is presented In dIIIerent Ianguages, the orIgInaI and the transIated work
usuaIIy dIIIer to such a great extent that onIy those who understand both Ianguages can
recognIze that the two works are reIated. n other words, what Is essentIaI about
Ianguage, and where It dIIIers IundamentaIIy Irom the vIsuaI medIa and musIc, Is that
there are many Ianguages and that they are transIatabIe Into one another. ThIs Is another
IndIcatIon or consequence (together wIth the Iact that the IInguIstIc work can be eIther
auraI or vIsuaI) oI the arbItrarIness oI the IInguIstIc sIgn.
ote, moreover, that there Is a dIIIerence between the correct cIaIm that sIgns are
InIInIteIy transIatabIe, and errIda's exaggerated cIaIm that "the pIay oI sIgnIIyIng
reIerences that constItute Ianguage" must never end, that the chaIn oI reIerences must
aIways go on Iorever. A (reaI) sIgn(IIIer) reIers to somethIng mentaI, to a sIgnIIIed, and thIs
mcy be another (ImagIned) sIgn(IIIer), just may, but does not have to. The sIgnIIIed,
Instead oI beIng another sIgnIIIer, can aIso be an Image (In any sense-modaIIty), an
ImagIned experIence oI sIght, hearIng, {p.46) smeII, taste, or touch. ow, an Image has
the character oI a symboI rather than that oI a sIgn, that Is, It Is not InIInIteIy transIatabIe.
ThereIore, the chaIn oI reIerences does not have to be InIInIte. It can go on Iorever, but It
may aIso be arrested at an Image. SImIIarIy, what stands at the begInnIng oI a chaIn oI
reIerence may, but does not have to, be a sIgn. t may just as weII be a reaI or ImagInary
experIence, and thIs Is sureIy hors-texte.
So much Ior the constItutIon oI the IInguIstIc work and the character oI the IInguIstIc code.
What remaIns to be dIscussed Is the content oI the worId that may be represented In
Ianguage as compared to what may be represented by means oI the vIsuaI medIa and
musIc. t shouId be obvIous by now that the worId representabIe by IInguIstIc means Is
InIInIteIy rIcher. n vIsuaI medIa or musIc, not onIy the work, but aIso the worId that thIs
work to a certaIn extent resembIes must be vIsuaI or auraI. A paIntIng or scuIpture
cannot represent InvIsIbIe thIngs, aIthough It can represent vIsuaI objects that wIII
suggest them, as CaravaggIo does when he IIIIs hIs The Rest During the Flight into Egypt
(at the orIa IamphIII GaIIery In Iome) wIth sound by havIng an angeI pIay vIoIIn Irom the
musIc heId by St. joseph whIIe Mary and her chIId are sIeepIng, or as ernInI does when
he IIIIs the Iace oI St. Theresa oI AvIIa (Iome, Santa MarIa deIIa VIctorIa) wIth symptoms oI
paIn and deIIght oI ecstasy. Thanks to the arbItrarIness oI the IInguIstIc sIgn, the IInguIstIc
worId knows no such IImItatIons. the experIence In any sense modaIIty can be
represented In Ianguage. (We have observed thIs aIready when comparIng the
representatIonaI powers oI scuIpture and paIntIng. the more abstract the work, the more
rIchIy reaIIstIc the worId.) There Is no sensuous experIence, and no accompanyIng
pIeasure or paIn, that couId not be taIked about.
ut the abIIIty to represent sensuous experIence as weII as pIeasure and paIn does not
exhaust Ianguage's representatIonaI powers. We can use Ianguage aIso to represent our
desIre Ior, or revuIsIon Irom, the object oI our sensuous experIence. have suggested
that whIIe vIsuaI medIa are the Instruments oI knowIng the object oI desIre but not the
desIre ItseII, tonaI musIc Is the Instrument oI knowIng the desIre but not Its object.
Ianguage transcends these IImItatIons and aIIows us to represent both the externaI
Page 32 of 54
object oI desIre (and not onIy Its vIsuaI aspect) and the InternaI desIre ItseII.
ut even thIs does not exhaust Ianguage's powers. n addItIon to beIng abIe to do
sIngIehandedIy what vIsuaI medIa and musIc do separateIy, Ianguage enabIes us to do
aIso somethIng that It Is ImpossIbIe to do In any other medIum. It aIIows us to represent
thInkIng, deIIberatIng, arguIng. t possesses not onIy representatIonaI, but aIso IogIcaI
powers. Thanks to Ianguage we can not onIy represent the objects oI our desIre as weII
as the desIre ItseII, but we can aIso represent thInkIng about our aIms and means,
deIIberatIng on the questIons oI whether our desIre Is justIIIed and how can It be
reaIIzed. As ArIstotIe put It, "mere voIce Is but an IndIcatIon oI pIeasure or paIn, and Is
thereIore Iound In other anImaIs . . . , but speech Is Intended to set Iorth the expedIent
and InexpedIent, and thereIore IIkewIse the just and the unjust."
57
{p.47) We are IundamentaIIy creatures that know the externaI objects In our
envIronment, desIre these objects InternaIIy, and thInk about the justIIIcatIon and
reaIIzatIon oI the desIres. Thus there seems to be nothIng that Is compIeteIy beyond the
representatIonaI powers oI Ianguage. The ceIebrated sentence that cIoses WIttgensteIn's
Trcctctus ("What we cannot speak about we must pass over In sIIence"
58
) Is puzzIIng.
Iow wouId we ever know that there Is somethIng oI whIch we cannot speak? (WhIch Is
not to deny that there are many thIngs, the quclic oI an experIence, whIch Ianguage
cannot capture wIth any precIsIon, whIch can be onIy "poInted to" rather than IuIIy
"saId.") ArIstotIe Is more IIkeIy to be rIght on thIs poInt when he says that "everythIng Is a
possIbIe object oI thought."
59
Gadamer observes that "the possIbIIItIes oI our knowIedge
seem to be Iar more IndIvIduaI than the possIbIIItIes oI expressIon oIIered by Ianguage."
ut In Iact "aII such crItIcIsm whIch rIses above the schematIsm oI our statements In
order to understand agaIn IInds Its expressIon In Ianguage. Ience Ianguage aIways
IorestaIIs any objectIon to Its jurIsdIctIon. ts unIversaIIty keeps pace wIth the unIversaIIty
oI reason."
60
have just made the cIaIm that Ianguage Is a medIum Ior representIng Images that
address any sense modaIIty, that Is, one whIch, aIone, aIIows us to do everythIng that, and
more than, we do, separateIy, wIth vIsuaI and auraI medIa. by means oI Ianguage, we can
represent any externaI object, the pIeasure or paIn It causes us, and our desIre Ior, or
revuIsIon Irom, It. have aIso cIaImed that, In addItIon, Ianguage Is the medIum Ior
representIng concepts and IogIcaI reIatIonshIps, that Is, the medIum Ior representIng
argumentatIve thInkIng that onIy Ianguage can represent. Ianguage aIIows us pubIIcIy to
deIIberate on such questIons as whIch objects oI desIre we shouId pursue and by whIch
means. ut II Ianguage Is so unIversaIIy versatIIe that It can serve to represent anythIng
that can be represented by means oI vIsuaI medIa and musIc, do we need the more
IImIted nonIInguIstIc medIa at aII?
We do, because In a crucIaIIy Important respect they perIorm theIr task better than
Ianguage. Thanks to the arbItrarIness oI the IInguIstIc sIgn, as opposed to the nonarbItrary
character oI the vIsuaI or musIcaI symboI, the actuaI sensuous quaIItIes oI the sIgn pIay an
IncomparabIy Iesser roIe In conveyIng Its meanIng than they do In the case oI the symboI.
The sIgn Is expected to dIsappear aImost wIthout a trace Into Its meanIng, Into the concept.
Page 33 of 54
And the concept ItseII, even when It Is the concept oI a perceptIbIe object, does not need
to be transIated Iurther Into any specIIIc Image. we can grasp the concept oI "tabIe" and
Iearn to use the word that conveys It, wIthout havIng to ImagIne any specIIIc tabIe, wIthout
havIng to ImagIne anythIng at aII. ven when we decIde to produce an Image, to vIsuaIIze
the content conveyed by the sIgn, the Image can vary greatIy as to the amount and
dIstInctness oI Its detaIIs, and usuaIIy IaIIs In both these respects Iar short oI the content
conveyed by the vIsuaI or auraI symboI. Three Iacts, then, have to be kept In mInd here.
that the sensuous quaIItIes oI the IInguIstIc sIgn are reIatIveIy InsIgnIIIcant, that the
movement Irom the sIgn to the concept does not need to proceed Iurther to the Image,
and that even when It {p.48) does, the Image wIII normaIIy be reIatIveIy vague and
IndIstInct. y contrast, In the InterpretatIon oI the symboI, Its sensuous quaIItIes remaIn oI
paramount Importance (because oI the necessary resembIance between the symboI and
Its meanIng), the meanIng cannot be pureIy conceptuaI, but rather must necessarIIy have
the Iorm oI an Image (whether vIsuaI or auraI), and the Image wIII normaIIy be reIatIveIy
much more precIse, detaIIed, and dIstInct than In the case oI the Image produced by the
IInguIstIc sIgn.
As a resuIt, even though It may be used to descrIbe a vIsuaI worId, Ianguage cannot
match the dIrectness and precIsIon the vIsuaI medIa brIng to thIs task. SImIIarIy, even
though It may be used to descrIbe desIre, It cannot make us experIence desIre as
dIrectIy, powerIuIIy, and pureIy (wIthout any knowIedge oI the desIred object) as musIc
can. A descrIbed worId must be ImagIned by the reader (thIs Is what Is meant by Its
reIatIve Iack oI dIrectness) and It can be ImagIned to Iook In a great varIety oI ways (thIs Is
what Is meant by the reIatIve Iack oI precIsIon In any descrIptIon). y contrast, a depIcted
worId can be seen dIrectIy In the work and, consequentIy, cannot be made to Iook
dIIIerentIy each tIme one vIews the work. Anna KarenIna Iooks somewhat dIIIerentIy to
each reader, but IaphaeI's Lc Velctc (In IaIazzo IIttI) Iooks the same to each vIewer.
SImIIarIy, a descrIbed desIre must be ImagIned by the reader, who mIght ImagIne IeeIIng
It In a great varIety oI ways. The dynamIcs oI desIre embodIed In the tonaI motIon oI musIc
Is IeIt dIrectIy when a musIcaI work Is heard and It cannot be IeIt dIIIerentIy each tIme one
hears the work.
ut we wouId not do IuII justIce to Ianguage II we IeIt our comparIson between Its
representatIonaI powers and those oI vIsuaI and auraI medIa here. There Is, nameIy, one
area where the dIrectness and precIsIon oI paIntIng or musIc Is IuIIy matched by
Ianguage. n deveIopIng the comparIson thus Iar, have consIdered onIy the reIerentIaI
sIde oI Ianguage, dIsregardIng Its seII-presentatIonaI sIde. So Iong as we Iocus on the
reIerentIaI IunctIon onIy, we may cIaIm, as dId above, that the sensuous aspects oI the
IInguIstIc sIgn are meant to dIsappear to gIve way to the concept reIerred to, and that the
movement Irom the concept to Image Is optIonaI. ut once we recaII the seII-presentatIonaI
IunctIon, the sensuous aspects oI the sIgn, the actuaI sounds, rhythms, and tempo oI the
speech, the tone oI the voIce, the Iook oI the handwrItIng, cannot be dIsregarded
compIeteIy, sInce they convey a weaIth oI InIormatIon about the speakers, about theIr
socIaI and educatIonaI background, theIr attItude to whatever It Is they are sayIng, theIr
state oI mInd, that suppIements the content oI theIr speech. t IoIIows that Ianguage can
Page 34 of 54
match the dIrectness and precIsIon oI nonIInguIstIc medIa when, and onIy when, It Is used
to represent someone's speech.
A noveIIst IaIIs Iar behInd a paInter when he descrIbes a Iandscape, but he Is equaIIy
dIrect and precIse when he represents the voIce oI the narrator or personage that
descrIbes the Iandscape. Moreover, he cannot descrIbe the Iandscape otherwIse than as
medIated by the voIce oI the narrator or personage. ( wIII have more to say on thIs
subject In chapter 4.) We wIII Iearn more about the represented Iandscape Irom the
paInter, but we wIII Iearn more about the represented {p.49) speaker who descrIbes
the Iandscape Irom the wrIter. A paInter represents the Iandscape dIrectIy, somethIng
that a wrIter cannot do, sInce hIs descrIptIon Is aIways medIated by a voIce. ut a wrIter
can represent the voIce dIrectIy. Thus, a depIctIon oI the externaI worId Is more
objectIve, whIIe a descrIptIon Is more subjectIve, aIways IIItered through the Iens oI
IndIvIduaI subjectIvIty.
n short, paIntIng gIves us the represented worId dIrectIy, Ianguage can onIy gIve us the
represented speakers dIrectIy, the rest oI the worId represented In Ianguage Is gIven us
IndIrectIy, as perceIved by the speakers. And musIc? IIke Ianguage, musIc can represent
dIrectIy onIy the seII-presentIng "voIces." (AgaIn, more wIII be saId on thIs notIon In
chapter 4.) ut, unIIke Ianguage, thIs Is aII musIc can represent. KnowIng no reIerence, It
cannot teII us what these "voIces" taIk about. ven wIthout tonaIIty and Its specIaI powers
to represent desIre, musIc can present theIr (the voIces') states oI mInd, but not theIr
IntentIonaI objects. One mIght say that musIc takes the seII-presentatIonaI sIde oI
Ianguage, dIvorces It Irom reIerence, and ampIIIIes It, deveIopIng dIIIerentIatIon, subtIety,
and controI In Its handIIng oI sound, rhythm, and tempo oI whIch poetry can onIy dream.
(ThIs seems to have been Kant's vIew oI musIc's reIatIonshIp wIth Ianguage, when he
cIaImed that musIc's "charm, whIch admIts oI such unIversaI communIcatIon, appears to
rest on the IoIIowIng Iacts. very expressIon In Ianguage has an assocIated tone suIted to
Its sense. ThIs tone IndIcates, more or Iess, a mode In whIch the speaker Is aIIected, and In
turn evokes It In the hearer. . . . The art oI tone wIeIds the IuII Iorce oI thIs Ianguage whoIIy
on Its own account, nameIy, as a Ianguage oI the aIIectIons."
61
) WhIIe paIntIng gIves us
the object wIthout the subject, musIc gIves us the subject wIthout the object. Ianguage
gIves us both, dIrectIy the speakIng subject, and IndIrectIy, through the subject's speech,
aIso the object.
ependIng on our purposes, the contrast In dIrectness and precIsIon between the
descrIptIon oI an externaI or InternaI worId In Ianguage and the embodIment oI a worId In
a vIsuaI medIum or In musIc may be taken to show Ianguage's weakness or strength. n
partIcuIar, dIrectness and precIsIon do not aIways have to be desIrabIe, and the reIatIve
representatIonaI IndetermInacy oI Ianguage may sometImes be an advantage. We have
seen that a IInguIstIc representatIon, unIIke a pIctorIaI one, say, InvItes the reader to
ImagIne the represented worId and Ieaves hIm consIderabIe Ireedom as to the specIIIc
content oI the Images produced. t Iorces the reader to be ImagInatIveIy more actIve and
creatIve than a vIewer or IIstener. y makIng the reader Into a co-creator oI the
represented worId, It InvoIves hIm ImagInatIveIy In thIs worId much more deepIy and
Page 35 of 54
personaIIy.
The reIatIve representatIonaI IndetermInacy oI Ianguage may have yet another Important
advantage. t may heIp to keep a IInguIstIc work Iresh, aIIve, and InterestIng Ior a very
Iong tIme, both Ior an IndIvIduaI reader and Ior generatIons oI readers. I each readIng
produces a worId some Ieatures oI whIch wIII be new each tIme, It Is understandabIe why
IndIvIduaI readers and generatIons oI readers mIght be tempted to reread. A IInguIstIc
work may be better than a pIctorIaI or musIcaI one at keepIng a tradItIon oI InterpretatIon
and appIIcatIon {p.50) or actuaIIzatIon aIIve. IeIIgIous IconocIasm may appeaI not onIy to
an understandabIe reIuctance to represent the unrepresentabIe, but aIso to a Iear that
too dIrect and precIse a representatIon may be detrImentaI to the creatIve IIIe oI the
ImagInatIon and may stunt the contInuIng growth oI an InterpretatIve tradItIon.
One more subject needs to be dIscussed here. ow that we understand that Ianguage,
unIIke other medIa, Is not just an Instrument oI representatIon, but aIso oI ratIonaI
thought, we may return once more to the errIdean topIc oI the reIatIve cIaIms oI spoken
and wrItten dIscourse. WhIIe the cIaIm that sound and wrItIng may provIde equaIIy
orIgInaI, underIved, embodIment Ior a IInguIstIc utterance Is correct, we may
nevertheIess consIder the questIon whether sound or wrItIng makes a better materIaI Ior
Ianguage. IegeI preIerred sound, arguIng that, sInce It Is the nature oI the sIgn to
dIsappear Into Its meanIng, It Is proper Ior It to exIst as a temporaI, that Is, dIsappearIng
sound.
The IntuItIon-In Its naturaI phase a somethIng gIven and gIven In space-acquIres,
when empIoyed as a sIgn, the pecuIIar characterIstIc oI exIstIng onIy as superseded
and subIImated. Such Is the negatIvIty oI InteIIIgence, and thus the truer phase oI
the IntuItIon used as a sIgn Is exIstence In time (but Its exIstence vanIshes In the
moment oI beIng). . . . ThIs InstItutIon oI the naturaI Is the vocaI note, where the
Inward Idea manIIests ItseII In adequate utterance.
62
Another argument In Iavor oI sound can aIso be made. One mIght be tempted to gIve
preIerence to sound on account oI Its more abstract character. IrecIseIy because we are
much Iess Interested In representIng the auraI worId than In representIng the vIsuaI one,
sound Is a more suItabIe materIaI Ior makIng abstract, arbItrary sIgns. there Is Iess
danger that our sIgns wIII brIng to mInd uncaIIed Ior assocIatIons, be taken to represent
somethIng by resembIIng It, when these sIgns are auraI. To be sure, thIs argument hoIds
onIy Ior pIcto- or Ideograms or Ior Iogography, that Is, Ior wrItIng systems In whIch a sIgn
reIers dIrectIy to a meanIng, the kInd oI wrItIng IegeI caIIed "hIerogIyphIc," It does not
appIy to a phonetIzed system oI wrItIng In whIch a sIgn reIers to a phonetIc vaIue and not
to a meanIng, the kInd oI wrItIng most IuIIy exempIIIIed by the aIphabetIc system. IegeI's
comparIson oI the two kInds oI wrItIng Is IIIumInatIng. "n partIcuIar, hIerogIyphIcs uses
spatIaI IIgures to desIgnate idecs, aIphabetIcaI wrItIng, on the other hand, uses them to
desIgnate vocaI notes whIch are aIready sIgns. AIphabetIcaI wrItIng thus consIsts oI sIgns
oI sIgns."
63
CIearIy, In a phonetIzed system oI wrItIng the danger mentIoned a moment
ago does not arIse. ut thIs In ItseII strengthens rather than weakens our argument.
esIdes, as IInguIsts poInt out, even aIphabetIc wrItIng Is not pureIy phonemIc, wIth each
Page 36 of 54
sIgn desIgnatIng one actuaI phoneme (unIt oI sound). Iather, dIIIerent speIIIngs oI two
dIIIerent but sImIIarIy pronounced words (such as "recede" and "re-seed") are used to
underscore that the words empIoy dIIIerent root morphemes (unIts oI meanIng). n other
words, even aIphabetIc wrItIng Is not pureIy phonemIc (reIerrIng to sound aIone) but,
rather, contaIns a morphemIc component (reIerrIng to the meanIng).
64
n {p.51) Steven
IInker's words, "the goaI oI readIng, aIter aII, Is to understand the text, not to pronounce
It."
65
Iowever, even II these arguments are convIncIng, the specuIatIon thus Iar seems IdIe.
There Is IIttIe poInt In askIng whether voIce or wrItIng Is a better embodIment Ior
Ianguage, untII we ask whIch oI the IunctIons oI Ianguage Is better supported by whIch
kInd oI embodIment. Above, have dIstInguIshed two IundamentaI IunctIons oI a IInguIstIc
utterance, that oI reIerrIng to a subject matter, and that oI the speaker's seII-
presentatIon. ow, II what we want to emphasIze Is the Iatter IunctIon, there can be no
better embodIment Ior the utterance than a IIvIng voIce, nothIng couId reveaI the
speaker's state oI mInd, hIs attItude to the subject matter oI hIs speech, better. The IIvIng
voIce, aIter aII, has many oI musIc's means at Its dIsposaI. dIIIerences oI pItch, rhythm,
tempo, tImbre, and dynamIcs. n comparIson, handwrItIng comes a dIstant second,
aIthough handwrItIng can aIso teII us a Iot about the state oI mInd oI the wrIter, In the
same way that gestures do, sInce, IIke the voIce, It Is produced dIrectIy by the body.
IrInt Is, oI course, the Ieast InIormatIve In thIs respect, sInce the dIrect reIatIon between
the sIgn and the body that produced It Is severed. I, however, the reIerentIaI IunctIon Is
to be Ioregrounded and the seII-presentIng one de-emphasIzed, then the order oI
preIerence wouId be reversed-prInt, handwrItIng, voIce.
ow, what Is probabIy most strIkIng about the sItuatIon oI IInguIstIc embodIment today Is
the Iact that recent exponentIaI growth oI eIectronIc means oI audIovIsuaI communIcatIon
IncreasIngIy chaIIenges the hegemony oI prInt as the prIvIIeged means oI pubIIc, as
opposed to prIvate, communIcatIon. ThIs Is the practIcaI context In whIch specuIatIve
comparIson oI the respectIve suItabIIIty oI voIce and wrItIng Ior IInguIstIc embodIment
needs not be entIreIy poIntIess, but, on the contrary, may prove to have InterestIng
practIcaI ImpIIcatIons. have just estabIIshed that wrItIng prIvIIeges the reIerentIaI IunctIon
oI Ianguage and de-emphasIzes the seII-presentIng IunctIon, whIIe the reverse Is true oI
voIce. I thIs Is the case, the shIIt In pubIIc communIcatIon Irom prInt to eIectronIcaIIy
transmItted voIce (and Image) cannot but aIIect the character oI our poIItIcaI debates.
IrInt concentrates the reader's attentIon on the matter under dIscussIon, rather than on
the person who dIscusses It, and It aIIows the reader to controI the temporaI dImensIon oI
the dIscourse, to read quIckIy or sIowIy, and to read agaIn. t gIves the reader tIme to
thInk through the Issues careIuIIy, encouragIng dIspassIonate ratIonaI anaIysIs. When a
IIvIng voIce Is used, It Is the speaker who controIs the tIme oI dIscourse, and It Is on the
speaker as much as on the matter dIscussed that the reader's attentIon Is Iocused. Thus,
when what Is at Issue Is the character oI the speaker, as It oIten Is, say, durIng eIectIon
campaIgns, eIectronIc medIa are InestImabIy eIIIcIent In transmIttIng the reIevant
InIormatIon. ut the very same medIa may be dIstractIng when what Is needed Is a caIm
Page 37 of 54
and ImpersonaI deIIberatIon on matters oI pubIIc poIIcy. (t Is sureIy no accIdent that the
age oI totaIItarIan dIctators was aIso the age oI radIo broadcast and IIIm newsreeI. ot
that the dIctators negIected to controI the prInted medIa, oI course, but {p.52) they
made very conscIous use oI the medIa and Iound prInt a Iess eIIectIve Instrument oI mass
propaganda than radIo and IIIm.) emocratIc poIItIcs In modern mass socIetIes Is to a very
Iarge extent a spectators' sport or theater (and wIII remaIn so untII dIrect democracy
repIaces or at Ieast suppIements the currentIy domInant representatIve one). the
busIness oI the government Is conducted by eIected poIItIcIans, whIIe the eIectorate
voIces Its approvaI or dIsapprovaI In perIodIc eIectIons. The prInt and eIectronIc medIa
transmIt the spectacIe. The Iatter are InvaIuabIe In communIcatIng the character oI the
pIayers, but the Iormer cannot be repIaced when the voters need to Iearn about the
Issues about whIch these pIayers deIIberate and make decIsIons.
t Is the Iact that they take the controI over the tIme oI dIscourse away Irom the reader
that, more than anythIng eIse, accounts Ior the powerIuI Impact the eIectronIc medIa can
have, a power that, dependIng on the context, may be consIdered gIorIous or pernIcIous,
enhancIng or threatenIng our IIbertIes. And thIs brIngs us back agaIn to the comparIson oI
musIc and other cuIturaI medIa, sInce here we have one more, thus Iar unmentIoned,
source oI musIc's uncanny power over us. A scuIpture or paIntIng (though not a dance or
IIIm) we can see "In our own tIme," so to speak, Ior as Iong as we wIsh, wIth InterruptIons
or wIthout. SImIIarIy, a wrItten dIscourse (but not a spoken one, or one enacted In theater
or on IIIm) we can read In IuII controI over the tIme oI our readIng, over Its tempo and
contInuIty. ot so wIth perIormed musIc, whIch Imposes Its temporaIIty on us. WhIIe
scuIpture, paIntIng, and wrItten dIscourse Ieave us In controI over the temporaI
dImensIon oI our experIence, musIc and spoken dIscourse (as weII as dance, enacted
drama, and IIIm) IIteraIIy grab us by grabbIng away the controI we otherwIse have over
thIs dImensIon. WIth the perIormIng arts, It Is onIy the varIous technoIogIes oI wrItIng and
recordIng that gIve us the controI over tIme. When musIc Is notated or recorded, when
dance, enacted drama, or IIIm are captured on vIdeo, we can read them the way we read
noveIs. IecordIngs, In partIcuIar, have transIormed our modes oI IIstenIng now In subtIe
and compIex ways, aIIowIng Ior dIstractIon and Ioss oI contInuIty, ImmedIacy, and
IntensIty, to be sure, but aIso Ior IntImacy and depth oI experIence and knowIedge
heretoIore reserved onIy Ior the musIcaIIy IIterate communIng wIth the scores at theIr
pIanos.
e. Works and Performances, Orgnas and Copes
n certaIn respects, works In the vIsuaI medIa oI scuIpture and paIntIng dIIIer Irom those
In the medIa oI musIc and Ianguage, whether spoken or wrItten. VIsuaI works have two
InterreIated Ieatures. IIrst, they are endurIng objects that can be made, mutIIated,
repaIred, and destroyed, to be sure, but that need not be repeated once they have
been made, or beIore they have been destroyed. They are sImpIy there, waItIng Ior the
vIewer to see them. Second, each IndIvIduaI work Is a sIngIe object, the "orIgInaI," that
may, but does not have to, beIong to a IamIIy oI reIated objects that cIoseIy resembIe one
another, and each orIgInaI can be reproduced to make one or more "copIes." The two
Ieatures are InterreIated. {p.53) sInce vIsuaI works are endurIng objects, It Is naturaI
Page 38 of 54
Ior them to exIst normaIIy as sIngIe objects and onIy exceptIonaIIy In IamIIIes, and to be
capabIe oI beIng copIed.
n scuIpture, paIntIng, and drawIng, there Is typIcaIIy a sIngIe orIgInaI, though In prIncIpIe
nothIng prevents an artIst Irom makIng muItIpIe versIons, muItIpIe orIgInaIs that cIoseIy
resembIe one another. Ior some artIsts (rancusI comes to mInd), makIng muItIpIe
versIons Is the normaI practIce. n thIs Iatter case, we oIten taIk IooseIy oI muItIpIe
versIons oI a sIngIe work, whIch unnecessarIIy suggests that there exIsts a thIng oI a
mysterIous ontoIogIcaI status caIIed "work" whIch dIIIers Irom aII oI the versIons. n the
termInoIogy adopted here, each oI the versIons Is a work and, Instead oI postuIatIng some
mysterIous essence they aII have In common, one sImpIy descrIbes In as much detaII as Is
avaIIabIe and useIuI the resembIances and dIIIerences between the versIons. IrInts and
photographs typIcaIIy have muItIpIe orIgInaIs, here aIso there Is no need to thInk In terms
oI an IdeaI "work" whIch these reaI objects somehow exempIIIy, sInce artIsts, deaIers,
coIIectors, and connoIsseurs have deveIoped practIcaI and useIuI ways oI descrIbIng the
reIatIonshIps among such muItIpIe orIgInaI works. just as Ior scuIpture and paIntIng, aIso
Ior prInts and photographs. the dIstInctIon between orIgInaIs and copIes remaIns vaIId and
Is not ontoIogIcaI, but depends on conventIons deveIoped by the reIevant communIty.
Whether two objects that cIoseIy resembIe one another wIII be consIdered two orIgInaIs
or an orIgInaI and a copy cannot be decIded on the basIs oI an examInatIon oI the objects
aIone, wIthout reIerence to any cuIturaI conventIons and practIces.
eIther oI these two Ieatures oI vIsuaI works (the work as an endurIng object and the
orIgInaI-copy dIstInctIon) are characterIstIc oI musIcaI and IInguIstIc works. A musIcaI work,
as the term Is understood here, Is a reaI (or ImagIned) soundIng object, IdentIcaI wIth
what Is usuaIIy caIIed a "perIormance." n thIs sense, no kInd oI musIc, whether art or
popuIar, Western or non-Western, IaIIs to be embodIed In works (perIormances). ut
musIcaI works are not endurIng objects that patIentIy waIt Ior us to hear them at a tIme
we choose. They are, rather, transItory and ephemeraI events that have to be produced
each tIme we want to hear them and that we can hear onIy whIIe they Iast. They come Into
beIng, Iast Ior a IImIted tIme, and then they are IrrevocabIy gone. ThIs Is the case even
when we ourseIves produce the perIormance, whether In actuaIIty or In ImagInatIon.
MusIcaI works change In tIme the way scuIptures and paIntIngs do not and, consequentIy,
they Impose theIr temporaIIty on us. n prIncIpIe, however, events oI thIs sort are
repeatabIe, provIded the memorIes oI the musIcIans producIng the sounds are good
enough or propped by adequate notatIon. The repeatabIIIty oI musIcaI works
compensates Ior theIr ephemeraIIty. oth vIsuaI and musIcaI works can exIst sIngIy or In
IamIIIes, but whIIe It Is normaI Ior vIsuaI works to stay sIngIe, sInce they endure and can
be revIsIted, It Is understandabIe that musIcaI works wIII usuaIIy Iorm IamIIIes to
overcome theIr transItory nature.
What Is "good enough" and "adequate" In cases oI repetItIon depends on the conventIons
oI a gIven cuIture. SImIIarIy, whether or not repetItIons oI work-events {p.54) are
consIdered desIrabIe Is cuIturaIIy contIngent. These repetItIons wIII be hIghIy vaIued In
cuItures, IIke that oI uropean art musIc In recent centurIes, that want musIcaI works to
Page 39 of 54
be repeatedIy experIenced and scrutInIzed In the manner oI cIassIc works oI vIsuaI art
and IIterature. Iurthermore, IIke dIIIerent ImpressIons oI a prInt, the repetItIons cannot,
oI course, ever be IdentIcaI, not even when the sounds are generated not by IIvIng
musIcIans, but by computers. At the very Ieast, they happen In dIIIerent tImes. ut the
resembIance among them can be Iesser or greater, and It can be strong enough to satIsIy
the requIrements oI a gIven musIc communIty, to enabIe members oI thIs communIty to
say that what they hear Is a repetItIon rather than a new work. AgaIn, the dIIIerence
between a repetItIon and a new work cannot be estabIIshed on the basIs oI hearIng aIone,
wIthout any reIerence to the reIevant cuIturaI conventIons.
The Iact that we normaIIy, and somewhat IooseIy, taIk oI muItIpIe perIormances oI a sIngIe
"work" has gIven rIse to a vast phIIosophIcaI IIterature that attempts to descrIbe the
mysterIous ontoIogIcaI status oI thIs IdeaI "work" whIch actuaI perIormances somehow
mereIy exempIIIy.
66
t has seemed pIausIbIe to many peopIe that the concept oI "work"
understood In the IdeaI sense Is useIuI and InevItabIe even, sInce It accounts Ior the Iact
that actuaI perIormances oI a gIven "work" can be better or worse, or more or Iess
accurate. The concept gaIned partIcuIar pIausIbIIIty wIth reIerence to the post-
eethovenIan musIc cuIture wIth Its cIear dIvIsIon oI Iabor among composers and
perIormers. t seems that In such a cuIture the composer creates the IdeaI "work" and
IIxes It notatIonaIIy In the score (or text, In the sense oI the term adopted here), whIIe the
perIormers gIve thIs "work" soundIng reaIIzatIons that may be evaIuated by comparIson
wIth the IdeaI "work." ut In Iact, aIso In the post-eethovenIan musIc cuIture, aII we have
Is the composer's text, consIstIng oI InstructIons Ior the perIormers that teII them what
they shouId be doIng, and the works the perIormers produce IoIIowIng these
InstructIons. The text may be more or Iess precIse, It may Ieave greater or smaIIer
questIons to be resoIved at the perIormers' dIscretIon, It may reIy on unwrItten, but
commonIy understood conventIons. The work produced by the perIormers may IoIIow
the expIIcIt and ImpIIcIt InstructIons oI the text wIth greater or Iesser accuracy, and the
perIormers may be more or Iess InspIred or IngenIous In resoIvIng questIons that the
text IeIt IndetermInate. n any case, we have no access to the IdeaI "work" In comparIson
wIth whIch the actuaI perIormances are supposed to be evaIuated, aII we have access to
Is the same text, and the same reIevant contextuaI knowIedge, that Is avaIIabIe to the
perIormers. And the perIormances can weII be evaIuated wIth reIerence to thIs text.
"very perIormance Is an event, but not one that wouId In any way be separate Irom the
work-the work ItseII Is what 'takes pIace In the perIormatIve event," says Gadamer.
67
n short, aII we have and aII we are ever IIkeIy to get are necessarIIy works-perIormances
and, optIonaIIy, scores-texts. The IdeaI "work" Is the resuIt oI a typIcaI seductIon by
Ianguage, a concept wIth no useIuI job to do (apart Irom provIdIng an entertaInIng
metaphysIcaI puzzIe Ior proIessIonaI phIIosophers and a shortcut Ior musIcIans). AII the
same, have no IIIusIons that {p.55) my cIaIms wIII make the musIc worId stop taIkIng
about "works" (rather than texts or scores) and the "perIormances" or "InterpretatIons"
thereoI. There Is no harm In such Ioose taIk ( Intend to engage In It myseII) provIded It
does not put us on a hopeIess chase aIter thIs nonexIstent entIty, the IdeaI "work" dIstInct
Irom both perIormances and scores.
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have estabIIshed above that, sInce vIsuaI works are endurIng objects whIIe musIcaI
works are transItory events, It Is normaI Ior the Iormer to exIst sIngIy and Ior the Iatter to
Iorm IamIIIes. t IoIIows, Iurthermore, that In the reaIm oI vIsuaI works, the dIstInctIon
between the orIgInaI and Its copIes wIII tend, In some cuItures at Ieast, to become IIrmIy
entrenched, whIIe In the reaIm oI musIcaI works thIs dIstInctIon wIII tend to have a IImIted
appIIcabIIIty. where the works normaIIy remaIn sIngIe, there wIII be a strong temptatIon to
produce copIes, where they tend to Iorm IamIIIes, the need to make copIes wIII be Iess
obvIous. One area oI musIc where the orIgInaI-copy dIstInctIon cIearIy and commonIy does
appIy Is that oI recorded IIve perIormances. A recordIng oI a IIve perIormance remaIns In
the same reIatIon to the orIgInaI perIormance as a photograph oI a paIntIng does to the
orIgInaI paIntIng. (To avoId possIbIe mIsunderstandIngs, shouId add that It Is not my aIm
here to downpIay the centraI roIe oI recordIngs In the cIrcuIatIon oI musIc today, nor to
deny that most recordIngs are Iar Irom sImpIe copIes oI IIve perIormances. Most
recordIngs we IIsten to are orIgInaIs, not copIes. SImIIarIy, one wouId not want to overIook
the centraI roIe pIayed by photography In the cIrcuIatIon oI nonphotographIc vIsuaI art, or
the Iact that most such photography does more than sImpIy copy. compare your
experIence oI seeIng the IIero deIIa Irancesca Irescoes In St. IrancIs' Church oI Arezzo
wIth seeIng them In a weII-produced aIbum.) A musIcaI copy can aIso be produced by Iess
mechanIcaI means, just as a paIntIng can be copIed by a paInter. Thus, a band may be
Iormed to copy orIgInaI perIormances oI the uke IIIngton band. ut In comparIson wIth
the very promInent roIe copyIng by hand has Iong pIayed In our vIsuaI cuIture, these
nonmechanIcaI reproductIons have aIways been oI margInaI Importance In our musIc
cuIture. OnIy wIth the advent oI mechanIcaI reproductIon has copyIng become equaIIy
promInent In vIsuaI and musIcaI domaIns.
t Is strIkIng, by the way, how dIIIerent the Impact oI mechanIcaI reproductIon Is In the
vIsuaI and musIcaI IIeIds. n both areas mechanIcaI reproductIon deprIves the work oI
what enjamIn IdentIIIed as Its "aura," compounded In equaI measure oI Its unIqueness
and Its embeddedness wIthIn the orIgInaI context.
68
ut whIIe we commonIy consIder a
recordIng oI a perIormance as an adequate vehIcIe oI a musIcaI experIence, a
photographIc reproductIon oI a paIntIng Is rareIy more than an cide-memoire, useIuI as a
remInder oI what the orIgInaI Iooks IIke, but not an adequate substItute Ior seeIng the
orIgInaI. ThIs dIIIerence Is partIy the resuIt oI the Iact that, whIIe a recordIng does not
normaIIy change the temporaI dImensIon oI the musIcaI work, a photograph usuaIIy
changes the spatIaI dImensIons oI the paIntIng. n at Ieast one respect, however, a
photographIc reproductIon IunctIons sImIIarIy to a recordIng. When It captures aspects oI
the orIgInaI whIch are dIIIIcuIt to see under the usuaI vIewIng condItIons {p.56) (Ior
Instance, detaIIs oI a dIstant Iresco), a photograph, no Iess than a recordIng, enhances the
IntImacy and depth oI experIence and knowIedge avaIIabIe to us.
WhIch oI the two modeIs oI work obtaIns In Ianguage? Are IInguIstIc works endurIng
objects or transItory events? t was my cIaIm, It wIII be recaIIed, that, unIIke a vIsuaI work
whIch may be embodIed onIy In vIsuaIIy perceptIbIe materIaI, and unIIke a musIcaI work
whIch may be embodIed onIy In sound, a IInguIstIc utterance may be embodIed eIther
auraIIy, In sound, or vIsuaIIy, In wrItIng. ow when a IInguIstIc work Is embodIed prImarIIy
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In sound, It behaves generaIIy IIke musIc, whIIe when Its prImary embodIment Is wrItIng, It
resembIes a work In a vIsuaI medIum. Whether what we deaI wIth In any specIIIc case Is
one or the other kInd oI prImary embodIment Is a cuIturaIIy contIngent Iact, that Is, the
questIon cannot be answered by examInIng the specIIIc utterance In compIete IsoIatIon. n
both cases, however, the arbItrarIness oI the IInguIstIc sIgn enabIes us to toIerate much
greater varIety oI embodIments wIthIn a IamIIy oI muItIpIe orIgInaIs than we wouId aIIow In
eIther paIntIng or musIc. thInk how reIatIveIy IIttIe dIIIerence It makes whether a poem Is
prInted In bIack or crImson Ink and how much dIIIerence It wouId make II VeIzquez
decIded to make another versIon oI the portraIt oI nnocent X, thIs tIme In bIack robes.
When Ianguage Is embodIed prImarIIy In sound, the IInguIstIc work Is a transItory,
ephemeraI event whIch does not patIentIy waIt Ior our scrutIny, but must be produced,
or perIormed, anew, eIther Irom memory or Irom a wrItten text, each tIme we want to
have It. just IIke when we read a score, a perIormance oI a IInguIstIc work may aIso be
actuaI (as when we read aIoud) or ImagInary (as when we read sIIentIy). And just as wIth
musIc, an ImagInary perIormance, sIIent readIng, does not have to, and rareIy does,
reaIIze equaIIy vIvIdIy and precIseIy everythIng IndIcated In the notatIon. When we read
scores sIIentIy, we rareIy ImagIne everythIng we wouId hear II the score was actuaIIy
perIormed. SImIIarIy, when we read a IInguIstIc text sIIentIy, we rareIy ImagIne precIseIy
how the text wouId sound II read aIoud. ThIs Is especIaIIy the case sInce wIth Ianguage we
aIways have the optIon oI treatIng the wrItten text as II It were the prImary embodIment oI
the work. ut as Iong as we do not do thIs, as Iong as we consIder the prImary
embodIment to be auraI, the reIatIonshIp between the soundIng work and wrItten text In
Ianguage wIII be sImIIar to that obtaInIng In musIc. The maIn dIIIerence wIII be that In our
post-AmbrosIan cuIture It Is much more common to read IInguIstIc texts sIIentIy than to do
the same wIth musIc scores. the sIght oI a commuter sIIentIy readIng strIng quartets
astonIshes IeIIow passengers today no Iess than the sIght oI St. Ambrose sIIentIy readIng
astonIshed St. AugustIne. "ut when he was readIng, he drew hIs eyes aIong over the
Ieaves, and hIs heart searched Into the sense, but hIs voIce and tongue were sIIent.
OIttImes when we were present . . . we stIII saw hIm readIng to hImseII, and never
otherwIse."
69
When Ianguage Is embodIed prImarIIy In wrItIng, the IInguIstIc work Is an endurIng object,
sImIIar to a scuIpture or paIntIng, an object we can scrutInIze In our own tIme, when we
want. We can aIso read It aIoud, oI course, but In that case Its soundIng embodIment
wouId be secondary, derIved, and InessentIaI.
{p.57) Ior obvIous reasons, "hIerogIyphIc" wrItIng (In IegeI's sense, that Is, wrItIng In
whIch the sIgns reIer dIrectIy to what Is meant, rather than to sounds) tends to
encourage the vIew oI wrItIng as the prImary embodIment oI Ianguage, but It does not
make It necessary. y the same token, "aIphabetIc" wrItIng (where the sIgns reIer to
sounds, rather than to what Is meant) tends to prIvIIege the vIew oI Ianguage as
embodIed prImarIIy In sound, but, agaIn, does not make thIs vIew InevItabIe. What Is
consIdered IIterature In the West today usuaIIy behaves IIke musIc, that Is, It tacItIy
assumes the prImacy oI sound. Ior the most part, our wrItten IIterature Is meant to be
Page 42 of 54
read, aIoud or sIIentIy, so that the soundIng embodIment oI Ianguage Is not entIreIy
bypassed. ut such phenomena as some poems In ApoIIInaIre's Cclligrcmmes, to say
nothIng oI the use oI caIIIgraphy In-and as-paIntIng In ChIna, show cIearIy that thIs must
not aIways and everywhere be the case.
The above dIscussIon oIIers no more than a map oI possIbIIItIes. a work can be an
endurIng object or an ephemeraI event, In eIther case, the work may be repeated,
creatIng a IamIIy oI cIoseIy reIated objects, or It may stay sIngIe, any orIgInaI work Is
capabIe oI beIng copIed (wIth the dIstInctIon between a repetItIon and a copy beIng
governed by the reIevant conventIons and practIces). t Is a matter oI empIrIcaI research
to estabIIsh whIch oI these dIvergent possIbIIItIes are Ioregrounded In any partIcuIar
cuIture. n the Iast Iew centurIes, the hIgh cuIture In the West has tended to prIvIIege
works as endurIng objects to such an extent that even the medIum ontoIogIcaIIy
condemned to ephemeraIIty, musIc, has evoIved practIces that aIIow repetItIon, thus
counterIng the necessarIIy transItory character oI the musIcaI work. The reasons and
causes that account Ior thIs state oI aIIaIrs are hIghIy dIverse. They sureIy embrace the
aspIratIon that post-eethovenIan musIc acquIre structuraI and expressIve compIexIty
equaI to that oI the greatest IIterature and paIntIng and hence be objectIIIed In works
aIIowIng repeated scrutIny. And equaIIy sureIy, they IncIude the deveIopment oI a market
economy and hence the commodIIIcatIon oI musIc In the Iorm oI marketabIe scores. ut
even In the West, jazz has chaIIenged the Idea that repeatabIIIty Is a necessary attrIbute
oI aII artIstIcaIIy sIgnIIIcant musIc. ImprovIsatIon, spontaneIty, and vItaIIty may be vaIued as
hIghIy as permanence and repeatabIIIty. And then, no sooner was the chaIIenge Issued
but recordIngs transIormed thIs Iorm oI ephemeraIIty, too, Into endurIng (and
marketabIe) objects. t Is onIy to be expected that In a hIghIy deveIoped cuIture the
possIbIIItIes concernIng the status oI the work whIch we have mapped wIII be engaged In a
compIex IashIon.
f. Representatons and Arguments
We know now what the cuIturaI medIa are generaIIy Ior, what basIc kInds oI medIa there
are, and what theIr IundamentaI structure Is. We have Iearned that medIa InvoIve works
(reaI objects) that have to be transIormed Into worIds (ImagInary objects). ut cIearIy,
not aII works and worIds are works and worIds oI art. We need to examIne medIa Iurther
to Iearn when they can and when they {p.58) cannot be put to artIstIc uses. And to Iearn
thIs, we need to turn our attentIon Irom works to worIds.
My cIaIm here wIII be that there are two IundamentaI worId-types, nameIy,
representatIons and arguments,
70
that representatIons subdIvIde Iurther Into those oI
actuaI and those oI IIctIonaI objects, and that arguments subdIvIde Iurther Into those
about the worId as It Is (or was) and those about the worId as It shouId be. A pIace Ior art
wIII be Iound to resuIt Irom the superImposItIon oI these cIassIIIcatIons.
The dIstInctIon between representatIons and arguments has aIready been adumbrated In
some oI what has been saId above. We have aIready Iearned that In at Ieast three
respects Ianguage dIIIers IundamentaIIy Irom vIsuaI and auraI medIa. IIrst, a IInguIstIc
work can reIer to Images In any sense modaIIty. y contrast, the ImagInary worIds
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Invoked by vIsuaI medIa consIst oI partIcuIar vIsuaI Images, whIIe those Invoked by musIc
consIst oI partIcuIar auraI Images. Second, unIIke a work In the vIsuaI and auraI medIa, a
IInguIstIc work does not reIer to Images dIrectIy. Iather, It does so through the
IntermedIary oI concepts, that Is, It reIers to generaI concepts under whIch a varIety oI
partIcuIar Images may, but do not have to, be subsumed. ThIrd, and most Important,
Ianguage possesses not onIy representatIonaI, but aIso IogIcaI powers, that Is, It enabIes
us to do somethIng that Is ImpossIbIe to do In any other medIum, nameIy, to represent
thInkIng, deIIberatIng, arguIng. t Is the onIy medIum In whIch we can represent not onIy
the objects oI our desIre as weII as the desIre ItseII, but aIso the thInkIng and arguIng
about our aIms and means, the deIIberatIng on the questIons oI whether our desIre Is
justIIIed and how can It be reaIIzed.
The dIstInctIon between representatIons and arguments depends on these poInts, the Iast
one In partIcuIar. Works In aII medIa, Ianguage IncIuded, can evoke worIds that are
representatIons, that Is, consIst oI partIcuIar Images, ImagIned sensuous experIences.
OnIy a IInguIstIc work can aIso evoke a worId that Is an argument, that Is, consIsts oI
generaI InteIIectuaI concepts and IogIcaI reIatIons among them. (n a dIIIerent IdIom, Croce
sImIIarIy cIaImed that the "Iorms oI knowIedge are two. the IntuItIon and the concept."
71
)
SInce arguments are possIbIe In Ianguage onIy, In thInkIng about the dIstInctIon between
the representatIonaI and argumentatIve worId-types we need not worry about the vIsuaI
and auraI medIa at aII. Iowever, Ianguage's two IundamentaI IunctIons, that oI seII-
presentatIon oI the speaker, whIch It shares wIth other medIa, and that oI reIerence,
whIch Is unIque to It, are both reIevant to my IorthcomIng cIaIm that In art- and hIstory-
worIds representatIons and not arguments are oI the essence. When the reIerentIaI
IunctIon Is consIdered, the cIaIm ImpIIes that In artIstIc and hIstorIcaI uses oI Ianguage, that
Is, In IIterature and hIstory as opposed to phIIosophy or scIence, the reader wIII be
encouraged not just to go Irom words to concepts and stop there, but to reaIIze the
concepts ImagInatIveIy, to move Irom unIversaI concepts to partIcuIar Images. When the
seII-presentatIonaI IunctIon Is consIdered, the cIaIm ImpIIes that In IIterature and hIstory,
unIIke In phIIosophy or scIence, what matters Is not onIy the worId {p.59) reIerred to, or
spoken about, by the speakIng voIce, but aIso the speakIng voIce ItseII. The voIce ItseII,
and not onIy what It speaks about, Is an essentIaI component oI the worId represented In
a IIterary and even In a hIstorIcaI work. (The notIon oI the voIce wIII be dIscussed In more
detaII In chapter 4.) IecaII that, as have argued above, the actuaI sounds, rhythms, and
tempo oI the speech, the tone oI voIce, the Iook oI the handwrItIng, convey a weaIth oI
InIormatIon about the speakers, about theIr socIaI and educatIonaI backgrounds, theIr
attItudes to whatever It Is they are sayIng, theIr states oI mInd, that suppIements the
content oI theIr speech. Moreover, as have argued, Ianguage can gIve us dIrectIy onIy
the represented speakers, the rest oI the worId represented In Ianguage Is gIven us
IndIrectIy, as perceIved by the speakers.
IInguIstIc worIds need not, and rareIy do, present these two types, representatIon and
argument, In theIr pure Iorm. Iather, they are usuaIIy mIxed In varIous proportIons.
When they are so mIxed, It Is oIten possIbIe to decIde whIch type predomInates. A worId
Page 44 of 54
may be IundamentaIIy a representatIon wIth an admIxture oI argument, or the reverse.
ut a mIxture can aIso be such that the work may be equaIIy IruItIuIIy read and
Interpreted Irom eIther perspectIve, as a representatIon, or as an argument. Works oI
hIstory are oIten oI thIs sort, when they represent the events, and at the same tIme oIIer
expIanatIons oI these events In terms other than the sImpIe probabIIIstIc narratIve IogIc oI
antecedent events ImpIyIng consequent ones. ut not onIy works commonIy cIassIIIed as
hIstory may be thIs way. WhIIe It wouId be somethIng oI an exaggeratIon to cIaIm that In
IegeI's Fhenomenology oj Mind representatIon and argument are equaIIy baIanced, the
book sureIy asks to be read as a phIIosophIcaI argument and sImuItaneousIy a hIstorIcaI
narratIve, a Bildungsromcn oI human mInd and cuIture.
72
Who couId decIde whether
representatIons or arguments predomInate In KIerkegaard's Either/Or, or even what In
thIs book Is a representatIon and what an argument? ("|T|he wrIters usuaIIy IdentIIIed as
'phIIosophers IncIude both argumentatIve probIem-soIvers IIke ArIstotIe and IusseII and
oracuIar worId-dIscIosers IIke IIato and IegeI," says Iorty.
73
) SImIIarIy, Iroust's worId
Interweaves representatIons and arguments so cIoseIy that It has been IruItIuIIy read
both as a noveI and as a work oI phIIosophy.
Most IInguIstIc worIds, however, not onIy mIx representatIons and arguments, but mIx
them In such a way that one type cIearIy predomInates. ut there Is an ImbaIance
between these two worId-types. representatIons can and oIten do exIst IndependentIy oI
arguments, but arguments rareIy II ever appear In a pure state, wIthout any
representatIons. IureIy vIsuaI or musIcaI representatIons are, oI course, Iree oI any
admIxture oI argument, sInce argument Is ImpossIbIe where there Is no Ianguage. ut
even when the medIum Is Ianguage, pure representatIon Is common. Argument, by
contrast, seems to need representatIons to argue about. That, In any case, Is what
ArIstotIe thought. "To the thInkIng souI Images serve as II they were contents oI
perceptIon. . . . That Is why the souI never thInks wIthout an Image."
74
And Iurther. "The
so-caIIed abstract objects the mInd thInks just as, II one had thought oI the snub-nosed
not as snub-nosed but {p.60) as hoIIow, one wouId have thought oI an actuaIIty wIthout
the IIesh In whIch It Is embodIed. It Is thus that the mInd when It Is thInkIng the objects oI
MathematIcs thInks as separate, eIements whIch do not exIst separate."
75
Croce,
sImIIarIy, thought that Images couId exIst IndependentIy oI concepts, but not the reverse.
"I we have shown that the aesthetIc Iorm |oI knowIedge, that Is, knowIedge productIve oI
Images| Is aItogether Independent oI the InteIIectuaI |Iorm oI knowIedge, the one
productIve oI concepts| and suIIIces to ItseII wIthout externaI support, we have not saId
that the InteIIectuaI can stand wIthout the aesthetIc. . . . Concepts are not possIbIe wIthout
IntuItIons."
76
( do not know enough about the phIIosophy oI IogIc and mathematIcs to be
abIe to say whether pure argument Is ever possIbIe.)
When what predomInates In a IInguIstIc worId Is representatIon, the work that embodIes
the worId beIongs to one oI the two very broadIy conceIved kInds oI IInguIstIc works, art
or hIstory. When argument predomInates, It beIongs to phIIosophy or scIence. n a
preIImInary and schematIc IashIon, one mIght say that art and hIstory represent worIds,
whIIe phIIosophy and scIence argue about such representatIons. (ote that my "art,"
"hIstory," "phIIosophy," and "scIence" are IdeaIIzatIons In whIch not aII workIng artIsts,
Page 45 of 54
hIstorIans, phIIosophers, and scIentIsts wIII want to recognIze themseIves.)
t shouId be cIear that the pIace oI art and hIstory, as opposed to phIIosophy and scIence,
Is on the sIde oI representatIon. ThIs does not mean, oI course, that aII art must be
representatIonaI In some narrow sense, or that aII hIstory must be nothIng but the
descrIptIon and narratIon oI past events. t does mean, however, that the worId that Is
evoked In a work oI art or hIstory cannot have a pureIy argumentatIve structure, cannot
consIst oI concepts and theIr IogIcaI reIatIonshIps onIy, whIIe It may, though does not have
to, have a pureIy representatIonaI structure (even II no hIstorIan wouId want to, or
shouId, be deprIved oI the abIIIty to argue). n other words, It must have, predomInantIy
and essentIaIIy, the structure oI representatIon, that Is, It must consIst prImarIIy oI
Images. (Iroust captured the dIstInctIon am makIng here most succInctIy when he
compared earIy, Immature poems oI Iugo wIth Lc Lgende des Sicles. "n these IIrst
poems, VIctor Iugo Is stIII a thInker, Instead oI contentIng hImseII, IIke ature, wIth
suppIyIng Iood Ior thought."
77
) And the reverse. the worId that Is evoked In a work oI
phIIosophy or scIence cannot be pureIy representatIonaI, cannot consIst oI Images onIy. n
other words, It must have, predomInantIy and essentIaIIy, the structure oI argument, that
Is, It must consIst prImarIIy oI concepts and theIr IogIcaI reIatIonshIps. SomethIng Is an
essentIaI component oI an object when we cannot have the object wIthout thIs component.
We cannot have art and hIstory wIthout representatIons and we cannot have phIIosophy
and scIence wIthout arguments.
What Is the Iorce oI aII these "musts" and "cannots"? CIearIy, we couId not prevent an
avant-garde artIst Irom oIIerIng a pureIy conceptuaI worId as a worId oI art. ut we can
do two thIngs. We can, IeebIy, poInt out that Ior most art as we know It, the
representatIonaI worId-type Is oI the essence. And we can, more {p.61) IorceIuIIy,
remInd ourseIves that our aIm here Is not to estabIIsh what art Is or can be, but rather
what Its IunctIon shouId be II It were to be cuIturaIIy Important, one that couId be IuIIIIIed
onIy by art, and, moreover, by much oI the art that aIready exIsts. I these condItIons are
to be respected, art, Indeed, must be Iooked Ior on the sIde oI representatIons, sInce
arguments are the backbone oI the worIds evoked by phIIosophy and scIence.
The dIstInctIon between hIstory and art, In turn, depends upon a Iurther subdIvIsIon oI
representatIonaI worIds Into those representIng actuaI objects, that Is, objects that
actuaIIy exIst or exIsted In the reaI worId IndependentIy oI any representatIons thereoI,
and those representIng IIctIonaI objects, that Is, objects that exIst onIy as representatIons.
ote that the dIstInctIon between what Is actuaI and what Is IIctIonaI Is not IdentIcaI wIth
the dIstInctIon between what Is reaI and what Is ImagInary. have estabIIshed earIy on
that the IunctIon oI medIa Is to enabIe us to encode reaI or ImagInary experIences In
works (reaI objects) and to decode these experIences by transIormIng the works Into
worIds (ImagInary objects). AII objects that make up a representatIonaI worId are
ImagInary. ut some oI these objects portray actuaI objects that exIst or exIsted In the
reaI worId, whIIe others do not. The Iatter objects are not onIy ImagInary, but aIso
IIctIonaI. IepresentatIonaI worIds that portray actuaI objects are embodIed In kInds oI
works we caII hIstory. IepresentatIonaI worIds that are aIso IIctIonaI are embodIed In
Page 46 of 54
kInds oI works we caII art. oth hIstory and art beIong to the (predomInantIy and
essentIaIIy) representatIonaI worId-type, but Images oI the Iormer portray actuaI objects,
whIIe Images oI the Iatter are predomInantIy or excIusIveIy IIctIons. We cannot have
hIstory whIch does not at aII represent the actuaI, the worId as It Is or was. And we cannot
have art whIch does not at aII represent a IIctIonaI worId. CIearIy, both these sweepIng
pronouncements cannot be IeIt wIthout comment.
t shouId be noted that, whIIe my use oI the term "hIstory" has ampIe cIassIcaI precedent
In ArIstotIe, the term covers much more than the academIc dIscIpIIne oI hIstory. ts scope
IncIudes any portrayaI oI the reaI worId, present as weII as past, journaIIstIc as weII as
hIstorIcaI. t shouId be noted aIso that there wIII be borderIIne cases. IIstory and art can
be mIxed, though usuaIIy one wIII predomInate, as when a hIstorIan ImagInatIveIy
reconstructs the thoughts oI a hIstorIcaI protagonIst that, strIctIy speakIng, cannot be
documented, or when a noveIIst combInes actuaI and IIctIonaI personages and settIngs.
There are aIso borderIIne cases that are more dIIIIcuIt to decIde. Take Van yke's
portraIt oI CharIes (In the Iouvre). As a portraIt oI a man who actuaIIy exIsted, It Is a
hIstorIcaI record, a work oI hIstory. Yet It Is cIearIy more than a IamIIy snapshot or a
journaIIstIc photograph. IIke every great portraItIst, Van yke wanted to achIeve more
than a IaIthIuI record oI how hIs modeI actuaIIy Iooked. IIs aIm was aIso to convey an IdeaI
vIsIon oI what hIs modeI shouId have Iooked IIke, the way the modeI wanted to appear and
to be, a man oI sImpIe but IncomparabIe eIegance and authorIty. Thus the Image Is oI an
actuaI object and at the same tIme Is IIctIonaI. hIstory and art remaIn IntertwIned. VIsuaI
worIds, In partIcuIar, {p.62) oIten exhIbIt a duaI nature oI thIs sort. ote, IInaIIy, that,
even though aII medIa can, and both Ianguage and vIsuaI medIa oIten do, serve the aIms
oI hIstory and art, In practIce we have no sIgnIIIcant auraI works oI hIstory. It has aIready
been poInted out that our Interest In portrayIng the auraI Ieatures oI the outer worId Is
mInImaI.
ThIs quaIIIIes the statement that "we cannot have hIstory whIch does not at aII represent
the actuaI" suIIIcIentIy to make It pIausIbIe. ut what about the statement whIch seems to
cry even more IoudIy Ior quaIIIIcatIon, the statement to the eIIect that "we cannot have
art whIch does not at aII represent a IIctIonaI worId"? What seems probIematIc here Is that
so much art Is not obvIousIy representatIonaI. t Is not just that the ImagInary worIds
evoked by art may consIst oI abstract objects, as we have seen to be the case wIth most
abstract paIntIng and wIth tonaI musIc. t Is, rather, that much art Is not representatIonaI
even In thIs broad sense In whIch abstract paIntIng or tonaI InstrumentaI musIc can be
saId to be representatIonaI. IecaII, however, what has been saId earIIer about repIIcas
and abstract works. When dIscussIng the structure oI medIa, have estabIIshed that, at
the extremes, the work whose IunctIon Is to represent a worId ceases to represent and
becomes no more than a reaI object (one that repIIcates other actuaIIy exIstIng reaI
objects, or one that does not, that Is abstract). IepIIcas and abstract works are pertInent
here, sInce art as we know It Is IuII oI them. AbstractIon In partIcuIar remaIns a centraI
preoccupatIon oI the vIsuaI arts and musIc throughout the twentIeth century, and works
oI even earIIer, tonaI musIc combIne representatIonaI and abstract Ieatures.
Page 47 of 54
As have argued above, when conIronted wIth a perIectIy abstract work (or a repIIca, Ior
that matter), we have the choIce oI eIther treatIng It as nothIng but a reaI object, or
assImIIatIng It to our cuIturaI habIts and InterpretIng It as an embodIment oI an ImagInary
worId, an expressIon oI a state oI mInd, Ior Instance. n the Iormer case, It Is dIIIIcuIt to
see what the poInt oI a perIectIy abstract work, or oI a repIIca, mIght be (unIess It
becomes an eIement oI a Iarger desIgn by an archItect, gardener, or InterIor decorator).
ThereIore, the Iatter choIce has to be made II the work Is to be worthy oI our eIIort, Is to
have any vaIue Ior us. Moreover, we know that we have the same choIce when
conIronted wIth any reaI object. we may treat It eIther as an artIIact desIgned to IuIIIII a
IunctIon, to be used, or as an artwork, an embodIment oI an ImagIned worId oI human
practIces and aspIratIons that the object ImpIIes, sInce It mIght IunctIon In such a worId.
uIIdIngs, In partIcuIar, are reaI objects desIgned to be used, and In consIderIng them we
may aIways remaIn hard-headed reaIIsts and see them Irom a strIctIy utIIItarIan poInt oI
vIew as Instruments servIng theIr desIgnated IunctIons more or Iess eIIIcIentIy. ut wIth
buIIdIngs we aIso have the optIon oI treatIng them as embodIments oI theIr buIIders or
owners seII-Images, aspIratIons, vaIues, and preIerences as to Iorms oI IIIe worth
cuItIvatIng, that Is, as IntImatIng ImagInary Lebenswelten.
t Is thIs abIIIty to evoke ImagInary worIds, and not representatIon In the strIct and
narrow sense, whIch Is the dIstInguIshIng Ieature oI art. ThIs Is the sense In {p.63) whIch
my cIaIm that "we cannot have art whIch does not at aII represent a IIctIonaI worId" can be
justIIIed. ven a perIectIy abstract work, a repIIca, or an artIIact, In so Iar as they are
treated as artworks, must be seen or heard to embody an ImagInary worId, II they are to
have any vaIue Ior us. ut we may draw a dIstInctIon between objects whIch must be
treated as representatIons II they are to be understood at aII (we mIght caII them "poetIc"
artworks, sInce theIr paradIgmatIc exampIes are works empIoyIng the medIum oI
Ianguage) and objects whIch gIve us the optIon oI treatIng them eIther as mere
Instruments oI use, or as embodIments oI IIIe Iorms (we mIght caII these "desIgn"
artworks, sInce theIr most typIcaI exampIes are works oI archItecture).
ote, however, that the broad sense In whIch representatIon Is conceIved In my cIaIm
Iorces me to revIse one oI my earIIer concIusIons. When a vIsuaI (or auraI) work Is
representatIonaI In the broader, rather than narrower, sense, It Is no Ionger true that, as
have prevIousIy cIaImed, the worId It evokes must be vIsuaI (or auraI). The worId In
such cases Is, IIke a IIterary worId, conceptuaI, that Is, It consIsts oI concepts each oI whIch
may, but does not have to, be reaIIzed (cashed In) wIth a varIety oI Images. A heavy
peasant dance evoked In a movement oI a ruckner symphony brIngs to mInd concepts
("a peasant dance" and Iurther, more broadIy, "a peasant way oI IIIe") that may be IIIIed
In wIth most varIed Images In aII sense modaIItIes. evertheIess, such a worId stIII has the
structure oI a representatIon, and not oI an argument.
have cIaImed that the dIstInctIon between the representatIonaI worIds oI hIstory and art
depends on whether theIr representatIons portray actuaI objects or are IIctIonaI.
Somewhat sImIIarIy, the dIstInctIon between the argumentatIve worIds oI scIence and
phIIosophy depends upon a Iurther subdIvIsIon oI arguments. oth scIence and
Page 48 of 54
phIIosophy argue, resuIt In beIIeIs, about the worId. ut whIIe scIence aIms to produce
beIIeIs about the worId as It Is, phIIosophy aIms to produce beIIeIs about the worId as It
shouId be.
reaIIze, oI course, that much wouId have to be saId to make thIs Iast cIaIm pIausIbIe,
much more In Iact than couId say here wIthout gettIng hopeIessIy sIdetracked. My
conceptIon oI phIIosophy, In partIcuIar, Is at Ieast as debatabIe as any other. an ongoIng
debate about the nature oI phIIosophy Is so centraI to thIs dIscIpIIne that one wouId
probabIy have to IncIude It In any comprehensIve deIInItIon thereoI. Whatever eIse they
do, phIIosophers aIso worry about the nature and aIms oI phIIosophy. ut my purposes
wIII not be served by my enterIng thIs partIcuIar debate. t wIII be quIte suIIIcIent here to
note that arguments about the worId as It shouId be, rather than as It Is, are possIbIe and
that "phIIosophy" Is the name under whIch we shaII subsume aII such arguments here.
Two poInts mIght be made to deIend such usage. IIrst, the questIon, Iow shouId we
IIve? was crucIaIIy Important to the dIscIpIIne's IoundIng Iathers, much more so than the
epIstemoIogIcaI questIons whIch took center stage wIth escartes, and It was a questIon
about what shouId be, rather than what Is. (IecaII Socrates statIng In the Republic that
hIs InquIry concerns "the greatest oI aII thIngs, the good IIIe or the bad IIIe.") Second, to
the extent that phIIosophy has hIstorIcaIIy {p.64) occupIed ItseII aIso wIth what Is, Its
scope has been narrowed step-by-step as partIcuIar scIences took over Its varIous
specIIIc questIons. Iad phIIosophy occupIed ItseII onIy wIth what Is, Its eventuaI demIse
wouId have been easy to predIct. ut questIons concernIng what shouId be, rather than
what Is, wIII, one hopes, contInue to be asked, and these questIons cannot be gIven
scIentIIIc treatment. "IhIIosophy" seems to remaIn the hIstorIcaIIy best justIIIed name Ior
arguments deaIIng wIth questIons oI thIs sort.
Notes:
(1.) GIovannI IIco deIIa MIrandoIa, "OratIon on the IgnIty oI Man," trans. IIzabeth
IIvermore Iorbes, In rnst CassIrer, IauI Oskar KrIsteIIer, and john Ierman IandaII,
jr., eds., The Rencisscnce Fhilosophy oj Mcn (ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress,
1948), pp. 224-25.
(2.) IIato, Republic, bk. 9, 578c, trans. IauI Shorey.
(3.) johann GottIrIed Ierder, Esscy on the Origin oj Lcngucge, trans. AIexander Gode, In
jean-jacques Iousseau and j.G.Ierder, On the Origin oj Lcngucge (ChIcago. The
!nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1966), pp. 85-166.
(4.) IrIedrIch Ietzsche, On the Advcntcge cnd Discdvcntcge oj History jor Lije, 1,
trans. Ieter Ireuss (ndIanapoIIs. Iackett, 1980), pp. 8-9.
(5.) MartIn IeIdegger, "The OrIgIn oI the Work oI Art," In Foetry, Lcngucge, Thought
(ew York. Iarper S Iow, 1971), p. 44.
(6.) Two recent essays stress the roIe oI the ImagInary In eatIng and In erotIcIsm,
respectIveIy. Ieon I. Kass, The Hungry Soul: Ecting cnd the Ferjecting oj Our Ncture
Page 49 of 54
(ew York. Iree Iress, 1994), and OctavIo Iaz, The Double Flcme: Love cnd Eroticism,
trans. IeIen Iane (ew York. Iarcourt race, 1995).
(7.) SebasteIn Ioch IcoIas ChamIort, Froducts oj the Ferjected Civilizction: Selected
Writings, trans. W. S. MerwIn (Iondon. MacmIIIan, 1969), p. 170.
(8.) The Iatter seems to be the case oI the ChInese art oI wrItIng. AccordIng to SImon
Ieys, the apprecIatIon oI thIs art "does not resIde In a IIterary apprecIatIon oI the
contents, but In an ImagInatIve communIon wIth the dynamIcs oI the brushwork, what the
vIewer needs Is not to read a text, but to retrace In hIs mInd the orIgInaI dance oI the
brush and to reIIve Its rhythmIc progress." SImon Ieys, "One More Art," The New York
Review oj Books 43/7 (AprII 18, 1996), 28.
(9.) MIcheI IoucauIt, The Order oj Things: An Archeology oj the Humcn Sciences (ew
York. Iandom Iouse, 1970).
(10.) CharIes audeIaIre, "IIchard Wagner and Tcnnhcuser In IarIs," In Selected
Writings on Art cnd Artists, trans. I. . Charvet (Iarmondsworth. IenguIn ooks, 1972),
pp. 330-31.
(11.) Arthur C. anto, Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visucl Arts in Fost-Historiccl
Ferspective (ew York. Iarrar, Straus and GIroux, 1992), pp. 5-6.
(12.) anto, Beyond the Brillo Box, pp. 39-40.
(13.) Ians-Georg Gadamer, Truth cnd Method (ew York. ContInuum, 1975), p. 141.
(14.) IeIdegger, "The OrIgIn oI the Work oI Art," In Foetry, Lcngucge, Thought, pp. 32-
37.
(15.) ote, however, that not everyone wIII IInd even thIs exampIe convIncIng. anto,
commentIng on the struggIe oI contemporary artIsts to achIeve a IIat surIace, wrItes.
"whIIe nothIng seemed easIer-the surIaces were IIat-the task was ImpossIbIe In that,
however evenIy paInt was appIIed, the resuIt was a pIece oI pIctorIaI depth oI
anIndetermInate extensIon." Arthur C. anto, The Trcnsjigurction oj the Commonplcce: A
Fhilosophy oj Art (CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1981), p. 87.
(16.) As quoted In Sandra IaWaII IIpshuItz, Selected Works. The Minnecpolis lnstitute oj
Arts (MInneapoIIs. The MInneapoIIs nstItute oI Arts, 1988), pp. 220-21, where the
paIntIng Is reproduced.
(17.) IIchard WoIIheIm, Fcinting cs cn Art (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1987),
pp. 46, 62. WoIIheIm's argument Is deveIoped In KendaII I. WaIton, Mimesis cs Mcke-
Believe: On the Foundctions oj the Representctioncl Arts (CambrIdge. Iarvard
!nIversIty Iress, 1990), pp. 55-56.
(18.) See Anthony Iunt, Artistic Theory in ltcly 1450-1500 (OxIord. OxIord !nIversIty
Page 50 of 54
Iress, 1962), pp. 53-55.
(19.) AIaIn CorbIn, The Foul cnd the Frcgrcnt: Odor cnd the French Socicl lmcginction
(CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1986), CorbIn, Les cloches de lc terre: pcyscge
sonore et culture sensible dcns les ccmpcgnes cu XlX
e
sicle (IarIs. A. MIcheI, 1994),
IeInhard Strohm, Music in Lcte Medievcl Bruges (OxIord. CIarendon Iress, 1985).
(20.) . I. GombrIch, Art cnd lllusion: A Study in the Fsychology oj Fictoricl
Representction, 2d ed. (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1961), p. 281.
(21.) . I. GombrIch, The Sense oj Order: A Study in the Fsychology oj Decorctive Art
(thaca. CorneII !nIversIty Iress, 1979), p. 302.
(22.) Ior arguments to the eIIect that musIcaI motIon and tIme are sembIances, see,
among others, Susanne K. Ianger, Feeling cnd Form: A Theory oj Art (ew York.
CharIes ScrIbner's Sons, 1953), pp. 107-18. More recentIy, Ioger Scruton has
repeatedIy emphasIzed that musIcaI motIon Is ImagInary and that Its descrIptIon must
necessarIIy InvoIve the use oI metaphor. See Ioger Scruton, The Aesthetics oj
Architecture (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1979), pp. 82-84, "!nderstandIng
MusIc," In The Aesthetic Understcnding (Iondon. Methuen, 1983), pp. 77-100, "AnaIytIc
IhIIosophy and the MeanIng oI MusIc," In I. Shusterman, ed., Anclytic Aesthetics
(OxIord. asII IackweII, 1989), pp. 85-96, and especIaIIy The Aesthetics oj Music (OxIord.
CIarendon Iress, 1997), pp. 1-96. Ior Scruton, however, "movement and boundary are
. . . IntrInsIc to the musIcaI experIence, and not pecuIIar to tonaI musIc." (The Aesthetics oj
Music, p. 54). On the other hand, he does recognIze that "the Interest oI more recent
experIments In atonaIIty oIten resIdes In noveI sonorItIes, organIzed In ways whIch do not
permIt the experIence oI musIcaI movement. MusIc then retreats Irom the IntentIonaI to
the materIaI reaIm." (lbid., p. 281).
(23.) duard IansIIck, On the Musicclly Becutijul: A Contribution towcrds the Revision oj
the Aesthetics oj Music, trans. GeoIIrey Iayzant (ndIanapoIIs. Iackett, 1986), pp. 29 and
93.
(24.) Ianger, Feeling cnd Form, p. 109.
(25.) Ianger, Feeling cnd Form, p. 125.
(26.) Ioman ngarden, The Work oj Music cnd the Froblem oj lts ldentity (erkeIey.
!nIversIty oI CaIIIornIa Iress, 1986), pp. 77-78.
(27.) CI. Ired IerdahI, "CognItIve ConstraInts on ComposItIonaI Systems," In john A.
SIoboda, ed., Generctive Frocesses in Music: The Fsychology oj Ferjormcnce,
lmprovisction, cnd Composition (OxIord. CIarendon Iress, 1988), pp. 231-59.
(28.) Sren KIerkegaard, Either/Or, ed. and trans. I. V. Iong and . I. Iong, voI. 1
(IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1987), p. 64.
Page 51 of 54
(29.) Arthur Schopenhauer, The World cs Will cnd Representction, trans. . I. j. Iayne,
voI. 1 (ew York. over, 1966), 52, p. 256.
(30.) Schopenhauer, The World cs Will cnd Representction, voI. 1, 52, p. 257.
(31.) Schopenhauer, The World cs Will cnd Representction, voI. 1, 52, p. 260.
(32.) G. W. I. IegeI, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, 2 voIs. (OxIord.
OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1975), p. 626.
(33.) IegeI, Aesthetics, p. 891.
(34.) IansIIck, On the Musicclly Becutijul, p. 50.
(35.) mmanueI Kant, The Critique oj ]udgement, trans. j. C. MeredIth (OxIord. OxIord
!nIversIty Iress, 1952), 330, p. 196.
(36.) ArIstotIe, Folitics, bk. 8, ch. 5, 1340a-b, trans. enjamIn jowett.
(37.) IIato, Republic, bk. 3, 401d, trans. IauI Shorey.
(40.) IrIedrIch Ietzsche, Twilight oj the ldols, In The Fortcble Nietzsche, ed. and trans.
W. KauImann (ew York. VIkIng, 1954), p. 520.
(41.) Firenze e dintorni, GuIda d'taIIa deI TourIng CIub taIIano, 6th ed. (MIIan. T.C..,
1974), p. 320.
(42.) saIah erIIn, Fersoncl lmpressions (ew York. VIkIng, 1981), p. 193.
(43.) IegeI, Aesthetics, pp. 88-89.
(46.) The cIassIc phenomenoIogIcaI study where thIs poInt Is argued Is jean-IauI Sartre,
The Fsychology oj lmcginction (Secaucus, .j.. The CItadeI Iress, n.d.), a transIatIon oI
hIs L'lmcgincire (IarIs. GaIIImard, 1940). On the sIde oI the anaIytIcaI tradItIon, see In
partIcuIar Ioger Scruton, Art cnd lmcginction: A Study in the Fhilosophy oj Mind
(Iondon. Methuen, 1974).
(47.) IIato, Sophist, 263e, trans. IrancIs MacdonaId CornIord, In . IamIIton and I.
CaIrns, eds., The Collected Diclogues (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1961), p.
1011.
Page 52 of 54
(48.) See Steven IInker, The Lcngucge lnstinct (ew York. IarperIerennIaI, 1995), pp.
55-82.
(49.) jacques errIda, Oj Grcmmctology, trans. GayatrI Chakravorty SpIvak (aItImore.
johns IopkIns !nIversIty Iress, 1976), p. 7.
(50.) errIda, Oj Grcmmctology, p. 73.
(54.) jean-jacques Iousseau, Esscy on the Origin oj Lcngucges, trans. john I. Moran
(ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1966), ch. 5, pp. 21-22.
(55.) ArIstotIe, Foetics, ch. 6, 1450b17-20, trans. ngram ywater.
(56.) Georg WIIheIm IrIedrIch IegeI, Fhilosophy oj Mind. Being Fcrt Three oj the
Encyclopcedic oj the Fhilosophiccl Sciences (1830), 458, trans. WIIIIam WaIIace and A. V.
MIIIer (OxIord. OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1971), p. 213.
(57.) ArIstotIe, Folitics, bk. 1, ch. 2, 1253a, trans. enjamIn jowett.
(58.) IudwIg WIttgensteIn, Trcctctus logico-philosophicus, 7, trans. . I. Iears and . I.
McGuInness (Iondon. IoutIedge S Kegan IauI, 1961), pp. 150-51.
(59.) ArIstotIe, On the Soul, 429a, trans. j. A. SmIth.
(60.) Gadamer, Truth cnd Method, pp. 362-63.
(61.) Kant, The Critique oj ]udgement, 328, p. 194.
(62.) IegeI, Fhilosophy oj Mind, 459, pp. 213-14.
(63.) IegeI, Fhilosophy oj Mind, 459, p. 215.
(64.) See the exceIIent dIscussIon In IInker, The Lcngucge lnstinct, pp. 189-91, Irom
whom the exampIe Is taken.
(65.) IInker, The Lcngucge lnstinct, p. 191.
(66.) Iecent exampIes oI thIs IIterature are dIscussed In IydIa Goehr, The lmcgincry
Museum oj Musiccl Works: An Esscy in the Fhilosophy oj Music (OxIord. CIarendon
Iress, 1992).
(67.) Gadamer, Truth cnd Method, p. 130.
Page 53 of 54
(68.) WaIter enjamIn, "The Work oI Art In the Age oI MechanIcaI IeproductIon," In
llluminctions (ew York. Schocken ooks, 1969), pp. 217-51.
(69.) St. AugustIne, Conjessions, bk. 6, ch. 3, trans. WIIIIam Watts.
(70.) Seymour Chatman dIstInguIshed three "text-types," narratIve, descrIptIon, and
argument, In hIs "arratIve and Two Other Text-Types," In Coming to Terms: The
Rhetoric oj Ncrrctive in Fiction cnd Film (thaca. CorneII !nIversIty Iress, 1990), pp. 6-
21. My dIstInctIon paraIIeIs Chatman's to the extent that my "representatIons" embrace
both hIs "narratIves" and "descrIptIons," whIIe our "arguments" correspond wIth one
another. The dIIIerence between our conceptIons Is that what Ior Chatman are "text-
types" are Ior me "worId-types."
(71.) enedetto Croce, Aesthetic cs Science oj Expression cnd Genercl Linguistic, trans.
ougIas AInsIIe, rev. ed. (Iondon. MacmIIIan S Co., 1922), p. 31.
(72.) AccordIng to Arthur C. anto, In Ajter the End oj Art: Contemporcry Art cnd the
Fcle oj History (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1997), p. 18, n. 5, the IIrst one
thus to characterIze IegeI's book was josIah Ioyce.
(73.) IIchard Iorty, "s errIda a TranscendentaI IhIIosopher?," In Esscys on Heidegger
cnd Others. Fhilosophiccl Fcpers, voI. 2 (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress,
1991), p. 123.
(74.) ArIstotIe, On the Soul, bk. 3, ch. 7, 431a, trans. j. A. SmIth.
(75.) ArIstotIe, On the Soul, bk. 3, ch. 7, 431b, trans. j. A. SmIth.
(76.) Croce, Aesthetic cs Science oj Expression cnd Genercl Linguistic, p. 22.
(77.) MarceI Iroust, The Guermcntes Wcy, Remembrcnce oj Things Fcst, trans. C. K.
Scott MoncrIeII, voI. 1 (ew York. Iandom Iouse, 1934), p. 1107.
Page 54 of 54
Aesthetics II. The Uses of Art
Page 1 of 50
A Theory of Art
Karo Berger
IrInt S-13. 9780195128604
O. 10.1093/0195128605.001.0001
Aesthetcs II. The Uses of Art
DOI:10.1093/0195128605.003.0002
The repertory oI medIated experIences aIIows us to begIn deIIberatIng on the questIon oI
how we shouId IIve, to choose the extent that It Is possIbIe through our actIons and
passIons, and to justIIy our choIces. The most basIc kInds oI works - hIstory, art, scIence,
and phIIosophy - dIvIde among themseIves varIous tasks that aIIow us to understand
ourseIves and our worId, to know how we shouId IIve. SInce phIIosophy uses arguments
to make expIIcIt, crItIcIze, and Improve the norms that govern our aIready current
practIces, and hence Its arguments cannot exIst In separatIon Irom the representatIons oI
hIstory and art, IegeIs thesIs oI the end oI art cannot stand. ut art Is more than an
Instrument oI seII-knowIedge and seII-InventIon, no Iess Important than educatIon Is
pIeasure. The varIous vIews concernIng the possIbIe worth oI the dIsInterested aesthetIc
pIeasure that have been hIstorIcaIIy derIved Irom Kants anaIysIs. aII varIants oI the cIaIm
that to the extent that we vaIue human Ireedom, we must aIso vaIue those actIvItIes In
whIch the possIbIIIty oI such Ireedom Is most cIearIy and characterIstIcaIIy demonstrated,
Page 2 of 50
do not persuade, any pIeasure, unIess It Is harmIuI, Is seII-evIdentIy vaIuabIe and does
not requIre any Iurther arguments In Its Iavor. t Is argued that there Is nothIng InartIstIc
or Improper In derIvIng Interested pIeasures Irom the experIence oI art. AgaInst
purItanIcaI moraIIsts, It Is argued that such Interested pIeasures may IunctIon not onIy as
a means oI seII-escape or oI corruptIng the young and IrresponsIbIe, but aIso as a means
oI seII-dIscovery, In whIch pIeasure Is edIIIcatIon.
leywords: ethca fe, hstory, art, phosophy, Hege, end-of-art thess, educaton, peasure, aesthetc, Kant
Agcinst the crt oj works oj crt. - Art Is above and beIore aII supposed to becutijy
IIIe, thus make us ourseIves endurabIe, II possIbIe pIeasIng to others. wIth thIs task
In vIew It restraIns us and keeps us wIthIn bounds, creates socIaI Iorms, Imposes on
the unmannerIy ruIes oI decency, cIeanIIness, poIIteness, oI speakIng and stayIng
sIIent at the proper tIme. Then, art Is supposed to concecl or reinterpret
everythIng ugIy, those paInIuI, dreadIuI, dIsgustIng thIngs whIch, aII eIIorts
notwIthstandIng, In accord wIth the orIgIn oI human nature agaIn and agaIn InsIst on
breakIng Iorth. It Is supposed to do so especIaIIy In regard to the passIons and
psychIcaI Iears and torments, and In the case oI what Is IneIuctabIy or InvIncIbIy
ugIy to Iet the mecning oI the thIng shIne through. AIter thIs great, Indeed Immense
task oI art, what Is usuaIIy termed art, thct oj the work oj crt, Is mereIy an
cppendcge.
IrIedrIch Ietzsche, Humcn, All Too Humcn
a. The Ethca Lfe
What have done thus Iar was to IInd pIaces Ior the most basIc kInds oI works (hIstory,
art, scIence, and phIIosophy) In the grId oI worId-types. We know now that both hIstory
and art represent worIds, the Iormer actuaI, the Iatter IIctIonaI ones, and that both
scIence and phIIosophy argue about the worId, the Iormer as It Is, the Iatter as It shouId
be. Thus we know now what these varIous kInds oI works do. The questIon that stIII needs
to be expIored more IuIIy Is what theIr (and In partIcuIar, art's) poInt Is, what the vaIue Is
oI theIr doIng what they do.
An InItIaI answer pertaInIng to aII cuIturaI medIa was suggested at the outset In the sectIon
"The MedIa oI CuIture." have estabIIshed there that at bottom we need the medIa sInce,
In order to know what to desIre and what to avoId, we {p.66) need to go beyond
ImmedIate awareness, to be abIe to objectIIy and store earIIer experIences In some way,
so that we may recaII them In ImagInatIon when necessary. The repertory oI medIated
experIences, those oI our own and those oI our IeIIows, aIIows us to begIn to IInd out
what we shouId want and what we shouId avoId, to make choIces between varIous
objects oI our desIre and between competIng or conIIIctIng desIres, to justIIy our desIres
and ensuIng actIons to ourseIves and to others, to justIIy our IeeIIngs. !ItImateIy, the
medIa aIIow us to deIIberate on the questIon, Iow shouId we IIve?, to choose to the
extent that It Is possIbIe our actIons and passIons and to justIIy our choIces.
The extent to whIch such choIces are possIbIe does not seem ever to be IuIIy knowabIe.
Page 3 of 50
That our choIces are aIways IImIted In some ways by the cIrcumstances Is cIear. Whether
we ever are Iree to make choIces Is the subject oI an Intense centurIes-Iong debate over
determInIsm and Iree wIII (or, II you preIer the theoIogIcaI versIon oI the debate, the
subject oI an equaIIy Intense controversy over how to reconcIIe God's omnIpotence wIth
our human responsIbIIIty Ior our own saIvatIon or damnatIon). IegardIess oI what the
outcome oI thIs debate wIII be (II It ever has an outcome), It Is unIIkeIy to have sIgnIIIcant
practIcaI consequences. It does not seem to be at aII possIbIe to IIve and act consIstentIy
wIth the convIctIon that nothIng we do Is ever the resuIt oI our Iree choIce. We seem to
have no choIce In thIs matter, but to IIve and act as II we beIIeved that we can make
choIces whIch, aIthough IImIted In varIous ways by cIrcumstances, are Iree In the sense
that In choosIng to act thus, we beIIeve we couId aIso choose to act otherwIse. n other
words, regardIess oI whether the convIctIon that we are abIe to make genuIne choIces, to
act thus or otherwIse, Is metaphysIcaIIy or otherwIse justIIIed or not, It Is a necessary
convIctIon. we may deny that we have It, but we cannot IIve and act consIstentIy wIth thIs
denIaI. As IegeI put It, "Ireedom Is just as much a basIc determInatIon oI the wIII as
weIght Is a basIc determInatIon oI bodIes."
1
Or agaIn. "The nature oI spIrIt can best be
understood II we contrast It wIth Its dIrect opposIte, whIch Is matter. just as gravIty Is the
substance oI matter, so aIso can It be saId that Ireedom Is the substance oI spIrIt."
2
nstead oI worryIng about the metaphysIcaI underpInnIng oI our Ireedom, then, we
wouId do better to make practIcaI decIsIons as to when It makes sense to treat ourseIves
and others as Iree and when as determIned. We mIght want, Ior Instance, to treat the
grown-up members oI a moraI communIty as more responsIbIe Ior theIr actIons and the
chIIdren (as we try to educate them Into a membershIp In such a communIty) as more
determIned. SImIIarIy, we mIght want to consIder the threat oI torture or death a better
excuse Ior a grown-up's wrongdoIng than hIs havIng been deprIved oI a proper
educatIon or genes as a chIId. saIah erIIn made thIs poInt most admIrabIy In hIs 1954
essay on "IIstorIcaI nevItabIIIty".
t may weII be that the growth oI scIence and hIstorIcaI knowIedge does In Iact tend
to show-make probabIe-that much oI what was hItherto attrIbuted to the acts oI
the unIettered wIIIs oI IndIvIduaIs can be satIsIactorIIy expIaIned onIy by the
workIng oI other, 'naturaI, ImpersonaI Iactors, that we have, In our Ignorance or
vanIty, extended the reaIm oI human Ireedom much too Iar. Yet, {p.67) the very
meanIng oI such terms as 'cause and 'InevItabIe depends on the possIbIIIty oI
contrastIng them wIth at Ieast theIr ImagInary opposItes. . . . !nIess we attach some
meanIng to the notIon oI Iree acts, I.e. acts not whoIIy determIned by antecedent
events or by the nature and 'dIsposItIonaI characterIstIcs oI eIther persons or
thIngs, It Is dIIIIcuIt to see why we come to dIstInguIsh acts to whIch responsIbIIIty Is
attached Irom mere segments In a physIcaI, or psychIcaI, or psycho-physIcaI causaI
chaIn oI events. . . . Yet It Is thIs dIstInctIon that underIIes our normaI attrIbutIon oI
vaIues, In partIcuIar the notIon that praIse and bIame can ever be justIy (not mereIy
useIuIIy or eIIectIveIy) gIven. . . . do not here wIsh to say that determInIsm Is
necessarIIy IaIse, onIy that we neIther speak nor thInk as II It couId be true, and that
It Is dIIIIcuIt, and perhaps beyond our normaI powers, to conceIve what our pIcture
oI the worId wouId be II we serIousIy beIIeved It.
3
Page 4 of 50
Iousseau's Savoyard vIcar thought sImIIarIy.
You wIII ask me agaIn how know that there are spontaneous motIons. shaII teII
you that know It because sense It. want to move my arm, and move It wIthout
thIs movement's havIng another ImmedIate cause than my wIII. t wouId be vaIn to
try to use reason to destroy thIs sentIment In me. t Is stronger than any evIdence.
One mIght just as weII try to prove to me that do not exIst.
4
n short, we have no choIce but to make choIces. ut must we aIso justIIy them? Iere we
do have a choIce. We know as a matter oI sImpIe empIrIcaI moraI psychoIogy that our
actIons are motIvated by eIther passIons, or reasons, or a mIxture oI the two. A IIIe oI
random choIces, each taken at the moment's whIm, wIthout any deIIberatIon and
justIIIcatIon, Is conceIvabIe. ut It Is useIuI to be aware oI the ethIcaI and poIItIcaI
consequences oI such a IIIe. A socIety whose members dId not deveIop the practIce oI
justIIyIng theIr actIons to theIr IeIIows wouId have no mechanIsm oI resoIvIng InternaI
conIIIcts other than by naked Iorce. The name oI the practIce oI justIIIcatIon Is most
IeIIcItous, because the essentIaI IunctIon oI thIs practIce Is precIseIy to provIde an
aIternatIve to Iorce, a mechanIsm oI resoIvIng conIIIcts by deIIberatIon conducted under
the guIdance oI the Idea oI justIce (IaIrness, ImpartIaIIty). ut there seems to be no way oI
justIIyIng eIther choIce we make between the two IundamentaI Iorms oI socIaI IIIe, the IIIe
oI random choIces or the IIIe oI justIIIed choIces. Much as we habItuaI wrIters and
readers mIght thInk that the Iatter Iorm oI IIIe Is obvIousIy preIerabIe, we couId not
convInce someone IIke Ietzsche In hIs Ieast attractIve moments not to vaIue unIettered
expressIons oI InstInctuaI vItaIIty above aII eIse. The choIce we make between the two
IundamentaI Iorms oI socIaI IIIe Is ItseII unjustIIIed. The best we can do Is to be aware oI
what each choIce ImpIIes, that Is, to speII out In as much detaII as possIbIe the actuaI and
IIkeIy consequences oI eIther Iorm oI IIIe and to make InvIdIous comparIsons between
them. ut In any case, the Iact that we cannot reaIIy justIIy the IIIe oI justIIIed choIces
makes no practIcaI dIIIerence whatsoever. once we IeeI the need to justIIy such a IIIe, we
have aIready ImpIIcItIy made the choIce In Its Iavor.
Once we see the beneIIts that the practIce oI justIIIcatIon brIngs and acquIre {p.68) a
taste Ior It, we are IIkeIy to broaden Its scope. We wIII deIIberate not onIy on cases when
wIIIs cIash, but on aII our centraI aIms and means, wantIng to justIIy them, to oIIer reasons
Ior them, to ourseIves and our IeIIows. That Is, we wIII want to convInce ourseIves and
others not onIy that we want somethIng and are goIng to get It In a partIcuIar way, but
aIso that we have reasons that justIIy our wantIng It and our method oI gettIng It.
Moreover, we wIII deIIberate under the guIdance oI not onIy justIce, but aIso many other
reIevant vIrtues. AIter aII, In any partIcuIar case, our aIms and means may satIsIy the
requIrements oI justIce, but be otherwIse worthIess. justIce Is the essentIaI IndIspensabIe
bedrock vIrtue (IIato made It approprIateIy the subject oI hIs most sustaIned InquIry In
the Republic, one oI the truIy IoundatIonaI books oI our cuIture), but It oIIers guIdance
onIy In cases oI conIIIct. We need to act In accordance wIth a number oI vIrtues II we are
to IIII our IIves wIth an ethIcaIIy justIIIabIe content. AgaIn, we know as a matter oI sImpIe
empIrIcaI moraI psychoIogy that our actIons are motIvated eIther by passIons, or reasons,
or both, and that when we are motIvated by reasons, we justIIy our actIons, to ourseIves
Page 5 of 50
and to others, not onIy wIth reIerence to common Interest (justIce, IaIrness, ImpartIaIIty),
but aIso wIth reIerence to seII-Interest. (We aIso know that, even when convInced that
common Interest shouId overrIde seII-Interest, aII too oIten we mIsrepresent our
motIves, to others or to ourseIves, conscIousIy or not, by cIaImIng to be motIvated by
justIce when In Iact we serve eIther seII-Interest or passIon. ut thIs compIIcatIon need
not detaIn us here.)
VIrtues by themseIves wIII not provIde us wIth worthy aIms. our aIms are born at the
crossroads between our naturaI capacItIes and contIngent cIrcumstances. ut vIrtues
aIIow us to evaIuate our aIms and means. WhIIe, as we have seen a moment ago, we do
not reaIIy need to justIIy the practIce oI justIIyIng actIons, we do need to have at Ieast a
generaI sense oI how such a practIce mIght actuaIIy work. (t wIII quIckIy become obvIous
that my, admIttedIy very sImpIIIIed, account oI the practIce oI justIIIcatIon Is IargeIy
derIved Irom ArIstotIe, whose Nicomcchecn Ethics seems to me, as to a number oI other
recent wrIters-Ians-Georg Gadamer, AIasdaIr Macntyre, Martha C. ussbaum, and
Ioger Scruton In partIcuIar come to mInd-stIII the best guIde to these matters.
5
t Is not
that ArIstotIe's system oI vIrtues Is necessarIIy anythIng more than a hIstorIcaIIy and
cuIturaIIy contIngent code oI behavIor suItabIe Ior an AthenIan cItIzen. t Is rather that
ArIstotIe provIdes us wIth an account oI how to thInk about justIIyIng actIons whIch works
regardIess oI any specIIIc ethIcaI code we mIght want to adopt and whIch Is more pIausIbIe
than other avaIIabIe accounts.)
An actIon can be praIsed or bIamed onIy when It Is voIuntary, that Is, IreeIy chosen, not
done under compuIsIon or In Ignorance oI the cIrcumstances. AccordIng to ArIstotIe, "on
voIuntary passIons and actIons praIse and bIame are bestowed, on those that are
InvoIuntary pardon, and sometImes aIso pIty. . . . Those thIngs . . . are thought InvoIuntary,
whIch take pIace under compuIsIon or owIng to Ignorance."
6
ThIs ImpIIes that the actIon Is
a resuIt oI a deIIberatIon. "choIce InvoIves a ratIonaI prIncIpIe and thought."
7
And Iurther.
"so that sInce {p.69) moraI vIrtue Is a state oI character concerned wIth choIce, and
choIce Is deIIberate desIre, thereIore both the reasonIng must be true and the desIre
rIght, II the choIce Is to be good, and the Iatter must pursue just what the Iormer
asserts."
8
We justIIy a partIcuIar actIon by cIaImIng that It exempIIIIes some generaI
prIncIpIe oI actIon that, Ior some reason, we IInd bIndIng, obIIgatory, proper Ior peopIe
IIke us to IoIIow. The InteIIectuaI vIrtue oI practIcaI wIsdom (phronesis) Is what we need In
order to appIy generaI prIncIpIes to partIcuIar sItuatIons.
ut how can we ever subsume actIons under prIncIpIes? A bodIIy movement by ItseII Is
not an actIon. t constItutes an actIon onIy when It serves an agent's purpose. (Thus,
understand the pecuIIar movements oI your hand as an actIon when reaIIze that you
Intend to scratch yourseII.) t Is precIseIy because an actIon serves the agent's purpose
that It may be seen to embody a generaI prIncIpIe (whether the prIncIpIe Is made expIIcIt
or not) the Iorm oI whIch mIght be somethIng IIke thIs. "GIven the cIrcumstances x, It Is
good to (or. we shouId) do y." (Say, "II It Itches, scratch," or, more to the poInt, "II
oIIended, avenge yourseII," or "II oIIended, turn the other cheek.") When the prIncIpIe oI
an actIon Is made expIIcIt, one can assess whether one has succeeded or IaIIed to do not
Page 6 of 50
onIy what one Intended to do, but aIso what one shouId have done.
ArIstotIe's way oI makIng thIs poInt Is to say that an actIon Is justIIIabIe when It can be
shown that Its prIncIpIe Is In accordance wIth an ethIcaI vIrtue (such as justIce, courage,
temperance, IIberaIIty, and others). A vIrtue Is a Iearned skIII or exceIIence, an acquIred
and permanent good dIsposItIon oI character (ethos), exhIbIted In the exercIse oI one oI
our capacItIes. (As ArIstotIe expIaIns, "we are adapted by nature to receIve them
|vIrtues|, and are made perIect by habIt." And Iurther. "the vIrtues we get by IIrst
exercIsIng them, as aIso happens In the case oI the arts as weII. Ior the thIngs we have to
Iearn beIore we can do them, we Iearn by doIng them."
9
AgaIn, "states oI character arIse
out oI IIke actIvItIes. . . . t makes no smaII dIIIerence, then, whether we Iorm habIts oI one
kInd or oI another Irom our very youth, It makes a very great dIIIerence, or rather cll
the dIIIerence."
10
AgaIn, "we must take as a sIgn oI states oI character the pIeasure or
paIn that ensues on acts . . . Ience we ought to have been brought up In a partIcuIar way
Irom our very youth, as IIato says, so as both to deIIght In and to be paIned by the thIngs
that we ought."
11
) A justIIIabIe course oI actIon Is one that a vIrtuous person, a person
oI good character, wouId take, gIven approprIate cIrcumstances. ("ActIons . . . are caIIed
just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man wouId do, but
It Is not the man who does these that Is just and temperate, but the man who aIso does
them cs just and temperate men do them."
12
) Macntyre summarIzes ArIstotIe's vIew
oI practIcaI reasonIng as IoIIows.
There are IIrst oI aII the wants and goaIs oI the agent, presupposed by but not
expressed In, hIs reasonIng. . . . The second eIement Is the major premIse, an
assertIon to the eIIect that doIng or havIng or seekIng such-and-such Is the type oI
thIng that Is good Ior or needed by a so-and-so. . . . The thIrd eIement Is the mInor
premIse whereIn the agent, reIyIng on a perceptuaI judgment, asserts {p.70) that
thIs Is an Instance or occasIon oI the requIsIte kInd. The concIusIon . . . Is the actIon.
13
ut whence do ethIcaI prIncIpIes (the "major premIses" above) derIve theIr authorIty,
why do we IInd them compeIIIng, bIndIng, obIIgatory, proper Ior peopIe IIke us to IoIIow?
ThInkers oI the nIIghtenment assumed that there were two competIng sources oI
authorIty oI unIversaIIy bIndIng ethIcaI prIncIpIes, reIIgIous tradItIon based on dIvIne
reveIatIon, and phIIosophIcaI specuIatIon based on eIther conscIence or reason. AccordIng
to the Savoyard vIcar, IInd the prIncIpIes oI conduct
wrItten by nature wIth IneIIaceabIe characters In the depth oI my heart. have onIy
to consuIt myseII about what want to do. verythIng sense to be good Is good,
everythIng sense to be bad Is bad. The best oI aII casuIsts Is the conscIence.
14
And Iurther.
There Is In the depths oI souIs, then, an Innate prIncIpIe oI justIce and vIrtue
accordIng to whIch, In spIte oI our own maxIms, we judge our actIons and those oI
others as good or bad. t Is to thIs prIncIpIe that gIve the name conscience.
15
Page 7 of 50
n the vIcar's ceIebrated IormuIa, God has gIven me conscIence so that may Iove the
good, reason so that may know It, and IIberty so that may choose It.
16
The vIcar's vIew contInues to IInd Its adherents today. CoIIn McGInn has recentIy argued,
IoIIowIng IusseII, that judgements oI ethIcs, no Iess than those oI IogIc or mathematIcs,
are ImmedIate and a prIorI, that our knowIedge oI ethIcaI truth Is naturaI, spontaneous,
Innate, just as, accordIng to Chomsky, our knowIedge oI grammar Is.
17
Ior McGInn,
ethIcaI knowIedge does not reIy upon InductIon or abductIon. . . . We beIIeve It to be
a Iaw that bodIes acceIerate unIIormIy as they IaII to earth on the basIs oI InductIon
Irom past conIIrmIng Instances, but we do not beIIeve the 'Iaw that steaIIng Is
wrong by observIng past conIIrmIng Instances and then projectIng to the Iuture.
Ior we do not need to reIy on any such InductIon In the ethIcaI case, we know that
steaIIng Is wrong just by knowIng what steaIIng Is.
18
Iurthermore, "the pIaIn Iact Is that there are many thIngs that are obvIousIy moraIIy
wrong-murder, torture, theIt, betrayaI-and anyone who dIsagrees about these Is
eIther dIshonest or conIused."
19
McGInn may err, however, In hIs cIaIm that whIIe the
truth oI a beIIeI about nature Is coercIve ("we are not Iree to beIIeve whatever we IIke
about nature, not II we want to thrIve"), the truth oI an ethIcaI beIIeI Is not, because
"moraI Iacts do not have causaI powers."
20
suspect, rather, that we are not Iree to
beIIeve whatever we IIke about ethIcs eIther II we want to thrIve. ThInk how IntoIerabIe a
worId wouId be In whIch ethIcaI truths (such as those procIaImIng the vaIue oI truth-
sayIng, promIse-keepIng, or benevoIence, to say nothIng oI respect Ior the IIIe and
property oI another) were {p.71) systematIcaIIy vIoIated and denIed and you wIII readIIy
see that such truths are no Iess pragmatIcaIIy coercIve than the scIentIIIc ones.
t Is Important to notIce, however, that the voIce oI conscIence Is much better at teIIIng
me what not to do than at teIIIng me what to do. More precIseIy, It can teII me onIy what to
do, and especIaIIy what not to do, In a gIven sItuatIon In whIch aIready IInd myseII.
Iemember that, accordIng to Iousseau's vIcar, IIrst want to do somethIng and onIy
then consuIt my conscIence to see whether or not what want Is good. ConscIence Is oI
much Iess heIp when decIde on the kInd oI IIIe want to IIve, the sort oI generaI aIms
wIsh to pursue.
Irom thIs standpoInt, the nIIghtenment's second aIternatIve to reIIgIon, the voIce oI
reason, Is, II anythIng, even Iess heIpIuI. Kant's phIIosophy, In partIcuIar, represented the
most ambItIous attempt to provIde the moderns wIth unIversaIIy bIndIng moraI prIncIpIes
rooted In reason aIone and thus to make the modern moraI agent autonomous, Iree,
answerabIe to no externaI authorIty. Kant beIIeved he had Iound the uItImate prIncIpIe oI
moraIs, one that shouId be bIndIng on every ratIonaI wIII and wIth whIch every other
moraI prIncIpIe shouId accord, In the categorIcaI ImperatIve, whIch requIres oI us In one
IormuIatIon that we treat each human beIng never onIy as a means but aIways aIso as an
end, and In another that we act on prIncIpIes we can wIII to be unIversaI Iaws.
t wouId be dIIIIcuIt not to IeeI sympathy wIth the recommendatIon that we try to respect
Page 8 of 50
the Ireedom oI others and not treat them as machInes and that we try to appIy to our
own behavIor the same standards we appIy to the behavIor oI everyone eIse. ut It Is
equaIIy dIIIIcuIt to avoId the ImpressIon that In a sense these recommendatIons are quIte
empty oI actuaI content. Kant's categorIcaI ImperatIve can provIde us wIth no concrete
aIms to pursue and no concrete prIncIpIes to IoIIow. At most, It mIght seem to set IImIts to
our actIons by provIdIng us wIth a way oI testIng our prIncIpIes. n Iact, however, It Is not
certaIn that It does even that much, especIaIIy In Its second IormuIatIon (whIch says that
one must be abIe to wIII wIthout contradIctIon that the prIncIpIe wIII be unIversaIIy
IoIIowed). As many commentators begInnIng wIth IegeI cIaImed, It Is dIIIIcuIt to IInd an
actIon the prIncIpIe oI whIch one couId not wIII to be a unIversaI Iaw, sInce one can aIways
descrIbe one's actIon so that the proposed prIncIpIe wIII aIIow the actIon whIIe not aIIowIng
others to do anythIng that wouId make the prIncIpIe seII-contradIctory II unIversaIIzed.
21
A guard In a concentratIon camp couId perIorm hIs dutIes wIth the comIortIng convIctIon
that hIs actIons, beIng IegaI, were consIstent wIth the categorIcaI ImperatIve. And even the
IIrst IormuIatIon oI the categorIcaI ImperatIve oIIers a Iar Irom IooIprooI test, sInce a
sIave-owner can easIIy persuade hImseII that sIaves are not quIte human. (As an ordInary
member oI the German Ordnungspolizei that heIped the azI genocIde In occupIed
IoIand so dIsarmIngIy put It. "The jew was not acknowIedged by us to be a human
beIng."
22
) n IegeI's words,
however essentIaI It may be to emphasIze the pure and uncondItIonaI seII-
determInatIon oI the wIII as the root oI duty-Ior knowIedge oI the wIII IIrst {p.72)
gaIned a IIrm IoundatIon and poInt oI departure In the phIIosophy oI Kant, through
the thought oI Its InIInIte autonomy-to cIIng on to a mereIy moraI poInt oI vIew
wIthout makIng the transItIon to the concept oI ethIcs reduces thIs gaIn to an empty
jormclism, and moraI scIence to an empty rhetorIc oI duty jor duty's scke. Irom
thIs poInt oI vIew, no Immanent theory oI dutIes Is possIbIe. One may Indeed brIng
In materIaI jrom outside and thereby arrIve at pcrticulcr dutIes, but It Is ImpossIbIe
to make the transItIon to the determInatIon oI partIcuIar dutIes Irom the above
determInatIon oI duty as cbsence oj contrcdiction, as jormcl correspondence with
itselj, whIch Is no dIIIerent Irom the specIIIcatIon oI cbstrcct indeterminccy, and
even II such a partIcuIar content Ior actIon Is taken Into consIderatIon, there Is no
crIterIon wIthIn that prIncIpIe Ior decIdIng whether or not thIs content Is a duty. On
the contrary, It Is possIbIe to justIIy any wrong or ImmoraI mode oI actIon by thIs
means. . . . The Iact that no property Is present Is In ItseII no more contradIctory
than Is the non-exIstence oI thIs or that IndIvIduaI peopIe, IamIIy, etc., or the
compIete cbsence oj humcn lije. ut II It Is aIready estabIIshed and presupposed
that property and human IIIe shouId exIst and be respected, then It Is a
contradIctIon to commIt theIt or murder, a contradIctIon must be a contradIctIon
wIth somethIng, that Is, wIth a content whIch Is aIready IundamentaIIy present as an
estabIIshed prIncIpIe.
23
IegeI's own (and, to my mInd, persuasIve) vIew was that onIy the actuaI practIces and
InstItutIons oI our own socIety can gIve concrete content to our duty, whIch Is to say that
our duty Is to engage In the perIectIng oI some oI the practIces oI our socIety and to take
Page 9 of 50
care oI the InstItutIons that make these practIces possIbIe. ThIs does not mean that we can
never crItIcIze the exIstIng practIces and InstItutIons. I It dId, how couId we ever Improve
them, and how couId we demand socIaI or poIItIcaI change when conIronted wIth
tyrannIcaI and unjust practIces and InstItutIons? t Is here that conscIence and maybe
even Kant's categorIcaI ImperatIve can perhaps be useIuI aIter aII, provIdIng us wIth
crIterIa, however IaIIIbIe, by whIch we mIght judge our practIces and InstItutIons, say,
whether they are consIstent wIth the requIrements oI reason that the Ireedoms and
rIghts oI each person must be respected, and that our practIces and InstItutIons must be
subject to Iaws that treat every IndIvIduaI aIIke. ut whIIe we may and shouId crItIcIze and
change some oI our socIety's practIces and InstItutIons, we shouId recognIze that we do
not create those ex nihilo, but, rather, InherIt them, and that onIy such InherIted, ongoIng
structures can gIve rIse to any concrete ethIcaI and poIItIcaI prIncIpIes oI actIon. A
wIthdrawaI Irom the practIces and InstItutIons oI our socIety makes sense onIy In, one
hopes, exceptIonaI cIrcumstances, such as those oI totaIItarIan tyranny. To hear IegeI
agaIn,
In the shapes whIch It more commonIy assumes In hIstory (as In the case oI
Socrates, the StoIcs, etc.), the tendency to Iook inwcrds Into the seII and to know
and determIne Irom wIthIn the seII what Is rIght and good appears In epochs when
what Is recognIzed as rIght and good In actuaIIty and custom Is unabIe to satIsIy the
better wIII. When the exIstIng worId oI Ireedom has become unIaIthIuI to the better
wIII, thIs wIII no Ionger IInds ItseII In the dutIes {p.73) recognIzed In thIs worId and
must seek to recover In IdeaI Inwardness aIone that harmony whIch It has Iost In
actuaIIty. . . . OnIy In ages when the actuaI worId Is a hoIIow, spIrItIess, and unsettIed
exIstence may the IndIvIduaI be permItted to IIee Irom actuaIIty and retreat Into hIs
Inner IIIe.
24
And II we agree wIth Iousseau's and Kant's crItIcs and IInd the voIce oI conscIence and
the categorIcaI ImperatIve useIess not onIy as generators oI prIncIpIes, but even as a test
oI prIncIpIes generated by other means, what then? I we can neIther accept the cIaIms oI
reveaIed reIIgIon nor be guIded by conscIence or reason aIone, II we reject the
unIversaIIst pretensIons oI both ChrIstIanIty and the nIIghtenment, what eIse Is IeIt? ven
beIore IegeI's crItIque, Kant's younger contemporary, johann GottIrIed Ierder, In hIs
ldeen zur Fhilosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-91) provIded wIdeIy heard
arguments In Iavor oI the beIIeI that each hIstorIcaI communIty deveIops prIncIpIes oI
actIon that are unIqueIy Its own, that In part at Ieast deIIne Its IndIvIduaIIty, and that
shouId be respected and cherIshed Ior thIs very reason. Ior Ierder, prIncIpIes derIve
theIr authorIty Irom nothIng more than the tradItIon oI the communIty whose ethIcaI IIIe
they govern. SIgnIIIcantIy, hIs vIsIon Incorporates an awareness oI a pIuraIIty oI vaIId
communaI tradItIons coexIstIng and competIng wIth one another.
Some Iorm oI IerderIan IomantIcIsm may be the onIy way avaIIabIe to us, secuIar
chIIdren oI post-nIIghtenment urope. I a pIuraIIty oI IntersectIng, contIngent,
hIstorIcaIIy evoIvIng communaI tradItIons Is aII we have, and II no Independent (God's or
phIIosopher's) poInt oI vIew Irom whIch these tradItIons mIght be evaIuated Is avaIIabIe to
Page 10 of 50
us, we have no choIce but to be ethnocentrIc and IIttIe choIce but to be open-mInded. We
have to be ethnocentrIc, because we cannot step outsIde aII partIcuIar tradItIons, we can
evaIuate them, our own IncIuded, onIy Irom the standpoInt where we aIready IInd
ourseIves. ut the awareness that there are many tradItIons and that they are aII equaIIy
contIngent urges us to keep our mInds open. We can then evaIuate prIncIpIes evoIved by
others and by our own ancestors Irom the standpoInt oI the best overaII vIsIon oI
desIrabIe IIIe we have been abIe to deveIop thus Iar and thus aIIow our tradItIon to evoIve
Iurther. "IractIcaI reasonIng," wrItes CharIes TayIor, " . . . aIms to estabIIsh, not that some
posItIon Is correct absoIuteIy, but rather that some posItIon Is superIor to some other. . . .
The ratIonaI prooI consIsts In showIng that thIs transItIon |Irom one posItIon to another| Is
an error-reducIng one."
25
TradItIons, as both Gadamer and Macntyre stressed, are not
somethIng IIxed and cIosed. "when a tradItIon Is In good order It Is aIways partIaIIy
constItuted by an argument about the goods the pursuIt oI whIch gIves to that tradItIon
Its partIcuIar poInt and purpose. . . . A IIvIng tradItIon . . . Is an hIstorIcaIIy extended, socIaIIy
embodIed argument, and an argument precIseIy In part about the goods whIch constItute
that tradItIon."
26
Thus we can crItIcIze and reIIne our prIncIpIes oI actIon In a communaI enterprIse
InvoIvIng a dIaIogue wIth other communItIes as weII as practIcaI experIment, trIaI and
error. As Ietzsche knew, "objectIvIty" shouId be {p.74) understood not as
'contempIatIon wIthout Interest (whIch Is a nonsensIcaI absurdIty), but as the abIIIty to
control one's Iro and Con and to dIspose oI them, so that one knows how to empIoy a
vcriety oI perspectIves and aIIectIve InterpretatIons In the servIce oI knowIedge.
IenceIorth, my dear phIIosophers, Iet us be on guard agaInst the dangerous oId
conceptuaI IIctIon that posIted a 'pure, wIII-Iess, paInIess, tImeIess knowIng subject, Iet us
be on guard agaInst the snares oI such contradIctory concepts as 'pure reason,
'absoIute spIrItuaIIty, 'knowIedge In ItseII. these aIways demand that we shouId thInk oI
an eye that Is compIeteIy unthInkabIe, an eye turned In no partIcuIar dIrectIon. . . . There Is
only a perspectIve seeIng, only a perspectIve 'knowIng, and the more aIIects we aIIow to
speak about one thIng, the more eyes, dIIIerent eyes, we can use to observe one thIng,
the more compIete wIII our 'concept oI thIs thIng, our 'objectIvIty be.
27
n IearnIng how to justIIy our actIons, we may sImuItaneousIy Iearn how to justIIy our
passIons. That passIons can be justIIIed, that reasons can be oIIered Ior havIng them, or
Ior changIng them, may come as a surprIse to those who have been taught by IIato that
passIons are entIreIy IrratIonaI. ut ArIstotIe Is a much more proIound teacher In thIs
matter aIso. n hIs unsurpassed account oI emotIons (Rhetoric, book 2, chapters 1-11),
ArIstotIe poInted out that each emotIon can be anaIyzed Into three components. There Is,
IIrst, what mIght be caIIed the component oI sensatIon, the way It IeeIs to be In a partIcuIar
emotIonaI state, the paInIuI or pIeasurabIe state oI mInd oI the person aIIected by the
emotIon. There Is, second, what mIght be anachronIstIcaIIy caIIed the IntentIonaI object oI
the emotIon or, as ArIstotIe puts It, the peopIe toward whom the emotIon Is IeIt. And
IInaIIy, there are aIso the grounds on whIch the emotIon Is IeIt, that Is, precIseIy, the
reasons that justIIy our IeeIIng It. Take, Ior Instance, ArIstotIe's IIrst exampIe, anger. IIrst,
the phIIosopher teIIs us, anger Is accompanIed by a paInIuI sensatIon. Second, It Is IeIt
Page 11 of 50
towards peopIe who have conspIcuousIy and wIthout justIIIcatIon sIIghted us or our
IrIends. ThIrd, our IeeIIng angry Is justIIIed when the peopIe we IeeI angry wIth have
Indeed conspIcuousIy and wIthout justIIIcatIon sIIghted us or our IrIends. ow, sIIghtIng Is
a voIuntary act. I, IeeIIng angry wIth some peopIe, we Iearn that we were mIstaken about
the matter, that theIr actIons dId not have the IntentIon oI sIIghtIng us, we Iose the
grounds Ior the emotIon and we have every reason to change our IeeIIngs, to quIet the
anger and grow caIm. Thus, an emotIon can be ratIonaIIy justIIIed, and It can be modIIIed
as a resuIt oI an argument. eedIess to say, just as we do not reaIIy have to justIIy our
actIons, we are aIso not compeIIed to justIIy our passIons. ut once we choose a IIIe oI
justIIIed actIons, we are IIkeIy to want to justIIy our passIons too.
n sum, a IuIIy deveIoped ethIcaI IIIe InvoIves not onIy choosIng both the aIms and the
means oI our actIons, but aIso justIIyIng the most Important choIces, as weII as justIIyIng
and hence, to the IImIted extent that It Is possIbIe, choosIng some oI our passIons. We
justIIy partIcuIar actIons (and passIons) by showIng that they exempIIIy generaI prIncIpIes
("GIven the cIrcumstances x, It Is good to do |or IeeI| y") whIch derIve theIr authorIty
Irom the reIevant communaI tradItIons {p.75) (themseIves subject to contInuous
crItIcIsm and revIsIon). The most basIc kInds oI works IdentIIIed above-hIstory, art,
scIence, and phIIosophy-dIvIde among themseIves varIous tasks that together aIIow us to
understand ourseIves and our worId, to know how we shouId IIve, that Is, to make
precIseIy the choIces an ethIcaI IIIe requIres.
b. Art and Hstory
At the very Ieast, we must have a repertory oI medIated experIences, a memory oI what
actuaIIy happened, and It Is the task oI hIstory (In the very broad sense In whIch thIs term
Is understood here) to provIde It. (IIstory In the usuaI, more narrow, sense Is memory
subjected to schoIarIy rIgor and hence made sImuItaneousIy more systematIc and more
reIIabIe.) y teIIIng us what actuaIIy happened to ourseIves and to others, hIstory aIIows
us to make the IIrst step beyond our ImmedIate awareness, to compare present and past
experIences, and such comparIsons are a prerequIsIte to our beIng abIe to make choIces
that are InIormed rather than random among the objects oI desIre and among desIres
themseIves.
IIstory represents men and women actIng and suIIerIng In partIcuIar cIrcumstances
whIch IImIt theIr choIces. To be sure, thIs deIInItIon, acceptabIe though It probabIy wouId
have been to ThucydIdes, GIbbon, and MIcheIet (but perhaps not to urckhardt), sounds
rather oId-IashIoned today when the most InterestIng work proIessIonaI hIstorIans have
been doIng In recent decades has tended to concentrate on, and stress the determInIng
roIe oI, cIrcumstances (naturaI as weII as manmade, that Is, cIrcumstances such as
geography, cIImate, demography, economy, socIaI reIatIons and InstItutIons, cuIture, and
others) and when the narratIon oI IndIvIduaI human actIons and suIIerIngs has been
consIdered Iess InterestIng. There Is certaInIy nothIng wrong wIth thIs partIcuIar
emphasIs. On the contrary, It accounts Ior much that Is most vItaI In recent achIevements
oI the dIscIpIIne. ut the more tradItIonaI narratIve mode oI hIstory Is unIIkeIy to be
ecIIpsed, or conceded to popuIar wrIters, permanentIy. We need to understand better
Page 12 of 50
and better both the cIrcumstances that constraIn and deIImIt our Ireedom oI actIon, and
the ways we actuaIIy act In such cIrcumstances. t has been estabIIshed above that we
justIIy a partIcuIar actIon by cIaImIng that It exempIIIIes some generaI prIncIpIe oI actIon
that we have accepted and that may take the Iorm. "GIven the cIrcumstances x, It Is good
to do y." I we are to Iearn Irom hIstory, Irom the comparIson oI present and past
experIences, we need the kInd oI hIstory that probes both cIrcumstances and actIons.
esIdes, the hIstory oI our own century, so crucIaIIy shaped by partIcuIar decIsIons made
by partIcuIar IndIvIduaIs (such as IItIer, StaIIn, ChurchIII, IooseveIt, to stIck to just one
generatIon), suggests that we wouId be unwIse to abandon the narratIve mode, wIth Its
emphasIs on actIng and suIIerIng IndIvIduaIs, aItogether. TocquevIIIe, as so oIten, has
somethIng sensIbIe to say on thIs subject.
IIstorIans who wrIte In arIstocratIc ages generaIIy attrIbute everythIng that
happens to the wIII and character oI partIcuIar men. . . . IIstorIans who IIve In
{p.76) democratIc ages show contrary tendencIes. Most oI them attrIbute hardIy
any InIIuence over the destInIes oI mankInd to IndIvIduaIs, or over the Iate oI a
peopIe to the cItIzens. ut they make great generaI causes responsIbIe Ior the
smaIIest partIcuIar events. . . . am IIrmIy convInced that even In democratIc natIons
the genIus, vIces, or vIrtues oI IndIvIduaIs deIay or hasten the course oI the naturaI
destIny oI a peopIe. . . . n aII ages some oI the happenIngs In thIs worId are due to
very generaI causes and others depend on very partIcuIar InIIuences. These two
kInds oI causes are aIways In operatIon, onIy theIr proportIon varIes. GeneraI
causes expIaIn more, and partIcuIar InIIuences Iess, In democratIc than In
arIstocratIc ages.
28
More to the poInt, hIstory In the broadest sense Invoked here, that Is, hIstory as a
memory oI what actuaIIy happened, IncIudes much more than what proIessIonaI hIstorIans
wrIte. t IncIudes journaIIsm and aII sorts oI InIormaI rememberIng we aII constantIy
engage In and transmIt whether In wrItIng or oraIIy. IeopIe who thInk that hIstory has
nothIng to teach them sImpIy dIsregard how much hIstory has aIready taught them. Our
decIsIons regardIng such matters as whether to put our hand Into a IIre, or to start a
war, are potentIaIIy wIser when InIormed by a memory oI what happened Iast tIme we
chose to put our hand Into a IIre or to start a war.
The ImpressIon that hIstory has nothIng to teach us resuIts Irom the Iact that hIstory's
Iessons are dIIIIcuIt to Interpret. IIstory teaches by exampIe. Our abIIIty to Iearn Irom
exampIes requIres beIng abIe to move Irom partIcuIar representatIons to generaI
prIncIpIes and back. ThIs Is cIearIy a matter oI what ArIstotIe caIIed practIcaI wIsdom, a skIII
more dIIIIcuIt than most to acquIre. IIke aII skIIIs, It requIres at Ieast some naturaI aptItude
and pIenty oI practIce. The materIaI a practIce oI thIs sort needs consIsts oI the partIcuIar
exampIes oI our own and our IeIIows' experIences. Thus, the use oI the exampIes hIstory
provIdes Is twoIoId. IIrst, we may IInd a partIcuIar past experIence to be comparabIe to,
and hence to IIIumInate, our present experIence. Second, the very process oI
understandIng hIstorIcaI representatIons InvoIves brIngIng partIcuIar actIons under
generaI prIncIpIes and hence exercIses the skIII oI practIcaI wIsdom. The obvIous
Page 13 of 50
advantage oI usIng the medIated experIences oI others Is that we can Iearn Irom such
experIences wIthout havIng to suIIer theIr consequences. Thus we may Iearn Irom hIstory
wIthout havIng to IIve thereaIter wIth burned IIngers or bombed-out cItIes.
ut our repertory oI medIated experIences does not have to be IImIted onIy to a record
oI what actuaIIy happened. We know aIready that we can encode In our medIa not onIy
actuaI, but aIso IIctIonaI experIences. We know that medIa users can be true creators, not
onIy recreators oI experIence, that they can use the medIa not onIy to record what
actuaIIy happened, but aIso to envIsage new possIbIIItIes, new, as yet not actuaIIzed,
events. Thus can not onIy represent, but aIso, to a certaIn extent at Ieast, Invent myseII
and the worId. ThIs Is precIseIy what art does. "there Is a proIounder sense In whIch the
hIstorIan's actIvIty Is an artIstIc one," wrItes saIah erIIn.
29
Croce, sImIIarIy, cIaImed that
"hIstorIcIty Is not Iorm but content. as Iorm, It Is nothIng but IntuItIon or aesthetIc Iact."
30
{p.77) As wIII become cIear In chapters 4 and 5, the content oI the worIds represented
by hIstory and art Is sImIIar, In that both represent men and women actIng and suIIerIng
In partIcuIar cIrcumstances whIch IImIt theIr choIces. ut by contrast wIth hIstory, art
represents not actuaI, but IIctIonaI worIds. IIke hIstory, art aIIows us to step beyond our
ImmedIate awareness, to compare the present experIence wIth the experIences stored In
It. And IIke hIstory, art teaches by exampIe. o matter how abstract or IantastIc, IIctIons oI
art are suIIIcIentIy IIke the actuaI worId to be usabIe In the same IashIon hIstorIcaI
representatIons are, provIded we have the wIsh and suIIIcIent skIII so to use them. ut
Instead oI teIIIng us what actuaIIy happened to ourseIves and to others, art teIIs us what
IIctIonaIIy happened to peopIe IIke us (and aII peopIe, actuaI and IIctIonaI, are, by deIInItIon,
to some extent IIke us) and hence aIso what, gIven certaIn cIrcumstances, mIght happen to
us.
As was the case wIth hIstory, there are peopIe who assert that art, too, has nothIng to
teach us. t Is dIIIIcuIt not to sympathIze wIth theIr motIves In a century Ioud wIth
demands, not InIrequentIy enIorced by the IuII power oI the state, that art serve poIItIcaI
or moraI aIms, a century durIng whIch, repeatedIy, a sIgnIIIcant part oI the InteIIectuaI
opInIon In the West has gIven and contInues to gIve actIve support to poIItIcaIIy drIven
phIIIstInIsm. ut, agaIn, those who cIaIm that art has nothIng to teach them Ignore how
much they, together wIth aII oI us, have aIready Iearned Irom It.
Art, In the very broad sense In whIch the term has been used here, Is aIter aII much
more than just Iembrandt and eethoven and ante. n aII socIetIes, premodern and
modern, uropean and non-uropean, art has aIways been aII-pervasIve. Irom our earIy
chIIdhood on, we are constantIy surrounded by vIsuaIIy, auraIIy, and verbaIIy produced
Images oI IIctIonaI experIences. What Is perhaps even more sIgnIIIcant, we not onIy
passIveIy receIve such Images, but actIveIy and constantIy produce them, drawIng
pIctures, sIngIng songs, teIIIng storIes and jokes, IantasIzIng. There Is a contInuum
between these mundane everyday actIvItIes and those oI Iembrandt and eethoven and
ante, between the "naIve" art oI the amateurs and the "sentImentaI" art oI the
proIessIonaIs, II may be aIIowed thIs rather Iree adaptatIon Irom SchIIIer. t wouId be
unreaIIstIc to suppose that aII these Images oI IIctIonaI experIences pIay no roIe
Page 14 of 50
whatsoever In the channeIIng oI our desIres and aversIons, partIcuIarIy In younger years.
just thInk how much we Iearn about who we are and what we want by ImagInIng
ourseIves In varIous sItuatIons, especIaIIy once we Iearn to reIIect on our ImagInIngs and
to Interpret them In the IIght oI our IrequentIy hIdden motIves. AdvertIsIng agencIes know
better than our sceptIcs, and so dId IIato when he cIaImed that oId wIves' taIes shouId be
taken serIousIy as a component oI the educatIon oI the young and even subjected to
censorshIp, advIce we stIII take serIousIy In our IndIvIduaI and socIaI practIces and In
dIscussIons about what we shouId aIIow our chIIdren to see and hear.
31
ArIstotIe provIded us wIth an expIanatIon oI the educatIonaI power oI representatIons.
{p.78)
esIdes, when men hear ImItatIons, even apart Irom the rhythms and tunes
themseIves, theIr IeeIIngs move In sympathy. SInce . . . vIrtue consIsts In rejoIcIng
and IovIng and hatIng arIght, there Is cIearIy nothIng whIch we are so much
concerned to acquIre and to cuItIvate as the power oI IormIng rIght judgments, and
oI takIng deIIght In good dIsposItIons and nobIe actIons. . . . The habIt oI IeeIIng
pIeasure or paIn at mere representatIons Is not Iar removed Irom the same IeeIIng
about reaIItIes.
32
More recentIy, Ioger Scruton has stressed the roIe oI art In the educatIon oI IeeIIng.
A man who decIares that hIs tender IeeIIngs have been awoken by the chIId he sees
In the pIcture Is at odds wIth hImseII when he shows hImseII unabIe to IeeI
tenderness towards a reaI chIId. Thus . . . we may . . . test the sIncerIty oI hIs
remark through hIs subsequent behavIor. . . . What IeeI In the presence oI works
oI art may IInd Its uItImate expressIon In my behavIour towards my IeIIows.
33
IepresentatIons, whether oI actuaI or IIctIonaI worIds, teach us to IeeI arIght, to rejoIce
or grIeve, to bestow praIse or bIame, when approprIate, so that we mIght IeeI arIght aIso
when conIronted wIth the reaI worId. "|O|ne oI the oIdest IunctIons oI art," wrItes IauI
IIcoeur, Is "that It constItutes an ethIcaI Iaboratory where the artIst pursues through the
mode oI IIctIon experImentatIon wIth vaIues."
34
Art's great advantage over hIstory In the
economy oI our ethIcaI IIIe Is that It aIIows us to go beyond the actuaI, to make ImagInatIve
experIments, and thus to broaden ImmeasurabIy our repertory oI medIated experIence.
t Is In thIs sense that art aIIows us to create ourseIves. Thanks to art, In IearnIng Irom
partIcuIar exampIes we are not IImIted to what actuaIIy happened, we may antIcIpate and
Invent. And we may do so at a reIatIveIy Iow cost, sInce, when somethIng goes wrong,
ImagInatIve experIments InvoIvIng IIctIonaI characters do much Iess damage than
experIments wIth reaI peopIe. We may Iearn Irom IIctIonaI experIence the same way we
may Iearn Irom actuaI experIence, wIthout havIng to suIIer the consequences oI actuaI
experIence.
Thus, to the extent, and the way, that we Iearn Irom hIstory, we aIso Iearn Irom art, but
where the exampIes oI hIstory have the weIght and soIIdIty oI the actuaI worId as It Is, the
exampIes oI art aIIow us to ImagIne the worId that never was, but that mIght and perhaps
even shouId, or shouId not, be. WIthout hIstory, our choIces wouId be deprIved oI a hard
Page 15 of 50
reaIIty test. WIthout art, they wouId be unImagInatIve and unInventIve, they wouId
reproduce tradItIonaI modes oI actIng, rather than openIng up new ways. We cIearIy need
both. Art has an essentIaIIy utopIan dImensIon. It Is about the worId that Is not. I we want
to do more than sImpIy perpetuate the worId as It Is (In ItseII, not a mean, and IncreasIngIy
dIIIIcuIt, task), II we want to Improve the worId, to brIng It more In IIne wIth what It shouId
be, the exampIes produced by the ImagInatIve experIments oI art are IndIspensabIe. n
short, both hIstory and art provIde us wIth representatIons oI partIcuIar experIences
whIch we may use to IIIumInate our own experIences and {p.79) to hone our skIII oI
practIcaI wIsdom. ut where the exampIes oI hIstory aIIow us to conIront our experIences
wIth the worId as It Is, those oI art conIront us wIth the worId as It mIght be. Thus, the
Iormer encourage us to take or avoId roads taken In the past, the Iatter to try or not try
somethIng new.
StendhaI IamousIy cIaImed that "beauty Is onIy the promIse oI happIness," a phrase that
Ior good reason captIvated both audeIaIre and Ietzsche.
35
(n the bIeak twentIeth
century, thIs became Ieter das's "beauty Is the advance payment on desIre."
36
) The
reason StendhaI sounds exactIy rIght Is that we tend to caII beautIIuI those artIstIc worIds
In whIch we thInk we wouId IeeI at home. t Is the worId as It shouId be that Is beautIIuI.
ut It Is Important to keep In mInd that not aII art Is, or need be, beautIIuI, that beauty Is
onIy one oI many goaIs an artIst mIght want to pursue.
Thus Iar have been stressIng art's utopIan dImensIon. ut It shouId not be overIooked
that IIctIons oI art have another equaIIy Important and cIoseIy reIated dImensIon. They
serve not onIy to Invent aIternatIves to, but aIso to IIIumInate, the actuaI worId. just as we
may appIy art's exampIes to our own experIences, we may appIy them to the Iarger
hIstorIcaI experIence oI our worId. n both cases, IIctIons may throw IIght on the actuaI.
Art's advantage over hIstory In thIs task Is that, not bound by aII the contIngent Ieatures
oI what actuaIIy happened, It can represent onIy what Is oI the essence In partIcuIar
actIons and cIrcumstances. t can thus make the essentIaI meanIng oI the actuaI more
cIearIy apparent In Its representatIons than honest and detaIIed hIstory mIght. One wouId
not want to substItute StendhaI's account oI the battIe oI WaterIoo, or Iroust's oI the
reyIus aIIaIr, Ior works oI hIstorIcaI schoIarshIp, but the noveIIsts' accounts captured
somethIng essentIaI about these events wIth partIcuIar cIarIty and Iorce and are IIkeIy to
contInue to shape our ImagInIng and understandIng them as powerIuIIy as any work oI
hIstory.
The aIm oI an artIst, argued audeIaIre, was to extract the poetry Irom mere IashIon, the
eternaI Irom the transItory.
37
t Is Ior sImIIar reasons that ArIstotIe thought poetry was
more phIIosophIcaI than hIstory, more phIIosophIcaI precIseIy In the sense oI beIng Iess
bound to the contIngent, oI aIIowIng the essentIaI to shIne Iorth more cIearIy.
The dIstInctIon between hIstorIan and poet . . . consIsts reaIIy In thIs, that the one
descrIbes the thIng that has been, and the other a kInd oI thIng that mIght be.
Ience poetry Is somethIng more phIIosophIc and oI graver Import than hIstory,
sInce Its statements are oI the nature rather oI unIversaIs, whereas those oI
hIstory are sInguIars. y a unIversaI statement mean one as to what such or such
Page 16 of 50
a kInd oI man wIII probabIy do or necessarIIy say or do-whIch Is the aIm oI poetry,
though It aIIIxes proper names to the characters, by a sInguIar statement, one as to
what, say, AIcIbIades dId or had done to hIm.
38
IeIdegger approved ("ArIstotIe's words In the Foetics, aIthough they have scarceIy been
pondered, are stIII vaIId-that poetIc composItIon Is truer than expIoratIon oI beIngs"
39
)
and so dId IegeI. {p.80)
eIther can the representatIons oI art be caIIed a deceptIve appearance In
comparIson wIth the truer representatIons oI hIstorIography. Ior the Iatter|'s| . . .
content remaIns burdened wIth the entIre contIngency oI ordInary IIIe and Its
events, compIIcatIons, and IndIvIduaIItIes, whereas the work oI art brIngs beIore us
the eternaI powers that govern hIstory wIthout thIs appendage oI the ImmedIate
sensuous present and Its unstabIe appearance.
40
To be sure, Ior IegeI, aIready the representatIons oI hIstorIography, when truIy
successIuI, are Iess burdened wIth the contIngency oI ordInary IIIe, and hence are more
phIIosophIc In ArIstotIe's sense, than the actuaI experIence ItseII.
a truIy artIstIc hIstorIan . . . sketches Ior us a pIcture that Is Iar hIgher and truer
than any we couId gaIn by ourseIves as eye-wItnesses. IeaIIty Is overburdened
wIth appearance as such, wIth accIdentaI and IncIdentaI thIngs, so that oIten we
cannot see the wood Ior the trees. . . . t Is theIr IndweIIIng sense and spIrIt whIch
aIone makes events Into great actIons, and these are gIven to us by a genuIneIy
hIstorIcaI portrayaI whIch does not accept what Is pureIy externaI and reveaIs onIy
that In whIch the Inner spIrIt Is vIvIdIy unIoIded.
41
The Iast word here shouId perhaps be gIven to IamIet, who saId more or Iess aII that
needs to be saId on the hIstorIcaI dImensIon oI art when he Instructed hIs pIayers on "the
purpose oI pIayIng, whose end, both at the IIrst and now, was and Is, to hoId, as twere,
the mIrror up to nature, to show vIrtue her own Ieature, scorn her own Image, and the
very age and body oI the tIme hIs Iorm and pressure."
42
Or, In IIchard Iorty's modern
transIatIon. "To every age, Its own gIory and Its own stupIdIty. The job oI the noveIIst Is to
keep us up to date on both."
43
c. Art and Phosophy
ut whIIe the representatIons oI hIstory and art are IndIspensabIe tooIs oI the ethIcaI IIIe
oI justIIIed choIces, they are not suIIIcIent Ior such a IIIe, equaIIy necessary are the
arguments oI scIence and phIIosophy. We have seen that hIstory and art aIIow us to make
the IIrst steps beyond ImmedIate awareness, to compare reaI experIences wIth actuaI and
IIctIonaI ImagInary ones, and we have seen that such comparIsons are a prerequIsIte to
our beIng abIe to make choIces among the objects oI desIre and among desIres
themseIves. ComparIsons oI thIs sort heIp us to make choIces, uItImateIy because we
Iearn Irom them about the necessary or probabIe consequences oI a partIcuIar course oI
actIon. AIready In comparIng reaI and ImagInary experIences we move beyond pure
representatIons and operate not onIy wIth Images, but aIso wIth concepts. a concept
enabIes us to brIng together dIverse Images and hence aIso to compare them. ut to be
abIe to Iead the IIIe oI justIIIed choIces we need more. As we have seen, we justIIy a
Page 17 of 50
partIcuIar actIon by cIaImIng that It exempIIIIes some generaI prIncIpIe, the Iorm oI whIch
mIght be. "GIven cIrcumstances x, do (that Is, a good man wouId do) y." ThIs cannot be
done so Iong as we operate wIth Images aIone, or even wIth Images and concepts. What Is
needed, In addItIon, Is argumentatIve IogIc {p.81) IInkIng the concepts In a course oI
reasonIng aImed at demonstratIng the truth oI a beIIeI expressed In a gIven prIncIpIe.
SpecIIIcaIIy, we need to derIve generaI prIncIpIes Irom partIcuIar Instances (whether by
InductIve IogIc or, II Iopper's vIew that "the IogIc oI scIentIIIc dIscovery" does not reIy on
InductIon Is correct, by the IopperIan hypothetIcaI-deductIve method. the creatIve
IormatIon oI ImagInatIve hypotheses IoIIowed by the deductIve derIvatIon oI IaIsIIyIng
Instances and the empIrIcaI search Ior such Instances), and we need deductIve IogIc to
derIve concIusIons concernIng partIcuIar Instances Irom generaI prIncIpIes.
n short, It Is the roIe oI Images (ImagInary experIences) to provIde us wIth materIaI to
compare wIth reaI experIences. t Is the roIe oI generaI concepts under whIch partIcuIar
Images are brought to provIde us wIth a mechanIsm to make such comparIsons oI
experIences wIth Images possIbIe. t Is the roIe oI arguments to produce true beIIeIs
about generaI prIncIpIes oI actIon and about partIcuIar actIons. And It Is the roIe oI
practIcaI wIsdom to aIIow us to subsume partIcuIar actIons under generaI prIncIpIes.
The productIon oI arguments resuItIng In true beIIeIs about what Is and about what
shouId be Is, as we have seen, the job oI scIence and phIIosophy, respectIveIy. OI the two,
scIence provIdes our thInkIng about actIon wIth a reaIIty test, teIIs us what Is and what Is
not possIbIe Ior us to do. (ndIrectIy It, oI course, aIso provIdes us wIth technoIogIcaI tooIs
that enabIe us to do what Is possIbIe.) ut what It cannot do Is teII us whIch oI the roads
open to us we shouId actuaIIy take. ThIs Is the task oI phIIosophy In the admIttedIy pecuIIar
sense In whIch the term Is understood here.
The respectIve roIes oI scIence and phIIosophy run paraIIeI to those oI hIstory and art.
One mIght say that hIstory and scIence share theIr aIm (to capture the worId as It Is), but
dIIIer In the means they empIoy (representatIons and arguments, respectIveIy). SImIIarIy,
art and phIIosophy have a common aIm (to teII us about the worId as It shouId be, as weII
as Is) but dIverse means (agaIn, representatIons and arguments, respectIveIy). Thus, on
our grId, art Intersects wIth both hIstory (wIth whIch It shares the means, but not the
aIm) and phIIosophy (wIth whIch It shares the aIm, but not the means). A IuIIy deveIoped
ethIcaI IIIe oI justIIIed actIons and passIons cIearIy requIres aII Iour kInds oI works. SInce
we justIIy partIcuIar actIons (and passIons) by showIng that they exempIIIy generaI
prIncIpIes, we need to represent and to argue about the worId as It Is and as It shouId be
In order to deveIop a repertory oI generaI prIncIpIes and the abIIIty to appIy them to
partIcuIar Instances. WIthout representatIons, we wouId Iack the materIaI oI partIcuIar
Instances Irom whIch to derIve generaI prIncIpIes. WIthout arguments, we wouId Iack the
abIIIty to move back and Iorth between partIcuIar Instances and generaI prIncIpIes.
WIthout specIIIcaIIy artIstIc representatIons, we wouId Iack the abIIIty to chart new roads
ahead. WIthout specIIIcaIIy phIIosophIcaI arguments, we wouId Iack the abIIIty to decIde
whether such roads shouId or shouId not be taken.
I It Is the (or, at Ieast, a) task oI phIIosophy as thIs term Is understood here to derIve
Page 18 of 50
generaI prIncIpIes oI actIon (and passIon) Irom partIcuIar Instances {p.82) (actIons,
experIences), to IormuIate and support our ethIcaI and poIItIcaI norms, how does It
accompIIsh thIs task, what Is the IogIc oI Its arguments? Whatever the specIIIc IogIc oI
scIentIIIc InquIry Is, It may weII InvoIve such steps as the InductIve comparIng oI
representatIons, the IormatIon oI hypotheses, the deductIve derIvatIon oI IaIsIIyIng
Instances, and the empIrIcaI search Ior such Instances. Some such steps may aIso be
InvoIved In a phIIosophIcaI argument, but they cannot suIIIce. AmassIng sImIIar Instances
and InductIveIy derIvIng Irom them generaI prIncIpIes can yIeId knowIedge about what Is
IIkeIy to happen gIven such and such cIrcumstances, but It can never produce beIIeIs
about what shouId happen. Someone who does not know how to swIm wIII quIckIy Iearn
Irom experIence that he Is IIkeIy to drown In deep water, and hence that, to avoId
drownIng, he shouId eIther Iearn how to swIm or avoId gettIng Into deep water. ut no
amount oI experIence and InductIve reasonIng can produce the convIctIon that one
shouId avoId drownIng. SImIIarIy, It Is easy to see how one mIght go about tryIng to IaIsIIy
a beIIeI IIke, "I you do not want to drown and do not know how to swIm, avoId gettIng
Into deep water." ut It Is not obvIous how one mIght try to IaIsIIy a beIIeI IIke, "!nder no
cIrcumstances, shouId you want to drown."
ut thIs Is not to say, as phIIosophers at Ieast sInce the eIghteenth century oIten have,
that we cannot derIve "ought" Irom "Is," quIte the contrary. Iow, then, Is "ought"
derIved? What Is InvoIved In producIng beIIeIs IIke, "n the cIrcumstances x, a good man
shouId do y"? t Is Important to keep In mInd that, In moraI reasonIng, we never begIn
wIth a bIank page. We are aIways aIready moraI agents, Iong beIore we begIn to
phIIosophIze. We do not have the Iuxury oI waItIng to act untII we have had a chance to
deveIop a IuIIy expIIcIt and coherent system oI moraI and poIItIcaI norms. n ethIcaI IIIe, as
eIsewhere, practIce precedes theory. y the tIme we begIn to make our IIrst attempts at
expIIcItIy IormuIatIng our ethIcaI prIncIpIes, we are aIready In some way In possessIon oI a
great many oI them, as weII as In possessIon oI an overaII vIsIon, however Inchoate and
provIsIonaI, oI a IIIe worth IIvIng. Macntyre, In hIs deveIopIng oI an ArIstoteIIan way oI
thInkIng about ethIcaI IIIe, Is rIght to stress that moraI vIrtues are embodIed In socIaI
practIces.
44
"A vIrtue Is an acquIred human quaIIty the possessIon and exercIse oI whIch
tends to enabIe us to achIeve those goods whIch are InternaI to practIces and the Iack oI
whIch eIIectIveIy prevents us Irom achIevIng any such goods," Is Macntyre's "partIaI and
tentatIve deIInItIon."
45
As ArIstotIe stressed, we deveIop vIrtues not by hearIng someone
persuasIveIy preach them to us, but rather by IearnIng how to take part In the practIces
In whIch such vIrtues IInd theIr pIace.
46
t Is onIy by engagIng In practIces that we acquIre
a Iund oI knowIedge about what a "good man" (a good monk or soIdIer, pIanIst or
scIentIst, Iather or cItIzen) does In gIven cIrcumstances. IhIIosophy attempts to make thIs
ImpIIcIt knowIedge expIIcIt.
ThIs does not mean, as some mIght suppose, that we are aIways condemned to adopt
aIready exIstIng practIces and norms and can never crItIcIze or extend them. t means
onIy that we cannot crItIcIze them Irom an ImpartIaI, neutraI poInt oI vIew, a standpoInt
that presupposes nothIng, no socIaI practIces, InstItutIons, {p.83) or tradItIons. Such a
standpoInt, God's standpoInt, Is not avaIIabIe to us humans. ut practIces do not exIst In
Page 19 of 50
IsoIatIon. n a socIety oI any compIexIty, there are aIways a great many oI them aIready
goIng on aII at once. Sooner or Iater, we dIscover that we cannot take part In aII oI them,
though we need not IImIt ourseIves to just one. We aIso dIscover that, In Max Weber's
words, "the varIous vaIue spheres oI the worId stand In IrreconcIIabIe conIIIct wIth each
other."
47
I we are to acquIre any vIrtues at aII, we need to make a Iong-range
commItment to some practIces, but by commIttIng ourseIves to one set oI practIces
rather than another, we commIt ourseIves to an overaII vIsIon oI IIIe we want to have and
we reaIIze that our choIce Is IrreconcIIabIe wIth other such possIbIe overaII attItudes
toward IIIe. We can then subject aII sort oI practIces to a crItIque Irom the standpoInt oI
thIs uItImate attItude toward IIIe that we have adopted. n thIs way we dIscover that the
actIvItIes oI a soIdIer, or a stockbroker, are InapproprIate Ior most monks. Moreover, In
addItIon to thIs externaI crItIque, we can aIso subject any practIce to an InternaI crItIque
by cIarIIyIng Its aIms, IdentIIyIng more cIearIy the goods It seeks to produce, and thus
ImprovIng It by makIng It more coherent and seII-perspIcacIous.
ut a commItment to thIs rather than that way oI IIIe can never be the resuIt oI a
compeIIIng argument. AIternatIves are aIways possIbIe. You may thInk that a dImInutIon oI
human suIIerIng and mIsery Is a worthy aIm oI poIItIcaI actIon, but there Is no way oI
convIncIng someone who does not see It (or oI IaIsIIyIng your beIIeI). Argument can be
useIuIIy empIoyed, however, to demonstrate that a partIcuIar practIce or actIon Is
consIstent or not wIth a partIcuIar vIsIon oI IIIe. t aIso IInds Its use In our ImagInIng the
IIkeIy consequences oI varIous vIsIons and makIng InvIdIous comparIsons among
weItanschauungen. n short, theorIes about how we shouId IIve cannot be proven or
IaIsIIIed. AII we can reaIIy do In deIendIng such theorIes once we have ascertaIned that
they are InternaIIy coherent Is to show In as much detaII as we can theIr IIkeIy
consequences and to make comparIsons among competIng vIsIons.
AII oI thIs suggests that moraI and poIItIcaI phIIosophy Is a kInd oI a socIaI theory.
48
t
cannot be proIItabIy conducted In a pIatonIc vacuum oI pure Ideas. Iather, It
presupposes a rIch context oI socIaI practIces, InstItutIons, tradItIons. ts aIm Is to make
expIIcIt, crItIcIze, and Improve the norms that govern our aIready ongoIng practIces. What
It cannot do eIIectIveIy Is to produce ethIcaI and poIItIcaI prIncIpIes In abstractIon Irom any
ethIcaI and poIItIcaI practIces and InstItutIons. At Ieast some, though not necessarIIy aII, oI
these practIces and InstItutIons must be actuaI present and past practIces and InstItutIons
oI our own and oI other socIetIes. Some may aIso be IIctIonaI, envIsIoned, but not
reaIIzed, utopIan possIbIIItIes. (y the way, II on thIs account phIIosophy Is a socIaI theory,
a theory oI socIaI practIces, we may extend Its reaIm to IncIude not onIy moraI and
poIItIcaI, but aIso other kInds oI practIces, IncIudIng those oI hIstorIans, artIsts, scIentIsts,
and phIIosophers themseIves. The scope oI phIIosophy wouId IncIude, then, In addItIon to
theorIes oI ethIcs and poIItIcs, theorIes oI hIstory, art, scIence, and phIIosophy ItseII.)
{p.84) An Important consequence Is that, In our terms, the arguments oI phIIosophy
cannot exIst In IsoIatIon Irom the representatIons oI hIstory and art. WIthout
representatIons, arguments are empty, wIthout arguments, representatIons are bIInd.
We have to represent our practIces II we want to have anythIng to argue about at aII. And
Page 20 of 50
Ior reasons aIready brought Iorward, some oI our representatIons may be oI IIctIonaI
rather than actuaI practIces. ThIs suggests that IegeI's thesIs oI the end oI art cannot
sImpIy be sustaIned and needs to be reexamIned.
IegeI's Iamous concIusIon that "art, consIdered In Its hIghest vocatIon, Is and remaIns Ior
us a thIng oI the past"
49
Is so oIten mIsunderstood that we need to take a cIose Iook at
the passage that precedes It.
ut whIIe on the one hand we gIve thIs hIgh posItIon to art, It Is on the other hand
just as necessary to remember that neIther In content nor In Iorm Is art the hIghest
and absoIute mode oI brIngIng to our mInds the true Interests oI the spIrIt. Ior
precIseIy on account oI Its Iorm, art Is IImIted to a specIIIc content. OnIy one sphere
and stage oI truth Is capabIe oI beIng represented In the eIement oI art. n order to
be a genuIne content Ior art, such truth must In vIrtue oI Its own specIIIc character
be abIe to go Iorth Into |the sphere oI| sense and remaIn adequate to ItseII there.
ThIs Is the case, Ior exampIe, wIth the gods oI Greece. On the other hand, there Is a
deeper comprehensIon oI truth whIch Is no Ionger so akIn and IrIendIy to sense as
to be capabIe oI approprIate adoptIon and expressIon In thIs medIum. The ChrIstIan
vIew oI truth Is oI thIs kInd, and, above aII, the spIrIt oI our worId today, or, more
partIcuIarIy, oI our reIIgIon and the deveIopment oI our reason, appears as beyond
the stage at whIch art Is the supreme mode oI our knowIedge oI the AbsoIute. The
pecuIIar nature oI artIstIc productIon and oI works oI art no Ionger IIIIs our hIghest
need.
50
And Iurther.
|A|rt no Ionger aIIords that satIsIactIon oI spIrItuaI needs whIch earIIer ages and
natIons sought In It, and Iound In It aIone, a satIsIactIon that, at Ieast on the part oI
reIIgIon, was most IntImateIy IInked wIth art. The beautIIuI days oI Greek art, IIke the
goIden age oI the Iater MIddIe Ages, are gone. The deveIopment oI reIIectIon In our
IIIe today has made It a need oI ours, In reIatIon both to our wIII and judgement, to
cIIng to generaI consIderatIons and to reguIate the partIcuIar by them, wIth the
resuIt that unIversaI Iorms, Iaws, dutIes, rIghts, maxIms, prevaII as determInIng
reasons and are the chIeI reguIator. ut Ior artIstIc Interest and productIon we
demand In generaI rather a quaIIty oI IIIe In whIch the unIversaI Is not present In the
Iorm oI Iaw and maxIm, but whIch gIves the ImpressIon oI beIng one wIth the senses
and the IeeIIngs, just as the unIversaI and the ratIonaI Is contaIned In the ImagInatIon
by beIng brought Into unIty wIth a concrete sensuous appearance. ConsequentIy
the condItIons oI our present tIme are not IavourabIe to art.
51
Ior IegeI, the reason why "art, consIdered In Its hIghest vocatIon" (that Is, as a "mode oI
brIngIng to our mInds the true Interests oI the spIrIt"), "Is and remaIns Ior us a thIng oI
the past" Is that, In my terms, art makes use oI representatIons rather than arguments.
Sensuous Images oI myth and, above aII, scuIpture, {p.85) may have been suIIIcIent
adequateIy to embody the most IundamentaI beIIeIs that guIded a cItIzen oI the ancIent
AthenIan polis. A cItIzen oI a modern uropean state, however, judges and acts on the
basIs oI beIIeIs that can no Ionger be embodIed In Images aIone, but rather requIre
Page 21 of 50
concepts and arguments Ior theIr proper expressIon, that Is, he judges and acts on
generaI prIncIpIes ("unIversaI Iorms, Iaws, dutIes, rIghts, maxIms") and not partIcuIar
Images. Ience, In the modern worId the arguments oI phIIosophy and not the
representatIons oI art brIng to our mInds "the true Interests oI the spIrIt" In theIr most
deveIoped and most perspIcacIous Iorm.
Ours Is a worId, says IegeI, "where the essence oI ethIcaI IIIe, I.e. justIce and Its ratIonaI
Ireedom, has aIready been worked out and preserved In the Iorm oI a legcl regIme, so
that now, aIIke In ItseII and In the externaI worId, thIs regIme exIsts as an InIIexIbIe
necessIty, Independent oI partIcuIar IndIvIduaIs and theIr personaI mentaIIty and
character."
52
n such a worId, "the scope Ior IdeaI conIIguratIon Is onIy oI a very IImIted
kInd. Ior the regIons In whIch Iree scope Is IeIt Ior the Independence oI partIcuIar
decIsIons are smaII In number and range."
53
The end oI art Is thus not the resuIt oI any
pureIy InternaI deveIopment oI art, but rather the outcome oI the evoIutIon oI socIetIes
and theIr seII-understandIngs under the condItIons oI modernIty.
||n the worId oI today the IndIvIduaI subject may oI course act oI hImseII In thIs or
that matter, but stIII every IndIvIduaI, wherever he may twIst or turn, beIongs to an
estabIIshed socIaI order and does not appear hImseII as the Independent, totaI, and
at the same tIme IndIvIduaI IIvIng embodIment oI thIs socIety, but onIy as a
restrIcted member oI It. Ie acts, thereIore, aIso as onIy InvoIved In It, and Interest
In such a IIgure, IIke the content oI Its aIms and actIvIty, Is unendIngIy partIcuIar. . . .
Ie Is not, as he was In the IeroIc Age proper, the embodIment oI the rIght, the
moraI, and the IegaI as such.
54
wIII have to Ieave It to cIassIcIsts to decIde whether IegeI's thesIs does justIce to the
respectIve roIes oI art and phIIosophy In the spIrItuaI IIIe oI a cItIzen oI ancIent Athens. As
a descrIptIon oI theIr respectIve roIes In our IIves It Is persuasIve onIy II we suppIement It
wIth a remInder that, however Important phIIosophy has become Ior us, It can never
compIeteIy suppIant art In our overaII spIrItuaI economy. There Is a sense In whIch IegeI
Is rIght. the IIberaI state Is wIth dIstance modernIty's greatest artIIact. ven so,
representatIons can never be superseded by arguments, and art Is not IIkeIy to be
compIeteIy repIaced by phIIosophy. Art (and hIstory) cannot be truIy IeIt behInd, sInce Its
representatIons are the IndIspensabIe materIaI Ior phIIosophy and Ior deveIopIng practIcaI
wIsdom. What mIght seem more pIausIbIe, and Is subject to empIrIcaI verIIIcatIon, Is a
modIIIcatIon oI the IegeIIan thesIs accordIng to whIch earIIer stages oI IndIvIduaI IIIe and
coIIectIve cuIture wouId reIy more on artIstIc representatIons, whIIe Iater ones wouId
make IuIIer use oI phIIosophIcaI arguments. nItIaIIy, representatIons can guIde our actIons
wIthout arguments (we can be InspIred by IndIvIduaI exampIes). As we mature, we ask Ior
reasoned prIncIpIes. n thIs {p.86) sense, IegeI mIght be rIght that In the modern worId
art no Ionger expresses our hIghest IdeaIs, that they can be Iound more adequateIy and
IuIIy expressed In phIIosophy.
ut whIIe a thesIs postuIatIng such a change oI emphasIs mIght be pIausIbIe, there can be
no questIon oI art beIng compIeteIy repIaced by phIIosophy. ven Ior us moderns, both
have IndIspensabIe roIes to pIay In the overaII economy oI our ethIcaI IIves. IhIIosophy
Page 22 of 50
oIIers arguments Ior how we shouId act (In matters oI prIvate moraIIty and pubIIc poIIcy),
art (and hIstory) oIIer exampIes. Gadamer observes that "human passIons cannot be
governed by unIversaI prescrIptIons oI reason. n thIs sphere one needs, rather,
convIncIng exampIes."
55
Common sense, he adds a IIttIe Iater, the sense oI communIty, oI
moraI and cIvIc soIIdarIty, "Is In Iact IargeIy characterIzed by judgment. The dIIIerence
between a IooI and a sensIbIe man Is that the Iormer Iacks judgment, I.e. he Is not abIe to
subsume |a partIcuIar under a unIversaI| correctIy and hence cannot appIy correctIy
what he has Iearned and knows. . . . t |judgment| cannot be taught In generaI, but onIy
practIced Irom case to case."
56
And Iurther.
oth taste and judgment are evaIuatIons oI the object In reIatIon to a whoIe In
order to see II It IIts In wIth everythIng eIse. . . . ThIs kInd oI sense Is obvIousIy
needed wherever a whoIe Is Intended, but not gIven as a whoIe. . . . Thus taste Is In
no way IImIted to what Is beautIIuI In nature and art . . . but embraces the whoIe
area oI moraIIty and manners. ven the Ideas oI moraIIty are never gIven as a
whoIe or determIned In a normatIve, unambIguous way. . . . judgment Is necessary
In order to make a correct evaIuatIon oI the concrete Instance. . . . t Is aIways a
questIon oI somethIng more than the correct appIIcatIon oI generaI prIncIpIes. . . .
The judge does not onIy appIy Iaw In concreto, but contrIbutes through hIs very
judgment to the deveIopment oI the Iaw. . . . IIke Iaw, moraIIty Is constantIy
deveIoped through the IecundIty oI the IndIvIduaI case.
57
SImIIarIy, Martha ussbaum has deIended the moraI and poIItIcaI IndIspensabIIIty oI
IIterature, and In partIcuIar oI the noveI, by cIaImIng about the reader's experIence "IIrst,
that It provIdes InsIghts that wouId pIay a roIe (though not as uncrItIcIzed IoundatIons) In
the constructIon oI an adequate moraI and poIItIcaI theory, second, that It deveIops moraI
capacItIes wIthout whIch cItIzens wIII not succeed In makIng reaIIty out oI the normatIve
concIusIons oI any moraI or poIItIcaI theory, however exceIIent."
58
You wIII recaII that art represents by usIng IndIvIduaI Images, aIms at producIng
experIences oI actIons and passIons that mIght be subject to justIIIcatIon. IhIIosophy
argues by usIng generaI concepts and IogIcaI connectIons, aIms at producIng thoughts,
knowIedge, beIIeIs about actIons and passIons that mIght be subject to justIIIcatIon. oth
oIIer us seII-Images and seII-understandIngs. oth expIore not how thIngs are, but how
they shouId be (In thIs they dIIIer Irom hIstory and scIence). oth aIm at educatIon
(Bildung) In the deepest sense oI the term, the sense oI character IormatIon, at IIndIng
out who we are and how we shouId cope. The exampIes oIIered by art cannot be
suppIanted by phIIosophy's arguments, sInce these exampIes deveIop our abIIIty to IIsten
to others, hearIng {p.87) strange, unIamIIIar voIces, and we acquIre thIs IndIspensabIe
abIIIty IIke any other vIrtue or skIII by ImItatIng modeIs. n short, phIIosophy provIdes
reasons and aIms at episteme, knowIedge, art provIdes modeIs and aIms at phronesis,
practIcaI wIsdom. At bottom, both art and phIIosophy are our means oI reIIectIng on
ethIcaI and poIItIcaI practIce.
t Is not at random, by the way, that have been InvokIng Gadamer here. Gadamer's was
Page 23 of 50
the earIIest Important voIce In what has become a contemporary chorus regrettIng and
crItIcIzIng the Iate eIghteenth-century separatIon oI aesthetIcs Irom ethIcs and poIItIcs.
Truth cnd Method begIns wIth a descrIptIon oI the process that Ied to Kant's IImItIng the
operatIon oI the judgment oI taste to aesthetIcs and thus gIvIng aesthetIcs Its autonomy.
ut, unIIke most oI hIs successors, Gadamer notIces that not onIy art, but aIso ethIcs paId
a steep prIce Ior thIs separatIon and autonomIzatIon. The judgment oI taste, Gadamer
correctIy argues, was the centraI component oI the cIassIcaI Idea oI practIcaI knowIedge.
Once Its operatIon was IImIted to aesthetIcs, the ArIstoteIIan notIon oI practIcaI knowIedge
was destroyed. Art gaIned autonomy, but, together wIth the rest oI the humanIstIc
dIscIpIInes, Iost any practIcaI justIIIcatIon as a component oI a moraI and poIItIcaI educatIon.
Taste has been dIsempowered.
There Is one more cIoseIy reIated reason why art can never be IuIIy suppIanted by
phIIosophy, why phIIosophy needs art. We have seen that the IunctIon oI cuIturaI medIa Is
to aIIow us contInuousIy to reInvent ourseIves, that Is, our ends and means. Art and
phIIosophy In partIcuIar are concerned wIth varIous ends we mIght pursue and, whIIe art
shows these ends, phIIosophy argues Ior or agaInst them. ut In representIng ends, art
aIso deveIops our capacIty to ImagIne what It wouId IeeI IIke to achIeve them. And thIs
capacIty Is an IndIspensabIe component oI any ratIonaI pursuIt oI an end. The "knowIedge
oI what It wIII be IIke to IuIIIII one's aIm," wrItes Ioger Scruton,
Is essentIaI to the reasoned pursuIt oI It, and It Is a Iorm oI knowIedge that Is both
IntrInsIcaIIy practIcaI . . . and aIso IncIpIentIy aesthetIc. To know what somethIng Is IIke
In advance oI the experIence oI It, Is to have an ImagInatIve apprehensIon oI that
experIence. The abIIIty to partIcIpate ImagInatIveIy In Iuture experIences Is one oI
the aIms oI aesthetIc educatIon, and It Is onIy by the cuItIvatIon oI present
dIscrImInatIon, and the present sense oI what Is approprIate, that It can be properIy
achIeved.
59
IInaIIy, there Is yet another reason why we need to revIse the end-oI-art thesIs. As many
thInkers have recentIy argued, our IndIvIduaI and coIIectIve IdentItIes necessarIIy take the
Iorm oI narratIves ( shaII have more to say on the subject oI thIs Iorm In chapter 5).
60
The extent to whIch we care about our personaI and coIIectIve IdentItIes dIIIers vastIy
Irom case to case, as does the extent to whIch we are successIuI In constructIng IdentItIes
oI suIIIcIent compIexIty and coherence, but It Is dIIIIcuIt to ImagIne how an IndIvIduaI or a
communIty couId IIourIsh wIthout some mInImaI sense oI IdentIty. ow, we IdentIIy
ourseIves as IndIvIduaIs and as communItIes by means oI storIes we teII about ourseIves,
about {p.88) where we come Irom and where we are goIng, and we have no other way
oI estabIIshIng and deIInIng them than by narratIve means. "n order to have a sense oI
who we are, we have to have a notIon oI how we have become, and oI where we are
goIng," wrItes CharIes TayIor.
61
We are the storIes oI our projects, accompIIshments,
and IaIIures, and storIes are kInds oI representatIons, not arguments.
Moreover, we can eIther IoIIow storIes scrIpted Ior us by someone eIse (our IamIIIes or
communItIes), or we can attempt to be to at Ieast a certaIn extent the authors oI our own
IIIe storIes. One oI the most IundamentaI ways In whIch we modern Westerners IIke to
Page 24 of 50
thInk oI ourseIves Is as the kInd oI peopIe who are abIe to be the authors oI theIr own IIIe
storIes to a much greater extent than our premodern ancestors were. To be sure, aII oI
thIs makes onIy hIstory, but not art (In the very broad sense In whIch these terms have
been deIIned above), InescapabIe. ut Ior reasons aIready Invoked, gIven that we want to
author and teII storIes about ourseIves, we mIght just as weII compare them to the
broadest possIbIe repertoIre oI other such storIes, IncIudIng IIctIonaI ones. "|T|he moraI
justIIIcatIon oI the InstItutIons and practIces oI one's group," wrItes IIchard Iorty,
. . . Is mostIy a matter oI hIstorIcaI narratIves (IncIudIng scenarIos about what Is
IIkeIy to happen In certaIn Iuture contIngencIes), rather than oI phIIosophIcaI
metanarratIves. The prIncIpaI backup Ior hIstorIography Is not phIIosophy but the
arts, whIch serve to deveIop and modIIy a group's seII-Image by, Ior exampIe,
apotheosIzIng Its heroes, dIaboIIzIng Its enemIes, mountIng dIaIogues among Its
members, and reIocusIng Its attentIon.
62
When taken In thIs sense, young Ietzsche's deIense oI myth (recaII that a muthos Is a
pIot, a story) and reIusaI to accept Its repIacement by the SocratIc scIence as permanent
becomes pIausIbIe.
The Images oI the myth have to be the unnotIced omnIpresent demonIc guardIans,
under whose care the young souI grows to maturIty and whose sIgns heIp the man
to Interpret hIs IIIe and struggIes. ven the state knows no more powerIuI
unwrItten Iaws than the mythIcaI IoundatIon that guarantees Its connectIon wIth
reIIgIon and Its growth Irom mythIcaI notIons.
63
t Is Ior reasons oI thIs sort that the Importance oI representatIons may have actuaIIy
Increased rather than decreased In modern tImes. Iorty IInds It "temptIng to thInk oI our
cuIture as an IncreasIngIy poetIcIzed one."
64
CharIes TayIor, too, notes the
unprecedented socIaI prestIge oI the modern artIst, hardIy a sIgn oI the decIIne or end oI
art.
There Is a set oI Ideas and IntuItIons, stIII InadequateIy understood, whIch make us
admIre the artIst and the creator more than any other cIvIIIzatIon ever has. . . . The
wIdespread beIIeI today that the artIst sees Iarther than the rest oI us . . . depends
on that modern sense . . . that what meanIng there Is Ior us depends In part on our
powers oI expressIon, that dIscoverIng a Iramework Is Interwoven wIth InventIng.
65
{p.89) Iet us note, moreover, that IegeI's thesIs does not ImpIy that aII artIstIc
productIon wIII stop. Art, IegeI thought, "ends wIth the artIst's personaI productIve
mastery over every content and Iorm," a stage oI Its deveIopment reached In IegeI's
own tIme.
66
The artIst today "Is no Ionger domInated by the gIven condItIons oI a range
oI content and Iorm aIready InherentIy determIned In advance, but retaIns entIreIy wIthIn
hIs own power and choIce both the subject-matter and the way oI presentIng It."
67
ut
even II the hIghest Interests oI mankInd have Iound better modes oI expressIon
eIsewhere, there stIII remaIns pIenty Ior artIsts to do. "t Is the appearance and actIvIty oI
ImperIshabIe humanIty In Its many-sIded sIgnIIIcance and endIess aII-round deveIopment
Page 25 of 50
whIch In thIs reservoIr oI human sItuatIons and IeeIIngs can now constItute the absoIute
content oI our art."
68
TocquevIIIe concurs.
Among a democratIc peopIe poetry wIII not Ieed on Iegends or on tradItIons and
memorIes oI oId days. The poet wIII not try to peopIe the unIverse agaIn wIth
supernaturaI beIngs In whom neIther hIs readers nor he hImseII any Ionger
beIIeves, nor wIII he coIdIy personIIy vIrtues and vIces better seen In theIr naturaI
state. AII these resources IaII hIm, but man remaIns, and the poet needs no more.
Iuman destIny, man hImseII, not tIed to tIme and pIace, but Iace to Iace wIth nature
and wIth God, wIth hIs passIons, hIs doubts, hIs unexpected good Iortune, and hIs
IncomprehensIbIe mIserIes, wIII Ior these peopIes be the chIeI and aImost the soIe
subject oI poetry. . . . quaIIty, then, does not destroy aII the subjects oI poetry. t
makes them Iewer but more vast.
69
As a postscrIpt, Iet me add that In recent years, IegeI's end-oI-art thesIs has receIved an
InterestIng, though IntentIonaIIy one-sIded, reInterpretatIon at the hands oI Arthur C.
anto. anto's versIon deemphasIzes the motII that was centraI to IegeI, nameIy, art's
repIacement by reIIgIon and phIIosophy as the maIn modes oI "brIngIng to our mInds the
true Interests oI the spIrIt," the modes In whIch we artIcuIate our most Important seII-
understandIngs and beIIeIs. nstead, anto chooses to stress another motII. As he puts It,
"the hIstory oI art has come, In a way, to an end . . . In the sense that It has passed over
Into a kInd oI conscIousness oI ItseII and become, agaIn In a way, Its own phIIosophy."
70
As orIgInaIIy IormuIated, the thesIs seemed to suggest that art had reached Its appoInted
destIny by makIng Its own ontoIogIcaI status Into Its subject.
|A|rt . . . evoIved In such a way that the phIIosophIcaI questIon oI Its status has
aImost become the very essence oI art ItseII, so that the phIIosophy oI art, Instead
oI standIng outsIde the subject and addressIng It Irom an aIIen and externaI
perspectIve, became Instead the artIcuIatIon oI the InternaI energIes oI the subject.
t wouId today requIre a specIaI kInd oI eIIort at tImes to dIstInguIsh art Irom Its
own phIIosophy. . . . Art . . . has turned Into seII-conscIousness, the conscIousness oI
art being art In a reIIexIve way. . . . Artworks have been transIIgured Into exercIses
In the phIIosophy oI art.
71
ShouId thIs Indeed be the case, one wouId have to raIse a questIon that does not seem to
Interest anto much, nameIy, why shouId thIs sort oI narcIssIstIc {p.90) naveI-gazIng be
oI Interest to anyone other than those concerned wIth the ontoIogy oI artworks. ut over
the years anto's thesIs evoIved Into somethIng eIse. n Its most recent IormuIatIon It
became a thesIs about the kInd oI storIes we teII about art,
a somewhat dramatIc way oI decIarIng that the great master narratIves whIch IIrst
deIIned tradItIonaI art, and then modernIst art, have not onIy come to an end, but
that contemporary art no Ionger aIIows ItseII to be represented by master
narratIves at aII. Those master narratIves InevItabIy excIuded certaIn artIstIc
tradItIons and practIces as 'outsIde the paIe oI hIstory-a phrase oI IegeI's. . . .
Ours Is a moment, at Ieast (and perhaps onIy) In art, oI deep pIuraIIsm and totaI
Page 26 of 50
toIerance. othIng Is ruIed out.
72
t shouId be cIear that anto's thesIs Is now not so much about art as about the hIstory oI
art, about the end oI the present and Iuture desIrabIIIty or possIbIIIty oI constructIng a
pIausIbIe aII-embracIng narratIve oI art's deveIopment. !sIng Iyotard's terms, we mIght
say that anto dIagnoses the present condItIon oI art as "postmodern" In the sense that
we are no Ionger abIe or wIIIIng to search Ior a narratIve oI thIs sort. oth Iyotard and
anto may weII be correct In thus dIagnosIng the present pIuraIIst mood. ut anto's
thesIs Ieaves the questIon that Interests me here, the questIon oI the uses oI art, Intact. In
the new post-hIstorIcaI era art's uses remaIn as they aIways were. The IegeIIan versIon
oI the thesIs raIsed at Ieast a suspIcIon that perhaps we mIght want to move Irom art to
other, more worthy, pursuIts. ot so anto's versIon. II art was ever worth our whIIe, It
remaIns no more and no Iess worthy oI attentIon today.
d. Art, Regon, and the State
IIstory, art, scIence, phIIosophy. What Is conspIcuousIy mIssIng Irom our kIt oI cuIturaI
tooIs Is reIIgIon. Where does reIIgIon IIt wIthIn the grId oI representatIons (oI the actuaI
and oI the IIctIonaI) and arguments (about what Is and about what shouId be)?
t Is the purpose oI reIIgIon to make sense oI what Is most IntractabIe In our experIence,
oI evII, suIIerIng, and death, and to do so by pIacIng the negatIve wIthIn a dIvIne, nature-
transcendIng order. Irom the standpoInt oI our grId, the actuaIIy exIstIng reIIgIous
tradItIons are most Impure, mIxIng as they do aII Iour eIements. n the judaIc and
ChrIstIan tradItIons, at Ieast, the centraI document Is the ook, and thIs, to a secuIar mInd,
appears to consIst oI aII Iour eIements unevenIy mIxed, wIth a strong preponderance oI
representatIons over arguments. s there a dIIIerence between the representatIons oI a
reIIgIous tradItIon and those oI a secuIar hIstory and art? Art In partIcuIar has Ior
centurIes had an essentIaIIy reIIgIous content. !ntII at Ieast 1500, the most ImpressIve
archItecture, scuIpture, paIntIng, and musIc created In urope had reIIgIous subjects and
IunctIons, and through at Ieast the mIddIe oI the eIghteenth century reIIgIous content
contInued to be oI major sIgnIIIcance to the uropean arts. s there a dIIIerence between
art and reIIgIon? Or, to IormuIate the questIon wIth more precIsIon, Is {p.91) there
anythIng dIstInctIve about hIstorIcaI and artIstIc representatIons when theIr content
beIongs to a reIIgIous tradItIon?
The maIn dIIIerence, It seems to me, Is that a reIIgIous tradItIon cIaIms Ior Its
representatIons a specIaI and excIusIve authorIty and Importance, authorIty and
Importance that are bIndIng Ior the whoIe reIIgIous communIty. (On thIs vIew, "reIIgIon" Is
not a category oI the same sort as "hIstory," "art," or "phIIosophy," It Is, rather, a kInd oI
use one makes oI hIstory, art, or phIIosophy.) Ior us, secuIar InhabItants oI the West, the
representatIons oI the IbIe exIst on a par wIth a great many other hIstorIcaI and artIstIc
representatIons. Ior a reIIgIous jew and ChrIstIan, they are the sIngIe most Important
representatIons and aII others are subordInate to them. ThIs preemInence oI reIIgIous
representatIons stems Irom the Iact that they Iound the sense oI IdentIty and dIrectIon
not just Ior thIs or that IndIvIduaI, but Ior the whoIe reIIgIous communIty. These are the
Page 27 of 50
storIes that aIIow members oI the communIty to answer the questIons oI who they
IundamentaIIy are and what they most badIy want. SecuIar persons may aIso have canons
oI representatIons that heIp them to deIIne themseIves. ut typIcaIIy, these are theIr
prIvate canons, rather than one canon a specIIIc communIty shares, and hence they are
more IIexIbIe and changeabIe, sharIng varIous components wIth members oI varIous
IntersectIng communItIes.
The secuIarIzatIon oI uropean art, Its graduaI abandonment between the Iate IIIteenth
and Iate eIghteenth century oI excIusIveIy reIIgIous content In Iavor oI a more IIexIbIe and
varIed repertoIre oI subjects, Is one oI the most IundamentaI processes that deIInes
modernIzatIon. t Is cIearIy an aspect oI the Iarger hIstorIcaI process whereby we
graduaIIy acquIred the possIbIIIty oI deIInIng ourseIves to a certaIn (growIng) extent on
our own, rather than aIways havIng to be born to our IdentItIes. The premoderns and the
moderns (admIttedIy, IdeaI types, rather than IIteraIIy hIstorIcaI reaIItIes) dIIIer In that the
Iormer InherIted theIr IdentItIes, whIIe the Iatter have graduaIIy Increased the scope
wIthIn whIch they may choose who they are. We, IIberaI heIrs oI the nIIghtenment, may,
and shouId, embrace thIs process oI modernIzatIon wIth enthusIasm as It enIarges the
reaIm oI human IIberty, Increases the area oI Iree choIce, aIIows us to be, to a greater
extent than beIore, the authors oI our own IIIe storIes. ut we cannot be entIreIy deaI to
the crIes oI dIscontent comIng Irom those thIs process makes unhappy, the
communItarIan heIrs oI IomantIcIsm, because theIr dIscontent Is weII justIIIed.
ModernIzatIon entaIIs not onIy gaIns, but Iosses, the maIn one beIng the Ioss oI saIety that
InherIted and unquestIoned IndIvIduaI and coIIectIve IdentItIes brIng. IIberty Is
exhIIaratIng, but It aIso breeds anxIety. And the most proIound sources oI thIs anxIety
have to do wIth the Increased socIaI IragmentatIon, wIth the dIsappearance, or at Ieast the
erosIon, oI a cIear and unquestIoned sense oI coIIectIveIy shared vaIues.
Art, as we have seen, Is, together wIth phIIosophy, our most potent tooI oI seII-InventIon.
I modernIzatIon ImpIIes secuIarIzatIon, the abandonment oI reIIgIon as the excIusIve or
most authorItatIve source oI representatIons deIInIng our communaI IdentIty, It Is
understandabIe that the roIe oI art wouId become more {p.92) rather than Iess
Important In the modern perIod (IegeI's thesIs needs to be modIIIed here aIso). t Is aIso
understandabIe that art was bound to be repeatedIy tempted to step Into the shoes
abandoned by reIIgIon. Iere Ietzsche saw more cIearIy than IegeI.
Animction oj crt. - Art raIses Its head where the reIIgIons reIax theIr hoId. t takes
over a host oI moods and IeeIIngs engendered by reIIgIon. . . . The weaIth oI
reIIgIous IeeIIngs, swoIIen to a torrent, breaks Iorth agaIn and agaIn and seeks to
conquer new regIons. but the growth oI the nIIghtenment undermIned the
dogmas oI reIIgIon and InspIred a IundamentaI dIstrust oI them. so that the IeeIIngs
expeIIed Irom the sphere oI reIIgIon by the nIIghtenment throw themseIves Into
art, In IndIvIduaI cases Into poIItIcaI IIIe as weII, Indeed even straIght Into the
scIences. Wherever we perceIve human endeavours to be tInted wIth a hIgher,
gIoomIer coIourIng, we can assume that dread oI spIrIts, the odour oI Incense and
the shadows oI churches are stIII adherIng to them.
73
Page 28 of 50
(ndeed, the Iew decades that preceded IegeI's Iectures on aesthetIcs team wIth artIstIc
attempts to Invent prIvate and semI-prIvate mythoIogIes and symboIIc systems, or to
moduIate the pubIIc ones, whether ChrIstIan or MasonIc, In IndIvIduaI ways. The Mcgic
Flute, the work oI Iake, the unreaIIzed Zeiten cycIe oI IhIIIpp Otto Iunge, aII InhabIt a
haIIway house between premodern reIIgIous art and modern secuIar art.) ut Irom thIs
perspectIve, art's record In the Iast two centurIes Is mIxed. To put It most schematIcaIIy
(and nothIng more than a schema wIII be attempted here), modern art has been most
successIuI when It underpInned the prIvate search Ior IndIvIduaI IdentIty. AIter aII, as
have argued throughout thIs chapter, thIs Is a proper roIe Ior art. ut as soon as art
attempted to usurp reIIgIon's posItIon as the source oI the most authorItatIve and
Important, rather than mereIy optIonaI, representatIons deIInIng our coIIectIve sense oI
dIrectIon, It began to breed, or at Ieast support, monsters. n partIcuIar, the experIence
oI thIs century suggests that art begIns to pIay wIth IIre as soon as It enters a pact oI
mutuaI support wIth the state.
The current quarreI between IndIvIduaIIst IIberaIs and communItarIans (ItseII the Iate
twentIeth-century versIon oI the contInuIng quarreI between the nIIghtenment and
IomantIcIsm) Is unIIkeIy to end anytIme soon wIth a cIear vIctory Ior eIther sIde, sInce
both speak Ior authentIc human needs that have to be satIsIIed and kept In baIance In
some way. We are unIIkeIy, and wouId be unwIse, at thIs poInt to want to abandon the
modern gaIns In IndIvIduaI IIberty and to Iet others teII us who we are. ut we are aIso
unIIkeIy to Iorget the hunger Ior a communIty, Ior coIIectIveIy shared vaIues. The reaI
chaIIenge Is not to choose between these authentIc needs, but to baIance them properIy.
CommunItarIans are sureIy rIght to remInd us that most vIrtues worth cuItIvatIng can
onIy be cuItIvated In assocIatIon wIth other humans, that we can IuIIy deveIop our
potentIaIItIes and IIourIsh onIy In communItIes heId together by shared Images and beIIeIs.
IIberaIs are just as sureIy rIght In cIaImIng that the onIy communItIes we need and can
saIeIy aIIord wIII have the character oI IIexIbIe cIvII-socIety assocIatIons {p.93) medIatIng
between IamIIIes, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, assocIatIons we can Iorm
or joIn, dIssoIve or abandon, at wIII. They are partIcuIarIy rIght In warnIng us agaInst
gIvIng the status oI a communIty to the modern state. The Iesson oI twentIeth-century
totaIItarIanIsms Is cIear In thIs respect. One thIng we must not Iorget, aIter the azIs, Is
that, gIven the Immense power that modern technoIogy and bureaucratIc organIzatIon
conIer on the state, we wouId be IooIIsh to Invest the natIon-state ever agaIn wIth the
dIgnIty oI a communIty.
ow, In the past two hundred years, those cases where art managed to usurp the status
oI reIIgIon most successIuIIy were precIseIy the cases where art served the cause oI
natIonaIIsm. IewIs amIer correctIy caIIed natIonaIIsm "the passIonate creed oI the
InteIIectuaIs" (and on our account, artIsts, IIke aII creatIve users oI cuIturaI medIa, are
InteIIectuaIs). ndeed, natIonaIIsm as a substItute Ior reIIgIon seems custom-made to
appeaI to InteIIectuaIs In search oI a secuIar creed, sInce It provIdes them wIth an
exceedIngIy IIatterIng seII-Image. atIonaIIsm Is at bottom a pecuIIarIy modern way oI
provIdIng the power oI the state wIth IegItImacy by cIaImIng that It Is exercIsed In the
name oI a natIon. n much oI nIneteenth- and twentIeth-century urope and eIsewhere,
Page 29 of 50
natIons have been deIIned In terms oI theIr cuItures, and cuIture Is the InteIIectuaIs'
domInIon. As a resuIt, natIonaIIsm provIded the InteIIectuaI cIass wIth the IIatterIng seII-
Image oI a IegItImIzIng prIesthood, not dIIIerent In kInd Irom earIIer prIesthoods, one oI
whose roIes was to IegItImIze the power oI premodern ruIers as derIvIng Irom God.
74
As
Iong as the natIon In questIon Is an underdog struggIIng Ior poIItIcaI Independence and
seII-determInatIon, the InteIIectuaIs who provIde It wIth Its sense oI IdentIty and dIrectIon
are IIgures wIth whom It wouId be hard not to sympathIze. Such are the exempIary cases
oI ChopIn and IoIand, or earIy VerdI and taIy. The case oI art servIng an aIready
estabIIshed natIon-state Is more probIematIc, IncreasIngIy so the more powerIuI and weII-
estabIIshed the state Is. Ietzsche was quIck to sense that thIs mIght become the case oI
Wagner, when In 1888 he caIIed Wagner reichsdeutsch ("What dId never IorgIve
Wagner? That he condescended to the Germans-that he became reichsdeutsch."
75
) and
observed that "It Is IuII oI proIound sIgnIIIcance that the arrIvaI oI Wagner coIncIdes In
tIme wIth the arrIvaI oI the 'Reich. both events prove the very same thIng. obedIence
and Iong Iegs."
76
n 1888, thIs was bIatantIy unIaIr. (rahms's Triumphlied Is more
overtIy reichsdeutsch than anythIng Wagner ever wrote.
77
) ut wIth the whoIesaIe
approprIatIon oI Wagner's work by the next IeIch, Ietzsche's words acquIred a
prophetIc rIng.
My cIaIm, In short, Is thIs. We need Images and representatIons, we need above aII
storIes, to gIve ourseIves an IdentIty and to gIve our exIstence a depth oI sIgnIIIcance.
WIthout representatIons oI hIstory and art wIth whIch to compare our own experIences,
our worId wouId be appaIIIngIy IIat, one-dImensIonaI, and ImpoverIshed, the worId
deservIng Ienry james's bIeak characterIzatIon (In The Americcn Scene). "what you see
Is not onIy what you get, It Is aII there Is." The advantage oI a reIIgIon Is that Its storIes
unIte a whoIe communIty. ts {p.94) dIsadvantage Is Its buIIt-In excIusIvIty and
IntoIerance oI other, aIternatIve storIes. Art Is saIer. It keeps our worId Irom becomIng
totaIIy "dIsenchanted," IIat, and devoId oI sIgnIIIcance, maIntaIns the depth that storIes
Impart to our exIstence and to our worId and thus aIIows us to preserve the premodern
serIousness In our attItudes to ourseIves and the worId, wIthout gIvIng up on what Is
attractIve about modernIty-nameIy, a cIearsIghted, crItIcaI, empIrIcaI-scIentIIIc attItude.
Art and hIstory gIve us a muItIIayered worId In whIch what we see Is onIy a smaII part oI
what there Is. And they do thIs wIthout the adverse eIIects brought on by the dreams oI
metaphysIcs, dreams oI "another worId" beyond the worId oI appearances, or the
excIusIve authorItarIanIsm oI reIIgIon.
There Is nothIng wrong wIth art that represents a content wIth moraI or poIItIcaI
sIgnIIIcance. On the contrary, to represent such a content Is one oI the centraI IunctIons
oI art. There Is, however, somethIng proIoundIy sInIster In an art eIevated by the modern
natIon-state to the posItIon oI a state reIIgIon. MussoIInI mIsapproprIatIng VerdI's Aidc to
ceIebrate the rape oI AbyssInIa, IItIer hoIdIng a most wIIIIng ayreuth In hIs embrace,
above aII StaIIn enIorcIng a whoIesaIe natIonaIIzatIon oI the arts-these grIm Iessons oI the
century shouId not be Iorgotten. Max Weber's dIagnosIs oI 1918 Is stIII worth
consIderIng.
Page 30 of 50
The Iate oI our tImes Is characterIzed by ratIonaIIzatIon and InteIIectuaIIzatIon and,
above aII, by the 'dIsenchantment oI the worId. IrecIseIy the uItImate and most
subIIme vaIues have retreated Irom pubIIc IIIe eIther Into the transcendentaI reaIm
oI mystIc IIIe or Into the brotherIIness oI dIrect and personaI human reIatIons. t Is
not accIdentaI that our greatest art Is IntImate and not monumentaI, nor Is It
accIdentaI that today onIy wIthIn the smaIIest and IntImate cIrcIes, In personaI human
sItuatIons, In picnissimo, that somethIng Is puIsatIng that corresponds to the
prophetIc pneumc, whIch In Iormer tImes swept through the great communItIes IIke
a IIrebrand, weIdIng them together. I we attempt to Iorce and to 'Invent a
monumentaI styIe In art, such mIserabIe monstrosItIes are produced as the many
monuments oI the Iast twenty years. I one trIes InteIIectuaIIy to construe new
reIIgIons wIthout a new and genuIne prophecy, then, In an Inner sense, somethIng
sImIIar wIII resuIt, but wIth stIII worse eIIects. And academIc prophecy, IInaIIy, wIII
create onIy IanatIcaI sects but never a genuIne communIty.
78
One oI the prIncIpaI reasons thIs dIagnosIs sounds pIausIbIe was IdentIIIed earIy on by
enjamIn Constant, who, In the aItermath oI the Irench IevoIutIon, IamousIy argued that
the there was a IundamentaI dIIIerence between the ancIent and modern understandIng
oI IIberty.
79
n ancIent repubIIcs, Constant cIaImed, IIberty was "poIItIcaI" rather than
"cIvII," It meant not the Ireedom oI each cItIzen Irom socIaI oppressIon, but rather hIs
abIIIty to partIcIpate In the government. ecause the number oI cItIzens was reIatIveIy
smaII, each cItIzen "had poIItIcaIIy a great personaI Importance. . . . I the socIaI power was
oppresIve, each assocIate consoIed hImseII by the hope oI exercIsIng It."
80
The IIberty oI
the moderns, by contrast, Is cIvII rather than poIItIcaI. n modern states wIth theIr great
number oI cItIzens, the great mass can excercIse sovereIgnty onIy at {p.95) the tIme oI
eIectIons. "The peopIe cannot be but ensIaved or Iree, they can never be governIng. The
happIness oI the majorIty does not IIe anymore In the enjoyment oI power, but In the
IndIvIduaI IIberty."
81
n short, "the IIberty oI the ancIent tImes was aII that assured the
cItIzens the greatest part In the exercIse oI socIaI power. The IIberty oI modern tImes Is
everythIng whIch guarantees the Independence oI the cItIzens Irom the power."
82
t Is
not that we dId, or shouId, stop carIng about poIItIcaI IIberty. t Is, rather, that, Ior us, It Is,
or shouId be, Iess an aIm In ItseII than a means oI guaranteeIng our IndIvIduaI IIbertIes.
83
I Constant's cIaIm that the prIvate sphere matters much more to the majorIty oI the
moderns than the pubIIc one, that they seek theIr happIness In the Iormer rather than the
Iatter, Is correct, It wouId expIaIn why modern art Is so much more successIuI In gIvIng
expressIon to prIvate IndIvIduaIItIes and concerns than to pubIIc duty or poIItIcaI vIrtue.
IenIn, StaIIn, IItIer, Mao, IoI Iot. recent attempts to re-enchant the pubIIc, poIItIcaI
sphere, to make the state dIvIne, produced suIIerIng and destructIon on a scaIe
unprecedented In recorded hIstory. At the end oI thIs unIamented century, we cannot be
sure that "the uItImate and most subIIme vaIues" have Indeed once and Ior aII "retreated
Irom pubIIc IIIe eIther Into the transcendentaI reaIm oI mystIc IIIe or Into the brotherIIness
oI dIrect and personaI human reIatIons," but we must ardentIy hope that they have. The
practIcaI and dIIIIcuIt tasks oI saIeguardIng securIty, IIberty, and justIce Ior every cItIzen,
and oI gettIng the baIance between the creatIon oI weaIth and socIaI justIce rIght, wIII
Page 31 of 50
provIde our poIItIcs and our states wIth aII the dIgnIty and grandeur they wIII ever
requIre. We must wIsh Ior a compIeteIy dIsenchanted and shaIIow poIItIcs and satIsIy our
hunger Ior enchantment and depth In the prIvate and semI-prIvate spheres oI IamIIy and
cIvII socIety.
84
Matters oI uItImate Import shouId remaIn Ior us separate Irom the state.
And II we are Iucky enough that they do, IegeI's dIagnosIs oI the end oI art wIII have to
be reconsIdered In thIs respect, too, Ior our most proIound seII-understandIngs may weII
contInue to requIre representatIons and not onIy arguments Ior theIr embodIment, and
the representatIons oI art no Iess than those oI reIIgIon.
At the begInnIng oI the thIrd act oI Die Meistersinger von Nurnberg, the shoe-maker-poet
Ians Sachs medItates on the remarkabIe ease wIth whIch outwardIy weII-ordered
peaceIuI communItIes, IIke hIs beIoved uremberg, can IaII apart and succumb to cIvII
strIIe. "Where do Iook InquIrIngIy, In cIty and worId chronIcIe, to IInd out the cause why
peopIe torment and oppress one another to the quIck In useIess IurIous rage?"
85
The
answer to thIs Why Is the eternaI human IoIIy. "IoIIy! IoIIy! verywhere IoIIy!" SInce
nothIng happens wIthout thIs IrratIonaI Iorce ("It Is just the oId IoIIy, wIthout whIch nothIng
may happen"), the task, the poIItIcIan's and poet's, Sachs's, task, Is subtIy to steer It so
that It mIght serve the communIty, not destroy It. "ow Iet us see how Ians Sachs does
It that he can subtIy steer the IoIIy to do a nobIe work."
Iow does Sachs do It? When Iater In the day the whoIe oI uremberg gathers on an
open meadow to ceIebrate the Ieast oI St. john and "the peopIe" greet {p.96) theIr dear
poet wIth many a resoundIng "IeII!," the motIonIess Sachs, who, "as II rapt In thought,"
as the remarkabIe stage dIrectIon teIIs us, "has been gazIng Iar away over the crowd, at
Iength turns hIs eyes wIth kIndIy expressIon on them and begIns" (act 3, scene 5).
86
IIs
speech opens the sIngIng contest, durIng whIch he manages to steer the respectIve IoIIIes
oI the contestants and the peopIe wIth so much subtIety that the strIIe that had
threatened to puII the communIty apart the prevIous nIght ends In a generaI
reconcIIIatIon, aIbeIt one In whIch no room can be Iound Ior one oI the contestants, the
utterIy humIIIated eckmesser, who "rushes away In Iury and Ioses hImseII In the
crowd."
87
(CarI ahIhaus perceptIveIy remarks. "The C major jubIIatIon oI the cIose oI
the work, aIter everythIng that has come beIore It, Is not so serene, aIter aII, to an ear
that has been tuned musIco-dramatIcaIIy. t Is no accIdent that the motIve that bIends wIth
the IInaI chord Is that to whIch the crowd mocked eckmesser."
88
Ior some "Others"
there Is sImpIy no room In thIs homogeneous communIty.)
Sachs's IInaI speech speIIs out, then, the IIrm IoundatIons on whIch a communIty ever
threatened by IrratIonaI IoIIy shouId be buIIt. n bad tImes, he teIIs the peopIe, when
poIItIcaI Independence Is Iost to IoreIgn powers, "II the German peopIe and empIre were
IIrst to dIsIntegrate, soon, In IaIse Irench majesty, no prInce wouId understand Its peopIe
anymore and they wouId pIant In our German Iand Irench humbug wIth Irench
trumpery." n such tImes, "no one wouId know any more what Is German and genuIne, II
It dId not IIve In the gIory oI German masters." The guIId Sachs speaks Ior here Is sureIy
not that oI shoe-makers. t Is, rather, the guIId oI the InteIIectuaIs, the "masters," the
secuIar prIesthood whose gIory Is to deIIne, express, and preserve the natIon's IdentIty.
Page 32 of 50
And the moraI? Sachs's IInaI words, enthusIastIcaIIy repeated by the peopIe, make It
expIIcIt. "honor your German masters! Then you wIII speII-bInd good spIrIts, and II you
Iavor theIr work, even II the IoIy Ioman mpIre were to dIssoIve Into thIn aIr, we wouId
stIII have the hoIy German art!" "Ietzsche's tenet that art Is the onIy thIng that justIIIes
IIIe . . . summarIzes the theme oI Die Meistersinger," concIudes CarI ahIhaus In
InterpretIng these IInes.
89
ThIs seems to me very wIde oI mark. n Sachs's vIsIon, It Is not
art that justIIIes IIIe, but the reverse, art Is justIIIed and vaIued, because, and II, It serves
IIIe (whether oI IndIvIduaIs, or oI whoIe natIonaI communItIes) weII.
Sachs, Iet us recaII, does not want to eradIcate "the oId IoIIy," sInce he understands that
the bIInd IrratIonaI Iorce (whIch bears an uncanny resembIance to the SchopenhauerIan
wIII) Is not onIy destructIve, but aIso creatIve. Ie just wants It to serve IIIe, not destroy It.
Once you accept the SchopenhauerIan metaphysIcaI InsIght that the onIy reaIIty behInd
the veII oI appearances Is the bIInd IrratIonaI wIII, there are Indeed onIy two ways to go.
The truIy radIcaI and heroIc way Is to embrace annIhIIatIon, but thIs road Is accessIbIe
onIy to the exceptIonaI Iew (such as TrIstan, soIde, or runnhIIde). Ior the rest oI us, Ior
Sachs, there Is the second best way, the way oI resIgned wIsdom. n the sexuaI sphere,
Sachs wants Ior va neIther a passIonIess unIon wIth eckmesser, nor an aII-too-
passIonate eIopement wIth WaIther. Ie wIshes, rather, Ior a Iove-marrIage, passIonate,
but {p.97) aIso sanctIoned by the communIty. n art, he wants neIther eckmesser's
bIInd and desIccated attachment to tradItIonaI ruIes, nor WaIther's bIInd and anarchIc
passIon (as he teIIs WaIther, "Indeed, wIth such poetry and IIre oI Iove one seduces
daughters to adventure, but Ior bIessed matrImony one Iound other words and
meIodIes" act 3, scene 2) and youthIuI InspIratIon that couId not be sustaIned through a
IIIetIme. Iather, he wants a marrIage oI common poetIc ruIes and InspIred IndIvIduaI
dreams, a creatIvIty suIIIcIentIy rooted In tradItIonaI practIce not to burn out quIckIy and
suIIIcIentIy InspIred to be abIe to extend the tradItIon. "Iearn earIy the master ruIes, that
they may accompany you IaIthIuIIy and heIp you to preserve weII that whIch, In the years
oI youth, wIth sacred drIve, sprIng and Iove pIaced In your unconscIous heart." ut Sachs
aIso wants thIs sort oI art, an art capabIe oI harnessIng "the oId IoIIy" In the servIce oI IIIe
and preventIng It Irom destroyIng IndIvIduaIs and IamIIIes, to serve a Iarger natIonaI
communIty, to provIde It wIth a sense oI shared IdentIty and destIny, a gIue that wouId
bInd It together and prevent It Irom IaIIIng apart In cIvII strIIe or Irom dIsIntegratIng under
a IoreIgn domInatIon. "even II the IoIy Ioman mpIre were to dIssoIve Into thIn aIr, we
wouId stIII have the hoIy German art!"
SkIIIIuIIy deveIopIng brIIIIant InsIghts oI Ietzsche and Adorno, ahIhaus has
demonstrated how the musIc oI Die Meistersinger manages to sound archaIc and
modern at the same tIme ("It sounded so oId and yet was so new," as Sachs muses about
WaIther's TrIaI Song at the begInnIng oI the second act).
90
o Iess than Its musIc, the
opera's poIItIcs aIso sound so oId and yet are so new. y the tIme they aII assembIe at the
meadow, the communIty oI uremberg burghers has metamorphosed Into the German
peopIe. Wagner artIcuIated Germany's deepIy IngraIned and Iong-endurIng seII-Image oI
dIsunIty and decIIne Irom the greatness oI her medIevaI empIre In the very years oI
Ismarck's InexorabIy successIuI empIre-buIIdIng (Die Meistersinger was wrItten and
Page 33 of 50
composed between 1861 and 1867 and premIered In 1868). The artIst's remedy Ior the
decIIne was dIIIerent Irom the statesman's. What Wagner oIIered was not the hard-nosed
reaIIty oI poIItIcaI actIon, oI new unIty Iorged through dIpIomacy and war, but the magIc oI
art as the IoundatIon oI natIonaI unIty. Iad Ismarck been Iess, or more, successIuI, we
wouId today see Wagner's natIonaIIsm In a IIght sImIIar to that In whIch we see VerdI's, as
an exempIary reIIc Irom an era when art usurped Ior ItseII the mantIe abandoned by
reIIgIon, the era when artIsts, together wIth the rest oI the InteIIectuaI cIass, the
educators, the hIstorIans, commonIy saw themseIves as provIders oI Images and beIIeIs
that wouId gIve cohesIon to a socIety IncreasIngIy uprooted Irom tradItIonaI condItIons oI
IIIe by the pressures oI the modern IndustrIaI order (and the reader aIready knows that
aII the optImIstIc procIamatIons oI the comIng oI the postmodern age do not suIIIce to
assure me that that earIIer era Is truIy over). The bIack magIc oI IItIer, combInIng and
carIcaturIng the remedIes oI Wagner wIth those oI Ismarck, taught us to see, Instead,
the dangers Inherent In takIng art Ior reIIgIon.
"The hoIy German art" as a substItute Ior "the IoIy German mpIre" sounds benIgn
enough. What Sachs Iorgot to warn hIs peopIe about Is the dIsgrace oI {p.98) the same
art becomIng the successIuI and aggressIve empIre's state reIIgIon. n 1868, the
ceIebratIon oI the artIst's megaIomanIa mIght have seemed harmIess. Today It Is dIIIIcuIt to
contempIate Sachs on hIs uremberg meadow, "motIonIess, as II rapt In thought, . . .
gazIng Iar away over the crowd," wIth the enthusIastIc "peopIe" swIrIIng around hIm IIke
pIanets around the IIxed sun and accIaImIng hIm wIth theIr "IeII!," wIthout superImposIng
on the scene the Images oI that other IestIvaI on a uremberg meadow, the 1934
Fcrteitcg as staged In IenI IIeIenstahI's Triumph oj the Will (1935), wIth Its IndeIIbIe
Images oI the motIonIess, abstracted Iuhrer caught by the camera constantIy gyratIng
around hIm. (MusIc ItseII pIays a roIe In thIs superImposItIon. the soundtrack
accompanyIng the openIng sequence oI the IIIm has the preIude to Die Meistersinger
march eIIortIessIy Into the Horst Wessel Lied.) Thus death ImItates art. Weber's
prophetIc dIagnosIs stands. In modern condItIons In whIch the state can easIIy acquIre the
power to crush everythIng that stands In Its way, art as state reIIgIon can onIy breed
monstrosItIes.
ut II we shouId mIstrust art that supports the state, Is the opposIte aIso the case? s
there anythIng wrong wIth state support Ior the arts? n a perhaps unexpected way, the
comparIson oI art and reIIgIon can be made reIevant to our thInkIng about thIs questIon
too. ruce Ackerman has argued that the IIberaI tradItIon Is spIIt on the Issue oI whether
or not the state shouId support the arts. On the one sIde there are the jacobIn heIrs oI
the antIcIerIcaI Irench nIIghtenment who want to enIIst the support oI the state In theIr
cuIturaI war agaInst what they consIder to be reIIgIous superstItIon. On the other sIde
there are the more thoroughgoIng IIberaIs who, IIke Ackerman hImseII, argue Ior a radIcaI
dIsestabIIshment between the state and cuIture to compIete the separatIon oI church and
state. n the modern worId, they poInt out, reIIgIon and art are engaged In an ongoIng
contest over our uItImate convIctIons and IdentItIes, over no Iess than the meanIng oI IIIe.
"As much as possIbIe," wrItes Ackerman,
Page 34 of 50
the IIberaI state shouId be neutraI on such matters, IeavIng It to each cItIzen to
determIne whether he shouId gIve hIs IInancIaI support to the Church oI Iome or
the one at ayreuth. . . . ThIs eutraIIst IIberaI phIIosophy strIves to prevent eIther
sIde In the ongoIng cuIture war Irom usIng the state's coercIve powers oI taxatIon
as a weapon In the struggIe Ior men's souIs. . . . AIter aII, II the state ostentatIousIy
takes sIdes In thIs conversatIon, It cannot avoId denIgratIng the uItImate convIctIons
oI many oI Its dIssentIng cItIzens.
91
WhIIe IuIIy accept Ackerman's neutraIIst prIncIpIe, aIso thInk that hIs concIusIon that the
state shouId stop subsIdIzIng opera (and, suppose, aII other kInds oI artIstIc practIces) Is
onIy one oI the two concIusIons one can derIve Irom It. The other one, equaIIy consIstent
wIth the neutraIIst prIncIpIe, Is that the state shouId support aII sIdes In the cuIturaI
debate In a neutraI IashIon. To be sure, thIs does excIude dIrect state subsIdIes to artIstIc
or reIIgIous InstItutIons. It does not seem possIbIe to devIse a way oI IaIrIy dIvIdIng the
totaI approprIated Ior the cuIturaI conversatIon, sInce the number oI partIcIpants In the
debate, to say nothIng {p.99) oI theIr needs, constantIy changes. State management oI
the arts In thIs respect resembIes state economIc pIannIng and Is more than IIkeIy to
produce sImIIarIy dIsmaI resuIts. t Is not that the empIoyees oI the MInIstry oI CuIture
are necessarIIy Iess smart or ImagInatIve than prIvate donors or IoundatIons. t Is rather
that the mIstakes oI the Iatter can be promptIy rectIIIed by other donors and IoundatIons,
whIIe the mIstakes oI the state monopoIIst are much more dIIIIcuIt to correct.
ut IndIrect state support, neutraIIy admInIstered, Is certaInIy possIbIe. t wouId be
enough to grant nonproIIt or tax-exempt status to both reIIgIous and art organIzatIons, to
estabIIsh a tax deductIon Ior charItabIe contrIbutIons, and to aIIow such contrIbutIons to
be made to both reIIgIous and art organIzatIons. ThIs way the state's coercIve powers oI
taxatIon wouId cIearIy be enIIsted on behaII oI cuIturaI conversatIon, but each cItIzen
wouId be IeIt Iree to determIne whIch partIcuIar InstItutIon he wouId want to support.
(The dIIIIcuItIes wouId begIn onIy II we wanted to redIstrIbute the Iunds and support the
cuIturaI practIces oI those who couId not aIIord to support them themseIves. ut these
dIIIIcuItIes wouId not be InsurmountabIe In a socIety that accepted In prIncIpIe that
redIstrIbutIon may be just. t Is here that the state wouId have a useIuI roIe to pIay, as It
usuaIIy has when mInorItIes need to be protected.)
A rIgorous IIberaI mIght object at thIs poInt that the state shouId not be In the busIness oI
supportIng the quest Ior the meanIng oI IIIe, even when thIs support Is IndIrect and
neutraI, sInce It wouId then be usIng the powers oI taxatIon to coerce those who see no
need to engage In such a quest. ut the Iact Is that Ior a IIberaI the InvoIvement oI the
state In any area becomes controversIaI, once the most eIementary externaI and InternaI
securIty needs and the admInIstratIon oI justIce have been provIded Ior. The state's
support oI heaIth servIces or educatIon Is no Iess In need oI a democratIc debate and
decIsIon than Its support oI reIIgIon or art. ut once such a debate has taken pIace and
the decIsIon has been made, even the most rIgorous IIberaI conscIence can be at peace
wIth ItseII. And one can weII ImagIne a socIety that decIdes that the quest Ior the meanIng
oI IIIe Is as essentIaI to cIvIIIzed IIvIng as, say, the provIsIon oI unIversaI heaIth servIces or
Page 35 of 50
educatIon, and that It (the socIety) has a custodIaI obIIgatIon to make Its cuIturaI herItage
avaIIabIe to the next generatIon (how can they be expected IruItIuIIy to engage In a
debate over the meanIng oI IIIe II they do not know what has aIready transpIred In thIs
debate?) at prIces even Its Iess Iortunate members can aIIord. ThIs book Is In part an
attempt to provIde arguments In Iavor oI such a concIusIon.
e. Peasure
The concIusIon that there Is nothIng wrong wIth an art that represents a content wIth
moraI or poIItIcaI sIgnIIIcance Is IIkeIy to raIse some eyebrows In the more orthodox
aesthetIcIst cIrcIes. On our account so Iar, art's cuIturaI IunctIon Is sternIy cognItIve and
ethIcaI. art Is the Instrument oI seII-knowIedge and seII-InventIon, It Is there to Improve
(prodesse). ut what about the second haII oI {p.100) the IoratIan IormuIa? s art
there aIso to pIease (delectcre)? The cIaIm shaII be makIng In thIs sectIon Is that pIeasure
Is at Ieast as centraI a purpose oI art as educatIon. The centraI Importance oI pIeasure
deserves to be stressed expIIcItIy, because the Iact that have much Iess to say on the
subject oI pIeasure than on the subject oI edIIIcatIon mIght create the undesIrabIe
ImpressIon that consIder the Iormer somehow Iess pertInent.
ndeed, gIven the Intense pIeasure that art-Iovers assocIate wIth theIr passIons, any
account oI the uses oI art that dId not consIder pIeasure wouId be serIousIy
ImpoverIshed. ut, at the begInnIng oI our InquIry, we promIsed to search Ior the
IunctIon oI art that wouId be cuIturaIIy Important or, better yet, IndIspensabIe, and that
couId be IuIIIIIed onIy by art, IncIudIng much oI the art that aIready exIsts. The educatIonaI
IunctIon IdentIIIed above meets these crIterIa. IIeasure, however, may appear to IaII to
meet them. It does not seem to be somethIng that onIy art can gIve us, and Its cuIturaI
Importance or IndIspensabIIIty has yet to be estabIIshed. What shaII try to do now Is to
show that, In Iact, pIeasure IIts our bIII just as weII as Improvement does.
That we derIve pIeasure Irom many kInds oI thIngs and actIvItIes Is undenIabIe. ut It Is
possIbIe to argue that there exIsts a IamIIy oI pIeasures that are specIIIcaIIy aIIorded by
art, pIeasures tradItIonaIIy subsumed under the concept oI "aesthetIc pIeasure." The
nature oI aesthetIc pIeasure was most InIIuentIaIIy anaIyzed by Kant In 1790, when, In The
Critique oj ]udgement, he cIaImed that "the deIIght whIch determInes the judgement oI
taste |that Is, aesthetIc judgement| Is Independent oI aII Interest," that Is, It Is not
connected "wIth the representatIon oI the reaI exIstence oI the object" and, thereIore,
does not InvoIve "a reIerence to the IacuIty oI desIre."
92
Kant couId thus dIstInguIsh
aesthetIc pIeasure, deIIght In the beautIIuI, Irom sensuous gratIIIcatIon, "deIIght In the
agreeabIe," whIch "Is coupIed wIth Interest" In the object,
93
sInce thIs object "provokes
a desIre Ior sImIIar objects |and| consequentIy the deIIght |In It| presupposes, not the
sImpIe judgement about It, but the bearIng Its reaI exIstence has upon my state so Iar as
aIIected by such an Object."
94
SImIIarIy, Kant couId dIstInguIsh aesthetIc pIeasure Irom
ratIonaI esteem, or "deIIght In the good," whIch Is aIso "coupIed wIth Interest," sInce It
ImpIIes the concept oI an end or purpose oI the object ("to deem somethIng good, must
aIways know what sort oI a thIng the object Is Intended to be") "and consequentIy the
reIatIon oI reason to (at Ieast possIbIe) wIIIIng, and thus a deIIght In the existence oI an
Page 36 of 50
Object or actIon."
95
"OI aII these three kInds oI deIIght |In the beautIIuI, the agreeabIe,
and the good|, that oI taste In the beautIIuI may be saId to be the one and onIy
dIsInterested and jree deIIght, Ior, wIth It, no Interest, whether oI sense or reason,
extorts approvaI."
96
Kant concIuded. "Tcste Is the IacuIty oI estImatIng an object or a
mode oI representatIon by means oI deIIght or aversIon cpcrt jrom cny interest. The
object oI such a deIIght Is caIIed becutijul."
97
We may take the aesthetIc pIeasure In a reaI object or an ImagInary representatIon. What
demarcates thIs sort oI pIeasure Irom other kInds oI deIIght Is that It Is Independent oI the
dIctates oI our appetItes or reasons and thus remaIns {p.101) unconnected wIth our
desIres ("dIsInterested" and "Iree"). The deIIght In the agreeabIe or the good necessarIIy
generates a desIre that the object oI our deIIght be reaI and be ours, and It, potentIaIIy at
Ieast, aIso generates an actIon desIgned to satIsIy the desIre. The aesthetIc pIeasure ends
In ItseII, not In a desIre or an actIon. Kant's anaIysIs Is persuasIve In so Iar as we can, and
do, on occasIon take pIeasure In objects wIthout theIr havIng to satIsIy any oI our
sensuous desIres or ratIonaI purposes. o one wIth a serIous passIon Ior paIntIng or
musIc couId be persuaded that hIs Irequent vIsIts to gaIIerIes or hIs reguIar pIayIng oI
ach's Iugues on the pIano serve onIy to satIsIy hIs wIsh to dIstInguIsh hImseII Irom hIs
Iess Iortunate and Iess educated IeIIows, even II he readIIy admIts that such a wIsh may
enter Into hIs artIstIc Interests. And sImIIarIy, onIy proIessors oI IIterature can serIousIy
entertaIn the notIon that an addIctIon to readIng noveIs or poetry cannot be anythIng eIse
than a cravIng Ior IIIusory satIsIactIons oI more or Iess hIdden desIres, aIthough one does
not have to proIess IIterature to admIt that Indeed readIng may aIso serve such
purposes. To cIaIm that aesthetIc pIeasure Is the onIy IegItImate and actuaI use one makes
oI art wouId be as patentIy IaIse as to cIaIm that there Is no such thIng as a pIeasure whIch
Is "dIsInterested" In Kant's sense. (Iater on, In the epIIogue, shaII expIaIn why thInk It
unIIkeIy that the pIeasure we derIve Irom the practIce oI the arts Is ever pureIy
aesthetIc.)
ut to IdentIIy a specIIIcaIIy aesthetIc pIeasure Is not the same thIng as to show that onIy
art can provIde It. On the contrary, Kant hImseII cIearIy had nature rather than art In
mInd at thIs stage oI hIs dIscussIon ("IIowers, Iree patterns, IInes aImIessIy IntertwInIng-
technIcaIIy termed IoIIage"
98
were hIs preIerred exampIes) and, Indeed, we have seen
that aesthetIc pIeasure may be taken not onIy In an ImagInary representatIon, but aIso In a
reaI object. At most, we mIght suppose that, II It Is characterIstIc oI aesthetIc pIeasure that
It Is Independent oI any thought concernIng the reaI exIstence oI the object, an ImagInary
representatIon mIght support such a pIeasure better than a reaI object. wIth a reaI
object, It may be more dIIIIcuIt to achIeve genuIne Independence Irom any thought
concernIng Its reaI exIstence. And thIs Is, Indeed, aII that we can cIaIm here. t Is sureIy not
onIy art that can gIve us aesthetIc pIeasure, but art has the advantage over nature that It
Is specIIIcaIIy desIgned to provIde pIeasure oI thIs kInd (In addItIon to Its other uses, oI
course) and hence may provIde It more eIIIcIentIy than anythIng eIse (wIth the possIbIe
exceptIon oI sports, another great source oI aesthetIc pIeasure and a cIose cousIn oI the
arts).
Page 37 of 50
ut even II we are persuaded that art can be a source oI aesthetIc pIeasure, can we aIso
cIaIm that provIdIng such pIeasure Is a cuIturaIIy Important or IndIspensabIe IunctIon? n
thInkIng about the possIbIe worth oI pIeasure, we mIght consIder a rather IoIty vIew that
mIght be dIrectIy derIved Irom Kant's anaIysIs. As Kant emphasIzed, aesthetIc pIeasure Is
"dIsInterested" and "Iree," Independent oI our appetItes or reasons, unconnected wIth
our desIres. t serves none oI our sensuous or practIcaI Interests. What couId the
possIbIe worth oI such a useIess IdIe pIeasure be? SImpIy thIs that, to the extent that we
vaIue human Ireedom, we must aIso vaIue actIvItIes In whIch the possIbIIIty oI such
Ireedom {p.102) Is most cIearIy and characterIstIcaIIy demonstrated. The very Iact that
we can take pIeasure In somethIng that serves none oI our sensuous or practIcaI
Interests shows that we can on occasIon rIse above the reaIm oI necessIty to the reaIm oI
Ireedom. "The beautIIuI prepares us to Iove somethIng . . . apart Irom any Interest. the
subIIme to esteem somethIng hIghIy even In opposItIon to our (sensIbIe) Interest," says
Kant.
99
As CarI ahIhaus has poInted out, thIs IIne oI deIense oI aesthetIc pIeasure
connects the aesthetIc IdeoIogy oI the modern German educated mIddIe cIass wIth the
premodern tradItIon oI "IIberaI arts," the arts deservIng to be cuItIvated by Iree men.
100
(ndeed, IauI Oskar KrIsteIIer has shown how, Irom the sIxteenth to the eIghteenth
century, the modern system oI IIne arts evoIved Irom the premodern one oI IIberaI arts.
what the two systems had In common was an emphasIs on IeIsurIy contempIatIon rather
than useIuI Iabor.
101
) The contempIatIon oI eethoven's symphonIes takes over Irom
the contempIatIon oI the mathematIcaI order oI the cosmos as the actIvIty paradIgmatIcaIIy
demonstratIng what ArIstotIe consIdered to be the content oI happIness In the hIghest
sense, nameIy, the contempIatIve IIIe oI phIIosophIc wIsdom. The contempIatIve actIvIty
aIone, ArIstotIe taught, Is IeIsureIy and "wouId seem to be Ioved Ior Its own sake, Ior
nothIng arIses Irom It apart Irom the contempIatIng, whIIe Irom practIcaI actIvItIes we gaIn
more or Iess apart Irom the actIon."
102
GIven the IncreasIngIy obvIous practIcaI IruIts oI
modern scIence, the contempIatIon oI beauty IuIIIIIs the need Ior an actIvIty worthy oI Iree
men even better than the contempIatIon oI truth.
AII oI thIs mIght seem persuasIve untII one notIces that a couch potato enjoyIng hIs game
on TV mIght not be the most compeIIIng exampIe oI the reaIIzatIon oI human Ireedom and
happIness In the hIghest sense. t Is understandabIe that phIIosophers, or aesthetes,
wouId be oI the opInIon that theIrs Is the hIghest human actIvIty, but there Is no reason to
take such seII-servIng cIaIms too serIousIy. The argument that mIght be derIved Irom
Kant Is In essence that aesthetIc pIeasure remInds us that we are Iree and that Its worth
Is IntertwIned wIth our sense oI dIgnIty as Iree beIngs. ut do we reaIIy need to be
remInded oI our Ireedom at thIs poInt? sn't It, rather, that no matter how hard we try,
we moderns cannot but consIder ourseIves Iree to a certaIn extent, that It seems to be
quIte ImpossIbIe to thInk and act entIreIy consIstentIy wIth the strIct determInIst doctrIne?
And II we do derIve a sense oI dIgnIty Irom the conscIousness oI our Ireedom, Isn't thIs
conscIousness suIIIcIentIy supported by any actIvIty we IreeIy choose to undertake,
whether dIsInterested or not?
A Iess hIgh-mInded but more persuasIve argument showIng the vaIue oI aesthetIc
pIeasure wouId sImpIy say that pIeasure, any pIeasure, unIess It Is harmIuI, Is seII-
Page 38 of 50
evIdentIy vaIuabIe and does not requIre any Iurther arguments In Its Iavor. ow, the onIy
harm a dIsInterested pIeasure mIght possIbIy do to us or to others Is that Its pursuIt, IIke
any other actIvIty, consumes our tIme and other resources and, consequentIy, mIght
prevent us Irom pursuIng other, more worthy actIvItIes. ThIs objectIon, however, whIIe
vaIId enough, Is hardIy damagIng, sInce It Is true oI any vIrtuous (or vIcIous) actIvIty we
mIght chose to engage In. We can, and {p.103) have to, negotIate a mIddIe course
between the rIdIcuIousIy exaggerated aesthetIcIst posItIon whIch eIevates the pursuIt oI
aesthetIc pIeasure to the roIe oI the hIghest actIvIty avaIIabIe to us, and the purItanIcaI
rejectIon oI aII pIeasure as the work oI the devII, or oI whatever socIaI or poIItIcaI enemy
one thInks to be the devII's progeny.
To be sure, on thIs Iess hIgh-mInded account, aesthetIc pIeasure has been reduced to a
kInd oI amusement, a cIose cousIn oI the pIeasures we derIve Irom aII sorts oI games.
There Is no harm In that. we need to be amused, even II we are rIghtIy unwIIIIng to
eIevate amusement to an exaggeratedIy hIgh posItIon among the goods. Iere we mIght
take another cue Irom ArIstotIe. IappIness, ArIstotIe taught, "does not IIe In amusement,"
Ior happIness Is an end and "to exert oneseII and work Ior the sake oI amusement seems
sIIIy and utterIy chIIdIsh. ut to amuse oneseII In order that one may exert oneseII . . .
seems rIght, Ior amusement Is a sort oI reIaxatIon, and we need reIaxatIon because we
cannot work contInuousIy."
103
t makes, oI course, quIte a dIIIerence whether one
consIders aesthetIc pIeasure to be a contempIatIve component oI the end oI IIIe, or a
mere amusIng means oI reIaxatIon, a needed but InessentIaI detour on the way to what
truIy matters. ut even on the more modest account, the great pIeasures that the
cuItIvatIon oI the arts gIves us are nothIng we need to dIsmIss or despIse. esIdes,
amusement and other, hIgher, uses oI the arts do not excIude one another. Ior ArIstotIe,
musIc was a source oI amusement, but aIso oI moraI educatIon, and even oI InteIIectuaI
contempIatIon, aII at once. "OI the three thIngs mentIoned In our dIscussIon, whIch does It
|musIc| produce?-educatIon or amusement or InteIIectuaI enjoyment, Ior It may be
reckoned under aII three, and seems to share In the nature oI aII oI them."
104
t has to
be admItted, however, that we wouId not want to spend our tIme wrItIng, or readIng,
books about art, II cll that art provIded was amusement.
We can nevertheIess recapture the IoratIan delectcre sIde by sIde wIth the prodesse
and maIntaIn that the provIsIon oI pIeasure Is as IegItImate a IunctIon oI art as edIIIcatIon.
Moreover, II IegeI Is rIght to thInk that In the modern worId art no Ionger expresses our
hIghest IdeaIs and that they can be Iound more IuIIy expressed In phIIosophy, It wouId
IoIIow that In the modern worId the Importance oI aesthetIc pIeasure Is IIkeIy to Increase
In reIatIon to the Importance oI educatIon as the IunctIon oI art. Such a quIntessentIaIIy
modern phenomenon as the emergence and growth oI aesthetIcIsm seems to conIIrm the
predIctIon. ut, whIIe the exact baIance between pIeasure and Improvement wIII have to
be negotIated anew wIth each IndIvIduaI perIod, art, artIst, and work even, It Is IIkeIy that
a proIonged estrangement oI art Irom eIther one oI Its two IunctIons wouId ImpoverIsh
and crIppIe It. Art that ceases to gIve pIeasure runs the rIsk oI degeneratIng Into dreary
dIdactIcIsm or, worse, InsIdIous propaganda. ut art that permanentIy gIves up on Its
educatIonaI IunctIon Is In danger oI becomIng IrIvoIous, empty oI sIgnIIIcant content, and
Page 39 of 50
uItImateIy sterIIe, a mere game that Is pIeasIng enough, but does not engage our most
proIound Interests and concerns. ven so, the reIatIonshIp between pIeasure and
edIIIcatIon Is an unequaI one. {p.104) The thought oI an art that Is onIy useIuI Is most
unappeaIIng. t Is not so wIth art that Is mereIy pIeasIng. ThIs mIght not answer our hIghest
conceptIon oI what art Is capabIe oI, but It Is certaInIy not oIIputtIng. On the contrary, the
objectIons oI purItans notwIthstandIng, to enhance peopIe's IIves by provIdIng aesthetIc
pIeasure Is an entIreIy honorabIe occupatIon.
ut the most Important poInt about the pIeasure oI art has not been made yet. We shouId
keep In mInd that not aII, or most, oI the pIeasure we derIve Irom art Is aesthetIc and that,
consequentIy, edIIIcatIon and pIeasure are not as neatIy separated as have pretended
them to be here. AIso pIeasure can have a cognItIve dImensIon (and IearnIng can be
pIeasurabIe).
Much oI the pIeasure we take In art Is not oI the aesthetIc kInd, but, rather, IaIIs
somewhere between the dIsInterested and Interested. What oIten happens Is that we IInd
enterIng a IIctIonaI worId pIeasurabIe (or dIspIeasIng), because we ImagIne ourseIves
beIongIng to thIs worId and we IInd Its varIous objects appeaIIng (or repeIIent, or both, as
the case may be). (Thus, IIke Madame ovary, we may enjoy ImagInIng ourseIves wIth
heroes oI romantIc IIctIon, IeadIng the IIIe oI IeIsured passIon.) The pIeasure In such cases
can hardIy be consIdered dIsInterested. It Is certaInIy not unconnected wIth our desIres.
t Is much more IIke deIIght In the agreeabIe or the good. It generates a desIre that the
object oI our deIIght be reaI and be ours. ut the object Is neIther reaI nor ours, and the
pIeasure can never be IdentIcaI wIth that oI the satIsIactIon oI an empIrIcaI desIre by Its
reaI object. Iather, the pIeasure consIsts In experIencIng an empIrIcaI desIre and
ImagInIng what It wouId be IIke to satIsIy It. We and our desIre are reaI enough, but the
object and the satIsIactIon remaIn ImagInary.
t Is obvIous why thIs sort oI pIeasure can be provIded onIy by art, onIy by
representatIons oI IIctIonaI worIds. ut what Is the vaIue oI such pIeasure, II any? Ior the
aesthete such pIeasures are suspect, because they are, weII, nonaesthetIc. We may saIeIy
Ignore these suspIcIons. the IdentIIIcatIon oI art wIth the aesthetIc, or rather, the IImItatIon
oI art to the aesthetIc, Is an unjustIIIed act oI post-KantIan usurpatIon and we have
aIready seen that art Is, and shouId be, more than just a purveyor oI aesthetIc deIIghts.
ut then, there are aIso stern moraIIsts who see In nonaesthetIc pIeasures derIved Irom
IIctIons nothIng more than a reprehensIbIe escape Irom reaIIty Into a dream-worId oI
IIIusory IuIIIIIments. The danger they see Is reaI enough. t Is possIbIe to use IIctIons as
opIum and to seek In them consoIatIons one does not dare to pursue In reaI IIIe, that Is, to
use them to IooI oneseII. ut thIs Is sureIy not aII we do wIth daydreams. When we derIve
thIs sort oI pIeasure Irom the ImagInary experIences art provIdes, we have the
opportunIty to Iearn somethIng about ourseIves. We can dIscover what It Is that gIves us
pIeasure, that Is, what It Is that we mIght reaIIy desIre. Iere pIeasure gets us back to
knowIedge, but now the object oI knowIedge Is not a IIctIonaI personage who Is IIke us,
but we ourseIves. n thIs sense, the nonaesthetIc pIeasure oI art may become an
Instrument oI seII-dIscovery, an Instrument that aIIows us to see somethIng about
Page 40 of 50
ourseIves that had been hIdden Irom our vIew.
105
(Thus Irancesca, the wIIe oI {p.105)
GIancIotto, and IaoIo, hIs younger brother, both oI whom ante meets In the second
cIrcIe oI heII among "the carnaI sInners, who subject reason to desIre,"
106
dIscovered
theIr reaI passIon In the represented one oI GuInevere, KIng Arthur's queen, and
IanceIot, hIs knIght. When ante asks Irancesca "but teII me, . . . by what and how dId
Iove grant you to know the dubIous desIres?",
107
she IdentIIIes as "the IIrst root oI our
Iove"
108
theIr readIng oI the IanceIot romance together. "A GaIIehauIt |a go-between|
was the book and he who wrote It."
109
t Is not that they were corrupted by bad
exampIe. Iather, the exampIe opened theIr eyes to theIr unacknowIedged mutuaI Iove so
eIIectIveIy that "that day we read no Iarther In It."
110
) IeIIectIve chIIdren and younger
peopIe, In partIcuIar, use IIctIons thIs way aII the tIme, and so do we aII, at Ieast Irom tIme
to tIme. Ior us, pIeasure is, or can be, edIIIcatIon.
scapIsm, however, Is not the onIy, or even the prImary, danger moraIIsts see In the
nonaesthetIc pIeasures oI art. More threatenIng stIII, they thInk, Is the seductIon and
corruptIon by pIeasures oI an Incorrect sort, whatever they may be, pIeasures the
addIctIon to whIch wouId Ioster quaIItIes they IInd undesIrabIe In theIr IeIIow cItIzens. To
those who take thIs danger serIousIy, some Iorm oI censorshIp seems InevItabIe. IIato's
Republic artIcuIated thIs posItIon very cIearIy. IIctIonaI personages may act vIrtuousIy or
vIcIousIy and hence brIng us Iessons vIrtue or vIce. Moreover, IIctIons provIde us not
onIy wIth modeIs oI actIng and IeeIIng weII or badIy, but aIso appeaI to our desIres, even
II, unIIke IIato, we are not convInced that the Iatter appeaI must aIways be corruptIng, It
cIearIy can be corruptIng sometImes, when the aroused desIre Is IncompatIbIe wIth vIrtue
(the desIre to act crueIIy, say). SInce IIctIons have these powers, the concIusIon seems
InevItabIe that, II we want to Ioster good characters and hInder evII dIsposItIons, we
shouId not aIIow IIctIons that show vIcIous actIons or excIte vIcIous desIres.
ShaII we, then, thus IIghtIy suIIer our chIIdren to IIsten to any chance storIes
IashIoned by any chance teachers and so to take Into theIr mInds opInIons Ior the
most part contrary to those that we shaII thInk It desIrabIe Ior them to hoId when
they are grown up?
y no manner oI means wIII we aIIow It.
We must begIn, then, It seems, by a censorshIp over our storymakers, and what
they do weII we must pass and what not, reject.
111
And Iurther. "the IIrst storIes that they hear shouId be so composed as to brIng the
IaIrest Iessons oI vIrtue to theIr ears."
112
Moreover, It Is not onIy the poets that shouId
be so controIIed.
s It, then, onIy the poets that we must supervIse and compeI to embody In theIr
poems the sembIance oI the good character or eIse not wrIte poetry among us, or
must we keep watch over the other craItsmen, and IorbId them to represent the
evII dIsposItIon, the IIcentIous, the IIIIberaI, the graceIess, eIther In the IIkeness oI
IIvIng creatures or In buIIdIngs or In any other product oI theIr art, on penaIty, II
unabIe to obey, oI beIng IorbIdden to practIce theIr art among us, {p.106) that
Page 41 of 50
our guardIans many not be bred among symboIs oI evII, as It were In a pasturage
oI poIsonous herbs, Iest grazIng IreeIy and croppIng Irom many such day by day
they IIttIe by IIttIe and aII unawares accumuIate and buIId up a huge mass oI evII In
theIr own souIs.
113
When It comes to the educatIon oI chIIdren, IIato's argument has to be taken serIousIy,
and It occasIonaIIy Is. CoIIn McGInn has argued recentIy that, sInce "an evII character Is
one that derIves pIeasure Irom paIn and paIn Irom pIeasure |oI another|,"
114
"we shouId
be concerned about the psychoIogIcaI eIIects oI vIoIent entertaInment. There are reaI
rIsks In conjoInIng kIIIIng and Iun."
115
The pIatonIc caII that socIety (or parents) exercIse
some controI over the IIctIons It aIIows Its chIIdren to hear and watch Is sureIy justIIIed.
ArIstotIe, who rareIy agreed wIth IIato otherwIse, was oI the same opInIon concernIng
thIs partIcuIar Issue. "The Irectors oI ducatIon, as they are termed, shouId be careIuI
what taIes or storIes the chIIdren hear, Ior aII such thIngs are desIgned to prepare the
way Ior the busIness oI Iater IIIe, and shouId be Ior the most part ImItatIons oI the
occupatIons whIch they wIII hereaIter pursue In earnest."
116
And Iurther. "ut the
IegIsIator shouId not aIIow youth to be spectators oI IambI or oI comedy untII they are oI
an age to sIt at the pubIIc tabIes and to drInk strong wIne, by that tIme educatIon wIII have
armed them agaInst the evII InIIuences oI such representatIons."
117
ut treatIng aduIts IIke chIIdren Is another matter. I we want to extend to grown-ups the
courtesy oI treatIng them wIth the dIgnIty that moraIIy responsIbIe agents deserve, we
have to consIder the IIkeIIhood that censorshIp mIght do more harm than good. IIato
hImseII was too great an artIst not to be uncomIortabIe wIth hIs radIcaI concIusIons. n a
Iamous passage In book 10 oI the Republic, he suggested that the phIIosophIcaI dIstrust oI
poetry preceded hIs own work and he Issued a chaIIenge to hIs successors.
Iet us, then concIude our return to the topIc oI poetry and our apoIogy, and aIIIrm
that we reaIIy had good grounds then Ior dIsmIssIng her Irom our cIty, sInce such
was her character. Ior reason constraIned us. And Iet us Iurther say to her, Iest
she condemn us Ior harshness and rustIcIty, that there Is Irom oI oId a quarreI
between phIIosophy and poetry. . . . ut nevertheIess Iet It be decIared that, II the
mImetIc and duIcet poetry can show any reason Ior her exIstence In a weII-
governed state, we wouId gIadIy admIt her, sInce we ourseIves are very conscIous
oI her speII. . . . And we wouId aIIow her advocates who are not poets but Iovers oI
poetry to pIead her cause In prose wIthout meter, and show that she Is not onIy
deIIghtIuI but beneIIcIaI to orderIy government and aII the IIIe oI man. And we shaII
IIsten benevoIentIy, Ior It wIII be cIear gaIn Ior us II It can be shown that she
bestows not onIy pIeasure but beneIIt.
118
The pIckIng apart oI IIato's argument has been goIng on, expIIcItIy or ImpIIcItIy, at Ieast
sInce ArIstotIe's Foetics, wIth Its attempt to show why the experIence oI tragedy may be
edIIyIng rather than corruptIng. More generaIIy, the obvIous objectIon to IIato Is that a
mature person can derIve a useIuI Iesson Irom a representatIon oI vIcIous actIons (a
Iesson concernIng a dImensIon oI human {p.107) potentIaIIty) wIthout wantIng to ImItate
such actIons. ChIIdren need Iessons oI thIs sort too, sInce moraI educatIon requIres the
Page 42 of 50
use oI exampIes not onIy oI what one shouId want, but aIso oI what one shouId avoId. And
the sItuatIon oI art arousIng Incorrect desIres Is not dIIIerent Irom the sItuatIon oI art
representIng evII. no doubt, some may be corrupted by the exampIe oI such
representatIons, but others wIII Iearn about evII hIdden In themseIves and theIr IeIIows.
IecaII what Ietzsche saId on the subject oI "dangerous books."
Dcngerous books. - Somebody remarked. ' can teII by my own reactIon to It that
thIs book Is harmIuI. ut Iet hIm onIy waIt and perhaps one day he wIII admIt to
hImseII that thIs same book has done hIm a great servIce by brIngIng out the
hIdden sIckness oI hIs heart and makIng It vIsIbIe.
119
ut regardIess oI whether such arguments agaInst censorshIp are compeIIIng or not,
there Is one IrequentIy made argument we shouId abandon, even though It Is poIItIcaIIy
eIIIcacIous. We shouId stop deIendIng IIctIons threatened wIth censorshIp wIth the
argument that they shouId be IeIt aIone because they are Art. I pornography, In
partIcuIar, deserves protectIon, It deserves It under the IIrst Amendment, IIke other
Iorms oI expressIon, and not because oI Its specIIIcaIIy artIstIc quaIItIes.
120
n takIng thIs
Iatter IIne oI deIense, we teII the jury, In eIIect. "True, the content oI the worId
represented here oIIends the norms oI thIs communIty, but Iook how beautIIuI Its Iorm
Is." Thus, janet Kardon, the curator oI an exhIbItIon oI Iobert MappIethorpe's
photographs, some oI whIch became the centerpIeces oI the weII-pubIIcIzed 1990
obscenIty trIaI In CIncInnatI, In her testImony In Iront oI the jury "poInted to
MappIethorpe's sensItIve IIghtIng, texture, and composItIon, caIIIng 'a seII-portraIt oI
MappIethorpe wIth the handIe oI a whIp Inserted In hIs anus "aImost cIassIcaI" In Its
composItIon. "
121
(Ior Iobert Iughes, thIs testImony represents "the kInd oI
exhausted and IIteraIIy de-moraIIzed aesthetIcIsm that wouId IInd no basIc dIIIerence
between a uremberg raIIy and a usy erkeIey spectacuIar, sInce both, aIter aII, are
exampIes oI Art eco choreography."
122
) "As the jury IIstened to wItness aIter deIense
wItness cIaIm that the MappIethorpe photographs were works oI art," reports Wendy
SteIner, "and as the InItIaI shock at the Images was repIaced by a vast web oI aesthetIc
InterpretatIon, the jury members were Iorced to concede to the experts."
123
That jurIes are wIIIIng to IIsten Is a touchIng testImony to the contInuIng prestIge oI Art.
!nIortunateIy, It Is aIso a testImony to how utterIy IrreIevant to any serIous ethIcaI or
poIItIcaI concerns art Is consIdered to be. n a post-KantIan IashIon, the argument
assumes that art's onIy proper IunctIon Is to provIde aesthetIc pIeasure and It ImpIIcItIy
denIes that art can aIso be an Instrument oI seII-knowIedge. n the short run, It may
protect thIs or that endangered work Irom censorshIp. n the Iong run, It does art more
harm than good, sInce It teIIs artIsts, In eIIect. "You can do what you want, sInce no
matter what you do, It does not much matter to us."
Notes:
(1.) G. W. I. IegeI, Elements oj the Fhilosophy oj Right, ed. AIIen W. Wood, trans. I. .
Isbet (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1991), 4, p. 35.
Page 43 of 50
(2.) G. W. I. IegeI, Lectures on the Fhilosophy oj World History. lntroduction: Recson in
History, trans. I. . Isbet (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1975), p. 47.
(3.) saIah erIIn, "IIstorIcaI nevItabIIIty," In Four Esscys on Liberty (OxIord. OxIord
(4.) jean-jacques Iousseau, "IroIessIon oI IaIth oI the Savoyard VIcar," Emile or On
Educction, bk. 4, trans. AIIan Ioom (ew York. asIc ooks, 1979), p. 272.
(5.) See Ians-Georg Gadamer, Truth cnd Method (ew York. ContInuum, 1975), AIasdaIr
Macntyre, Ajter Virtue: A Study in Morcl Theory, 2d ed. (otre ame, nd.. !nIversIty
oI otre ame Iress, 1984), Martha C. ussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Esscys on
Fhilosophy cnd Litercture (ew York. OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1990), and Ioger
Scruton, The Aesthetic Understcnding (Iondon. Methuen, 1983).
(6.) ArIstotIe, Nicomcchecn Ethics, bk. 3, ch. 1, 1109b, trans. W. . Ioss.
(7.) ArIstotIe, Nicomcchecn Ethics, bk. 3, ch. 2, 1112a, trans. W. . Ioss.
(13.) Macntyre, Ajter Virtue, pp. 161-62.
(14.) Iousseau, "IroIessIon oI IaIth," p. 286.
(17.) CoIIn McGInn, Ethics, Evil, cnd Fiction (OxIord. CIarendon Iress, 1997), pp. 7-60.
(18.) McGInn, Ethics, Evil, cnd Fiction, p. 39.
(21.) IegeI's crItIque oI Kant, together wIth the rest oI hIs mature ethIcaI and poIItIcaI
phIIosophy, can be Iound In hIs 1821 Elements oj the Fhilosophy oj Right. Ior an
exceIIent recent commentary, see AIIen W. Wood, Hegel's Ethiccl Thought (CambrIdge.
CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1990).
Page 44 of 50
(22.) uoted In Gordon A. CraIg, "Iow IeII Worked," The New York Review oj Books
43/7 (AprII 18, 1996), 7.
(23.) IegeI, Elements oj the Fhilosophy oj Right, 135, pp. 162-63.
(25.) CharIes TayIor, Sources oj the Selj: The Mcking oj the Modern ldentity (CambrIdge.
Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1989), p. 72.
(26.) Macntyre, Ajter Virtue, p. 222.
(27.) IrIedrIch Ietzsche, On the Geneclogy oj Morcls, In Bcsic Writings oj Nietzsche,
ed. and trans. W. KauImann (ew York. Modern IIbrary, 1968), p. 555.
(28.) AIexIs de TocquevIIIe, Democrccy in Americc, ed. j. I. Mayer, trans. George
Iawrence (Garden CIty, .Y.. Anchor ooks, 1969), pp. 493-95.
(29.) saIah erIIn, "The Concept oI ScIentIIIc IIstory," In Concepts cnd Cctegories:
Fhilosophiccl Esscys (ew York. IenguIn, 1981), p. 132.
(30.) enedetto Croce, Aesthetic cs Science oj Expression cnd Genercl Linguistic, trans.
ougIas AInsIIe, rev. ed. (Iondon. MacmIIIan S Co., 1922), p. 26.
(31.) IIato, Republic, 377b, trans. IauI Shorey.
(33.) Ioger Scruton, Art cnd lmcginction: A Study in the Fhilosophy oj Mind (Iondon.
Methuen, 1974), p. 131.
(34.) IauI IIcoeur, Time cnd Ncrrctive, voI. 1 (ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress,
1984), p. 59. See aIso IIcoeur, Oneselj cs Another, trans. KathIeen Iamey (ChIcago. The
!nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1992), p. 115.
(35.) StendhaI, On Love (ew York. !nIversaI IIbrary, 1967), bk. 1, ch. 17, p. 44, n. 1.
See CharIes audeIaIre, "The IaInter oI Modern IIIe," In Selected Writings on Art cnd
Artists, trans. I. . Charvet (Iarmondsworth. IenguIn ooks, 1972), p. 393, and
IrIedrIch Ietzsche, On the Geneclogy oj Morcls, In Bcsic Writings oj Nietzsche, ed. and
trans. W. KauImann (ew York. Modern IIbrary, 1968), p. 540.
(36.) Ieter das, A Book oj Memories, trans. van Sanders wIth mre GoIdsteIn (ew
York. Iarrar, Straus and GIroux, 1997), p. 103.
(37.) audeIaIre, "The IaInter oI Modern IIIe," p. 402.
Page 45 of 50
(39.) MartIn IeIdegger, "Ietter on IumanIsm," In Bcsic Writings (ew York. Iarper S
Iow, 1977), p. 240.
(40.) G. W. I. IegeI, Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, 2 voIs. (OxIord.
OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1975), p. 9. See aIso pp. 993-94.
(42.) Shakespeare, Hcmlet, act 3, scene 2.
(43.) IIchard Iorty, "IeIdegger, Kundera, and Ickens," Esscys on Heidegger cnd
Others. Fhilosophiccl Fcpers, voI. 2 (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1991), pp.
76-77.
(46.) ArIstotIe, Nicomcchecn Ethics, bk. 2, ch. 1, 1103a32-5, trans. W. . Ioss.
(47.) Max Weber, "ScIence as a VocatIon," In I. I. Gerth and C. WrIght MIIIs, eds., From
Mcx Weber: Esscys in Sociology (ew York. OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1946), p. 147.
(48.) Ior a persuasIve recent statement oI thIs essentIaIIy IegeIIan vIsIon oI the proper
reIatIonshIp between socIaI theory and practIce, aIready Invoked In the proIogue, see
CharIes TayIor, "SocIaI Theory as IractIce," In Fhilosophy cnd the Humcn Sciences.
Fhilosophiccl Fcpers 2 (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1985), pp. 91-115.
(50.) IegeI, Aesthetics, pp. 9I.
(58.) Martha C. ussbaum, Foetic ]ustice: The Litercry lmcginction cnd Fublic Lije
(oston. eacon Iress, 1995), p. 12.
Page 46 of 50
(59.) Ioger Scruton, The Aesthetics oj Architecture (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty
Iress, 1979), p. 243.
(60.) Ior a summary and deveIopment oI many oI these arguments, see avId Carr,
Time, Ncrrctive, cnd History (IoomIngton. ndIana !nIversIty Iress, 1986). See aIso
IIcoeur, Oneselj cs Another.
(61.) TayIor, Sources oj the Selj, p. 47.
(62.) IIchard Iorty, "IostmodernIst bourgeoIs IIberaIIsm," In Objectivity, Relctivism, cnd
Truth. Fhilosophiccl Fcpers, voI. 1 (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1991), p.
200.
(63.) IrIedrIch Ietzsche, The Birth oj Trcgedy, In The Bcsic Writings oj Nietzsche,
trans. and ed. W. KauImann (ew York. Modern IIbrary, 1968), p. 135.
(64.) IIchard Iorty, "nquIry as IecontextuaIIzatIon. An AntI-duaIIst Account oI
nterpretatIon," In Objectivity, Relctivism, cnd Truth, p. 110.
(69.) TocquevIIIe, Democrccy in Americc, p. 487.
(70.) Arthur C. anto, The Trcnsjigurction oj the Commonplcce: A Fhilosophy oj Art
(CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1981), p. vII.
(71.) anto, Trcnsjigurction oj the Commonplcce, p. 56. See aIso anto, "The nd oI Art,"
In The Fhilosophiccl Disenjrcnchisement oj Art (ew York. CoIumbIa !nIversIty Iress,
1986), pp. 81-115.
(IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1997), pp. xIII-xIv.
(73.) IrIedrIch Ietzsche, Humcn, All Too Humcn, .150, pp. 81-82, In Scmtliche Werke,
KrItIsche StudIenausgabe, ed. GIorgIo CoIII and MazzIno MontInarI, voI 2 (MunIch and
erIIn. eutscher Taschenbuch VerIag and WaIter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 144. CI. a prIvate
note Irom the Autumn oI 1881. "Music-a hIdden gratIIIcatIon oI the reIIgIous. To turn
one's eyes Irom the word! ThIs Is her advantage! ndeed, aIso IromImages! So that the
InteIIect wouId not be cshcmed! Thus It Is heclthy and a reIIeI Ior those drIves that yet
wcnt to be grctijied!" Ietzsche, Ncchgelcssene Frcgmente 1880-1882, In Scmtliche
Werke, KrItIsche StudIenausgabe, ed. CoIII and MontInarI, voI. 9, p. 581.
Page 47 of 50
(74.) On natIonaIIsm, see especIaIIy rnest GeIIner, Nctions cnd Nctionclism (thaca.
CorneII !nIversIty Iress, 1983), and rIc j. Iobsbawm, Nctions cnd Nctionclism since
1780, 2d ed. (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1992). GeIIner, In partIcuIar,
argues Ior an understandIng oI natIonaIIsm as provIdIng modern socIety, estranged Irom
tradItIon by Incessant technoIogIcaI and economIc change, wIth a sense oI common
IdentIty and destIny Iorged through a common educatIonaI system, Ianguage, and hIstory.
(75.) IrIedrIch Ietzsche, Ecce Homo, In Bcsic Writings, trans. WaIter KauImann (ew
York. Modern IIbrary, 1968), p. 704.
(76.) IrIedrIch Ietzsche, The Ccse oj Wcgner, In Bcsic Writings, trans. WaIter
KauImann, p. 636.
(77.) owe the reIerence to the Triumphlied to Iaurence reyIus.
(78.) Max Weber, "ScIence as a VocatIon," In I. I. Gerth and C. WrIght MIIIs, eds., From
Mcx Weber: Esscys in Sociology (ew York. OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1946), p. 155.
(79.) enjamIn Constant, Frincipes de politique cppliccbles c tous les gouvernements
(version de 1805-1810), bk 16. "e I'autorIte socIaIe chez Ies ancIens" (IarIs. Iachette,
1997), pp. 357-81.
(80.) Constant, Frincipes de politique, p. 359.
(83.) Constant, Frincipes de politique, pp. 373-74.
(84.) Ior an InterestIng recent dIscussIon oI thIs notIon, and one by an author whose
hIstorIcaI experIence makes hIm much Iess suspIcIous oI the state, and much more
apprecIatIve oI Its Importance, than tend to be, see CharIes TayIor, "nvokIng CIvII
SocIety," In Fhilosophiccl Arguments (CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1995), pp.
204-24. TayIor's vIew oI the desIrabIe reIatIonshIp between the cIvII socIety and the state
Is Iurther artIcuIated In "IIberaI IoIItIcs and the IubIIc Sphere," ibid., pp. 257-87.
(85.) !nIess noted otherwIse, aII transIatIons Irom Die Meistersinger are mIne.
(86.) Trans. IrederIck jameson.
(87.) Trans. IrederIck jameson.
(88.) CarI ahIhaus, Richcrd Wcgner's Music Drcmcs, trans. Mary WhIttaII (CambrIdge.
CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1979), pp. 65-66.
(89.) ahIhaus, Wcgner's Music Drcmcs, p. 68.
Page 48 of 50
(90.) ahIhaus, Wcgner's Music Drcmcs, pp. 72-79. See aIso IrIedrIch Ietzsche, Beyond
Good cnd Evil, 8.240, In Bcsic Writings oj Nietzsche, trans. WaIter KauImann, pp. 363-64,
and Theodor W. Adorno, ln Secrch oj Wcgner, trans. Iodney IIvIngstone (Iondon. I,
1981), p. 120.
(91.) ruce Ackerman, "WohIIahrt Iur Mozart?," Der Stcndcrd |VIenna|, june 9, 1998, p.
31. wouId IIke to thank IroIessors ruce Ackerman and Andrzej IapaczynskI Ior IettIng
me read thIs text prIor to pubIIcatIon.
(92.) mmanueI Kant, The Critique oj ]udgement, trans. james Creed MeredIth (OxIord.
OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1952), 204, p. 42.
(100.) CarI ahIhaus, Foundctions oj Music History, trans. j. . IobInson (CambrIdge.
CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1983), pp. 111, 146-47. CI. aIso ahIhaus, "AutonomIe und
IIdungsIunktIon," In SIgrId AbeI-Struth, ed., Aktuclitct und Geschichtsbewusstsein in der
Musikpcdcgogik, MusIkpdagogIk. Iorschung und Iehre, voI. 9 (MaInz. . Schott's
Shne, 1973), pp. 20-29.
(101.) IauI Oskar KrIsteIIer, "The Modern System oI the Arts," In Rencisscnce Thought
cnd the Arts. Collected Esscys (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1980), pp. 163-
227.
(104.) ArIstotIe, Folitics, bk. 8, ch. 5, 1339b, trans. enjamIn jowett.
(105.) Compare the reIated dIstInctIon between amusIng escapIst Iantasy and edIIyIng
ImagInatIon whIch aIms to grasp reaIIty, not to escape Irom It, dIscussed In Ioger Scruton,
"Iantasy, magInatIon and the Screen," In The Aesthetic Understcnding, pp. 127-36.
(106.) ante, lnjerno, canto V.38-9, trans. CharIes S. SIngIeton.
Page 49 of 50
(107.) ante, lnjerno, canto V.118-20, trans. SIngIeton.
(108.) ante, lnjerno, canto V.124-25, trans. SIngIeton.
(109.) ante, lnjerno, canto V.137, trans. SIngIeton.
(110.) ante, lnjerno, canto V.138, trans. SIngIeton. CI. SIngIeton's commentary on IIne
129 In The Divine Comedy, trans., wIth commentary, CharIes S. SIngIeton, lnjerno, 2.
Commentary (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1970), p. 94. "t Is the recding ItseII
that reveaIs theIr Iove to them and In thIs sense Is theIr 'go-between."
(111.) IIato, Republic, bk. 2, 377b, trans. IauI Shorey.
(112.) IIato, Republic, bk, 2, 378d-e, trans. IauI Shorey.
(113.) IIato, Republic, bk. 3, 401b-c, trans. IauI Shorey.
(117.) ArIstotIe, Folitics, bk. 7, ch. 17, 1336b, trans. enjamIn jowett.
(118.) IIato, Republic, bk. 10, 607b-e, trans. IauI Shorey.
(119.) Ietzsche, Humcn, All Too Humcn, 2.58, p. 227.
(120.) See Iaura KIpnIs, Bound cnd Gcgged: Fornogrcphy cnd the Folitics oj Fcntcsy in
Americc (ew York. Grove Iress, 1996).
(121.) Wendy SteIner, The Sccndcl oj Flecsure: Art in cn Age oj Fundcmentclism
(ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1995), p. 9. SteIner quotes Irom Stephen
SaIIsbury, "ArguIng obscenIty," Fhilcdelphic lnquirer, October 1, 1990, p. 7-.
(122.) Iobert Iughes, "Art, MoraIs, and IoIItIcs," New York Review oj Books, AprII 23,
1992, p. 24, quoted In SteIner, The Sccndcl oj Flecsure, p. 10.
(123.) SteIner, The Sccndcl oj Flecsure, p. 33.
Page 50 of 50
Aesthetics III. The Genealogy of Modern European Art Music
Page 1 of 62
A Theory of Art
Karo Berger
IrInt S-13. 9780195128604
O. 10.1093/0195128605.001.0001
Aesthetcs III. The Geneaogy of Modern European Art Musc
DOI:10.1093/0195128605.003.0003
Modern uropean art musIc Is a socIaI practIce wIth InternaI aIms on whIch Its cIaIm to
reIatIve autonomy rests (reIatIve, because the contrast between autonomous and
IunctIonaI musIc, as weII as the paraIIeI contrast between art and popuIar musIc, Is the
contrast between IdeaI types). A proIound transIormatIon oI these aIms marks a
revoIutIon or a paradIgm shIIt In the hIstory oI thIs practIce. WIth each successIve
paradIgm shIIt, the specIIIc reIatIon and proportIon between Its artIstIc-autonomous and
popuIar-IunctIonaI components, specIIIcaIIy between the Idea oI musIc as the abstract
embodIment oI harmony and the Idea oI musIc as the representatIon or mImesIs oI
passIons, changed. The IormaIIsm and abstractIon that characterIze the musIcaI and
artIstIc modernIty ceIebrates the modern absoIute Ireedom oI a subjectIvIty that Intends
everythIng, but Is commItted to nothIng. At Its most radIcaI, It Iaces the same Ioss oI
sIgnIIIcance and sterIIIty that Is Iaced by the subjectIvIty It ceIebrates.
leywords: soca practce, paradgm shft, musc, autonomous, functona, art, popuar, harmony,
Page 2 of 62
representaton, mmess
have no Iear that the poetry oI democratIc peopIes wIII be Iound tImId or that It
wIII stIck too cIose to the earth. am much more aIraId that It wIII spend Its whoIe
tIme gettIng Iost In the cIouds and may IInIsh up by descrIbIng an entIreIy IIctItIous
country. am aIarmed at the thought oI too many Immense, Incoherent Images,
overdrawn descrIptIons, bIzarre eIIects, and a whoIe IantastIc breed oI
braInchIIdren who wIII make one Iong Ior the reaI worId.
AIexIs de TocquevIIIe, Democrccy in Americc
n any case, It Iooks as II our present tIme mIght be marked In the annaIs oI art
maInIy as the age oI musIc. . . WIth the deveIopment oI conscIous IIvIng, men Ioose aII
pIastIc gIIt. At the end even the sense oI coIor Is extInguIshed, sInce thIs Is aIways
tIed to a deIInIte drawIng. The heIghtened spIrItuaIIty, the abstract reaIm oI thought,
reaches Ior sounds and tones In order to express an InartIcuIate eIIusIveness,
whIch Is perhaps nothIng other than the dIssoIutIon oI the whoIe materIaI worId.
musIc Is perhaps the Iast word oI art, just as death Is the Iast word oI IIIe.
IeInrIch IeIne, Lutetic
What Is happenIng? Where have the spIendId, red-bIooded, stunnIng beeI steaks
such as Goethe, eethoven, evaporated to Irom our artIstIc kItchen? Iow can we
make art stop beIng an expressIon oI our medIocrIty and agaIn become an
expressIon oI our greatness, beauty, and poetry? ThIs Is my program. Frimo, to
reaIIze, In the most paInIuI way, what mIIksops we are. Secundo, to dIscard aII
aesthetIc theorIes produced durIng the Iast IIIty years that are workIng IurtIveIy to
weaken the personaIIty. ThIs whoIe perIod Is poIsoned by strIvIng Ior the IeveIIng oI
vaIues and peopIe-away {p.109) wIth It! Tertio, havIng done away wIth the
theorIes, to turn to peopIe, to the great personaIItIes oI the past, and In covenant
wIth them to recover In our own persons the eternaI weIIsprIngs oI ImagInatIon,
InspIratIon, panache, and grace. Ior there Is no democracy In whIch some kInd oI
arIstocracy, some specIes oI superIorIty, wouId not be attaInabIe. Dixi.
WItoId GombrowIcz, Dicry, Volume 3
Two sIns are endemIc to phIIosophIcaIIy mInded art theory. IIrst, one speaks ahIstorIcaIIy,
as II art (or, rather, Art) were a permanent unchangIng Ieature oI human nature, rather
than a hIstorIcaIIy evoIvIng cuIturaI practIce or IamIIy oI practIces. (ThIs Is not aIways so,
certaInIy not wIth IegeI. ut most AngIo-AmerIcan anaIytIcaI phIIosophers, wIth the
Important exceptIon oI anto, taIk about art wIthout gIvIng any IndIcatIon that they know
that art In the specIIIc sense In whIch they anaIyze the concept Is perhaps no more than
two centurIes oId.) And second, one speaks oI Art, rather than concrete specIIIc arts,
even though more oIten than not one actuaIIy does have one specIIIc art, and not Art In
generaI, In the back oI one's mInd. (Thus, when ewey speaks about art, he usuaIIy
means paIntIng, just as IeIdegger usuaIIy means poetry.) So Iar, have sInned IIke a true
Page 3 of 62
phIIosopher. have been taIkIng about art In generaI and In dIscussIng the questIon oI Its
uses ahIstorIcaIIy, 've asked what these uses shouId be, rather than askIng what they
have been and are. am, however, not a phIIosopher, but a musIcoIogIst, that Is, someone
more used to thInkIng In hIstorIcaI terms, about thIngs as they are or were, rather than
as they shouId be. t Is, thereIore, tIme to stop, II onIy Ior the duratIon oI thIs chapter,
and reIocus the dIscussIon on actuaI hIstorIcaI uses oI art and, moreover, on one specIIIc
art onIy, musIc.
The need to reIocus the dIscussIon Irom phIIosophy to hIstory at thIs poInt shouId be
obvIous. We need a reaIIty test. IavIng presented arguments Ior a specIIIc answer to the
questIon oI what art shouId be Ior, shouId now see whether at Ieast one oI the arts has
ever actuaIIy served such aIms durIng the course oI Its hIstory. I we were to IInd that
the aIms thInk art shouId pursue were In Iact consIstentIy Ignored In those centurIes
that gave us our greatest exampIes oI what art can be and what It can accompIIsh,
common sense wouId suggest that somethIng went badIy wrong not wIth art but wIth my
theory. We have known Irom the begInnIng that what we want Is to IInd a worthwhIIe
IunctIon Ior art as It aIready Is, not Ior some as yet nonexIstent practIce Ior whIch we
IIIegItImateIy approprIate the name oI art. Thus the present hIstorIcaI excursus Is not
optIonaI, It Is oI the essence. Another way oI puttIng It wouId be to say that my theory oI
art aspIres to the pecuIIarIy IegeIIan mIxture oI phIIosophy and hIstory, oI essentIaIIsm
and hIstorIcIsm, succInctIy characterIzed by anto.
As an essentIaIIst In phIIosophy, am commItted to the vIew that art Is eternaIIy the
same-that there are condItIons necessary and suIIIcIent Ior somethIng to be an
artwork, regardIess oI tIme and pIace. do not see how one can do the phIIosophy
oI art-or phIIosophy period-wIthout to thIs extent beIng an essentIaIIst. ut as an
hIstorIcIst am aIso commItted to the vIew that what {p.110) Is a work oI art at
one tIme cannot be one at another, and In partIcuIar that there Is a hIstory, enacted
through the hIstory oI art, In whIch the essence oI art-the necessary and suIIIcIent
condItIons-are paInIuIIy brought to conscIousness.
1
ut why musIc when any specIIIc art wouId do? One sImpIe reason Is that, as a
proIessIonaI musIc hIstorIan, know much more about It than about any other art and,
consequentIy, hope to be abIe to taIk about Its evoIutIon In an InIormed IashIon and to say
somethIng about It that has not been saId beIore. ut there Is a Iurther reason why musIc
Is partIcuIarIy approprIate Ior the reaIIty test we now need, better than eIther IIterature
or paIntIng wouId be. ThIs reason Is rooted In the reIatIveIy abstract character oI the art.
MusIc, shaII presentIy cIaIm, went abstract more than a century beIore the vIsuaI arts.
Moreover, and the two deveIopments are not unreIated, no other group oI artIsts now
actIve have Iost as much oI theIr Iormer pubIIc as have twentIeth-century composers oI
art musIc. artk, StravInsky, and erg, aII born In the 1880s, were the Iast composers to
have acquIred an unmIstakabIy canonIc status, sureIy an aIarmIng sItuatIon when
compared wIth that oI poetry (whIch In the Iate twentIeth century Is IIourIshIng) or even
paIntIng (whIch Is not). To a much greater extent than the other arts, durIng the Iast IIIty
years contemporary art musIc has been abandoned even by the hIghIy educated and IeIt
Page 4 of 62
as the nearIy excIusIve provInce oI the proIessIonaIs. One hundred and IIIty years ago,
ChopIn, eIacroIx, and Sand shared the same audIence. Many oI the peopIe who read
TrakI and apprecIated SchIeIe aIso wanted to see and hear Wozzeck. The very same
peopIe whose spIrItuaI IIIe contInues to be InIormed today by the new paIntIng and
poetry, who IIock to a retrospectIve oI IucIan Ireud and who InsIst on buyIng the
coIIected works oI IhIIIp IarkIn, Ieave most contemporary musIc premIeres to the
proIessIonaIs. t Is not that musIc Is unImportant Ior these peopIe, Iar Irom It. ut theIr
sensIbIIItIes, the ways they experIence the worId, Is shaped eIther by popuIar musIc, or
by art musIc oI the past, by MonteverdI or ebussy, Schubert or MahIer, not by theIr
contemporarIes.
Ians eItIng has recentIy raIsed the specter oI "the end oI the hIstory oI art".
n non-Western cuItures, such as those oI the Iar ast, we IInd a hIghIy deveIoped
awareness oI the IImIts oI a tradItIon oI art, oI the earIy compIetIon oI a canon.
ndeed, one oI the questIons whIch the condItIon oI contemporary art raIses Is
whether we have run up agaInst the IImIts oI the medIum oI art In Western
cuIture. . . . I thIs Is so, then not onIy wouId the 'InternaI crItIque oI art oI whIch we
have spoken make perIect sense, but aIso a reevaIuatIon oI the hIstory oI art. a
hIstory whIch suddenIy becomes avaIIabIe as an achIeved entIrety.
2
o such possIbIIIty couId be serIousIy entertaIned today wIth regard to poetry. Auden,
MerrIII, CeIan, MIIosz, Ierbert, ZagajewskI, rodsky . . .. there can be IIttIe doubt that, In
severaI Ianguages, the perIod aIter AuschwItz Is a great age oI poetry. WIth paIntIng and
wIth musIc one hopes that the Idea oI "the earIy compIetIon oI a canon" wIII be proven
wrong. ut II the Idea can even be put {p.111) Iorward by an art hIstorIan In the Iace oI
such strong Iate twentIeth-century contenders Ior the canonIc status as aIthus, acon,
or KIeIer, how much more pIausIbIe Is It wIth regard to musIc. MusIc, thereIore,
represents the sItuatIon and dIIemmas oI art today In a partIcuIarIy radIcaI, acute, and
cIear IashIon.
a. Soca Practces and Ther Hstores
A hIstorIan who experIenced the end oI the CoId War and the exhIIaratIng acceIeratIon oI
hIstory durIng the Iate 1980s wIII be naturaIIy drawn back to some oI the IundamentaI
questIons hIstory raIses. Iow does the normaI process oI graduaI change dIIIer Irom a
revoIutIon In the hIstory oI the practIce one studIes? And does the aIternatIng rhythm oI
graduaI changes and revoIutIons provIde the hIstory oI the practIce wIth an overaII
temporaI shape akIn to a musIcaI Iorm? Can we ascrIbe to the hIstory oI uropean musIc a
shape oI Its own, Instead oI InscrIbIng thIs hIstory Into shapes derIved Irom hIstorIes oI
other practIces, poIItIcaI, socIaI, economIc, or cuIturaI?
As we have seen, the busIness oI hIstorIans Is to represent and understand human
beIngs actIng and suIIerIng under the cIrcumstances In whIch they IInd themseIves,
cIrcumstances IargeIy not oI theIr own makIng. Thus, IndIvIduaI actIons and the generaI
cIrcumstances In whIch they are undertaken are the two IundamentaI IeveIs oI a hIstorIcaI
descrIptIon and InterpretatIon. The two IeveIs can be separated conceptuaIIy, but actuaIIy
Page 5 of 62
they are strIctIy Interdependent. an IndIvIduaI actIon can make sense onIy agaInst the
background oI the antecedent cIrcumstances, and the cIrcumstances are the resuIt oI
InnumerabIe IndIvIduaI actIons.
ut II cIrcumstances are at bottom the resuIt oI earIIer IndIvIduaI actIons, they can
become more than just that. They can begIn to Iorm an ongoIng socIaI practIce. The
specIIIc sense gIven the term "practIce" by AIasdaIr Macntyre wIII be reIevant here. A
practIce, Macntyre wrItes, Is
any coherent and compIex Iorm oI socIaIIy estabIIshed cooperatIve human actIvIty
through whIch goods InternaI to that Iorm oI actIvIty are reaIIzed In the course oI
tryIng to achIeve those standards oI exceIIence whIch are approprIate to, and
partIaIIy deIInItIve oI, that Iorm oI actIvIty, wIth the resuIt that human powers to
achIeve exceIIence, and human conceptIons oI the ends and goods InvoIved, are
systematIcaIIy extended. TIc-tac-toe Is not an exampIe oI a practIce In thIs sense, nor
Is throwIng a IootbaII wIth skIII, but the game oI IootbaII Is, and so Is chess.
rIckIayIng Is not a practIce, archItecture Is. IIantIng turnIps Is not a practIce,
IarmIng Is. So are the InquIrIes oI physIcs, chemIstry and bIoIogy, and so Is the work
oI the hIstorIan, and so are paIntIng and musIc.
3
Two aspects In partIcuIar deIIne a socIaI practIce thus understood, dIstInguIsh one
practIce Irom another. IIrst, a practIce Is characterIzed through the "goods" It reaIIzes.
Second, the reIatIve success, or Iack thereoI, In the reaIIzatIon oI the reIevant goods Is
measured by the practIce's "standards oI exceIIence." To {p.112) descrIbe and
understand a practIce wouId InvoIve, then, specIIyIng the goods It attempts to brIng
about and the standards oI exceIIence In terms oI whIch such goods are evaIuated.
I an IndIvIduaI actIon Is a part oI an aIready estabIIshed ongoIng socIaI practIce, a hIstorIan
cannot hope to understand It, or even to descrIbe Its reIevant Ieatures correctIy, wIthout
a reIerence to the goods and standards oI the practIce In questIon. (Someone wIthout the
sIIghtest notIon oI what the goods and standards oI IootbaII pIayIng or symphonIc musIc-
makIng are mIght see and hear what you and see and hear at a game or a concert but
wouId have no Idea oI what was reaIIy goIng on.) IractIces constItute the generaI
presupposItIons, premIses, condItIons, constraInts In the terms oI whIch partIcuIar actIons
do, or do not, make sense. One mIght say that practIces reIate to IndIvIduaI actIons IIke
Ianguages reIate to IndIvIduaI utterances. a practIce Is the Ianguage an agent speaks.
To be sure, our understandIng oI the goods and standards oI a practIce may, and very
oIten does, remaIn IargeIy practIcaI and ImpIIcIt, that Is, embodIed In our abIIIty to act In an
approprIate IashIon In partIcuIar sItuatIons, rather than theoretIcaI and expIIcIt, that Is,
embodIed In our abIIIty to say what the reIevant goods and standards are. (Our stadIums
and concert haIIs wouId be quIte empty II onIy the theoretIcaIIy sophIstIcated were to be
admItted, yet It wouId be InteIIectuaIIy pretentIous to cIaIm that most peopIe have no Idea
oI what Is goIng on In such pIaces.) ut hIstorIans wIII naturaIIy want to make the goods
and standards oI practIces they study as theoretIcaIIy expIIcIt as possIbIe. ven II they
preIer to emphasIze the IeveI oI actIon rather than that oI practIce In theIr work, an
Page 6 of 62
expIIcIt understandIng oI the background practIce wIII make theIr descrIptIons and
InterpretatIons oI an actIon so much the more secure. Thus, a cIear bIas oI twentIeth-
century hIstorIans In Iavor oI the study oI practIces rather than actIons has deeper roots
than a sImpIe mIstrust oI wItnesses to and partIcIpants In mass socIetIes In any IndIvIduaI's
abIIIty to make much oI a dIIIerence, to make hIstory. ven hIstorIans oI an artIstIc practIce
Ior whom specIIIc actIons oI IndIvIduaI human beIngs are naturaIIy oI centraI Interest wIII
not be abIe to dIsregard the background structures oI goods and standards that make
such actIons InteIIIgIbIe.
We have Iearned Irom Macntyre that to descrIbe and understand a practIce InvoIves
specIIyIng the goods It attempts to make and the standards oI exceIIence In terms oI
whIch such goods are evaIuated. The stress here has to IaII on the goods rather than the
standards. the Iatter may In theory be IndependentIy IormuIated, but actuaIIy they are
sImpIy embodIed In the Iormer. n other words, a descrIptIon and understandIng oI a
practIce prImarIIy InvoIves specIIyIng Its IundamentaI aIms.
Iet It be added In passIng that a hIstorIan shouId, oI course, want to go beyond
Macntyre and enrIch the descrIptIon oI the aIms wIth a consIderatIon oI the means used
by those who reaIIze these aIms and oI the InstItutIons that make the reaIIzatIon oI the
aIms possIbIe. To descrIbe the practIce oI nIneteenth-century symphonIc musIc, one
wouId have to do more than expIaIn Its aIms. One wouId {p.113) aIso have to descrIbe
the means aII those engaged In the practIce (composers, perIormers, audIences,
pubIIshers, crItIcs) had at theIr dIsposaI. One wouId, In other words, have to say
somethIng about the composItIonaI and perIormIng means used dIrectIy by the musIcIans
to produce theIr goods and by audIences to use them (means such as the harmonIc and
thematIc IogIc, the symphony orchestra, or the concert haII). And one wouId aIso have to
say somethIng about the InstItutIons that support the actIvItIes oI the producers,
consumers, and IntermedIarIes (InstItutIons such as the mIddIe-cIass pubIIc concert, the
pubIIshIng house, or the press). n short, one shouId consIder the paradIgm oI a practIce
as a conIIguratIon InvoIvIng not onIy the practIce's aIms (the goods It wants to achIeve and
the standards by whIch such goods are to be evaIuated), but aIso Its means (the means
used dIrectIy by those who make and use the goods In questIon), as weII as the
InstItutIons supportIng the actIvItIes oI the makers and users.
A practIce as conceIved by Macntyre Is necessarIIy characterIzed by two Ieatures. It
possesses a degree oI autonomy In reIatIon to other practIces, and It has a hIstory oI Its
own. A practIce Is autonomous, rather than heteronomous or IunctIonaI, that Is,
subordInated to another practIce, because It Is a Iorm oI socIaI actIvIty that reaIIzes
"goods InternaI to that Iorm oI actIvIty" and because It appIIes "standards oI exceIIence
whIch are approprIate to, and partIaIIy deIInItIve oI, that Iorm oI actIvIty." Goods are
InternaI to a practIce, Macntyre teIIs us, when, IIrst, "we can onIy specIIy them In terms
oI" thIs practIce "and by means oI exampIes Irom" It, and second, when "they can onIy be
IdentIIIed and recognIzed by the experIence oI partIcIpatIng In the practIce In questIon."
4
n other words, a practIce Is autonomous because It has aIms oI Its own, It does not
derIve Its aIms Irom eIsewhere, Irom another practIce, that Is, because Its aIms can be
Page 7 of 62
reaIIzed onIy by thIs, and not by any other, practIce.
eedIess to say, any practIce can aIso serve to produce goods externaI to It. ut thIs In
no way IegItImIzes the wIdespread and crude reductIonIsm accordIng to whIch the
productIon oI such externaI goods Is what at bottom the practIce Is aII about.
5
Macntyre's cIarIIIcatIon oI the dIIIerence between the InternaI and externaI goods Is
useIuI.
t Is characterIstIc oI what have caIIed externaI goods that when achIeved they are
aIways some IndIvIduaI's property and possessIon. Moreover characterIstIcaIIy
they are such that the more someone has oI them, the Iess there Is Ior other
peopIe. ThIs Is sometImes necessarIIy the case, as wIth power and Iame, and
sometImes the case by reason oI contIngent cIrcumstance as wIth money. xternaI
goods are thereIore characterIstIcaIIy objects oI competItIon In whIch there must
be Iosers as weII as wInners. nternaI goods are Indeed the outcome oI competItIon
to exceI, but It Is characterIstIc oI them that theIr achIevement Is a good Ior the
whoIe communIty who partIcIpate In the practIce. So when Turner transIormed the
seascape In paIntIng or W. G. Grace advanced the art oI battIng In crIcket In a quIte
new way theIr achIevement enrIched the whoIe reIevant communIty.
6
{p.114) A second necessary Ieature oI a practIce In addItIon to autonomy Is that It Is not
sImpIy in hIstory, but, rather, has a hIstory oI Its own. t Is a resuIt oI a practIce,
Macntyre teIIs us, "that human powers to achIeve exceIIence, and human conceptIons oI
the ends and goods InvoIved, are systematIcaIIy extended." The standards oI exceIIence
by whIch Its goods are evaIuated are not gIven IndependentIy oI these goods, but rather
are embodIed In them. ConsequentIy, our understandIng oI what these standards are Is
extended and modIIIed wIth each new genuIne achIevement oI the practIce. And, sImIIarIy,
even our understandIng oI what the goods brought about by the practIce are mIght be
modIIIed and extended In thIs way.
n other words, the aIms oI the practIce are not IIxed once and Ior aII theoretIcaIIy and
IndependentIy oI the practIce, but rather are embodIed In the practIce ItseII,
consequentIy, understandIng oI these aIms Is IIkeIy to evoIve and to be modIIIed wIth each
genuIneIy new achIevement. And II the aIms can evoIve, so, naturaIIy, can the means that
serve these aIms. t IoIIows that a practIce can be radIcaIIy transIormed as It evoIves. I It
does not Iose Its IdentIty In the process, It Is presumabIy onIy because not everythIng,
both aIms and means, changes at once. ut II, as have proposed, a descrIptIon and
understandIng oI a practIce prImarIIy InvoIves a specIIIcatIon oI Its IundamentaI aIms, a
truIy proIound transIormatIon oI these aIms wouId have to mark a revoIutIon In the
hIstory oI the practIce. A change oI the most basIc presupposItIons oI a practIce wouId
constItute, then, what Thomas Kuhn, In The Structure oj Scientijic Revolutions, caIIed a
"paradIgm shIIt."
7
Iet me dIgress agaIn. We have estabIIshed that the paradIgm oI a practIce Is a
conIIguratIon InvoIvIng not onIy the practIce's aIms, but aIso Its means, as weII as the
enabIIng InstItutIons. Thus, II we wanted to wrIte a IuII hIstory oI a practIce, we wouId
Page 8 of 62
have to descrIbe It In terms oI the changes thIs conIIguratIon undergoes. n doIng thIs, we
shouId make no assumptIons about the causaI prIorIty oI any oI the eIements oI the
conIIguratIon. n partIcuIar, the questIon whether changes In the conceptIon oI the aIms
drIve the changes In the means empIoyed or the reverse has to be answered separateIy
In each specIIIc case, on the basIs oI detaIIed empIrIcaI InvestIgatIon, and there Is no
reason to assume that the answer wIII aIways be the same. n Iact, It mIght be advIsabIe to
Ieave the questIon oI what causes what asIde at IIrst and begIn just by descrIbIng how the
three eIements are correIated at any moment and how they change.
ut whIIe aII three eIements oI the conIIguratIon (aIms, means, and InstItutIons) are
Important II we want to have a IuII pIcture oI the practIce, and changes In any one oI them
can cause changes In the others, they are not aII Important In the same way. A sImpIe
deIInItIon oI a practIce, Ior Instance, requIres that we Introduce Its IundamentaI aIms and
means, but not the enabIIng InstItutIons. That a practIce cannot be IuIIy deIIned by aIms
aIone, but onIy by a combInatIon oI aIms and means, becomes cIear when we reIIect on
the Iact that In the seventeenth century, under the Impact oI the ruIIng mImetIc theory
expressed In such sIogans as ut picturc poesis, vIsuaI depIctIon and IIterary descrIptIon
shared theIr {p.115) aIms and dIIIered In theIr means onIy. And neIther can a practIce
be IuIIy deIIned by Its means aIone. Ianguage Is the means Ior both hIstorIans and
noveIIsts. ut the enabIIng InstItutIons, unIIke the aIms and means, are not necessary to
deIIne a practIce, sInce they can change wIthout the practIce changIng Its IdentIty. the
practIce oI symphonIc musIc does not need to be redeIIned when the recordIng company
suppIements or repIaces the concert as Its enabIIng InstItutIon. Thus, we may cIaIm that In
terms oI the IogIc oI deIInItIon, the aIms and means oI a practIce are IundamentaI and the
InstItutIons are subordInated to them. ut we have to keep In mInd that thIs hIerarchy Is
dIctated onIy by the IogIc oI deIInItIon and carrIes no ImpIIcatIons as to the causaI reIatIons
among the eIements oI the conIIguratIon.
Moreover, even though the aIms and means are equaIIy Important Irom the standpoInt oI
the IogIc oI deIInItIon, they are not equaIIy Important Irom the standpoInt oI the IogIc oI
descrIptIon. n thIs case, the aIms dIctate the means and are Independent Irom them,
rather than the reverse. (The narratIves oI musIc hIstory, as weII as those oI other artIstIc
practIces, have more oIten than not concentrated on means. A hIstory oI musIc Is usuaIIy
toId as a hIstory oI styIe and Its tradItIonaI perIodIzatIon Is styIIstIc. What we shouId
consIder Is the possIbIIIty oI a musIc hIstory centered on aIms, wIth a perIodIzatIon
obeyIng the InternaI rhythm oI the deveIopment oI musIc's aIms.) ut, agaIn, we need to
keep In mInd that thIs Is onIy the descrIptIve, not the causaI IogIc. t sImpIy makes sense to
descrIbe the aIms wIthout taIkIng about the means, but not the reverse. And thIs Is what
shaII do here as pIck up the maIn thread oI the argument agaIn.
eIore do thIs, however, the reader shouId be warned. My panorama oI the hIstory oI
uropean musIc Is oI necessIty goIng to be paInted wIth a broad brush, wIth many detaIIs
that mIght compIIcate the pIcture sImpIy omItted and wIth contrasts and antItheses
overdrawn. IIstorIcaI reaIIty Is never as neat and tIdy as It wIII appear here. ThIs shouId
not matter. AII that my task requIres Is to get the maIn Ieatures oI the Iandscape rIght so
Page 9 of 62
that we can see the road we have traveIed, our present sItuatIon, and Iuture
perspectIves.
b. Functona and Autonomous Musc
Modern uropean art musIc Is a kInd oI socIaI practIce, or perhaps better, a IamIIy oI
InterreIated practIces, In precIseIy the sense proposed by Macntyre, a socIaI actIvIty
wIth Its own InternaI aIms on whIch Its cIaIm to reIatIve autonomy rests. ThIs much wIII
probabIy be quIte uncontroversIaI. Controversy IIares up, however, as soon as we
attempt to deIIne the startIng poInt. The bIrth oI the modern age has, aIter aII, been dated
anytIme between the IIIth and the Iate nIneteenth century, and the startIng poInt oI the
modern era In musIc has been varIousIy Iocated around 1600, 1740, or 1910. At whIch
poInt dId uropean musIc acquIre the unmIstakabIe characterIstIcs oI an autonomous
practIce? A practIce Is autonomous, we have Iearned, because It has aIms oI Its own and
does not derIve them Irom another practIce. At whIch poInt, then, dId uropean musIc
acquIre InternaI aIms?
{p.116) The contrast between autonomous and IunctIonaI musIc, that Is, between musIc
made and heard Ior Its own sake and musIc that Is nothIng but a means oI some other
practIce, Is the contrast between "IdeaI types" that rareIy, II ever, actuaIIy appear In theIr
pure Iorm.
8
Most oI the musIc as actuaIIy practIced In urope over the centurIes IaIIs
somewhere between these two poIes. Thus, II we conIused the autonomy we are IookIng
Ior wIth the arrIvaI oI the seII-conscIous theory oI aesthetIc autonomy In Iate eIghteenth-
century Germany, we wouId have to eIImInate Irom our purvIew a Iot oI musIc whIch,
whIIe embedded In extramusIcaI processes and servIng extramusIcaI IunctIons (such as
those oI IIturgy, poIItIcaI representatIon, or convIvIaIIty), has a cIaIm to a partIaI, or
reIatIve, autonomy. (AIter aII, even such a paradIgmatIc genre oI autonomous musIc as
the Iate eIghteenth-century strIng quartet mIght wIth good reason be cIaImed to have
served a IunctIon oI convIvIaIIty not dIIIerent In kInd Irom that IuIIIIIed by the taIIan
madrIgaI In the Iate sIxteenth century.) Iather than expectIng to IInd the poInt at whIch the
era oI autonomous musIc began, we shouId Iook Ior Ieatures oI partIaI autonomy In aII
musIc, Ieatures that cannot be expIaIned by extramusIcaI IunctIons and that testIIy to the
musIc's havIng been made In part Ior Its own sake, that Is, Ieatures that gIve the musIc an
artIstIc character ("artIstIc" and "autonomous" beIng synonyms In thIs case). (t Is
precIseIy the contInuIty oI musIc's InternaI aIms, as opposed to Its externaI IunctIons, that
made possIbIe the retrospectIve IncIusIon oI works oI ach, MonteverdI, and josquIn In
the canon oI great art musIc even though the externaI IunctIons oI theIr musIc changed.)
Some genres oI uropean musIc exhIbIt such Ieatures unmIstakabIy at Ieast as earIy as
the thIrteenth century, that Is, when musIcIans sIgnIIIcantIy advanced In transIormIng
poIyphony Irom beIng a way oI embeIIIshIng IIturgIcaI chant In perIormance Into a method
oI composItIon whose products outIast a sIngIe perIormance. The IsorhythmIc motet oI the
Iourteenth and earIy IIIteenth centurIes Is arguabIy the IIrst major genre oI art musIc In
the tradItIon. The centraI prerequIsIte Ior musIc's acquIsItIon oI an artIstIc character was
the emergence oI composItIon as a process oI musIc-makIng dIstInct Irom perIormance, a
partIaI separatIon much aIded, In turn, by the deveIopment oI notatIon, whIch aIIowed the
Page 10 of 62
products oI composItIon to persIst IndependentIy oI perIormance. A composer, not beIng
Iorced to make musIc In reaI tIme, can aIIord to experIment, to try thIngs out, to rIsk
makIng mIstakes, to an IncomparabIy greater degree than even the most skIIIIuI
perIormer and thus can make musIc whose artIstIc character Is potentIaIIy much greater.
And the wrItten text oI a composItIon makes It avaIIabIe Ior study, and hence aIso Ior
ImItatIon and emuIatIon, whIch, agaIn, Is Independent oI reaI tIme and thus can be much
more detaIIed and muItIIaceted.
WIth the InventIon and deveIopment oI the basIc eIements oI pItch notatIon InItIated In the
earIy nInth century and compIeted In the earIy eIeventh, and wIth the InventIon and
deveIopment oI the basIc eIements oI rhythmIc notatIon InItIated In the earIy thIrteenth
and vIrtuaIIy compIeted In the earIy Iourteenth century, It became possIbIe to IIx In
wrItIng reIatIve pItches and duratIons, the two prImary parameters oI musIcaI thInkIng
untII the mIddIe oI our own century. {p.117) WrItIng was not absoIuteIy IndIspensabIe
Ior the separatIon between composItIon and perIormance to occur. many composers
have been known to be abIe to do a Iot oI work In theIr mInds rather than In wrItIng, and It
Is possIbIe to transmIt a work oraIIy to the perIormers. The Importance oI wrItIng resIdes,
rather, In the Iact that the wrItten text makes It possIbIe Ior musIc to become an object
avaIIabIe Ior scrutIny IndependentIy oI the reaI tIme oI a perIormance. Thus, thanks to the
wrItten text, musIc can acquIre the character oI an object ("work" In the tradItIonaI sense
oI the term) dIstInct Irom Its perIormances.
The graduaI recognItIon that composIng Is a dIstInct part oI musIc-makIng, dIIIerent Irom
perIormIng, can be traced In the IncreasIng Irequency wIth whIch names oI composers
appear In sources preservIng theIr musIc. ThIs custom, stIII exceptIonaI In the thIrteenth
century, becomes the norm In the Iourteenth. y 1477, johannes TInctorIs, a IIemIsh
chapeI master at the eapoIItan court, Iound It entIreIy naturaI to dIstInguIsh
"composers" (compositores) Irom "sIngers" (concentores) and to taIk oI musIcaI "works"
(operc) as somethIng one not onIy "heard" (cudio), but aIso "examIned" (considero). Ior
TInctorIs, the works oI admIred composers were worthy oI beIng treated as modeIs Ior
ImItatIon no Iess then the cIassIcaI works oI poetry. n a Iamous passage oI hIs Liber de
crte contrcpuncti he decIared.
there does not exIst a sIngIe pIece oI musIc, not composed wIthIn the Iast Iorty
years, that Is regarded by the Iearned as worth hearIng. Yet at thIs present tIme,
not to mentIon InnumerabIe sIngers oI the most beautIIuI dIctIon, there IIourIsh . . .
countIess composers, among them jean Ockeghem, jean IegIs, AntoIne usnoys,
IIrmIn Caron, and GuIIIaume Iaugues, who gIory In havIng studIed thIs dIvIne art
under john unstabIe, GIIIes Inchoys, and GuIIIaume uIay, recentIy deceased.
earIy aII the works oI these men exhaIe such sweetness that In my opInIon they
are to be consIdered most suItabIe, not onIy Ior men and heroes, but even Ior the
ImmortaI gods. ndeed, never hear them, never examIne them, wIthout comIng
away happIer and more enIIghtened. As VIrgII took Iomer Ior hIs modeI In that
dIvIne work the Aeneid, so , by IercuIes, have used these composers as modeIs
Ior my modest works, and especIaIIy In the arrangement oI the concords have
Page 11 of 62
pIaInIy ImItated theIr admIrabIe styIe oI composIng.
9
Ior TInctorIs, the object oI ImItatIon and emuIatIon was a composer's styIe oI
counterpoInt rather than an IndIvIduaI work. y the sIxteenth century, the normaI way oI
makIng a new poIyphonIc mass had become to base It on the motIvIc and contrapuntaI
Ideas derIved Irom a specIIIc poIyphonIc modeI, a motet or a song, oI an admIred
predecessor, a process oI composItIon technIcaIIy IabeIed "ImItatIon" (imitctio), or-by
those wIshIng to show oII theIr Greek-"parody" (pcrodic). ut aIready Ior TInctorIs, what
gets ImItated Is what composers, not sIngers, have made.
The IuII recognItIon that composIng resuIts In works whose character Is dIIIerent Irom
that oI perIormances can be IIrst Iound In 1537 In the wIdeIy dIstrIbuted musIc prImer by
the Iutheran cantor IcoIaus IIstenIus. Where earIIer {p.118) wrIters on musIc,
IoIIowIng the ArIstoteIIan notIons oI "contempIatIng" (theoric) and "actIng" (prcxis),
dIstInguIshed the "theoretIcaI musIc" (musicc theoricc/ theoreticc), that Is, the IIberaI art
dedIcated to the scIentIIIc contempIatIon oI pItch reIatIons, Irom the "practIcaI musIc"
(musicc prccticc) dedIcated to varIous aspects oI the craIt oI makIng musIc, IIstenIus
Introduced yet another category, modeIed on the ArIstoteIIan notIon oI "makIng"
(poiesis), nameIy, that oI "poetIc musIc" (musicc poeticc), and thus dIstInguIshed the
theory oI composItIon expIIcItIy Irom that oI perIormance. IoetIc musIc, IIstenIus
expIaIned, "consIsts In makIng or producIng, that Is, In such Iabor whIch even aIterwards,
when the craItsman Is dead, Ieaves a perIect and absoIute work" (opus perjectum et
cbsolutum).
10
The deveIopment oI modern uropean art musIc wouId be unthInkabIe wIthout thIs
partIaI separatIon oI composItIon and perIormance In the process oI musIc-makIng and
wIthout the survIvaI oI the products oI composItIon Independent oI perIormance. These
are the deIInIng Ieatures that dIstInguIsh art musIc Irom popuIar musIc tradItIons, at Ieast
as these terms wIII be used here. We wouId get It aII wrong, however, II we InsIsted on
too strIct a separatIon oI art and popuIar musIc. n partIcuIar, we shouId not ImagIne that
the emergence oI art musIc Ied to a compIete dIsappearance oI popuIar musIc. Iather, we
shouId thInk oI uropean musIc sInce at Ieast the Iate thIrteenth century as InvoIvIng a
compIex InteractIon between the two, a precarIous, hIghIy unstabIe, ever changIng
baIancIng act. n other words, we shouId keep In mInd that "art musIc" and "popuIar
musIc" are no more than heurIstIcaIIy useIuI IdeaI types and that much musIc-makIng In
urope mIxed both types In varIous proportIons.
Iet us take another Iook at our IdeaI types. have suggested that Its artIstIc character Is
the basIs Ior musIc's cIaIm to autonomy, whIch ImpIIes that, whIIe art musIc Is
autonomous, popuIar musIc Is IunctIonaI. have proposed Iurther that the separatIon oI
composItIon Irom perIormance and the survIvaI oI the products oI composItIon as wrItten
texts Independent oI perIormances are the two deIInIng Ieatures oI art, as opposed to
popuIar, musIc. IopuIar musIc exIsts In reaI tIme, In perIormance, Its mode oI exIstence
mIght be caIIed a process. Art musIc exIsts In thIs way too, but It aIso exIsts as an object
that may be IndependentIy surveyed, as a wrItten text that Is the resuIt oI composItIon,
Page 12 of 62
that Is, It has Its own pecuIIar mode oI exIstence that at Ieast sInce the IIIteenth century
has been caIIed a "work" (In a sense dIIIerent Irom the one In whIch thIs term has been
used In chapter 1 above, a sense synonymous wIth my "text"). ote that the symmetry
between the two types Is Iess than perIect. musIc can exIst as a process wIthout exIstIng
aIso as a work, but when It does exIst as a work It aIso has to exIst as a process, sInce a
wrItten text Is aIso a set oI InstructIons Ior how to make a perIormance. One mIght say
that, whIIe It Is naturaI Ior musIc to exIst as a process, It Is somethIng artIIIcIaI, somethIng
requIrIng an eIIort, an achIevement, Ior It to exIst as a work.
11
Irocess and work, musIc's two contrastIng modes oI exIstence, encourage In turn two
dIIIerent modes oI experIencIng musIc. WIth a musIcaI process one {p.119) tends to
IdentIIy, eIther by partIcIpatIng In the perIormance, or at Ieast by cIoseIy IoIIowIng and
IdentIIyIng wIth what the perIormers are doIng. The emphasIs on events happenIng In reaI
tIme InvItes one eIther to IoIIow the events cIoseIy or to IoIIow them IntermIttentIy In a
dIstracted IashIon, but In any case to be drawn by them In an attItude oI passIve
IdentIIIcatIon wIth the musIc In those moments when one pays attentIon to It at aII. y
contrast, a work objectIIIes the musIc, encourages an attItude not oI passIve IdentIIIcatIon,
but rather oI actIve contempIatIon Irom a certaIn dIstance. Thanks to the possIbIIIty oI
beIng studIed IndependentIy oI reaI tIme, at one's own IeIsure, musIc objectIIIed Into a
work gaIns the abIIIty oI beIng taken as a whoIe, that Is, as a Iorm, not as a sequence oI
IooseIy reIated or unreIated successIve IndIvIduaI moments, but as a temporaI
conIIguratIon In whIch each IndIvIduaI moment has a IunctIon In the creatIon oI the whoIe
oI whIch It Is a part. ven when experIenced In reaI tIme, a work caIIs Ior a mode oI
experIence In whIch a current moment Is heard and understood In reIatIon to Its
antIcIpated consequences and recoIIected antecedents, wIth the Iorm oI the musIc
emergIng as a cIosed whoIe not so much In the actuaI experIence ItseII, as In the memory
thereoI. ote that there Is a systematIc connectIon between the Idea oI artIstIc autonomy
and the Idea oI the products oI an art objectIIIed Into works. As a Iorm, that Is, a cIosed
whoIe, a work wants to be contempIated Ior Its own sake rather than beIng seen as a part
oI a Iarger whoIe or process. n the experIence oI musIc, the onIy thIng that reaIIy exIsts Is
the IndIvIduaI moment we have assocIated wIth the popuIar mode oI hearIng. ThIs,
however, Is poIgnantIy transItory, ephemeraI, death-bound. The Iorm as a whoIe Is
capabIe oI transcendIng death and achIevIng ImmortaIIty, but onIy at the expense oI
reaIIty. The Iorm as experIenced Is not reaI, but onIy recoIIected, ImagIned. ut thIs
dIaIectIc oI ephemeraI reaIIty and ImagInary transcendence characterIzes not onIy our
experIence oI musIc, but aII oI our temporaI experIence. The experIence oI musIc thus
preIIgures the experIence oI our own exIstence. "Autonomous art Is a pIece oI enacted
ImmortaIIty, utopIa, and hubrIs aII at once," says Adorno.
12
(t was IeInrIch esseIer who Introduced the useIuI dIstInctIon between the popuIar
IunctIonaI practIce oI "everyday musIc" |Umgcngsmusik|, In whIch everybody was an
actIve partIcIpant In musIc-makIng, and the artIstIc autonomous practIce oI "presentatIon
musIc" |Dcrbietungsmusik|, whIch separated the musIcIans Irom IIsteners, he aIso
deveIoped Iugo IIemann's contrast between the actIve and passIve modes oI hearIng.
13
My use oI these categorIes dIIIers Irom esseIer's In so Iar as see In them
Page 13 of 62
components oI IdeaI types rather than hIstorIcaI reaIItIes. correIate passIve hearIng wIth
IunctIonaI musIc and actIve hearIng wIth art musIc, whIIe Ior esseIer the two types oI
hearIng aIso separated the CIassIcaI and IomantIc ages oI art musIc.)
n short, our two IdeaI types InvoIve, on the sIde oI IunctIonaI popuIar musIc, the mode oI
exIstence oI musIc as a perIormed process happenIng In reaI tIme and the mode oI
experIencIng It In an attItude oI passIve IdentIIIcatIon wIth Its IndIvIduaI IooseIy reIated or
unreIated successIve moments, and, on the sIde oI {p.120) autonomous art musIc, the
mode oI exIstence oI musIc as a composed work Independent oI reaI tIme and the mode
oI experIencIng It In an attItude oI actIve contempIatIon oI Its Iorm, a whoIe In whIch the
IndIvIduaI moments do not appear IndependentIy, but rather as reIated by the IunctIons
they have In makIng up the whoIe. ut It Is crucIaI to remember that In actuaI practIce the
two types appear mIxed In varIous proportIons and that, even as an IdeaI type, art musIc
presupposes popuIar musIc as Its other. the actIveIy contempIated work Is achIeved wIth
eIIort agaInst the underIyIng background oI the process wIth whIch one passIveIy
IdentIIIes.
t has been estabIIshed above that a descrIptIon and understandIng oI a practIce
prImarIIy InvoIves specIIyIng Its IundamentaI aIms and that a truIy proIound
transIormatIon oI these aIms wouId have to mark a revoIutIon, a paradIgm shIIt, In the
hIstory oI the practIce. t wIII be my cIaIm now that wIth each successIve paradIgm shIIt In
the hIstory oI modern uropean art musIc the specIIIc reIatIon and proportIon between
Its artIstIc and popuIar components changed.
c. The Rse of Mmetc Musc
!nIIke archItects, scuIptors, or poets, modern uropean musIcIans knew no cIassIcaI
exampIes oI ancIent musIc wIth whIch to compare theIr own products. The "ancIent musIc"
they dId know was the herItage oI cIassIcaI Ideas about musIc transmItted In IIato's
Republic and Timceus, In ArIstotIe's Folitics and Foetics, In MacrobIus earIy IIIth-century
Commentcry on the Drecm oj Scipio, and In oethIus earIy sIxth-century Fundcmentcls
oj Music, among many other, Iess InIIuentIaI, texts. What they Iound In those texts were
two basIc Ideas about the nature and aIms oI musIc. the Idea that musIc was the sensuous
embodIment oI InteIIIgIbIe harmony (hcrmonic) and the Idea that musIc was capabIe oI
makIng humans IeeI varIous changeabIe passIons (pcthos) and thus capabIe oI IormIng a
person's endurIng character (ethos).
Irom the Timceus, a text known In the IatIn West throughout the MIddIe Ages, one
Iearned that both the cosmIc and the human souI were sImIIarIy composed oI theIr
constItuent eIements accordIng to the same proportIons, the ratIos oI the Iythagorean
tunIng they shared wIth a musIcaI hcrmonic, a dIatonIc octave scaIe. n the "ream oI
ScIpIo" that CIcero descrIbed In the Iast book oI hIs Republic, the tones oI the dIatonIc
octave scaIe are produced by the eIght ceIestIaI spheres surroundIng the earth.
MacrobIus wIdeIy dIssemInated Commentcry made the notIon oI the musIc oI the
spheres an endurIng commonpIace. The same InteIIIgIbIe harmony oI sImpIe numerIcaI
ratIos Is thus embodIed In the structures oI the worId, man, and musIc In what oethIus,
throughout the MIddIe Ages the sIngIe most InIIuentIaI authorIty on musIc, wIII caII musicc
Page 14 of 62
mundcnc, humcnc, et instrumentclis. IIato was aIso a major source oI the beIIeI that
specIIIc scaIes, rhythms, and Instruments can aIIect human passIons In specIIIc ways and
thus Iorm character. Thus It Is not surprIsIng to IInd In oethIus openIng chapter, entItIed
"MusIc Is reIated to us by nature and can ennobIe or corrupt the character,"
14
the
IoIIowIng words. "oI the Iour {p.121) mathematIcaI dIscIpIInes, the others are concerned
wIth the pursuIt oI truth, but musIc Is reIated not onIy to specuIatIon but to moraIIty as
weII. othIng Is more characterIstIc oI human nature than to be soothed by sweet modes
and stIrred up by theIr opposItes."
15
n the pronouncements oI musIc theorIsts, these two ancIent Ideas about the aIms oI
musIc, the Idea oI musIc as the soundIng embodIment oI the InteIIIgIbIe harmony oI sImpIe
numerIcaI ratIos, the same harmony embodIed In the structure oI the cosmos, and the
Idea oI musIc as capabIe oI stIrrIng human passIons and IormIng character, presIded over
the deveIopment oI the art durIng the MIddIe Ages and beyond. ut It appears that, untII
the mIddIe oI the sIxteenth century, the practIce oI vocaI poIyphony, whIch IncIuded aII the
most artIstIcaIIy deveIoped genres, the mass and motet, In partIcuIar, was governed
aImost excIusIveIy by the aIm expressed In the Idea oI harmony. The ethIcaI power oI
musIc was dutIIuIIy paId reguIar IIp servIce In IntroductIons to treatIses on musIc, but It
dId not InIIuence the actuaI content oI musicc prccticc. The theorIsts who descrIbed the
practIce oI poIyphony were not concerned wIth teachIng musIcIans how to maIntaIn or
Increase theIr sway over human passIons. Iather, Irom the Iate thIrteenth to the earIy
sIxteenth century, the prIncIpaI aIm oI uropean art musIc, as both the survIvIng
specImens oI the practIce and the contemporary theoretIcaI reIIectIon on It attest, was the
achIevement and perIectIon oI harmony. (To avoId a possIbIe mIsunderstandIng, hasten
to add that In an age In whIch the Idea oI harmony reverberated wIth eternaI, dIvIne,
cosmIc overtones, Its pursuIt by the great masters oI IIIteenth- and sIxteenth-century
poIyphony Irom uIay through Iassus resuIted In musIc oI great expressIve power,
depth, and varIety, musIc wIthout whIch we mIght have onIy a very approxImate Idea oI
what It IeIt IIke to Immerse oneseII In Iervent prayer, or In ecstatIc contempIatIon.)
The sense oI progress, oI a practIce approxImatIng Its aIm ever more cIoseIy, Is paIpabIe In
the wrItIngs oI TInctorIs, who In 1477 dIsmIssed aII musIc oI more than Iorty years oI age
as worthIess. Irom the mIddIe oI the sIxteenth century on, an opInIon began to spread
that thIs progress had attaIned Its aIm. Ior the SwIss humanIst IeInrIch GIarean, wrItIng
In 1547, the earIy sIxteenth-century vocaI poIyphony oI josquIn des Irez and hIs Iranco-
IIemIsh contemporarIes represented the "perIect art to whIch nothIng couId be added"
(crs perjectc, qui nihil cddi potest).
16
Ior GIoseIIo ZarIIno, the VenetIan student and
eventuaI successor oI the IIemIsh chapeI master at St. Mark's, AdrIan WIIIaert, the
practIce had IInaIIy been perIected by hIs teacher. ZarIIno cIearIy echoed GIarean when
he decIared that the musIc oI hIs day "has been brought to such perIectIon that one
aImost cannot hope Ior anythIng better."
17
ZarIIno's monumentaI treatIse oI 1558, Le
lstitutioni hcrmoniche, was generaIIy and correctIy consIdered to be the deIInItIve
theoretIcaI treatment oI the crs perjectc untII weII Into the eIghteenth century, when Its
posItIon was chaIIenged by Grcdus cd Fcrncssum, the 1725 handbook oI strIct
counterpoInt wrItten by the VIennese court chapeI master, johann joseph Iux. (n the
Page 15 of 62
meantIme, the Iate sIxteenth-century Ioman composer, GIovannI IIerIuIgI da IaIestrIna,
whose musIc and styIe were canonIzed {p.122) In the repertory oI the papaI chapeI, had
dIspIaced both josquIn and WIIIaert as the cIassIc exponent oI vocaI poIyphony.)
IIke GIarean, whose praIse Ior josquIn IncIuded the statement that "no one has more
eIIectIveIy expressed the passIons oI the souI In musIc than thIs symphonIst,"
18
ZarIIno
was by no means obIIvIous to the ethIcaI sIde oI musIc. On the contrary, he Iound
tradItIonaI reports oI the mIracuIous emotIonaI eIIects ancIent musIcIans had achIeved
entIreIy credIbIe and thought that "aIso at the present tIme musIc Is not deprIved oI the
power to achIeve such eIIects."
19
ut he consIdered the "eIIects," ImpressIve and
Important though they were, not to be the centraI aIm oI musIc-makIng. The essence oI
musIc Ior hIm was harmony (the very tItIe oI hIs summa oI theoretIcaI and practIcaI musIc,
The Hcrmonic lnstitutions, announces thIs). "speakIng unIversaIIy, . . . musIc Is nothIng
but harmony."
20
"Iarmony" was tradItIonaIIy deIIned as the "concord oI dIscords,
meanIng a concord oI dIverse thIngs that can be joIned together,"
21
the concord beIng
conceIved as a proportIon expressIbIe by a sImpIe numerIcaI ratIo.
n musIc, harmony was embodIed In consonant reIatIons between two or more sounds
and especIaIIy between two or more sImuItaneous meIodIes. The two topIcs ZarIIno
dIscussed In depth In the practIcaI part oI hIs book were the modes and counterpoInt.
vIdentIy, he beIIeved that the mastery oI these two subjects gave the composer what he
needed to know, II he wanted to ensure that hIs musIc be harmonIous. The IdeaI aIm oI
crs perjectc was the harmonIous movement oI sImuItaneous vocaI meIodIes reguIated by
the doctrInes oI the modes and counterpoInt. The proper empIoyment oI the modes
saIeguarded the harmonIc IntegrIty oI the IndIvIduaI meIodIc IInes In a poIyphonIc
composItIon, and the proper empIoyment oI the contrapuntaI ruIes saIeguarded the
harmonIc IntegrIty oI the poIyphonIc whoIe. The doctrIne oI counterpoInt was partIcuIarIy
Important, sInce It estabIIshed whIch vertIcaI harmonIes were IegItImate and toId one how
to move correctIy Irom one to another. SInce dIssonances presented the maIn threat to
the consonant essence oI "harmony," the core oI the teachIng had to IIe In the strIct
reguIatIon oI dIssonances. ThIs core was suppIemented by the eIucIdatIon oI specIaI
contrapuntaI technIques, the most Important oI whIch was caIIed the "Iugue" (jugc), It
aIIowed one to use the same or sImIIar meIodIc materIaI In aII the voIces oI a phrase, thus
ensurIng that, as TInctorIs had aIready put It, aII sIngers wouId sIng "wIth dIverse (but not
adverse) voIces."
22
ut just as soon as ZarIIno perIected Its theoretIcaI IoundatIons, the practIce oI vocaI
poIyphony based on the Idea oI musIc as the soundIng embodIment oI InteIIIgIbIe harmony
oI sImpIe numerIcaI ratIos began to be chaIIenged.
23
etween the mIddIe oI the sIxteenth
and the earIy seventeenth centurIes, uropean art musIc experIenced Its IIrst paradIgm
shIIt. n a nutsheII, the rIvaI ancIent Idea oI musIc as capabIe oI stIrrIng passIons and
IormIng human character began to be taken serIousIy, wIthout the Idea oI musIc as
harmony beIng dIscarded aItogether. When by the mIddIe oI the seventeenth century,
the revoIutIon was compIeted and a new practIce stabIIIzed, It Iound ItseII governed not
by one, but by two competIng aIms, the embodIment oI harmony and the representatIon
Page 16 of 62
oI passIons. {p.123) The Idea oI musIc as an ethIcaI Iorce graduated Irom beIng an Idea
conventIonaIIy Invoked In praIse oI musIc to an aIm capabIe oI shapIng actuaI practIce. And
the baIance between the two ancIent Ideas changed.
Ierhaps the earIIest theorIst who unmIstakabIy promoted the cause oI the musIcaI
representatIon oI passIons was another taIIan student oI WIIIaert, and, besIde ZarIIno,
the most substantIaI IIgure In the musIc theory oI the 1550s, IcoIa VIcentIno. n hIs
L'cnticc musicc ridottc cllc modernc prctticc oI 1555, VIcentIno InsIsted repeatedIy that
musIc shouId express the meanIng oI the words, "show by means oI the harmony theIr
passIons,"
24
and demanded that harmony be subordInated to passIons. "musIc made
upon words Is made Ior no other purpose than to express the thought and the passIons
and theIr eIIects wIth harmony."
25
The concept oI ImItatIon IInked In hIs thought the art oI
the poet and that oI the composer, whom VIcentIno caIIed, In an expressIon remInIscent oI
IIstenIus, the "musIcaI poet" (Foetc Musico).
26
A chaIn oI ImItatIon began wIth the
passIons and Ied through the words oI the poet, the musIc oI the composer, and the
sounds oI the sInger to the IIstener In whom the ImItated passIons were to be aroused.
n postuIatIng the ImItatIon and arousaI oI passIons as the most IundamentaI goaI oI musIc-
makIng, VIcentIno was no doubt InspIred by the cIassIcaI reports oI the extraordInarIIy
powerIuI ethIcaI and emotIonaI eIIects achIeved by musIc In antIquIty, reports so wIdeIy
known In hIs tIme that VIcentIno couId reIer to them sImpIy as "those eIIects whIch, as the
Authors wrIte, were made In ancIent tImes"
27
and saIeIy assume that hIs readers wouId
know precIseIy what he was reIerrIng to. IIs aIm, programmatIcaIIy announced In the
very tItIe oI hIs treatIse, The Ancient Music Restored to Modern Frcctice, was not an
antIquarIan restoratIon oI the styIIstIc and composItIonaI resources oI ancIent musIc. t
was, rather, the recovery Ior modern musIcIans oI the mIracuIous power oI ancIent
musIc.
n other words, what needed to be restored, VIcentIno cIaImed, were not the means but
the aIms oI musIc. As Ior the means, these requIred not restoratIon, but Iurther
deveIopment, sInce theIr power to move dImInIshed as one got used to hearIng them.
ThIs poInt deserves our attentIon. n the perIod under dIscussIon, the humanIstIcaIIy
InspIred readIng oI ancIent pagan authors was, superIIcIaI appearances notwIthstandIng,
IIkeIy to motIvate progressIve rather than conservatIve practIce, the deveIopment oI new
musIcaI resources and styIes rather than the restoratIon oI oId ones. n the musIcaI
versIon oI the "quarreI oI the ancIents and moderns" whIch VIcentIno InItIated and whIch
Iasted, as we shaII see, untII the mIddIe oI the eIghteenth century, the "ancIents," those
who wanted musIcaI practIce to proceed under the banner oI the ImItatIon oI passIons,
were IIkeIy to advocate styIIstIc change. The deIenders oI harmony were the deIenders oI
the styIIstIc status quo. t Is not dIIIIcuIt to see why thIs was the case. Iarmony, whether
cosmIc, human, or InstrumentaI, Is ImmutabIe. ts Iaws may be progressIveIy dIscovered
and descrIbed, the musIcaI practIce embodyIng It may be perIected. ut once It has been
perIected (whether by josquIn, {p.124) WIIIaert, Iassus, or IaIestrIna) and once Its
ruIes have been properIy IormuIated (by ZarIIno), styIIstIc hIstory has come to an end. t
couId resume agaIn onIy when motIvated by a dIIIerent IdeaI, that oI passIons. SInce the
Page 17 of 62
practIce oI vocaI poIyphony achIeved perIectIon, the onIy way Iorward was to Invent
another, second practIce.
I ZarIIno spoke most eIoquentIy Ior the "moderns," the most Important spokesman Ior
the "ancIents," the theorIst who IormuIated theIr program most IorceIuIIy and
InIIuentIaIIy, was not VIcentIno, but ZarIIno's pupII, the IIorentIne IutenIst VIncenzo GaIIIeI.
n the 1570s and 1580s, GaIIIeI pIayed an Important roIe as an authorIty on musIc theory
In the dIscussIons oI musIcIans, poets, and amateurs who constItuted the InIormaI
academy known as the Camerata oI Count GIovannI de ardI, a group whose Interest
centered on a VIcentInIan project oI the revIvaI oI ancIent Greek musIc. ut unIIke
VIcentIno, whose actuaI knowIedge oI ancIent musIc theory was extremeIy IImIted, GaIIIeI
approached the task oI understandIng ancIent musIc more serIousIy than any oI hIs
predecessors had and was Iucky enough to get expert advIce between 1572 and 1582
Irom the greatIy Iearned IIorentIne phIIoIogIst resIdIng In Iome, GIroIamo MeI. y the
tIme GaIIIeI InItIated theIr correspondence, MeI was aIready IntImateIy IamIIIar wIth
vIrtuaIIy the compIete corpus oI ancIent Greek musIc theory, and It was MeI's
understandIng oI ancIent musIc, as weII as hIs arguments Ior Its superIorIty over modern
practIce, that decIsIveIy InIIuenced GaIIIeI and turned hIm away Irom ZarIIno. The resuIt
was GaIIIeI's Diclogo dellc musicc cnticc, et dellc modernc oI 1581, the Camerata's maIn
theoretIcaI statement.
eIore correspondIng wIth MeI, GaIIIeI beIIeved wIth ZarIIno that musIc's aIm was to
provIde pIeasure by means oI harmony. MeI showed hIm how a dIIIerent aIm mIght be
envIsIoned, an aIm that gave musIc ethIcaI sIgnIIIcance and thus was hIgher than mere
sensuous pIeasure, how modern musIc mIght be crItIcIzed Irom the standpoInt oI ancIent
practIce. MusIc oI the ancIents, MeI cIaImed, aImed not just to deIIght the ear, IIke theIr
contemperarIes, but to arouse passIons.
IavIng absorbed MeI's teachIng, GaIIIeI started to beIIeve that the aIm oI modern practIce
wouId be suItabIe Ior InstrumentaI musIc onIy, and that It was InIerIor to the ethIcaI aIm oI
ancIent vocaI practIce. "The practIce oI musIc," he wrote In the Diclogo, "was Introduced
by men . . . IIrst, . . . to express the conceIts oI the mInd wIth greater eIIIcacy . . . and
second, to Impress them wIth equaI Iorce upon the mInds oI mortaIs Ior theIr beneIIt and
comIort."
28
The "conceIts" that musIc Is to express and Impress are, prImarIIy, the
passIons oI the words, and the IIsteners beneIIt Is understood In the IoratIan IashIon not
onIy as pIeasure, but aIso as moraI betterment, "not onIy as deIIghtIuI to IIIe, but aIso as
useIuI to vIrtue."
29
These were the aIms oI ancIent musIc and shouId be, but are not, the
aIms oI modern practIce too.
Modern practIce, whIch GaIIIeI IdentIIIes wIth poIyphony, got under way some hundred
and IIIty years ago (GaIIIeI's chronoIogy Is remarkabIy sImIIar to that oI TInctorIs) and
(another echo oI GIarean's crs perjectc) "Irom that tIme untII {p.125) today, . . . It has
reached the hIghest pInnacIe oI perIectIon man couId possIbIy ImagIne."
30
evertheIess,
"no man oI understandIng thInks that they have brought It back to Its ancIent state."
31
The reason Ior thIs Is that modern practIce treats counterpoInt as the aIm In ItseII,
IorgettIng, In the words oI GIovannI de ardI, that "just as the souI Is nobIer than the
Page 18 of 62
body, so the words are nobIer than the counterpoInt."
32
n theory, GaIIIeI thought, the
task oI restorIng musIc to Its ancIent state had aIready been accompIIshed by GIroIamo
MeI. ut the task oI doIng the same thIng In practIce remaIned to be accompIIshed.
The task InvoIved turnIng away Irom Iranco-IIemIsh poIyphony. n hIs Ietters to GaIIIeI,
GIroIamo MeI aIIIrmed that the aIm oI ancIent musIcIans "was not the sweetness oI the
consonances to satIsIy the ear (sInce there Is no testImony nor any evIdence by the
authors about the use oI these In theIr sIngIng) but the compIete and eIIIcacIous
expressIon oI everythIng he wanted to make understood . . . by means and through the
aId oI hIgh and Iow sounds . . . accompanIed wIth the reguIated temperament oI the Iast
and sIow."
33
nspIred by MeI, GaIIIeI and hIs Camerata IrIends concIuded that, II modern
vocaI musIc was to abandon the aIm oI sensuous pIeasure Ior the hIgher one oI ethIcaI
eIIIcacy, It aIso had to abandon poIyphony Ior monophony. IassIons were represented In
a meIody by approprIateIy chosen vocaI range and rhythm and tempo. IoIyphony not onIy
made words dIIIIcuIt to IoIIow, but worse, It set the same words In contradIctory IashIon,
gIvIng them dIIIerent ranges and rhythms In dIIIerent voIces.
n hIs Iate unpubIIshed dIscourses, GaIIIeI modIIIed thIs radIcaIIy antIpoIyphonIc stance
somewhat and began to advocate what came to be known as "monody," that Is, vocaI
meIody supported by the accompanIment oI InstrumentaI consonant harmonIes.
nstrumentaI consonances, he was now wIIIIng to concede, not onIy pIeased the ear. "the
musIcIan, wIth varIety oI IntervaIs and In partIcuIar oI consonances communIcates to the
InteIIect aII the passIons oI the souI, especIaIIy shaped approprIateIy by the text."
34
n taIy, the ground Ior thIs sort oI texture oI InstrumentaIIy and chordaIIy accompanIed
vocaI meIody was weII prepared. AIready In 1528, aIdassare CastIgIIone In hIs ll
cortegicno advocated soIo song wIth vIoI accompanIment (il ccntcre cllc violc) as the
most approprIate Iorm oI courtIy vocaI musIc. ut the reIorms stemmIng Irom the
Camerata cIrcIe were more Iar-reachIng, In that they went beyond a mere expressIon oI
preIerence Ior a partIcuIar mode oI perIormance and resuIted In vIabIe new styIes and
genres oI composItIon. TheIr permanent Iegacy was to provIde even the most ambItIous
art musIc wIth a texturaI aIternatIve to the cIassIcaI equaI-voIced poIyphony oI crs
perjectc. Thus, the pIuraIIty oI aIms that was the most Important achIevement oI the Iate
sIxteenth century InvoIved a correspondIng pIuraIIty oI means and, not the Ieast among
them, a pIuraIIty oI textures. The new genre oI opera, the most Important IruIt oI the
Camerata dIscussIons, became the maIn arena Ior the empIoyment oI InstrumentaIIy
accompanIed vocaI meIody and the most artIstIcaIIy ambItIous genre to chaIIenge the
supremacy oI the poIyphonIc mass and motet.
WIth GaIIIeI's Diclogo, the new paradIgm, aIready outIIned In some detaII by {p.126)
VIcentIno, Is IuIIy mapped out. There are two musIcaI practIces, the modern and the
ancIent. The modern aIms at "nothIng other then the deIIght oI hearIng"
35
and hence Is
adequateIy served by means oI poIyphony, by what ZarIIno caIIed "harmony." The
ancIent, by contrast, wanted "to Iead another to the same aIIectIon one IeeIs oneseII,"
36
to be ethIcaIIy useIuI, and hence It couId not treat harmony as an aIm In ItseII, but had to
Page 19 of 62
subordInate It to the passIons oI the words. SInce ethIcaI educatIon Is cIearIy nobIer than
mere pIeasure, the aIm oI ancIent practIce Is oIIered as an aIternatIve, and hIgher, IdeaI
Ior contemporary practIce as weII.
n the earIy seventeenth century, the new paradIgm was succInctIy and IamousIy
summarIzed by CIaudIo MonteverdI, the IeadIng composer among the new "ancIents."
When In 1600 GIovannI MarIa ArtusI, a oIognese canon and pedantIc student and
IoIIower oI ZarIIno, subjected severaI excerpts Irom MonteverdI's then unpubIIshed
madrIgaIs to a crItIcaI anaIysIs In a book entItIed L'Artusi, overo delle imperjettioni dellc
modernc musicc (excerpts that he sIgnIIIcantIy presented wIthout theIr poetIc texts), he
gave MonteverdI an InvaIuabIe opportunIty to IormuIate and deIend hIs artIstIc goaIs In
the preIatory Ietter In the IIIth ook oI hIs MadrIgaIs oI 1605, a text the composer's
brother, GIuIIo Cesare, gIossed extensIveIy In a "IchIarattIone" that appeared In
CIaudIo's Scherzi musiccli oI 1607. To ArtusI's accusatIon that some contemporary
composers IoIIow no other ruIe than "to satIsIy theIr whIms,"
37
CIaudIo MonteverdI
responded "that do not compose my works at haphazard"
38
and that, IIke hIs
predecessors, the contemporary composer aIso "buIIds upon the IoundatIon oI truth."
39
t Is thIs IoundatIon, however, that has shIIted. There were now two dIstInct musIcaI
practIces, the oIder "IIrst practIce" (primc prctticc), "IInaIIy perIected by Messer AdrIano
|WIIIaert| wIth actuaI composItIon and by the most exceIIent ZarIIno wIth most judIcIous
ruIes,"
40
as the composer's brother expIaIned, and the newer, "second practIce"
(secondc prctticc). The second practIce dIIIered prImarIIy In Its treatment oI dIssonances,
IntroducIng and resoIvIng them In ways that ZarIIno's ruIes oI strIct usage prohIbIted. The
core oI the secondc prctticc consIsted In a reIaxatIon oI these ruIes, a reIaxatIon
understood not as an abrogatIon whereby the ruIes were sImpIy pushed asIde as
IrreIevant, but as the IntroductIon oI IIcenses the expressIve eIIect oI whIch couId be IeIt
onIy agaInst the remembered background oI the strIct usage. The second practIce
conceIved oI dIssonance not as a threat to "harmony," a threat whIch had to be strIctIy
controIIed and subordInated to consonances, but rather as an Independent expressIve
means, and expressIve at Ieast In part precIseIy because IIcentIous.
n a Iamous passage, GIuIIo Cesare expIaIned how the IoundatIon oI truth shIIted, makIng
room Ior the new IIcentIous composItIonaI technIques. "y IIrst IractIce he |CIaudIo
MonteverdI| understands the one that turns on the perIectIon oI the harmony, that Is,
the one that consIders the harmony not commanded, but commandIng, not the servant,
but the mIstress oI the words. . . . y Second IractIce . . . he understands the one that
turns on the perIectIon oI the meIody, that Is, the one that consIders harmony not
commandIng, but commanded, {p.127) and makes the words the mIstress oI the
harmony."
41
IeIyIng dIrectIy on IIato's Republic (398), GIuIIo Cesare understood by
"meIody" the unIon oI "the words, the harmony |that Is, the tune|, and the rhythm"
(orctione, hcrmonic, Rithmo). Ie aIso quoted IIato's opInIon that It was apt "II the rhythm
and the harmony IoIIow the words, and not the words these," the opInIon that was cIearIy
a major source oI hIs brother's ceIebrated sIogan. (CIaudIo MonteverdI, In turn, made
cIear that hIs aIms were IdentIcaI wIth the ancIent ethIcaI Idea oI musIc when he quoted
the tItIe oI the IIrst chapter oI oethIus In the Ioreword to hIs Mcdrigcli guerrieri ed
Page 20 of 62
cmorosi oI 1638. "thIs |to move our mInd| Is the purpose whIch aII good musIc shouId
have-as oethIus asserts, sayIng, 'MusIc Is reIated to us, and eIther ennobIes or
corrupts the character."
42
)
The sIogan ItseII expressed wIth paradIgmatIc cIarIty and Iorce the most IundamentaI
opposItIon underIyIng the new vIsIon oI what musIc was Ior, the opposItIon between the
Idea oI musIc as the sensIbIe embodIment oI the ImperturbabIe and eternaI InteIIIgIbIe
harmony obtaInIng In the unIverse God created, and the Idea oI musIc as the mImetIc
medIum ImItatIng the ImpassIoned and protean IntonatIons oI human speech and
enhancIng the emotIonaI power oI the sung words. What was centraIIy at stake In the
opposItIon was the status oI harmony. on the one hand, harmony was understood to be
the essence oI musIc, autonomous and not subservIent to anythIng eIse, on the other, It
was subordInated to somethIng more Important, the ImItatIon and expressIon oI the
passIons oI the sIngIng character, passIons whose nature and object was made cIear
through the text. t was no accIdent that ArtusI presented the excerpts Irom
MonteverdI's madrIgaIs wIthout the text. autonomous harmony was aII that mattered to
hIm. or was It surprIsIng that the composer Iound thIs abstractIon oI harmony Irom the
text objectIonabIe.
Ior the second practIce, the text was oI the essence. t beIonged to musIc by Its pIatonIc
deIInItIon (accordIng to whIch musIc was the unIon oI the words, harmony, and rhythm),
and because It expIaIned and justIIIed harmonIc usages that dId not make sense on theIr
own. Ior the IIrst practIce, however, even vocaI musIc was essentIaIIy "nothIng but
harmony," as ZarIIno put It. The text was added to the musIc, but It was not the musIc,
sInce the autonomous harmony obeyed Its own IogIc. GaIIIeI had a poInt when he
suggested that poIyphony was the approprIate means oI pureIy InstrumentaI musIc,
though admIttedIy the poInt Is easIer to see Irom twentIeth- or rather Iate eIghteenth-
century hIndsIght, sInce the InstrumentaI musIc oI GaIIIeI's own tIme was sImpIy no match
Ior the artIstIc rIches oI the contemporary vocaI poIyphony. The contIngent Iact that the
crs perjectc was vocaI shouId not make us obIIvIous to the Ieatures It shared wIth what In
the nIneteenth century wouId have been caIIed "absoIute" musIc, to Its reIatIve autonomy
not onIy Irom externaI IunctIons (to be sure, the core oI thIs musIc was IIturgIcaI, but the
means It empIoyed were to a consIderabIe extent Independent oI IIturgy), but aIso Irom
Ianguage.
The dIchotomy that emerged In the mIddIe oI the sIxteenth century between the
harmonIc and mImetIc aIms oI musIc, the resuIt oI the vIew that passIons {p.128) mIght
be taken serIousIy as an object oI practIcaI musIcaI concern, that the demands oI harmony
and those oI passIons dId not have to coIncIde, and that the prImacy and autonomy oI
harmony mIght be chaIIenged, remaIned In Iorce at Ieast through the thIrd quarter oI the
eIghteenth century. The Idea whIch In the mIddIe oI the sIxteenth century stIrred the
ImagInatIon oI IsoIated humanIstIcaIIy InspIred vIsIonarIes, the Idea oI musIc as a mImetIc
art, an art abIe to ImItate passIons, came to domInate opInIon In more advanced cIrcIes by
the Iast quarter oI the century. t dId so, however, wIthout eIImInatIng the Idea oI
harmony aItogether, so that Irom now on the two Ideas had to coexIst. And the tensIon
Page 21 of 62
between the two MonteverdIan practIces couId be strongIy IeIt as Iate as the mIddIe oI
the eIghteenth century, In jean-jacques Iousseau's poIemIc agaInst the great harmonIc
theorIst and the most sIgnIIIcant Irench composer oI hIs tIme, jean IhIIIppe Iameau.
Iameau's admIratIon Ior ZarIIno, whom he regarded as hIs most Important predecessor
In harmonIc theory, Is weII documented (Iameau quoted approvIngIy rossard's opInIon
that ZarIIno was "the prInce oI modern musIcIans"),
43
and the centraIIty oI the Idea oI
harmony to hIs thInkIng about musIc Is announced In the very tItIe oI hIs semInaI Trcit de
l'hcrmonie oI 1722. What partIcuIarIy provoked Iousseau was Iameau's ZarIInIan
IdentIIIcatIon oI musIc's essence wIth harmony and the resuItIng subordInatIon oI meIody
to harmony. Iameau opened hIs treatIse wIth these sentences.
MusIc Is the scIence oI sounds, thereIore sound Is the prIncIpaI subject oI musIc.
MusIc Is generaIIy dIvIded Into harmony and meIody, but we shaII show In the
IoIIowIng that the Iatter Is mereIy a part oI the Iormer and that a knowIedge oI
harmony Is suIIIcIent Ior a compIete understandIng oI aII the propertIes oI musIc.
44
n hIs Essci sur l'origine des lcngues oI ca. 1754-61, Iousseau argued that musIc and
Ianguage had a common orIgIn In human moraI needs and passIons, and then separated
so that Ianguage couId express the Ideas oI reason and meIody the passIons oI the souI.
ut "to the degree that Ianguage Improved, meIody, beIng governed by new ruIes,
ImperceptIbIy Iost Its Iormer energy, and the caIcuIus oI IntervaIs was substItuted Ior
nIcety oI InIIectIon. . . . That Is aIso when It stopped producIng the marveIs It had produced
when It was mereIy the accent and harmony oI poetry and gave to It the power over the
passIons that speech subsequentIy exercIsed onIy on reason."
45
IavIng Iost Its IntImate
connectIon wIth speech and become IdentIIIed wIth pureIy abstract harmony, musIc
"Iound ItseII deprIved oI the moraI power It had yIeIded when It was the twoIoId voIce oI
nature."
46
t Is ImItatIon aIone, Iousseau argued, that raIses musIc to the IeveI oI a IIne
art, and what aIIows musIc to ImItate passIons Is not harmony, not pure sounds and theIr
IntervaIIIc reIatIons, whIch can provIde no more than sensuous pIeasure, but meIody,
whIch IoIIows the InIIectIons oI the ImpassIoned speakIng voIce.
Thus Iousseau's poIemIc agaInst Iameau recapItuIates at a dIstance oI some {p.129)
hundred and seventy years the centraI themes oI GaIIIeI's strIctures agaInst ZarIIno.
SImIIarItIes between Iousseau's and GaIIIeI's posItIons are no Iess strIkIng than Iameau's
more overtIy acknowIedged Indebtedness to ZarIIno. They extend to such mysterIous
detaIIs as GaIIIeI's comparIson, In hIs unpubIIshed Discorso intorno cll'uso
dell'Enhcrmonio, oI the IunctIon oI vertIcaI consonances In musIc to that oI coIors In
paIntIng, a topIc Iousseau, who was unIIkeIy to have read GaIIIeI's dIscourse, deveIoped
In a most InterestIng way when he compared meIodIc IInes wIth drawIng and chords wIth
coIorIng, cIaImIng that In both musIc and paIntIng onIy IInes served the purpose oI
representatIon, whIIe chords and coIors provIded mere sensuous pIeasure. Iousseau's
argument, deveIoped In a chapter devoted to the crucIaIIy Important topIc oI meIody,
deserves to be quoted at some Iength.
just as the IeeIIngs that a paIntIng excItes In us are not at aII due to coIors, the
Page 22 of 62
power oI musIc over our souIs Is not at aII the work oI sounds. eautIIuI, subtIy
shaded coIors are a pIeasIng sIght, but thIs Is pureIy a pIeasure oI the sense. t Is
the drawIng, the representatIon, whIch gIves IIIe and spIrIt to these coIors. The
passIons they express are what stIr ours, the objects they represent are what
aIIect us. . . . The roIe oI meIody In musIc Is precIseIy that oI drawIng In a paIntIng.
ThIs Is what constItutes the strokes and IIgures, oI whIch the harmony and the
sounds are mereIy the coIors. . . . MusIc Is no more the art oI combInIng sounds to
pIease the ear than paIntIng Is the art oI combInIng coIors to pIease the eye. I there
were no more to It than that, they wouId both be naturaI scIences rather than IIne
arts. mItatIon aIone raIses them to thIs IeveI. ut what makes paIntIng an ImItatIve
art? rawIng. What makes musIc another? MeIody.
47
o Iess than the GaIIIeI-ZarIIno dIspute, the Iousseau-Iameau poIemIc shows to what
extent the newer mImetIc vIew oI musIc embraced by the oIten somewhat dIIettantIsh
InteIIectuaIs put the Iearned proIessIonaI guardIans oI the tradItIonaI craIt who espoused
the oIder harmonIc vIew on the deIensIve. n the seventeenth and eIghteenth centurIes
one taIked oI musIc, but more oIten than not one meant the representatIonaI genre oI
opera. n thIs cIImate, It was naturaI Ior the "ancIents" to score poIemIcaI poInts agaInst
the "moderns." The agenda IaId out In taIy In the Iate sIxteenth century remaIned vaIId In
aII oI urope Ior aImost two hundred years, to be chaIIenged onIy In the Iate eIghteenth
century by the new German thInkIng on InstrumentaI musIc.
The Iegendary ethIcaI power oI ancIent musIc Is Invoked by Iousseau no Iess than by
VIcentIno and GaIIIeI to justIIy theIr advocacy oI the IdeaI oI musIc as a mImetIc art, as
ImItatIve oI passIons. ut, as we aIready know, Iegends testIIyIng to thIs mIracuIous power
were never Iorgotten and constItuted a standard repertory oI the topIc oI lcus musicce
throughout the MIddIe Ages wIthout anyone drawIng serIous practIcaI consequences
Irom them. What happened In the mId-sIxteenth century that aIIowed the representatIon
oI passIons to chaIIenge the embodyIng oI harmony In a serIous and practIcaI way Ior the
IIrst tIme and to become the domInant aIm oI musIc-makIng? WIthout pretendIng to oIIer
an {p.130) exhaustIve expIanatIon oI such a proIound shIIt, one that reorganIzed the
aIms and means oI the whoIe musIcaI practIce, one mIght sIngIe out two Important causes.
IIrst, the sIxteenth-century revoIutIon In naturaI scIences was makIng the Idea oI cosmIc
harmony, to whIch the harmony oI musIc supposedIy corresponded, Iess and Iess secure.
As AIexandre Koyre poInted out, modern scIence, wIth Its ImpIIed separatIon oI vaIue and
Iact, was bound to undermIne and eventuaIIy dIscard the use oI vaIue-concepts, such as
harmony, johannes KepIer's and MarIn Mersenne's powerIuI rescue eIIorts
notwIthstandIng. ZarIIno couId stIII beIIeve In the anaIogy oI musIcaI and cosmIc harmony,
because he understood the harmonIous concord oI dIverse eIements to consIst In both
cases In proportIons expressIbIe In sImIIar numerIcaI ratIos. ut, even as he wrote,
scIentIsts were begInnIng to chaIIenge the tradItIonaI ItoIemaIc cosmoIogy and oIIerIng
new vIews oI the mathematIcaI structure oI the unIverse, transIormIng the cIosed
premodern cosmos Into the InIInIte unIverse oI modern scIence.
At the same tIme, empIrIcaI research Into acoustIcs undertaken by the scIentIst GIovannI
Page 23 of 62
attIsta enedettI and Iater by GaIIIeI demonstrated that the ratIos oI the just IntonatIon
on whIch ZarIIno's vIew oI musIcaI harmony rested couId not as a matter oI Iact be the
basIs oI modern practIce. The tunIng, ItoIemy's syntonIc dIatonIc, was greatIy attractIve
to theorIsts oI poIyphonIc harmony, sInce It made aII consonances, perIect and ImperIect,
just, In the rIvaI Iythagorean tunIng, onIy perIect consonances were just, that Is, onIy
these were, strIctIy speakIng, consonant, whIch created a dIscrepancy wIth the practIce
that recognIzed thIrds and sIxths as consonant. ItoIemy's syntonIc dIatonIc was
redIscovered by the IIrst reaI humanIst among musIc theorIsts, IranchIno GaIIurIo, In hIs
De hcrmonic musicorum instrumentorum opus oI 1518, and champIoned as the basIs oI
contemporary practIce by GIovannI Spataro In Errori di Frcnchino Gcjurio (1521),
IodovIco IogIIano In Musicc theoricc (1529), and ZarIIno. enedettI's prooI, In a Ietter to
CIprIano de Iore (ca. 1563) and In Diverscrum speculctionum mcthemcticcrum
physicorum liber (1585), that the use oI just IntonatIon In poIyphonIc practIce was bound
to produce a IowerIng oI pItch deprIved poIyphonIc harmony oI Its theoretIcaI IoundatIons.
Thus, the credIbIIIty oI the anaIogy between ceIestIaI and musIcaI harmonIes was
undermIned on both ends. ThIs "untunIng oI the sky" (to borrow john IoIIander's
paraphrase oI ryden's Iamous Image) meant that musIc had to Iook Ior a new justIIIcatIon
oI Its exIstence.
Second, just as scIentIIIc empIrIcIsm was begInnIng to erode the credIbIIIty oI the
correspondence between the musIcaI and cosmIc harmony, humanIst reverence Ior
ancIent Ideas and practIces provIded musIc wIth a vIabIe aIternatIve ethIcaI roIe based on
the subordInatIon oI harmony to words. We have aIready seen how GIuIIo Cesare
MonteverdI justIIIed the second practIce by InvokIng the authorIty oI IIato. The same
passage Irom IIato's Republic In whIch the prImacy oI words over harmony and rhythm Is
asserted was used some seventy-IIve years earIIer by Ishop jacopo SadoIeto, a Iuture
member oI the CouncII oI Trent, In hIs De liberis recte instituendis oI 1533 to support hIs,
and Iater the CouncII's, {p.131) vIew that musIc shouId be guIded by the text.
(SadoIeto's book was known and quoted by GaIIIeI.) The same passage Irom IIato served
as an InspIratIon to those who wanted to subordInate the autonomous "harmony" oI the
Iranco-IIemIsh poIyphonIc tradItIon to words, whether theIr maIn Interest was In the
reIorm oI church musIc or secuIar musIc.
Two Iurther deveIopments reInIorced the turn to the passIons oI the words. Iate
IIIteenth-century IIorence wItnessed In the wrItIngs oI the eopIatonIst phIIosopher and
magIcIan MarsIIIo IIcIno the bIrth oI an InIIuentIaI and coherent theory expIaInIng how
musIc mIght achIeve Its powerIuI magIcaI eIIects. n the words oI the Ioremost student oI
IIcIno's musIcaI magIc, . I. WaIker, IIcIno
Is the earIIest IenaIssance wrIter know oI to treat the eIIects oI musIc serIousIy
and practIcaIIy, and not mereIy as a constItuent oI the rhetorIcaI topIc oI the lcus
musicce. y provIdIng them wIth a ratIonaI expIanatIon, he removes them Irom the
status oI more or Iess Iegendary marveIs, makes them Into excItIng reaIItIes, and,
by hIs astroIogIcaI musIc, IndIcates ways oI revIvIng them.
48
ZarIIno was aware oI IIcIno's theorIes, as was, more tantaIIzIngIy, MonteverdI's
Page 24 of 62
champIon, a certaIn I'Ottuso AccademIco, who, In a Ietter pubIIshed by ArtusI (In
Secondc pcrte dell Artusi overo delle imperjettioni dellc modernc musicc, 1603), quoted
IIcIno to expIaIn how musIc InIIuenced aIIectIons. y the mIddIe oI the seventeenth
century, escartes wouId provIde the musIcaI worId wIth a new but reIated theory oI the
nature and mechanIsm oI passIons In hIs Les pcssions de lcme (1649).
At the same tIme, the steadIIy IncreasIng InIIuence oI ArIstotIe's Foetics, generaIIy
avaIIabIe onIy sInce 1498 when GIorgIo VaIIa's IatIn transIatIon appeared, reInIorced thIs
pIatonIc Iesson by provIdIng musIc, aIong wIth poetry, wIth a mImetIc aIm and by
suggestIng Ior It the roIe oI a powerIuI ampIIIIer oI ImpassIoned dramatIc speech. We have
heard Iousseau cIaImIng the status oI a IIne art Ior musIc on the basIs oI Its mImetIc
abIIItIes. The ArIstoteIIan notIon oI representatIon (mimesis) provIded musIc wIth a
ground on whIch It couId be compared wIth poetry, eventuaIIy aIIowIng It to enter, In the
eIghteenth century, the emergIng modern system oI IIne arts. Thus the shIIt Irom
harmony to passIons meant aIso that, IncreasIngIy, It was to poetIcs and rhetorIc, rather
than to the mathematIcaI dIscIpIInes oI the quadrIvIum, that musIc theorIsts Iooked Ior
sources oI useIuI concepts and Ideas. Step by step, musIc ceased to be a premodern
IIberaI art aIIIed wIth the quadrIvIum and became a modern IIne art aIIIed wIth other IIne
arts.
To summarIze thIs part oI our story, the new paradIgm that began to emerge In the Iate
sIxteenth century and persIsted through the Iate eIghteenth pItted the oIder Idea oI
musIc as a soundIng embodIment oI abstract harmony and the newer Idea oI musIc as a
mImesIs oI human passIons agaInst one another. The mImetIc Idea represented a return
to the ancIent conceptIon oI musIc as consIstIng oI {p.132) hcrmonic, rhythmos, and
logos, and It made harmony subservIent to the words that specIIIed the represented
passIons and hence justIIIed the harmonIc means. The abstract Idea saw the essence oI
musIc In hcrmonic aIone and dId not need words to justIIy the autonomous IogIc
governIng the choIce oI those sImuItaneousIy soundIng tones and those IntervaIIIc
progressIons that made sense. n other words, the most Important dIIIerence between
the two Ideas was that In the mImetIc conceptIon Ianguage was an essentIaI component oI
musIc, whIIe In the abstract conceptIon It was not. The dIstInctIon, IncIdentaIIy, shouId In no
way be conIused wIth the dIstInctIon between vocaI and InstrumentaI musIc. ArtusI's
untexted exampIes show that a IIrst-practIce musIcIan understood even vocaI musIc
essentIaIIy In terms oI abstract counterpoInt. And by the earIy eIghteenth century
mImetIc musIcIans heard even InstrumentaI meIody as II It ImpIIed a text that specIIIed the
represented passIons, as johann Mattheson made cIear In hIs Der vollkommene
Ccpellmeister oI 1739.
The mImetIc Idea had an obvIous ethIcaI-poIItIcaI justIIIcatIon, In that the representatIons oI
passIons couId be seen as servIng the purpose oI human seII-knowIedge and moraI
betterment. The justIIIcatIon oI the abstract Idea was shown by Its crItIcs to be more
precarIous. Ior Its deIenders, the pIeasure aIIorded by musIcaI harmony had a proIound
metaphysIcaI justIIIcatIon, sInce the InteIIIgIbIe harmony that musIc embodIed was the
same as that oI the worId God created, and hence musIc's harmony was a sInguIarIy
Page 25 of 62
suItabIe medIum In whIch to praIse God. (As TInctorIs put It In 1477, "the art oI
counterpoInt . . . whIch, oI the consonances decIared by oethIus to govern aII the
deIectatIon oI musIc, Is contrIved Ior the gIory and honor oI IIs eternaI majesty."
49
) ut
Ior Its detractors the pIeasure aIIorded by musIcaI harmony was mereIy pIeasure oI the
senses, "nothIng other then the deIIght oI hearIng," as GaIIIeI opIned. The abstract Idea oI
musIc was best served by means oI the essentIaIIy abstract though vocaIIy reaIIzed
counterpoInt oI the sacred genres oI mass and motet. The mImetIc Idea was best served
by means oI the essentIaIIy texted InstrumentaIIy accompanIed vocaI meIody oI the
secuIar genre oI opera.
The new paradIgm IundamentaIIy reconIIgured the reIatIonshIp between our two IdeaI
types oI art and popuIar musIc. The aIIInItIes between abstract and art musIc, on the one
hand, and mImetIc and popuIar musIc, on the other, are systematIc. MImetIc musIc, musIc
that represents and ampIIIIes the passIons oI the sIngIng personage, caIIs Ior the popuIar
mode oI hearIng In whIch the IIstener passIveIy IdentIIIes wIth the personage at any gIven
moment, and It Iavors the popuIar mode oI exIstence oI musIc as a perIormed process In
reaI tIme. MImetIc musIc Is the perIormer's art, the success oI an ImpersonatIon depends
more on the perIormer than on the composer. arIy seventeenth-century monodIes,
those oI SIgIsmondo d'ndIa, say, are tedIous unIess brought to IIIe by a convIncIng
sInger. CarI IhIIIpp manueI ach IInked mImetIc musIc wIth the art oI the perIormer
expIIcItIy when In hIs 1753 Versuch uber die wchre Art dcs Clcvier zu spielen he
paraphrased IInes Irom Iorace's Ars poeticc and cIaImed that a perIormer who wants to
move others must hImseII be moved.
50
(More reaIIstIcaIIy, {p.133) Iderot argued In
hIs 1773 Le Fcrcdoxe sur le comdien the exactIy opposIte poInt. a great actor knows
how to represent the outward sIgns oI IeeIIng, but Is hImseII unmoved when he pIays,
otherwIse, how couId he pIay the same part twIce?
51
) A century Iater, duard IansIIck,
a great enemy oI the "aesthetIcs oI emotIon" whIch he consIdered "putreIIed," cogentIy
argued that It was the aesthetIcs oI the perIormer.
The act In whIch the dIrect emanatIon In tones oI a IeeIIng can take pIace Is not so
much the IabrIcatIon as the reproductIon oI a musIc work. . . . To the perIormer Is
granted to reIease dIrectIy the IeeIIng whIch possesses hIm, through hIs
Instrument, and breathe Into hIs perIormance the wIId storms, the passIonate
Iervour, the serene power and joy oI hIs Inwardness. . . . The composer works
sIowIy and IntermIttentIy, the perIormer In Impetuous IIIght, the composer Ior
posterIty, and the perIormer Ior the moment oI IuIIIIIment. The musIcaI artwork Is
Iormed, the perIormance we experIence. . . . The same pIece dIsturbs or deIIghts,
accordIng to how It Is anImated Into resoundIng actuaIIty.
52
And II mImetIc musIc Is the musIc oI the perIormer, abstract musIc Is the musIc oI the
composer. When musIc Is conceIved as an abstract IogIc oI tonaI reIatIons, It caIIs Ior the
artIstIc mode oI experIence In whIch one wants to go beyond IsoIated moments and to
take In the Iorm oI the whoIe In actIve antIcIpatory and recoIIectIng contempIatIon, and It
Iavors the artIstIc mode oI exIstence as a composed and wrItten work reIatIveIy
Independent oI reaI tIme.
Page 26 of 62
uropean musIc cuIture oI the seventeenth and eIghteenth centurIes unmIstakabIy
Iavored the mImetIc and popuIar sIde oI the new paradIgm. The abstract herItage oI crs
perjectc was demoted Irom the centraI posItIon It had occupIed In the IIIteenth and
sIxteenth centurIes and became the domaIn oI provIncIaI, conservatIve, and pedantIc, but
oIten aIso Iearned and skIIIIuI, proIessIonaI church musIcIans, whether CathoIIc IoIIowers
oI IaIestrIna or German Iutheran cantors. The center stage was now taken by opera and
Its cosmopoIItan and urbane, progressIve and oIten dIIettantIsh InteIIectuaI devotees. (The
decIIne In the voIume oI musIc pubIIshIng throughout urope aIter 1620 whIch Iorenzo
IanconI noted and whIch he persuasIveIy attrIbuted to economIc Iactors may perhaps
aIso be a symptom oI a decIIne In prestIge that abstract art musIc suIIered.
53
) ut
between, roughIy, 1780 and 1820 another paradIgm shIIt, as IundamentaI as that oI the
Iate sIxteenth century, but occurrIng thIs tIme not In taIy, but In Germany, compIeteIy
revoIutIonIzed the practIce oI musIc In urope.
d. The Rse of Abstract Musc
To understand thIs new revoIutIon one has to reaIIze that what brought It about was not
an IntroductIon oI new aIms, but rather a shIIt In the baIance between the oId ones.
Abstract musIc once agaIn became a vIabIe IIeId oI InnovatIve actIvIty and thought, whIIe
mImetIc musIc Iost Its predomInance and, In some cIrcIes, suddenIy began to seem oId-
IashIoned and worn. othIng couId be {p.134) more embIematIc oI thIs revoIutIon than
the way It posthumousIy transIormed an obscure Iutheran cantor Irom provIncIaI
IeIpzIg Into the unIversaI "composers composer," the "progenItor oI harmony" (Urvcter
der Hcrmonie) as eethoven caIIed hIm In 1801,
54
whose Wohltemperiertes Klcvier and
Kunst der Fuge dIstIIIed Ior the new era aII the arcana oI abstract poIyphony, sureIy the
most spectacuIar revaIuatIon In musIc hIstory.
(ote, by the way, that whIIe thIs transIormatIon was no doubt one-sIded, IgnorIng as It
dId ach's commItment to mImesIs, It dId not InvoIve a compIete IaIsIIIcatIon. ach's own
seII-Image was deepIy rooted In the tradItIon oI GIarean's crs perjectc. The concept oI
"perIectIon" Is centraI to ach's seII-understandIng as conveyed by Irnbaum. n the
words oI ChrIstoph WoIII, "the reason Ior ScheIbe's IncomprehensIon and ach's Iack oI
compromIse |In "the Iamous controversy . . . between ScheIbe and Irnbaum (speakIng
Ior ach)"| Is actuaIIy Iounded on hIs work's cIaIm to perIectIon. 'IerIectIon Is, In Iact,
oIten aIIuded to In Irnbaum's argumentatIon, cuImInatIng In the pIuraI Iorm In hIs terse
reIerence to 'the xtraordInary IerIectIons oI the Ion. Court Composer (dIe
sonderbaren |unmIstakabIe, dIstInctIve| VoIIkommenheIten des Ierrn IoI-
ComposIteurs). ach's IndIvIduaIIstIc adherence to prIncIpIe, utterIy unsuIted Ior debate,
draws Its IegItImacy Irom hIs avowaI oI perIectIon."
55
And Iurther. "IerIectIon ImpIIes the
knowIedge oI 'the most hIdden secrets oI harmony. "
56
The expressIon "the most
hIdden secrets oI harmony" comes Irom the obItuary pubIIshed by CarI IhIIIpp manueI
ach and johann IrIedrIch AgrIcoIa.
57
And the concept oI harmony Is centraI to ach's
posthumous Image. Thus Goethe wrItes to CarI IrIedrIch ZeIter about the ImpressIon
ach's organ musIc made on hIm when he heard It at erka In ecember oI 1818. "It was
there . . . that IIrst obtaIned some Idea oI your grand master. saId to myseII, It Is as II
the eternaI harmony were conversIng wIthIn ItseII, as It may have done In the bosom oI
Page 27 of 62
God just beIore the CreatIon oI the worId. So IIkewIse dId It move In my Inmost souI, and
It seemed as II neIther possessed nor needed ears, nor any other sense-Ieast oI aII,
the eyes."
58
)
We wouId not do justIce to the sItuatIon aIter 1800, however, II we ImagIned that the Idea
oI mImetIc musIc sImpIy dIsappeared to be repIaced by somethIng eIse. On the contrary,
the Idea remaIned the guIdIng prIncIpIe oI the cosmopoIItan operatIc cuIture, and Ior
many, perhaps most, musIcIans and IIsteners It contInued to represent the naturaI and
obvIous way oI thInkIng about musIc's aIms. ven InstrumentaI musIc contInued to be
heard by those peopIe as It was by Mattheson, as II the gestures oI the musIc carrIed an
ImpIIed text that IdentIIIed Its expressIve content. The popuIarIty oI program musIc In the
second haII oI the nIneteenth century shows that the mImetIc conceptIon oI musIc as
necessarIIy contaInIng an ImpIIed or expIIcIt IInguIstIc component contInued to be a Iorce
even In the most seII-conscIousIy advanced cIrcIes oI the ew German schooI. ut II the
revoIutIon oI around 1800 dId not make the Idea oI mImetIc musIc dIsappear, It dId
provIde It wIth a IormIdabIe opponent by gIvIng the Idea {p.135) oI abstract musIc a new
vItaIIty and movIng It Irom provIncIaI organ IoIts Into the center oI aesthetIc debate.
Thus the rebIrth oI the Idea oI abstract, that Is, nonmImetIc, musIc (or, as Wagner was to
name It In 1846, "absoIute musIc"), the emergence oI the new German "metaphysIcs oI
InstrumentaI musIc" (to use a IavorIte phrase oI Its Ioremost student, CarI ahIhaus), was
the centraI eIement In the paradIgm shIIt around 1800. The key documents oI thIs rebIrth
were the two essays by rnst Theodor Amadeus IoIImann, "eethoven's nstrumentaI
MusIc" ("eethovens nstrumentaImusIk" oI 1813, but based on two revIews pubIIshed
In 1810 and 1813) and "OId and ew Church MusIc" ("AIte und neue KIrchenmusIk" oI
1814). uIIdIng on the earIIer wrItIngs oI jean IauI (Hesperus, 1795), WIIheIm IeInrIch
Wackenroder (Herzensergiessungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders, 1797), and
both Wackenroder and IudwIg TIeck (Fhcntcsien uber die Kunst jur Freunde der Kunst,
1799), IoIImann presented In these essays a persuasIve argument Ior reInterpretIng
InstrumentaI musIc, consIdered by enIIghtened opInIon to be a poor, mImetIc reIatIon oI
vocaI musIc ("more a matter oI enjoyment than oI cuIture," In Kant's Iamous IousseauIst
phrase),
59
as, rather, a medIum capabIe oI gIvIng expressIon to an essentIaI metaphysIcaI
regIon InaccessIbIe to Ianguage. n the IIIteenth and sIxteenth centurIes, the dIgnIty and
vaIue oI abstract counterpoInt rested on the beIIeI that It embodIed somethIng more
substantIaI than tones aIone, the InteIIIgIbIe harmony, wIth Its cosmIc and dIvIne
sIgnIIIcance. WIth the scIentIIIc revoIutIon, thIs notIon Iost much oI Its credIbIIIty and Iuster.
IoIImann's essays show cIearIy that the rebIrth and new vItaIIty oI the Idea oI abstract
musIc InvoIved IIndIng somethIng comparabIe to the notIon oI harmony, somethIng
capabIe oI gIvIng mere soundIng metaphysIcaI or reIIgIous Import.
"When musIc Is spoken oI as an Independent art, does not the term properIy appIy onIy to
InstrumentaI musIc, whIch scorns aII aId, aII admIxture oI other arts (poetry), and gIves
pure expressIon to Its own pecuIIar artIstIc nature?"
60
Thus IoIImann begIns hIs essay
"eethoven's nstrumentaI MusIc." n vocaI musIc, "the poetry suggests precIse moods
through words."
61
There are even some "poor InstrumentaI composers who have
Page 28 of 62
IaborIousIy struggIed to represent precIse sensatIons, or even events."
62
ut thIs has
IIttIe to do wIth the "pecuIIar nature oI musIc."
63
t Is not musIc's roIe to represent
specIIIc passIons, sensatIons, events. MusIc's "onIy subject-matter Is InIInIty."
64
"MusIc
reveaIs to man an unknown reaIm, a worId quIte separate Irom the outer sensuaI worId
surroundIng hIm, a worId In whIch he Ieaves behInd aII precIse IeeIIngs In order to
embrace an InexpressIbIe IongIng."
65
And IoIImann turns the tabIes even more radIcaIIy
on those who wouId hear InstrumentaI musIc mImetIcaIIy by cIaImIng that, on the
contrary, even In vocaI musIc the representatIonaI powers oI the poetry are overcome
by musIc's abIIIty to go beyond the specIIIc passIons toward the reaIm that Is InaccessIbIe
to Ianguage. "n sIngIng, where the poetry suggests precIse moods through words, the
magIcaI power oI musIc acts IIke the phIIosopher's mIracuIous eIIxIr. . . . Any passIon-Iove,
hate, anger, despaIr, etc.-presented to us In an {p.136) opera Is cIothed by musIc In
the purpIe shImmer oI romantIcIsm, so that even our mundane sensatIons take us out oI
the everyday Into the reaIm oI the InIInIte."
66
"nIInIty," "an unknown reaIm, a worId quIte separate Irom the outer sensuaI worId", In
the post-KantIan age, IoIImann's readers were bound to recognIze here the KantIan
noumenaI reaIm oI the thIng-In-ItseII, a reaIm utterIy unknowabIe, but underIyIng the
dIstInct and knowabIe phenomenaI worId oI human experIence. MImetIc arts cannot
penetrate beyond the phenomena, but abstract InstrumentaI musIc can. And II It Is thIs
noumenaI reaIm beyond the phenomena that musIc reveaIs, then a suItabIe substItute Ior
cosmIc harmony has been Iound to underwrIte the dIgnIty and worth oI abstract,
nonmImetIc, musIc.
SIx years aIter IoIImann, Arthur Schopenhauer expIIcItIy IdentIIIed the "unknown reaIm"
to whIch musIc, but no other medIum, gave voIce as Kant's noumenaI regIon oI the thIng-
In-ItseII and, In a move that wouId sureIy make Kant wInce, Iurther characterIzed It as wIII
(Die Welt cls Wille und Vorstellung, 1819). "|W|e must attrIbute to musIc,"
Schopenhauer wrote, "a Iar more serIous and proIound sIgnIIIcance that reIers to the
Innermost beIng oI the worId and oI our own seII."
67
"|M|usIc Is as immedicte an
objectIIIcatIon and copy oI the whoIe will as the worId ItseII Is."
68
IIke IoIImann,
Schopenhauer cIaImed that even vocaI musIc shouId not be heard as mImetIc. When
musIc Is joIned wIth words or pantomIme, It does not ImItate them, but rather they "stand
to It onIy In the reIatIon oI an exampIe, chosen at random, to a unIversaI concept."
69
SImIIarIy, IegeI wouId cIaIm In hIs Iectures on IIne art that "the text Is the servant oI the
musIc and It has no worth other than creatIng Ior our mInds a better Idea oI what the
artIst has chosen as the subject oI hIs work."
70
Ior the Iess phIIosophIcaIIy IncIIned, as IoIImann's essay on "OId and ew Church
MusIc" shows, the metaphysIcaI and reIIgIous dImensIons couId be cIoseIy IntertwIned.
Ior IoIImann hImseII, metaphysIcs seems to have been the reIIgIon oI the post-ChrIstIan
age. "Sound audIbIy expresses an awareness oI the hIghest and hoIIest, oI the spIrItuaI
power whIch enkIndIes the spark oI IIIe In the whoIe oI nature, and so musIc and sIngIng
become an expressIon oI the totaI pIenItude oI exIstence-a paean to the Creator! y
vIrtue oI Its essentIaI character, thereIore, musIc Is a Iorm oI reIIgIous worshIp."
71
The
Page 29 of 62
oId church musIc was perIected by IaIestrIna, whose art was pure harmony.
WIthout adornment and wIthout the Impetus oI meIody, chord IoIIows upon chord,
most oI them are perIect consonances, whose boIdness and strength stIr and
eIevate our spIrIts wIth InexpressIbIe power. That Iove, that consonance oI aII thIngs
spIrItuaI In nature whIch Is promIsed to the ChrIstIan, IInds expressIon In chords
whIch onIy came Into exIstence wIth ChrIstIanIty, thus chords and harmony become
the Image and expressIon oI that communIon oI spIrIts, oI that bond wIth the eternaI
IdeaI whIch at once embraces and reIgns over us.
72
n short, IaIestrIna's "reaIIy Is musIc Irom the other worId."
73
The decIIne oI the oId
church musIc set In when "musIc mIgrated Irom the church to the theatre {p.137) and
then, wIth aII the empty ostentatIon It had acquIred there, moved back Into the church."
74
ut, In any case, "It Is sImpIy ImpossIbIe Ior a composer today to wrIte In the same way
as IaIestrIna. . . . Those tImes, partIcuIarIy when ChrIstIanIty stIII shone Iorth In aII Its gIory,
seem to have vanIshed Irom the earth Ior ever."
75
Iowever, even In recent tImes, "the
bewIIderIng spectacIe presented by men sundered Irom aII hoIIness and truth" dId not
prevent "the more perceptIve souI" Irom recognIzIng "the exIstence oI the spIrIt."
76
"Our mysterIous urge to IdentIIy the workIngs oI thIs anImatIng naturaI spIrIt, and to
dIscover our essence, our other-wordIy abode In It, whIch gIves rIse to the pursuIt oI
knowIedge, Iay aIso behInd the hauntIng sounds oI musIc, whIch descrIbed wIth
IncreasIng rIchness and perIectIon the wonders oI that dIstant reaIm. t Is quIte cIear that
In recent tImes InstrumentaI musIc has rIsen to heIghts earIIer composers dId not dream
oI."
77
Iaydn, Mozart, and eethoven, In partIcuIar, are the "composers, In whom the
spIrIt was so gIorIousIy manIIest."
78
ew church musIc mIght deveIop onIy on the basIs
oI the "new art" they have evoIved.
79
ut eethoven's symphony appears aIready to be
the IaIestrIna mass Ior the tImes when ChrIstIanIty no Ionger shInes Iorth In aII Its gIory,
the new reveIatIon oI "the other worId," the reaIm oI the spIrIt.
Thus German romantIc poets and phIIosophers Iound In the varIousIy named absoIute
reveaIed by musIc a vIabIe substItute Ior harmony, a conceptIon capabIe oI justIIyIng
abstract, nonmImetIc musIc's cIaIm to dIgnIty and vaIue, an answer to Kant's dIsmIssIve
verdIct ("more enjoyment than cuIture"). Two Iactors made thIs conceptIon credIbIe and
gave It Its ImpressIve stayIng power. IIrst, the Idea oI absoIute musIc, InstrumentaI musIc
Iree oI text, program, or IunctIon, was musIc's perIect answer to the demand newIy
raIsed by German aesthetIc theory that art must be Independent oI aII socIaI IunctIons.
The semInaI treatIse oI KarI IhIIIpp MorItz, ber die bildende Ncchchmung des Schnen
oI 1788, presented a pIea Ior an autonomous art centered on a perIect and seII-suIIIcIent
work, and Kant's Critique oj ]udgment (1790), In partIcuIar, was wIdeIy read (and
perhaps partIy mIsread) as a deIense oI the aesthetIc autonomy oI art.
The emergence and popuIarIty oI thIs new theory oI artIstIc autonomy, In turn, has been
ImpressIveIy correIated wIth changes In the structures oI artIstIc patronage and the
resuItIng change In the socIaI posItIon oI the artIst that occurred In eIghteenth-century
German Iands. The suppIementIng oI tradItIonaI church and court patronage wIth more
anonymous market InstItutIons such as the pubIIc concert or the musIc pubIIshIng house
Page 30 of 62
made the IreeIance artIst sImuItaneousIy more Independent and more Insecure than hIs
coIIeagues In church or court servIce. Martha Woodmansee, Ior exampIe, has argued In
The Author, Art, cnd the Mcrket that the Idea oI autonomous art was Introduced In Iate
eIghteenth-century Germany as an attempt to stem the commercIaIIzatIon oI IIterature
under the condItIons oI a market economy. "the chIeI goaI oI thIs phIIosophy was to sever
the vaIue oI a work Irom Its capacIty to appeaI to a pubIIc that wanted above aII to be
dIverted."
80
Moreover, the theory oI the InternaI {p.138) perIectIon oI the artwork
transIerred to the work a property oI the dIvIne. "n Its orIgIns the theory oI art's
autonomy Is cIearIy a dIspIaced theoIogy."
81
There can be IIttIe doubt that Ideas can and do have socIaI and economIc roots and,
perhaps more Important, gaIn InIIuence and resonance more easIIy In certaIn socIaI and
economIc envIronments. We shouId be under no IIIusIon, however, that we have saId
everythIng worth sayIng about these Ideas when we have IdentIIIed theIr socIoeconomIc
orIgIns. Whether an Idea Is persuasIve or not In the Iong run Is quIte Independent oI Its
orIgInaI IunctIon. More to the poInt, the Iact that a theory oI autonomous art emerged In
Iate eIghteenth-century Germany shouId be taken to mean neIther that art was not
autonomous earIIer and eIsewhere, nor that It reaIIy became autonomous In Germany
then. As have suggested earIIer, we wouId do better to consIder the contrast between
autonomous and IunctIonaI musIc as the contrast between "IdeaI types" and to see most
oI the musIc as It was actuaIIy practIced In urope over the centurIes as IaIIIng
somewhere between these two poIes. AII the same, It cannot be denIed that the new
aesthetIc theory strengthened artIstIc autonomy consIderabIy by makIng It conscIous oI
ItseII and provIdIng It wIth a ratIonaIe.
The second Iactor that made the Idea oI absoIute musIc credIbIe and InIIuentIaI was that,
by the tIme IoIImann wrote hIs essays, a sIzabIe repertory oI artIstIcaIIy ImpressIve
InstrumentaI musIc had aIready come Into beIng In the works oI the VIennese cIassIcs.
Mozart's and Iaydn's orchestraI and chamber musIc oI the 1780s, the InternatIonaI
recognItIon oI Iaydn's symphonIes epItomIzed by hIs Iondon trIumphs oI the 1790s, and
the ImpressIon made by eethoven's symphonIes In the IoIIowIng decade made the Idea
that InstrumentaI musIc couId be more than mere enjoyment entIreIy beIIevabIe. y
presentIng InstrumentaI dIscourses oI consIderabIe sIze, dIscourses the InternaI
coherence and sense oI whIch were based on the harmonIc and motIvIc IogIc oI tonaI
reIatIons, mature VIennese symphonIes and strIng quartets demanded to be taken
serIousIy as objects oI aesthetIc contempIatIon.
Thus, the new paradIgm that emerged around 1800 InvoIved a productIve InteractIon
and tensIon between the weII-estabIIshed and somewhat oId-IashIoned but stIII vItaI Idea oI
mImetIc musIc and the taIo-Irench cuIture oI opera It supported (a cuIture arIstocratIc In
orIgIn, enIIghtened and cosmopoIItan In attItude, seekIng pIeasure and IIndIng It In
sensuous beauty, at ease wIth conventIon, a cuIture cIose to our IdeaI type oI popuIar
musIc) and the avant-garde Idea oI abstract absoIute musIc and the Austro-German
cuIture oI symphonIc musIc whIch was based on It (a cuIture cIose to our IdeaI type oI art
musIc, mIddIe-cIass In orIgIn, romantIc and natIonaIIst In attItude, aImIng at edIIIcatIon and
Page 31 of 62
the contempIatIon oI an uItImate subIIme reaIIty beyond the sensuous one, worshIppIng
orIgInaIIty). The two cuItures were brIIIIantIy and InvIdIousIy conIronted In 1888 In
Ietzsche's The Ccse oj Wcgner, where they were subjected to a crItIque In terms oI
IIourIshIng-as In Ccrmen, the musIc whose beauty gIves pIeasure and makes one IertIIe
-and decadence-as In Fcrsijcl, the musIc whose subIImIty preaches and Increases
exhaustIon. That the two Ideas Interacted and {p.139) that theIr conIIIct was productIve
through the nIneteenth century Is best shown by such phenomena as what mIght be
caIIed the "mImetIcIzatIon" oI the symphony In erIIoz's and IIszt's program musIc and
the "absoIutIzatIon" oI opera In Wagner's musIc drama.
82
!ntII about the IIrst WorId
War, the mImetIc Idea managed to hoId Its own, whIIe the abstract Idea maIntaIned and
even Increased Its avant-garde sheen. t was gIven a second IIIe when, In 1854, Wagner
dIscovered Schopenhauer and enIIsted hIs theory In the servIce oI the musIc drama.
Thanks to Wagner's prestIge In advanced art cIrcIes, and thanks to Ietzsche's own
adoptIon oI Schopenhauer's theory oI musIc (mInus the pessImIsm) In The Birth oj
Trcgedy oI 1872 (a book that became the bIbIe Ior many artIsts around 1900), the
romantIc Idea oI absoIute musIc maIntaIned Its IuII credIbIIIty through the IIrst decade oI
the twentIeth century.
e. The Cod War of Mmess and Abstracton
Today, we are stIII makIng musIc under the premIses oI the post-1800 paradIgm. ut the
paradIgm, InvoIvIng as It does a competItIon between two dIstInct vIews oI the aIms oI
musIc-makIng, Is InherentIy unstabIe and dId not survIve the IIrst WorId War Intact.
Iather, the tendencIes It harbored Irom the begInnIng went through a perIod oI very
rapId IntensIIIcatIon and radIcaIIzatIon between, roughIy, 1908 and 1924, a perIod the IuII
consequences oI whIch were not IeIt untII aIter the Second WorId War, when the "zenIth
oI modernIsm" (to borrow the tItIe oI a recent study oI one oI the centraI musIcaI
InstItutIons oI the tIme) was reached.
83
SpecIIIcaIIy, In the earIy twentIeth century the
trend toward prIvIIegIng the abstract Idea oI musIc at the cost oI the mImetIc one
IntensIIIed to such an extent that, by the 1950s, the productIve InteractIon there had
been between the two Ideas durIng the nIneteenth century was deepIy dIsturbed and at
tImes compIeteIy ceased.
Two deveIopments, In partIcuIar, characterIze the sItuatIon that arose durIng the
twentIeth century. IIrst, the Idea oI abstract musIc, whIch throughout the nIneteenth
century deIIned ItseII by Its avant-garde opposItIon to the mImetIc status quo, trIumphed
so compIeteIy In art musIc cIrcIes that by the mId-twentIeth century the mImetIc Idea
stopped beIng taken serIousIy even as somethIng one needed to be agaInst. Second, the
understandIng oI abstract musIc changed once more, so that It was now seen as the
embodIment oI neIther harmony nor the absoIute. nstead, It was understood as sImpIy
ItseII, the pure soundIng Iorm, not poIntIng to any transcendent meanIng. We need to take
a cIoser Iook at these two deveIopments, one by one.
MImetIc musIc, we shaII recaII, consIders Ianguage, whether expIIcItIy present or ImpIIed,
to be the essentIaI component oI musIc, on a par wIth harmony, and not as somethIng
added to musIc. t Is Ianguage that names the object oI musIcaI representatIon. n the
Page 32 of 62
twentIeth century, thIs Idea became so compIeteIy dIsreputabIe In art musIc cIrcIes that In
recent decades It requIred somethIng oI an eIIort oI hIstorIcaI ImagInatIon and sympathy
to understand how It couId ever have been taken serIousIy. Art musIc has
contemptuousIy turned Its back on the {p.140) Idea oI representatIon and IeIt It as the
nearIy excIusIve property oI popuIar musIcIans. WIth onIy a sIIght exaggeratIon, one mIght
cIaIm that by the mIddIe oI our century, onIy popuIar song and IIIm musIc dared to be
IrankIy mImetIc, wIthout shame or apoIogy.
The symptoms oI thIs deveIopment were the rejectIon oI ways oI hearIng InstrumentaI
musIc as II It encoded a hIdden program, ways stIII wIdespread In the earIy twentIeth
century, the reIated demIse oI program musIc, and evIdence that even vocaI musIc was
now beIng heard wIthout much regard Ior the text. The program Ior "musIcaI
hermeneutIcs" advanced by Iermann Kretzschmar In the earIy years oI the century (In
"Anregungen zur Irderung musIkaIIscher IermeneutIk" and "eue Anregungen zur
Irderung musIkaIIscher IermeneutIk. SatzsthetIk" that appeared In ]chrbuch der
Musikbibliothek Feters oI 1902 and 1905), In essence a program Ior decIpherIng the
aIIectIve content oI InstrumentaI musIc, IaIIed to catch on and came to be regarded as a
Iast-dItch attempt to preserve the dIscredIted modes oI hearIng Irom the nIneteenth- and
even eIghteenth-century past. n a reveaIIng essay on "The IeIatIonshIp to the Text"
whIch appeared In 1912 In KandInsky's and Marc's Der blcue Reiter, ArnoId Schoenberg
expIaIned why proposaIs such as Kretzschmar's were unacceptabIe. "Wagner . . . , when
he wanted to gIve the average man an IndIrect notIon oI what he as a musIcIan had Iooked
upon dIrectIy, dId rIght to attach programs to eethoven's symphonIes. Such a
procedure becomes dIsastrous when It becomes generaI usage. Then Its meanIng
becomes perverted to the opposIte, one trIes to recognIze events and IeeIIngs In musIc
as II they must be there."
84
Schoenberg's posItIon depends on the SchopenhauerIan
premIse accordIng to whIch musIc does not represent somethIng that can aIso be
specIIIed In Ianguage, but, rather, copIes a reaIIty Ianguage cannot reach, but can onIy
IndIrectIy and ImperIectIy exempIIIy (and Indeed we read a Iew sentences earIIer that
"Schopenhauer . . . says somethIng reaIIy exhaustIve about the essence oI musIc"
85
). y
1939-40, In hIs orton Iectures at Iarvard on the Foetics oj Music, gor StravInsky
derIded the SovIet "revoIutIonary and romantIc cuIt . . . dedIcated to eethoven" as
based on "the Ideas oI IomaIn IoIIand, who, as you know, heard 'saber-cIashIngs, the
noIse oI battIe, and the IamentatIons oI the vanquIshed In the 'roIca. "
86
n a sImIIar
spIrIt, varIous Iorms oI program musIc, guIded maInIy by the SchopenhauerIan thought
that one mIght hear InstrumentaI musIc as exempIIIIed by a verbaI program, stIII serIousIy
contempIated by MahIer, ebussy, and Strauss, became unacceptabIe to the composers
oI the IoIIowIng generatIon. As Ior payIng attentIon to the verbaI text, Schoenberg's
testImony In hIs 1912 essay Is characterIstIc.
A Iew years ago was deepIy ashamed when dIscovered In severaI Schubert
songs, weII-known to me, that had absoIuteIy no Idea what was goIng on In the
poems on whIch they were based. ut when had read the poems It became cIear
to me that had gaIned absoIuteIy nothIng Ior the understandIng oI the songs
thereby, sInce the poems dId not make It necessary Ior me to change my
Page 33 of 62
conceptIon oI the musIcaI InterpretatIon In the sIIghtest degree. On {p.141) the
contrary, It appeared that, wIthout knowIng the poem, had grasped the content,
the reaI content, perhaps even more proIoundIy than II had cIung to the surIace
oI the mere thoughts expressed In words.
87
ThIs tendency toward what mIght be caIIed abstract IIstenIng was noted a century earIIer
by IegeI In hIs Iectures.
We IInd a sImIIar phenomenon agaIn In the case oI IIsteners too, I.e. the pubIIc,
especIaIIy In reIatIon to dramatIc musIc. . . . n thIs case the contents are doubIe. the
externaI actIon and the Inner IeeIIng. . . . The IIstener easIIy Irees hImseII Irom thIs
subject-matter |the actIon| . . . and stIcks sImpIy to what Is reaIIy musIcaI and
meIodIous. . . . IeopIe . . . onIy attend . . . to the strIctIy musIcaI parts whIch In that
case are enjoyed pureIy musIcaIIy. t IoIIows Irom thIs that the composer and the
pubIIc are on the verge oI IIberatIng themseIves aItogether Irom the meanIng oI the
words and treatIng and enjoyIng the musIc on Its own account as Independent
musIc.
88
Most sIgnIIIcantIy, Schoenberg connects these abstractIonIst tendencIes In musIc wIth the
bIrth oI abstractIon In paIntIng.
When KarI Kraus caIIs Ianguage the mother oI thought, and WassIIy KandInsky and
Oskar Kokoschka paInt pIctures the objectIve theme oI whIch Is hardIy more than
an excuse to ImprovIse In coIors and Iorms and to express themseIves as onIy the
musIcIan expressed hImseII untII now, these are symptoms oI a graduaIIy expandIng
knowIedge oI the true nature oI art. And wIth great joy read KandInsky's book On
the Spiritucl in Art, In whIch the road Ior paIntIng Is poInted out and the hope Is
aroused that those who ask about the text, about the subject-matter, wIII soon ask
no more.
89
One reads In an 1814 note Iound among Schopenhauer's papers. "t Is the aIm oI every
art to become IIke music."
90
KandInsky's book and deveIopment In those years Indeed
conIIrmed thIs dIagnosIs and Schoenberg was quIck to recognIze thIs.
91
The
abandonment oI mImesIs was now somethIng musIc couId share wIth paIntIng.
We do not yet IuIIy understand the causes oI thIs abandonment. or can we even be
sure that we know how to dIstInguIsh causes and eIIects In thIs case. Some causes,
however, are not dIIIIcuIt to Iathom. t Is understandabIe that the unprecedented
traumas InIIIcted on her socIetIes by crImInaI poIItIcIans between 1914 and 1989 wouId
Induce some oI urope's artIsts to seek reIuge In a reaIm oI art hermetIcaIIy seaIed oII
Irom the rest oI the worId, a reaIm In whIch esotherIc Ianguages understood onIy by the
InItIates to the seII-encIosed mysterIes oI art are spoken. t Is aIso cIear that any account
oI the causes wouId have to IncIude the contInuatIon and IntensIIIcatIon oI the
socIoeconomIc process that attended the bIrth oI the phIIosophy oI aesthetIc autonomy In
the Iate eIghteenth century. As It became IncreasIngIy cIear that, under the condItIons oI a
market economy, art musIc had no chance oI wInnIng the competItIon Ior the
entertaInment-cravIng pubIIc wIth popuIar musIc, the Iormer had to justIIy Its exIstence
Page 34 of 62
by cIaImIng to pursue dIIIerent aIms, and sInce the mImetIc Idea was governIng the
{p.142) productIon oI popuIar musIc, It was naturaI Ior art musIcIans to want to abandon
It. othIng Is more characterIstIc oI thIs sItuatIon than the snobbIsh scorn that Theodor W.
Adorno, at mId-century the most vocaI spokesman Ior the Ideas oI abstract musIc and
aesthetIc autonomy, heaped on the "entertaInment Industry," the "commodIIIed" and
"IetIshIzed" popuIar musIc It produced, and the "regressIve" popuIar modes oI hearIng It
encouraged. The dIagnosIs oI hIs Fhilosophy oj New Music oI 1949 Is cIear. "The
IIberatIon oI modern paIntIng Irom objectIvIty . . . was determIned by the deIensIve
agaInst the mechanIzed art commodIty-above aII, photography. IadIcaI musIc, Irom Its
InceptIon, reacted sImIIarIy to the commercIaI depravIty oI the tradItIonaI IdIom. t
IormuIated an antIthesIs agaInst the extensIon oI the cuIture Industry Into Its own
domaIn."
92
ut the abandonment oI musIcaI mImesIs was onIy one haII oI the new twentIeth-century
sItuatIon. The other haII InvoIved a radIcaI change In the way one understood musIcaI
abstractIon. The maIn document oI thIs change appeared surprIsIngIy earIy, In the 1854
"contrIbutIon towards the revIsIon oI the aesthetIcs oI musIc" by Wagner's antagonIst,
duard IansIIck, entItIed On the Musicclly Becutijul.
IansIIck conceIved hIs book as a poIemIc agaInst the stIII powerIuI mImetIc understandIng
oI musIc, and rIght at the outset he made an assumptIon whIch deprIved the mImetIc Idea
oI aII credIbIIIty, the assumptIon, nameIy, that musIc Is essentIaIIy InstrumentaI and that In
vocaI musIc the text Is extramusIcaI. WIth thIs assumptIon, the argument agaInst those
who cIaImed that musIc represented emotIons was easIIy won. As we have aIready seen,
ArIstotIe, In hIs anaIysIs oI emotIons In Rhetoric (book 2, chs. 1-11), shows that emotIons
are not sImpIy IrratIonaI, sInce every specIIIc emotIon, In addItIon to beIng a IeeIIng or
state oI mInd, aIso has a cognItIve component, In that It has what wouId be caIIed an
IntentIonaI object today, Is IeIt toward someone, and consequentIy Is subject to reasons,
can be justIIIed or not. II we get angry wIth those who sIIght us, we wIII have grounds to
stop IeeIIng anger when we Iearn that the sIIght was ImagIned or InvoIuntary. SImIIarIy,
IansIIck suggested that a specIIIc emotIon, In addItIon to beIng a sensatIon, a IeeIIng, must
aIso have a cognItIve component, a thought oI the IntentIonaI object. Schopenhauer
cIaImed that musIc Is very good at conveyIng the component oI sensatIon, but cannot
represent the cognItIve component.
It |musIc| never expresses the phenomenon, but onIy the Inner nature, the In-ItseII,
oI every phenomenon, the wIII ItseII. ThereIore musIc does not express thIs or that
partIcuIar and deIInIte pIeasure, thIs or that aIIIIctIon, paIn, sorrow, horror, gaIety,
merrIment, or peace oI mInd, but joy, paIn, sorrow, horror, gaIety, merrIment,
peace oI mInd themselves, to a certaIn extent In the abstract, theIr essentIaI nature,
wIthout any accessorIes, and so aIso wIthout the motIves Ior them.
93
Iater on, Schopenhauer eIaborated. "Irom Its own resources, musIc Is certaInIy abIe to
express every movement oI the wIII, every IeeIIng, but through the addItIon oI the
words, we receIve aIso theIr objects, the motIves that gIve rIse to that {p.143) IeeIIng."
94
IansIIck agreed, and sInce Ianguage has been excIuded Irom musIc by deIInItIon, he
Page 35 of 62
couId saIeIy and convIncIngIy concIude that musIc does not represent specIIIc emotIons.
n a passage that reverberated wIth echoes oI the Iate sIxteenth-century musIcaI quarreI
oI the ancIents and moderns and that reads as II IansIIck was answerIng Iousseau or
even GaIIIeI (a passage that mIght appear astonIshIngIy anachronIstIc untII we recaII that
IansIIck's book cIoseIy IoIIowed Wagner's treatIses projectIng a rebIrth oI ancIent
tragedy), IansIIck expIaIned why the modern abstract conceptIon oI musIc was superIor
to the ancIent ethIcaI one.
|O|ur moraIIsts . . . |teII us| how 'even the anImaIs yIeId to the power oI musIc. . . .
ut Is It reaIIy so commendabIe to be a musIc Iover In such company? AIter the
anImaIs have perIormed theIr numbers, the oId human chestnuts come onstage,
mostIy In the manner oI the story about AIexander the Great. . . . There can be no
doubt at aII that, Ior the ancIents, musIc had a much more ImmedIate eIIect than It
has now, sInce humankInd onIy just In Its prImItIve stage oI deveIopment Is much
cIoser to and more at the mercy oI the eIementaI than Iater, when conscIousness
and seII-determInatIon come Into theIr own.
95
The excIusIon oI Ianguage Irom the domaIn oI musIc Ied naturaIIy to the theory oI the
"specIIIcaIIy musIcaI . . . Inherent In the tonaI reIatIonshIps wIthout reIerence to an
extraneous, extramusIcaI context."
96
MusIcaI beauty "consIsts sImpIy and soIeIy oI tones
and theIr artIstIc combInatIon."
97
n a ceIebrated IormuIa, IansIIck asserted that "the
content oI musIc Is tonaIIy movIng Iorms."
98
"The Iorm (as tonaI structure), as opposed
to the IeeIIng (as wouId-be content), Is precIseIy the reaI content oI the musIc, Is the
musIc ItseII."
99
ut what about Iousseau's and Kant's suspIcIon that musIc so purIIIed Is empty, mere
enjoyment? IansIIck's answer Is dIIIerent Irom that oI the romantIcs. Ie does not cIaIm
Ior musIc the power to dIscIose the "absoIute." nstead, he sees the dIgnIty oI abstract
musIc sImpIy In Its beIng a product oI a creatIve human mInd. "t Is a spIendId and
sIgnIIIcant thIng to IoIIow the creatIve spIrIt."
100
t Is thIs that aIIows hIm to concIude that
"musIc Is pIay |Spiel| but not IrIvoIIty |Spielerei|."
101
n Iact, as CarI ahIhaus noted,
102
IansIIck took paIns In subsequent edItIons oI hIs book to remove aII passages that stIII
spoke the Ianguage oI the romantIc metaphysIcs oI absoIute musIc, In partIcuIar, the
cIosIng passage whIch In the IIrst edItIon contaIned the IoIIowIng sentences. "MusIc aIIects
hIm |the IIstener| not mereIy and absoIuteIy through Its own beauty, but aIso as the
soundIng copy oI the great cosmIc motIons. Thanks to the deep and mysterIous reIatIons
wIth nature, the meanIng oI tones grows Iar beyond them themseIves and aIIows us
aIways at the same tIme to IeeI InIInIty In the work oI human taIent."
103
t Is no wonder
IansIIck was persuaded to remove such sentences, because what hIs whoIe theory
actuaIIy aIIIrms Is that there Is no transcendent meanIng In tonaI Iorms beyond theIr beIng
creatIons oI the human spIrIt. Thus IansIIck accepts the romantIcs conceptIon oI musIc as
essentIaIIy abstract, {p.144) nonmImetIc, but not theIr justIIIcatIon oI such musIc's
worth and dIgnIty. IormaIIsm Is romantIcIsm mInus the metaphysIcs.
104
ronIcaIIy, 1854, the year when On the Musicclly Becutijul appeared, was aIso the year
Page 36 of 62
Wagner dIscovered Schopenhauer. IansIIck's IIttIe treatIse was ImmedIateIy wIdeIy read
and dIscussed, but Ior haII a century It had to compete wIth the SchopenhauerIan
metaphysIcs oI absoIute musIc. t was onIy around the IIrst WorId War that the Iatter
was IInaIIy abandoned (In musIc theory, Its Iast sIgnIIIcant document was probabIy rnst
Kurth's 1926 book on ruckner) and IansIIck's IormaIIst InterpretatIon oI abstract musIc
became the norm. y 1925, one oI thIs century's most InIIuentIaI theorIsts oI harmony,
IeInrIch Schenker, had adopted IansIIck's ceIebrated IormuIa and stated that "music is
the living motion oj tones in the spcce given in Ncture: the composIng-out (the renderIng
In meIodIc IIne, the IInearIzatIon) oI the ature-gIven sonorIty," wIthout suggestIng that
thIs "IIvIng motIon" embodIes the noumenaI wIII or anythIng eIse.
105
(One couId not cIaIm
that Schenker IeIt cll metaphysIcs behInd, but that Is another story.) A posItIon sImIIar to
IansIIck's was aIso taken up by StravInsky In hIs Iarvard Iectures, whIch treated "the
phenomenon oI musIc as a Iorm oI specuIatIon In terms oI sound and tIme."
106
StravInsky asked hIs audIence the IormaIIst's standard rhetorIcaI questIon. "o we not, In
truth, ask the ImpossIbIe oI musIc when we expect It to express IeeIIngs, to transIate
dramatIc sItuatIons, even to ImItate nature?"
107
And he gave the standard IormaIIst
answer, not IorgettIng to embrace vocaI musIc In hIs conceptIon. "Irom the moment song
assumes as Its caIIIng the expressIon oI the meanIng oI dIscourse, It Ieaves the reaIm oI
musIc and has nothIng more In common wIth It."
108
As Ior a justIIIcatIon oI the worth oI
the abstract musIcaI Iorm, Ior StravInsky, as Ior IansIIck, It appears to be that "musIc . . .
wIII make us partIcIpate actIveIy In the workIng oI a mInd that orders, gIves IIIe, and
creates."
109
To be sure, a nonIormaIIst InterpretatIon oI musIcaI abstractIon survIved through the
mIddIe oI the century In Schoenberg's cIrcIe. Schoenberg hImseII, as we have seen,
expressIy endorsed Schopenhauer's theory and combIned It wIth a characterIstIc
prophetIc messIanIsm. n an essay on Gustav MahIer, he aIIIrmed. "there Is onIy one
content, whIch aII great men wIsh to express. the IongIng oI mankInd Ior Its Iuture Iorm,
Ior an ImmortaI souI, Ior dIssoIutIon Into the unIverse-the IongIng oI thIs souI Ior Its
God."
110
And as Iate as 1950 he was cIaImIng that "musIc conveys a prophetIc message
reveaIIng a hIgher Iorm oI IIIe towards whIch mankInd evoIves."
111
n 1918, thIs sort oI
utopIan InterpretatIon oI musIc was advanced, agaIn on expIIcItIy SchopenhauerIan
premIses, by rnst Ioch, who caIIed musIc the "IIrst townshIp oI the hoIy Iand."
112
Adorno's case Is more compIex. t wouId perhaps not be IaIr to accuse Adorno oI more
than resIduaI attachment to the romantIc metaphysIcs oI InstrumentaI musIc. ut neIther
wouId It be correct to caII hIs InterpretatIon oI musIcaI abstractIon IormaIIst. Adorno Is
cIoser to IoIImann than to IansIIck In beIIevIng that the sIgnIIIcance oI abstract musIcaI
Iorm transcends the Iorm ItseII, that the Iorm IntImates a totaIIty Iarger than ItseII. ut,
unIIke Ior IoIImann and Schoenberg {p.145) and Ioch, Ior Adorno the Iocus oI thIs
totaIIty was not another worId, but the actuaI socIaI worId oI the composer. "The deepest
currents present In thIs |new| musIc proceed . . . Irom exactIy those socIoIogIcaI and
anthropoIogIcaI IoundatIons pecuIIar to that |contemporary| pubIIc. The dIssonances whIch
horrIIy them testIIy to theIr own condItIons, Ior that reason aIone do they IInd them
unbearabIe."
113
Page 37 of 62
Adorno's vIew Is neIther Iess nor more convIncIng than IoIImann's or Schopenhauer's.
IaII a century Iater, It Is dIIIIcuIt to understand how anyone couId have Iound It
beIIevabIe, but many peopIe dId. It must have met a deepIy IeIt need. ut In spIte oI the
undenIabIe resonance that Adorno's InterpretatIon oI musIcaI abstractIon as an IntImatIon
oI the socIaI totaIIty Iound among the uropean avant-garde oI the 1950s, It was the
IormaIIst InterpretatIon that remaIned domInant In the twentIeth century and that
trIumphed In the !nIted States among composers. (The perIormIng musIcIans and theIr
audIences thought otherwIse and kept the oIder paradIgms aIIve.) IansIIck's
transIormatIon oI the romantIc metaphysIcs oI InstrumentaI musIc Into IormaIIsm and the
ascendance oI IormaIIsm In our century represent a change In the InterpretatIon oI
musIcaI abstractIon as proIound as the one that occurred In the Iate sIxteenth century. n
both cases, abstract musIc was deprIved oI a grand justIIIcatIon, oI metaphysIcaI
sIgnIIIcance. And In both cases, one has to Iook beyond the evoIutIon oI musIcaI practIce to
IInd some oI the causes, such as, respectIveIy, the scIentIIIc deveIopments around 1600
whIch undermIned the Idea oI cosmIc and musIcaI harmony, and the antImetaphysIcaI turn
taken by phIIosophy In the mId-nIneteenth and agaIn In the earIy twentIeth century.
eIther embodyIng the InteIIIgIbIe harmony nor IntImatIng the absoIute, abstract musIc
now had to survIve on Its own, as nothIng but ItseII, a pure soundIng Iorm wIth no
transcendent meanIng.
y 1854 musIc couId aIIord thIs antImetaphysIcaI turn. there was so much great
InstrumentaI musIc around that the practIce no Ionger needed phIIosophIcaI or reIIgIous
crutches to justIIy ItseII. OI the two deveIopments that joIntIy shaped the practIce oI art
musIc In the twentIeth century, the near-abandonment oI mImesIs to popuIar musIc and
the repIacement oI the metaphysIcaI wIth a IormaIIst InterpretatIon oI abstractIon, It was
the Iormer that reIIected and reInIorced what Irom the perspectIve oI our own IIn de
sIecIe appears to have marked thIs practIce most proIoundIy. ut both IacIIItated the
acceptance oI the Idea that the abandonment oI tonaIIty by art musIc was necessary and
InevItabIe, the Idea whIch by the 1950s had hardened Into dogma to such an extent that
even StravInsky IeIt the need to convert to serIaIIsm. At IIrst gIance, the cIaIm that the
nearIy unIversaI acceptance oI atonaIIty by art musIc composers was IacIIItated by the
antImImetIcIsm and IormaIIsm mIght seem puzzIIng and paradoxIcaI. atonaIIty orIgInaIIy
served the hyperexpressIonIst aIms oI capturIng the workIngs oI a severeIy dIsturbed
mInd thrown Into an out-oI-joInt worId (not Ior nothIng Is erg's Wozzeck oI 1917-22 the
key masterpIece oI thIs orIgInaI perIod). ut In Iact atonaIIty, especIaIIy In Its second, cooI
and objectIve, IormaIIst, dodecaphonIc phase, was an exceIIent tooI Ior those who wanted
to keep representatIon at bay. {p.146) IecaII that It Is tonaIIty (together wIth meter) that
makes us hear In the reaI sounds oI whIch the musIc Is made the ImagInary IInes oI
dIrected motIon and that, consequentIy, the suppressIon oI tonaIIty Is needed II one does
not want any ImagInary worId to arIse on the IoundatIon oI the reaI work. A tonaI work
may be abstract, but It Is stIII representatIonaI (what Is represented In It Is an abstract
object). ThIs cannot be satIsIatory to those who want to IoIIow the antImImetIcIst IormaIIst
ImpuIses to theIr radIcaI concIusIons. OnIy the abandonment oI tonaIIty promIses any
success, II the goaI Is to banIsh aII representatIon, even the representatIon oI abstract
objects, to have a work In whIch what you hear Is aII you get (because It Is aII there Is).
Page 38 of 62
The separatIon oI mImetIc popuIar musIc and abstract art musIc reached Its most
rIgorous Iorm at armstadt In the earIy 1950s and coIncIded, as IIchard TaruskIn has
observed, wIth the most rIgorous phase oI the CoId War.
114
nge Kovcs has recentIy
shown In some detaII how much the program poIIcy oI the InternatIonaI summer courses
Ior new musIc at armstadt was InIIuenced by the ast-West CoId War conIrontatIon.
115
Ior Kovcs, the wIsh to gIve the avantgarde a space Iree oI aII socIaI pressures was a
reactIon agaInst the StaIInIst cuIturaI poIIcIes In 1948-49.
116
AndreI Zhdanov's speech oI
january 1948 caIIed Ior "reaIIst" musIc destIned Ior the masses and condemned the
IndIvIduaIIst "IormaIIsm." IormaIIsm In musIc was aIso condemned In the CentraI
CommIttee IesoIutIon oI Iebruary 10, 1948. (Ior Zhdanov and hIs coIIeagues on the
poIItburo, "IormaIIsm" stood IIrst and Ioremost Ior the antImImetIc ImpuIse, sInce It
prIvIIeged "Iorm" at the expense oI "content.") "AgaInst thIs hIstorIcaI background,"
concIudes Kovcs,
It Is strIkIng that the West uropean avant-garde IncreasIngIy propagated and
represented precIseIy thIs whIch was subject to repressIon on the StaIInIst sIde.
Thus Its deveIopment around 1950 shouId be understood wIthIn the settIng oI the
CoId War, whIch shouId not excIude other attempts at expIanatIon, In partIcuIar, the
context oI just havIng IIved through the atIonaI-SocIaIIst dIctatorshIp and the
Second WorId War. And the reverse, one may observe that nothIng that the
SovIets demanded oI musIc has pIayed any roIe In the armstadt oI the earIy
1950s. . . . One concentrated on thInkIng about the probIems InternaI to musIc.
117
SImIIarIy, Adorno's convoIuted deIense oI artIstIc autonomy and musIcaI abstractIon was
conducted agaInst the background oI not onIy the encroachments oI the "entertaInment
Industry," but aIso the oIIIcIaI posItIon oI the SovIet CommunIst Iarty. or were these
deveIopments conIIned to Western urope or to musIc onIy. t shouId be recaIIed that
the AmerIcan art-Ior-art's-sake aesthetIcIsm oI the Iate IortIes and IIItIes had Its roots In
the ew York IeIt's antI-StaIInIsm oI the Iate thIrtIes. CIement Greenberg and IaroId
Iosenberg, arguabIy the most InIIuentIaI crItIcs promotIng new AmerIcan paIntIng aIter
the war, embraced precIseIy the kInd oI modernIst art that was attacked by the StaIInIsts.
As Ior the vIsuaI arts In urope, the sImIIarIty between the postwar sItuatIon descrIbed
by jean CIaIr and the musIcaI deveIopments descrIbed here Is uncanny. n CIaIr's
{p.147) scenarIo, the roIe oI armstadt Is pIayed by the CasseI documentc, created In
1956 wIth the express IntentIon "to demonstrate to the West, In a town cIose to the
curtaIn whIch dIvIded urope In two, that Germany has never stopped beIng the country
oI modernIty."
118
The new orthodoxy oI the Iate 1950s promoted abstract art to the
roIe oI a unIversaI Ianguage. Abstrckte Kunst eine Weltsprcche as the tItIe oI an InIIuentIaI
German book oI 1958 had It.
Werner IaItmann, one oI the IIrst dIrectors oI the documentc, . . . procIaImed |thIs
orthodoxy| In the cataIogues and on the posters. 'Abstract art Is the IdIom oI the
Iree worId. |!| SInce the sense IaIIed, sInce It has been perverted |by the
totaIItarIan regImes|, It was proper to propose Ior aII an art washed cIean oI aII
sense, an art wIthout IIgure, wIthout memory and wIthout the past. . . . Germany,
heavy wIth an ImposIng mIIItary presence whIch marked Its Iandscape and Its
Page 39 of 62
everyday IIIe, became the brIdgehead oI the AmerIcan cuIture In urope, and In
partIcuIar erIIn. the TIergarten and the GropIus au, a Iew hundred meters away
Irom the WaII, were the sItes oI the great IestIvaIs oI modernIty.
119
The wIsh to keep a dIstance Irom the trIvIaIItIes oI socIaIIst-reaIIst or commercIaI art was
understandabIe, but, as Iong as It remaIned entIreIy negatIve and reactIve, It couId not by
ItseII provIde a suIIIcIent program Ior worthwhIIe art productIon. ThIs became obvIous
aIter StaIIn's death, as the ruIIng partIes In some oI the communIst countrIes, most
notabIy IoIand, reaIIzed that the armstadt-styIe musIcaI avant-garde was poIItIcaIIy
harmIess. o sooner was serIaIIsm IIcensed, It was aImost ImmedIateIy abandoned, as the
most sIgnIIIcant composers moved beyond avant-gardIsm (a move Ior whIch IendereckI's
Fcssion remaIns an embIem). MeanwhIIe, In the West the avant-garde settIed Into the
comIortabIe roIe oI the oIIIcIaIIy sponsored artIstIc estabIIshment (doubIy comIortabIe,
because combInIng oIIIcIaI support wIth the IIatterIng seII-Image oI antIbourgeoIs
subversIveness), the roIe oI what used to be caIIed In the nIneteenth century academIc
art.
120
Iuture research wIII show whether and to what extent state sponsorshIp oI the
avant-garde In post-war urope was drIven by the expIIcIt and IuIIy conscIous poIIcy oI
showcasIng Western IIbertIes and contrastIng them IavorabIy wIth SovIet regImentatIon oI
the arts. t Is aIready cIear, however, that the decIIne and termInaI exhaustIon oI the
avant-garde coIncIded very precIseIy wIth the IInaI phase oI the CoId War, that Is, wIth the
erosIon and dIsappearance oI a centraI argument Ior Its socIaI and poIItIcaI sIgnIIIcance. (n
the !nIted States, where dIrect state sponsorshIp oI the arts Is much Iess acceptabIe than
In urope, the musIcaI avant-garde became both IIteraIIy and metaphorIcaIIy thoroughIy
academIc by settIIng earIy on Into tenured posItIons In the unIversItIes, where It has now
reached retIrement age.) "I you were to ask what reaIIy brought down the erIIn WaII,"
wrItes Ioger Scruton, "the answer wouId sureIy IncIude some reIerence to AmerIcan
popuIar cuIture, whIch had so captIvated the hearts oI the young that theIr ImpatIence to
joIn that enchanted worId wouId brook no Iurther deIay."
121
t Is unIIkeIy that the
answer wouId aIso have to IncIude a reIerence to the artIstIc productIon oI armstadt
and thIs Is just as weII. the {p.148) bIbIIcaI precedent notwIthstandIng, we shouId not
demand oI musIc that It brIng down waIIs (and, In any case, heavIIy ampIIIIed popuIar
musIc wIII be much better at It than art musIc). armstadt's cuIturaI poIItIcs, however,
wIth Its deIense oI the artIst's autonomy, wouId deserve an honorabIe mentIon.
Adorno's argument In the Fhilosophy oj New Music oI 1949 was In one respect a
reIteratIon oI IegeI's proIound dIagnosIs oI the sItuatIon oI modern musIc In hIs Iectures
on Aesthetics oI the 1820s. (ndeed, Adorno's InterpretatIon oI musIcaI abstractIon as
poIntIng toward a socIaI totaIIty has aII the marks oI a desperate attempt to justIIy the
absoIute musIc he Ioved and, at Ieast In part under the speII oI IegeI, IeIt to be
threatened by meanIngIessness.) IegeI, no IrIend oI the romantIcs and unImpressed by
theIr metaphysIcs oI InstrumentaI musIc, but aware oI the Importance oI the recent
emancIpatIon oI InstrumentaI musIc, recognIzed a contradIctIon that drove the evoIutIon
oI contemporary musIc. Ie acknowIedged that the IIberatIon oI musIc Irom Ianguage was
the prerequIsIte Ior Its unprecedented deveIopment as an art. At the same tIme,
however, he dId not beIIeve, as IoIImann and Schopenhauer dId, that precIseIy the
Page 40 of 62
Ireedom Irom conceptuaIIy deIIned content enabIed musIc to IntImate a worId beyond the
worId. On the contrary, he warned that the very Ireedom that aIIowed musIc to evoIve as
an art threatened It wIth what he caIIed the "Ioss oI metaphysIcaI substance." And sInce
Ior IegeI the hIghest purpose oI art was to gIve a sensuous embodIment to the dIvIne, to
the reIIgIous substance oI the age, the emancIpatIon oI InstrumentaI musIc speIIed Ior hIm
musIc's demIse as Art and reemergence as mere art. At the very moment that musIc Is
abIe to deveIop Its artIstIc means to the hIghest pItch oI reIInement, It Is threatened wIth a
Ioss oI sIgnIIIcance, wIth meanIngIessness.
specIaIIy In recent tImes musIc has torn ItseII Iree Irom a content aIready cIear on
Its own account and retreated In thIs way Into Its own medIum, but Ior thIs reason
It has Iost Its power over the whoIe Inner IIIe, aII the more so as the pIeasure It can
gIve reIates to onIy one sIde oI the art, nameIy bare Interest In the pureIy musIcaI
eIement In the composItIon and Its skIIIIuIness, a sIde oI musIc whIch Is Ior
connoIsseurs onIy and scarceIy appeaIs to the generaI human Interest In art.
122
And Iurther.
|A|mongst aII the arts musIc has the maxImum possIbIIIty oI IreeIng ItseII Irom any
actuaI text as weII as Irom the expressIon oI any specIIIc subject-matter, wIth a vIew
to IIndIng satIsIactIon soIeIy In a seII-encIosed serIes oI the conjunctIons, changes,
opposItIons, and moduIatIons IaIIIng wIthIn the pureIy musIcaI sphere oI sounds. ut
In that event musIc remaIns empty and meanIngIess, and because the one chIeI
thIng In aII art, nameIy spIrItuaI content and expressIon, Is mIssIng Irom It, It Is not
yet strIctIy to be caIIed art. OnIy II musIc becomes a spIrItuaIIy adequate expressIon
In the sensuous medIum oI sounds and theIr varIed counterpoInt does musIc rIse
to beIng a genuIne art, no matter whether thIs content has Its more detaIIed
sIgnIIIcance IndependentIy expressed {p.149) In a IIbretto or must be sensed
more vagueIy Irom the notes and theIr harmonIc reIatIons and meIodIc anImatIon.
123
The Iesson Ior contemporary composers IegeI drew Irom hIs dIagnosIs was thIs. "MusIc
Is thereIore more proIound when the composer gIves the same attentIon even In
InstrumentaI musIc to both sIdes, to the expressIon oI a content (true, a rather vague
one) and to the musIcaI structure."
124
At mId-twentIeth century, Adorno Iound the IegeIIan dIagnosIs drastIcaIIy conIIrmed by
the sItuatIon oI contemporary art musIc, though he departed Irom IegeI In seeIng the
growth oI artIstIc autonomy as drIven by market Iorces. "n the process oI pursuIng Its
own Inner IogIc," he wrote In the Fhilosophy oj New Music,
musIc Is transIormed more and more Irom somethIng sIgnIIIcant Into somethIng
obscure-even to ItseII. . . . The strIctness oI musIcaI structure, whereIn aIone
musIc can assert ItseII agaInst the ubIquIty oI commercIaIIsm, has hardened musIc
to the poInt that It Is no Ionger aIIected by those externaI Iactors whIch caused
absoIute musIc to become what It Is. . . . Advanced musIc has no recourse but to
Page 41 of 62
InsIst upon Its own ossIIIcatIon wIthout concessIon to that wouId-be humanItarIanIsm
whIch It sees through . . . as the mask oI InhumanIty. ts truth appears guaranteed
more by Its denIaI oI any meanIng In organIzed socIety . . . than by any capabIIIty oI
posItIve meanIng. . . . !nder the present cIrcumstances It Is restrIcted to deIInItIve
negatIon.
125
ut even thIs negatIon turns out to be an empty, II heroIc, gesture. "The IuIIIIIment oI
Ireedom oI mInd occurs sImuItaneousIy wIth the emascuIatIon oI the mInd. . . .
!ndoubtedIy, such |nonconIormIng| musIc preserves Its socIaI truth through the
IsoIatIon resuItIng Irom Its antIthesIs to socIety. The IndIIIerence oI socIety, however,
aIIows thIs truth to wIther."
126
ConsequentIy, "modern musIc sees absoIute obIIvIon as
Its goaI. t Is the survIvIng message oI despaIr Irom the shIpwrecked."
127
Thus Adorno accepted IegeI's verdIct that modern abstract art musIc deveIops under
the ever growIng threat oI meanIngIessness, but Iound IegeI's advIce that equaI
attentIon be paId to the spIrItuaI content as to the abstract tonaI structure unacceptabIe,
as It entaIIed a compromIse wIth, Ior hIm, utterIy unredeemabIe contemporary socIety
and Its commercIaI cuIture. ow, one does not need to embrace thIs uncompromIsIng
(and, In my vIew, quIte sIIIy) posItIon to aIIow that both IegeI and Adorno at Ieast
addressed a Ieature In the sItuatIon oI modern musIc whIch Is oI centraI Importance and
whIch can be Ignored, but not wIshed away. The radIcaI separatIon oI abstract art musIc
and mImetIc popuIar musIc In our century does Indeed threaten the Iormer wIth a Ioss oI
sIgnIIIcance, just as It threatens the Iatter wIth trIvIaIIty.
Can thIs threat oI meanIngIessness be successIuIIy overcome? The dIchotomy between
the abstract and mImetIc aIms oI musIc-makIng In terms oI whIch have proposed to read
the hIstory oI modern uropean art musIc suggests two {p.150) dIstInct strategIes Ior
counterIng musIc's Ioss oI sIgnIIIcance. IIrst, one mIght hope Ior the emergence oI yet
another conceptIon groundIng abstract musIc's dIgnIty In some sort oI an uItImate reaIIty,
a conceptIon to repIace the dIscredIted notIons oI InteIIIgIbIe harmony or noumenaI worId
beyond the worId oI appearances. WhIIe It Is not the task oI a hIstorIan to engage In
prophecy, must conIess that the prospect oI a strategy oI thIs kInd succeedIng In our
resoIuteIy postmetaphysIcaI age seems to me most remote and, In any case, undesIrabIe,
precIseIy because one hopes that the age wIII remaIn postmetaphysIcaI. A second
strategy, and one wIth much better prospects, wouId have to InvoIve, then, some Iorm oI
rapprochement and accommodatIon between the abstract and mImetIc Ideas, a
reIertIIIzatIon oI abstractIon wIth mImesIs. n the case oI InstrumentaI musIc, such
reIertIIIzatIon wouId necessarIIy mean puttIng the musIc back Into a context that Ianguage
can name. a IIguratIve tItIe, a program, an "archetypaI pIot" (to use Anthony ewcomb's
term),
128
a quotatIon or aIIusIon to other musIc, an InvocatIon oI a styIe that once had a
IunctIon (a dance, say), an anthropomorphIc gesture suggestIng a speakIng, sIngIng,
movIng, or dancIng body, anythIng oI thIs kInd wouId do.
(ote, by the way, that a mImetIc gesture can pIay a sImIIar roIe In abstract paIntIng. . I.
GombrIch wrItes. "t seems to me no accIdent that the one twentIeth-century pIoneer
who understood the roIe oI representatIon In the composItIon oI near-abstract
Page 42 of 62
conIIguratIons was IauI KIee, who was aIso a musIcIan. Though the pattern came IIrst In
hIs buIIdIng Irom eIements, he assIgned It a tItIe, a dIrectIon, a potentIaI weIght or scaIe by
takIng some eIement Irom the vIsuaI worId. . . . |Thus| the shapes IaII Into pIace, our
InterpretatIon Is guIded, we can empathIze and IeeI the thrust oI the dIrectIon together
wIth Its emotIonaI Impact."
129
MatIsse understood thIs at Ieast equaIIy weII. IIs paIntIngs
between 1907 and 1917, one oI the truIy cIassIc repertoIres In the art oI the twentIeth
century, InvoIve a Iar-reachIng emancIpatIon oI both IIne and especIaIIy coIor Irom the
IunctIon oI representIng. ut the paIntIngs are never whoIIy abstract. Iather, they retaIn
representatIonaI sIgnposts, not unIIke the mImetIc gestures or tItIes In InstrumentaI
musIc, sIgns that serve as props, that guIde InterpretatIon oI what Is In essence an
abstract pIay oI IInes and coIors. Ficno Lesson Is the tItIe oI one oI the most beautIIuI oI
those paIntIngs |1916, The Museum oI Modern Art, ew York|, but they aII are one
great musIc Iesson, a Iesson Ior paInters and composers aIIke, a Iesson In how to baIance
abstractIon and mImesIs.)
One can, Indeed, read the Iast Iew decades oI musIc hIstory as exhIbItIng precIseIy thIs
very tendency, the graduaI erosIon oI the musIcaI CoId War between abstractIon and
mImesIs, an erosIon Ior whIch the canonIzatIon oI MahIer In the 1960s mIght serve as an
embIem. n composItIon, where It was cIearIy notIceabIe aIready In the earIy 1960s, thIs
tendency manIIests ItseII In such dIverse phenomena as the reappearance oI poetIc
Imagery as IntegraI to InstrumentaI composItIon In the work oI IIgetI and IendereckI, the
dramatIc terms In whIch InstrumentaI Iorm Is reconceIved by Carter and IutosIawskI, the
new Interest In quotatIon and coIIage In the work oI erIo, above aII In the InternatIonaI
reappearance {p.151) oI Interest In tonaIIty as a vIabIe composItIonaI optIon and In the
IncreasIng recognItIon oI the evIdent artIstIc (as opposed to commercIaI) banaIIty oI
technoIogy. (n recent paIntIng, a partIcuIarIy compeIIIng case oI a compIex marrIage oI
abstractIon and mImesIs has been provIded by the oeuvre oI AnseIm KIeIer.) n
musIcoIogy, the same trend became notIceabIe In Germany In the 1970s and In the
!nIted States In the 1980s In the IncreasIngIy common attempts to move beyond strIctIy
IormaIIst modes oI InterpretIng musIcaI texts, to reInvent musIcaI hermeneutIcs, and,
above aII, to recontextuaIIze the Interpreted musIcaI practIces and aboIIsh aII IImIts on
contexts deemed IegItImate.
These trends InspIre hope that the canon oI art musIc has not been cIosed wIth the
generatIon oI the 1880s. The perspectIves oI new musIc seem brIghter today than at any
poInt In the Iast IIIty years, as the hunger Ior art carryIng a spIrItuaI sIgnIIIcance reasserts
ItseII and as the mId-century CoId War condItIons become a IaInt memory. On the one
hand, the poIItIcaI justIIIcatIon oI the avant-garde as the showcase oI Western Ireedoms Is
no Ionger suIIIcIentIy InterestIng and one expects Irom a creatIve artIst more than a
sImpIe demonstratIon oI Independence. eIng mereIy agaInst (agaInst StaIIn, or
commercIaIIsm, or tradItIon . . . ) Is no Ionger enough. On the other hand, the Iear that
mImesIs mIght be manIpuIated by poIItIcaI power has become Iess acute than It was In the
age oI totaIItarIan partIes. At the same tIme, the beIIeIs, once wIdespread In more
enIIghtened musIc cIrcIes, that atonaIIty and serIaIIsm are the InevItabIe outcome oI the
"hIstorIcaI process" rather than contIngent styIIstIc deveIopments, and that onIy more
Page 43 of 62
tIme and exposure are needed Ior a majorIty oI cIassIcaI musIc Iovers, as opposed to the
proIessIonaIs, to canonIze the output oI the academIc avant-garde appear Iess and Iess
credIbIe wIth each passIng year. The Iormer evaporates together wIth the beIIeI In any
kInd oI hIstorIcaI InevItabIIIty, and the Iatter sImpIy wIth the reaIIzatIon that aII the tIme and
exposure thIs musIc has aIready had do not seem to have made much dIIIerence. What
becomes IncreasIngIy more IIkeIy, Instead, Is that the best composItIon today wIII attract
more than the proIessIonaIs and the canon wIII expand agaIn, because the most ambItIous
and taIented composers wIII no Ionger see any need to contInue the seII-mutIIatIng ban on
mImesIs and tonaIIty, no Ionger IeeI that they must speak an artIIIcIaI speranto or not be
heard at aII. eIng aIIowed to speak the naturaI Ianguage agaIn, they wIII be abIe to renew
the dIaIogue wIth the past masters oI thIs Ianguage and thus to renew the tradItIon.
Thus there Is stIII hope Ior uropean musIc, as there Is Ior urope In generaI as she
emerges Irom the short but uncommonIy destructIve twentIeth century (1914-89). ut
beIore we succumb compIeteIy to a compIacent optImIsm, we shouId keep In mInd that
the precarIous baIance between popuIar and art musIc wIII be as dIIIIcuIt to achIeve and
maIntaIn as ever. !nIess the rehabIIItatIon oI mImesIs Is coupIed wIth a commItment to a
compeIIIng abstract order, unIess expressIve depth meets structuraI compIexIty, there Is
IIttIe chance that the musIc oI the Iuture, no matter how powerIuIIy expressIve, wIII be
abIe to escape the suspIcIon oI IIghtweIghtedness and extend the tradItIon whose
standards {p.152) oI exceIIence have been deIIned by great craItsmen Irom uIay to
StravInsky. have argued here that the popuIar mode Is musIc's naturaI, normaI way oI
beIng, In contrast to the art mode, whIch Is aIways somethIng oI a precarIous achIevement
In need oI justIIIcatIon. Thus, It Is not the Iuture oI popuIar musIc that Is reaIIy In questIon,
but rather the Iuture oI art musIc. And the questIon remaIns open because the Idea oI
abstract order does not have today, and Is unIIkeIy to get In the Iuture, a grand
metaphysIcaI justIIIcatIon oI the kInd It used to have In art musIc's greatest perIods. We
can onIy hope that IansIIck's modest justIIIcatIon (In terms oI the pIeasure one takes In
IoIIowIng the actIvIty oI a creatIve mInd) Is aII that Is requIred here. (The pervasIve Impact
oI technoIogy on the current sItuatIon oIIers no cIue as to what the Iuture hoIds, because
It Is ambIguous. on the one hand, IIIm and TV encourage the popuIar mode oI IntermIttent
and dIstracted hearIng, on the other, however, the recordIng medIum, whIch gIves us
Wagner's "InvIsIbIe orchestra," can be the tooI oI the most concentrated and
undIstracted artIstIc hearIng ImagInabIe.)
As It now turns out, even Adorno was aII aIong harborIng secret thoughts oI "rescuIng"
program musIc. n the recentIy pubIIshed posthumous book on eethoven, one IInds the
IoIIowIng hauntIng note.
The Issue oI whether musIc Is capabIe oI representIng somethIng specIIIc or Is onIy
a pIay oI Iorms set In motIon by sounds Is reaIIy besIde the poInt. The phenomenon
can be compared rather to dreams whose Iorm musIc Is In many respects so cIose
to, as romantIcIsm weII knew. n the IIrst movement oI Schubert's C-major
Symphony, at the begInnIng oI the deveIopment sectIon, one has the ImpressIon oI
beIng Ior a brIeI moment at a peasant weddIng, a story even seems to be
Page 44 of 62
unIoIdIng, but It Is gone In an Instant, drowned by the rushIng oI the musIc, whIch,
once repIete wIth that Image, proceeds accordIng to a quIte dIIIerent pattern.
mages oI the materIaI worId appear In musIc onIy In a desuItory, eccentrIc IashIon,
IIashIng beIore us and then vanIshIng, yet they are essenticl to It precIseIy In theIr
decayIng, consumed state. The program Is, as It were, the wakIng memory oI musIc.
-We are in musIc In the same way we are In dreams. We are at the peasant
weddIng, and are then puIIed away by the stream oI the musIc, God knows where
(perhaps It Is the same wIth death, perhaps thIs Is musIc's aIIInIty to death).-
beIIeve the passIng Images are objective, not mereIy subjectIve assocIatIons. . . . t
Is aIong the IInes oI such a theory that one couId attempt to rescue the Idea oI
program musIc.
130
CouId one ask Ior a cIearer sIgn that even at mId-century the dream oI musIcaI mImesIs
was not entIreIy extInguIshed? Adorno's vIsIon Is one oI restItutIon oI the IntrIcate
InterpIay oI abstractIon and mImesIs that IertIIIzed musIc In what Ior hIm was Its most
creatIve moment.
f. The Sgnfcance of Abstracton
The graduaI achIevement oI autonomy Irom tradItIonaI socIaI IunctIons, the achIevement
that extended over severaI centurIes and came to seII-awareness In Iate eIghteenth-
century German aesthetIc theory, Is commonIy seen as the centraI {p.153) deIInIng
Ieature oI the modernIzatIon oI art. t Is Indeed strIkIng that not onIy IIterature, paIntIng,
and musIc, but even such an unIIkeIy candIdate as archItecture aII sooner or Iater went
through the process oI autonomIzatIon. So Iar as the Iatest, and Ior obvIous reasons most
reIuctant, member oI the cIub oI autonomous arts, archItecture, Is concerned, WItoId
IybczynskI comments on the IIst oI "the most Important buIIdIngs In the Iast hundred
years" chosen by the readers oI Architecturcl Record In 1991.
What was partIcuIarIy strIkIng about the IIst . . . was that most oI the buIIdIngs the
archItects thought were Important wouId be unknown to the pubIIc or, II known,
wouId be recognIzed as notabIe works oI art but not as Important pIaces. . . . That a
buIIdIng wIth absoIuteIy no socIaI, cIvIc, or cuIturaI sIgnIIIcance couId be consIdered
an Important pIece oI archItecture . . . wouId have been unImagInabIe In the past.
The modeIs oI Important archItecture-the cathedraIs, the county court houses,
the seats oI government-were aIso the Important pubIIc pIaces. . . . t Is onIy In the
modern perIod that a buIIdIng's aesthetIc achIevement has been dIvorced Irom Its
actuaI IunctIon.
131
t Is not my purpose to deny that autonomy Is an Important Ieature oI modernIzatIon. ut
the pIcture that has emerged In thIs book suggests that autonomIzatIon, the process oI
abstractIng art Irom the context oI Its tradItIonaI socIaI IunctIons, shouId be seen as one
aspect oI the more generaI trend, the turn toward abstractIon. t Is thIs generaI abstract
turn, oI whIch autonomIzatIon Is but an aspect, that deIInes artIstIc modernIty. The Iate oI
modern musIc Is exempIary, because musIc, beIng a medIum to whIch abstractIon comes
more naturaIIy than to IIterature or the vIsuaI arts, and whIch can be dIvorced Irom socIaI
IunctIons wIth much greater ease than archItecture, took the decIsIve abstract turn much
Page 45 of 62
earIIer than other arts. ut paIntIng's sImIIar turn In our own century shows that more Is
at stake here than sImpIy a naturaI deveIopment oI musIc's Inherent tendencIes. n the
hIstorIes oI both arts the emergence oI abstractIon Is a reIatIveIy Iate deveIopment, the
emancIpatIon oI pureIy InstrumentaI genres Irom the perIphery to the center oI the art
occurrIng onIy In the Iate eIghteenth century (aIthough, as have argued above, aIready
the crs perjectc oI the premodern masters oI vocaI poIyphony was to a consIderabIe
extent abstractIy conceIved) and the bIrth oI abstract paIntIng at the begInnIng oI our
own. ndeed, one mIght be justIIIed to Interpret the Iatter bIrth as the reaIIzatIon oI
paIntIng's aspIratIon towards the condItIon oI musIc, the aspIratIon that WaIter Iater
ascrIbed to aII art In 1877 ("AII art constantIy aspIres towards the condItIon oI musIc").
132
We have aIready seen that KandInsky's 1912 manIIesto, Concerning the Spiritucl in
Art,
133
wouId support such a readIng and In Iact was ImmedIateIy Interpreted In thIs way
by Schoenberg.
134
GombrIch wrItes. "n turnIng away Irom the vIsIbIe worId, art may
reaIIy have Iound an uncharted regIon whIch waIts to be dIscovered and artIcuIated, as
musIc has dIscovered and artIcuIated It through the unIverse oI sound."
135
And he
adds. "aII or most oI It |twentIeth-century art| trIes to represent the worId oI the mInd
where shapes and coIors stand Ior IeeIIngs."
136
{p.154) Moreover, In the recent deveIopment oI both arts, the abstract turn has
proven not so much a sIngIe revoIutIonary event, as rather an ever more Intense
radIcaIIzatIon, an Important stage oI whIch was the achIevement oI compIete abstractIon, a
poInt at whIch the dIstInctIon between the work and the worId oI art coIIapses and the
artIst's ambItIon Is to make nothIng but reaI objects (to use the terms deIIned In chapter
1). ThIs ambItIon, surprIsIngIy dIIIIcuIt to reaIIze because oI our IngraIned vIewIng and
IIstenIng habIts, whIch make us expect to see and hear a worId In a work, vIrtuaIIy deIInes
one strand In the vIsuaI and musIcaI avant-garde oI the second haII oI thIs century, that In
whIch MarceI uchamp and john Cage were centraI IIgures and In whIch many artIsts
undertook epIc struggIes to reduce paIntIng to the dIIIerentIated IIat surIace onIy. Thus,
MIchaeI IrIed wrItes.
|Irank SteIIa's earIy work| can be IItted neatIy Into a versIon oI modernIsm that
regards the most advanced paIntIng oI the past hundred years as havIng Ied to the
reaIIzatIon that paIntIngs are nothIng more than a partIcuIar sub-cIass oI things,
Invested by tradItIon wIth certaIn conventIonaI characterIstIcs (such as theIr
tendency to consIst oI canvas stretched across a wooden support, ItseII
rectanguIar In most Instances) whose arbItrarIness, once recognIzed, argues Ior
theIr eIImInatIon. AccordIng to thIs vIew |a vIew that IrIed makes cIear Is repugnant
to hIm|, the assertIon oI the IIteraI character oI the pIcture-support manIIested wIth
growIng expIIcItness In modernIst paIntIng Irom Manet to SteIIa represents nothIng
more nor Iess than the graduaI apprehensIon oI the basIc 'truth that paIntIngs are
In no essentIaI respect dIIIerent Irom other cIasses oI objects In the worId.
137
anto quotes IrIed and comments.
And, paradoxIcaIIy enough, II the paIntIngs were to be understood as sayIng, about
themseIves, that they were onIy thIngs In the worId, the Iact that they saId It wouId
Page 46 of 62
reIute them. an appIe does not commonIy assert that It Is just an appIe. n one
sense nothIng couId be more easy and more dIIIIcuIt at the same tIme than to
create a work that onIy was to be IdentIcaI wIth Its own physIcaI support, sInce the
Iatter wouId ipso jccto be the subject oI the work, whereas physIcaI supports
IogIcaIIy Iack subjects. The probIem Is anaIogous to that In whIch contemporary
artIsts struggIed to achIeve a surIace that was IIat, Ior whIIe nothIng seemed easIer
-the surIaces were IIat-the task was ImpossIbIe In that, however evenIy paInt was
appIIed, the resuIt was a pIece oI pIctorIaI depth oI an IndetermInate extensIon.
138
ecause oI the nature oI Its medIum, IIterature wouId seem to be resIstant to
abstractIon, the Irench posie pure oI the Iate nIneteenth century notwIthstandIng.
139
ut the "expressIvIst turn" taken by IomantIc poetry In the Iate eIghteenth century, the
turn Irom the representatIon oI the objectIve worId to the expressIon oI subjectIvIty
anaIyzed by M. I. Abrams In hIs cIassIc The Mirror cnd the Lcmp
140
and Interpreted by
CharIes TayIor In Sources oj the Selj,
141
shouId be seen as yet another aspect oI the
same generaI tendency toward abstractIon. n the Iate eIghteenth century, wrItes TayIor,
"our representatIonaI {p.155) powers came to be seen not onIy or maInIy as dIrected to
the correct portrayaI oI an Independent reaIIty but aIso as our way oI manIIestIng
through expressIon what we are. . . . ThIs expressIve revoIutIon IdentIIIes and exaIts a new
poIetIc power, that oI the creatIve ImagInatIon."
142
n a moment It wIII become cIear why
subjectIvIzatIon and abstractIon beIong together, why the expressIvIst turn Is not sImpIy
a shIIt Irom representIng the outer to representIng the Inner worId, but rather a
wIthdrawaI, an abstractIon, Irom the objectIve worId. ut It Is the case that the nature oI
Ianguage guards IIterature Irom the kInd oI compIete and permanent wIthdrawaI that Is a
reaIIstIc possIbIIIty Ior musIc and even Ior paIntIng.
ote, by the way, that the modern turn toward abstractIon Is by no means the excIusIve
property oI the eIIte taste. On the contrary, It has shaped certaIn aspects oI the popuIar
cuIture oI our tIme no Iess proIoundIy than It has transIormed the cuIture oI the
InteIIectuaIs. ThInk oI thIs pecuIIar phenomenon, the cuIt oI ceIebrItIes. n our century, the
earIIer veneratIon oI "heroes," men and women admIred Ior theIr extraordInary
achIevements, was at IIrst suppIemented and then graduaIIy suppIanted by the
veneratIon oI "ceIebrItIes," men and women admIred Ior beIng admIred ("Iamous Ior
beIng Iamous").
143
Where the name or Image oI a hero stands Ior a concrete, deIInIte
vaIue or content (the saIntIIness achIeved, the battIe won, the symphony IInIshed), the
name or Image oI a ceIebrIty is the onIy concrete vaIue or content there Is there and
stands Ior nothIng eIse. t Is a bIank check whIch the broad admIrIng pubIIc Is InvIted to IIII
In wIth a myrIad oI vaIues It IancIes, an abstractIon to be concretIzed IoIIowIng the
IndIvIduaI desIres oI the consumers oI the Image. n thIs sense, the journaIIstIc
photograph oI a ceIebrIty shares Ieatures wIth the abstract work oI art.
I It Is true, then, that what deIInes artIstIc modernIty Is the abstract turn, we need to ask
now what are the reasons Ior, and what Is the sIgnIIIcance oI, thIs pervasIve tendency oI
modern art toward abstractIon? The reasons seem to me to go much deeper than the
aIready mentIoned wIsh to escape commercIaIIzatIon that so many cuIturaI hIstorIans and
Page 47 of 62
crItIcs, more oIten than not InIIuenced by Adorno, Invoke. They have aIready been partIy
IntImated here, but they shouId now be brought out expIIcItIy.
The decIsIve cIue comes Irom IegeI, the socIaI theorIst who, earIIer than anyone eIse,
dIscerned and named the deIInIng Ieatures and dIIemmas oI modernIty. AccordIng to
IegeI, we moderns IundamentaIIy dIIIer Irom the ancIents In our seII-understandIng. We
thInk oI ourseIves as "Iree subjects," that Is, beIngs whose IIves can be meanIngIuI onIy II
they are shaped by our own IreeIy made choIces. "The rIght oI the subject's pcrticulcrity
to IInd satIsIactIon," wrItes IegeI In hIs Grundlinien der Fhilosophie des Rechts oI 1821,
"or-to put It dIIIerentIy-the rIght oI subjective jreedom, Is the pIvotaI and IocaI poInt In
the dIIIerence between cntiquity and the modern age. ThIs rIght, In Its InIInIty, Is
expressed In ChrIstIanIty |that Is, Is expressed In ChrIstIanIty as an IdeaI, an aspIratIon|,
and It has become the unIversaI and actuaI prIncIpIe oI a new Iorm oI the worId."
144
(AIso
TocquevIIIe, another great theorIst oI the modern age, cIearIy dIscerned the {p.156)
ChrIstIan roots oI modernIty. "The proIoundest and most wIde-seeIng mInds oI Greece
and Iome never managed to grasp the very generaI but very sImpIe conceptIon oI the
IIkeness oI aII men and oI the equaI rIght oI aII at bIrth to IIberty. . . . jesus ChrIst had to
come down to earth to make aII members oI the human race understand that they were
naturaIIy sImIIar and equaI."
145
) ThIs thought runs through the Grundlinien IIke a
IeItmotII. "n IIato's repubIIc, subjectIve Ireedom Is not yet recognIzed, because
IndIvIduaIs stIII have theIr tasks assIgned to them by the authorItIes. n many orIentaI
states, thIs assIgnment Is governed by bIrth. ut subjectIve Ireedom, whIch must be
respected, requIres Ireedom oI choIce on the part oI IndIvIduaIs."
146
"|A|n ' wIII must
be pronounced by man hImseII on the Issue to be decIded. ThIs ' wIII constItutes the
great dIIIerence between ancIent and modern worIds."
147
"The prIncIpIe oI the modern
worId at Iarge Is Ireedom oI subjectIvIty."
148
We mIght rephrase IegeI's thought In terms reIated to those Invoked In the precedIng
chapter and say that, whIIe our premodern ancestors aspIred to no more than to enact
wIth skIII tradItIonaI socIaI roIes and IIIe storIes assIgned to them at bIrth, we moderns
want to be not onIy the actors but aIso the authors oI our own IndIvIduaIIy scrIpted IIIe
storIes. ven when we opt Ior a tradItIonaI socIaI roIe, we want thIs to be our own choIce.
Ior us, wrItes IegeI, "the questIon oI whIch partIcuIar estate the individucl wIII beIong to
Is InIIuenced by hIs naturaI dIsposItIon, bIrth, and cIrcumstances, aIthough the uItImate
and essentIaI determInant Is subjective opinion and the pcrticulcr crbitrcry will, whIch are
accorded theIr rIght, theIr merIt, and theIr honour In thIs sphere."
149
And Iurther.
n thIs respect, too, In reIatIon to the prIncIpIe oI partIcuIarIty and subjectIve
arbItrarIness, a dIIIerence emerges between the poIItIcaI IIIe oI east and west, and
oI the ancIent and modern worIds. n the Iormer, the dIvIsIon oI the whoIe Into
estates came about objectively cnd oj its own cccord, because It Is ratIonaI in itselj,
but the prIncIpIe oI subjectIve partIcuIarIty was at the same tIme denIed Its rIghts,
as when, Ior exampIe, the aIIocatIon oI IndIvIduaIs to specIIIc estates was IeIt to the
ruIers . . . , or to bIrth clone. . . . Thus subjectIve partIcuIarIty, excIuded Irom the
organIzatIon oI the whoIe and not reconcIIed wIthIn It, consequentIy shows ItseII-
Page 48 of 62
sInce It IIkewIse appears as an essentIaI moment-as a hostIIe eIement, as a
corruptIon oI the socIaI order. . . . ut II It Is supported by the objectIve order,
conIormIng to the Iatter and at the same tIme retaInIng Its rIghts, subjectIve
partIcuIarIty becomes the soIe anImatIng prIncIpIe oI cIvII socIety and oI the
deveIopment oI InteIIectuaI actIvIty, merIt, and honour. The recognItIon and rIght
accordIng to whIch aII that Is ratIonaIIy necessary In cIvII socIety and In the state
shouId at the same tIme come Into eIIect through the mediction oj the crbitrcry will
Is the more precIse deIInItIon oI what Is prImarIIy meant by the unIversaI IdeaI oI
jreedom.
150
Thus, the respect Ior the rIght oI subjectIve Ireedom Is not sImpIy a dijjerentic specijicc
oI the modern age. t Is, rather, what makes the modern order potentIaIIy superIor to the
ancIent one, Ior It makes It possIbIe that a harmony between the subjectIve IndIvIduaI
choIces and the objectIve socIaI order mIght arIse.
{p.157) ut whIIe the respect Ior the rIght oI subjectIve Ireedom Is the necessary
condItIon II we moderns are to Iead meanIngIuI IIves, It Is Iar Irom a suIIIcIent condItIon,
sInce by ItseII It Is IncapabIe oI provIdIng our IIves wIth meanIngIuI content. We have to be
abIe to choose the contents oI our IIves IreeIy, but our subjectIve Ireedom cannot by
ItseII provIde us wIth any partIcuIar choIces. These can onIy come Irom beyond the
IsoIated Iree IndIvIduaI subjectIvIty, Irom the aIready exIstIng objectIve socIaI context oI
practIces and InstItutIons. (ThIs Is what makes pIausIbIe Iate IeIdegger's InsIstence that
we IIsten to the caII oI "eIng," especIaIIy In Gadamer's demystIIyIng transIatIon oI "eIng"
as "tradItIon." ut earIy IeIdegger Is no Iess expIIcIt. "hIstorIcaIIty |the Iact that It aIready
Is In a tradItIon| Is a determInIng characterIstIc Ior aseIn."
151
) !sIng the term "state" In
a mIsIeadIngIy broad sense whIch embraces not onIy the poIItIcaI organIzatIon, but aII
socIaI order, aII socIaI practIces and InstItutIons, IncIudIng those oI IamIIy and, above aII,
cIvII socIety, IegeI wrItes. "The determInatIons oI the wIII oI the IndIvIduaI acquIre an
objectIve exIstence through the state, and It Is onIy through the state that they attaIn
theIr truth and actuaIIzatIon. The state Is the soIe precondItIon oI the attaInment oI
partIcuIar ends and weIIare."
152
(IegeI's occasIonaI use oI the term "state" In thIs broad
sense embracIng the whoIe objectIve socIaI order, IamIIy and cIvII socIety IncIuded, Is
partIcuIarIy unIortunate Irom our posttotaIItarIan perspectIve, sInce It works agaInst our
understandabIe dIstrust oI the state In the strIct narrow sense In whIch It Is dIstInct Irom
IamIIy and cIvII socIety. The danger IegeI, In hIs optImIsm, dId not Ioresee was the
possIbIIIty oI the state devourIng cIvII socIety, Instead oI securIng the condItIons In whIch
It may IIourIsh. n thIs respect, IegeI's understandIng oI the modern condItIon has to be
suppIemented by Constant's and TocquevIIIe's.)
IegeI, by the way, was hardIy the IIrst or Iast phIIosopher to argue aIong these IInes.
"The naturaI pIace oI vIrtue," says MontesquIeu, "Is at the sIde oI IIberty, but It cannot be
Iound at the sIde oI extreme IIberty any more than at the sIde oI servItude."
153
n The
Morclity oj Freedom, joseph Iaz wrItes. "The compIeteIy autonomous person Is an
ImpossIbIIIty. . . . An autonomous personaIIty can onIy deveIop and IIourIsh agaInst a
background oI bIoIogIcaI and socIaI constraInts."
154
"A person's weII-beIng," Iaz
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contInues, "depends to a Iarge extent on success In socIaIIy deIIned and determIned
pursuIts and actIvItIes."
155
ThIs Is so because "some comprehensIve goaIs requIre socIaI
InstItutIons Ior theIr very possIbIIIty"
156
and because "an IndIvIduaI cannot acquIre the
goaI by expIIcIt deIIberatIon," but onIy "by habItuatIon."
157
A pecuIIar danger we moderns Iace Is what IegeI caIIs the "prIncIpIe oI atomIcIty," the
danger that our seII-understandIng mIght be arrested at subjectIve Ireedom, that we
mIght become so obsessed wIth thIs IndIspensabIe but abstract rIght and so aIraId that
any concrete choIce we make wouId IImIt our InIInIte Ireedom (as It Indeed InescapabIy
wouId) that we wIII IaII to reaIIze and make concrete use oI our rIght, to make an actuaI
choIce and commIt ourseIves to the cuItIvatIon oI specIIIc practIces and care oI specIIIc
InstItutIons. We moderns, In short, are In danger oI IovIng our subjectIve Ireedom so
much that we mIght IaII {p.158) to make It objectIve and actuaI and Instead oI IIvIng a
meanIngIuI IIIe remaIn condemned to emptIness and meanIngIessness. Irom hIs dIIIerent
perspectIve, TocquevIIIe dIscerned a sImIIar danger In exacerbated IndIvIduaIIsm.
ArIstocracy IInks everybody, Irom peasant to kIng, In one Iong chaIn. emocracy
breaks the chaIn and Irees each IInk. . . . Thus, not onIy does democracy make men
Iorget theIr ancestors, but aIso cIouds theIr vIew oI theIr descendants and IsoIates
them Irom theIr contemporarIes. ach man Is Iorever thrown back on hImseII aIone,
and there Is danger that he may be shut up In the soIItude oI hIs own heart.
158
ThIs danger, IegeI thought, reached Its most paIpabIe hIstorIcaI expressIon In hIs own
IIIetIme, durIng the Terror phase oI the Irench IevoIutIon. The wIII, he wrItes, has "thIs
cbsolute possibility oI cbstrccting Irom every determInatIon. . . . I the wIII determInes
ItseII In thIs way, . . . thIs Is negctive Ireedom." And Iurther. "II It |the negatIve Ireedom|
turns to actuaIIty, It becomes In the reaIm oI both poIItIcs and reIIgIon the IanatIcIsm oI
destructIon, demoIIshIng the whoIe exIstIng socIaI order, eIImInatIng aII IndIvIduaIs
regarded as suspect by a gIven order, and annIhIIatIng any organIzatIon whIch attempts
to rIse up anew."
159
ut even apart Irom the poIItIcaI reaIm, the resuIts are dIsastrous
Ior the IndIvIduaI hImseII, sInce they threaten hIm wIth empty, meanIngIess exIstence. "A
wIII whIch . . . wIIIs onIy the abstract unIversaI, wIIIs nothing and Is thereIore not a wIII at aII.
The partIcuIar |thIng| whIch the wIII wIIIs Is a IImItatIon, Ior the wIII, In order to be a wIII,
must In some way IImIt ItseII."
160
Thus It Is not onIy the TerrorIst revoIutIonary ready to
use the guIIIotIne to prevent any socIaI order Irom arIsIng, or the GuIag to cow cIvII
socIety Into totaI submIssIon, that Is a characterIstIc product oI the pecuIIarIy modern
one-sIded attachment to InIInIte subjectIve Ireedom. An equaIIy characterIstIc product Is
the romantIc artIst wIth hIs aspIratIon "to be beautIIuI," to prevent the Inward purIty oI
the souI Irom gettIng soIIed by actuaI IIvIng.
A wIII whIch resoIves on nothIng Is not an actuaI wIII. . . . The reason Ior such
IndecIsIon may aIso IIe In an over-reIIned sensIbIIIty whIch knows that, In
determInIng somethIng, It enters the reaIm oI IInItude, ImposIng a IImIt on ItseII and
reIInquIshIng InIInIty, yet It does not wIsh to renounce the totaIIty whIch It Intends.
Such a dIsposItIon Is dead, even II Its aspIratIon Is to be beautIIuI.
161
Page 50 of 62
As KIerkegaard's aesthete put It (wIth a nod to Socrates). "Marry, and you wIII regret It.
o not marry, and you wIII aIso regret It."
162
OId MontaIgne, though aIso a modern,
knew better.
|S|o It Is wIth mInds. !nIess you keep them busy wIth some deIInIte subject that wIII
brIdIe and controI them, they throw themseIves In dIsorder hIther and yon In the
vague IIeId oI ImagInatIon. . . . And there Is no mad or IdIe Iancy that they do not
brIng Iorth In thIs agItatIon. . . . The souI that has no IIxed goaI Ioses ItseII, Ior as they
say, to be everywhere Is to be nowhere.
163
One aspect oI the tendency toward abstractIon In art, Iet us note In passIng, Is the paraIIeI
tendency toward InterIorIzatIon, a turn away Irom the representatIon {p.159) oI the
externaI worId to the expressIon oI InternaI states oI mInd. The reason why the two
tendencIes are IntImateIy reIated shouId be obvIous. The turn away Irom the externaI
worId Is the turn away Irom any concrete determInatIon oI empty and abstract InterIorIty.
Ior IegeI, thIs InterIorIzatIon Is characterIstIc oI modern "romantIc" (that Is, ChrIstIan)
art In generaI. "The true content oI romantIc art Is absoIute Inwardness, and Its
correspondIng Iorm Is spIrItuaI subjectIvIty wIth Its grasp oI Its Independence and
Ireedom. ThIs InherentIy InIInIte and absoIuteIy unIversaI content Is the absoIute negatIon
oI everythIng partIcuIar, the sImpIe unIty wIth ItseII whIch has dIssIpated aII externaI
reIatIons."
164
And Iurther.
|T|he new task oI art can onIy consIst In brIngIng beIore contempIatIon . . . not the
ImmersIon oI the Inner In externaI corporeaIIty but, converseIy, the wIthdrawaI oI
the Inner Into ItseII, the spIrItuaI conscIousness oI God In the IndIvIduaI. . . . Content
and Iorm are not aIIorded eIther by the naturaI as such, as sun, sky, stars, etc., or
by the beautIIuI group oI the Greek gods, or by heroes and externaI deeds
wrought on the ground oI IamIIy obIIgatIons and poIItIcaI IIIe, on the contrary, It Is
the actuaI IndIvIduaI person In hIs Inner IIIe who acquIres InIInIte worth, sInce In hIm
aIone do the eternaI moments oI absoIute truth, whIch Is actuaI onIy as spIrIt, unIoId
Into exIstence.
165
just as the ChrIstIan prIncIpIe oI Iree subjectIvIty had to go through arduous hIstorIcaI
processes such as the Irotestant IeIormatIon and Irench IevoIutIon to acquIre socIaI
actuaIIty, so the "romantIc" InterIorIzatIon oI art's content was radIcaIIzed and deepened
onIy In the Iate eIghteenth century, the perIod In whIch hIstorIans oI poetry, In partIcuIar,
Iocate the decIsIve turn Irom the representatIon oI the externaI worId toward the
expressIon oI the InternaI states oI mInd. MusIc, whIch, as we have seen, Is a medIum
partIcuIarIy suIted to embody the InterIor rather than the exterIor worId, was bound to
be at the center oI thIs turn. ot surprIsIngIy, musIcaI metaphors make theIr appearance
at a decIsIve moment In IegeI's characterIzatIon oI the romantIc art.
|T|he Inner, so pushed to the extreme, Is an expressIon wIthout any externaIIty at
aII, It Is InvIsIbIe and Is as It were a perceptIon oI ItseII aIone, or a musIcaI sound as
such wIthout objectIvIty and shape, or a hoverIng over the waters, or a rIngIng
tone over a worId whIch In and on Its heterogeneous phenomena can onIy accept
Page 51 of 62
and re-mIrror a reIIectIon oI thIs Inwardness oI souI. . . . IrecIseIy because the ever
expanded unIversaIIty and the restIessIy actIve depths oI the heart are the prIncIpIe
here, the keynote oI romantIc art Is musiccl and, II we make the content oI thIs Idea
determInate, lyriccl. Ior romantIc art the IyrIc Is as It were the eIementary
IundamentaI characterIstIc, a note whIch epIc and drama strIke too and whIch waIts
even round works oI vIsuaI art as a unIversaI Iragrance oI souI, because here spIrIt
and heart strIve to speak, throguh every one oI theIr productIons, to the spIrIt and
the heart.
166
shaII expIore the notIon oI the "IyrIcaI" more IuIIy In chapter 5. The abstract turn oI
modern art, wouId now IIke to cIaIm, an aspect oI whIch Is the abstractIon oI varIous arts
Irom theIr tradItIonaI socIaI IunctIons, has Its deepest {p.160) root In the pecuIIarIy
modern tendency IdentIIIed by IegeI, the reIuctance oI the InIInIteIy Iree subject to
Impose any IInIte determInatIons upon ItseII, to gIve Its IIIe any actuaI objectIve content. t
Is one oI the IunctIons oI art, have argued here, to show us who we are, to provIde us
wIth seII-Images and seII-understandIngs. More oIten than not, a modern artIst makes
hImseII Into the maIn subject oI hIs art, shows us not the worId so much as hIs experIence
oI the worId. (eethoven Is hIs own subject to an extent that ach, notwIthstandIng hIs
penchant Ior encodIng hIs own name wIthIn hIs musIc, wouId IInd dIstasteIuI,
IncomprehensIbIe even.) Abstract art Is a perIect Image oI InIInIteIy Iree subjectIvIty, a
subjectIvIty escapIng aII IImItIng determInatIons and IntendIng Instead the InIInIte totaIIty.
IecaII IoIImann's cIaIm that musIc's "onIy subject-matter Is InIInIty," the KantIan
noumenaI reaIm. IecaII aIso Schopenhauer's cIaIm that "we must attrIbute to musIc a Iar
more serIous and proIound sIgnIIIcance that reIers to the Innermost beIng oI the worId
and oI our own seII" and that "musIc Is as immedicte an objectIIIcatIon and copy oI the
whoIe will as the worId ItseII Is." n consIderIng such cIaIms we shouId not be put oII by
the no Ionger credIbIe metaphysIcs they Invoke. What matters, rather, Is the correct
recognItIon that, unIIke mImetIc art wIth Its IInIte and determInate subject matter, the new
abstract art Intends the InIInIte totaIIty, the worId as a whoIe and the desIrIng seII beIore
Its desIre settIes on anythIng In partIcuIar. And It makes no dIIIerence whether the accent
IaIIs on the worId or on the seII. as the noumenaI InIInIte and compIeteIy IndetermInate
reaIms, both are equaIIy IneIIabIe.
Iremodern artIsts by and Iarge strove to represent In theIr varIous medIa contents they
dId not Invent but Iound transmItted In the cIassIcaI and ChrIstIan tradItIons. The modern
artIst, Instead, Invents the content oI hIs work In the attempt to express hIs own unIque
seII. t Is not surprIsIng that sooner (sooner, the more radIcaIIy modern he Is) or Iater he
encounters the specter oI sterIIIty. pure seII Is empty, It acquIres a content onIy when It
comes Into contact wIth somethIng other than ItseII. And It Is not suprIsIng that musIc has
been tormented by thIs specter Ionger and more proIoundIy than other arts.
One oI the most IntrIguIng cIaIms In Macntyre's Ajter Virtue Is the suggestIon that the
moraI structure oI a socIety Is best captured In a specIIIc narratIve genre. Thus, Ior
Instance, the moraI structure oI the heroIc socIety
embodIes a conceptuaI scheme whIch has three centraI InterreIated eIements. a
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conceptIon oI what Is requIred by the socIaI roIe whIch each IndIvIduaI InhabIts, a
conceptIon oI exceIIences or vIrtues as those quaIItIes whIch enabIe an IndIvIduaI to
do what hIs or her roIe requIres, and a conceptIon oI the human condItIon as IragIIe
and vuInerabIe to destIny and to death. . . . AII three eIements IInd theIr InterreIated
pIaces onIy wIthIn a Iarger unItary Iramework. . . . ThIs Iramework Is the narratIve
Iorm oI epIc or saga. . . . IeroIc socIaI structure is enacted epIc narratIve.
167
Abstract art, on the InterpretatIon proposed here, Is the Iorm oI modernIty, a
characterIstIc symptom oI the modern condItIon dIagnosed by IegeI, and hence {p.161)
Its contemporary sItuatIon reIIects IaIthIuIIy the Iarger dIIemma we Iace. We want to
saIeguard our modern rIght oI subjectIve Ireedom but not at the cost oI never
exercIsIng thIs rIght, and we hope to IInd ourseIves In an objectIve socIaI worId that wIII
oIIer us worthwhIIe opportunItIes Ior exercIsIng It, a worId oI socIaI practIces we mIght
want to partIcIpate In and extend and oI InstItutIons we mIght wIsh to preserve and
Improve. Our art reIIects thIs sItuatIon IIke a good mIrror. At Its most radIcaI, It ceIebrates
the modern InIInIteIy Iree subjectIvIty, IntendIng everythIng, commItted to nothIng. And,
precIseIy at Its most radIcaI, It IInds ItseII IacIng the very same Ioss oI sIgnIIIcance and the
very same sterIIIty that Is Iaced by the subjectIvIty It ceIebrates. What It needs Is to
Ieaven subjectIvIty wIth objectIvIty, abstractIon wIth mImesIs, that Is, somethIng the best
musIc oI the Iast two hundred years has been doIng supremeIy weII. {p.162)
Notes:
(IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1997), p. 95. To be sure, a IuIIer eIaboratIon oI
thIs posItIon wouId requIre one to say somethIng that anto says In hIs Ioreword to
Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, cnd the Mcrket: Rerecding the History oj
Aesthetics (ew York. CoIumbIa !nIversIty Iress, 1994). "t may be that the Idea oI a
concept that exIsts outsIde the hIstory oI Its progressIve characterIzatIon In the course oI
phIIosophIcaI InquIry Is as much and as IIttIe warranted as the Idea oI the souI Is, Invoked
to gIve unIty to a IIIe It IIes outsIde oI. The subject oI a IIved IIIe, IIke the subject oI a
hIstory, may be metaphysIcaIIy posIted, engendered by a kInd oI grammar, and gIven
some prIde oI metaphysIcaI pIace when In truth both souI and concept may sImpIy be the
hIstorIes, and have no reaIIty outsIde them" (p. xv).
(2.) Ians eItIng, The End oj the History oj Art?, trans. ChrIstopher S. Wood (ChIcago.
The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1987), p. 52.
(3.) AIasdaIr Macntyre, Ajter Virtue: A Study in Morcl Theory, 2d ed. (otre ame, nd..
!nIversIty oI otre ame Iress, 1984), p. 187.
(5.) Ior a typIcaI contemporary exampIe, see IIerre ourdIeu, Distinction: A Socicl
Critique oj the ]udgement oj Tcste, trans. IIchard Ice (CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty
Iress, 1984).
Page 53 of 62
(7.) Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure oj Scientijic Revolutions, 2d ed. (ChIcago. The
!nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1970).
(8.) CI. CarI ahIhaus, "TrIvIaImusIk und sthetIsches !rteII," In C. ahIhaus, ed., Studien
zur Triviclmusik des 19. ]chrhunderts, StudIen zur MusIkgeschIchte des 19.
jahrhunderts 8 (Iegensburg. Gustav osse VerIag, 1967), pp. 13-28. See aIso ahIhaus,
Foundctions oj Music History, trans. j. . IobInson (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty
Iress, 1983), pp. 108-9.
(9.) johannes TInctorIs, Liber de crte contrcpuncti, Operc theoreticc, 2, ed. A. Seay,
Corpus ScrIptorum de MusIca 22 (n.p.. AmerIcan nstItute oI MusIcoIogy, 1975), pp. 12-
13, trans. OIIver Strunk, Source Recdings in Music History (ew York. orton, 1950), p.
199.
(10.) IcoIaus IIstenIus, Musicc (WIttenberg. Georg Ihau, 1537), ch. 1.
(11.) CI. CarI ahIhaus, "On the decIIne oI the concept oI the musIcaI work," Schoenberg
cnd the New Music, trans. . IuIIett and A. CIayton (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty
Iress, 1987), pp. 220-33, esp. pp. 220-21.
(12.) Theodor W. Adorno, sthetische Theorie, ed. G. Adorno and I. TIedemann
(IrankIurt am MaIn. Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 209, trans. Stephen IInton.
(13.) See In partIcuIar, IeInrIch esseIer, Dcs musikclische Hren der Neuzeit, erIchte
uber dIe VerhandIungen der SchsIschen AkademIe der WIssenschaIten zu IeIpzIg,
IhIIoIogIsch-hIstorIsche KIasse, and 104, IeIt 6 (erIIn. AkademIe-VerIag, 1959). Ior a
IuII hIstory oI these terms and concepts, see Stephen IInton, The ldec oj
Gebrcuchsmusik, OutstandIng IssertatIons In MusIc Irom rItIsh !nIversItIes (ew
York. GarIand, 1989) and "GebrauchsmusIk," In I. I. ggebrecht, ed., Hcndwrterbuch
der musikclischen Terminologie (WIesbaden. I. SteIner, 1988).
(14.) Strunk, Source Recdings in Music History, p. 79.
(16.) IeInrIch GIarean, Dodeccchordon (aseI. IeInrIch IetrI, 1547).
(17.) GIoseIIo ZarIIno, Le lstitutioni hcrmoniche, (VenIce. no pubIIsher gIven, 1558), pt. 2,
ch. 4, p. 62.
(19.) ZarIIno, Le lstitutioni hcrmoniche, pt. 2, ch. 4, p. 62.
Page 54 of 62
(22.) johannes TInctorIs, Froportioncle musices, Operc theoreticc, 2a, ed. A. Seay,
CorpusScrIptorum de MusIca 22 (euhausen-Stuttgart. AmerIcan nstItute oI
MusIcoIogy, 1978), p. 10, trans. Strunk, Source Recdings in Music History, p. 195.
(23.) The IoIIowIng pages, descrIbIng the paradIgm shIIt around 1600, reproduce In part
my "Concepts and eveIopments In MusIc Theory, 1520-1640," IorthcomIng In The New
Oxjord History oj Music, voI. 4, ed. j. Iaar (OxIord. OxIord !nIversIty Iress), where the
Interested reader wIII aIso IInd the reIevant secondary IIterature.
(24.) IcoIa VIcentIno, L'cnticc musicc ridottc cllc modernc prctticc (Iome. AntonIo
arre, 1555), IoI. 48r.
(25.) VIcentIno, L'cnticc musicc ridottc cllc modernc prctticc, IoI. 86r.
(26.) VIcentIno, L'cnticc musicc ridottc cllc modernc prctticc, IoI. 94r.
(27.) VIcentIno, L'cnticc musicc ridottc cllc modernc prctticc, IoI. 6v.
(28.) VIncenzo GaIIIeI, Diclogo dellc musicc cnticc, et dellc modernc (IIorence. GIorgIo
MarescottI, 1581), p. 81.
(29.) GaIIIeI, Diclogo dellc musicc cnticc, et dellc modernc, p. 1.
(32.) GIovannI de'ardI, Discorso mcndcto c Ccccini soprc lc musicc cnticc e'l ccntcr
bene |1578|, IbIIoteca ApostoIIca VatIcana, Ms. arberInIanus IatInus 3990, IoI. 10r,
trans. Strunk, Source Recdings in Music History, p. 295.
(33.) GIroIamo MeI, Ietter oI May 8, 1572 In CIaude V. IaIIsca, Girolcmo Mei: Letters on
Ancient cnd Modern Music to Vincenzo Gclilei cnd Giovcnni Bcrdi, MusIcoIogIcaI StudIes
and ocuments 3 (n.p.. AmerIcan nstItute oI MusIcoIogy, 1960), p. 117.
(34.) VIncenzo GaIIIeI, Discorso intorno cll'uso dell'Enhcrmonio, IIorence, IbIIoteca
azIonaIe CentraIe, Ms. GaI. 3, IoI. 17v.
(37.) GIovannI MarIa ArtusI, L'Artusi, overo delle imperjettioni dellc modernc musicc
(VenIce. GIacomo VIncentI, 1600), IoI. 16r.
(38.) CIaudIo MonteverdI, preIatory Ietter, ll quinto libro de mcdrigcli c cinque voci
Page 55 of 62
(VenIce. IIccIardo AmadIno, 1605).
(39.) MonteverdI, preIatory Ietter, ll quinto libro de mcdrigcli c cinque voci.
(40.) GIuIIo Cesare MonteverdI, "IchIaratIone deIIa Iettera stampata neI quInto IIbro de
suoI madrIgaII," In CIaudIo MonteverdI, Scherzi musiccli (VenIce. IIccIardo AmadIno,
1607).
(41.) GIuIIo Cesare MonteverdI, "IchIaratIone."
(43.) jean IhIIIppe Iameau, Trectise on Hcrmony, trans. IhIIIp Gossett (ew York. over,
1971), p. 22.
(44.) Iameau, Trectise on Hcrmony, p. 3.
(45.) jean-jacques Iousseau, Esscy on the Origin oj Lcngucges, trans. john I. Moran
(ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1966), ch. 19, p. 68.
(46.) Iousseau, Esscy on the Origin oj Lcngucges, ch. 19, p. 72.
(47.) Iousseau, Esscy on the Origin oj Lcngucges, ch. 13, pp. 53 and 55.
(48.) . I. WaIker, Spiritucl cnd Demonic Mcgic jrom Ficino to Ccmpcnellc (Iondon. The
Warburg nstItute, 1958), pp. 25-26.
(49.) TInctorIs, Liber de crte contrcpuncti, trans. Strunk, Source Recdings in Music
History, p. 198.
(50.) See CarI ahIhaus, "SI vIs me IIere," Die Musikjorschung, 25 (1972), pp. 51-2.
(51.) enIs Iderot, The Fcrcdox oj Acting and WIIIIam Archer, Mcsks or Fcces? (ew
York. IIII and Wang, 1957), p. 14.
the Aesthetics oj Music, trans. GeoIIrey Iayzant (ndIanapoIIs. Iackett, 1986), pp. 48-49.
(53.) Iorenzo IanconI, Music in the Seventeenth Century (CambrIdge. CambrIdge
(54.) Ietter to IrIedrIch IoIImeIster, january 15, 1801 In IudwIg van eethoven,
Scmtliche Brieje und Aujzeichnungen, ed. IrItz IreIInger, voI. 1 (VIenna and IeIpzIg,
1907), p. 65.
(55.) ChrIstoph WoIII, " 'The xtraordInary IerIectIons oI the Ion. Court Composer. An
nquIry Into the ndIvIduaIIty oI ach's MusIc," Bcch: Esscys on His Lije cnd Music
(CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1991), p. 392.
Page 56 of 62
(56.) WoIII, " 'The xtraordInary IerIectIons oI the Ion. Court Composer. ach's
MusIc," p. 394.
(57.) The Bcch Recder: A Lije oj ]ohcnn Sebcsticn Bcch in Letters cnd Documents, ed.
Ians T. avId and Arthur MendeI, rev. ed. (ew York. orton, 1966), p. 222.
(58.) johann WoIIgang von Goethe, Ietter to CarI IrIedrIch ZeIter, trans. by A. .
CoIerIdge, The Bcch Recder, p. 369.
!nIversIty Iress, 1952), 328, p. 194.
(60.) rnst Theodor Amadeus IoIImann, "eethoven's nstrumentaI MusIc," In E. T. A.
Hojjmcnn's Musiccl Writings: Kreislericnc, The Foet cnd the Composer, Music Criticism,
ed. avId CharIton, trans. Martyn CIarke (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress,
1989), p. 96.
(61.) IoIImann, "eethoven's nstrumentaI MusIc," p. 96.
(66.) IoIImann, "eethoven's nstrumentaI MusIc," pp. 96-97.
(67.) Arthur Schopenhauer, The World cs Will cnd Representction, trans. . I. j. Iayne, 2
voIs. (ew York. over, 1966), voI. 1, p. 256.
(68.) Schopenhauer, The World cs Will cnd Representction, voI. 1, p. 257.
(71.) rnst Theodor Amadeus IoIImann, "OId and ew Church MusIc," In E. T. A.
Hojjmcnn's Musiccl Writings, ed. avId CharIton, p. 355.
(72.) IoIImann, "OId and ew Church MusIc," pp. 357-58.
(73.) IoIImann, "OId and ew Church MusIc," p. 358.
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(77.) bId.
(78.) bId.
(79.) bId.
(80.) Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, cnd the Mcrket: Rerecding the History oj
Aesthetics (ew York. CoIumbIa !nIversIty Iress, 1994), p. 31.
(81.) Woodmansee, The Author, Art, cnd the Mcrket, p. 20.
(82.) Thomas S. Grey demonstrated to what great extent the desIre to cIaIm Ior musIc
representatIonaI powers contInued to anImate even the most avant-garde mId-nIneteenth-
centuryew German cIrcIes where It uneasIIy grated agaInst the IdeoIogy oI musIcaI
autonomy. See Grey, Wcgner's Musiccl Frose: Texts cnd Contexts (CambrIdge.
CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1995), pp. 1-50.
(83.) GIanmarIo orIo and Iermann anuser, eds., lm Zenit der Moderne. Die
lnternctionclen Ferienkurse jur Neue Musik Dcrmstcdt 1945-1955. Geschichte und
Dokumentction in vier Bcnden (IreIburg Im reIsgau. Iombach VerIag, 1997).
(84.) ArnoId Schoenberg, "The IeIatIonshIp to the Text," In Style cnd ldec (ew York.
IhIIosophIcaI IIbrary, 1950), p. 2.
(85.) Schoenberg, "The IeIatIonshIp to the Text," p. 1.
(86.) gor StravInsky, Foetics oj Music in the Form oj Six Lessons, trans. A. KnodeI and .
ahI (ew York. VIntage ooks, 1947), p. 110.
(90.) Arthur Schopenhauer, Mcnuscript Remcins in Four Volumes, ed. Arthur Iubscher,
trans. . I. j. Iayne (OxIord. erg, 1988), no. 338, p. 230.
(91.) The SchopenhauerIan background oI KandInsky's, MaIevIch's, and MondrIan's turn
toward abstractIon has been recentIy dIscussed In AIaIn esanon, L'lmcge interdite.
Une histoire intellectuelle de l'iconoclcsme (IarIs. Iayard, 1994). esanon pIaces thIs
turn wIthIn the context oI the hIstory oI IconocIasm and stresses the reIIgIous dImensIon
oI earIy pIctorIaI abstractIon. "Thus 'abstract art deveIopes wIthIn the womb oI a
reIIgIous, and more precIseIy mystIcaI, movement" (p. 15). And Iurther. "A new
IconocIasm, II one consIders that the abandonment oI the reIerence to 'objects and to
nature Is not a resuIt oI a Iear In Iront oI the dIvIne, but oI the mystIc ambItIon IInaIIy to
Page 58 of 62
gIve the dIvIne an Image It deserves" (p. 16), "by reIusIng the IIgure as IncapabIe oI
capturIng the absoIute, MaIevIch and KandInsky recovered, wIthout knowIng It, the
cIassIcaI argument oI IconocIasm" (p. 17).
(92.) Theodor W. Adorno, Fhilosophy oj Modern Music (ew York. Seabury Iress,
1973), p. 5.
the Aesthetics oj Music, trans. GeoIIrey Iayzant (ndIanapoIIs. Iackett, 1986), pp. 61-63.
(96.) IansIIck, On the Musicclly Becutijul, p. xxIII.
(102.) CarI ahIhaus, The ldec oj Absolute Music, trans. Ioger IustIg (ChIcago. The
!nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1989), pp. 27-28.
(103.) uoted In CarI ahIhaus, Die ldee der cbsoluten Musik (KasseI. renreIter-
VerIag, 1978), p. 33.
(104.) CI. CarI ahIhaus, "IormsthetIk und achahmungsprInzIp," Klcssische und
Romcntische Musikcsthetik (Iaaber. Iaaber-VerIag, 1988), pp. 44-49.
(105.) IeInrIch Schenker, The Mcsterwork in Music: A Yecrbook. Volume 1 (1925), ed.
WIIIIam rabkIn (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1994), p. 2.
(106.) StravInsky, Foetics oj Music, p. 19.
(110.) Schoenberg, "Gustav MahIer," In Style cnd ldec, p. 26.
(111.) Schoenberg, "CrIterIa Ior the vaIuatIon oI MusIc," In Style cnd ldec, p. 194.
Page 59 of 62
(112.) rnst Ioch, Esscys on the Fhilosophy oj Music (CambrIdge. CambrIdge
!nIversIty Iress, 1985), p. 139. "MusIc-thIs kerneI and seed, thIs reIIectIon oI the
brIghtIy IIIumIned death-nIght and oI eternaI IIIe, thIs nucIeus oI the mystIcaI InterIor sea oI
servants, thIs jerIcho and IIrst townshIp oI the hoIy Iand."
(113.) Adorno, Fhilosophy oj Modern Music, p. 9.
(114.) See IIchard TaruskIn, "StravInsky and the Subhuman. A Myth oI the TwentIeth
Century. The Rite oj Spring, the TradItIon oI the ew, and 'the MusIc tseII," In Dejining
Russic Musicclly: Historiccl cnd Hermeneuticcl Esscys (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty
Iress, 1997), pp. 360-18.
(115.) nge Kovcs, "Ie IerIenkurse aIs SchaupIatz der Ost-West-KonIrontatIon," In
orIo and anuser, eds., lm Zenit der Moderne, voI. 1, pp. 116-39.
(116.) Kovcs, "Ie IerIenkurse aIs SchaupIatz der Ost-West-KonIrontatIon," p. 117.
(117.) Kovcs, "Ie IerIenkurse aIs SchaupIatz der Ost-West-KonIrontatIon," p. 129.
(118.) jean CIaIr, Lc responscbilit de l'crtiste: les cvcnt-gcrdes entre terreur et rcison
(IarIs. GaIIImard, 1997), pp. 71-72.
(119.) CIaIr, Lc responscbilit de l'crtiste, p. 72.
(120.) State sponsorshIp oI the supposedIy subversIve avant-garde has been one oI the
Issues In the debate over the crIsIs oI contemporary art that has been ragIng In Irance
sInce 1991. (The debate has been chronIcIed In Yves MIchaud, Lc crise de l'crt
contemporcin: Utopie, dmocrctie et comdie |IarIs. Iresses !nIversItaIres de Irance,
1997|.) jean CIaIr, Ior Instance, wrItes. "The darIIng oI the mInIsterIaI programs oI cuIturaI
deveIopment, InstItutIonaIIzed and bureaucratIzed, It |avant-garde| nevertheIess
pretends stIII to embody the spIrIt oI InsubmIssIon to the estabIIshed power. Whence the
survIvaI oI thIs astonIshIng prIvIIege? SInce It Is sureIy no Ionger the matter oI the
subversIon oI estabIIshed vaIues. o state has ever subventIoned the subversIon oI Its
own vaIues" (Lc responscbilit de l'crtiste, p. 20). See aIso Marc IumaroII, LEtct
culturel: une religion moderne (IarIs. dItIons de IaIIoIs, 1992).
(121.) Ioger Scruton, The Aesthetics oj Music (OxIord. CIarendon Iress, 1997), pp.
496-97.
(125.) Adorno, Fhilosophy oj Modern Music, pp. 19-20.
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(128.) See Anthony ewcomb, "Once More 'etween AbsoIute and Irogram MusIc.
Schumann's Second Symphony," 19th-Century Music 7 (1984), 233-50, "Schumann and
Iate Ighteenth-Century arratIve StrategIes," 19th-Century Music 11 (1987), 164-74.
(129.) . I. GombrIch, The Sense oj Order: A Study in the Fsychology oj Decorctive Art
(thaca. CorneII !nIversIty Iress, 1979), p. 302.
(130.) Theodor W. Adorno, Beethoven: Fhilosophie der Musik, Ncchgelcssene Schrijten,
voI. 1, ed. IoII TIedemann (IrankIurt am MaIn. Suhrkamp, 1993, 2d ed. 1994), p. 27,
trans. Stephen IInton.
(131.) WItoId IybczynskI, "A TruIy mportant IIace. The Abundant IubIIc ArchItecture oI
Iobert MIIIs," The Times Litercry Supplement, ovember 11, 1994, p. 3.
(132.) WaIter Iater, "The SchooI oI GIorgIone" In hIs The Rencisscnce: Studies in Art cnd
Foetry, ed. . I. IIII (erkeIey. !nIversIty oI CaIIIornIa Iress, 1980), p. 106.
(133.) ber dcs Geistige in der Kunst, insbesondere in der Mclerei (MunIch. I. IIper,
1912).
(134.) ArnoId Schoenberg, "The IeIatIonshIp to the Text," In Der blcue Reiter, ed. V.
KandInsky and I. Marc |1912|, ed. K. IankheIt (MunIch. I. IIper, 1965) and The Blcue
Reiter Almcncc, ed. K. IankheIt (Iondon. Thames and Iudson, 1974).
Representction, 2d ed. (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1961), p. 358.
(136.) GombrIch, Art cnd lllusion, p. 368.
(137.) MIchaeI IrIed, Three Americcn Fcinters: Kenneth Nolcnd, ]ules Olitski, Frcnk
Stellc (CambrIdge. Iogg Art Museum, Iarvard !nIversIty, 1965), p. 43.
(138.) Arthur C. anto, The Trcnsjigurction oj the Commonplcce: A Fhilosophy oj Art
(CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1981), p. 87.
(139.) The aIIIIIatIon between "absoIute musIc" and posie pure Is expIored In ahIhaus,
The ldec oj Absolute Music, ch. 10, pp. 141-55.
(140.) M. I. Abrams, The Mirror cnd the Lcmp: Romcntic Theory cnd the Criticcl
Trcdition (OxIord. OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1953).
(141.) CharIes TayIor, Sources oj the Selj: The Mcking oj the Modern ldentity
(CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1989), ch. 21, pp. 368-90. Ior the Iate
eIghteenth-century turn Irom the representatIon oI tradItIonaI communaI myths to the
expressIon oI IndIvIduaI subjectIvIty, and Irom aIIegory to symboI, see especIaIIy Ians-
Georg Gadamer, Truth cnd Method (ew York. ContInuum, 1975), pp. 39-73.
Page 61 of 62
(143.) See anIeI j. oorstIn, The lmcge: or, Whct Hcppened to the Americcn Drecm
(ew York. Atheneum, 1962).
(145.) AIexIs de TocquevIIIe, Democrccy in Americc, ed. j. I. Mayer, trans. George
Iawrence (Garden CIty, .Y.. Anchor ooks, 1969), p. 439.
(146.) IegeI, Elements oj the Fhilosophy oj Right, 262, p. 286.
(151.) MartIn IeIdegger, Being cnd Time (ew York. Iarper S Iow, 1962), 6, p. 42.
(153.) MontesquIeu, De l'Esprit des lois, In Oeuvres compltes, ed. anIeI Oster (IarIs.
dItIons du SeuII, 1964), 8.3, p. 571.
(154.) joseph Iaz, The Morclity oj Freedom (OxIord. OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1986), p.
155.
(155.) Iaz, The Morclity oj Freedom, p. 309.
(158.) TocquevIIIe, Democrccy in Americc, p. 508.
(162.) Sren KIerkegaard, Either/Or, part 1, trans. Ioward V. Iong and dna I. Iong
(IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1987), p. 38.
(163.) MontaIgne, The Complete Works, trans. onaId M. Irame (StanIord. StanIord
Page 62 of 62
!nIversIty Iress, 1943), p. 21.
Poetics I: Diegesis and Mimesis. The Poetic Modes and the Matter of Artistic
Presentation
Page 1 of 28
A Theory of Art
Karo Berger
IrInt S-13. 9780195128604
O. 10.1093/0195128605.001.0001
Poetcs I: Degess and Mmess. The Poetc Modes and the Matter of Artstc
Presentaton
DOI:10.1093/0195128605.003.0004
ThIs chapter expIores the nature oI the dIegetIc and mImetIc modes In IIterature, the
questIon oI theIr appIIcabIIIty to paIntIng and musIc, and the reIatIonshIp between the
author and the voIces he empIoys In hIs work. The categorIes oI eIements that constItute
the worId presented In the IIterary work are the settIng, the personage, and the narrator.
WhIIe we may easIIy IInd anaIogues Ior the settIng and the personage In paIntIng and
musIc, a true narratIve voIce Is more dIIIIcuIt to Iocate and may be somethIng oI a rarIty In
these two arts, aIthough It may appear under specIIIc cIrcumstances. The reaI author Is
the creator oI the ImmedIateIy speakIng voIces he empIoys to present the worId oI hIs
work, but hImseII does not beIong to thIs worId. As Ior the ImpIIed author, the arguments
Ior postuIatIng the exIstence oI thIs entIty are examIned, and the concIusIon reached Is
that the concept Is a theoretIcaI IIctIon wIth no useIuI task to perIorm.
leywords: poetcs, degess, mmess, mode, voce, settng, personage, narrator, terature, pantng
Presentation
Page 2 of 28
n part , attempted to answer the questIon, What shouId the IunctIon oI art be, II art Is
to have a vaIue Ior us? n the IIrst two chapters oI part , shaII ask, Iow does art IuIIIII
Its IunctIons? n other words, shaII turn now Irom the aIms to the means oI art. More
specIIIcaIIy, shaII endeavor to show what the worId represented In an artwork shouId
consIst oI II It Is to IuIIIII Its IunctIons. n chapter 4, shaII attempt to IdentIIy the eIements
that constItute an artworId. Chapter 5 wIII show how these eIements may be IormaIIy
arranged.
n the thIrd book oI the Republic, Socrates, havIng examIned the subject matter oI taIes
or the "what" oI speech, went on to dIscuss the "how," the "dIctIon" or "the manner oI
speech."
1
"IabuIIsts or poets," he saId, "proceed eIther by pure narratIon (diegesis) or
by a narratIve that Is eIIected through ImItatIon (mimesis), or both." On some occasIons,
Iomer "hImseII Is the speaker and does not even attempt to suggest to us that anyone
but hImseII Is speakIng." On other occasIons, he "trIes as Iar as may be to make us IeeI
that not Iomer Is the speaker," but a personage In hIs taIe. n the Iormer case, he eIIects
hIs storyteIIIng through pure and sImpIe narratIon, In the Iatter, through the ImItatIon oI
another person's speech. Thus, "there Is one kInd oI poetry and taIeteIIIng whIch works
whoIIy through ImItatIon, . . . tragedy and comedy, and another whIch empIoys the recItaI
oI the poet hImseII, best exempIIIIed . . . In the dIthyramb, and there Is agaIn that whIch
empIoys both, In epIc poetry and In many other pIaces."
ArIstotIe, In the Foetics, took over the pIatonIc dIstInctIons. The representatIonaI arts,
"epIc poetry and tragedy, as aIso comedy, dIthyrambIc poetry, and most IIute-pIayIng and
Iyre-pIayIng,"
2
but aIso others, such as dance
3
and perhaps even paIntIng,
4
dIIIer Irom
one another In the means or medIa they use, In the objects {p.166) they represent, and
In the manner or mode oI ImItatIon.
5
"GIven both the same means and the same kInd oI
object Ior ImItatIon, one may eIther (1) speak at one moment In narratIve and at another
In an assumed character, as Iomer does, or (2) one may remaIn the same throughout,
wIthout any such change, or (3) the ImItators may represent the whoIe story
dramatIcaIIy, as though they were actuaIIy doIng the thIngs descrIbed."
6
IoIIowIng IIato and ArIstotIe, we may provIsIonaIIy dIstInguIsh the two pure "modes" In
whIch the content oI a IIterary work may be presented, the "dIegetIc" mode (as shaII caII
It here In order to avoId the potentIaIIy conIusIng term "narratIve"), In whIch the
storyteIIer, the narrator, speaks, and the "dramatIc" mode (agaIn, the term "mImetIc"
mIght be conIusIng), In whIch the represented personages speak, as weII as the thIrd
"mIxed" mode combInIng the two pure ones. My aIm here Is to cIarIIy the nature oI the
modes,
7
raIse the questIon oI theIr appIIcabIIIty outsIde the reaIm oI IIterature,
specIIIcaIIy to paIntIng
8
and musIc,
9
and dIscuss the reIatIonshIp between the author and
the voIces he empIoys In hIs work.
a. The Voces
When we use Ianguage, we speak (or IIsten to speech), wrIte (or read), or sIIentIy thInk.
Any use oI Ianguage presupposes a speaker (and IIstener, even II the Iatter Is the same
person as the speaker), wrIter (and reader), or thInker. SInce the dIIIerences between
speakIng, wrItIng, and thInkIng are IrreIevant here, shaII reIer to the Ianguage-user
Presentation
Page 3 of 28
ImpIIed by any act oI speech as the "speaker" or the "voIce."
A speaker can, oI course, be a reaI person or an ImagInary personage. And hIs exIstence,
whether reaI or ImagInary, may be mereIy ImpIIed by the very Iact that somethIng Is saId,
or It may be brought Into Iocus wIth varIous degrees oI expIIcItness (just as my exIstence
as the speaker oI thIs text Is presented much Iess expIIcItIy here than It wouId be II thIs
were an autobIography). n other words, whIIe any speech act ImpIIes a speaker, some
may do no more than that, IeavIng the questIon oI the reaIIty oI the speaker entIreIy open
and not expIIcItIy assertIng hIs exIstence.
A IundamentaI dIstInctIon one must make when thInkIng about the nature oI IIterary
modes (a dIstInctIon that, It seems to me, has never been made wIth suIIIcIent cIarIty) Is
the one between a voIce speakIng ImmedIateIy, that Is, wIthout the medIatIon oI another
voIce, and a voIce whose speech Is reported by another, ImmedIateIy speakIng, voIce.
(Thought poIIce searchIng Ior traces oI the "metaphysIcs oI presence" shouId reIax upon
IearnIng that "an ImmedIateIy speakIng voIce" does not mean here "a voIce not embodIed
In a medIum," but mereIy "a voIce not medIated by another voIce.") ote that a speech
may be reported In another reported speech, whIch In turn may be reported In yet
another reported speech, and so on, but at the end oI the chaIn there must be an
ImmedIateIy speakIng voIce. ote aIso that the dIstInctIon between ImmedIate and
reported speech Is not coextensIve wIth the dIstInctIon between dIrect and IndIrect
speech. n, " 'We have, saId Iaze, 'an exceIIent dentIst. Our neIghbor, In {p.167) Iact.
r. uIIty. !ncIe or cousIn, thInk, oI the pIaywrIght, " Iaze speaks dIrectIy, whIIe In
"They had, saId Iaze, an exceIIent dentIst. TheIr neIghbor, In Iact. r. uIIty. !ncIe or
cousIn, she thought, oI the pIaywrIght," she wouId be speakIng IndIrectIy, but In both
cases her speech Is reported by another voIce, the one that says "saId Iaze" and
beIongs to Iumbert. ow a IIterary work, cny IIterary work, must present Its content by
means oI at Ieast one voIce, and It may empIoy many voIces. AII oI the voIces heard In a
IIterary work may speak ImmedIateIy, or onIy some voIces may speak ImmedIateIy, whIIe
others have theIr speech reported by those speakIng ImmedIateIy. When the work
empIoys onIy one voIce, It must speak ImmedIateIy. When severaI voIces are heard, they
may aII speak ImmedIateIy and at Ieast one oI them must speak ImmedIateIy.
Thus, II we want to cIassIIy IIterary works on the basIs oI the voIces they use, we must
IIrst dIstInguIsh those that speak ImmedIateIy Irom those whose speech Is reported. SInce
onIy ImmedIateIy speakIng voIces are necessary to any IIterary presentatIon, whIIe the
use oI reported speech Is optIonaI, we may cIassIIy aII IIterary works Into those usIng onIy
one ImmedIateIy speakIng voIce and those usIng many such voIces. n other words, we
mIght dIstInguIsh the "monophonIc" mode, In whIch there Is onIy one ImmedIateIy
speakIng voIce (wIth aII other voIces, II any, havIng theIr speech reported) and the
"poIyphonIc" mode, In whIch there are many ImmedIateIy speakIng voIces (wIthout
excIudIng, or requIrIng, voIces whose speech Is reported). (eedIess to say, the terms
are used In a sense quIte dIIIerent Irom akhtIn's, a sense much cIoser to theIr source In
the vocabuIary oI musIc theory.
10
) ut we shouId not prematureIy concIude that our
dIstInctIon between the monophonIc and poIyphonIc modes Is IdentIcaI wIth the pIatonIc
Presentation
Page 4 of 28
dIstInctIon between the dIegetIc and dramatIc modes.
When IIato Introduced the concepts oI diegesis and mimesis, what mattered to hIm was
not the number oI ImmedIateIy speakIng voIces, but rather theIr nature. We mIght best
be abIe to capture the essentIaI dIIIerence he had In mInd II we see It as dependIng on
whether a speaker beIongs to the worId presented by hIs speech or not. A speaker may
hImseII beIong to the worId hIs speech presents, he may be what we caII a "character" or
"personage" In thIs worId. Or a speaker mIght teII us oI a worId to whIch he hImseII does
not beIong, he may be what we caII a "narrator" oI the presented worId. The mode In
whIch aII the ImmedIateIy speakIng voIces beIong to the personages Is the dramatIc mode.
n the dIegetIc mode, the ImmedIateIy speakIng voIce beIongs to the narrator.
The notIon oI a speaker beIongIng or not to the worId presented by hIs speech requIres
some cIarIIIcatIon, II It Is not to be mIsIeadIng. We need a crIterIon oI the IdentIty oI a
worId, a crIterIon on the basIs oI whIch we can decIde whether gIven persons beIong to
the same worId or not. An unambIguous crIterIon wIII be Iound when we reIIect on the
reIatIonshIp between the persons and the deIctIc temporaI adverbs, words such as
"now," "then," "today," "yesterday," or "tomorrow," they use. Two persons do not
share a common worId II It Is possIbIe that when they utter In some sense sImuItaneousIy
the word "now" (or any oI the deIctIc temporaI adverbs) It mIght not have the same
meanIng (or, more precIseIy, mIght not reIer to the same tIme). ThIs Is never possIbIe Ior
you and me and {p.168) hence we InhabIt a common worId. ut when hear IIchard,
uke oI GIoucester announce "ow Is the wInter oI our dIscontent . . . ," know that hIs
"now" does not reIer to the same tIme as my own "now," the "now" In whIch hear hIm,
and that, thereIore, we cannot beIong to the same worId. SImIIarIy, sInce the "now" oI the
narrator does not have to reIer to the same tIme as the "now" oI a personage In the
narrator's story, they beIong to two dIIIerent worIds.
11
To be sure, a narrator mIght be
teIIIng a story that happens sImuItaneousIy wIth hIs teIIIng It. ut thIs does not synchronIze
the "nows" oI the narrator and personage necessarIIy and permanentIy, because It Is
aIways possIbIe Ior the narrator to reteII the same story. The next tIme he teIIs It, the
"now" oI the personage wIII be In the past oI the "now" oI the narrator. ThIs Is because
the "now" oI the personage In the story reIers aIways to the same tIme each tIme the
story Is toId, whIIe the "now" oI the story-teIIIng narrator reIers to a dIIIerent tIme each
tIme he teIIs the story.
ote that thIs Is the case even when the narrator Is a personage In the story he narrates.
sInce hIs "now" as the narrator Is dIIIerent Irom hIs "now" as the personage, In hIs roIe as
the narrator he beIongs to a dIIIerent worId than the one he narrates and to whIch he
beIongs In hIs roIe oI a personage.
12
ote moreover, that, whIIe the Iack oI
synchronIzatIon oI the two "nows" Is verbaIIy expIIcIt when the narrator uses the past
tense-as Is hIs wont, the asynchronIsm obtaIns even In those storIes In whIch the teIIer
uses the present tense (whIch Is why one usuaIIy caIIs the tense the "hIstorIcaI present").
n cases oI thIs sort the reader must decIde whether the speaker teIIs a story (and the
author uses the dIegetIc mode) or reports on what he currentIy observes (and the mode
oI the text Is dramatIc). WhIIe the author may Ieave the reader wIthout a cIue, usuaIIy a
Presentation
Page 5 of 28
cIue Is provIded. n Chekhov's dreary taIe oI "Gusev," the speaker stIcks rIgorousIy to
the present tense, but by the tIme Gusev's dead body Is thrown overboard Into the
ocean and at a depth oI over sIxty Ieet Is encountered by a shark the reader reaIIzes that
thIs must be a story, It beIng most unIIkeIy that anyone wouId be observIng such a scene
dIrectIy. ut II It Is a story, the narrator's "now" must dIIIer Irom, be posterIor to, the
"nows" oI the unIortunate Gusev and the Iortunate shark, sInce the narrator presumabIy
knows the story's outcome In advance oI the teIIIng. Another kInd oI cIue, thIs tIme
expIIcItIy verbaI, Is provIded In Goethe's 1782 baIIad oI the "rIknIg." The narratIng
voIce, heard onIy In the IIrst and Iast stanzas, uses the present tense throughout to
report on the Iather's hurrIed nIght rIde home, hIs groanIng son In hIs arms, but swItches
to the preterIte In the Iast verse to descrIbe the outcome. "n seInen Armen das KInd
war tot" ("The chIId was dead In hIs arms"). Thus the narratIng voIce dIstances ItseII
suddenIy and IInaIIy Irom the narrated worId (the move paraIIeIed by Schubert In hIs
ceIebrated settIng when, Ior the Iast verse, he abandons the pIanIstIc reenactment oI the
breathIess rIde Ior the suddenIy dIstancIng objectIve tone oI the recItatIve).
ThIs asynchronIsm oI the narrator's and the personage's "nows" resuIts In what Is sureIy
the sIngIe most essentIaI Ieature oI diegesis. A IIterary work may {p.169) present a
narrator who, In turn, presents a worId whIch Is not hIs own. t IoIIows that whIIe the
worId presented dramatIcaIIy In a IIterary work may be a sIngIe worId, the worId
presented dIegetIcaIIy wIII consIst oI at Ieast two dIstInct ontoIogIcaI IeveIs, the
ImmedIateIy presented worId oI the narrator and the worId medIated by the voIce oI the
narrator. WhIIe the prImary Iocus oI the reader's attentIon Is usuaIIy on thIs Iatter
medIated worId, structuraIIy the narrated worId Is hIerarchIcaIIy subordInated to the
worId oI the narrator. One mIght aIso say that the Iormer Is embedded In, or dependent
on, the Iatter, sInce It Is the exIstence oI the narrator's voIce that makes the exIstence oI
the narrated worId possIbIe, and not the reverse.
The Iour terms oI the two modaI dIchotomIes, that between monophony and poIyphony
and that between diegesis and mimesis, may occur In actuaI IIterary works In every
possIbIe combInatIon. the dIegetIc mode Is usuaIIy monophonIc ("monophony" In the
sense In whIch the term Is used here wouId, oI course, In no way prevent a work Irom
beIng "poIyphonIc" In the sense Introduced by akhtIn), but a IIterary work may aIso
empIoy severaI ImmedIateIy speakIng voIces as narrators, the dramatIc mode Is usuaIIy
poIyphonIc, but a IIterary work may aIso empIoy a sIngIe ImmedIateIy speakIng voIce as a
personage (as In the dramatIc monoIogue). A mIxed mode, In whIch some oI the
ImmedIateIy speakIng voIces serve as narrators and others as personages, Is aIso
conceIvabIe. Moreover, we have aIready seen that a narrator can aIso be a personage (In
a story toId by hImseII or by another narrator), aIthough as a narrator he wIII beIong to a
dIIIerent, more IundamentaI or prImary, worId than the one he beIongs to as a
personage. ConverseIy, a personage can become a narrator In hIs own rIght, though
agaIn, as a narrator he wIII beIong to a dIIIerent, more IundamentaI, worId than the worId
he presents In hIs narratIon.
Two observatIons shouId be made at thIs poInt. IIrst, even though IIato and ArIstotIe
Presentation
Page 6 of 28
concentrated on the "narratIve" In the broad sense oI the term, that Is, on the IIterary
presentatIon oI events, oI men In actIon, and dIsregarded what we caII the "IyrIc," the
kInd oI poem whIch does not present the actIons one does, but the states one IInds
oneseII In, the modaI categorIes they Introduced cut across the narratIve-IyrIc dIstInctIon
and are appIIcabIe to the whoIe reaIm oI IIterature. (The dIstInctIon between the narratIve
and IyrIc wIII be the subject oI chapter 5.) n other words, the appIIcabIIIty oI modaI
categorIes does not depend on dIstInctIons based on the object oI presentatIon. Thus our
two modaI dIchotomIes are operatIve not onIy In the narratIve text-type or Iorm, but aIso
In the IyrIc. A poIyphonIc IyrIc Is conceIvabIe, though a monophonIc one Is Iar more usuaI.
And the IyrIcaI voIce may beIong eIther to a personage (whether ImpIIed or expIIcIt),
makIng no dIIIerence between hIs own "now" and the "now" oI the worId oI whIch he
speaks, or It may beIong to a narrator whose "now" Is not that oI the worId oI whIch he
speaks (as happens when he uses the preterIte).
Second, our two modaI dIchotomIes are operatIve In texts regardIess oI whether the
worId portrayed In them Is ImagInary (as In works oI IIctIon) or reaI (as In works oI
hIstory). ote In partIcuIar that not onIy the noveIIst, but {p.170) aIso the hIstorIan
presents In hIs work a narrator whose "now," and hence worId, Is dIIIerent Irom that oI
the worId whIch comes Into beIng In the narrator's story. The hIstorIan may try very hard
to keep the narrator as InconspIcuous as possIbIe, but he cannot make hIm dIsappear
compIeteIy. The very choIce oI the topIc, the arrangement oI the materIaI, the judgments
passed on the actors and events oI the narrated hIstory aIIow us to catch a gIImpse,
however IIeetIng, oI the narrator, ImpIy what kInd oI a person he Is, what hIs prIorItIes and
vaIues are.
The resuIts reached thus Iar may be summarIzed as IoIIows. IIrst, a IIterary work must
present Its content by means oI at Ieast one ImmedIateIy speakIng voIce (monophony) and
It may empIoy many such voIces (poIyphony). Second, an ImmedIateIy speakIng voIce may
beIong to a personage, that Is, a speaker who Is hImseII a part oI the worId hIs speech
presents (the dramatIc mode), or It may beIong to a narrator, that Is, a speaker who teIIs
us oI a worId oI whIch he hImseII Is not a part (the dIegetIc mode). ThIrd, both the
personage and the narrator beIong to the worId presented In the IIterary work, but whIIe
the worId presented dramatIcaIIy may be a sIngIe worId, the worId presented dIegetIcaIIy
must consIst oI at Ieast two dIstInct and hIerarchIcaIIy reIated ontoIogIcaI IeveIs, the worId
to whIch the narrator beIongs and the dIIIerent, subordInated, worId whIch he presents.
AII the ImmedIate (as weII as, oI course, aII the reported) voIces and theIr speakers are
presented In the IIterary work. That Is to say, they are not just the way In whIch the
work's content Is presented, the work's "how," as IIato wouId say, but aIso a component
oI thIs content ItseII, oI the work's "what," or, to use ArIstotIe's terms, they are not onIy
the whoIe oI the mode, but aIso a part oI the object oI representatIon. To put It more
precIseIy, the worId whIch comes Into beIng, Is made present, In the work does not
consIst onIy oI the represented "object," that Is, the "materIaI" exIstents, such as the
actIng (suIIerIng) and speakIng (IIstenIng, wrItIng, readIng, thInkIng) personages and the
settIngs In whIch they act and speak, as weII as the "IormaI" reIatIonshIps among them. t
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consIsts aIso oI the "mode" oI representatIon ItseII, that Is, the ImmedIateIy speakIng
voIces and theIr speakers. ThIs Is obvIousIy the case In the dramatIc mode In whIch aII the
ImmedIateIy speakIng voIces beIong to the represented personages. Iess obvIousIy, thIs
Is aIso the case In the dIegetIc mode. the narratIng voIce Is not onIy a medIum oI
presentatIon, but aIso a component oI the presented worId, even though the narrator
may be reaIIzed wIth varyIng degrees oI compIeteness, rangIng Irom a IuIIy rounded and
expIIcIt personage to an attenuated and dIsembodIed voIce, and even though the worId oI
the narrator dIIIers Irom the narrated worId.
b. The Modes n Pantng and Musc
We have seen that In a IIterary work the mode and the matter oI presentatIon overIap,
but onIy In part. whIIe aII the ImmedIateIy speakIng voIces, that Is, the mode oI
presentatIon, are at the same tIme, as personages and narrators, a part oI the presented
matter, not aII oI the matter must aIso be the mode. n other {p.171) words, aII oI the
voIces that do the presentIng are aIso presented, but not everythIng that Is presented Is
aIso engaged In presentIng. Some or even aII oI the personages may never become a part
oI the mode and none oI the settIng ever does. t Is precIseIy because the overIap
between the mode and matter In a IIterary work Is onIy partIaI that It Is sometImes useIuI
to dIstInguIsh between the two. ow It Is strIkIng that In most paIntIng and musIc the
mode and matter seem to overIap so compIeteIy that the dIstInctIon between them
coIIapses. ut In each oI these arts thIs happens In a somewhat dIIIerent way. One mIght
be tempted to thInk, nameIy, that In paIntIng the mode Is absorbed by the matter, whIIe In
musIc the matter dIsappears Into the mode.
I one wanted to IInd In paIntIng somethIng anaIogous to the ImmedIateIy speakIng voIces
oI IIterature, one wouId have to enIarge the scope oI the notIon oI "voIce" to IncIude a
person's way oI communIcatIng hIs meanIng by addressIng not onIy our sense oI hearIng,
but aIso our sense oI sIght, that Is, to IncIude not onIy hIs speech, but aIso hIs totaI aspect,
especIaIIy the IacIaI expressIon and gestures. A IIterary personage communIcates hIs
meanIng by means oI speech, a paInted one by means oI aspect. Once we have enIarged
the scope oI the notIon oI voIce to IncIude not onIy speech but aIso appearance, however,
we notIce ImmedIateIy that a IIgure In a paIntIng communIcates In exactIy the same way as
the settIng does. n a IIterary work, the personage may present hImseII, but the settIng
can onIy be presented (by a personage or the narrator). n a paIntIng, the settIng
presents ItseII just as much as a personage does. ut II thIs Is so, II-as It appears-
everythIng presents ItseII and nothIng Is mereIy presented, the dIstInctIon between the
mode and the matter oI presentatIon seems to Iose aII useIuIness In paIntIng.
y contrast wIth paIntIng, In musIc It wouId be easy to taIk about the mode oI
presentatIon. ut just as In paIntIng, aIso In musIc It seems to be ImpossIbIe to dIstInguIsh
the mode Irom the matter oI presentatIon. The concept oI mode IIts musIc In a most
naturaI way, because the notIon oI voIce has been very much at home In musIc theory Ior
centurIes. ThIs was onIy to be expected, so Iong as the most sophIstIcated art musIc (the
kInd that was most IIkeIy to become the object oI theorIzIng) was predomInantIy or
excIusIveIy vocaI. A "voIce" In a composItIon was sImpIy a meIodIc IIne. I there was onIy
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one such IIne, the composItIon was "monophonIc," II there were two or more
sImuItaneous IInes, It was "poIyphonIc." The graduaIIy IncreasIng Importance and
Independence oI Instruments dId not brIng any essentIaI change In thIs respect, sInce a
meIodIc IIne can be carrIed by an Instrument just as weII as by a human voIce. t dId
Introduce, however, a new texturaI possIbIIIty ("homophony"), In whIch a IuIIy IntegraI
meIodIc IIne Is gIven an "accompanIment," a kInd oI a soundscape settIng whIch does not
quIte attaIn the IuII IntegrIty oI shape and contInuIty that an Independent IIne possesses,
but can have a degree oI motIvIc deIInItIon oI Its own. Much oI the texturaI Interest oI
musIc wrItten aIter 1780 IIes In the Iact that the boundary between a IIne and Its
accompanIment may become bIurred, that a meIodIc motII can joIn the accompanIment
and the reverse, an accompanImentaI {p.172) motII can be meIodIcaIIy thematIzed. On
occasIon It Is even ImpossIbIe to decIde whether what we hear Is a meIody or an
accompanIment, the musIc can be heard both ways. ut even when such possIbIe
ambIguItIes have been taken Into account, everythIng that we hear In a pIece oI musIc Is
eIther a IIne, or Its accompanIment, or both. Iowever, IIke In paIntIng In whIch aII matter
seems aIways to present ItseII, aIso In musIc both the IIne and the accompanIment seem
aIways to present themseIves and never to be mereIy presented. (Another way oI makIng
thIs poInt mIght be to say that the pIctorIaI and musIcaI voIces, unIIke the IIterary ones,
seem to be abIe to use onIy the IIrst-person pronouns, "" and "we.") ut II thIs Is so,
then-agaIn-It appears that the dIstInctIon between the mode and the matter oI
presentatIon Ioses Its useIuIness aIso In musIc.
ote In thIs context that Adorno's cIaIm "that |MahIer's| musIc perIorms ItseII, has ItseII
Ior the content, narrates wIthout the narrated"
13
Ioses Its aIr oI paradox when musIc
stops beIng compared wIth IIterature (where we normaIIy expect a voIce to present
somethIng other than ItseII In addItIon to presentIng ItseII) and Is compared wIth paIntIng
Instead (where we do not expect a "voIce" to present anythIng other than ItseII). MusIc's
Iack oI "reIerentIaIIty" wIII stop troubIIng us when, Instead oI expectIng It to behave IIke
Ianguage, we notIce that In thIs respect It Is more akIn to paIntIng. A depIcted IIgure does
not "reIer" to anythIng, It sImpIy appears. IIke a musIcaI voIce, It says somethIng wIthout
our beIng abIe to teII what It says, or, more precIseIy, wIthout our beIng abIe to
dIstInguIsh Its appearance Irom what It says. I thIs does not troubIe us when we thInk
about paIntIng, there Is no reason why It shouId when musIc Is our subject.
ncIdentaIIy, It probabIy goes wIthout sayIng that the cIaIm that In paIntIng and musIc
everythIng seems to present ItseII and nothIng to be mereIy presented shouId not be
construed to mean that the matter presentIng ItseII may never brIng to mInd somethIng
other than ItseII. ThIs Is obvIousIy not the case In paIntIng, where one InvarIabIy sees the
paInted IIgures and settIngs In the context, so to speak, oI those we know Irom other
sources-paInted, wrItten, or reaI. ut even In abstract InstrumentaI musIc, the IInes and
accompanIments oIten brIng to mInd somethIng other than themseIves, II they have
prevIousIy been assocIated wIth thIs "somethIng other," prevIousIy, that Is, In the course
oI the cuIturaI tradItIon (the way IanIares sound mIIItary and menuets arIstocratIc), or In
the course oI a partIcuIar work (In the manner oI a WagnerIan IeItmotII). The cIaIm that In
paIntIng and musIc everythIng seems to present ItseII and nothIng to be mereIy
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presented means onIy that In these two arts, unIIke In vIsuaI or auraI traIIIc sIgns or In
Ianguage when It Is reduced to Its reIerentIaI IunctIon, what presents ItseII cannot be
bypassed wIthout a Ioss oI somethIng essentIaI.
Iowever, the cIaIm that In paIntIng and musIc everythIng presents ItseII and nothIng Is
mereIy presented, whIIe generaIIy correct, has to be revIsed II we are to account Ior
some sIgnIIIcant phenomena. Iet us consIder how the categorIes oI eIements that
constItute, sIngIy or In any combInatIon, the worId presented In the IIterary work (nameIy,
the settIng, the personage, and the narrator) compare wIth those constItutIng the worIds
presented In paIntIngs and musIcaI works. My {p.173) cIaIm wIII be that whIIe we may
easIIy IInd anaIogues Ior the settIng and the personage In paIntIng and musIc, a true
narratIve voIce Is more dIIIIcuIt to Iocate and may be somethIng oI a rarIty In these two
arts. ormaIIy, the settIng and the personage, or theIr anaIogues, exhaust the IIst oI
categorIes oI eIements that constItute the worIds presented In a paIntIng or musIcaI work.
We have observed above that the onIy way to make the notIon oI "voIce" or "speaker"
appIIcabIe not onIy to IIterature and musIc but aIso to paIntIng, was to enIarge Its scope to
IncIude not onIy speech but aIso appearance. Once we do that, we can see that In
IIguratIve paIntIng the presented human IIgure Is the exact anaIogue oI the IIterary
personage and the naturaI or man-made surroundIngs oI the IIgure become strIctIy
anaIogous to the IIterary settIng. n such genres as Iandscape or stIII IIIe, the settIng can
emancIpate ItseII Irom the human IIgure and be an Independent theme, just as In some
portraIts the settIng may be IeIt aImost entIreIy IndIstInct. ut In any case, the personage
and the settIng are the onIy categorIes oI eIements oI the worId normaIIy presentabIe In
IIguratIve paIntIng.
The anaIogues that can be Iound In abstract paIntIng Ior settIng and personage are much
Iess exact. We have aIready Iearned that much abstract paIntIng Is a specIes oI
representatIonaI paIntIng. ow one can IInd Inexact anaIogues oI the personage and the
settIng even In abstract paIntIng, because the ImagInary worId presented In It must
consIst oI the IIgure(s) and the more or Iess dIstInct (back)ground agaInst whIch It Is (they
are) seen. To be sure, just as In InstrumentaI musIc sInce the Iate eIghteenth century It Is
occasIonaIIy ImpossIbIe to decIde whether what we hear Is a meIody or an
accompanIment, so In paIntIng oI our own century (and not onIy abstract works-thInk oI
cubIsm) It Is oIten ImpossIbIe to decIde whether what we see Is IIgure or ground, the
paIntIng can be seen both ways. ut even when such possIbIe ambIguItIes have been
taken Into account, everythIng that we see In a paIntIng, whether IIguratIve or abstract, Is
eIther IIgure, or ground, or both. The paIntIng beIng abstract, the IIgure cannot be
IdentIIIed as human, or as any other kInd oI recognIzabIe object. ut sInce the IIne
dIvIdIng the abstract Irom the IIguratIve paIntIng Is bIurred, the IIgure may be
anthropomorphIc, or-more generaIIy-It may, but does not have to, resembIe to a
degree any kInd oI vIsuaI object.
So much Ior the anaIogues oI the personage and settIng In paIntIng, whether IIguratIve or
abstract. To turn now to musIc, the use oI voIces utterIng texts Is what IIterary works and
pIeces oI vocaI musIc have In common. t IoIIows that In vocaI musIc (whether
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accompanIed by Instruments or not) the exact anaIogue oI the personage's voIce Is the
meIodIc IIne carrIed by the human voIce. A sInger oI such a IIne Is doIng exactIy what an
actor does when he recItes hIs part, they both Impersonate. I there Is an
accompanIment, Its IunctIon Is anaIogous to that oI the settIng, nameIy, to provIde an
envIronment Ior the personage, a background agaInst whIch he may appear.
These anaIogIes are maIntaIned, aIthough Iess exactIy, In pureIy InstrumentaI musIc as
weII. As KendaII I. WaIton has poInted out, "most or even aII musIc wIII IIkeIy have to be
consIdered representatIonaI" Ior reasons anaIogous to those {p.174) brought Iorward
by IIchard WoIIheIm In support oI hIs thesIs that both IIguratIve and abstract paIntIng are
specIes oI representatIonaI art.
14
AIso In musIc we make a dIstInctIon between the
meIodIc IInes and the accompanIment, or-more generaIIy-between IIgures and a more
or Iess dIstInct ground agaInst whIch they appear. SInce a pIece oI InstrumentaI musIc, no
Iess than a vocaI one, presents a worId consIstIng oI IIgures heard agaInst a more or Iess
dIstInct ground, one can IInd Inexact anaIogues oI the personage (the IIne) and the settIng
(the accompanIment) even In InstrumentaI musIc. The anaIogues are Iess exact than In
vocaI musIc, because the IIne may be so Iar removed Irom the vocaI styIe oI meIody and
Irom any kInd oI movement a human body mIght make that we wouId not want to
attrIbute It to a human source. ut the reverse Is aIso true. the IIne may be strongIy
anthropomorphIc, It may preserve to some extent a vocaI character, or the character oI a
styIIzed human movement, and hence aIso an IntImatIon oI a human utterance or
appearance, even when It Is carrIed by an Instrument rather than a voIce. One mIght say
that vocaI and InstrumentaI musIc dIIIer In the degree oI abstractIon oI the concepts
under whIch we brIng what we hear. n vocaI musIc we usuaIIy attrIbute the meIodIc IIne
to a human personage. n InstrumentaI musIc, or In vocaI musIc wIth Independent
(obbligcto Is the technIcaI term) InstrumentaI IIne(s), the InstrumentaI IIne can sometImes
be attrIbuted to a source that resembIes to a certaIn degree a human person or another
object we couId name, but It can aIso remaIn so abstract that we wIII not be tempted to
attrIbute It to a human or any other kInd oI recognIzabIe source. (ncIdentaIIy, It wIII not
have escaped us by now to what extent the reIatIonshIp between vocaI and InstrumentaI
musIc resembIes the one between IIguratIve and abstract paIntIng.) "!nderstandIng
musIc," wrItes Ioger Scruton, "InvoIves the actIve creatIon oI an IntentIonaI worId, In
whIch Inert sounds are transIIgured Into movements, harmonIes, rhythms-metaphorIcaI
gestures In a metaphorIcaI space. And Into these metaphorIcaI gestures a metaphorIcaI
souI Is breathed by the sympathetIc IIstener."
15
Iowever, whIIe we couId IInd wIth IIttIe dIIIIcuIty more or Iess exact anaIogues oI the
IIterary personage and settIng In paIntIng and musIc, It Is Iess easy to IdentIIy a narrator In
eIther oI these two arts. Iet us recaII that a IIterary work that empIoys the dIegetIc mode
must present Its content by means oI at Ieast one ImmedIateIy speakIng voIce beIongIng to
a narrator, a speaker who teIIs us oI a worId oI whIch he hImseII Is not a part, the worId
presented dIegetIcaIIy must aIso consIst oI at Ieast two dIstInct and hIerarchIcaIIy reIated
ontoIogIcaI IeveIs, the worId to whIch the narrator beIongs and the dIIIerent,
subordInated, worId whIch he presents. Thus the dIegetIc mode InvoIves IIrst, the
hIerarchIcaI reIatIonshIp between the worId oI the narrator and the presented worId, wIth
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the Iatter embedded so to speak In the Iormer, second, the ImmedIateIy speakIng voIce oI
the narrator, and thIrd, the presented worId medIated by the narrator's voIce. We
shouId ask now whether any oI these three Ieatures oI diegesis Is possIbIe In paIntIng and
In musIc.
To begIn wIth paIntIng, there can be IIttIe doubt that somethIng very much {p.175) akIn
to the IIrst Ieature oI diegesis Is possIbIe there. The worId presented In a paIntIng may be
spIIt Into two hIerarchIcaIIy reIated IeveIs when the paIntIng presents a pIcture-wIthIn-a-
pIcture. (We shouId not consIder here those Iate medIevaI paneIs that sImuItaneousIy
present severaI epIsodes Irom the IIIe oI a saInt when they are not hIerarchIcaIIy reIated
but sImpIy juxtaposed, sInce such paneIs may have been Intended to be taken serIaIIy,
IIke a comIc strIp, rather than as a sIngIe pIcture.) A pIcture-wIthIn-a-pIcture presents a
secondary, ontoIogIcaIIy Iess IundamentaI, dependent worId embedded In the prImary,
Independent, IundamentaI one. The sImpIest case Is a paIntIng that presents a room wIth a
paIntIng hangIng on the waII. (n spIte oI IntrIguIng sImIIarItIes, a mIrror, or a wIndow,
wouId not quIte do, sInce what It reIIects, or opens to, Is the prImary worId oI the
paIntIng, not a secondary one.) More compIex and possIbIy ambIguous cases may arIse
when the InternaI Irame separatIng the pIcture-wIthIn-a-pIcture Irom the rest oI the maIn
pIcture Is not expIIcItIy marked but onIy ImpIIed by, say, the dIIIerent scaIe oI the objects
presented wIthIn It. The sItuatIon Is stIII more ambIguous, hopeIessIy so, In abstract
paIntIng. An InternaI Irame Is, oI course, entIreIy possIbIe there, but It may be that II we
are ever IncIIned to see the worId wIthIn the Irame as dIIIerent Irom the one outsIde, It Is
onIy by anaIogy wIth and In remInIscence oI the IIguratIve paIntIngs we have seen. And the
ambIguIty Is hopeIess, because we can never decIde whether the InternaI Irame remInds
us oI one deIImItIng a pIcture hangIng on the waII, a mIrror, or a wIndow. evertheIess, II
the contrast between what Is wIthIn and what Is outsIde the InternaI Irame Is suIIIcIentIy
great, we may be tempted to Interpret the worId wIthIn the Irame as dIIIerent Irom the
one outsIde.
SomethIng IIke the second Ieature oI the dIegetIc mode, the ImmedIateIy speakIng voIce oI
the narrator, may aIso appear In paIntIng, provIded we accept our earIIer observatIon
that we have to enIarge the scope oI the notIon oI "voIce" to IncIude not onIy speech, but
aIso appearance. A human IIgure presented In a paIntIng may gesture towards the
pIcture-wIthIn-a-pIcture and thus IunctIon IIke the narrator, the ImmedIateIy speakIng
voIce presentIng a worId oI whIch he hImseII Is not a part. St. john the aptIst who poInts
toward martyred jesus and says "ehoId the Iamb oI God" (as In Ioger van der
Weyden's Brcque Triptych In the Iouvre, or In the CrucIIIxIon paneI oI MathIas
GrunewaId's lsenheim Altcrpiece oI 1515 at CoImar) acts as a narrator, sInce, not havIng
been present at the crucIIIxIon, he cannot beIong to the worId toward whIch he dIrects
our attentIon. Ior obvIous reasons such a IIgure cannot appear In abstract paIntIng. ut
we shouId remember that aIso In IIterature the narratIng voIce may be aImost compIeteIy
dIsembodIed, that the source oI thIs voIce does not have to come Into Iocus as a
personage. Thus we may have somethIng IIke the narratIng voIce In paIntIng even wIthout
the expIIcItIy presented human IIgure gesturIng towards the pIcture-wIthIn-a-pIcture,
sInce the worId outsIde the InternaI Irame may be saId to present In a sense the worId
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wIthIn the Irame. n a representatIon oI an empty room wIth a paIntIng hangIng on the waII,
It Is the room ItseII-oI whIch the paIntIng on the waII, understood as a "reaI" object, Is a
part-that presents {p.176) the worId oI the paIntIng on the waII. WIthout the room,
specIIIcaIIy wIthout the paIntIng on the waII understood as a "reaI" object, as a part oI the
room's IurnIture, the worId presented In the paIntIng on the waII couId not appear, just as
the worId presented by the narratIng voIce couId not appear wIthout thIs voIce.
ThIs observatIon has an InterestIng but potentIaIIy mIsIeadIng coroIIary. t mIght be
concIuded, nameIy, that the IundamentaI structure oI any work oI art Is In a certaIn sense
aIways "dIegetIc," sInce the work Is aIways a reaI object (an object exIstIng In the "now" oI
the reaI worId) that medIates an "ImagInary" or "IntentIonaI" presented worId (wIth Its
own, dIIIerent, "now"). ThIs Is correct, but the crucIaIIy Important poInt to keep In mInd
here Is that the work as the reaI object Is outside the presented worId, whIIe the
narratIve voIce must be within It.
And here we have aIready crossed over to the thIrd Ieature oI the dIegetIc mode. I the
observatIons made above are correct, It must be possIbIe to have In paIntIng a presented
worId medIated by the narratIng voIce, sInce the worId oI the pIcture-wIthIn-a-pIcture Is
necessarIIy medIated or presented by the worId outsIde the InternaI Irame. ote that the
Iatter two Ieatures oI diegesis are In a sense redundant, sInce they are aIready ImpIIed
by the IIrst Ieature. Thus the hIerarchIcaI reIatIonshIp between two worIds, or two
ontoIogIcaI IeveIs, Is aII we need to IdentIIy the presence oI the dIegetIc mode. ut II we
want the narratIng "voIce" to become expIIcIt as the personage oI the narrator, we must
have a human IIgure gesturIng towards the pIcture-wIthIn-a-pIcture.
One mIght be tempted to object here that we have overIooked an Important dIstInctIon
between paIntIng and IIterature. I In a IIguratIve paIntIng presentIng a pIcture-wIthIn-a-
pIcture we take away the InternaI Irame and everythIng outsIde oI It, we wIII be IeIt wIth a
presentatIon In the pureIy dramatIc mode and no trace oI any diegesis, wIthout havIng to
repaInt anythIng wIthIn the InternaI Irame. I, on the other hand, In a IIterary work
presented In the dIegetIc mode we take away the voIce oI the narrator, It mIght requIre
consIderabIe rewrItIng to obIIterate aII traces oI diegesis and transIorm the presentatIon
Into the dramatIc mode. ThIs Is, oI course, a correct observatIon. ts sIgnIIIcance,
however, shouId not be overestImated. When transIormIng a IIterary presentatIon Irom
the dIegetIc Into the dramatIc mode, we are Iorced to rewrIte what remaIns aIter the
narratIng voIce had been removed onIy II IndIrect speech was used. We then have to put
everythIng the personages say Into dIrect speech. AII that our observatIon means Is that
IndIrect speech Is possIbIe onIy In IIterature and not In paIntIng. ThIs, however, cannot
constItute an objectIon to our showIng how the dIegetIc mode can arIse In paIntIng, sInce
aIso In IIterature we can have diegesis wIthout the use oI IndIrect speech.
The concIusIons we have reached concernIng paIntIng are ImmedIateIy reIevant to an
understandIng oI the dIegetIc potentIaI oI musIc. SInce In a vocaI IIne the text usuaIIy
Imposes Its mode on the musIc, the voIce oI the narrator Is, oI course, entIreIy possIbIe
there (thInk oI the vangeIIst In a ach IassIon). ut Is It aIso possIbIe when the text has
been subtracted Irom the meIodIc IIne, or was never attached to It, In InstrumentaI musIc,
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or In the obbligcto InstrumentaI {p.177) voIces oI vocaI-InstrumentaI works? The key
questIon, we have just seen, Is whether one mIght be abIe to present In an InstrumentaI
IIne two hIerarchIcaIIy reIated worIds, one embedded In the other. To ask thIs questIon In
a more precIse, and potentIaIIy more IruItIuI, way, can an InstrumentaI voIce, In addItIon
to presentIng ItseII, medIate another voIce (or accompanIment), beIongIng to a dIIIerent
worId, wIthout sImpIy becomIng thIs other voIce? ow It Is Important to reaIIze that the
way an InstrumentaI voIce maIntaIns Its IdentIty In a pIece Is crucIaIIy dependent on the
IdentIty oI the Instrument (or, In the case oI the orchestraI rather than soIoIstIc or
chamber-musIc texture, Instruments) that perIorm It. As Adorno put It, In the orchestraI
texture "the sound aIone presents a We as the musIcaI subject."
16
n the case oI
Instruments capabIe oI poIyphony, such as the organ or pIano, It Is the regIster wIthIn
whIch the voIce moves that Is crucIaI. (To be sure, the sItuatIon Is Iurther compIIcated by
the Iact that actuaIIy used Instruments may combIne Into ImagInary "super-Instruments"
to such an extent that even a whoIe orchestra mIght be conceIved oI as a sIngIe muItI-
coIored "super-Instrument." Moreover, It may on occasIon be ImpossIbIe to decIde
whether the musIc Is pIayed by a sIngIe ImagInary "Instrument," or by many such
"Instruments", the musIc may be IegItImateIy heard In severaI dIIIerent ways.
17
ut thIs
added compIIcatIon does not crucIaIIy aIIect our argument here.) Once thIs Is
understood, we can see that an InstrumentaI voIce can maIntaIn Its IdentIty whIIe
medIatIng another voIce, because the IdentIty oI the Instrument (or Instruments, or
regIster) may be preserved, even when what the Instrument pIays beIongs In some
sense to someone eIse, to another voIce.
ut how can an InstrumentaI voIce approprIate the "speech" oI another voIce? ThIs can
happen onIy when what the Instrument pIays has been "saId" or pIayed earIIer, by
someone or somethIng eIse, In the same pIece or In a dIIIerent one, In or outsIde oI musIc,
that Is, when the InstrumentaI voIce IIteraIIy quotes Irom, or Iess-then-IIteraIIy aIIudes to,
someone eIse's "speech." AIso In IIterature, quotatIon and aIIusIon, IIke aII medIated
speech, are IntrInsIcaIIy and InescapabIy dIegetIc. presently quote or aIIude to (medIate)
what someone eIse saId In the pcst. A quotatIon or aIIusIon comes aIways wIth the expIIcIt
or ImpIIed dIegetIc tag. "saId X." Through the gates oI quotatIon and aIIusIon the
narrator's preterIte enters musIcaI dIscourse, separatIng the "now" oI the ImmedIateIy
heard InstrumentaI voIce Irom the anterIor "now" oI the medIated voIce.
The Iess IIteraI the aIIusIon, the more ambIguous Its status. The borderIIne between
aIIusIon and nonaIIusIon Is not razor-sharp, and In InterpretIng what a voIce says we
shouId resIst the temptatIon oI tryIng to decIde the undecIdabIe cases. t Is useIess, Ior
Instance, to appeaI to the author's IntentIon, sInce, on the one hand, an aIIusIon may be
InvoIuntary and, on the other, It may be unsuccessIuIIy reaIIzed.
oth quotatIon and aIIusIon-that Is, one voIce's approprIatIon oI another voIce's specIIIc
IndIvIduaI utterance-must be dIstInguIshed Irom the much more common, InescapabIe
even, use oI generaIIzed Ieatures oI a Ianguage, styIe, or genre by the voIce. The Iatter
does not have the dIegetIc structure. Whether In {p.178) Ianguage, paIntIng, or musIc,
there Is no such thIng as a perIectIy IndIvIduaI utterance. n speakIng, we must aIways
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use a Ianguage whIch Is not oI our own makIng. t does not IoIIow that, as IeIdegger
seems to suggest on occasIon, It Is not we but Ianguage that speaks, that an utterance can
never be IndIvIduaI (we can and do sometImes say somethIng new and we can even,
rareIy, extend the IImIts oI the Ianguage), but onIy that the IndIvIduaIIty can be no more
than reIatIve.
18
ut neIther shouId we draw Irom akhtIn a concIusIon hIs work does not
warrant to the eIIect that every voIce (In the prose oI the noveI, at Ieast) Is "doubIe-
voIced," or "dIaIogIzed," or "heterogIot" to the same degree, that we couId make no
dIstInctIons concernIng the reIatIve expIIcItness or ImpIIcItness wIth whIch a gIven voIce
uncovers or hIdes a muItIpIIcIty oI voIces It makes use oI.
19
very IndIvIduaI utterance
must make use oI generaIIzed Ieatures oI a Ianguage, styIe, or genre, but onIy some
utterances quote or aIIude to other specIIIc IndIvIduaI utterances and thus acquIre
dIegetIc structure.
Thus Iar we have consIdered onIy one voIce's approprIatIon oI another voIce's "speech."
ut, In IIterature at Ieast, seII-quotatIon and -aIIusIon are aIso possIbIe and they too have a
dIegetIc structure. quote "now" what saId In another "now." Are they aIso possIbIe In
musIc? Iet us observe that In cases oI both IIterary and musIcaI seII-quotatIon or -aIIusIon
the matter quoted or aIIuded to wouId have to be InternaI to the gIven work (though thIs
mIght consIst oI severaI parts or movements), sInce the "speakIng seII" retaIns Its IdentIty
onIy wIthIn the boundarIes oI the work, It wouId make IIttIe sense to cIaIm that the
narrator oI one noveI Is "the same" as that oI another noveI, or that the IIrst vIoIIn
represents "the same voIce" In aII strIng quartets. (One mIght thInk that a IIterary voIce
that portrays a reaI person constItutes an exceptIon, sInce here the IdentIty oI the
speaker mIght be taken to transcend the IImIts oI the work. ut In Iact It Is the IdentIty oI
the portrayed modeI that transcends the IImIts oI the work, not the IdentIty oI the
speaker.) ThIs dIstInctIon apart, seII-quotatIon and -aIIusIon are no dIIIerent In character
Irom other kInds oI quotatIon and aIIusIon and are equaIIy possIbIe In musIc as they are In
IIterature.
The bIg dIIIerence between the two arts In thIs respect Is quantItatIve. MusIc toIerates
and thrIves on an IncomparabIy greater amount oI ImmedIate repetItIon, recapItuIatIon
(the return oI the same or sImIIar materIaI aIter an IntervenIng dIscourse), and
eIaboratIon (such as varIatIon or deveIopment) oI the materIaI than IIterature. n a sense,
musIc recompensates In thIs way Ior Its Iack oI those Ieatures (such as the tenses or
deIctIc temporaI adverbs) that commonIy estabIIsh the dIegetIc mode In IIterature.
One mIght object here that to treat, say, an ImmedIate and exact repetItIon oI a phrase as
a case oI (seII-)quotatIon and to attrIbute to It the dIegetIc structure stretches both the
notIon oI quotatIon and that oI diegesis beyond acceptabIe IImIts. And yet, whether or not
we caII such a case quotatIon, Its dIegetIc structure Is undenIabIe. ven the sImpIest
ImmedIate repetItIon oI a statement (whether In musIc or IIterature) dIIIers IundamentaIIy
Irom the orIgInaI statement {p.179) In that, whIIe the Iatter caIIs onIy Ior the recognItIon
that somethIng Is saId In the "now" oI the present speaker, the Iormer addItIonaIIy
requIres that we recognIze that thIs somethIng has aIready been saId beIore In the "now"
oI the then-speaker (agaIn, It does not matter whether the two speakers are the same or
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two dIIIerent voIces).
ecause the practIces oI repetItIon, recapItuIatIon, and eIaboratIon are so wIdespread In
musIc, musIcaI voIces very IrequentIy wouId seem to acquIre the narratIng character. In
addItIon to speakIng and presentIng themseIves "now," they wouId seem to medIate
somethIng saId (by themseIves or by other voIces) In another "now," that Is, to present
themseIves as weII as somethIng beIongIng to a worId dIIIerent Irom the one they
themseIves beIong to. The Important task Ior a crItIc Is to dIstInguIsh truIy InterestIng
cases oI dIegetIc utterance In musIc Irom these ubIquItous and hence rather trIvIaI
practIces. The return oI the exposItIon themes In the recapItuIatIon oI a sonata movement
Is expected and hence does not advertIse Its dIegetIc character. The sItuatIon Is dIIIerent
when the thematIc recaII Is not dIctated by the estabIIshed IormaI and generIc
conventIons. When In the IIght-hearted AIIegretto IInaIe oI eethoven's StrIng uartet In
b
, Op. 18 o. 6, the musIc oI the Introductory AdagIo "Ia maIInconIa" Is unexpectedIy
recaIIed just beIore the coda, the eIIect Is that oI a mInd drawn Irom Its present careIree
state to a remembrance oI the meIanchoIy experIenced In the past. As CharIes Iosen has
observed, "eethoven Is the IIrst composer to represent the compIex process oI
memory-not mereIy the sense oI Ioss and regret that accompanIes vIsIons oI the past,
but the physIcaI experIence oI caIIIng up the past wIthIn the present."
20
ndeed, one oI
eethoven's great dIscoverIes was that musIc Is capabIe oI the past tense, In the sense
that It can represent a mInd abandonIng Its present concerns In Iavor oI a recoIIectIon oI
somethIng In the past.
21
Such moments oI wIthdrawaI Irom the here and now are
possIbIe, however, onIy when the normaI musIcaI dIscourse Is ruptured In some way.
!nIIke IIterature, InstrumentaI musIc contaIns moments oI sIgnIIIcant diegesis onIy rareIy
and dId not seem to have any at aII beIore eethoven.
22
Our dIscovery oI the dIegetIc dImensIon oI quotatIon and aIIusIon Iorces us to backtrack
Ior a moment and consIder whether they are aIso possIbIe In paIntIng. Iere IIteraI
quotatIon or Iess-then-IIteraI aIIusIon have the structure oI someone or somethIng
appearIng ImmedIateIy In the pIcture and at the same tIme medIatIng the appearance oI
someone or somethIng eIse, someone or somethIng beIongIng to a dIIIerent worId,
someone or somethIng that had appeared beIore somewhere eIse, In another pIcture, or
In reaIIty. Thus In Manet's Fortrcit oj Emile Zolc (1868, Musee d'Orsay), the
reproductIon oI the paInter's Olympic (1863, Musee d'Orsay) attached to the waII oI
ZoIa's study Is a quotatIon. the rectanguIar pIece oI paper marked wIth IInes and coIors
that ImmedIateIy appears In the portraIt medIates the Image we may have seen beIore.
The Image oI the IarIsIan prostItute herseII, as It ImmedIateIy appears In Manet's
Olympic, aIIudes to (medIates) a specIIIc earIIer Image oI the OIympIan goddess {p.180)
oI Iove, In TItIan's Venus oj Urbino (1538-39, !IIIzI). As aIways, the dIstInctIon between
quotatIon and aIIusIon Is not razor-sharp. t Is, rather, the dIIIerence In the degree oI
IIteraIness wIth whIch an earIIer Image Is medIated by a Iater one.
IIve observatIons are In order here. IIrst, whIIe what a quotatIon or aIIusIon reIers to
may be by ItseII outsIde the worId oI the work, the quotatIon or aIIusIon Induct It, so to
speak, Into the worId oI the work. I In InterpretIng thIs worId we do not notIce, or
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dIsregard, the quotatIon or aIIusIon, we mIss a Ieature oI the worId we Interpret, not
somethIng externaI to It. "ntertextuaIIty" Is not an optIonaI Ieature oI readIng, It Is oI the
essence. A reader who, upon scannIng a Wcll Street ]ourncl headIIne "AprII Is the
crueIest month," thInks onIy oI the recessIon bottomIng out notIces Iess oI what Is out
there than one whose thoughts oI the recessIon are accompanIed by a grander vIsIon oI a
decayIng cIvIIIzatIon.
Second, a portrayaI oI a reaI person or object Is cIearIy a specIes oI "quotatIon/aIIusIon" In
the enIarged sense In whIch these terms are used here. t dIIIers Irom the other kInd oI
quotatIon/aIIusIon In that what It quotes or aIIudes to exIsts In reaIIty rather than In the
pIctorIaI tradItIon. n thIs sense, In Manet's Zolc the Image oI the wrIter hImseII Is no Iess a
quotatIon than Is the Image oI the paInter's Olympic. y the same token, aIso a IIterary
portrayaI oI a reaI person, event, or object (as In a work oI a bIographer or hIstorIan) Is a
specIes oI quotatIon/aIIusIon. here aIso someone or somethIng present In the worId oI the
IIterary work medIates the appearance oI someone or somethIng eIse that beIongs to
another, reaI worId. MusIc may sImIIarIy quote or aIIude to sounds oI the reaI worId
(thInk oI the revoIver shots or the cIIckIng oI the typewrIter In rIk SatIe's bcllet rcliste
oI 1917, Fcrcde).
ThIrd, just as In IIterature and musIc, aIso In paIntIng, the quotatIon or aIIusIon medIates a
specIIIc IndIvIduaI appearance, not a styIIstIc or generIc type. n Western paIntIng a
recIInIng IemaIe nude InscrIbes ItseII Into the tradItIon oI representatIons oI Venus, but
onIy some oI these Images have a dIegetIc structure, nameIy, those that, IIke Manet's
Olympic, aIIude to a specIIIc IndIvIduaI Image wIthIn the tradItIon, and not to the tradItIon
In generaI.
Iourth, not onIy a part oI a pIcture, but the pIcture as a whoIe can evoke a quotatIon or,
rather, aIIusIon (a IIteraI quotatIon In such cases wouId be no more than a copy or
reproductIon). IrancIs acon's obsessIve varIatIons on the subject oI VeIzquez's great
Ioman Fortrcit oj Fope lnnocent X (1650, GaIIerIa orIa-IamphIII) beIong here. The
phenomenon can aIso occur In a varIety oI Iorms In other arts (thInk oI eethoven's
Dicbelli Vcrictions, IIszt's transcrIptIons oI Schubert's songs, even oI the
transIormatIons the Odyssey undergoes In joyce's Ulysses). ote aIso that, at Ieast In
paIntIng and IIterature, a "quotatIon/aIIusIon" can reIer not onIy to another artwork, but
aIso to a Iragment oI the reaI worId. thIs Is the case oI VeIzquez's portraIt ItseII as weII as
oI any hIstorIcaI narratIve.
IIIth, In paIntIng, seII-quotatIon or -aIIusIon can occur onIy when the same IIgure or object
appears In the pIcture or serIes oI pIctures more than once and we have reason to
beIIeve that the IIgure or object truIy "Is the same" rather than {p.181) mereIy "Iooks
the same." dentIcaI coIumns oI a paInted Iacade do not quote one another, but a IIgure oI
a saInt In a serIes oI pIctures IIIustratIng hIs IIIe does reIer to other appearances oI the
same IIgure In other pIctures oI the serIes. (SImIIarIy, IdentIcaI accompanyIng IIgures oI
the so-caIIed AIbertI bass do not quote one another, but a recapItuIated musIcaI theme
does reIer to other, earIIer, appearances oI the same theme wIthIn the work.) CIearIy,
seII-quotatIon/aIIusIon Is IncomparabIy Iess common In paIntIng than It Is In musIc or even
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IIterature.
We may come back now Ior a moment to the questIon we had been pursuIng a whIIe ago.
can an InstrumentaI voIce narrate? We have seen that the dIegetIc mode does not requIre
that the narratIve voIce comes Into Iocus as a human IIgure. AII that Is needed Is the
hIerarchIcaI reIatIonshIp between the two presented worIds. n thInkIng about the
dIegetIc potentIaI oI InstrumentaI musIc Iurther, beyond what Is ImpIIed by quotatIons and
aIIusIons, we shouId take a hInt Irom paIntIng. t Is here that we may Iearn to dIstInguIsh
truIy InterestIng cases oI dIegetIc utterance In musIc Irom the reIatIveIy trIvIaI ones
produced by the wIdespread practIces oI repetItIon, recapItuIatIon, and eIaboratIon. What
Is certaInIy possIbIe In InstrumentaI musIc Is the eIIect oI an InternaI Irame separatIng the
dIscourse Into two parts, one outsIde and the other wIthIn the Irame. Composers have at
theIr dIsposaI a whoIe range oI punctuatIng devIces, such as cadences oI varIous
strengths, wIth whIch to artIcuIate theIr musIcaI dIscourses. They can easIIy Interrupt a
dIscourse wIth an InterpoIatIon oI any Iength onIy to resume the maIn traIn oI thought
Iater.
23
Iowever, just as In abstract paIntIng, aIso In InstrumentaI musIc, It Is ImpossIbIe
to decIde wIth compIete certaInty whether what we have outsIde and wIthIn the InternaI
Irame are two dIIIerent worIds or a sIngIe one. AII we can say Is that the more
InterpoIatIons oI thIs sort dIIIer Irom the dIscourse they Interrupt, the stronger the
suggestIon oI the dIegetIc mode. n IIszt's pIano transcrIptIon oI Schubert's settIng oI the
"rIknIg," the IInaI recItatIve contrasts so strongIy wIth the precedIng gaIIop that, even
wIthout Goethe's text In our ears, we are IIkeIy to read It as an appearance oI a new worId
suddenIy pushIng the oId one Into a dIstance. ut wIthout Goethe's "war" ("was") Instead
oI "Ist" ("Is"), we cannot be absoIuteIy sure that what has been Introduced Is a truIy new
ontoIogIcaI IeveI. Iet us keep In mInd, however, that we are not compeIIed to sacrIIIce
IIIumInatIng InterpretatIons oI artworks to the InapproprIate requIrement oI compIete
certaInty.
Thus, wIth some IngenuIty, we can IInd anaIogues oI the dIegetIc mode In paIntIng and
musIc. SpecIIIcaIIy, we have just seen that, In both IIguratIve and abstract paIntIng,
quotatIon/aIIusIon-understood In the broad sense Introduced above-make the pIctorIaI
"voIce" dIegetIc, otherwIse, In IIguratIve paIntIng the dIegetIc mode Is possIbIe (II we have
a pIcture-wIthIn-a-pIcture) and so Is the personage oI the narrator (II we have a human
IIgure gesturIng towards the pIcture-wIthIn-a-pIcture), In abstract paIntIng the dIegetIc
mode Is, strIctIy speakIng, not possIbIe (though an InternaI Irame may brIng It to mInd)
and neIther In any case Is the narrator, In both vocaI and InstrumentaI musIc,
quotatIon/aIIusIon make the musIcaI voIce dIegetIc, otherwIse, In vocaI musIc both the
dIegetIc mode and {p.182) the narrator are possIbIe, Imported dIrectIy Irom IIterature
wIth the text, and In InstrumentaI musIc the dIegetIc mode Is, strIctIy speakIng, not
possIbIe (though, agaIn, an InternaI Irame may brIng It to mInd) and neIther Is the
narrator. Thus not onIy In IIterature, but aIso In paIntIng and musIc, we are apt to
encounter personages and settIngs, or-more abstractIy-IIgures and grounds, as weII
as narrators. ut It has to be kept In mInd that In paIntIng and musIc truIy sIgnIIIcant and
InterestIng cases oI diegesis are exceptIonaI and rare.
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ote that In aII three arts aII the ImmedIateIy speakIng voIces, that Is, the mode oI
presentatIon, are at the same tIme-as personages, settIngs, and narrators (or theIr
anaIogues)-at Ieast a part (or aII) oI the presented matter. t IoIIows that there Is nothIng
that we mIght say about the mode oI an artwork that we had not aIready saId about Its
matter (assumIng we had descrIbed the Iatter precIseIy). Thus, at the end oI our anaIysIs
oI the modes oI artIstIc presentatIon, the modes themseIves dIssoIve Into the matter. ThIs
Is not to say that the dIstInctIon between the presentIng voIces and the presented matter
Is InvaIId, but onIy that once the presented matter has been correctIy and precIseIy
descrIbed, the presentIng voIces have too.
evertheIess, whether we consIder them "modaI" or "materIaI," the IoIIowIng two
dIstInctIons are oI IundamentaI Importance. IIrst, the presence (or absence) oI the
narratIng voIce ImprInts an IndeIIbIe mark on the text and the worId It presents. IegetIc
texts are seII-reIIexIve to a dIIIerent degree than dramatIc ones.
24
The essentIaI way Ior a
drama to become seII-reIIexIve Is to present a theatrIcaI perIormance on stage (theater-
wIthIn-theater), thus to become seII-reIerentIaI, and InvIte reIIectIon on Its own nature.
Shakespeare Is the master oI dramatIc seII-reIIexIvIty oI thIs kInd, In Hcmlet and, above aII,
In The Tempest.
25
A pIcture-wIthIn-a-pIcture has cIearIy the same potentIaI Import, and so
does musIc-wIthIn-musIc, they InvIte reIIectIon on the nature oI vIsuaI and auraI
presentIng as weII as on seeIng and hearIng. ThIs kInd oI expIIcIt seII-reIIexIvIty Is, oI
course, avaIIabIe aIso to dIegetIc texts. ut II the dramatIc seII-reIIexIvIty Is expIIcIt and
optIonaI, the dIegetIc spIIttIng oI the presented worId Into two ontoIogIcaI IeveIs
Introduces Its own kInd oI ImpIIcIt or expIIcIt, but not optIonaI, seII-reIIexIvIty, sImpIy
because It necessarIIy presents us wIth a worId-wIthIn-a-worId, the narrated worId
embedded wIthIn the worId oI the narrator. The more promInentIy the worId and the
IIgure oI the narrator step Iorward, the more expIIcItIy seII-reIIexIve Is the narratIve. ThIs
Is why the narratIve seII-reIIexIvIty reaches Its zenIth In autobIography, whether
"hIstorIcaI" (St. AugustIne, Iousseau, Goethe) or "IIctIonaI" (ante, Iroust), where
reIIectIons on the narratIng seII and on the act oI narratIng are InextrIcabIy enmeshed. At
the same tIme, the presence oI the narratIng voIce Introduces dIstance between the
reader/vIewer/IIstener and the presented worId, makes the Iatter Iess ImmedIate,
because-IIteraIIy-medIated by the narratIng voIce. ThIs dIegetIc dIstance Is the obverse
sIde oI the dIegetIc seII-reIIexIvIty. ts resuIt Is to make the medIated-that Is, ImagInary-
nature oI the presented worId more expIIcIt. n thus IayIng theIr cards on the tabIe
dIegetIc texts are InherentIy Iess IIIusIonIstIc and potentIaIIy {p.183) more truthIuI than
dramatIc ones, not necessarIIy more truthIuI to the portrayed reaIIty, to be sure, but
more truthIuI about theIr own medIated nature. Ience It Is no wonder that the dIegetIc
mode Is Iavored by hIstorIans.
Second, the presence (or absence) oI the personage wIthIn the worId oI the artwork
makes a dIIIerence to the nature oI thIs worId. The IIgure and the ground, the personage
and the settIng, beIong together and deIIne one another. t Is obvIous that the settIng can
never be truIy compIeteIy absent, though It may be extremeIy attenuated and ImpIIcIt,
the IIgure has to emerge Irom somewhere, though thIs "somewhere" may be the
IndIstInct dark background oI a portraIt or the sIIence agaInst whIch one hears the
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meIodIc IInes oI unaccompanIed poIyphony, or the voIce oI the IyrIc "" speakIng oI
nothIng but Its own state oI mInd. t wouId seem, however, that the personage can be
absent, most commonIy perhaps In such pIctorIaI genres as the stIII-IIIe and the Iandscape,
but aIso In IIterary descrIptIons that InvoIve no personages, or In musIc that dIspenses
wIth IInes. ut Is It truIy absent, or-IIke the settIng at tImes-onIy attenuated and ImpIIcIt?
s It possIbIe that not onIy the IIgure ImpIIes a ground, but aIso the reverse? The
admIttedIy specuIatIve cIaIm wouId IIke to make Is that those presented worIds Irom
whIch a personage Is absent present, precIseIy though paradoxIcaIIy, an absent
personage. The cIaIm cannot be tested and Is unIaIsIIIabIe and hence unprovabIe. t can
be understood onIy as an InterpretatIve postuIate or wIsh desIgned to ensure that even
the presented worIds Irom whIch personages are absent can serve art's aIm oI human
seII-presentatIon, -ImagInIng, and -knowIedge. We want the presented worId to be not just
any worId, but Lebenswelt, the human worId. A stIII-IIIe Is IuII oI human IIngerprInts, the
presented objects bear wItness to human purposes, use, and soIIcItude. A Iandscape,
even one presentIng a wIIderness, Is a potentIaI scene oI human dweIIIng and actIng, even
when thIs actIng takes the hIghIy reIIned Iorm oI the contempIatIon oI naturaI beauty.
n thus ImpIyIng (presentIng) an (absent) personage, artIstIc presentatIons oI the settIng
come cIose In theIr cuIturaI sIgnIIIcance to the nonrepresentatIonaI arts, IIrst and Ioremost
to archItecture. WhIIe the meanIng oI the archItecturaI work cannot be reduced to Its
utIIItarIan IunctIon, It can be grasped onIy II the work Is seen as a potentIaI settIng Ior
humans, Ior a partIcuIar way oI IIIe, a scene oI human actIons and passIons the IuII range
oI whIch, whIIe not unIImIted (the range oI behavIor approprIate at Grand CentraI StatIon
Is cIearIy dIIIerent Irom that beIIttIng the San CarIo aIIe uattro Iontane), cannot be
deIImIted and specIIIed wIth any precIsIon In advance.
26
The onIy dIIIerence between a
Lebenswelt presented, say, In a paIntIng Irom whIch IIgures are absent and one desIgned
by the archItect Is that whIIe the Iormer Is, precIseIy, presented, that Is, ImagInary and
hence apt to be peopIed by the spectator wIth ImagInary IIgures, the Iatter Is reaI and
hence provIdes a settIng Ior reaI peopIe, the spectator IncIuded. ut Iet us not mIsjudge
the exact sIgnIIIcance oI thIs dIIIerence. When we experIence and Interpret a buIIdIng as a
suItabIe scene Ior certaIn ways oI IIIe (that oI a suburban commuter, say, or a
metaphysIcaI poet), we peopIe the buIIdIng wIth {p.184) more or Iess dIstInctIy ImagIned
IIgures, that Is, IIgures no Iess ImagInary than those that mIght have just IeIt the scene oI
a ChardIn stIII-IIIe. The dIIIerence Is onIy that, somewhat more dIrectIy than the
representatIonaI arts, archItecture InvItes us to ImagIne ourseIves as pursuIng certaIn
ways oI IIIe, to put on masks and rehearse ImagInary roIes. Ior a dIzzyIng moment
aIIorded by aesthetIc experIence, the work oI archItecture, the most reaI oI aII artIstIc
objects, InvItes us to shed our own reaIIty and to transIorm ourseIves Into ImagInary
beIngs. ut the dIIIerence wIth the representatIonaI arts Is one oI degree onIy, and a smaII
degree at that. The ImagInary worIds presented by poets, paInters, and composers aIso
InvIte us to enter them, they are onIy somewhat Iess InsIstent, or make It Iess easy Ior us
to accept the InvItatIon.
n the precedIng chapter, have argued that the sIgnIIIcance oI the characterIstIc
tendency oI modern art toward abstractIon IIes In Its ceIebratIon oI the modern InIInIteIy
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Iree subjectIvIty whIch Intends everythIng, but commIts ItseII to nothIng. ow am
suggestIng that those artworIds Irom whIch personages are absent may ImpIy absent
personages, that Is, may be read as scenes oI potentIaI, though not actuaI, human actIng
and suIIerIng, and that thIs brIngs them cIose to the artwords presented by nonIIguratIve
art. TocquevIIIe may have been the IIrst to recognIze thIs transItIonaI sIgnIIIcance oI
Iandscape, Its posItIon between the art oI premodern arIstocratIc socIetIes representIng
and eIaboratIng tradItIonaI myths and the art oI modern democratIc socIetIes ceIebratIng
a human subjectIvIty Ireed Irom aII tradItIonaI roIes and attachments.
When sceptIcIsm had depopuIated heaven, and equaIIty had cut each man to a
smaIIer and better known sIze, the poets, wonderIng what to substItute Ior the
great themes Iost wIth the arIstocracy, IIrst turned theIr eyes to InanImate nature.
Gods and heroes gone, they began by paIntIng rIvers and mountaIns. . . . ut |thIs
Is| . . . onIy . . . a transItIonaI phenomenon. n the Iong run am sure that democracy
turns man's ImagInatIon away Irom externaIs to concentrate It on hImseII aIone.
emocratIc peopIes may amuse themseIves momentarIIy by IookIng at nature, but
It Is about themseIves that they are reaIIy excIted. Iere, and here aIone, are the
true sprIngs oI poetry among them.
27
c. The Author, Imped and Rea, Dead and Ave
t has been cIaImed here that the settIng, the personage, and the narrator exhaust the IIst
oI categorIes oI eIements that may constItute, sIngIy or In varIous combInatIons, the worId
presented In the work oI art. Two addItIonaI candIdates Ior IncIusIon on the IIst are the
reaI author oI the work and Its so-caIIed "ImpIIed author," and theIr cIaIms shouId be
consIdered now.
Iet us caII the reaI author oI the work sImpIy the "author" and dIsregard the questIons oI
whether the author Is known or anonymous, a sIngIe person or a coIIectIve. n wrItten
IIterature and musIc, as weII as In paIntIng, the author Is, obvIousIy, he the creator oI the
ImmedIateIy speakIng "voIces" he empIoys to present the worId oI hIs work, but, Iess
obvIousIy, he hImseII does not beIong to thIs worId. That he does not Is shown by the Iact
that hIs "now" Is not the same {p.185) as the "now" oI the "speakers." ote that thIs Is
the case even In the most scrupuIousIy honest autobIography or autoportraIt. the reaI
worId oI the reaI author Is not the same as the worId oI the narrator the author presents,
just as the worId oI the narrator Is not the same as the worId oI the personage the
narrator presents In hIs story. The act oI wrItIng or paIntIng IIxes the narrator's "now"
Iorever In the steadIIy recedIng past oI the reaI worId to whIch the author beIongs. (OraI
IIterature, IIke ImprovIsed musIc, raIses In thIs respect specIaI probIems Ior poetIcs,
probIems that wIII not be addressed here.
28
)
There Is onIy one sense In whIch the author may enter the worId presented In hIs work.
Ie can do It In the same way as any reaI person or object can, nameIy, as the modeI oI a
portraIt, that Is, by becomIng a personage, or the narrator, or both. n other words, the
author may use a personage, narrator, or both as a vehIcIe Ior a portraIt, IncIudIng an
autoportraIt. n the same way, a reaI pIace may serve as the modeI Ior the settIng. The
questIons oI whether any part oI the reaI worId Is portrayed In the work and whether the
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portraIt Is accurate are empIrIcaI and we have to answer them IndIvIduaIIy In each specIIIc
case as best we can. ut even Ior a portraIt or autoportraIt, no new category needs to be
added to our IIst over and above those oI the settIng, personage, and narrator.
Those, however, who cIaIm that the author Is a part oI the work's worId have much more
than a portraIt In mInd. Ior them, the worId presented In the work ImpIIes In some way a
conscIousness Irom whose poInt oI vIew thIs worId Is seen. ThIs voIceIess, ImpIIcIt but not
expIIcItIy presented and heard, conscIousness Is oIten reIerred to as the "ImpIIed
author."
29
Two arguments Ior postuIatIng Its exIstence are commonIy put Iorward.
IIrst, It Is cIaImed that onIy the exIstence oI the ImpIIed author can account Ior texts that
ImpIy somethIng other than what theIr voIces expIIcItIy say. n partIcuIar, In those
demonstrabIe cases where the narrator Is unreIIabIe, we can become aware oI thIs
unreIIabIIIty, so the argument goes, onIy because the narrator's norms are dIIIerent than
those oI the ImpIIed author who Is the source oI the norms oI the text as a whoIe.
beIIeve, however, that we do not need to Invoke the exIstence oI the author, ImpIIed or
reaI, to account Ior such cases. A speaker (whether a reaI person, or a presented
narrator or personage) Is unreIIabIe when we cannot take what he says at Iace vaIue, and
we cannot take It at Iace vaIue when we have reason to beIIeve that he knowIngIy IIes,
unknowIngIy makes a mIstake, or Is IronIc. We become aware that the speaker may not be
teIIIng the truth (whether knowIngIy or not) when we reaIIze that what he says about
some aspects oI the worId he speaks oI Is InternaIIy InconsIstent, or InconsIstent wIth what
we otherwIse know about these aspects, or ImpIausIbIe In vIew oI what we otherwIse
know about comparabIe aspects oI comparabIe worIds. And we recognIze that the
speaker may be IronIc when we are aware that he or a person oI thIs kInd wouId not be
IIkeIy to say In earnest what he has just saId. n aII oI these cases we need onIy to pIace
what the speaker says In an approprIate context, a context provIded by what we
otherwIse know about hIm and the worId he speaks oI, or about peopIe IIke hIm and
comparabIe worIds. We {p.186) certaInIy do not need to postuIate In addItIon the
exIstence oI an ImpIIed authorIaI conscIousness.
The second argument In Iavor oI the exIstence oI the ImpIIed author Is based on the
observatIon that even a work created by a group oI reaI peopIe may seem to present Its
worId Irom a sIngIe vantage poInt. The cIaIm Is that the consIstency oI the poInt oI vIew can
be expIaIned onIy when we assume that the text ImpIIes a sIngIe authorIaI conscIousness.
ThIs argument, however, Is even Iess convIncIng. The aIIeged consIstency oI the poInt oI
vIew Is sImpIy IdentIcaI wIth the consIstency oI the presented worId. n Iact, there Is no
hope that we couId ever separate IruItIuIIy the worId presented In the work Irom the
poInt oI vIew Irom whIch It Is presented. The worId presented In the work does not exIst
anywhere apart Irom the work, that Is, It Is gIven aIways onIy together wIth the
perspectIve Irom whIch It Is presented and cannot be seen Irom any other. We have no
way oI IIndIng out IndependentIy oI the work how many chIIdren Iady Macbeth had, just
as we shaII never Iearn whether Cezanne's appIe had been bItten on the other sIde.
To be sure, one couId convIncIngIy argue that the worId oI the work and the standpoInt
Irom whIch It Is seen may be dIIIerentIated, because the worId, aIthough unIque and
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exIstIng nowhere eIse but In the work, Is suIIIcIentIy sImIIar to the reaI worId oI our
everyday experIence and to the worIds we know Irom other works to make It possIbIe Ior
us to ImagIne what It wouId be IIke to Iook at It Irom another perspectIve. ThIs Is shown by
the Iact that, whIIe we cannot answer the questIons about Iady Macbeth's chIIdren or
Cezanne's appIes, we can coherentIy, II IdIy, entertaIn them, and we are understood,
though not necessarIIy commended, when we do. eyond Its expIIcIt content, the work
engages the reader's (spectator's, IIstener's) generaI experIence oI other worIds, reaI
and presented. The ImpIIcIt perspectIve Irom whIch the worId oI the work Is seen can be
recognIzed as, precIseIy, c perspectIve because, and onIy when, the reader's generaI
experIence oI other worIds Is actIvated. We can recognIze the perspectIve onIy because
we couId ImagIne another, because we know Irom experIence that thIngs mIght be seen
Irom a dIIIerent angIe. ut It Is precIseIy the dIsmaIIy IdIe quaIIty oI aII such ImagInIngs that
teIIs us that the separatIon oI the presented worId Irom the poInt oI vIew can never be
IruItIuI. y sayIng that Iady Macbeth "Is seen by her ImpIIed author as" evII we express
nothIng that we had not aIready conveyed when we saId sImpIy that she "Is" evII. ven II It
Is true that the worId oI the work Is presented Irom a perspectIve, there Is nothIng we
can say In descrIbIng the perspectIve that we do not aIso and more sImpIy say In
descrIbIng the worId. t Is not the SophocIean perspectIve but the worId oI Antigone that
Is tragIc.
Thus, Ior aII practIcaI purposes, the consIstency oI the poInt oI vIew Irom whIch the worId
oI the work Is presented Is IdentIcaI wIth the consIstency oI the presented worId. ow we
cIearIy do not need to assume the exIstence oI the ImpIIed author to understand how the
Iatter sort oI consIstency was achIeved. The reaI author oI the work may choose to aIm at
achIevIng It or not, and he may {p.187) prove successIuI at hIs chosen task or not,
regardIess oI whether he Is an IndIvIduaI or a coIIectIve creator. I anythIng, the Iact that a
coIIectIve reaI author Is occasIonaIIy successIuI at presentIng a consIstent worId
demonstrates how IIttIe reIevance our knowIedge oI the author has Ior our knowIedge oI
the presented worId. Once agaIn, the exIstence oI the ImpIIed author turns out to be a
theoretIcaI IIctIon wIth no useIuI task to perIorm. OstensIbIy, Its task was to explcin the
consIstency oI the presented worId, but In Iact It turns out to be sImpIy cnother ncme Ior
thIs consIstency. The need to Invoke thIs name Is IIkeIy to have reIIgIous roots.
t shouId be noted, IncIdentaIIy, that the author, whether IndIvIduaI or coIIectIve, Is
greatIy aIded In the task oI presentIng a consIstent worId by the reader/spectator/IIstener
(the reaI, not ImpIIed, one). The unIty oI the work may be no more than an assumptIon the
reader makes and tests In the process oI readIng. The assumptIon, however, Is not
optIonaI, but necessary. I the reader's experIence Is to have any coherence and unIty at
aII, II It Is to be a sIngIe (though not necessarIIy sImpIe) experIence rather than a serIes oI
compIeteIy unreIated experIences, It must reIer to a sIngIe (though not necessarIIy
sImpIe) object. The uItImate unIty oI the work, no matter how dIIIIcuIt to estabIIsh or how
precarIousIy maIntaIned, Is an assumptIon the reader/spectator/IIstener must make and
the work must In some way, however reIuctantIy, partIaIIy, or ImperIectIy, conIIrm. I we
assume that what we read/vIew/hear Is a sIngIe work and not a coIIectIon oI severaI
unreIated works, then It Is seII-evIdent that what the work presents must be at the most
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IundamentaI IeveI a sIngIe worId.
30
(To be sure, we have seen that thIs worId can have
dIIIerent ontoIogIcaI IeveIs, dIIIerent subworIds, II you wIII. ut precIseIy because these
dIIIerent IeveIs are hIerarchIcaIIy reIated, together they constItute what Is uItImateIy a
sIngIe worId.) The unIty oI the work and the unIty oI the worId presented In It are
InextrIcabIy IInked. The unIty oI the work consIsts, precIseIy, In the Iact that the work
presents an uItImateIy sIngIe worId. y deIInItIon, a sIngIe work cannot present severaI
worIds, II It does, It Is not a sIngIe work. n other words, sInce the work In a sense is the
worId It presents, a sIngIe work must present a worId whIch at the most IundamentaI
IeveI Is aIso one. o matter how muItIIayered or Iragmented the presented worId Is, so
Iong as the reader beIIeves that he reads a sIngIe work rather than a coIIectIon oI works,
he must assume that the work presents what at the most IundamentaI IeveI Is a sIngIe
worId. As IIchard Iorty observed, the coherence oI the text Is not somethIng that exIsts
IndependentIy oI Its descrIptIons.
31
n sum, we have estabIIshed that the settIng, the personage, and the narrator are the
onIy eIements that constItute, sIngIy or In varIous combInatIons, the worId presented In
the work. The onIy kInd oI author whose exIstence Is ImpIIed by the work Is the reaI one.
The Iatter IIgure, however, IIke the Deus cbsconditus oI the jansenIsts, does not enter the
worId presented In hIs work, though, IIke any other part oI the reaI worId, he can serve
as the modeI oI a portraIt, that Is, become a personage, or narrator, or both. ThIs,
beIIeve, aIIows us to separate truth Irom exaggeratIon In the century-Iong crItIcaI tradItIon
procIaImIng, In the {p.188) phrase oI IoIand arthes, "the death oI the author."
32
The
notIon oI the ImpIIed author was one oI those characterIstIc devIces that Irom IIaubert to
ew CrItIcIsm and beyond served to keep the reaI author and reaI hIstory at bay, to
decontextuaIIze the text and the work. y puttIng thIs notIon asIde, we make room Ior the
reaI author and we return the text, the work, and Its worId to the messy contexts oI
actuaI hIstorIcaI worIds In whIch they came Into exIstence and In whIch they contInue to
IunctIon. The reaI author may not enter the worId oI the work, but, as we shaII see In the
Iast chapter, he has a useIuI roIe to pIay In our InterpretatIon oI thIs worId.
IInaIIy, Iet me add that just as the work ImpIIes the exIstence oI the reaI author, It aIso
ImpIIes the exIstence oI a potentIaI reaI reader the author addresses. ThIs, agaIn, Is a
IIgure that does not enter the worId oI the work, though a specIIIc potentIaI
reader/vIewer/IIstener may be portrayed In It. And, agaIn, thIs Is a IIgure wIth a useIuI
roIe to pIay In our InterpretatIons oI thIs artworId. St. omInIc or St. Ieter the Martyr,
eIther oI whom Is present In many GospeI scenes that Ira AngeIIco and hIs assIstants
paInted In the monks ceIIs oI the convent oI St. Mark In IIorence (1439-45) are cIearIy
not partIcIpants. They are, rather, readers oI the scenes, In severaI cases IIteraIIy so, as
the book In the hands oI the saInt remInds us. The saInts show theIr IeIIow omInIcans
how they shouId read sacred hIstory. They encourage them to enter ImagInatIveIy and
wIth sympathy the represented worId, as St. omInIc does when he IIageIIates hImseII on
observIng jesus bound to the coIumn, or when he weeps together wIth Mater oIorosa
under the Cross. SImIIarIy, the arIas and choraIes that Interrupt the vangeIIsts
narratIves In ach's IassIons represent IndIvIduaI and coIIectIve reactIons to the narrated
events and thus by exampIe Instruct ach's congregatIon how to take the GospeI story to
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theIr hearts, how to make Its words resonate and IIve In theIr mInds as jesus's "s Ist
voIIbracht!" resonates In the mInd oI the pIous ChrIstIan Impersonated by the aIto In the
St. john IassIon, o. 30.
ut even when the work does not portray the reader, It may sometImes suggest hIs
exIstence. Lc vecchic oI GIorgIone (ca. 1508, In the VenetIan AccademIa) seems to Iook
IntentIy Into a mIrror the surIace oI whIch paraIIeIs the surIace oI the paIntIng. The
pecuIIar expressIon oI her Iace, a mIxture oI surprIse ("s thIs reaIIy me?"), IronIc
amusement, despaIr, and exhaustIon, teIIs oI her mIxed IeeIIngs toward what she sees, a
Iace ravaged by tIme ("coI tempo," "wIth tIme," says the InscrIptIon she hoIds, thIs Is what
happens to a human Iace wIth tIme). ut there Is no mIrror there. What Is there, where
the mIrror shouId be, Is my own Iace as Iook at the oId woman. t Is my Iace she sees. t
Is my Iace see as Iook Into the mIrror oI the paIntIng.
Notes:
(1.) IIato, Republic, bk. 3, 392c-394c, trans. IauI Shorey.
(2.) ArIstotIe, Foetics, ch. 1, 1447a13-15, trans. ngram ywater.
(7.) n thInkIng about the probIems raIsed In thIs and the IoIIowIng chapter, have Iound
the work oI the IoIIowIng IIterary theorIsts partIcuIarIy useIuI. MIkhaII M. akhtIn,
"Iscourse In the oveI," In The Diclogic lmcginction (AustIn. !nIversIty oI Texas Iress,
1981), pp. 259-422, IoIand arthes, "ntroductIon to the StructuraI AnaIysIs oI
arratIves," In lmcge, Music, Text (ew York. IIII and Wang, 1977), pp. 79-124, Wayne
C. ooth, The Rhetoric oj Fiction, 2d ed. (ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress,
1983), Seymour Chatman, Story cnd Discourse: Ncrrctive Structure in Fiction cnd Film
(thaca. CorneII !nIversIty Iress, 1978), and Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric oj
Ncrrctive in Fiction cnd Film (thaca. CorneII !nIversIty Iress, 1990), Gerard Genette,
Ncrrctive Discourse: An Esscy in Method (thaca. CorneII !nIversIty Iress, 1980), The
Architext: An lntroduction, trans. j. . IewIn (erkeIey. !nIversIty oI CaIIIornIa Iress,
1992), and, Ncrrctive Discourse Revisited (thaca. CorneII !nIversIty Iress, 1988), Kte
Iamburger, The Logic oj Litercture, 2d rev. ed. (IoomIngton. ndIana !nIversIty Iress,
1973), Irank Kermode, The Sense oj cn Ending: Studies in the Theory oj Fiction (ew
York. OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1967), and The Genesis oj Secrecy (CambrIdge. Iarvard
!nIversIty Iress, 1979), Gunther MuIIer, Morphologische Foetik, ed. Iena MuIIer
(armstadt. WIssen-schaItIIche uchgeseIIschaIt, 1968), mII StaIger, Bcsic Concepts oj
Foetics (!nIversIty Iark. IennsyIvanIa State !nIversIty Iress, 1991), Tzvetan Todorov,
"The Grammar oI arratIve" and "arratIve TransIormatIons," In The Foetics oj Frose
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(thaca. CorneII !nIversIty Iress, 1977), pp. 108-19, 218-33. Over and above aII oI
those, my thInkIng has been centraIIy guIded by IauI IIcoeur, Time cnd Ncrrctive, 3 voIs.
(ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1984-88), as weII as by the cIoseIy reIated
work by avId Carr, Time, Ncrrctive, cnd History (IoomIngton. ndIana !nIversIty
Iress, 1986).
(8.) n addItIon to the IIterature specIIIcaIIy mentIoned Iater, my thInkIng about the
probIems raIsed by paIntIng In thIs and the IoIIowIng chapter Is Indebted In partIcuIar to
IIchard WoIIheIm, Fcinting cs cn Art (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1987), and
to the dIscussIons oI VeIzquez's Lcs Menincs that have been stImuIated by MIcheI
IoucauIt's 1966 readIng oI the paIntIng In The Order oj Things (Iondon. TavIstock, 1970),
pp. 3-16, nameIy, MadIyn MIIIner Kahr, Velczquez: The Art oj Fcinting (ew York.
Iarper S Iow, 1976), pp. 128-41, jonathan rown, lmcges cnd ldecs in Seventeenth-
Century Spcnish Fcinting (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1978), john I. SearIe,
"Lcs Menincs and IepresentatIon," Criticcl lnquiry 6 (1980), 477-88, joeI Snyder and
Ted Cohen, "IeIIectIons on Lcs Menincs: Iaradox Iost," Criticcl lnquiry 7 (1980), 429-
47, Ieo SteInberg, "VeIzquez Lcs Menincs," October 15 (1981), 45-54, SvetIana
AIpers, "nterpretatIon wIthout IepresentatIon, or, the VIewIng oI Lcs Menincs,"
Representctions 1 (1983), 31-42, enIs onoghue, "A Iorm oI AttentIon," In IaphaeI
Stern, IhIIIp Iodman, and joseph CobItz, eds., Crection cnd lnterpretction (ew York.
Iaven IubIIcatIons, 1985), pp. 75-100, CharIes KareIIs, "The Lcs Menincs IIterature
and ts Iesson," ibid., pp. 101-14.
(9.) n addItIon to the IIterature specIIIcaIIy mentIoned Iater, my thInkIng about the
probIems raIsed by musIc In thIs and the IoIIowIng chapter Is partIcuIarIy Indebted to a
number oI theorIsts and crItIcs who In the Iast three decades have expIored the poInts oI
contact between IIterature and musIc. n Germany, the maIn stImuIus to thInkIng about
musIc In these terms came Irom the "Ioman" chapter In Theodor W. Adorno's 1960
monograph on MahIer. Mchler. Eine musikclische Fhysiognomik, In GreteI Adorno and
IoII TIedemann, eds., Gescmmelte Schrijten, voI. 13 (IrankIurt am MaIn. Suhrkamp,
1971), pp. 209-29. See In partIcuIar Iermann anuser, "KonstruktIon des Iomans beI
Gustav MahIer," Musikclische Frosc, StudIen zur MusIkgeschIchte des 19. jahrhunderts
46 (Iegensburg. Gustav osse VerIag, 1975), pp. 87-117 (reprInted In anuser, Gustcv
Mchler und seine Zeit |Iaaber. Iaaber-VerIag, 1991|, pp. 152-84). n the !nIted States,
most work In thIs area Is Indebted to dward T. Cone, The Composer's Voice (erkeIey.
!nIversIty oI CaIIIornIa Iress, 1974), see aIso hIs "The WorId oI Opera and ts
nhabItants," In Music: A View jrom Deljt (ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress,
1989), pp. 125-38, and "Iesponses," College Music Symposium 29 (1989), 75-80. See In
partIcuIar Ired verett Maus, "MusIc as rama," Music Theory Spectrum 10 (1988),
56-73, Maus, "Agency In nstrumentaI MusIc and Song," College Music Symposium 29
(1989), 31-43, and CaroIyn Abbate, Unsung Voices: Operc cnd Musiccl Ncrrctive in the
Nineteenth Century (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1991). An Independent
strand oI musIc-narratoIogIcaI InquIry has been pursued by Anthony ewcomb In "Those
mages That Yet Iresh mages eget," ]ourncl oj Musicology 2 (1983), 227-45, "Once
More 'etween AbsoIute and Irogram MusIc. Schumann's Second Symphony," 19th-
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Century Music 7 (1984), 233-50, "Schumann and Iate Ighteenth-Century arratIve
StrategIes," 19th-Century Music 11 (1987), 164-74, and "arratIve Archetypes and
MahIer's Inth Symphony," In Steven IauI Scher, ed., Music cnd Text: Criticcl lnquiries
(CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1992), pp. 118-36.
(10.) CI. MIkhaII M. akhtIn, Froblems oj Dostoevsky's Foetics, trans. CaryI merson
(MInneapoIIs. !nIversIty oI MInnesota Iress, 1984).
(11.) Ior the dIstInctIon between the "tIme oI narratIng" and "narrated tIme," see the
cIassIc 1948 paper by Gunther MuIIer, "rzhIzeIt und erzhIte ZeIt," Morphologische
Foetik, pp. 269-86.
(12.) CI. IhIIIppe Iejeune, On Autobiogrcphy, Theory and IIstory oI IIterature, voI. 52
(MInneapoIIs. !nIversIty oI MInnesota Iress, 1989).
(13.) Adorno, Mchler. Eine musikclische Fhysiognomik, p. 225.
(14.) KendaII I. WaIton, Mimesis cs Mcke-Believe: On the Foundctions oj the
Representctioncl Arts (CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1990), p. 56. See aIso
WaIton, "What Is Abstract About the Art oI MusIc?," The ]ourncl oj Aesthetics cnd Art
Criticism 46 (1988), 351-64.
(15.) Ioger Scruton, "!nderstandIng MusIc," In The Aesthetic Understcnding (Iondon.
Methuen, 1983), p. 100.
(16.) Adorno, Mchler. Eine musikclische Fhysiognomik, p. 226. SImIIarIy, Cone, The
Composer's Voice, pcssim, speaks repeatedIy oI the "muItIpIe persona" oI the chorus.
(17.) ThIs poInt Is argued In Maus, "MusIc as rama" and "Agency In nstrumentaI MusIc
and Song." y contrast, Iawrence Kramer argues that InstrumentaI musIc tends tobe
monoIogIcaI. Iawrence Kramer, Music cs Culturcl Frcctice, 1800-1900 (erkeIey.
!nIversIty oI CaIIIornIa Iress, 1990), pp. 187-88.
(18.) CI., e.g., the IoIIowIng passages Irom IeIdegger. "AccordIng to thIs Idea |I.e., "the
notIon oI Ianguage that has prevaIIed Ior thousands oI years"| Ianguage Is the expressIon,
produced by men, oI theIr IeeIIngs and the worId vIew that guIdes them. Can the speII
thIs Idea has cast over Ianguage be broken? Why shouId It be broken? n Its essence,
Ianguage Is neIther expressIon nor an actIvIty oI man. Ianguage speaks" ("Ianguage," In
Foetry, Lcngucge, Thought, pp. 196-97), "Ianguage speaks. Man speaks In that he
responds to Ianguage. ThIs respondIng Is a hearIng" ("Ianguage," p.210), "Man acts as
though he were the shaper and master oI Ianguage, whIIe In Iact lcngucge remaIns the
master oI man. Ierhaps It Is beIore aII eIse man's subversIon oI this reIatIon oI domInance
that drIves hIs nature Into aIIenatIon" ("uIIdIng weIIIng ThInkIng," In Foetry, Lcngucge,
Thought, p. 146), "Man acts as though he were the shaper and master oI Ianguage, whIIe
In Iact Ianguage remaIns the master oI man. . . . Ior, strIctIy, It Is Ianguage that speaks.
Man IIrst speaks when, and onIy when, he responds to Ianguage by IIstenIng to Its appeaI"
(" . . . IoetIcaIIy Man weIIs. . . ," In Foetry, Lcngucge, Thought, pp. 215I).
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(19.) CI. akhtIn, "Iscourse In the oveI."
(20.) CharIes Iosen, The Romcntic Generction (CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress,
1995), p. 166.
(21.) have descrIbed and Interpreted thIs eethovenIan dIscovery In "eethoven and
the AesthetIc State," Beethoven Forum 7 (1998), pp. 17-44.
(22.) t Is the great merIt oI Abbate's book, Unsung Voices, to InvestIgate the means by
whIch nIneteenth-century musIc produces rare moments oI sIgnIIIcant diegesis. ut whIIe
see the IIrst sustaIned expIoratIon oI such technIques In eethoven's InstrumentaI
musIc, Abbate Iocates theIr orIgIn In opera, Wagner's In partIcuIar. SImIIarIy to Abbate and
myseII, In Music cs Culturcl Frcctice, 1800-1900, Iawrence Kramer concIudes that
narratIve (that Is, dIegetIc) eIIects In musIc are the exceptIon rather than the norm (p.
189).
(23.) See, e.g., the dIscussIon oI a Iarge-scaIe InterpoIatIon InterruptIng the IIrst movement
oI Iobert Schumann's pIano Fhcntcsie In C Major, Op. 17 In john averIo, "Schumann's
'm Iegendenton and IrIedrIch SchIegeI's Arcbeske," 19th-Century Music 11 (1987),
150-63. A smaII-scaIe InterpoIatIon oI thIs kInd, occurIng In the IIrst movement oI IudwIg
van eethoven's IIano Concerto o. 2 In -IIat Major, Op. 19, Is dIscussed In my "Toward
a IIstory oI IearIng. The CIassIc Concerto, A SampIe Case," In W.j. AIIanbrook, j.M. Ievy,
and W.I. Mahrt, eds., Convention in Eighteenth- cnd Nineteenth-Century Music. Esscys
in Honor oj Leoncrd G. Rctner (Stuyvesant, .Y.. Iendragon Iress, 1992), pp. 405-29. t
Is strIkIng that In Abbate's Unsung Voices, the most sustaIned dIscussIon oI musIcaI
diegesis we have, aII oI the key exampIes InvoIve some sort oI InterruptIon oI the maIn
dIscourse, that, as she puts It, "moments oI musIcaI narratIng InvoIve rendIng the IabrIc
oI musIc" (p. 152). See aIso james Webster, Hcydn's Fcrewell Symphony cnd the ldec oj
the Clcssiccl Style (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1991), pp. 267-87.
(24.) On seII-reIIexIve texts, cI. IucIen IIenbach, The Mirror in the Text (ChIcago.
!nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1989).
(25.) On seII-reIIexIvIty In The Tempest, see my "Irospero's Art," Shckespecre Studies
10 (1977), 211-39.
(26.) CI. Ioger Scruton, The Aesthetics oj Architecture (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty
Iress, 1979).
(27.) AIexIs de TocquevIIIe, Democrccy in Americc, ed. j.I. Mayer, trans. George
Iawrence (Garden CIty, .Y.. Anchor ooks, 1969), p. 484.
(28.) CI. IauI Zumthor, Orcl Foetry: An lntroduction, Theory and IIstory oI IIterature,
voI. 70 (MInneapoIIs. !nIversIty oI MInnesota Iress, 1990).
(29.) The IeIIcItous term, though not the concept, was Introduced In 1961 In Wayne
ooth's The Rhetoric oj Fiction. Ior a recent deIense oI the concept, wIth Iurther
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IIterature on the subject, see Chatman, Coming to Terms, pp. 74-108. n The Composer's
Voice, Cone postuIates the exIstence oI somethIng anaIogous to the ImpIIed author In
musIc. t shouId be apparent that II my arguments beIow agaInst the need Ior beIIevIng In
the exIstence oI thIs entIty In IIterature are convIncIng, they are equaIIy vaIId In the case oI
paIntIng or musIc. See aIso Cone, "The WorId oI Opera and ts nhabItants," In Music: A
View jrom Deljt (ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1989), pp. 125-38, and
"Iesponses," College Music Symposium 29 (1989), 75-80.
(30.) CI. the dIscussIon oI "organIc unIty" In IIchard Shusterman, Frcgmctist Aesthetics:
Living Becuty, Rethinking Art (OxIord and CambrIdge. IackweII, 1992), pp. 62-83.
Shusterman demonstrates "the essentIaI sameness oI |the errIdean| dijjrcnce and the
radIcaI concept oI organIc unIty" (p. 71).
(31.) IIchard Iorty, "The IragmatIst's Irogress," In S. CoIIInI, ed., lnterpretction cnd
Over-interpretction (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1992), p. 97.
(32.) See IoIand arthes, "The eath oI the Author," In lmcge, Music, Text (ew York.
IIII and Wang, 1977), pp. 142-48, as weII as MIcheI IoucauIt, "What Is an Author," In IauI
IabInow, ed., The Fouccult Recder (ew York. Iantheon, 1984), pp. 100-20.
Poetics II. Narrative and Lyric: The Poetic Forms and the Object of Artistic
Presentation
Page 1 of 28
A Theory of Art
Karo Berger
IrInt S-13. 9780195128604
O. 10.1093/0195128605.001.0001
Poetcs II. Narratve and Lyrc: The Poetc Forms and the Ob|ect of Artstc
Presentaton
DOI:10.1093/0195128605.003.0005
ThIs chapter cIarIIIes the essentIaI nature oI the two IundamentaI poetIc Iorms oI
composItIon - those oI the narratIve and the IyrIc - and shows how these two Iorms can
be seen to operate not onIy In IIterature, but aIso In paIntIng and musIc. arratIve Is a
kInd oI Iorm In the constItutIon oI whIch the essentIaI roIe Is pIayed by tIme, that Is, the
temporaI Iorm, the kInd oI Iorm In whIch the whoIe consIsts oI a number oI phases or
parts whIch succeed one another In a determIned order, theIr successIon governed by
the reIatIonshIps oI causIng and resuItIng by necessIty or probabIIIty. IyrIc, by contrast,
Is the atemporaI Iorm, the kInd oI Iorm In the constItutIon oI whIch tIme pIays no essentIaI
roIe, Its parts, whether exIstIng sImuItaneousIy or succeedIng one another, governed by
the reIatIonshIp oI the necessary or probabIe mutuaI ImpIIcatIon, rather than the
necessary or probabIe causatIon. The two Iorms are correIated wIth two kInds oI
contents. the narratIve Is the kInd oI Iorm properIy suIted Ior representIng human
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actIons, and the IyrIc Ior states oI mInd. The InterpIay oI narratIve and IyrIc then maps the
compIete IIeId oI not onIy artIstIc Iorms, but aIso human ways oI beIng In the worId, that
Is, oI everythIng that one mIght want to represent In art II one treats art as an Instrument
oI human seII-reveIatIon.
leywords: poetcs, narratve, yrc, form, terature, pantng, musc, tempora form, atempora form, acton
There are onIy three pure naturaI Iorms oI poetry, the pIaInIy narratIng, the
enthusIastIcaIIy excIted, and the personaIIy enacted. epIc, IyrIc, and drama. These
three poetIc Iorms can IunctIon together or separateIy. One IInds them oIten mIxed
together In the smaIIest poem and just because oI thIs unIon wIthIn the narrowest
space they produce the most wonderIuI eIIect, somethIng oI whIch the most
estImabIe baIIads oI aII natIons make us cIearIy aware. IIkewIse, we see aII three
unIted In the oIder Greek tragedy, and they separate onIy aIter a certaIn perIod oI
tIme.
Goethe, "otes and StudIes Toward a etter !nderstandIng oI the Weststlicher
Diwcn"
We have seen that the "what" and "how" oI art, the questIons oI what Is the content
presented and experIenced In an artwork and how Is thIs content presented and
experIenced, Iead InescapabIy to the concepts oI materIaI, matter, and Iorm. I an artwork
Is to exIst at aII, Its content must be embodIed In a perceptIbIe materIaI, such as stone,
pIgment, sound. As Iong as the work exIsts In the artIst's ImagInatIon onIy, the materIaI,
too, may be ImagIned, but II the work Is to be pubIIcIy avaIIabIe, Its materIaI must be reaI.
n eIther case, there Is no such thIng as dIsembodIed content or meanIng (just as there Is
no such thIng as a dIsembodIed human beIng).
We have aIso seen that, whIIe the materIaI Is reaI, the content or object oI presentatIon Is
not, It Is, rather, ImagInary. n the precedIng chapter, the matter oI whIch thIs object Is
made, the categorIes oI eIements the presented worId consIsts oI, have been Iound to be
reducIbIe to just the settIng, the personage, and the narrator (appearIng In a gIven
artworId sIngIy or In varIous combInatIons). ow the concept oI matter Is InextrIcabIy
IInked wIth that oI Iorm. The questIon {p.190) to be pursued presentIy Is what kInds oI
IormaI reIatIonshIps can arIse between the eIements oI the matter oI the presented
object.
These, then, are the two thIngs Intend InItIaIIy to accompIIsh here. IIrst, wouId IIke to
cIarIIy the essentIaI nature oI the two IundamentaI poetIc Iorms oI composItIon, those oI
the narratIve and the IyrIc, and second, wouId IIke to show how these two Iorms, II
understood In a suIIIcIentIy generaI way, can be seen to operate not onIy In the art oI
IIterature, but aIso In paIntIng and musIc.
a. Narratve and Lyrc
t Is most useIuI to thInk about the concept oI Iorm as InvoIvIng the InterreIated concepts
oI the whoIe and Its parts. OnIy an object whIch Is a whoIe and Is artIcuIated Into dIstInct
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parts can be saId to possess Iorm. ts Iorm consIsts In an InteIIIgIbIe reIatIonshIp between
the parts and the whoIe. The reIatIonshIp Is InteIIIgIbIe when one can perceIve the
contrIbutIon each part makes to the estabIIshment oI the object as a whoIe rather than a
mere heap oI unreIated eIements. t Is not necessary but certaInIy most naturaI Ior the
parts to be organIzed hIerarchIcaIIy. just as an object may enter Into InteIIIgIbIe
reIatIonshIps wIth other objects by becomIng a part oI a Iarger whoIe, so may a part be
artIcuIated Into Its own parts and become a Iesser whoIe In Its own rIght. To understand
the Iorm oI an object Is to understand how It Is dIvIded Into parts and how the parts are
reIated to one another and to the whoIe, that Is, what IunctIon each part has In the
makeup oI the whoIe.
TradItIonaIIy estabIIshed IIne arts generaIIy dIIIer In the kInds oI materIaI they use,
though, oI course, some kInds oI materIaI may be shared by severaI arts (the way tImbre
or meter are shared by IIterature and musIc, or stone by scuIpture and archItecture)
and artworks, contemporary as weII as tradItIonaI, may straddIe the boundarIes between
the arts (thInk oI the symbIotIc reIatIonshIp oI word and tone through most oI uropean
musIc hIstory). just IIke kInds oI matter, however, Iorm, as an InteIIIgIbIe reIatIonshIp
between parts and whoIe, Is common to aII arts. There Is, oI course, no IImIt to the
number oI ways In whIch Iorm may be reaIIzed In concrete artworks. ut It Is possIbIe Ior
certaIn generaI kInds oI Iorm to be shared by many artworks In dIIIerent medIa. Thus, Ior
Instance, a poem, a pIece oI musIc, a paIntIng, a Iacade, and a whoIe buIIdIng may aII
reaIIze the trIpartIte, symmetrIcaI Iorm (AA).
propose to understand "narratIve" and "IyrIc" as the most generaI and IundamentaI
kInds oI Iorm whIch artworIds may possess. ThIs understandIng represents a radIcaI
extensIon oI the accepted meanIngs oI the terms, and we wIII have to take a brIeI Iook at
these accepted meanIngs In order to apprecIate the exact sense oI the extensIon. IIterary
theorIsts do not thInk oI narratIve and IyrIc as Iorms at aII, but consIder them modes or
genres Instead. The ways In whIch the modaI and generIc components have been
IntertwIned and conIused In the hIstory oI these terms have been traced by Gerard
Genette In hIs The Architext.
1
SInce the story he teIIs Is very reIevant to my concerns,
wIII summarIze It brIeIIy here.
{p.191) IIato (In the thIrd book oI the Republic) and ArIstotIe (In the Foetics) thought oI
poetry as the representatIon oI events, or men In actIon, and were Interested In the
object oI representatIon (the "what") and the mode oI representatIon (the "how"). The
IundamentaI cIassIIIcatIon oI poetIc texts was based on the mode oI enuncIatIon whIch
IIato dIvIded Into the diegesis (narratIve mode), In whIch the storyteIIer, the narrator,
speaks, and mimesis (dramatIc mode), In whIch the represented personages speak.
SuperImposed on thIs was the secondary cIassIIIcatIon Into genres whIch was based
essentIaIIy on the "what" rather than "how," on the object or content rather than mode,
aIthough the ArIstoteIIan genres combIned the thematIc (that Is, content-reIated) and
modaI categorIes. The system IeIt beyond consIderatIon aII "nonrepresentatIonaI" poetry
(the quaIIIIcatIon Is Genette's, not mIne), that Is, It dIsregarded what we today caII the
IyrIc, the kInd oI poem whIch does not represent any actIon, but rather announces the
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Ideas or sentIments oI the speaker. SystematIc eIIorts to make room at the sIde oI the
narratIve and drama Ior the thIrd reaIm oI the IyrIc In poetIc theory date onIy Irom the
earIy seventeenth century on. Irom the tIme oI German IomantIcIsm untII our own day
the trIad oI epIc, drama, and IyrIc domInates IIterary theory. The trIad makes a
combInatIon oI modaI and thematIc categorIes InevItabIe and In practIce InvItes theIr
constant conIusIon. narratIve and drama are modes oI representatIon oI human actIon,
whIIe IyrIc does not represent actIons at aII, but rather mentaI states, thoughts, emotIons,
sItuatIons. The dIIIerence, then, between narratIve and drama Is In the mode oI
presentatIon, whIIe the dIIIerence between both these and IyrIc Is In the presented
object. The conIusIon between modaI and thematIc categorIes can be avoIded, Genette
teIIs us, II we return to the ArIstoteIIan system (enIarged by the IncIusIon oI
"nonrepresentatIonaI" poetry), crossIng n thematIc cIasses wIth p modaI cIasses to
produce np genres.
The cIassIIIcatIon oI genres, however, Is not my aIm here. nstead, wouId IIke to Iree the
concepts oI narratIve and IyrIc Irom aII "modaI" connotatIons and stress theIr "thematIc"
or "objectIve" dImensIon. t shouId be ImmedIateIy apparent that thIs conIIates epIc and
drama Into a sIngIe cIass (whIch, IoIIowIng current usage and Ior want oI a better term,
wIII caII "narratIve," even though used In thIs sense the term Is potentIaIIy conIusIng, sInce
It Is the presence oI the narratIng voIce that dIstInguIshes diegesis Irom mimesis,
2
In the
current usage one can have a "narratIve" wIthout a narrator) and repIaces the IomantIc
trIad oI epIc, drama, and IyrIc wIth the dyad oI narratIve and IyrIc. What Is Iess apparent,
but wIII emerge In the course oI thIs dIscussIon, Is that the cIassIIIcatIon Is based not
mereIy on the object oI presentatIon, but more specIIIcaIIy on the IormaI reIatIonshIps
between the materIaI eIements oI the object, that Is, that narratIve and IyrIc are not
mereIy kInds oI content, but more specIIIcaIIy kInds oI Iorm.
n dIsregardIng the "modaI" dImensIon, In conIIatIng epIc and drama, and In caIIIng the
resuIt narratIve, IoIIow cIoseIy the most penetratIng InvestIgatIon oI the concept oI
narratIve we have today, that presented by IauI IIcoeur In hIs Time cnd Ncrrctive.
3
IIcoeur, whIIe basIng hIs anaIysIs on ArIstotIe's Foetics, {p.192) does not hesItate to
deveIop and extend Its concepts to suIt hIs own purposes. Ie concedes that
there Is somethIng apparentIy paradoxIcaI In makIng narratIve actIvIty the category
encompassIng drama, epIc, and hIstory, when, on the one hand, what ArIstotIe caIIs
hIstory (historic) In the context oI the Foetics pIays the roIe oI a counterexampIe
and when, on the other hand, narratIve-or at Ieast what he caIIs dIegetIc poetry-
Is opposed to drama wIthIn the sIngIe encompassIng category oI mImesIs.
4
What makes It possIbIe to consIder narratIve as the common genus oI whIch epIc and
drama are the specIes and, moreover, to see thIs as justIIIed by ArIstotIe's text, Is the
prImacy In the Foetics oI the "what," or the object oI representatIon, over aII other
dImensIons oI composItIon, IncIudIng the "how," or the mode oI representatIon, that Is,
the prImacy oI what Genette wouId caII the "thematIc" over the "modaI" dImensIon.
ThIs prImacy resuIts Irom the IoIIowIng consIderatIon.
5
The end oI tragedy Is
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representatIon oI actIon (mimesis prcxeos), and thIs can be IdentIIIed wIth pIot (muthos),
whIch Is the most Important component oI the "what," the object oI representatIon. Thus,
even II In prIncIpIe the dImensIons oI means (such as Ianguage or meIody), mode, and
object are equaI, In actuaI anaIysIs In the Foetics the whoIe weIght Is on the "what." n
other words,
the equIvaIence between mImesIs and muthos Is an equIvaIence by means oI the
"what." And In terms oI Its pIot, epIc cIoseIy IoIIows the ruIes oI tragedy. The
essentIaI thIng Is that the poet-whether narrator or dramatIst-be a "maker oI
pIots."
6
The dIIIerence between epIc and drama Is based on mode. n both, the author acts as the
storyteIIer, but In the Iormer the storyteIIer speaks dIrectIy (dIegetIc composItIon) and In
the Iatter he speaks IndIrectIy through hIs personages (dramatIc composItIon). ArIstotIe
hImseII attenuates In varIous ways the modaI opposItIon and, In any case, the opposItIon
"does not aIIect the object oI ImItatIon, the empIotment."
7
Thus IIcoeur IeeIs justIIIed In
dIsregardIng the mode and concentratIng on the object, "caIIIng narratIve exactIy what
ArIstotIe caIIs muthos."
8
n short, IIcoeur deIInes narratIve In terms oI the empIotment. ThIs deIInItIon
sImuItaneousIy InvoIves the presented object In generaI and specIIIcaIIy the Iorm oI the
object. As the representatIon oI human actIon, the pIot Is IdentIcaI wIth the content
presented In a narratIve. ut the empIotment Is aIso a IormaI operatIon wIth generaI
Ieatures that are common to aII narratIve composItIons.
IIcoeur's anaIysIs oI the operatIon oI empIotment, the ArIstoteIIan muthos, shouId be
summarIzed here.
9
The pIot organIzes or synthesIzes the events Into a system
characterIzed by whoIeness, approprIate magnItude, and compIeteness. I may be
aIIowed to do to IIcoeur what we have seen hIm a moment ago do to ArIstotIe, shouId
say that even though In prIncIpIe the three characterIstIcs {p.193) are equaI, In actuaI
anaIysIs In both the Foetics and Time cnd Ncrrctive the entIre weIght Is on whoIeness. n
Iact, both the approprIate magnItude and compIeteness can be easIIy seen as aspects oI
whoIeness. As ArIstotIe puts It,
a whoIe Is that whIch has begInnIng, mIddIe, and end. A begInnIng Is that whIch Is not
ItseII necessarIIy aIter anythIng eIse, and whIch has naturaIIy somethIng eIse aIter It,
an end Is that whIch Is naturaIIy aIter somethIng ItseII, eIther as Its necessary or
usuaI consequent, and wIth nothIng eIse aIter It, and a mIddIe, that whIch Is by
nature aIter one thIng and has aIso another aIter It. A weII-constructed IIot,
thereIore, cannot eIther begIn or end at any poInt one IIkes, begInnIng and end In It
must be oI the Iorms just descrIbed.
10
The approprIate magnItude and compIeteness can be seen as aspects oI whoIeness, the
Iormer Is a sIze whIch makes the artIcuIatIon oI the whoIe Into InteIIIgIbIy reIated parts
possIbIe (that Is, a sIze Iarge enough so that the whoIe may be artIcuIated Into parts and
smaII enough so that the parts may be InteIIIgIbIy reIated), and the Iatter Is
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IndIstInguIshabIe Irom the characterIstIc oI havIng an end.
n commentIng on ArIstotIe's anaIysIs oI the notIon oI whoIeness, IIcoeur correctIy poInts
out that the accent Is put on the requIrements oI necessIty or probabIIIty governIng
successIon. "One aIter the other Is mereIy epIsodIc and thereIore ImprobabIe, one
because oI the other Is a causaI sequence and thereIore probabIe."
11
The IunctIon oI the
operatIon oI empIotment Is to transIorm a sImpIe successIon oI events (ArIstotIe's
prcgmctc) Into a meanIngIuI story, an InteIIIgIbIe whoIe, a conIIguratIon In whIch the
successIon Is necessary or probabIe. t Is the necessary or probabIe successIon that
synthesIzes the events Into a whoIe wIth a begInnIng, mIddIe, and end. y vIrtue oI the
poetIc composItIon, "concordance," that Is coherence, trIumphs over "dIscordance," the
threat oI Incoherence.
The art oI composItIon consIsts In makIng thIs dIscordance appear concordant. The
"one because oI the other" thus wIns over "one aIter the other." The dIscordant
overthrows the concordant In IIIe, but not In tragIc art.
12
n short, the operatIon oI empIotment whIch deIInes narratIve synthesIzes manIIoId
events Into the unIty oI one temporaI whoIe, wIth a begInnIng, mIddIe, and end, by makIng
the successIon oI the events necessary or probabIe.
So much Ior IIcoeur's anaIysIs oI the concept oI narratIve. t shouId be ImmedIateIy
apparent that, gIven my sense oI "Iorm" as an InteIIIgIbIe reIatIonshIp between parts and
whoIe, narratIve Is a kInd oI Iorm. The reIatIonshIp Is InteIIIgIbIe, have expIaIned, when
one can perceIve the contrIbutIon each part makes to the estabIIshment oI the object as a
whoIe rather than a mere heap oI unreIated eIements. To understand the Iorm oI an
object Is to understand how It Is dIvIded Into parts and how the parts are reIated to one
another and to the whoIe, that Is, what IunctIon each part has In the makeup oI the whoIe.
arratIve Is cIearIy a whoIe (pIot) wIth InteIIIgIbIy reIated parts (events) whIch constItute
the whoIe by perIormIng the IunctIons oI the begInnIng, mIddIe, and end. {p.194) We
have aIready seen how centraI the notIon oI the whoIe Is to the ArIstoteIIan understandIng
oI muthos. The Importance oI the concepts oI the whoIe and Its parts as weII as oI the
InteIIIgIbIIIty oI theIr reIatIonshIp, aII notIons deIInIng the Idea oI Iorm proposed here,
emerges wIth partIcuIar cIarIty In ArIstotIe's dIscussIon oI approprIate magnItude as an
essentIaI Ieature oI the pIot.
AgaIn. to be beautIIuI, a IIvIng creature, and every whoIe made up oI parts, must
not onIy present a certaIn order In Its arrangement oI parts, but aIso be oI a certaIn
deIInIte magnItude. eauty Is a matter oI sIze and order, and thereIore ImpossIbIe
eIther (1) In a very mInute creature, sInce our perceptIon becomes IndIstInct as It
approaches InstantaneIty, or (2) In a creature oI vast sIze-one, say, 1,000 mIIes
Iong-as In that case, Instead oI the object beIng seen aII at once, the unIty and
whoIeness oI It Is Iost to the behoIder. just In the same way, then, as a beautIIuI
whoIe made up oI parts, or a beautIIuI IIvIng creature, must be oI some sIze, but a
sIze to be taken In by the eye, so a story or IIot must be oI some Iength, but oI a
Iength to be taken In by the memory.
13
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Iowever, not aII Iorm Is narratIve. arratIve Is a kInd oI Iorm, wouId IIke to propose
now (aIso IoIIowIng the Iootsteps oI IIcoeur here), In the constItutIon oI whIch the
essentIaI roIe Is pIayed by tIme. t Is nothIng other than the temporaI Iorm. The temporaI
Iorm Is the kInd oI Iorm In whIch the whoIe consIsts oI a number oI "phases" or parts
whIch succeed one another In a determIned order. To understand the temporaI Iorm Is
to understand how an object Is dIvIded Into successIve phases and how the phases are
reIated to one another and to the whoIe, that Is, what IunctIon each phase has In the
makeup oI the whoIe, In the transIormatIon oI a mere successIon oI unreIated eIements
Into a conIIguratIon oI InteIIIgIbIy reIated phases. I the successIve phases are to enter Into
InteIIIgIbIe reIatIonshIps, II a successIon Is to be transIormed Into a conIIguratIon, earIIer
phases must not onIy precede but aIso In some way cause the appearance oI Iater ones,
and these In turn must not onIy succeed but aIso IoIIow Irom the earIIer ones, that Is, the
"one aIter the other" must become "one because oI the other." Ior thIs to happen, the
phases must perIorm such IunctIons as those oI beIng the begInnIng, mIddIe, or endIng.
The begInnIng phase Is the one whIch does not requIre any earIIer phase, but whIch does
requIre and In some way causes the appearance oI another, Iater phase or phases. The
endIng phase, converseIy, does not requIre any Iater phase, but requIres and In some
way IoIIows Irom an earIIer one or ones. And the mIddIe phase requIres and IoIIows Irom
an earIIer phase or phases as weII as requIres and causes a Iater one or ones. eedIess
to say, the reIatIonshIps oI causIng or IoIIowIng Irom may but do not have to obtaIn onIy
between ImmedIateIy adjacent phases. The more compIex and sophIstIcated temporaI
Iorms exhIbIt a Iarge number oI nonImmedIate, Iong-range reIatIonshIps between phases.
n short, what dIstInguIshes the narratIve or temporaI kInd oI Iorm Irom other kInds Is
that Its parts succeed one another In a determIned order and that theIr successIon Is
governed by the reIatIonshIps oI causIng and resuItIng by necessIty or probabIIIty.
The tradItIonaI dIvIsIon oI the whoIe IIterary IIeId Into epIc, drama, and IyrIc {p.195) and
the subsumptIon oI the Iormer two under the cIass oI narratIves Ieaves us now wIth the
task oI examInIng the narratIve's "other," the IyrIc. n Genette's terms, the dIstInctIon
between narratIve and IyrIc Is "thematIc" rather than "modaI," that Is, It Is In the IIrst
pIace the dIstInctIon between the kInds oI objects or contents presented In the IIterary
work. !nIIke the narratIve, the IyrIc does not represent men In actIon, but rather
announces the Ideas or sentIments oI the speaker, that Is, It represents (presents,
IIteraIIy, makes present) not actIons, but mentaI states, thoughts, emotIons, sItuatIons, not
the actIons one does, but the states one IInds oneseII In. ut thIs thematIcaIIy based
cIassIIIcatIon ImpIIes a IormaI cIassIIIcatIon as weII, that Is, not onIy narratIve, but aIso IyrIc
Is a kInd oI Iorm.
ThIs Iorm, however, can be deIIned at IIrst onIy In negatIve terms, as what It Is not. The
IyrIc Is the nonnarratIve, that Is, It Is the atemporaI Iorm, the kInd oI Iorm In the
constItutIon oI whIch tIme pIays no essentIaI roIe. The reason Ior thIs Is that whIIe tIme Is
the IndIspensabIe eIement oI the actIons one does, It Is not the necessary constItuent oI
the states one IInds oneseII In. (eIther Is space. the "systematIc" temptatIon oI caIIIng
IyrIc the "spatIaI" Iorm shouId be resIsted.) ote that whIIe tIme Is not oI the essence,
neIther Is It necessarIIy excIuded Irom the constItutIon oI a IyrIc Iorm. It sImpIy does not
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matter whether Its parts exIst sImuItaneousIy or successIveIy, but II they do exIst
successIveIy, the successIon Is a mere successIon, Is not domInated by the necessary or
probabIIIstIc causaIIty.
ut aII thIs does not mean that we cannot say anythIng posItIve about the IyrIcaI Iorm. The
crucIaI questIon to ask about any kInd oI Iorm Is what governs the reIatIonshIp between
the parts and the whoIe, what gIues the parts together Into a whoIe? We have seen that In
the narratIve Iorm thIs was a sort oI necessary or probabIe ccusction. ow, causatIon Is
an asymmetrIcaI, or, more precIseIy, IrreversIbIe, reIatIonshIp In whIch tIme pIays an
IndIspensabIe roIe. an earIIer c causes a Iater b, but b does not cause c, It resuIts Irom It.
The parts oI an atemporaI whoIe cannot be reIated In thIs way, oI course, but they can
and must be by a symmetrIcaI, or reversIbIe, reIatIonshIp oI necessary or probabIe
mutucl implicction In whIch tIme pIays no IndIspensabIe roIe (wIthout beIng necessarIIy
excIuded, eIther). an c (whether earIIer or sImuItaneous, It does not matter) ImpIIes In
some way a (Iater or sImuItaneous) b, whIIe the b ImpIIes the c. What "ImpIIcatIon" means
here Is somethIng IIke thIs. II a whoIe Is to be constItuted Irom these parts, then the
presence oI part c makes necessary or probabIe the presence oI part b, and the reverse.
n other words, II there are onIy two parts (and more compIex cases can be extrapoIated
Irom thIs sImpIest one), a whoIe wIII resuIt onIy II the parts ImpIy one another In some
way, II the presence oI one ImpIIes, necessarIIy or probabIy, the presence oI the other.
What gIues the parts together In the IyrIc Iorm, Is the reversIbIe mutuaI ImpIIcatIon (, II
c, then b, and II b, then c). What gIues them together In the narratIve Iorm Is the
IrreversIbIe causatIon (-, II c earIIer, then b Iater), whIch necessarIIy Introduces the
temporaI dImensIon IackIng In the mutuaI ImpIIcatIon. Thus we arrIve at a posItIve deIInItIon
oI the IyrIcaI Iorm. what dIstInguIshes the IyrIcaI Irom the narratIve Iorm {p.196) Is that
Its parts, whether exIstIng sImuItaneousIy or succeedIng one another, are governed by a
reIatIonshIp oI necessary or probabIe mutuaI ImpIIcatIon.
t shouId be cIear by now that the narratIve-IyrIc dIstInctIon Is not at aII IdentIcaI wIth the
dIstInctIon between artworks that deveIop In tIme (as IIterary or musIcaI works do) and
those that do not change (say, paIntIngs or buIIdIngs), that It Is not the dIstInctIon between
the so-caIIed temporaI and spatIaI arts. ThIs Is not sImpIy because, as ewey argued at
Iength, the experIence oI art aIways has a temporaI character.
14
The concepts oI
narratIve and IyrIc are concerned neIther wIth modes In whIch artworks exIst In the reaI
worId, nor wIth modes In whIch they are experIenced. Iather, what Is at stake wIth these
concepts Is the structure, temporaI or atemporaI, oI the worId whIch comes Into
exIstence In the work, the worId whIch the work makes present. A IyrIcaI descrIptIon oI a
room exIsts and deveIops In tIme and It Is experIenced In tIme by the reader. ut It may
be structured In such a way that the specIIIc order In whIch the IurnIture oI the room
comes Into beIng does not matter, just as It does not matter when a room Is depIcted In a
paIntIng (and even In a paIntIng we have to survey the contents oI the room In some
order). ConverseIy, a representatIon oI human actIon wIII have a temporaI structure
whether the actIon Is descrIbed or depIcted, sImpIy because the structure oI human
actIon Is necessarIIy temporaI.
15
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b. The Forms n Pantng and Musc
arratIve and IyrIc, as these terms are understood here, are IundamentaI poetIc Iorms
oI composItIon, not genres. ActuaI works oI IIterature may represent these Iorms In theIr
pure state. !suaIIy, however, the two Iorms coexIst In varIous, oIten unexpected
proportIons. The so-caIIed "narratIve" genres, In partIcuIar, are rareIy pure narratIve
(thInk oI the growIng presence oI the IyrIc In the noveI, a presence whIch reaches such
overwheImIng proportIons In some modern representatIves oI the genre that Genette
couId IamousIy summarIze the pIot oI A lc recherche du temps perdu In one brIeI
sentence. "MarceI becomes a wrIter"
16
). The useIuIness oI the concepts does not IIe In
theIr cIassIIIcatory power, but rather In theIr power to IIIumInate joIntIy aspects oI actuaI
works or genres. n any case, the appIIcabIIIty oI these two categorIes to IIterature,
whatever the specIIIc terms used to name them, Is evIdent and wIII not concern us here.
17
nstead, wouId IIke to show that the understandIng oI the concepts have proposed
Is suIIIcIentIy generaI to open the way to theIr beIng appIIcabIe to, and abIe to IIIumInate,
not onIy IIterature, but aIso paIntIng and musIc.
n her book on utch art In the seventeenth century, SvetIana AIpers gave new IIIe to the
tradItIonaI dIchotomy between taIIan and orthern paIntIng.
18
The taIIan IenaIssance,
she argued, conceIved oI the pIcture as a Iramed wIndow through whIch a vIewer Iooked
at a worId InhabIted by human IIgures perIormIng sIgnIIIcant actIons known to the vIewer
Irom texts that were the vesseIs oI poetIc, reIIgIous, and hIstorIcaI tradItIons. t was a
narratIve art guIded by the modern conversIon oI the IoratIan sIogan oI ut picturc
poesis. y contrast, {p.197) seventeenth-century utch art was concerned wIth
"descrIbIng" the surIace oI the seen worId rather than "narratIng" the actIons oI men and
women.
ote that AIpers's dIchotomy oI narratIng and descrIbIng Is based IundamentaIIy on the
content oI the represented worId. In paIntIng, one can "descrIbe" anythIng vIsIbIe, but
one can "narrate" onIy human actIons. To my mInd, the most Important coroIIary oI thIs
dIchotomy Is that narratIve paIntIng, unIIke Its descrIptIve sIster, must be guIded by the
paradoxIcaI ambItIon to show the InvIsIbIe. t Is not just that, as AIpers argues, narratIve
paIntIng uses the vIsIbIe actIons oI the body, that Is, gestures and IacIaI expressIons, to
present the InvIsIbIe states oI mInd oI the paInted IIgures. t Is, In addItIon and even more
crucIaIIy, that It must caII up to the vIewer's mInd not onIy the present tIme oI the paInted
scene, but aIso Its past and Iuture. human actIon Is InescapabIy temporaI, It sImpIy cannot
be understood In atemporaI terms.
t IoIIows that, as AIpers poInts out, taIIan paIntIng, by prIvIIegIng narratIon, puts a great
premIum on knowIedge and educatIon. t paInts somethIng that cannot mereIy be seen
but must aIso be known, and It requIres that the vIewer be educated In the reIIgIous,
poetIc, and hIstorIcaI tradItIons Irom whIch Its subjects are drawn. y contrast, the
descrIptIve utch paIntIng does not go beyond the vIsIbIe, that Is, It contents ItseII wIth
perceptIon and reIatIve Ignorance (reIatIve, because no perceptIon can be compIeteIy
Iree oI knowIedge). An aspect oI thIs contrast between knowIedge, on the one hand, and
perceptIon, on the other, Is that narratIve paIntIng aIms at the presentatIon oI generaI
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human traIts and truths, whIIe Its descrIptIve counterpart Is concerned wIth the
preservatIon oI the IndIvIduaI IdentItIes oI each person and thIng.
A Iurther Important coroIIary oI the dIstInctIon between narratIve and descrIptIve art Is
that the Iormer assumes an actIve and the Iatter a passIve attItude on the part oI the
paInter and vIewer. To brIng out thIs contrast, AIpers emphasIzes the taIIan art oI
perspectIve, the conceptIon oI a pIcture whIch presupposes a vIewer actIveIy IookIng out
at IIgures whose appearance Is a IunctIon oI theIr dIstance Irom hIm, and opposes thIs to
the orthern conceptIon oI a pIcture whIch cIaIms to be part oI passIve vIsIon and
demands no such actIve roIe Ior the vIewer. (Thus taIIan art prIvIIeges human beIngs not
onIy as the objects oI representatIon, but aIso as Its makers and vIewers.) The contrast Is
one between the paInter's and vIewer's actIve makIng (orderIng, possessIng the worId)
and theIr passIve absorptIon (just IookIng at the worId). AIpers's suggestIve observatIons
on the essentIaI roIe pIayed by the Irame In taIIan, but not orthern, paIntIng may be
seen to IoIIow Irom the contrast between the artIsts' actIve and passIve attItudes. the
Irame Is the IundamentaI devIce by means oI whIch the paInter orders the Image.
ut the systematIc connectIon between the narratIve-descrIptIve dIstInctIon, on the one
hand, and the actIve-passIve contrast, on the other, comes out most basIcaIIy, thInk, II
we recaII the reIatIve Importance knowIedge has Ior narratIve art, as opposed to the
premIum descrIptIve art puts on perceptIon. The vIewer {p.198) who has to compIete
the worId that Is vIsIbIe In the pIcture wIth hIs own knowIedge oI the way human beIngs
act In generaI and oI the presented story In partIcuIar assumes a much more actIve
attItude In Iront oI the paIntIng than the vIewer oI whom no such task Is requIred. The
contrast between knowIedge and perceptIon Is, oI course, reIatIve, as Is that between the
actIve and passIve roIes oI the vIewer. As any reader oI GombrIch's Art cnd lllusion
knows, no perceptIon Is compIeteIy Iree oI knowIedge, and by the same token no
perceptIon can be compIeteIy passIve.
19
ut thIs does not InvaIIdate the relctive
dIstInctIon between narratIve art requIrIng the vIewer's actIve and knowIedgeabIe
partIcIpatIon, on the one hand, and descrIptIve art assumIng perceptIon whIch In
comparIson appears quIte passIve, on the other.
The dIstInctIon between the two ways oI pIcturIng the worId Is not absoIute In yet another
sense. SInce "narratIve" art can never be entIreIy Iree oI "descrIptIon," and sInce,
converseIy, the presence oI human IIgures In such "descrIptIve" genres as the Iandscape
or portraIt aIways threatens to engage the "narratIve" vIewIng habIts, both ways oI
pIcturIng are oIten sImuItaneousIy present In a paIntIng In varIous proportIons and
InteractIng In varIous ways. Thus the dIstInctIon Is useIuI and IIIumInatIng not because oI
Its cIassIIIcatory power, but rather because It can heIp us see aspects oI IndIvIduaI works
or whoIe artIstIc cuItures In a new IIght (consIder the way In whIch the hIstory oI
nIneteenth-century Irench paIntIng Iends ItseII to a teIIIng, now enshrIned In the Musee
d'Orsay, In terms oI a compIex and subtIe struggIe between the "narratIve" art oI the
academy and the "descrIptIve" art oI the avant-garde).
AIpers's dIstInctIon between narratIve and descrIptIve pIcturIng can cIearIy be dIvorced
Irom the chronoIogIcaIIy and geographIcaIIy specIIIc cuIturaI IIeIds (the taIIan IenaIssance
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and the utch seventeenth century) to whIch she has appIIed It and used to Interpret any
area oI representatIonaI paIntIng. Thus generaIIzed, the dIstInctIon may be seen as a
transposItIon oI my dIstInctIon between narratIve and IyrIc Irom the IIterary to the
pIctorIaI domaIn. What makes the transposItIon possIbIe Is that both dIstInctIons are based
IundamentaIIy on the cIassIIIcatIon oI the content oI the presented worId. they both reIy
on what have termed the dIstInctIon between "actIons one does" and "states one IInds
oneseII In." n the domaIn oI paIntIng, the representatIon oI the Iatter must be coextensIve
wIth the representatIon oI the vIsIbIe worId, whIIe the attempt to represent the Iormer,
by IntroducIng temporaIIty, Is the attempt to show the InvIsIbIe. As a resuIt, we have seen
that narratIve paIntIng engages the knowIedge oI the vIewer to a much greater extent
than descrIptIve paIntIng does and thus demands a much more actIve stance. t Is cIear
that abstract paIntIng, even when understood-as here-as a specIes oI representatIonaI
art, can be onIy descrIptIve, and not narratIve. orderIIne cases, however, are possIbIe,
sInce anthropomorphIc IIgures can IntImate human actIon.
At the same tIme, In both the IIterary and pIctorIaI domaIns, the narratIveIyrIc dIstInctIon
InvoIves not mereIy the content oI the presented worId, that Is, the object oI
presentatIon, but more specIIIcaIIy the Iorm oI thIs object, that Is, {p.199) the
reIatIonshIps between the materIaI eIements oI the presented worId. n paIntIng, not Iess
than In IIterature, narratIve and IyrIc are kInds oI Iorm. What synthesIzes the parts oI a
descrIptIve pIcture Into a whoIe-that Is, what makes eIements oI the worId whIch the
pIcture presents Into, precIseIy, a worId-are the reIatIonshIps oI mutuaI ImpIIcatIon. A
narratIve paIntIng InvoIves, In addItIon, the synthesIzIng reIatIonshIps oI causIng and
resuItIng. t Is thIs suppIement oI narratIvIty that abstract paIntIng usuaIIy Iacks.
Can the categorIes oI narratIve and IyrIc be transposed aIso to the domaIn oI musIc, when
thIs Is taken (as It wIII be here) In Its pureIy InstrumentaI guIse?
20
(When musIc Is taken
together wIth the poetIc word, dance gesture, or dramatIc actIon, they tend to Impose
theIr Iorm on the whoIe.) n the case oI paIntIng, It wIII be remembered, the transposItIon
was based on the cIassIIIcatIon oI the content oI the presented worId. n the case oI an art
whIch Is representatIonaI onIy In the sense In whIch abstract paIntIng Is, that Is, where we
have no commonIy accepted crIterIa whIch wouId aIIow us to dIstInguIsh the
representatIon oI human actIon Irom the representatIon oI anythIng eIse, thIs route oI
transposItIon seems cIosed to us. ut we can aIways consIder the Iorm oI the presented
object dIrectIy.
n hIs essay on musIcaI hearIng oI the modern era, IeInrIch esseIer made a dIstInctIon
between the "actIve" or "synthetIc" hearIng oI Iate eIghteenth-century VIennese
CIassIcIsm and the "passIve" hearIng oI nIneteenth-century Austro-German IomantIcIsm.
21
The modern age oI musIc, argued esseIer, began wIth the transItIon Irom
"partIcIpatIon musIc" (Umgcngsmusik), In the makIng oI whIch aII those present took part,
to "presentatIon musIc" (Dcrbietungsmusik), whIch dIIIerentIated the musIcIans Irom the
IIsteners. n spIte oI the survIvaI oI the partIcIpatory attItude In some genres, Irom the
mId-eIghteenth century on, the essentIaI stance one took toward musIc was that oI a
IIstener. ut hearIng ItseII couId be actIve or passIve.
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ActIve-synthetIc hearIng deveIoped graduaIIy durIng the seventeenth and eIghteenth
centurIes to reach a hIgh poInt In the two decades precedIng 1800. MusIc oI the
seventeenth and eIghteenth centurIes was constructed Irom successIve parts, but whIIe
the earIIer musIc was composed and heard addItIveIy, sectIon aIter sectIon, so that at
most onIy the successIve sectIons couId be reIated to one another, In the eIghteenth
century one began to synthesIze the successIve phases so that Iarger and Iarger spans oI
musIc were aIIected untII the whoIe movement was turned Into a unIIIed whoIe. The unIty
was reaIIzed and grasped prImarIIy by means oI the InItIaI theme returnIng at the end and
oIten aIso recurrIng throughout the work. y the 1780s, the thematIc work and
sometImes even the derIvatIon oI the secondary theme Irom the maIn one guaranteed
the unIty oI the whoIe movement.
IormaI unIty was then sImuItaneousIy the unIty oI content or aIIectIve meanIng. urIng
the IIrst haII oI the eIghteenth century, aIIectIve meanIng underwent a transItIon Irom the
typIcaI to the IndIvIduaI. The seventeenth-century theme was typIcaI In that It represented
an objectIve "aIIect" whIch couId be shared by {p.200) many persons, just as the
theme ItseII couId be shared by many composers. y the 1780s, the theme became
IndIvIduaI, personaI, and orIgInaI, expressIng one unIque personaIIty and used by one
partIcuIar composer In one partIcuIar work. Thus a work, unIIIed by means oI a maIn
theme that retaIned Its IdentIty through aII the vIcIssItudes oI Its deveIopment, was
understood to express an endurIng IndIvIduaI moraI "character." ThIs understandIng Iay
behInd Iaydn's weII-known remark to hIs bIographer GrIesInger that hIs symphonIes
oIten represented moraI characters,
22
and It was expIIcItIy IormuIated theoretIcaIIy In
1795 by ChrIstIan GottIrIed Krner.
23
The unIty oI Iorm and oI meanIng both depended
on the synthesIzIng powers oI hearIng.
AIter 1800, esseIer contInued, the IomantIcs were IamIIIar wIth actIve-synthetIc hearIng
but pIaced It In a subordInate posItIon, IavorIng Instead a new IdeaI oI a passIve hearIng.
The IIstener's roIe was no Ionger, or at Ieast not prImarIIy, to grasp the work as an object
In Iront oI hIm In actIve synthesIs. The very dIstInctIon between the subject and object In
musIcaI experIence was chaIIenged In Iavor oI a prImordIaI unIty precedIng the
dIIIerentIatIon oI the two. The IIstener was to become In some way IdentIcaI wIth the
musIc, experIencIng It ImmedIateIy, passIveIy drownIng In It. The composItIonaI means
promotIng the new passIve hearIng were deveIoped by Schubert In hIs turn to the IyrIc,
they consIsted prImarIIy oI new InstrumentaI and harmonIc coIor and, even more
ImportantIy, oI ostInato accompanImentaI IIgures the repetItIve rhythms oI whIch InvIted
the IIstener to aIIow hImseII to be carrIed by the "rhythmIc stream," InducIng a tranceIIke
state.
Iand In hand wIth the new IdeaI oI hearIng and the new composItIonaI means to reaIIze It
went a new content. The centraI theme oI IomantIc musIc was neIther the aroque aIIect,
nor the CIassIcaI character, but "mood" (Stimmung). IeanIng IndIrectIy on the
pathbreakIng work oI hIs teacher MartIn IeIdegger, who assIgned an Important roIe to
the category oI mood In hIs IundamentaI anaIysIs oI human beIng In Sein und Zeit oI 1927,
24
and dIrectIy on Otto IrIedrIch oIInow's useIuI 1941 book on the essence oI moods,
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25
esseIer expIaIned that whIIe an emotIon aIways has Its IntentIonaI object (It Is, say, a
Iear oj somethIng), a mood Is rather a state, a specIIIc compIete "coIorIng" oI our beIng In
whIch the body and the souI, the man and the worId, are as II attuned to the same pItch.
Moods are so prImordIaI that they precede the dIIIerentIatIon Into the subject and object,
man and worId. Ience, what Is characterIstIc oI them Is the unIty oI the Inner and outer.
Moreover, a mood cannot be changed at wIII, It has the character oI somethIng that "IIIIs"
and masters us. t can, however, be awakened In us through proper means. We can "gIve
In" to a mood when we aIIow the means whIch brIng It to work on us. o wonder then
that the art whIch made mood Into Its centraI object requIred passIve receptIvIty, "gIvIng
oneseII away" to the mood In hearIng, wantIng to be "IIIIed" wIth, the musIc.
As shouId be cIear Irom the above summary, esseIer pIaces ways oI hearIng, actIve or
passIve, expIIcItIy at the center oI hIs dIchotomy. ut the IogIc oI the concepts he uses, the
manner In whIch these concepts are connected wIth one {p.201) another, suggests a
dIIIerent center. The most IundamentaI dIstInctIon he makes Is, thInk, the one havIng to
do wIth the content oI the worId whIch comes Into beIng In the work. A work can present
eIther a "character" or a "mood." AII other dIstInctIons depend on thIs one. The choIce oI
the presented object dIctates the choIce oI the musIcaI Iorm the composer wIII use and
both together determIne the attItude requIred oI the IIstener. The presentatIon oI an
IndIvIduaI moraI character endurIng through the IIIe story oI the represented person
requIres a Iorm unIIIed by a maIn theme that retaIns Its IdentIty through the whoIe story
oI Its exposItIon, deveIopment, and recapItuIatIon wIthIn the work, Its adequate receptIon
caIIs Ior actIve hearIng to synthesIze successIve parts oI the work Into a whoIe. The
presentatIon oI a mood or state oI mInd In whIch one IInds oneseII requIres a Iorm unIIIed
by the rhythmIc stream oI a repetItIve accompanImentaI IIgure, as weII as by the harmonIc
and InstrumentaI coIor, Its adequate receptIon caIIs Ior passIve hearIng In whIch the
IIstener aIIows hImseII to be IIIIed wIth the musIc and thus to be attuned to the mood It
evokes.
Irom the standpoInt oI our aIms here, the maIn Iesson to be drawn Irom esseIer's
essay Is that not aII musIcaI Iorm must be truIy temporaI, just as not aII IIterary Iorm must
be temporaI. To be sure, aII musIc (and aII IIterature) deveIops In tIme. ut we have to
recaII that the notIon oI Iorm whIch Is at Issue here InvoIves neIther the modes In whIch
artworks exIst In the reaI worId, nor the modes In whIch they are experIenced, but rather
the structure, temporaI or atemporaI, oI the presented worId. OnIy some kInds oI musIcaI
Iorm (paradIgmatIcaIIy, the CIassIcaI sonata Iorm) IuIIy capItaIIze on the Iact that musIc
deveIops In tIme by makIng the order In whIch the phases oI the work succeed one
another as weII as the causaI IogIc oI the reIatIonshIps between the phases matter
centraIIy. WhIIe no tonaI musIc can dIsregard Its deveIopment In tIme compIeteIy (thInk oI
the necessary successIon oI the tonIc aIter the domInant In a cadence), esseIer dIrected
our attentIon to the exIstence oI musIc (such as the IomantIc pIano IyrIc) In whIch the
overaII orderIng oI the parts, or even the questIon oI whether the work contaIns such
parts, or whether Its parts exIst sImuItaneousIy (the way, say, meIody and
accompanIment In the homophonIc texture, or severaI dIIIerent meIodIes In the poIyphonIc
one, do), Is reIatIveIy unImportant, where dIIIerent Iorces matter and reIate the parts to
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one another.
26
A musIcaI Iorm whIch, IIke that oI a CIassIcaI sonata aIIegro movement, Is a whoIe dIvIded
Into successIve parts heId together prImarIIy by the maIn theme retaInIng Its IdentIty
throughout Its metamorphoses wIthIn the work, and whIch caIIs Ior a hearIng capabIe oI
graspIng the successIve parts oI the work as a whoIe, Is cIearIy a temporaI Iorm. t Is a
kInd oI a narratIve In the sense In whIch the term Is used here, that Is, the kInd oI Iorm In
whIch tIme pIays the essentIaI roIe, because the parts oI the whoIe succeed one another
In a determIned order and theIr successIon Is governed by the reIatIonshIps oI causIng
and resuItIng. One cannot begIn to understand a sonata aIIegro II one does not have some
comprehensIon oI how the musIcaI dIscourse Is dIvIded Into successIve phases and how
the phases ImpIy and are derIved Irom one another. A musIcaI Iorm whIch, IIke {p.202)
that oI a IomantIc pIano IyrIc, Is a whoIe heId together prImarIIy by the rhythmIc stream
oI a repetItIve accompanImentaI IIgure as weII as by the harmonIc and InstrumentaI coIor,
and whIch caIIs Ior a hearIng In whIch the IIstener aIIows hImseII to be IIIIed wIth the musIc,
carrIed by Its rhythmIc stream, and thus to be attuned to the mood It evokes, Is cIearIy a
Iorm In whIch temporaIIty does not matter much. t Is a kInd oI a IyrIc In the sense In whIch
the term Is used here, that Is, It does not much matter whether the parts oI the whoIe
exIst sImuItaneousIy or successIveIy, and, II successIveIy, In whIch order, and the parts
are reIated to one another by mutuaI ImpIIcatIon. The musIcaI IyrIc Is guIded by the
paradoxIcaI, and, It shouId be stressed, never compIeteIy reaIIzabIe, ambItIon to
neutraIIze tIme, to render It IrreIevant. ts temporaI Iorm Is usuaIIy deIIberateIy sImpIe,
not to say sImpIe-mInded, because what matters Ior Its comprehensIon Is not the
recognItIon that Its phrases Iorm an AA or a sImIIar pattern, but rather the recognItIon oI
the mutuaI approprIateness oI the meIody and accompanIment, oI the motIvIc, rhythmIc,
and harmonIc detaIIs, to one another.
just as In IIterature and paIntIng, so aIso In musIc, the dIstInctIon between the narratIve
and IyrIcaI Iorms Is reIatIve rather than absoIute. A musIcaI work, or at Ieast a work oI
tonaI musIc, can never be entIreIy atemporaI. Iarge-scaIe sectIons may IoIIow one another
wIth no dIscernIbIe IogIc, but the order oI smaIIer-scaIe events-phrases, chords-can
never be compIeteIy random. ConverseIy, even In the most rIgorousIy argued sonata,
the temporaI order and causaIIty cannot be reIevant to every aspect oI the work, nor Is It
easy to Iree a musIcaI work entIreIy oI hypnotIc, tIme-arrestIng Ieatures. esseIer hImseII
recognIzed that In nIneteenth-century musIc the passIve and actIve types oI hearIng
coexIsted. One can go Iurther and cIaIm that the two kInds oI Iorm coexIst In varIous
proportIons and Interact In dIverse ways In most musIcaI works and genres. just as In the
domaIns oI IIterature and paIntIng, In musIc the useIuIness oI the dIchotomy IIes Iess In Its
power to cIassIIy works and genres and more In Its abIIIty to IIIumInate IndIvIduaI works
and whoIe musIcaI cuItures In new and InterestIng ways (an abIIIty convIncIngIy
demonstrated by esseIer's own hIstory oI hearIng).
Thus reIatIvIzed, generaIIzed beyond the chronoIogIcaIIy and geographIcaIIy specIIIc
cuIturaI IIeIds to whIch esseIer had orIgInaIIy appIIed It, and used to Interpret the whoIe
domaIn oI musIc, the dIchotomy can be seen as a potentIaIIy IruItIuI transposItIon oI the
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narratIve-IyrIc dIstInctIon Irom the IIterary to the musIcaI domaIn.
c. Acton and Passon
"|T|he human shape and what It expresses and says, whether human event, actIon, or
IeeIIng, Is the Iorm In whIch art must grasp and represent the content oI the spIrIt," says
IegeI.
27
Thus Iar have argued that the basIc kInds oI eIements that make up, sIngIy or
joIntIy, an artworId are the settIng, personage, and narrator, and that the basIc kInds oI
Iorm one can IashIon oI these eIements are narratIve and IyrIc. ut It was apparent
throughout the dIscussIon above that narratIve and IyrIc are aIso correIated wIth two
kInds oI contents, oI represented objects.
{p.203) arratIve, the temporaI Iorm, Is suIted Ior representIng human actIons because
oI theIr InescapabIy temporaI character. t Is not just that an actIon takes tIme. t Is aIso
that we cannot experIence and understand our own or our IeIIows' actIons except as
narratIveIy conIIgured, as pIots wIth begInnIngs, mIddIes, and ends. Iuman actIons dIIIer
Irom other kInds oI behavIor In that they cannot be descrIbed as a mere sequence oI
events. IIrst he IIIted hIs hand, than he scratched hIs head. Iather, they have to be
descrIbed wIth reIerence to the agent's motIves and IntentIons, to the InItIaI state oI
aIIaIrs one wants to aIter, and to the IInaI state oI aIIaIrs one wants to achIeve. he IIIted hIs
hand and scratched hIs head because he wanted to reIIeve the ItchIng. As avId Carr
argued, we do not experIence and understand human actIons as mere sequences oI
events on whIch we subsequentIy and optIonaIIy Impose narratIve structures, but as
aIready conIIgured sequences, as temporaI whoIes the IndIvIduaI phases oI whIch have
dIstInct IunctIons such as that oI a begInnIng, a contInuatIon, and an endIng.
28
AIong the
same IInes, IIcoeur wrItes oI hIs
basIc hypothesIs that between the actIvIty oI narratIng a story and the temporaI
character oI human experIence there exIsts a correIatIon that Is not mereIy
accIdentaI but that presents a transcuIturaI Iorm oI necessIty. . . . time becomes
humcn to the extent thct it is crticulcted through c ncrrctive mode, cnd ncrrctive
cttcins its jull mecning when it becomes c condition oj temporcl existence.
29
And Iurther, we have to "accord aIready to experIence as such an Inchoate narratIvIty. . . .
We teII storIes because . . . human IIves need and merIt beIng narrated."
30
A sImIIar poInt
has been made by Macntyre.
am presentIng . . . human actIons . . . as enacted narratIves. arratIve Is not the
work oI poets, dramatIsts and noveIIsts reIIectIng upon events whIch had no
narratIve order beIore one was Imposed by the sInger or the wrIter. . . . n
successIuIIy IdentIIyIng and understandIng what someone eIse Is doIng we aIways
move towards pIacIng a partIcuIar epIsode In the context oI a set oI narratIve
hIstorIes, hIstorIes both oI the IndIvIduaIs concerned and oI the settIngs In whIch
they act and suIIer. . . . We render the actIons oI others InteIIIgIbIe In thIs way
because actIon ItseII has a basIcaIIy hIstorIcaI character. t Is because we IIve out
narratIves In our IIves and because we understand our own IIves In terms oI the
narratIves that we IIve out that the Iorm oI narratIve Is approprIate Ior
understandIng the actIons oI others. StorIes are IIved beIore they are toId.
31
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Thus the Iorm oI the narratIve and the content oI actIng humans go together. "man Is In
hIs actIons and practIce, as weII as hIs IIctIons, essentIaIIy a story-teIIIng anImaI"
(Macntyre agaIn).
32
ut humans are not aIways actIve. just as oIten they are passIve.
Then, they do not change the state oI aIIaIrs they IInd themseIves In, do not act but suIIer.
IassIon, as opposed to actIon, Is not InescapabIy temporaI, and hence the Iorm properIy
suIted to represent It Is the atemporaI IyrIc, the Iorm we reach Ior when what we want to
make present Is not an actIon, but a mentaI state (whether one oI cognItIon, voIItIon, or
emotIon, or some mIxture thereoI). The Iorm oI the IyrIc and the content oI suIIerIng
humans go together.
{p.204) ActIon and mentaI state. Together, these two exhaust the ways In whIch we
humans are In the worId. We are the sort oI beIngs who are aware oI how they IeeI and
thInk about the state oI aIIaIrs In whIch they IInd themseIves and who, Irom tIme to tIme,
attempt to change thIs state oI aIIaIrs. The InterpIay oI narratIve and IyrIc, then, not onIy
maps the compIete IIeId oI artIstIc Iorms. ecause oI the correIatIon oI these Iorms wIth
kInds oI content, wIth actIon and passIon (or mentaI state), It aIso maps the compIete IIeId
oI human ways oI beIng In the worId, that Is, oI everythIng that one mIght want to
represent In art II one treats art as an Instrument oI human seII-reveIatIon. The
eIghteenth-century operc seric Is the artIstIc genre In whIch the separatIon and InterpIay
oI narratIve and IyrIc, oI actIon and passIon, crystaIIIzed wIth partIcuIar cIarIty. the
organIzatIon oI an operatIc scenc Into a representatIon oI an actIon accompanIed by a
speech-IIke recItatIve oI the partIcIpatIng personages IoIIowed by the representatIon oI a
passIon, the state oI mInd oI the protagonIst oI the just compIeted actIon, expressed
vocaIIy by means oI a musIcaIIy IuIIy deveIoped sIngIng, the protagonIst's arIa, Is a
monument oI earIy modern ratIonaIIsm (rather than an "exotIc and IrratIonaI
entertaInment," as r. johnson wouId have It).
t mIght be temptIng to thInk oI actIon and passIon as beIng, respectIveIy, outer- and
Inner-orIented, or objectIve and subjectIve. True, when we act, we dIrect our attentIon to
the objectIve worId, the worId beyond the conIInes oI our mInds (wherever these may
be), we try to aIIect and change our envIronment, whIIe when we suIIer, we concentrate
on the subjectIve worId, the worId oI our IeeIIngs and thoughts, we are aware oI the
envIronment onIy In so Iar as It aIIects us. ut too rIgId a separatIon oI the two In those
terms wouId be a mIstake. actIon has Its subjectIve aspect and passIon has an objectIve
dImensIon. An actIon, we have just remInded ourseIves, has to be descrIbed wIth
reIerence to the agent's motIves and IntentIons, to the InItIaI state oI aIIaIrs one wants to
aIter, and to the IInaI state oI aIIaIrs one wants to achIeve. Thus, a specIIIc actIon has an
Inner, subjectIve, dImensIon, constItuted by the agent's motIves and IntentIons. kIck a
baII (and thus aIIect my envIronment), because want to score a goaI (and my wantIng It,
or anythIng eIse, does not happen In my envIronment, but "In" my mInd). And the
reverse. a specIIIc state oI mInd, whether InvoIvIng cognItIon, voIItIon, or emotIon, has Its
IntentIonaI object, It Is about somethIng. thInk about scorIng a goaI and am gIad to have
succeeded.
t appears, however, that It Is possIbIe to have a state oI mInd dIvorced Irom any specIIIc
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IntentIonaI object. To be sure, rather doubt that thIs Is possIbIe In the case oI cognItIon
or voIItIon, that we mIght be abIe to thInk about, or want, nothIng. ut It does seem to be
possIbIe In the case oI emotIon whIch, when deprIved oI Its IntentIonaI object, ceases to
be an emotIon and becomes a mood.
Irom ArIstotIe, we have Iearned that emotIon Is not quIte as IrratIonaI as IIato thought.
Iather, an emotIon has Its IrratIonaI and ratIonaI components. the component oI sensatIon,
the way It IeeIs to be In a partIcuIar emotIonaI state, the paIn or pIeasure oI the person
aIIected by the emotIon, on one hand, and the IntentIonaI object oI the emotIon, as weII as
the grounds on whIch the emotIon Is IeIt, {p.205) on the other. ow, when the
component oI sensatIon appears aIone, wIthout any accompanyIng IntentIonaI object or
any reason Ior IeeIIng the sensatIon, the state oI mInd Is not an emotIon but a mood. Iet
me come back to esseIer's sources. IeIdegger made us aware oI thIs IundamentaI
structure oI moods when he anaIyzed the phenomenon oI "mood" (Stimmung) In sectIon
29 oI Being cnd Time. IeIdegger's awareness oI, and admIratIon Ior, ArIstotIe's anaIysIs
oI emotIons Is expIIcItIy acknowIedged In thIs sectIon.
t Is not an accIdent that the earIIest systematIc nterpretatIon oI aIIects that has
come down to us Is not treated In the Iramework oI 'psychoIogy. ArIstotIe
InvestIgates the pcthe |aIIects| In the second book oI hIs Rhetoric. . . . ThIs work oI
ArIstotIe must be taken as the IIrst systematIc hermeneutIc oI the everydayness oI
eIng wIth one another. . . . What has escaped notIce Is that the basIc ontoIogIcaI
nterpretatIon oI the aIIectIve IIIe In generaI has been abIe to make scarceIy one
Iorward step worthy oI mentIon sInce ArIstotIe."
33
)
WhIIe we do not aIways IeeI an emotIon, we are aIways In some mood. "In every case
aseIn aIways has some mood."
34
"And Iurthermore, when we master a mood, we do so
by way oI a counter-mood, we are never Iree oI moods."
35
A mood Is more prImordIaI
than any act oI cognItIon or voIItIon, It Is prIor even to any dIstInctIon between the seII and
the worId whIch such acts presuppose. t Is the most prImordIaI way In whIch our beIng In
the worId Is dIscIosed to us. "A mood makes manIIest 'how one Is, and how one Is
IarIng ",
36
"ontoIogIcaIIy mood Is a prImordIaI kInd oI eIng Ior aseIn, In whIch aseIn Is
dIscIosed to ItseII prior to aII cognItIon and voIItIon, and beyond theIr range oI dIscIosure."
37
AgaIn.
A mood assaIIs us. t comes neIther Irom 'outsIde nor Irom 'InsIde |It Is prIor to
any such dIstInctIon havIng been made|, but arIses out oI eIng-In-the-worId, as a
way oI such eIng. . . . The mood hcs clrecdy disclosed, in every ccse, Being-in-the-
world cs c whole, cnd mckes it possible jirst oj cll to direct oneselj towcrds
something.
38
Thus our InteractIons wIth thIs somethIng, wIth our envIronment, our worId, are aIways
coIored by the underIyIng mood. Our prImordIaI attunement wIth the worId resonates
through aII our mentaI states. A mood Is a "basIc way In whIch aseIn Iets the worId
'matter to It."
39
t dIscIoses the worId as somethIng, "as somethIng by whIch It can be
threatened, Ior Instance."
40
An aIIect such as Iear Is possIbIe onIy because the "eIng-In-
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the worId, wIth Its state-oI-mInd," had "aIready submItted ItseII to havIng entItIes wIthIn-
the-worId 'matter to It In a way whIch Its moods have outIIned In advance."
41
And the
dIIIerence between an emotIon such as Iear and the mood oI anxIety whIch makes Iear
possIbIe Is that whIIe Iear must have an IntentIonaI object ( am aIraId oI somethIng),
anxIety does not have any such object.
Thct in the jcce oj which one hcs cnxiety is Being-in-the-world cs such. What Is the
dIIIerence phenomenaIIy between that In the Iace oI whIch anxIety Is anxIous and
that In the Iace oI whIch Iear Is aIraId? That In the Iace oI whIch one {p.206) has
anxIety Is not an entIty wIthIn-the-worId. . . . That In the Iace oI whIch one Is anxIous
Is compIeteIy IndeIInIte. . . . What oppresses us Is not thIs or that, nor Is It the
summatIon oI everythIng present-at-hand, It Is rather the possibility oI the ready-
to-hand In generaI, that Is to say, It Is the worId ItseII.
42
And agaIn. "Iear Is occasIoned by entItIes wIth whIch we concern ourseIves
envIronmentaIIy. AnxIety, however, sprIngs Irom aseIn ItseII."
43
IeIdegger's understandIng oI moods as, IIrst, somethIng essentIaI and InescapabIe
rather than somethIng that aIIects us onIy occasIonaIIy ("In every case aseIn aIways has
some mood") and, second, as the most IundamentaI IeveI deIInIng and coIorIng aII the rest
oI our mentaI IIIe was crItIcaIIy taken up and deveIoped In a Iess ontoIogIcaI and more
anthropoIogIcaI dIrectIon by oIInow In Dcs Wesen der Stimmungen. Ior oIInow, as Ior
IeIdegger, moods dIIIer Irom emotIons In that they have no IntentIonaI objects.
44
"n the
mood, the worId has not yet become objectIve, as In Iater Iorms oI conscIousness, In
partIcuIar, In cognItIon. Iather, the moods IIve stIII entIreIy In the undIIIerentIated unIty oI
seII and worId, subjectIng both to a common mood-coIorIng."
45
A mood represents the most IundamentaI IeveI oI mentaI IIIe, a "basIc dIsposItIon"
(Grundverjcssung) whIch coIors aII oI our mentaI states. A specIIIc underIyIng mood gIves
aII our experIence a deIInIte dIrectIon, makIng certaIn kInds oI experIence possIbIe and
precIudIng other kInds.
46
"n each mood the worId Is aIready 'Interpreted In a quIte
deIInIte way and aII understandIng Is aIready Ied In advance by thIs orIgInaI InterpretatIon
oI IIIe and oI the worId In the mood."
47
t wouId not be possIbIe to produce a compIete
cIassIIIcatIon oI moods. One mIght, however, dIvIde aII moods Into two generaI groups oI
hIgh and Iow (or eIevated and depressed) ones.
48
AII the same, there are some moods,
such as the moods oI devotIon, soIemnIty, or IestIvIty, whIch cannot be Iocated between
these two poIes.
49
Above, have cIaImed that actIons and "passIons" (states oI mInd) exhaust the ways In
whIch we humans are In the worId. The Importance oI IeIdegger's and oIInow's anaIyses
Is that they Iorce us to recognIze that there Is yet another kInd oI mentaI state, In addItIon
to those InvoIvIng the actIvItIes oI cognItIon, voIItIon, or emotIon, nameIy, mood, a IeeIIng
dIvorced Irom the cognItIve and ratIonaI actIvItIes, a IeeIIng wIthout an IntentIonaI object
and wIthout justIIyIng reasons. Moods underIIe, gIve dIrectIon, and coIor our more
compIex states oI mInd.
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A person, oIInow thought, tends to be domInated and deIIned by a basIc mood or a
IamIIy oI such moods,
50
to have not onIy passIng, transItory moods, but aIso what we
mIght caII, to keep the musIcaI metaphors goIng (In German, a Stimmung Is not onIy a
mood, but aIso a tunIng), a deIInIte "temperament." (And just as It was not possIbIe to
produce a compIete cIassIIIcatIon oI moods, the great varIety oI human temperaments
couId not be reduced to a sImpIe cIassIIIcatIon, the tradItIonaI quartet notwIthstandIng.)
mIght add that our endurIng temperament dIIIers Irom our more transItory moods In a
sImIIar way as our endurIng character, consIstIng oI our vIrtues and vIces, our more or
Iess IIrm dIsposItIons {p.207) to act In certaIn ways, dIIIers Irom our transItory actIons.
ote, nameIy, how sImIIar are the reIatIonshIps between the temperament and mentaI
states oI a person, on the one hand, and between hIs character and actIons, on the other.
just as the temperament underIIes, coIors, and gIves dIrectIon to a person's states oI
mInd, the character underIIes, coIors, and gIves dIrectIon to hIs actIons. And just as we
come to know a person's character by observIng hIs actIons, we Iearn what hIs
temperament Is by observIng hIs passIons.
The notIon oI mood Is oI centraI Importance II we want to understand the nature oI the
content oI abstract art, and In partIcuIar, oI InstrumentaI "absoIute" musIc (that Is, musIc
whIch has no IunctIon other than beIng the object oI contempIatIon, no text, and no
program). t aIIows us, nameIy, to counter IansIIck's hItherto unassaIIabIe argument
agaInst the tradItIonaI mImetIc cIaIm that IeeIIngs or emotIons constItute the content oI
such musIc. We have aIready seen that the argument presented In chapter 2 oI On the
Musicclly Becutijul, a chapter bIuntIy entItIed "The representatIon oI IeeIIng Is not the
content oI musIc," has an ArIstoteIIan rIng to It. IeeIIngs, IansIIck cIaIms,
depend upon Ideas, judgments, and (In brIeI) the whoIe range oI InteIIIgIbIe and
ratIonaI thought, to whIch some peopIe so readIIy oppose IeeIIng. What, then, makes
a IeeIIng specIIIc, e.g., IongIng, hope, Iove? s It perhaps the mere strength or
weakness, the IIuctuatIons oI our Inner actIvIty? CertaInIy not. These can be sImIIar
wIth dIIIerent IeeIIngs, and wIth the same IeeIIng they can dIIIer Irom person to
person and Irom tIme to tIme. OnIy on the basIs oI a number oI Ideas and
judgments (perhaps unconscIousIy at moments oI strong IeeIIng) can our state oI
mInd congeaI Into thIs or that specIIIc IeeIIng. . . . I we take thIs away, aII that
remaIns Is an unspecIIIc stIrrIng, perhaps the awareness oI a generaI state oI weII-
beIng or dIstress. Iove cannot be thought wIthout the representatIon oI a beIoved
person, wIthout desIre and strIvIng aIter IeIIcIty, gIorIIIcatIon and possessIon oI a
partIcuIar object. ot some kInd oI mere mentaI agItatIon, but Its conceptuaI core,
Its reaI hIstorIcaI content, specIIIes thIs IeeIIng oI Iove. AccordIngIy, Its dynamIc can
appear as readIIy gentIe as stormy, as readIIy joyIuI as sorrowIuI, and yet stIII be
Iove. ThIs consIderatIon by ItseII suIIIces to show that musIc can onIy express the
varIous accompanyIng adjectIves and never the substantIve, e.g., Iove ItseII. . . .
MusIc cannot . . . render concepts. . . . s the resuIt oI aII thIs not psychoIogIcaIIy
IrreIutabIe? t Is that musIc Is IncapabIe oI expressIng deIInIte IeeIIngs, Indeed, the
deIInIteness oI IeeIIngs IIes precIseIy In theIr conceptuaI essence.
51
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MusIc can present not the content oI IeeIIng, but onIy the motIon, and motIon "Is just one
attrIbute" oI IeeIIng.
52
"MotIon Is the IngredIent whIch musIc has In common wIth
emotIonaI states."
53
IansIIck's argument seems, Indeed, correct. WIth Its nonexIstent or, at best, very IImIted
representatIonaI powers, musIc Is IncapabIe oI brIngIng to mInd the IntentIonaI object oI
an emotIon, and Its Iack oI IogIcaI powers makes It an unsuItabIe medIum In whIch to
present reasons Ior or agaInst an emotIon. AII It can do, and It does thIs supremeIy weII, Is
to make paIpabIe the dynamIc propertIes {p.208) oI the sensatIon whIch Is but one oI
the three components oI an emotIon. ut, precIseIy because It can do thIs, It Is Indeed
"IncapabIe oI expressIng deIInIte IeeIIngs," but just as sureIy capabIe oI expressIng
moods. The dIscovery that moods constItute a Iayer oI mentaI IIIe dIstInct Irom emotIons
and consIst oI IeeIIngs dIvorced Irom IntentIonaI objects or reasons aIIows us to bIunt the
counterIntuItIve edge oI IansIIck's concIusIon. The musIcaI metaphor oI "attunement" Is
sInguIarIy apt. etter perhaps than any other medIum, abstract, "absoIute" musIc
dIscIoses varIous ways In whIch seII and worId can resonate In one another, varIous
tunIngs In whIch the mInd may IInd ItseII as It experIences the worId, varIous underIyIng
coIorIngs (to mIx the metaphorIc paIette somewhat) that permeate aII mentaI states,
varIous moods.
t Is somethIng IIke thIs that IegeI mIght have had In mInd when he cIaImed that
the proper task oI musIc Is to vIvIIy some content or other In the sphere oI the
subjectIve Inner IIIe. . . . MusIc's purpose . . . must be IImIted to makIng the Inner IIIe
InteIIIgIbIe to ItseII. . . . The Inner IIIe In Its abstractIon Irom the worId has as Its IIrst
dIIIerentIatIon the one that musIc Is connected wIth, nameIy IeeIIng, I.e. the wIdenIng
subjectIvIty oI the seII whIch does proceed to have an objectIve content but stIII
Ieaves thIs content remaInIng In thIs ImmedIate seII-suIIIcIency oI the seII and the
seII's reIatIon to ItseII wIthout any externaIIty at aII. ThereIore IeeIIng remaIns the
shroudIng oI the content, and It Is to thIs sphere that musIc has IaId cIaIm.
54
n other words, musIc's domaIn Is that oI IeeIIng, and IeeIIng does have an objectIve
content (Its IntentIonaI object), but as IeeIIng (sensatIon) It Is pureIy subjectIve, a state oI
conscIousness (mood) suIIusIng the seII wIthout any reIerence to any kInd oI externaIIty.
Another passage In IegeI's Iectures shows that Ior hIm, too, musIc by ItseII was the art oI
moods and that It requIred another medIum to be transIormed Into the art oI deIInIte
IeeIIngs.
The souI's pure IeeIIng oI ItseII . . . Is In the Iast resort mereIy a mood and so too
generaI and abstract, and It runs the rIsk oI . . . becomIng pureIy empty and trIvIaI.
ut II grIeI, joy, IongIng, etc. are to resound In the meIody, the actuaI concrete souI
In the serIousness oI actuaI IIIe has such moods onIy In an actuaI context, In specIIIc
cIrcumstances, partIcuIar sItuatIons, events, and actIons, etc. . . . n thIs way a
Iurther task Is Imposed on musIc . . . , nameIy the . . . task oI gIvIng to Its expressIon
the . . . partIcuIar detaII. Ior musIc Is concerned not wIth the Inner IIIe In the
abstract, but wIth a concrete Inner IIIe. . . . The detaIIs oI the content are precIseIy
what the libretto provIdes.
55
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Ietzsche, a IIIeIong passIonate musIcIan and a sporadIc composer (to put It kIndIy),
thought that he had succeeded In capturIng somethIng oI IundamentaI Importance In hIs
Hymnus cn dcs Leben, "the onIy thIng oI my musIc that shouId remaIn, a kInd oI a
conIessIon oI IaIth In tones."
56
n a draIt oI a Iate 1887 Ietter to IeIIx MottI concernIng
thIs pIece he expIaIned Its Importance. " wouId wIsh {p.209) that thIs musIc mIght enter
to provIde a suppIement where the word oI a phIIosopher must necessarIIy remaIn
uncIear, as the word wIII. The aIIect oI my phIIosophy Is expressed In thIs hymn."
57
(The
score oI the hymn, by the way, IIke countIess other scores, does not show the IuII
courage oI thIs convIctIon and, just In case, suppIements the musIc wIth a verbaI
cIarIIIcatIon oI the Intended mood, "etermIned, wIth an heroIc expressIon"
|"ntschIossen, mIt heroIschen Ausdruck"|, to say nothIng oI the text.) doubt that In thIs
partIcuIar case the mood embodIed In the musIc captures the mood oI the phIIosophy
better than words. t Is the styIIstIc regIster oI a text, Its rhythm, tempo, and sonorIty, the
choIce oI vocabuIary and syntax, the way the text Is uttered, the tone oI voIce, the
accompanyIng gesture, that embodIes the kInd oI mood conveyed, whether eIevated or
depressed, tragIc or comIc, one Ior whIch we have aIready coIned a name or one whIch Is
as yet nameIess (or one Ior whIch we wIII be abIe to do no better than to reIer to It as
"Ietzschean"). IIke Iousseau, Ietzsche was Iar more skIIIIuI wIth words than wIth
tones, and hIs musIc Is no match Ior hIs IIterary styIe In capturIng the "aIIect" oI the
thought. ut In prIncIpIe, II not In Iact, Ietzsche was rIght. MusIc can and does convey a
mood, a IundamentaI attItude In whIch one Iaces beIng In the worId and IIvIng. What Is
embodIed In a movement oI a Mozart pIano concerto Is a whoIe way oI IIIe.
To be sure, thanks to a varIety oI styIIstIc means, Ianguage can do thIs job too.
IeIdegger, Ior whom the paradIgmatIc art was not musIc but poetry ("All crt . . . Is . . .
essenticlly poetry"
58
), stressed the mood-dIscIosIng potentIaI oI Ianguage. "eIng-In and
Its state-oI-mInd are made known In dIscourse and IndIcated In Ianguage by IntonatIon,
moduIatIon, the tempo oI taIk, 'the way oI speakIng. n 'poetIcaI dIscourse, the
communIcatIon oI the exIstentIaI possIbIIItIes oI one's state-oI-mInd can become an aIm In
ItseII, and thIs amounts to a dIscIosIng oI exIstence."
59
t Is onIy when It attempts to ncme
the mood, rather than to express It, that the word "must necessarIIy remaIn uncIear"
where the tone Is deIInIte and precIse. ut thIs shouId not mIsIead us, the way It dId
mIsIead many a romantIc, Into beIIevIng In the doctrIne oI musIc as a "Ianguage beyond
Ianguage," a Ianguage capabIe oI sayIng what naturaI Ianguages cannot say. Moods can be
gIven expressIon not onIy In musIc, but aIso In other medIa. Ianguage Is Iess deIInIte and
precIse than musIc onIy when It attempts to name the mood oI the musIc, but thIs teIIs us
somethIng about the nature oI Ianguage, not oI musIc. Moods, IIke artworks or persons
that embody them, are unIque and IndIvIduaI and hence, IIke everythIng IndIvIduaI,
uItImateIy IneIIabIe. At the same tIme, they aIso exempIIIy kInds or genres and hence can
be named, however ImperIectIy. Ianguage's attempt to name the partIcuIar Is aIways
IrustratIngIy ImprecIse when compared wIth a dIrect experIence oI the partIcuIar,
because the name brIngs the partIcuIar under a generaI concept, assocIates It wIth many
other partIcuIars, and thus bIunts the sharp edges oI Its partIcuIarIty. ut, agaIn, thIs teIIs
us somethIng about the nature oI Ianguage, not oI musIc. The necessary (and useIuI)
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ImprecIsIon oI namIng, as opposed to expressIng or embodyIng, Is the ImprecIsIon oI
{p.210) Ianguage, not oI moods, or oI musIc, or oI anythIng In partIcuIar that gets
named. The content oI musIc Is not any more IneIIabIe than the content oI any partIcuIar
experIence.
n a weII-known Ietter oI 15 October 1842, MendeIssohn wrote to Marc Andre Souchay.
IeopIe compIaIn usuaIIy that musIc Is so ambIguous, that It Is so doubtIuI what they
shouId thInk wIth It, whIIe words are understood by anyone. ut Ior me It Is exactIy
the other way around. And not just wIth whoIe speeches, aIso wIth IndIvIduaI
words, aIso these seem to me so ambIguous, so IndeIInIte, so easIIy mIsunderstood
In comparIson wIth true musIc. . . . What a pIece oI musIc whIch Iove teIIs me are
Ior me not thoughts that are too IndeIInIte to be grasped In words, but ones too
deIInIte. Thus IInd In aII attempts to express these thoughts In Ianguage somethIng
rIght, but aIso somethIng InsuIIIcIent . . . because a word does not mean Ior one
what It means Ior another, because onIy a song |wIthout words| can teII one the
same thIng It teIIs another, can awaken In hIm the same IeeIIng, a IeeIIng, however,
whIch does not express ItseII In the same words.
60
ThIs Is exactIy rIght. (A sImIIar thought can be Iound among Ietzsche's prIvate notes. "n
relction to music, aII communIcatIon by means oI words Is oI a shameIess sort, the word
makes thIn and dumb, the word depersonaIIzes, the word makes the uncommon
common."
61
) ut what Is true oI musIc Is true oI any partIcuIar whatsoever, thIs tabIe,
thIs dog (and teII a dog Iover that the word "dog" perIectIy captures the IndIvIduaIIty oI
hIs beIoved creature!). t Is not that musIc dIscIoses a regIon that cannot be reached by
any other means, pIctorIaI or IInguIstIc. The much Iess excItIng truth Is that whatever a
pIece oI musIc (paIntIng, poem, human Iace, tree) dIscIoses Is captured onIy ImperIectIy
by a name.
ut II we reject the romantIc topos oI musIc as a Ianguage beyond Ianguage, a reIated
romantIc doctrIne, the doctrIne oI musIc as the Ianguage oI the "InIInIte" (to speak wIth .
T. A. IoIImann) Is a good deaI more pIausIbIe. MusIc's hIstorIcaI edge over paIntIng or
poetry consIsts onIy In thIs, that, wIth Its Inherent tendency toward abstractIon, It was
abIe to provIde moods wIthout the admIxture oI anythIng eIse earIIer than the other arts
were. And moods show a pecuIIar aIIInIty wIth abstractIon. A mood, aIter aII, Is a IeeIIng
devoId oI any posItIve content, any specIIIc representatIon or thought, a "key" In whIch
the content oI a cognItIve, voIItIonaI, or emotIonaI mentaI state wIII be experIenced. n thIs
sense, whIIe undenIabIy specIIIc, each partIcuIar mood aIso has Its abstract sIde. It Is an
empty resonatIng vesseI waItIng to be IIIIed wIth a deIInIte content. IoIImann's ceIebrated
cIaIm, cIted In chapter 3, that the content oI InstrumentaI musIc Is not provIded by any
deIInIte emotIons, that musIc's "onIy subject-matter Is InIInIty," becomes quIte beIIevabIe
when It Is strIpped oI Its usuaI metaphysIcaI pretensIons, oI any suggestIon oI the
"noumenaI" or the SchopenhauerIan WIII, and seen In the context oI the emotIon-mood
dIstInctIon. WhIIe vocaI musIc can represent deIInIte emotIons, "absoIute" musIc
embodIes a mood, or a scenarIo oI successIve moods (an abstract "archetypaI pIot," to
use a term oI {p.211) Anthony ewcomb's), and each mood may be IIIIed wIth a content
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the scope oI whIch, whIIe not exactIy "InIInIte," Is certaInIy very broad and IndeIInIte. n
the very dIIIerent Ianguage oI MIkeI uIrenne,
aIthough nothIng Is reveaIed to me |In musIc| except a IIght, know that the reaI can
appear through It. . . . know that the reaI can be seen In thIs way. . . . There Is joy,
and It Is oI IIttIe Importance whIch partIcuIar objects manIIest It. . . . |uIrenne Is that
rare phIIosopher Ior whom musIc does not aIways have to be sad.| The prIvIIeged
character oI pure musIc Is to reveaI what Is essentIaI In the reaI wIthout my havIng
to antIcIpate the objects whIch gIve It a body. Iure musIc brIngs me the sIgnIIIcatIon
In advance oI the sIgns, the worId In advance oI thIngs.
62
n thIs way, InstrumentaI musIc becomes the IIrst Ianguage oI choIce oI the modern seII,
the Ianguage envIed and subsequentIy ImItated by other abstract arts aspIrIng to musIc's
status. Abstract art, as have argued In chapter 3, perIectIy matches and expresses the
modern aspIratIon to InIInIte Ireedom, the reIuctance oI the InIInIteIy Iree subject to
Impose any IInIte determInatIons upon ItseII, to gIve Its IIIe any actuaI objectIve content.
And It does so by presentIng pure moods, abstract mentaI states dIvorced Irom objects
or reasons and waItIng to be IIIIed wIth a more specIIIc content.
t mIght be recaIIed, IncIdentaIIy, that the expressIon oI IneIIabIe mentaI states has been
IdentIIIed wIth remarkabIe Irequency as the centraI task oI art by a great many twentIeth-
century theorIsts oI otherwIse most dIverse phIIosophIc persuasIons, Irom Croce
through CoIIIngwood, Ianger, and uIrenne, aII the way to anto. The notIon oI mood
aIIows us to specIIy more cIoseIy what the content oI thIs expressIon mIght actuaIIy be.
Moods, as we have just seen, are about as cIose as we ever get to abstract subjectIvIty.
o wonder that theIr expressIon, and hence the expressIon oI abstract subjectIvIty,
becomes the centraI task oI art Ior so many modern theorIsts. ut what they take Ior the
essence oI art In generaI, Is rather just one component oI art, aIbeIt one made centraIIy
Important by art's, and our, modern sItuatIon. nstead oI workIng out wIth ever greater
subtIety the ImpIIcatIons oI the paradIgm that emerged In the Iate eIghteenth century,
however, we mIght preIer to doubt the eternaI vaIIdIty oI thIs paradIgm and to Iook Ior
answers to the questIon that IeIdegger was probabIy the IIrst to raIse wIth IuII Iorce,
"the questIon |In Gadamer's words| oI how one can do justIce to the truth oI aesthetIc
experIence and overcome the radIcaI subjectIvIsatIon oI the aesthetIc that began wIth
Kant's Critique oj Aesthetic ]udgment."
63
xperIencIng the work oI art, IeIdegger
cIaImed In hIs 1935 Iecture on "The OrIgIn oI the Work oI Art," "does not reduce peopIe
to theIr prIvate experIences, but brIngs them Into aIIIIIatIon wIth the truth happenIng In
the work."
64
n short, II we want to use art as a means oI human seII-presentatIon, actIons and states oI
mInd are aII there are to represent. The presented actIons and passIons are those oI the
personages that beIong to the represented worId, not those oI the author or reader.
When aII that Is represented Is a settIng wIth no {p.212) personages In It, the ImpIIed
actIons or passIons may be those oI personages absent Irom, but not unthInkabIe wIthIn,
such a settIng. When the represented worId Is whoIIy abstract, It may stIII embody a
mood or a scenarIo oI moods, an abstract state oI mInd or an abstract pIot devoId oI any
Presentation
Page 24 of 28
subject or object.
OtherwIse, sonata, do not waste my tIme.
Notes:
(1.) Gerard Genette, The Architext: An lntroduction, trans. j. . IewIn (erkeIey.
!nIversIty oI CaIIIornIa Iress, 1992).
(2.) Thus, arguIng agaInst the current usage, Genette poInts out that "the soIe specIIIcIty
oI narratIve IIes In Its mode." Gerard Genette, Ncrrctive Discourse Revisited (thaca.
CorneII !nIversIty Iress, 1988), pp. 16-17.
(3.) IauI IIcoeur, Time cnd Ncrrctive, 3 voIs. (ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress,
1984-8). n Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric oj Ncrrctive in Fiction cnd Film (thaca.
CorneII !nIversIty Iress, 1990), Seymour Chatman aIso concIudes, IndependentIy oI
IIcoeur, that narratIve Is a IundamentaI "text-type," whIIe the dIIIerence between the
dIegetIc and mImetIc modes (between, Ior Instance, epIc and drama) Is secondary (pp.
109-23).
(4.) IIcoeur, Time cnd Ncrrctive, voI. 1, p. 32.
(5.) IIcoeur, Time cnd Ncrrctive, voI. 1, pp. 32-37.
(13.) ArIstotIe, Foetics, ch. 7, 1450b34-1451a6, trans. ngram ywater.
(14.) john ewey, Art cs Experience, The Lcter Works, 1925-1953, voI. 10 |1934|
(CarbondaIe and dwardsvIIIe. Southern IIInoIs !nIversIty Iress, 1987).
(15.) On the essentIaI temporaIIty oI actIon, see avId Carr, Time, Ncrrctive, cnd History
(IoomIngton. ndIana !nIversIty Iress, 1986).
(16.) Gerard Genette, Ncrrctive Discourse: An Esscy in Method (thaca. CorneII
!nIversIty Iress, 1980), p. 30.
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Page 25 of 28
(17.) Seymour Chatman, In Coming to Terms, pp. 6-37, dIstInguIshes three "text-types".
narratIve, descrIptIon, and argument. Ior Chatman, the deIInIng Ieature oI narratIveIs Its
"InternaI" temporaIIty (the duratIon oI the story, the sequence oI events that constItute
the pIot), whIch the other two types Iack, as weII as the IogIc oI causaIIty or at Ieast
contIngency governIng the reIatIonshIps between the events. escrIptIon, whIch "Is the
text-type most Iavored by IyrIc poems" (p. 23), Is governed "by a sort oI casuaI
contIguIty" (p. 10), Its IogIc Is metonymIc, It entaIIs the reIatIon oI the descrIbed objects to
each other. Argument attempts "to persuade an audIence oI the vaIIdIty oI some
proposItIon, usuaIIy proceedIng aIong deductIve or InductIve IInes" (p. 9). n actuaI texts,
one type Is usuaIIy the "overrIdIng" one, whIIe the other two may aIso be present but In
"subservIent" roIes. t shouId be ImmedIateIy apparent that Chatman's "narratIve" and
"descrIptIon" correspond very cIoseIy to my "narratIve" and "IyrIc," even though
Chatman treats hIs categorIes as "text-types" rather than types oI "Iorm." Chatman's
"argument," wouId IIke to cIaIm, cannot be the "overrIdIng" but onIy a "subservIent"
text-type In an artwork (as opposed to a phIIosophIcaI or scIentIIIc treatIse, say), sInce,
unIIke narratIve and descrIptIon, argument cannot be used to make a worId (oI the work)
present (to the reader).
(18.) SvetIana AIpers, The Art oj Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century
(ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1983).
Representction, 2d ed. (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1961).
(20.) CaroIyn Abbate, In Unsung Voices (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1991), p.
28, argues that the term "narratIve" shouId be reserved onIy Ior dIscourses whIch
empIoy narrators (that Is, whIch are dIegetIc) and objects to the pIot-centered usage
(adopted by IIcoeur, ewcomb, and myseII, among others). The Iatter usage, Abbate
argues, renders the term "narratIve" as appIIed to musIc unIIIumInatIng, sInce aII musIc,
beIng temporaI, Is "narratIve" In thIs sense. "A heurIstIc strategy that enabIes us to read
aII musIcaI dIscourse as narratIve Is cIearIy tautoIogIcaI one. Is there no nonnarratIve
musIc, as there are nonnarratIve text genres?" (p. 46). t Is precIseIy one oI the
objectIves oI the IoIIowIng portIon oI the chapter to estabIIsh that not aII musIc must be
narratIve.
(21.) IeInrIch esseIer, Dcs musikclische Hren der Neuzeit, erIchte uber dIe
VerhandIungen der SchsIschen AkademIe der WIssenschaIten zu IeIpzIg, IhIIoIogIsch-
hIstorIsche KIasse, and 104, IeIt 6 (erIIn. AkademIe-VerIag, 1959).
(22.) Georg August GrIesInger, Biogrcphische Notizen uber ]oseph Hcydn (IeIpzIg,
1810, reprInt, IeIpzIg. V eutscher VerIag Iur MusIk, 1979), p. 117, trans. In Vernon
GotwaIs, Hcydn: Two Contemporcry Fortrcits (MadIson. !nIversIty oI WIsconsIn Iress,
1968), p. 62.
(23.) ChrIstIan GottIrIed Krner, "!ber CharakterdarsteIIung In der MusIk," modern ed.
In WoIIgang SeIIert, Christicn Gottjried Krner. Ein Musikcsthetiker der deutschen
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Page 26 of 28
Klcssik (Iegensburg. Gustav osse VerIag, 1960), pp. 147-58. See aIso IeInrIch
esseIer, "Mozart und dIe eutsche KIassIk," In . Schenk, ed., Bericht uber den
lnternctionclen Musikwissenschcjtlichen Kongress Wien Mozcrtjchr 1955 3. bis 9. ]uni
(Graz-CoIogne. VerIag Iermann hIaus achI., 1958), pp. 47-54.
(24.) MartIn IeIdegger, Being cnd Time (ew York. Iarper S Iow, 1962), sec. 29, pp.
172-79.
(25.) Otto IrIedrIch oIInow, Dcs Wesen der Stimmungen, 3d ed. (IrankIurt am MaIn.
VIttorIo KIosterman, 1956).
(26.) SImIIarIy, Iaurence reyIus de-emphasIzes temporaIIty In hIs readIngs oI ach's
musIc In Bcch cnd the Fctterns oj lnvention (CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress,
1996).
(27.) G. W. I. IegeI, Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, 2 voIs. (OxIord.
(28.) See Carr, Time, Ncrrctive, cnd History, pcssim.
(31.) AIasdaIr Macntyre, Ajter Virtue: A Study in Morcl Theory, 2d ed. (otre ame,
nd.. !nIversIty oI otre ame Iress, 1984), pp. 211-12.
(33.) IeIdegger, Being cnd Time, sec. 29, p. 178.
(42.) IeIdegger, Being cnd Time, sec. 40, pp. 230-31.
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Page 27 of 28
(44.) oIInow, Dcs Wesen der Stimmungen, pp. 33-39.
(45.) oIInow, Dcs Wesen der Stimmungen, p. 39.
(51.) duard IansIIck, On the Musicclly Becutijul: A Contribution towcrds the Revision
oj the Aesthetics oj Music, trans. GeoIIrey Iayzant (ndIanapoIIs. Iackett, 1986), p. 9.
(56.) Ietter to Gustav Krug, Iebruary 1887, quoted In IrIedrIch Ietzsche, Der
musikclische Ncchlcss, ed. Curt IauI janz (aseI. renreIter, 1976), p. 341.
(57.) Ietzsche, Der musikclische Ncchlcss, p. 342.
(ew York. Iarper S Iow, 1971), p. 72.
(60.) uoted Irom CarI ahIhaus, "IIeder ohne Worte," Klcssische und Romcntische
Musikcsthetik (Iaaber. Iaaber-VerIag, 1988), pp. 141-42.
(61.) IrIedrIch Ietzsche, Ncchgelcssene Frcgmente 1885-1887, In Scmtliche Werke,
KrItIsche StudIenausgabe, ed. GIorgIo CoIII and MazzIno MontInarI, voI. 12 (MunIch and
erIIn. uetscher Taschenbuch VerIag and WaIter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 493.
(62.) MIkeI uIrenne, The Fhenomenology oj Aesthetic Experience (vanston.
orthwestern !nIversIty Iress, 1973), p. 519.
(63.) Ians-Georg Gadamer, Truth cnd Method (ew York. ContInuum, 1975), p. 87.
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Page 28 of 28
(64.) IeIdegger, "The OrIgIn oI the Work oI Art," p. 68.
Hermeneutics. Interpretation and Its Validity
Page 1 of 24
A Theory of Art
Karo Berger
IrInt S-13. 9780195128604
O. 10.1093/0195128605.001.0001
Hermeneutcs. Interpretaton and Its Vadty
DOI:10.1093/0195128605.003.0006
o InterpretatIon can escape the need to use IIguratIve Ianguage oI some sort. not even
the cIosest oI readIng, paraphrase, or anaIysIs where we stay wIthIn the conIInes oI the
Interpreted artworId ItseII (text) and eIucIdate Its InternaI structure, and certaInIy not the
InterpretatIon proper In whIch the resuIts oI anaIysIs are conIronted and compared wIth
other represented and Interpreted worIds so that the sIgnIIIcance oI the Interpreted
work Ior Its author and hIs audIence may emerge. To Interpret Is to Invent new
metaphors, but an Interpreted artworId Is not onIy a metaphor, It Is aIso a metonymy. n
an artworId, a vIsIbIe or audIbIe Iragment ImpIIes a much Iarger, hIdden whoIe, a whoIe
way oI IIIe, oI actIng and suIIerIng, and It Is a job oI the crItIc to brIng thIs hIdden whoIe
out Into the open. ased on the pragmatIsts rather than the IundamentaIIsts sIde In the
dIspute over what constItutes a vaIId InterpretatIon, It Is argued that aII we need are art
InterpretatIons that persuade us because IIke InterpretatIons we provIsIonaIIy accept In aII
other domaIns, they are consIstent wIth Iots oI other beIIeIs we hoId. They aIIow us to use
Page 2 of 24
the Interpreted artworId as we want to use It, to amuse and to edIIy us. ThIs posItIon Is
quaIIIIed by showIng that there are kInds oI InterpretatIon where It Is proper to raIse the
Issue oI IegItImacy and not to be satIsIIed wIth persuasIon aIone. n partIcuIar, It Is shown
that the pragmatIc vIew oI the nature oI InterpretatIon Is compatIbIe wIth a hermeneutIc
practIce that appeaIs to the ruIes and constraInts oI the socIaI practIce wIthIn the
Iramework oI whIch the Interpreted object has been made when construIng the meanIng
oI thIs object, and that InsIsts on the prImacy oI the InterpretatIon oI meanIng as a
prerequIsIte to any crItIcIsm oI sIgnIIIcance.
leywords: hermeneutcs, anayss, nterpretaton, vadty, meanng, sgnfcance, metaphor, metonymy,
text, context
ut nothIng's Iost. Or eIse. aII Is transIatIon
And every bIt oI us Is Iost In It
(Or Iound- wander through the ruIn oI S
ow and then, wonderIng at the peaceIuIness)
And In that Ioss a seII-eIIacIng tree,
CoIor oI context, ImperceptIbIy
IustIIng wIth Its angeI, turns the waste
To shade and IIber, mIIk and memory.
james MerrIII, "Iost In TransIatIon"
a. Interpretaton: Metaphor and Metonymy
Works oI art present IIctIonaI worIds. At thIs Iate stage In our dIscussIon, It can aImost be
taken Ior granted that these worIds need to be Interpreted. To be sure, In the IIrst pIace
an artwork needs to be experIenced, and one mIght be tempted to beIIeve that aII that an
artwork asks Ior Is to be experIenced, that the experIence Is the onIy InterpretatIon that
matters. An artwork, that Is, a reaI object In whIch an ImagInary experIence has been
encoded, must be experIenced-decoded II It Is to reveaI an artworId, and to experIence Is
to Interpret, to see the paInt on canvas as a Iace, to hear the sounds oI the pIano as a
domInant chord resoIvIng to the tonIc, and so on. "AII readIng that Is understandIng," says
Gadamer, "Is aIways a kInd oI reproductIon and InterpretatIon. . . . I thIs Is the case, then
the consequence Is unavoIdabIe that IIterature . . . has just as orIgInaI an exIstence In
beIng read, as the epIc has In beIng decIaImed by the rhapsodIst or the pIcture In beIng
Iooked at by the spectator. AccordIng to thIs, the readIng oI a book wouId stIII remaIn an
event In whIch the content presented ItseII."
1
ven the most sImpIe experIence Is not
sImpIe, It Is not just an exact repetItIon {p.214) oI somethIng that occurred beIore. SInce
the worId Is decoded by me, wIth aII my personaI IdIosyncrasIes and hIstory, It wIII not be
IdentIcaI to the one decoded by you. n each case, somethIng eIse wIII be unnotIced and
somethIng eIse emphasIzed. ut there are no vIabIe aIternatIves. meanIng IIves onIy In
such acts oI decodIng, It Is never sImpIy and ImmedIateIy gIven. As Irost shouId have
saId, and as MerrIII dId say In the great poem Irom whIch have borrowed the epIgraph
Ior thIs chapter, poetry (and aII meanIng) Is what gets Iost cnd jound In transIatIon. AII we
ever have access to are transIatIons, the orIgInaIs are not avaIIabIe.
Page 3 of 24
ut the InterpretatIon am maInIy concerned wIth here Is not the IaIrIy rudImentary one
that transIorms a work Into a worId. t Is, rather, a much more compIex InterpretatIon oI
thIs ImagInary worId ItseII. That we need thIs Iatter InterpretatIon IoIIows Irom what we
know about the proper uses oI art. I an artworId Is to be more than amusIng, II It Is to
IuIIIII Its edIIyIng potentIaI, It must be brought Into contact wIth the worId beyond Its own
conIInes, wIth the worId oI our Interests and concerns. Moreover, as we shaII dIscover
Iater on In thIs chapter, even II an artworId Is to deveIop onIy Its entertaInIng potentIaI to
the IuIIest, It needs to be compared wIth other artworIds oI the same kInd. The pIeasure
aIIorded by a vIsIt to Sant'Andrea aI uIrInaIe, consIderabIe In ItseII, wIII be much
enhanced once the vIsItor notIces the extent to whIch ernInI's InterIor Is a creatIve
transIormatIon oI that oI the Iantheon, wIth a sIde gIance at orromInI's San CarIIno up
the street. SImIIarIy, our apprecIatIon oI the achIevement oI IrancIs acon wIII be
enhanced when we reaIIze that he gave a new IIIe to one oI the most centraI subjects In
the vIsuaI arts, the human body, by representIng It as butchered meat, as IIesh tortured
and entrapped, and when we pIace hIs vIsIon not onIy wIthIn the hIstorIcaI context oI post-
AuschwItz urope, but aIso wIthIn the artIstIc context oI the CrucIIIxIon genre. Such
conIrontatIon oI dIIIerent worIds Is, precIseIy, the job oI InterpretatIon.
"very work oI art, not onIy IIterature, must be understood IIke any other text that
requIres understandIng . . . ," says Gadamer. "AesthetIcs has to be absorbed Into
hermeneutIcs."
2
The need Ior InterpretatIon Is partIcuIarIy pressIng today sInce so much
oI the art that Interests us was produced In dIstant pIaces and tImes. That "our art" Is
onIy the art beIng produced here and now may seem pIausIbIe II one consIders art
excIusIveIy Irom the standpoInt oI Its makers. ut Irom the standpoInt oI those who use,
rather than make, art, TItIan and Manet are no Iess "our art" than acon and
Iauschenberg. The users oI art are expressed by the art they use, or, more precIseIy,
are expressed by the way they use thIs art, much more than by the art sImpIy produced
by theIr contemporarIes and IeIIow cItIzens. Ior many oI us today, Schubert's or
MahIer's musIc Is aIso more proIoundIy "ours" than the musIc oI Stockhausen or GIass.
ThIs sItuatIon Is not unprecedented. MontaIgne's spIrItuaI worId was InhabIted by
IIutarch and a number oI Ioman authors to an IncomparabIy greater extent than by
most oI hIs contemporarIes. The sItuatIon seems new perhaps onIy Ior those arts that
began to acquIre canonIc repertorIes reIatIveIy recentIy, so that the memory oI tImes
when {p.215) contemporary products dId not have to compete wIth those oI the past Is
stIII reIatIveIy Iresh, as Is the case Ior art musIc, whIch started to deveIop a canon oI
cIassIcaI works onIy around 1800, to say nothIng oI jazz or IIIm.
Above aII, thIs sItuatIon shouId not be taken Ior an unheaIthy symptom oI decadent
hIstorIcIsm. Iather, It shouId be recognIzed as consIstent wIth the nature oI art. Ior
Gadamer "art Is never sImpIy past, but Is abIe to cross the guII oI tIme by vIrtue oI Its
own meanIngIuI presence."
3
The abIIIty to speak across temporaI, spatIaI, and cuIturaI
dIstances Is one oI the most characterIstIc and essentIaI Ieatures oI art. I an artworId
comes Into exIstence onIy when an artwork Is decoded, that Is, Interpreted, the act oI
InterpretatIon Is never exactIy contemporary wIth the act oI creatIon. The temporaI
dIstance Is there rIght Irom the begInnIng. Art exIsts onIy In so Iar as It Is Interpreted, and
Page 4 of 24
what Is Interpreted Is aIways the art oI the past. ThIs Is why Schubert's art can be as
much "ours" as Stockhausen's. Gadamer cIaIms wIth good reason that
'contemporaneIty Iorms part oI the beIng oI the work oI art. t constItutes the
nature oI 'beIng present. . . . ContemporaneIty . . . here means that a sIngIe thIng
that presents ItseII to us achIeves In Its presentatIon IuII presentness, however
remote Its orIgIn may be. Thus contemporaneIty Is not a mode oI gIvenness In
conscIousness, but a task Ior conscIousness and an achIevement that Is requIred oI
It.
4
ut II the IIctIonaI worIds oI art need to be Interpreted, how shouId thIs be done? And
how do we dIstInguIsh vaIId InterpretatIons Irom InvaIId ones? To begIn wIth, the
InterpretatIon oI art Is not much dIIIerent Irom the InterpretatIon oI anythIng eIse. To
Interpret an object, to speII out Its meanIng, aIways InvoIves pIacIng the object wIthIn a
context. When we Interpret an object In Iront oI us as a "chaIr," we brIng It wIthIn the
context oI other objects one mIght brIng under thIs concept. Our InterpretatIon Is correct
II the object turns out to be usabIe as a chaIr, Incorrect II It cannot be so used, II on
cIoser InspectIon, say, It shows ItseII to be Iar too hIgh Ior a chaIr, but just rIght to be
caIIed a "tabIe." Ither InterpretatIon mIght be the correct one, dependIng on a stIII Iarger
context. Ierhaps In a worId oI gIants the object mIght pass Ior a servIceabIe chaIr, whIIe In
ours It can serve onIy as a tabIe. Thus, even the sImpIest sort oI InterpretatIon quIckIy
Iorces us to brIng the object Into a Iarger and Iarger context, the context oI a whoIe
worId. When we say about the object In Iront oI us that It Is a chaIr, we reaIIy mean to say
that It Is a chaIr In a worId IIke ours, though It mIght be somethIng eIse, a tabIe, In a worId
oI gnomes. An object Is never gIven to us sImpIy and sIngIy. t comes wIth other objects
IIke It, objects that can be subsumed under the same concept, and It comes wIth Its
worId, the worId In whIch It Is the object It Is. n InterpretIng It, we usuaIIy take the
assumed reIevant worId Ior granted and Iocus on comparIng the object wIth other
objects IIke It.
The poInt that InterpretIng InevItabIy InvoIves comparIng the object wIth other objects IIke
It Is worth stressIng, sInce It brIngs out a paradoxIcaI Ieature oI the whoIe enterprIse. An
Interpreter concentrates on an IndIvIduaI object. t Is thIs {p.216) one object that he
wants to grasp In Its unIque IndIvIduaIIty. ut he cannot do thIs unIess he Is wIIIIng to see
the object as the very opposIte oI an IndIvIduaI, as a member oI a kInd, specIes, genre. To
capture the IndIvIduaI Ieatures oI thIs partIcuIar chaIr (portraIt, sonata, comedy), need
to recognIze that the object In questIon Is a chaIr (portraIt, sonata, comedy) In the IIrst
pIace. As Gadamer argued when crItIcIzIng the abstractIon oI the modern aesthetIc
conscIousness, "abstractIon untII onIy the 'pureIy aesthetIc Is IeIt Is obvIousIy a seII-
contradIctory process."
5
ArIstotIe, wrItes Gadamer,
has shown that aII aesthesIs tends to a unIversaI. . . . The specIIIc perceptIon oI
somethIng gIven by the senses as such Is an abstractIon. n Iact we see what Is
gIven to us IndIvIduaIIy by the senses In reIatIon to somethIng unIversaI. . . . ow
'aesthetIc vIsIon Is certaInIy characterIzed by Its not hurryIng to reIate what one
sees to a unIversaI. . . . ut that stIII does not stop us Irom seeIng reIatIonshIps. . . .
Page 5 of 24
very perceptIon conceIved as an adequate response to a stImuIus wouId never
be a mere mIrrorIng oI what Is there. Ior It wouId aIways remaIn an understandIng
oI somethIng as somethIng. . . . ThIs . . . Is aIso vaIId Ior aesthetIc conscIousness,
aIthough here one does not sImpIy Iook beyond what one sees,. . . but dweIIs on
It. . . . Iure seeIng and pure hearIng are dogmatIc abstractIons. . . . IerceptIon
aIways IncIudes meanIng.
6
Moreover, objects are not correIated wIth generIc concepts on a one-to-one basIs. On
the contrary, there seem to be no conceIvabIe IImIts to the number oI concepts under
whIch a gIven object mIght be brought. Some oI these concepts may be hIerarchIcaIIy
reIated. thIs Is a pIece oI IurnIture, but aIso a chaIr, and even a ChIppendaIe chaIr. Some
mIght pIck out unreIated aspects oI the object. thIs Is a chaIr Ior me, a bed Ior my cat, a
source oI tImber Ior aII oI us In a partIcuIarIy harsh wInter. The choIce we shaII make Irom
among those IImItIess possIbIIItIes wIII depend on our Interests and concerns.
t Is, thus, the IIrst step In an InterpretatIon to choose the generIc concepts under whIch
we want to consIder the object. And It Is the second step to consIder the object under
these concepts, comparIng It wIth other objects that IaII under them, and thus brIngIng
out both the generIc and the IndIvIduaI Ieatures oI the object In questIon. There Is IIttIe
that can be saId In generaI about the skIIIs InvoIved In perIormIng the second step.
ObvIousIy, one wIII need both a taIent and some experIence to perIorm It weII. At the very
Ieast, one wIII need to have a broad knowIedge oI objects that mIght IaII under a gIven
concept and to be perceptIve. ut the best guIdance In thIs area comes not so much Irom
generaI ruIes and precepts as Irom good modeIs and practIce. A student oI thIs aspect oI
InterpretatIon can do no better than observe MIchaeI axandaII as he Iooks at IIorentIne
qucttrocento paIntIngs, Marc IumaroII as he contempIates IoussIn, CharIes Iosen as he
IIstens to ChopIn, john Ireccero as he reads ante, or jean StarobInskI as he
Interrogates Iousseau.
7
More can be saId about the skIIIs requIred to perIorm the IIrst
step.
When the object to be Interpreted Is an artworId, a represented IIctIonaI worId, the
InterpretatIon InvoIves comparIng thIs worId wIth other worIds IIke It. The {p.217)
Interpreter's skIII here consIsts, precIseIy, In beIng abIe to pIck up approprIate worIds Ior
comparIson. n prIncIpIe, there are no preordaIned IImIts on what mIght be Iound
approprIate. ut II one wants to stay wIthIn the reaIm oI IIctIonaI worIds, the most
ImmedIateIy and obvIousIy approprIate worIds to choose Ior comparIson wIII be those
beIongIng to the same artIstIc genre. An artIst, no matter how modern, emancIpated, and
autonomous, aIways works wIthIn the Iramework oI an aIready estabIIshed and ongoIng
artIstIc practIce. What he makes aIways beIongs to a kInd, a specIes, a genre, whether It
be a genre as generaI as "art" or as specIIIc as "SpanIsh court portraIt." t makes sense
both as a matter oI sImpIe courtesy and oI practIcaI economy oI InterpretatIve eIIorts that
one wouId want to consIder the artIst's products under the generIc concepts under
whIch they have been produced, concepts the artIst and hIs audIence shared and
understood. We may eventuaIIy go beyond such generIc concepts. A genre Is, aIter aII,
constItuted In an act oI InterpretatIon by the very Iact that we brIng dIIIerent objects
Page 6 of 24
together Ior comparIson and we know somethIng the artIst and hIs audIence dId not
know, nameIy, the subsequent deveIopment oI the artIstIc practIce In questIon. We mIght,
thus, want to brIng new concepts, concepts the artIst and hIs audIence couId not know, to
bear on the work. t may IIIumInate not onIy IIszt's but aIso ChopIn's work II we consIder
together and compare ChopIn's baIIades and IIszt's symphonIc poems, even though
ChopIn couId know nothIng about the symphonIc poem. ut It wouId be ImpoIIte and
unwIse to bypass the InterpretatIon based on the artIst's own concepts aItogether.
Iather, we begIn wIth the concepts the artIst and hIs audIence knew and then we move
on to those they couId not know.
t IoIIows that thIs part oI the Interpreter's skIII whIch consIsts In choosIng approprIate
IIctIonaI worIds wIth whIch to compare the Interpreted artworId InvoIves art-hIstorIcaI
knowIedge. A knowIedge oI the hIstory oI the reIevant artIstIc practIce Is a necessary part
oI any crItIc's equIpment, and thIs Ior three reasons. IIrst, wIthout It, we couId not
IdentIIy the artIst's generIc IntentIons, hIs and hIs audIence's shared generIc concepts.
Second, we need to know "what happened next," what Iater works and genres mIght be
useIuIIy brought In Ior comparIson. ThIrd, a knowIedge oI the hIstorIcaI deveIopment oI
the genre Is a prerequIsIte Ior any attempt to IdentIIy both the generIc and the orIgInaI
Ieatures oI an IndIvIduaI specImen oI thIs genre. An art crItIc aIso needs to be an art
hIstorIan.
ut the Interpreter need not, and shouId not, IImIt the range oI the worIds chosen Ior
comparIson to IIctIonaI worIds onIy. On the contrary, II an artworId Is to educate and not
onIy to pIease, It must at some poInt be conIronted wIth the actuaI worId In whIch we IIve.
Iere the Interpreter's skIIIs cease to be pureIy artIstIc, whether anaIytIcaI or hIstorIcaI,
and begIn to resembIe practIcaI wIsdom. The InteIIectuaI vIrtue oI practIcaI wIsdom, we
shaII recaII, Is the skIII we need In order to appIy generaI prIncIpIes to partIcuIar sItuatIons.
We practIce thIs skIII on exampIes oI partIcuIar sItuatIons. And we have the skIII In part
when we can recognIze whIch exampIes beIong together. Thus, a good Interpreter wIII
need a {p.218) rIch repertoIre oI exampIes drawn not onIy Irom art, but aIso Irom IIIe.
Iere we may aIso want to begIn wIth worIds the artIst and hIs audIence knew and thus
expIore the range oI possIbIe meanIngs the work mIght have carrIed Ior them. And we
may and shouId then move beyond the worIds known to the artIst and hIs audIence and
expIore the range oI possIbIe meanIngs the work mIght have carrIed Ior Iater audIences,
IncIudIng ourseIves. roadIy based hIstorIcaI, and not just art-hIstorIcaI, knowIedge Iorms
the necessary equIpment oI the crItIc.
otIce, moreover, that no matter whether the worIds chosen Ior comparIson are IIctIonaI
or actuaI, both the Interpreted artworId and the worIds wIth whIch we compare It are
ImagInary representatIons. The actuaI worId cannot be had and handIed raw. t needs to
be grasped as a representatIon beIore It can be compared wIth anythIng at aII. The onIy
dIIIerence, In my terms, Is that In one case the comparIson-worIds are artIstIc (that Is,
IIctIonaI), and In the other they are hIstorIcaI (that Is, actuaI). oth art and hIstory, have
cIaImed throughout, represent men and women actIng and suIIerIng In partIcuIar
cIrcumstances whIch IImIt theIr choIces, cIrcumstances IargeIy not oI theIr own makIng.
Page 7 of 24
The dIIIerence between the two, have cIaImed Iurther, Is onIy the dIIIerence between
the IIctIonaI or actuaI nature oI what gets represented. ThIs Is why we are abIe to bracket
oII Ior the tIme beIng our awareness oI thIs dIIIerence and brIng hIstorIcaI worIds Into the
IuII repertory oI the worIds wIth whIch we compare the Interpreted one.
Art and hIstory share the object (the "what") oI representatIon. The basIc matter oI theIr
worIds consIsts oI narrators, personages, and settIngs, and the basIc Iorms are narratIve
and IyrIc. The same goes Ior Iurther subdIvIsIon Into genres. tragedy and comedy (or
Iarce, to speak wIth Marx), Ior Instance, are IundamentaI ways oI representIng human
actIon, whether thIs actIon Is IIctIonaI or actuaI. An act oI InterpretatIon InvoIves comparIng
the Interpreted artworId or an eIement or aspect thereoI wIth another represented
worId or Its eIement or aspect, whether artIstIc or hIstorIcaI, comparIng narrators,
personages, settIngs, actIons, and passIons.
At bottom, aII that an Interpreter can do Is to say "c Is IIke b" (whIch Is a shorter way oI
sayIng "c Is In certaIn respects IIke b and In others unIIke It") and hope that thIs wIII
IIIumInate c Ior someone who aIready knows b, that seeIng c In the IIght oI b wIII enabIe
one to notIce aspects oI c one mIght not notIce otherwIse. A useIuI Interpreter wIII make
comparIsons whIch are genuIneIy IIIumInatIng, that Is, neIther obvIous nor mereIy
eccentrIc, but rather at once unexpected and brIngIng out somethIng that Is truIy there,
somethIng hIdden but deservIng notIce.
Moreover, In an act oI InterpretatIon the IIght traveIs both ways. The conIrontatIon oI c
wIth b can aIso brIng out prevIousIy unnotIced aspects oI b. n thIs way both the Image oI
Odette and ottIceIII's Youth oj Moses were mutuaIIy transIormed Ior Swann once he
notIced hIs beIoved's resembIance to the IIgure oI ZIpporah, daughter oI jethro, In the
SIstIne ChapeI Iresco. "and, aIbeIt hIs admIratIon Ior the IIorentIne masterpIece was
probabIy based upon hIs dIscovery {p.219) that It had been reproduced In her, the
sImIIarIty enhanced her beauty aIso, and rendered her more precIous In hIs sIght."
8
We
do have a choIce whether we want to use contexts to throw IIght on the artworks, or the
reverse. eedIess to say, thIs Is a matter oI reIatIve emphasIs, not an absoIute opposItIon.
I we do our job weII, both the work and the context wIII Iook new. ut we may
IegItImateIy emphasIze one or the other goaI In our InvestIgatIons. we may use Wagner's
Ring as a pIece oI evIdence In a study oI the evoIutIon oI the CentraI-uropean
revoIutIonary InteIIIgentsIa In the postrevoIutIonary age, or we may use the Iatter to
eIucIdate the tortuous hIstory oI Wagner's revIsIons oI the Ring's concIusIon. oth
emphases are equaIIy IegItImate. Art (musIc, IIterature) crItIcs may be InstItutIonaIIy prone
to preIer to use hIstorIcaI contexts to IIIumInate texts, rather than the other way around.
ThIs Is because they mIght thInk that the Iatter Is the proper job Ior hIstorIans. To accept
thIs IIne oI reasonIng, however, wouId be to make a bookkeepIng error. I art Is to serve
IIIe, II Its edIIyIng IunctIon Is to be taken serIousIy, It Is cIearIy not enough Ior the crItIc to
use IIIe In order to IIIumInate art. t Is equaIIy Important that one show how art throws
IIght on IIIe.
n short, to Interpret Is to Invent new metaphors, metaphors that are neIther staIe (these
wouId teIIs us somethIng true but obvIous), nor Iorced (these wouId teII us somethIng
Page 8 of 24
Iess obvIous but untrue). (To be sure, "a Is IIke b" Is a sImIIe, but a metaphor Is nothIng
but a sImIIe wIth the "IIke" suppressed but understood.
9
) "Metaphor," ArIstotIe taught,
"consIsts In gIvIng the thIng a name that beIongs to somethIng eIse."
10
TheIr IunctIon Is to
teII us somethIng that Is sImuItaneousIy new and true. "It Is Irom metaphor that we can
best get hoId oI somethIng Iresh. . . . ut the metaphors must not be Iar-Ietched, or they
wIII be dIIIIcuIt to grasp, nor obvIous, or they wIII have no eIIect."
11
They "must be
IIttIng, whIch means that they must IaIrIy correspond to the thIng sIgnIIIed"
12
"must be
drawn . . . Irom thIngs that are reIated to the orIgInaI thIng, and yet not obvIousIy so
reIated."
13
To IInd IIttIng metaphors requIres a taIent Ior notIcIng sImIIarItIes where no
one has notIced them beIore, an art that cannot be taught. "ut the greatest thIng by Iar
Is to be a master oI metaphor. t Is the one thIng that cannot be Iearnt Irom others, and It
Is aIso a sIgn oI genIus, sInce a good metaphor ImpIIes an IntuItIve perceptIon oI the
sImIIarIty In dIssImIIars."
14
An Interpreted artworId Is a metaphor.
15
IecaII Irom chapter 1 IegeI's dIstInctIon
between sIgn, where the connectIon between the sIgnIIyIng and the sIgnIIIed Is externaI
and arbItrary, and symboI, where the sIgnIIyIng Is IdentIcaI wIth the sIgnIIIed. When the
sIgnIIyIng Is not an IndIvIduaI sIgn, but a whoIe represented worId, the proper tradItIonaI
name Ior the Iormer reIatIonshIp Is that oI aIIegory. A symboI represents content that
cannot be represented In any other way. An aIIegory, on the other hand, reIers to
content that mIght be reIerred to In a varIety oI ways. On my account oI InterpretatIon, an
artworId partakes oI the nature oI both symboI and aIIegory, wIthout beIng eIther. I an
Interpreter were to treat an artworId c as a symboI, aII he couId say wouId be. "c Is c."
To say thIs, however, wouId be to say somethIng true but compIeteIy unIIIumInatIng and
hence not worth sayIng. An artworId Is a symboI, It cannot be transIated {p.220) wIthout
a Ioss and dIstortIon. evertheIess, It demands InterpretatIon and, once Interpreted, It
stops beIng onIy a symboI, It becomes a metaphor. I the Interpreter were to treat the
artworId as an aIIegory, he wouId have to say. "c Is b" and reaIIy mean It (as opposed to
meanIng "c Is IIke b"). To say thIs, however, wouId be untrue, precIseIy because an
artworId cannot be compIeteIy transIated wIthout any Ioss and dIstortIon.
To be sure, In certaIn hIstorIcaI perIods, some artworIds or eIements thereoI may be
treated as eIther symboIs or aIIegorIes. I we are to beIIeve Ians eItIng, dIvIne beIngs
were IIteraIIy thought to be present In premodern reIIgIous Images such as yzantIne
Icons, and the purpose oI makIng such Images was to aIIow the dIvInIty to Intervene In the
reaI worId.
16
n cases IIke thIs, a premodern Image Is transIormed Into a modern
artwork precIseIy when It stops beIng taken Ior a pure symboI. SImIIarIy, the art oI the
aroque Is IuII oI aIIegorIes. ut even then, an artworId, In so Iar as It Is art at aII, Is more
than mereIy a pure aIIegory. I It deserves to be contempIated at aII, It cannot sImpIy
serve as a vehIcIe that transports us to a meanIng and can be dIscarded on arrIvaI. What
an Interpreter shouId be sayIng, thereIore, Is "c Is (IIke) b," and we shouId hope that he
has taIent enough to choose a b that wIII aIIow us to notIce somethIng about both c and b
we had not notIced beIore, somethIng that Is truIy there and worth notIcIng.
t Is the nature oI metaphorIcaI InterpretatIon that It Is sImuItaneousIy requIred and
Page 9 of 24
resIsted, requIred Ior reasons aIready speIIed out, resIsted because c Is onIy like b, It Is
not IIteraIIy b, and thereIore It Is aIso unlike b. (ot Ior nothIng does eIson Goodman say
that "a metaphor Is an aIIaIr between a predIcate wIth a past and an object that yIeIds
whIIe protestIng."
17
) owhere does thIs resIstance appear more cIearIy than In the case
oI the InterpretatIon oI musIc. ver sInce . T. A. IoIImann and Schopenhauer, verbaI
InterpretatIons oI musIc, IncIudIng the InterpretatIons aIIorded by the text oI a song or
the IIbretto oI an opera, were correctIy consIdered no more than exempIIIIcatIons, chosen
Irom among many possIbIe ones, oI the musIc's meanIng. IecaII IoIImann's cIaIm, quoted
In chapter 3, that "any passIon . . . presented to us In an opera Is cIothed by musIc In the
purpIe shImmer oI romantIcIsm, so that even our mundane sensatIons take us out oI the
everyday Into the reaIm oI the InIInIte." And recaII Schopenhauer's IormuIa that words or
pantomIme stand to musIc "onIy In the reIatIon oI an exampIe, chosen at random, to a
unIversaI concept." (As Scott urnham recentIy put It, taIkIng oI the reIatIonshIp between
the Eroicc Symphony and varIous programmatIc and anaIytIcaI narratIves devIsed over
the years to show Its content, "we must not Ior a moment thInk that the symphony Is
about these narratIves, Ior It Is precIseIy the other way around. the narratIves are about
the symphony."
18
)
ut the IomantIcs and theIr heIrs (Ietzsche comes to mInd here
19
) were wrong to
thInk that musIc Is unIque In thIs respect. On the contrary, the metaphorIcaI reIatIonshIp
between musIc and verbaI text Is not dIIIerent Irom the metaphorIcaI reIatIonshIp
estabIIshed between c and b In any act oI InterpretatIon, whether c Is musIc, IIterature, a
chaIr, anythIng. IaIntIng and IIterature, no {p.221) Iess than musIc, sImuItaneousIy cry
Ior, and resIst, metaphorIcaI InterpretatIon. When IeavIng IaroId IInter's The Birthdcy
Fcrty, we are rIght not to avoId naIve questIons IIke, Who are these two Intruders? and,
Where do they take StanIey?, but we know that any specIIIc answers to these questIons
wIII be onIy partIy satIsIactory, exempIIIyIng rather than exhaustIng the sIgnIIIcance oI the
spectacIe. The representatIons that we draw Irom art or IIIe when we attempt to
understand an artworId can do no more, and shouId do no Iess, than to exempIIIy the
meanIng, wIthout ever exhaustIng It.
There Is yet another, reIated, sense In whIch an Interpreted artworId Is more than just
the artworId on Its own. n an artworId, a Iragment dIscIoses, or rather suggests, a Iarger
whoIe, a whoIe worId. Vermeer's vIew oI a IIttIe street oI hIs home town (In the
IIjksmuseum) ImpIIes much more than what meets the eye, a whoIe way oI IIIe, oI actIng
and experIencIng, the way oI IIIe oI a utch burgher, and thus It suggests a Iarger worId
oI whIch the vIsIbIe one Is onIy a part, a worId the paInter captured on the greatest oI hIs
canvasses, the View oj Deljt (at the MaurItshuIs In The Iague). The reIIned nonchaIance
wIth whIch CharIes hoIds a gIove In the Van yke portraIt (at the Iouvre) sImIIarIy
condenses severaI centurIes oI arIstocratIc manners. AII artworks are IIke the
"nocturnes" oI Georges de Ia Tour In whIch the area oI physIcaI and spIrItuaI IIIumInatIon
Is aIways surrounded by a much vaster area oI darkness. A representatIon oI an actIon Is
aIways more than sImpIy a representatIon oI thIs partIcuIar actIon, because It brIngs to
mInd other actIons IIke thIs one. n thIs sense, every specIIIc narratIve exempIIIIes a
generaI sense oI how one mIght act. A representatIon oI a state oI mInd, sImIIarIy, Is
Page 10 of 24
aIways more than sImpIy a representatIon oI how thIs partIcuIar mInd experIences the
worId, because It suggests other mInds experIencIng theIr worIds In sImIIar ways. Thus,
every specIIIc IyrIc exempIIIIes a generaI sense oI how one mIght experIence one's worId.
Much oI the ethIcaI and poIItIcaI sIgnIIIcance oI art depends on thIs abIIIty oI a Iragmentary
artworId to IntImate a whoIe worId and way oI IIIe. t Is to such a whoIe way oI IIIe, we
have seen, that we make our IundamentaI commItment when we gIve our Ireedom a
content, our specIIIc choIces are made Irom wIthIn thIs generaI commItment. t Is the job
oI the crItIc to brIng thIs hIdden whoIe that Is onIy suggested out In the open, to speII out
the ImpIIed way oI IIIe, manner oI actIng and suIIerIng. The torso oI ApoIIo ImpIIes the
whoIe body oI the god, and the body, a whoIe, ApoIIonIan, way oI IIIe. ThIs Is why IIIke
couId Issue hIs Iamous InjunctIon when In the "Torso oI ApoIIo" (Irom the Neue Gedichte)
he demanded that a work oI art shouId change our IIIe. And thIs Is why IeIdegger was
rIght to stress In hIs essay on "The OrIgIn oI the Work oI Art" the essentIaI tensIon
between the emergence and the hIddenness (or "worId" and "earth" In IeIdeggerese)
In an artwork, the InterpIay between what Is reveaIed and what Is conceaIed In It.
20
(And
not onIy In an artwork. "ach beIng we encounter and whIch encounters us keeps to thIs
curIous opposItIon oI presence In that It aIways wIthhoIds ItseII at the same tIme In a
conceaIedness. The cIearIng In whIch beIngs stand Is In ItseII at the same tIme
conceaIment. ConceaIment, however, {p.222) prevaIIs. . . . At bottom, the ordInary Is not
ordInary, It Is extra-ordInary, uncanny. The nature oI truth, that Is, oI unconceaIedness, Is
domInated throughout by a denIaI."
21
)
n other words, an Interpreted artworId Is not onIy a metaphor, but aIso a metonymy.
The dIIIerence between InventIng metaphors and InventIng metonymIes Is that In the
Iormer one moves Irom one worId, c, to another, b, and cIaIms that c Is IIke b, whIIe In the
Iatter one remaIns wIthIn the same worId and cIaIms that the appearIng part Is, precIseIy,
part oI a hIdden whoIe. OtherwIse, however, the skIIIs requIred to Invent successIuI, that
Is, IIIumInatIng, metaphors and metonymIes are quIte sImIIar. n both cases, It Is the
matter oI havIng a broad art-hIstorIcaI and especIaIIy generaI hIstorIcaI knowIedge, what
mIght be caIIed the knowIedge oI the worId, and a sense oI what IIts wIth what. Moreover,
not onIy the metaphorIc, but aIso the metonymIc InterpretatIon Is sImuItaneousIy
requIred and resIsted, requIred, because there Is aIways more to the represented
worId than what actuaIIy appears, there are aIways aspects hIdden Irom vIew, and
resIsted, because we can never be sure that our guesswork that brought the hIdden
aspects Into the open has been IuIIy successIuI. n eIther case, whether we Invent
metaphors or metonymIes, what we brIng to the Interpreted artworId Is never more than
an exempIIIIcatIon oI the kInds oI thIngs one mIght brIng to It.
t shouId be cIear now why an artworId Is potentIaIIy InexhaustIbIe and why the task oI
InterpretatIon never ends. Ior one thIng, the vast area oI darkness In whIch the
represented worId Is metonymIcaIIy submerged cannot have cIearIy deIIned IImIts. Ior
another, new contexts In whIch the artworId metaphorIcaIIy takes on new sIgnIIIcance,
constantIy and unpredIctabIy emerge. o Iover oI VenIce couId have predIcted a century
ago how the IocatIon oI the cIty on the map oI the uropean ImagInatIon wouId be sIIghtIy
Page 11 of 24
adjusted by two vIsItors Irom St. Ietersburg, StravInsky and rodsky. t Is somethIng
IIke thIs potentIaI InexhaustIbIIIty oI the represented worId that Kant may have trIed to
capture In hIs very dIIIerent terms when he cIaImed that art Is the vehIcIe Ior presentIng
aesthetIc Ideas.
ut by an aesthetIc Idea mean that representatIon oI the ImagInatIon whIch
Induces much thought, yet wIthout the possIbIIIty oI any deIInIte thought whatever,
I.e. concept, beIng adequate to It, and whIch Ianguage, consequentIy, can never get
quIte on IeveI term wIth or render compIeteIy InteIIIgIbIe. - t Is easIIy seen, that an
aesthetIc Idea Is the counterpart (pendant) oI a rctioncl idec, whIch, converseIy, Is
a concept, to whIch no intuition (representatIon oI the ImagInatIon) can be adequate.
22
just as reason comes up wIth concepts, such as God, whIch cannot be appIIed to any
perceptIons sInce they reIer to InIInItIes, so art, converseIy, comes up wIth
representatIons Ior whIch no adequate concept can be Iound sInce they are potentIaIIy
InexhaustIbIe.
n most generaI terms, the provIsIonaI and InexhaustIbIe character oI InterpretatIon
stems Irom Its InescapabIy cIrcuIar nature, Irom the Iamous "hermeneutIc {p.223)
cIrcIe" that thanks to IeIdegger has been the subject oI much IruItIuI reIIectIon In thIs
century.
23
n Gadamer's words,
the whoIe hermeneutIcaI and rhetorIcaI tradItIon . . . regards as an essentIaI
IngredIent oI understandIng that the meanIng oI the part Is aIways dIscovered onIy
Irom the context, I.e. uItImateIy Irom the whoIe. . . . t was aIways cIear that thIs was
IogIcaIIy a cIrcuIar argument, In as Iar as the whoIe, In terms oI whIch the IndIvIduaI
eIement Is to be understood, Is not gIven beIore the IndIvIduaI eIement. . . .
IundamentaIIy, understandIng Is aIways a movement In thIs kInd oI cIrcIe, whIch Is
why the repeated return Irom the whoIe to the parts, and vIce versa, Is essentIaI.
Moreover, thIs cycIe Is constantIy expandIng, In that the concept oI the whoIe Is
reIatIve, and when It Is pIaced In ever Iarger contexts the understandIng oI the
IndIvIduaI eIement Is aIways aIIected. . . . |Ience| the Inner provIsIonaI and InIInIte
nature oI understandIng.
24
Ior those whose standards oI what counts as knowIedge are derIved Irom hard
scIences, the pIcture oI InterpretatIon paInted here may Iook dIsappoIntIngIy Iuzzy. WeII, It
Is a bIt IuzzIer than physIcs, and quIte a bIt IuzzIer than mathematIcs. ut, as ArIstotIe
repeatedIy observed, dIIIerent domaIns oI knowIedge requIre dIIIerent standards oI
precIsIon. "Our dIscussIon wIII be adequate," he says cIose to the begInnIng oI
Nicomcchecn Ethics,
II It has as much cIearness as the subject-matter admIts oI, Ior precIsIon Is not to be
sought Ior aIIke In aII dIscussIons, any more than In aII the products oI the craIts. . . .
t Is the mark oI an educated man to Iook Ior precIsIon In each cIass oI thIngs just so
Iar as the nature oI the subject admIts, It Is evIdentIy equaIIy IooIIsh to accept
Page 12 of 24
probabIe reasonIng Irom a mathematIcIan and to demand Irom a rhetorIcIan
scIentIIIc prooIs.
25
I we want to Interpret thIngs, metaphors and metonymIes are aII we have got. ut thIs Is
not a sItuatIon pecuIIar to art InterpretatIon. AII InterpretatIon, whether oI art, chaIrs, or
IossIIs, Is IIke that. And there Is no need to worry about thIs. Metaphors and metonymIes
do the job oI InterpretatIon very weII, wIth just as much precIsIon as the subject matter
at hand requIres.
n partIcuIar, we shouId not deIude ourseIves Into beIIevIng that there are ways oI
InterpretIng that escape the need to use metaphors, that there Is such a thIng as a IIteraI
descrIptIon, whether It takes the Iorm oI what musIcoIogIsts caII anaIysIs or what IIterary
crItIcs caII cIose readIng. MusIcaI anaIysIs, whIch Is as precIse a method oI descrIptIon or
paraphrase as we get In the arts, Is metaphorIcaI through and through, In so Iar as It
captures musIc at aII. A chord can be sImpIy IabeIed, to be sure. ut to say that thIs Is a C-
major trIad Is not yet to grasp the musIcaI meanIng oI what we hear. t Is mereIy to oIIer
an aIternatIve notatIon. The understandIng rather than IabeIIng or notatIng oI musIc
begIns when we say what the tonaI IunctIon oI thIs trIad In thIs pIece Is, when we say, Ior
Instance, that thIs Is the tonIc. We then cIaIm that It serves as the center oI tonaI attractIon,
the goaI oI tonaI motIon, Ior aII other chords. omInant and tonIc, the Urlinie, you name It,
are not sImpIe IabeIs Ior somethIng that Is objectIveIy {p.224) out there In the musIc.
They are optIonaI metaphors desIgned to capture the way we experIence the musIc,
optIonaI, because, as we have seen In Chapter 1, the experIence oI dIrected motIon that
tonaI musIc aIIords can be conveyed by means oI severaI sets oI aIternatIve metaphors.
At best, we can dIstInguIsh metaphors that are strongIy entrenched and those that are
more tentatIve and provIsIonaI. Metaphors used In tonaI anaIysIs are oI the Iormer kInd,
because, even though we have severaI sets oI those at our dIsposaI, we have to use one
II we are to capture the experIence oI tonaI "motIon" or "gravItatIon" at aII. Metaphors
used by musIcaI hermeneutIcs, whether oId or new, that Is, metaphors that InvoIve
cIaImIng that the abstract tonaI motIon Is IIke a Iess abstract motIon oI some sort (say, the
motIon oI gaIIopIng horses, or oI maIe sexuaI desIre), are necessarIIy more provIsIonaI,
because they can be oIIered onIy as exempIIIIcatIons oI how an abstract shape mIght be
concreteIy Interpreted, II one chose to Interpret It concreteIy at aII. n short, "anaIysIs"
and "hermeneutIcs" are equaIIy metaphorIcaI. The dIIIerence Is that, whIIe the metaphors
oI anaIysIs are entrenched because InescapabIe (II not thIs, than another metaphor oI thIs
kInd has to be Invoked II we are to understand the musIc at aII), the metaphors oI
hermeneutIcs are truIy optIonaI (we may choose not to Invoke them at aII and stIII
IegItImateIy cIaIm that we understand the musIc). ut, whIIe we can choose not to use
them, II we do so, we have no way oI makIng a connectIon between the musIc and the
worId, between art and IIIe.
We mIght conceIve oI the steps InvoIved In the InterpretatIon oI art as IoIIows. The most
prImItIve IeveI oI InterpretatIon Is somethIng that mIght be caIIed anaIysIs (or cIose
readIng). Iere we stay, to the extent that It Is at aII possIbIe and wIthout deIudIng
ourseIves that It Is compIeteIy possIbIe, wIthIn the conIInes oI the Interpreted artworId
Page 13 of 24
ItseII and eIucIdate Its InternaI structure, that Is, we IIst the eIements that constItute the
artworId, we consIder the reIatIonshIps among them, we show how the whoIe that Is thIs
worId Is artIcuIated Into parts, II It Is so artIcuIated, and what IunctIon, II any, each part
pIays wIthIn the whoIe. The InterpretatIon proper, whIch was the subject oI the dIscussIon
above, Is the next step, In whIch the resuIts oI the anaIysIs are conIronted and compared
wIth other represented and Interpreted worIds, artIstIc and hIstorIcaI.
ut we shouId be aware that the dIstInctIon between the two IeveIs oI InterpretatIon Is
very Iuzzy and mereIy pragmatIc. t Is ImpossIbIe to keep contexts entIreIy at bay when
one consIders a text. ven as sImpIe an operatIon as decIdIng that a chord Is the tonIc
Introduces the ImpIIcIt comparIson between the behavIor oI thIs partIcuIar chord In thIs
partIcuIar pIece and the behavIor oI countIess other chords In other pIeces. The very Iact
that a work Is made oI the Ianguage that went Into the makIng oI many other works brIngs
the work Into contact wIth matters externaI to It. The dIstInctIon between the two IeveIs oI
InterpretatIon Is thus more a matter oI degree or oI emphasIs, on the text or on Its
reIatIon to a context. And It Is sureIy not the case that onIy one oI these IeveIs InvoIves the
use oI metaphor or metonymy whIIe the other Is Iree oI IIguratIve Ianguage and
descrIbes the anaIyzed artworId IIteraIIy.
{p.225) What does seem to be the case, however, Is that anaIysIs Is more IundamentaI
than, and prIor to, the InterpretatIon proper, and Ior two reasons. IIrst, anaIysIs Is a
prerequIsIte Ior InterpretatIon because we need to make some sense, however
preIImInary and sketchy, oI the InternaI content oI the artworId beIore we can go on to
conIront It wIth other worIds. t Is an IIIusIon to thInk that we can skIp anaIysIs and
proceed dIrectIy to InterpretatIon, an IIIusIon restIng on the Iact that an experIenced art
crItIc or hIstorIan does a Iot oI preIImInary anaIytIcaI work aImost automatIcaIIy In the
course oI becomIng acquaInted wIth the artworId he Is about to Interpret. To anaIyze Is
nothIng eIse but to read wIth understandIng, to read cIoseIy. Second, we may choose to
arrest our InvoIvement wIth artworIds on the IeveI oI anaIysIs and go no Iurther. There Is,
as we have seen, a steep prIce to be paId Ior such a IImItatIon, but at Ieast the IImItatIon Is
possIbIe, whIIe we couId not IImIt ourseIves to the InterpretatIon proper even II we
wanted to, because wIthout anaIysIs there wouId be nothIng to Interpret.
n the current methodoIogIcaI dIscussIons InternaI to the humanIstIc dIscIpIInes that study
the arts, the concept oI "hIstorIcIty" (good) Is oIten presented In contrast to "IormaIIsm"
(bad). The commonIy toId story (In my admIttedIy crude carIcature) goes IIke thIs. n the
bad, repressIve, CoId War, modernIst 1950s, the academIc crItIcIsm oI the arts In the
!nIted States was "IormaIIst" (or "ew CrItIcaI"), that Is, Interested In eIucIdatIng IormaI
reIatIonshIps InternaI to the artwork ItseII, dIvorced Irom any hIstorIcaI context. n the
good, IIberated, post-CoId War, postmodernIst present we know better, recognIze
IormaIIsm Ior what It Is (a sterIIIzIng strategy desIgned to neutraIIze any crItIcaI power
that an artwork mIght possess), and study artworks In theIr rIch and thIck hIstorIcaI
contexts.
What we actuaIIy shouId want, however, Is to have It both ways, to have both the anaIysIs
and the contextuaI hermeneutIcs whIch goes beyond the anaIyzed works to other works
Page 14 of 24
and that even transcends the conIInes oI art and embraces hIstory. And we shouId want
to have the two kInds oI InterpretatIon, InternaI anaIysIs and contextuaI hermeneutIcs,
connected wIth one another. IuckIIy, thIs Is precIseIy what the best crItIcs-hIstorIans oI
the arts gIve us. WIthout the anaIysIs, our grasp oI the Interpreted artworId wIII be vague
and ImprecIse. WIthout the InterpretatIon proper, the precIse grasp that the anaIysIs
oIIers wIII remaIn poIntIess. We want to engage our entrenched metaphors and our
optIonaI metaphors and to pIay them oII agaInst each other. n any case, wIth a IargeIy
abstract art, IIke InstrumentaI musIc, the musIcoIogIcaI penduIum between anaIysIs and
hermeneutIcs Is IIkeIy to swIng back and Iorth, presumabIy synchronIcaIIy wIth the
movements between abstractIon and representatIon In the sIIghtIy Iarger worId oI art
musIc chronIcIed In chapter 3. SInce the anaIytIcaI metaphors are entrenched, there Is a
bIas In theIr Iavor In those perIods when one wants to be hard-nosed and precIse. SInce
anaIysIs remaIns encIosed wIthIn the charmed cIrcIe oI the anaIyzed work (Is "InternaI"),
there Is a bIas In Iavor oI hermeneutIcs In those perIods when one wants to open the
doors and Iet hIstory In, whether gIngerIy In the Iorm oI art hIstory, or aII the way In the
Iorm oI hIstory tout court.
{p.226) The InterpretatIon oI artworks Is a task art crItIcs and art hIstorIans share. ut,
whIIe It Is aII that art crItIcs do, art hIstorIans do more. IIstorIans oI an art, IIke hIstorIans
oI any practIce or IamIIy oI practIces, Interpret two kInds oI objects. IIrst, they may
devote theIr eIIorts to InterpretIng specIIIc IndIvIduaI actIons oI specIIIc IndIvIduaI
hIstorIcaI actors, that Is, to the InterpretatIon oI IndIvIduaI "utterances." Second, they may
aIso want to understand the generaI ruIes that governed the actIons oI those who
engaged In the studIed practIce, to understand the "Ianguage" In whIch IndIvIduaI
utterances were made. n the IIrst case, they Interpret artworks. n the second, they
reconstruct the premIses and condItIons that governed the productIon and receptIon oI
artworks, the range or IImIts oI what It was possIbIe to make and do under the constraInts
oI a gIven practIce.
ven In the IIrst case, however, the range oI a hIstorIan's Interest Is Iarger than that oI a
crItIc, Ior the sImpIe reason that the objects hIstorIans Interpret have very oIten been
made In the past and eIsewhere. We have three generaI choIces when we try to
understand such objects. IIrst, we may want to IInd out what thIs object (actIon,
product, work) meant to those who made It and Ior whom It was made. SInce the
documents that wouId aIIow us to answer thIs questIon wIth any kInd oI certaInty are
oIten sImpIy not there, especIaIIy In the case oI works Irom a more dIstant past, thIs
choIce usuaIIy has to be taken In a more generaI sense. what we want to IInd out Is not so
much what did thIs work mean to those who made It and Ior whom It was made as what
might It have meant In Its own tIme and pIace to the peopIe who used It. We mIght caII
hIstorIans Interested In such questIons "hIstorIcIsts." Second, we may want to IInd out
what meanIngs have been ascrIbed to thIs work In the tIme that has eIapsed between Its
orIgIns and today. IeopIe who ask thIs questIon are oIten caIIed "receptIon hIstorIans."
IInaIIy, we mIght aIso ask what does, or mIght, thIs work mean today. Above, have been
caIIIng peopIe who ask thIs questIon "crItIcs."
Page 15 of 24
ow, It Is Important to recognIze that these three enterprIses are aII equaIIy IegItImate
and that no one needs to IeeI obIIged to choose among them. We do want to understand
what the work mIght have meant to Its orIgInaI Intended users. ut at the same tIme, we
need to be aware that no one's IntentIons and seII-understandIngs can exhaust the IuII
sIgnIIIcance oI hIs actIons and works. ThIs Is because, as these actIons and works are seen
In new contexts, they reveaI new meanIngs. n partIcuIar, Ior obvIous InstItutIonaI
reasons, we academIc hIstorIans oI the arts need to be perIodIcaIIy remInded that the
thIrd enterprIse, that oI the "crItIc," Is equaIIy worthwhIIe as, and very IIkeIy more
necessary to the properIy IunctIonIng vItaI cuIture than, the enterprIses oI the
"hIstorIcIst" and "receptIon hIstorIan." IIstory Is not aII one does, or shouId do, wIth the
arts. We want the arts to speak to us, not onIy observe how they spoke to others. (IecaII
Ietzsche's cautIonary taIe about the uses and abuses oI hIstory.) Gadamer remInds us
that "the essentIaI nature oI the hIstorIcaI spIrIt does not consIst In the restoratIon oI the
past, but In thoughtIuI medIatIon wIth contemporary IIIe."
26
We have observed earIIer
how In IIterary studIes, art hIstory, and musIcoIogy the tIde has recentIy turned agaInst
IormaIIsm because one wanted to return the arts {p.227) to the reaI worId. A good
cause thIs, but we shouId not stop here. IIstorIcIsm, new and oId, may easIIy become a
technIque Ior neutraIIzIng the power oI art, Ior keepIng art at a saIe dIstance Irom us. (
shouId add that In musIc, as In other perIormIng arts, thIs may be equaIIy true oI
hIstorIcIsm In crItIcaI and In perIormIng practIce.)
Moreover, wouId want to cIaIm Iurther that the resuIts reached by our "hIstorIcIst"
and "receptIon hIstorIan" are not even a necessary prerequIsIte Ior the work oI our
"crItIc." We hIstorIans have no rIght to Impose on crItIcs any IImIts concernIng the contexts
wIthIn whIch they mIght want to pIace the objects they Interpret. CrItIcs may be
IIIumInatIng and persuasIve even when they dIsregard the hIstorIcIty oI the artwork. (And
In musIc, as In other perIormIng arts, the same goes Ior the perIormer. Our Ianguage Is
wIse to cover what crItIcs and perIormers do by a sIngIe term, "InterpretatIon.")
IInaIIy, It shouId be cIear that my posItIon on thIs Issue does not presuppose, naIveIy, that
we ever have an "ImmedIate" access to artworks. AII knowIedge and understandIng Is
contextuaI and hence medIated. AII cIaIm Is that an approprIate context Ior an artwork
can be "ahIstorIcIst" (wIthout thereby beIng "ahIstorIcaI"), can be ours rather than theirs.
n sum, then, Interpreters oI the arts Iace a number oI choIces. IIrst, we must decIde
whether what Interests us are IndIvIduaI "utterances" or coIIectIve "Ianguages" In whIch
such utterances are made, IndIvIduaI actIons or socIaI practIces. As oIten, the choIce here
cannot be absoIute, because practIces cannot be Independent oI the actIons that
constItute them, whIIe actIons make sense onIy wIthIn the context oI approprIate practIces.
The choIce Is, rather, a matter oI emphasIs. Second, II we decIde to concentrate on
IndIvIduaI works, we wouId do weII to begIn wIth a cIose readIng oI them, wIth InternaI
anaIysIs as a prerequIsIte oI a contextuaI InterpretatIon. We can then decIde whether the
contexts that we wouId want to expIore shouId be artIstIc, hIstorIcaI, or both. ThIrd, we
shouId decIde whether we want to be prImarIIy "hIstorIcIsts," "receptIon hIstorIans," or
"crItIcs," whether what Interests us In the IIrst pIace Is the sIgnIIIcance the Interpreted
Page 16 of 24
work mIght have had Ior Its author and orIgInaI audIence, or Ior subsequent audIences,
or Ior us today.
b. Vadty: Persuason and Legtmacy
Iow do we know that the InterpretatIon we have been oIIered Is vaIId, how do we
dIstInguIsh sense Irom nonsense In thIs area? There are currentIy at Ieast two competIng
vIews on what constItutes a vaIId InterpretatIon. There Is what mIght be caIIed the
"IoundatIonaIIst" vIew, accordIng to whIch we evaIuate an InterpretatIon by comparIng It
wIth the Interpreted object and seeIng how truthIuIIy the InterpretatIon represents the
object. And then there Is what mIght be caIIed the "pragmatIc" vIew, accordIng to whIch a
good InterpretatIon Is sImpIy the one that aIIows the Interpreted object to do Ior us the
job that we want It to do.
27
The dIspute over the vaIIdIty oI InterpretatIon Is cIearIy a part or rather a versIon oI a
Iarger dIspute over the nature oI knowIedge and truth and shaII do no {p.228) more
here than to paInt Its outIInes wIth the broadest possIbIe brush. Ior the IoundatIonaIIsts,
knowIedge Is a matter oI the reIatIonshIp between proposItIons and objects these
proposItIons are about. Truth Ior them Is the correct representatIon or correspondence
between the representIng proposItIons and the represented object. Thus, aIso, a vaIId
InterpretatIon Ior them wIII be the one that represents the Interpreted object truthIuIIy.
Ior the pragmatIsts, knowIedge Is a matter oI the reIatIonshIp between proposItIons and
other proposItIons Irom whIch the Iormer are InIerred. Truth Is not a matter oI the causaI
reIatIonshIp between an object and a proposItIon, but rather oI the IogIcaI reIatIonshIp
between proposItIons. A proposItIon Is true II we are justIIIed In beIIevIng It, have good
arguments In Its Iavor, and our beIIeI Is justIIIed when It aIIows us to get thIngs to work
Ior us. Thus, a vaIId InterpretatIon Ior pragmatIsts Is the one that aIIows us to use the
Interpreted object best.
The IoundatIonaIIst worrIes that II we gIve up hIs pIcture oI what constItutes knowIedge
we wIII stop checkIng our proposItIons agaInst the objects they are about and thus Iose aII
abIIIty to dIstInguIsh true Irom untrue proposItIons. The pragmatIst persuasIveIy counters
that checkIng proposItIons agaInst objects Is somethIng we cannot do In any case, because
we have no ImmedIate access to objects, they are aIways aIready medIated by
proposItIons, aIready Interpreted. ote that the pragmatIst Is not sayIng that proposItIons
are aII there Is, that there Is no hors-texte. On the contrary, there are objects out there
and we do react to stImuII we get Irom these objects by behavIng In varIous ways-
among others, by producIng proposItIons that heIp us use these objects, get them to
work Ior us. Thus, there Is such a thIng as a reaIIty test. Some proposItIons aIIow us to
use objects we want to use better than others. ew stImuII wIII make us change our
mInds, change the proposItIons we thInk are worth assertIng. ut we cannot compare our
proposItIons wIth the objects. We can onIy compare them wIth other proposItIons about
the objects. Thus, vaIIdIty cIaIms oI knowIedge and, by the same token, oI InterpretatIon
(sInce knowIedge is InterpretatIon), cannot be supported by Independent checkIng oI the
sentences In whIch thIs InterpretatIon Is expressed agaInst the Interpreted object. They
can be supported onIy by arguments that persuade the reIevant communIty because
Page 17 of 24
they are InternaIIy coherent and because the proposItIons they resuIt In heIp the
communIty to use the Interpreted objects as It wants to use them. ConsequentIy, the
IoundatIonaIIst's worrIes that we mIght Iose aII abIIIty to dIstInguIsh true Irom untrue
proposItIons are unIounded.
The pragmatIst's posItIon on thIs Issue Is persuasIve because It exposes a IataI weakness
In the IoundatIonaIIst vIew and because It does descrIbe reaIIstIcaIIy what actuaIIy
happens when we try to Interpret and to vaIIdate our cIaIms. ven the sImpIest act oI
InterpretatIon Is, precIseIy, an act. When we Interpret, we are actIve rather than passIve.
The object does not come carryIng Its meanIng on Its sIeeve. MeanIng Is created by the
Interpreter the way any scIentIIIc theory Is IashIoned, through the IramIng and testIng oI
hypotheses. To be sure, the Interpreter {p.229) works under the constraInts Imposed
by the object. ependIng on the cIrcumstances, hypotheses to the eIIect that the object Is
a chaIr or a tabIe may be IaIsIIIed, or they may be provIsIonaIIy accepted as true. ut the
object cannot turn out to be anythIng the Interpreter wants It to be. t may be a chaIr In
our worId, but not In the worId oI gIants. Thus, whIIe It Is true that the Interpreter
creates the meanIng, It Is equaIIy true that the Interpreted object Imposes constraInts and
IImIts on the Interpreter's Ireedom. AII the same, there seem to be no IImIts to the
Interpreter's Ireedom to consIder the object as beIongIng to a varIety oI worIds. And we
have aIready seen that any object can be brought under a great many concepts even In a
sIngIe-our-worId. Our InterpretatIon (whether "chaIr" or "tabIe") wIII be provIsIonaIIy
accepted by the communIty It addresses (provIsIonaIIy, that Is, untII a better
InterpretatIon Is oIIered) because It Is consIstent wIth other reIevant thIngs we say In thIs
case and because It aIIows the communIty to use the object eIIectIveIy.
One mIght put the dIspute between the IoundatIonaIIst and the pragmatIst Into yet other
terms and say that whIIe the Iormer wants the InterpretatIons to be IegItImate (that Is,
authorIzed by the IoundIng Interpreted object), the Iatter Is quIte satIsIIed when they are
persuasIve (that Is, accepted by the addressed audIence). Thus put, the contrast reveaIs
a hIstorIcaI dImensIon. The IoundatIonaIIst Is at one wIth those premoderns who Iocated
the uItImate source oI authorIty In the transcendent reaIm beyond our own messy
everyday human worId, the reaIm oI deas, say, or the CIty oI God. The pragmatIst
pushes Iorward the project oI the nIIghtenment whIch Kant has IamousIy characterIzed
as "man's reIease Irom hIs seII-Incurred tuteIage."
28
A reIIgIous tradItIon, especIaIIy one
that centers on the Truth reveaIed by God and IIxed In the ook, needs the contrast
between IegItImate and IIIegItImate InterpretatIon, because It needs to dIstInguIsh what
God wants us to know Irom cIaIms put Iorward by heretIcs and Impostors. A vIew oI the
vaIIdIty oI artIstIc InterpretatIon that consIders thIs vaIIdIty as IegItImacy has cIear roots In
the judeo-ChrIstIan tradItIon oI scrIpturaI InterpretatIon and beIongs wIth the IomantIc
takeover by art oI the IunctIons tradItIonaIIy IuIIIIIed by reIIgIon. ut once art abandons
reIIgIous pretensIons oI thIs sort (and have expIaIned In chapter 2 why thInk It shouId
abandon them once and Ior aII), we mIght thInk that we no Ionger need to cIIng to the vIew
oI vaIIdIty as IegItImacy. We mIght thInk, that Is, that aII we secuIar moderns need are
InterpretatIons oI art that persuade us because, IIke InterpretatIons we provIsIonaIIy
accept In aII other domaIns, scIence IncIuded, they are consIstent wIth Iots and Iots oI
Page 18 of 24
other beIIeIs we hoId and they aIIow us to use the Interpreted artworId as we want to
use It, to amuse and to edIIy us. AgaIn, we need not worry that thIs opens the door to aII
sorts oI nonsense. There mIght be no IIIegItImate InterpretatIons, but there wouId sure
stIII be pIenty oI sIIIy ones and we wouId not have to be persuaded by them.
ut Is It reaIIy true that "there are no IIIegItImate InterpretatIons"? do not thInk so and
wouId IIke to argue now that the pragmatIst posItIon embraced here {p.230) can be
consIstent wIth a deIense oI careIuIIy cIrcumscrIbed notIons oI IegItImacy and textuaI
authorIty. What wIII cIaIm, In brIeI, Is that there are certaIn kInds oI InterpretatIon that
have to be IegItImate In order to be reaIIy persuasIve.
IecaII that Interpreters may want to accompIIsh a number oI dIstInct tasks. They may
want to anaIyze the InternaI structure oI, and the reIatIonshIps wIthIn, the text In order to
eIucIdate Its meanIng. They may Iook Ior the sIgnIIIcance oI thIs meanIng Ior the text's
author and Ior hIs actuaI or Intended orIgInaI audIence. They may Iook Ior Its sIgnIIIcance
Ior subsequent audIences. They may, IInaIIy, Iook Ior Its sIgnIIIcance Ior us today.
IstInctIons oI thIs sort have been careIuIIy worked out In the hermeneutIc theory oI . .
IIrsch, jr.
29
IIrsch began by observIng that most word sequences can represent more
than one meanIng (consIder Irony or aIIegory, whose presence aIters the whoIe meanIng
wIthout changIng a sIngIe Ietter oI the text
30
), and he went on to dIstInguIsh the meanIng
represented by the text and the sIgnIIIcance oI thIs meanIng. The meanIng oI a sIgn
sequence Is determIned by the person usIng It. IreIerabIy, It Is determIned by Its author,
It Is what the author meant by Its use. OtherwIse, the meanIng wouId have to remaIn
IndetermInate and It wouId not be possIbIe to dIstInguIsh vaIId Irom InvaIId
InterpretatIons. SIgnIIIcance arIses when the meanIng Is pIaced In a reIatIonshIp wIth
anythIng we want to reIate It to. Thus the meanIng Is InherentIy stabIe, whIIe the
sIgnIIIcance Is not.
31
MeanIng Is the object oI InterpretatIon, sIgnIIIcance the object oI
crItIcIsm (In tradItIonaI hermeneutIc terms, oI interpretctio and cpplicctio, respectIveIy).
32
ThIs Is not to say, however, that In InterpretIng we can avoId aII context. The
Interpreter's understandIng oI the meanIng Is codetermIned by the Interpreted sIgn
sequence and hIs expectatIons arIsIng Irom hIs conceptIon oI the genre beIng used by the
author. The Interpreter makes an ImagInatIve guess, Irames a hypothesIs, concernIng the
genre and IoIIows It wIth crItIcaI testIng that InvoIves aII the reIevant knowIedge avaIIabIe
to hIm.
33
ThIs Is why the cIaIms oI the Interpreter can be evaIuated and crItIcIzed. he may
have dIsregarded some reIevant evIdence, or hIs argument may be IogIcaIIy IIawed.
34
IInaIIy, the Interpreter paraphrases the meanIng In terms hIs audIence wIII understand.
35
n crItIcIsm as opposed to InterpretatIon, that Is, In the constructIon oI sIgnIIIcance rather
than meanIng, we are not bound by the author's or anyone eIse's wIII. We can reIate the
meanIng oI a sIgn sequence to anythIng we want to reIate It to. ut, and thIs Is the crucIaI
poInt In IIrsch's conceptIon, crItIcIsm presupposes InterpretatIon. We must IIrst
construct the meanIng, or eIse we wIII not have anythIng that mIght be reIated to anythIng
eIse, nothIng that mIght have sIgnIIIcance.
36
WhIIe much oI thIs Is unexceptIonabIe and agrees weII wIth the pIcture oI InterpretatIon
Page 19 of 24
paInted above, there are two controversIaI moves In IIrsch's hermeneutIcs. IIrst, hIs
equatIon oI meanIng wIth the orIgInaI authorIaI meanIng Is not a IogIcaI necessIty and It wIII
be partIcuIarIy dIsturbIng to aII those who procIaIm the death oI the author, though by no
means onIy to them. t Is not IogIcaIIy necessary because II the meanIng oI a sIgn
sequence Is determIned {p.231) by the person usIng It, thIs person may be anyone at
aII, the Interpreter, Ior Instance, and not onIy the orIgInaI user, the author. IIrsch's
posItIon, and one wIth whIch am In sympathy, Is that the IdentIIIcatIon oI meanIng wIth the
orIgInaI authorIaI meanIng Is not a matter oI IogIcaI necessIty, to be sure, but It Is a matter
oI ethIcaI courtesy. IIrsch poInts out that when we use someone eIse's words Ior
purposes oI our own and dIsregard hIs IntentIons, It Is not much dIIIerent Irom our usIng
another person InstrumentaIIy, Ior our own purposes and In dIsregard oI hIs own aIms.
37
wouId make a sImIIar poInt somewhat dIIIerentIy. Instead oI usIng an author's words Ior
our own purposes, we wouId be more honest to use our own words and not pretend
that we are InterpretIng hIs. IIchard Iorty thInks, correctIy, that It Is "a mIstake to thInk
oI somebody's own account oI hIs behavIor or cuIture as epIstemIcaIIy prIvIIeged. . . . ut
It Is not a mIstake to thInk oI It as moraIIy prIvIIeged. We have a duty to IIsten to hIs
account, not because he has prIvIIeged access to hIs own motIves but because he Is a
humanbeIng IIke ourseIves. . . . ut cIvIIIty Is not a method, It Is sImpIy a vIrtue."
38
Isewhere, Iorty makes a useIuI dIstInctIon between what he caIIs "methodIcaI" and
"InspIred" readIngs, between knowIng In advance what one wants to get out oI a text and
aIIowIng the text to surprIse one, to change one's purposes and IIIe.
39
ut II It Is the Iatter
kInd oI readIng one preIers, IIstenIng to the author beIore one begIns to IIsten to oneseII
wouId certaInIy be advIsabIe. n any case, as IIrsch observes, when we Interpret
someone's speech In everyday communIcatIon we routIneIy IdentIIy the meanIng wIth the
author's, rather than our own, and there Is no good reason why we shouId behave
dIIIerentIy when InterpretIng wrItten or IIterary texts.
ut the appeaI to authorIaI IntentIon as the crIterIon oI vaIIdIty In InterpretatIon can be
easIIy mIsunderstood. Iet me brIeIIy consIder the most Important among the varIous
objectIons raIsed by Its opponents, the ceIebrated "IntentIonaI IaIIacy" argument
IormuIated by W. K. WImsatt and Monroe eardsIey In theIr cIassIc 1946 paper.
40
The
author's IntentIon Is IrreIevant to the InterpretatIon oI the artwork, they cIaImed, because
the meanIng oI a text resIdes In the meanIng oI the words used and In Its syntax. The
meanIng oI a sentence Is not a matter oI any IndIvIduaI's decIsIon, but a matter oI the
socIaI semantIc and syntactIc conventIons oI the communIty In the Ianguage oI whIch the
sentence has been uttered. IInd these cIaIms convIncIng, but see them as oIIerIng not so
much a reIutatIon as a way to reIIne IIrsch's pIcture.
One probIem wIth thIs pIcture Is that It seems to threaten InIInIte regress. In order to
understand the text we appeaI to the author's IntentIon, but thIs Is avaIIabIe, II at aII, onIy
as another text, whIch In turn requIres an InterpretatIon, and so on, cd injinitum. ut Iet
us recaII aIso that, Ior IIrsch, the Interpreter's understandIng oI the meanIng Is
codetermIned by the Interpreted sIgn sequence and hIs expectatIons arIsIng Irom hIs
conceptIon oI the "genre" beIng used by the author. Thus the author's IntentIon can be
taken to pertaIn to the text not dIrectIy but onIy IndIrectIy and to pertaIn dIrectIy to the
Page 20 of 24
"genres" (that Is, the socIaI conventIons oI Ianguage) he uses. n thIs case, we wouId Iook
not so much {p.232) Ior the author's decIaratIons concernIng what hIs IntentIons were
when he wrote the text, but Ior the evIdence concernIng the socIaI conventIons that an
author oI thIs kInd was IIkeIy to depIoy In a text oI thIs sort. "The IndIvIduaI author"
becomes now nothIng more than "a member oI thIs partIcuIar IInguIstIc communIty." ThIs
does not make the author and hIs IntentIon dIsappear compIeteIy. When InterpretIng a
word In a text by Shakespeare we wouId stIII be bound by the appeaI to authorIaI
IntentIon to choose a meanIng current around 1600 rather than one that dId not make Its
appearance untII jane Austen's tIme. ut we wouId avoId the probIem oI InIInIte regress.
And our posItIon wouId be compatIbIe wIth that oI the authors oI the IntentIonaI IaIIacy
argument. (To be sure, we wouId agree wIth them that the Interpreted Shakespearean
text aIso makes sense when the meanIng chosen Ior the troubIesome word arose onIy In
the nIneteenth century. ut we wouId sIde wIth IIrsch In sayIng that In that case we
wouId be more honest not to pretend that the text we Interpret Is Shakespeare's.)
n short, the onIy way to save authorIaI IntentIon as the crIterIon oI vaIIdIty In
InterpretatIon In the Iace oI the IntentIonaI IaIIacy argument Is to understand the authorIaI
IntentIon as pertaInIng dIrectIy onIy to the socIaI conventIons depIoyed In the text. We
Invoke "the author," understood not as "thIs concrete IndIvIduaI" but rather as "a
member oI thIs concrete communIty," to vaIIdate the InterpretatIon oI meanIng when we
cIaIm that a member oI thIs communIty wouId be IIkeIy (or unIIkeIy) to use these rather
than those socIaI conventIons when makIng a work oI thIs kInd. n other words, the IImIts
on vaIId InterpretatIon oI meanIng are estabIIshed not by what the IndIvIduaI author
wanted to say, but by the ruIes and constraInts oI the dIscursIve practIce wIthIn whIch
the utterance has been made. IIrsch was rIght to Iook Ior a prIncIpIe oI vaIIdIty In
InterpretatIon, but he mIsIocated thIs prIncIpIe at the IeveI oI the IndIvIduaI actIon or
utterance, Instead oI IookIng Ior It at the IeveI oI socIaI practIce or Ianguage. And perhaps
even IIrsch wouId be ready to concede thIs poInt. aIter aII, he starts hIs dIscussIon wIth
the author's IntentIon, but by the tIme he Introduces the notIon oI the "genre" It
becomes IIkeIy that the author's IntentIon Is not dIrectIy about the meanIng oI the text,
but about the "generIc" conventIons the author wIshes to Invoke and use.
ThIs vIew oI the matter, by the way, aIso aIIows us to Invoke the author when the author
Is anonymous or coIIectIve. One mIght thInk, aIter aII, that one argument agaInst our
consIderIng authorIaI IntentIon as the crIterIon oI vaIIdIty In InterpretatIon Is that we do
understand texts by authors about whom we know nothIng, or about whose authorIaI
IntentIons we know nothIng. ut In Iact It Is never so that we know absoIuteIy nothIng
about these thIngs, and even when we know nothIng Ior sure we make InIormed guesses.
I we guess that the author oI the Interpreted text was IIkeIy to have been an eIeventh-
century monk, we shaII not attrIbute to hIm meanIngs that mIght have been Intended onIy
by a seventeenth-century IIbertIne.
IIrsch's second controversIaI move concerns hIs InsIstence that InterpretatIon Is a
prerequIsIte Ior crItIcIsm, that we must construe the meanIng beIore goIng {p.233) on
to construe muItIpIe sIgnIIIcances oI the text. To show why thIs Is controversIaI, shaII
Page 21 of 24
agaIn contrast IIrsch's posItIon wIth another vIew oI the matter. n a 1985 paper on
"Texts and Iumps," IIchard Iorty put Iorward a rIgorousIy pragmatIst vIew oI
InterpretatIon.
41
There are severaI thIngs we can do, severaI dIstInct aIms we can
pursue, when we Interpret a text (or a "Iump". Iorty persuasIveIy argues that not onIy
man, but "cnything Is, Ior purposes oI beIng InquIred Into, 'constItuted by a web oI
meanIngs," that scIence Is no Iess "hermeneutIcaI" than the humanItIes, that "expIanatIon
oI IossIIs Is no Iess hoIIstIc than the expIanatIon oI texts-In both cases one needs to brIng
the object Into reIatIon wIth many other dIIIerent sort oI objects In order to teII a
coherent narratIve whIch wIII Incorporate the InItIaI object"
42
). We may want to teII a
story about (a) what the author wouId say In answer to questIons about the text whIch
were put In hIs own terms, or (b) what he wouId say In answer to questIons put In terms
that were not hIs own but that he had Iearned to understand, or (c) the text's roIe In
someone's vIew oI the deveIopment oI Its genre, or (d) Its roIe In someone's vIew oI
somethIng other than Its genre. Iorty's IIrst two tasks agree wIth the aIms oI "the
InterpretatIon oI meanIng" as understood by IIrsch, whIIe the Iast two correspond to
IIrsch's "crItIcIsm oI sIgnIIIcance." Where Iorty departs Irom IIrsch Is In hIs cIaIm that
there Is no hIerarchy among the dIIIerent IeveIs oI meanIng, that none oI the IeveIs Is a
prerequIsIte Ior any other.
On cIoser InspectIon, thIs second controversy reveaIs Its cIose kInshIp wIth the IIrst one
and may In Iact be the very same controversy. eIore we can pIace the Interpreted text
or object Into any sort oI context to examIne Its sIgnIIIcance, we have to have the text or
object ItseII, and sInce we can never have an object unmedIated by some sort oI
InterpretatIon, sInce objects are gIven us aIways aIready Interpreted, we cannot bypass
meanIng on our way to sIgnIIIcance. We can, as we have seen, Ignore the authorIaI
"generIc" IntentIons (that Is, the IInguIstIc conventIons oI hIs communIty) and stIII get
somethIng meanIngIuI. ut the probIem that arIses when we do thIs Is that then we have
no answer to someone who objects. Why do you pretend that you are crItIcIzIng
someone eIse's text, Instead oI admIttIng that you are crItIcIzIng a new text oI your own?
IecaII, however, the Iesson oI MerrIII. we cannot get the author's meanIng otherwIse than
by IosIng and IIndIng It In transIatIon. What IoIIows Is that the very dIstInctIon between
meanIng and sIgnIIIcance, between understandIng the text In the author's own terms and
understandIng It In our terms, Is at best Iuzzy and reIatIve, a matter oI approxImatIon and
emphasIs, not oI a cIear-cut eIther-or choIce. Much as we want to respect, somehow, the
author's meanIng, In actuaI InterpretatIve practIce we have to go back and Iorth between
meanIng and sIgnIIIcance, between hIs terms and our own, rather than get IIrst the
Iormer and onIy then the Iatter.
ote, by the way, that there Is no contradIctIon between our sIdIng In InterpretIve-crItIcaI
practIce wIth a drastIcaIIy reInterpreted IIrsch (whose partIcuIar IntentIons have rudeIy
dIsregarded), that Is, InvokIng the IInguIstIc conventIons oI the author's communIty as the
crIterIon oI vaIIdIty and poIIteIy tryIng to {p.234) Interpret the author's meanIng beIore
movIng on to crItIcIzIng sIgnIIIcance, on the one hand, and our embrace oI the radIcaIIy
pragmatIc, Iortyan, understandIng oI InterpretatIon, on the other. n other words, It may
Page 22 of 24
be that IIttIe oI practIcaI Importance Is at stake In our IundamentaI understandIng oI
InterpretatIon, In our makIng a choIce between the IoundatIonaIIst and pragmatIc
posItIons. We may have an Incorrect, IoundatIonaIIst, conceptIon oI the nature oI
InterpretatIon and stIII practIce InterpretatIon successIuIIy, and the reverse. IuckIIy, we
may aIso wIthout contradIctIon IoIIow Iorty In theory and a revIsed IIrsch In practIce.
Notes:
(1.) Ians-Georg Gadamer, Truth cnd Method (ew York. ContInuum, 1975), pp. 142-43.
(7.) MIchaeI axandaII, Fcinting cnd Experience in Fijteenth-Century ltcly (OxIord. OxIord
!nIversIty Iress, 1972), Marc IumaroII, LEcole du silence. Le sentiment des imcges cu
XVll
e
sicle (IarIs. IIammarIon, 1994), CharIes Iosen, The Romcntic Generction
(CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1995), john Ireccero, Dcnte: The Foetics oj
Conversion (CambrIdge. Iarvard !nIversIty Iress, 1986), jean StarobInskI, ]ecn-
]ccques Roussecu, Trcnspcrency cnd Obstruction, trans. Arthur GoIdhammer (ChIcago.
The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1988).
(8.) MarceI Iroust, Swcnn's Wcy, Remembrcnce oj Things Fcst, voI. 1 (ew York.
Iandom Iouse, 1934), p. 171.
(9.) See ArIstotIe, Rhetoric, bk. 3, ch. 4.
(10.) ArIstotIe, Foetics, ch. 21, 1457b, trans. ngram ywater.
(11.) ArIstotIe, Rhetoric, bk. 3, ch. 10, 1410b, trans. W. Ihys Ioberts.
(12.) ArIstotIe, Rhetoric, bk. 3, ch., 2, 1405a, trans. W. Ihys Ioberts.
(13.) ArIstotIe, Rhetoric, bk. 3, ch. 11, 1412a, trans. W. Ihys Ioberts.
(14.) ArIstotIe, Foetics, ch. 22, 1459a, trans. ngram ywater.
(15.) On the reIatIonshIp between metaphor and art, see In partIcuIar IauI IIcoeur, The
Rule oj Metcphor: Multi-disciplincry Studies oj the Crection oj Mecning in Lcngucge
(Toronto. !nIversIty oI Toronto Iress, 1977).
(16.) Ians eItIng, Likeness cnd Fresence: A History oj the lmcge Bejore the Erc oj Art,
trans. . jephcott (ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1994).
Page 23 of 24
(17.) eIson Goodman, Lcngucges oj Art: An Approcch to c Theory oj Symbols, 2d ed.
(ndIanapoIIs. Iackett, 1976), p. 69.
(18.) Scott urnham, Beethoven Hero (IrInceton. IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1995), p.
25.
(19.) See IrIedrIch Ietzsche, "On MusIc and Words," trans. W. KauImann, In CarI
ahIhaus, Between Romcnticism cnd Modernism: Four Studies in the Music oj the Lcter
Nineteenth Century (erkeIey. !nIversIty oI CaIIIornIa Iress, 1980), pp. 106-19.
(ew York. Iarper S Iow, 1971), pp. 48-49.
(21.) IeIdegger, "The OrIgIn oI the Work oI Art," pp. 53-54.
!nIversIty Iress, 1952), 314, pp. 175-76.
(23.) See MartIn IeIdegger, Being cnd Time (ew York. Iarper S Iow, 1962), sec. 32,
pp. 188-95.
(27.) The contrast has been IuIIy artIcuIated and deveIoped by IIchard Iorty In a
number oI books begInnIng wIth Fhilosophy cnd the Mirror oj Ncture (IrInceton.
IrInceton !nIversIty Iress, 1979). Other reIevant texts can be Iound In Consequences oj
Frcgmctism (Esscys: 1972-1980) (MInneapoIIs. !nIversIty oI MInnesota Iress, 1982) and
Objectivity, Relctivism, cnd Truth: Fhilosophiccl Fcpers, voI. 1 (CambrIdge. CambrIdge
!nIversIty Iress, 1991).
(28.) Kant wrItes Iurther In "What Is nIIghtenment?". "TuteIage Is man's InabIIIty to make
use oI hIs understandIng wIthout dIrectIon Irom another. SeII-Incurred Is thIs tuteIage
when Its cause IIes not In Iack oI reason but In Iack oI resoIutIon and courage to use It
wIthout dIrectIon Irom another." Kant, On History, trans. and ed. I. W. eck (ndIanapoIIs.
obbs-MerrIII, 1963), p. 3.
(29.) See . . IIrsch, jr., Vclidity in lnterpretction (ew Iaven. YaIe !nIversIty Iress,
1967), and The Aims oj lnterpretction (ChIcago. The !nIversIty oI ChIcago Iress, 1976).
(30.) IIrsch, The Aims oj lnterpretction, p. 23.
(31.) IIrsch, Vclidity in lnterpretction, pp. 4-9, and The Aims oj lnterpretction, pp. 2-3
and 79-80.
Page 24 of 24
(32.) IIrsch, Vclidity in lnterpretction, p. 57, and The Aims oj lnterpretction, p. 19.
(33.) IIrsch, Vclidity in lnterpretction, pp. 72-88 and x.
(34.) IIrsch, Vclidity in lnterpretction, p. 207.
(35.) IIrsch, Vclidity in lnterpretction, p. 136.
(36.) IIrsch, Vclidity in lnterpretction, pp. 141 and 162, and The Aims oj lnterpretction,
p. 19.
(37.) IIrsch, The Aims oj lnterpretction, p. 90.
(38.) Iorty, Consequences oj Frcgmctism, p. 202.
(39.) IIchard Iorty, "The IragmatIst's Irogress," In S. CoIIInI, ed., lnterpretction cnd
Overinterpretction (CambrIdge. CambrIdge !nIversIty Iress, 1992), p. 106.
(40.) W. K. WImsatt and Monroe eardsIey, "The ntentIonaI IaIIacy," Sewcnee Review 54
(1946), 468-88. Ior a useIuI recent dIscussIon wIth a hIstory oI the debate generated by
the paper and wIth reIerences to the reIevant IIterature, see George IckIe and W. Kent
WIIson, "The ntentIonaI IaIIacy. eIendIng eardsIey," The ]ourncl oj Aesthetics cnd Art
Criticism 53 (1995), 233-50.
(41.) IIchard Iorty, "Texts and Iumps," New Litercry History 17 (1985), 1-16.
(42.) Iorty, Consequences oj Frcgmctism, pp. 199-200.
Epilogue: The Power of Taste
Page 1 of 10
A Theory of Art
Karo Berger
IrInt S-13. 9780195128604
O. 10.1093/0195128605.001.0001
Epogue: The Power of Taste
Iessed are those who possess taste, even though It be bad taste!-And not onIy
bIessed. one can be wIse, too, onIy by vIrtue oI thIs quaIIty, whIch Is why the
Greeks, who were very subtIe In such thIngs, desIgnated the wIse man wIth a word
that sIgnIIIes the mcn oj tcste, and caIIed wIsdom, artIstIc and practIcaI as weII as
theoretIcaI and InteIIectuaI, sImpIy 'taste (sophic).
IrIedrIch Ietzsche, Humcn, All Too Humcn
t dIdn't requIre great character at aII
our reIusaI dIsagreement and resIstance
we had a shred oI necessary courage
but IundamentaIIy It was a matter oI taste
Yes taste
In whIch there are IIbers oI souI the cartIIage oI conscIence
ZbIgnIew Ierbert, "The Iower oI Taste"
One advantage oI doIng what we have done In thIs book, IIndIng out what art Is, or shouId
be, Ior, Is that thIs aIIows us to evaIuate. We are now In a posItIon to know not onIy what
Page 2 of 10
the vaIue oI art In generaI Is, but aIso to dIscuss and compare the reIatIve worth oI
IndIvIduaI artworks and artIstIc tradItIons. n brIeI, sInce we know what the IunctIons oI
art are, we can examIne how weII IndIvIduaI works and tradItIons perIorm theIr IunctIons.
t Is cIear that the edIIyIng IunctIon can serve as a crIterIon In evaIuatIon and so can the
IunctIon oI provIdIng the Interested, nonaesthetIc pIeasure. n both cases, better art wIII
make us wIser. ut can we actuaIIy use dIsInterested aesthetIc pIeasure as a crIterIon In
thIs way? sn't It, rather, that, In thIs case, de {p.236) gustibus . . . ? The actIvIty that
produces the aesthetIc pIeasure, It wIII be recaIIed, Is the dIsInterested contempIatIon oI
an object, dIsInterested In the sense that the pIeasure Is not attendant on a desIre
satIsIIed or purpose IuIIIIIed and does not resuIt In eIther desIre or actIon. t Is dIIIIcuIt to
see how one couId argue about any artwork that It Is a more or Iess suItabIe object oI
such contempIatIon, a better or worse source oI pIeasure. The onIy approach that seems
open here Is to IInd out empIrIcaIIy how weII or badIy the artwork IuIIIIIs thIs IunctIon.
What prevents us Irom arguIng about the reIatIve success oI an artwork as a source oI
pIeasure, accordIng to Kant, Is a Iurther, not yet dIscussed, Ieature oI aesthetIc pIeasure.
AesthetIc pIeasure, Kant cIaImed, Is subjectIve, that Is, "conceIved IndependentIy oI any
concept oI the object."
1
"ow a representatIon, whereby an object Is gIven, InvoIves, In
order that It may become a source oI cognItIon at aII, imcginction Ior brIngIng together
the manIIoId oI IntuItIon, and understcnding Ior the unIty oI the concept unItIng the
representatIons."
2
ut In the case oI the beautIIuI object, "the cognItIve powers brought
Into pIay by thIs representatIon are here engaged In a Iree pIay, sInce no deIInIte concept
restrIcts them to a partIcuIar ruIe oI cognItIon."
3
n other words, In an act oI cognItIon
whereby we get to know an object, the cognItIve powers oI ImagInatIon (that synthesIzes
"the manIIoId oI IntuItIon" gIven by the senses Into an entIty) and understandIng (that
brIngs thIs entIty under a concept) are engaged IIke two gear wheeIs. ut In an act oI
aesthetIc contempIatIon, the two wheeIs spIn wIthout engagIng and the cognItIve
mechanIsm runs on IdIe, sInce the understandIng InsIsts on no partIcuIar concept and
hence the object oI contempIatIon Is a pure "thIs" wIth no Iurther deIInItIon. AesthetIc
pIeasure Is "In the harmony oI the cognItIve IacuItIes,"
4
In "the quIckenIng oI both
IacuItIes (ImagInatIon and understandIng) to an IndeIInIte, and yet, thanks to the gIven
representatIon, harmonIous actIvIty."
5
ow, and thIs Is the crucIaI poInt, sInce we do not brIng the contempIated object under
any deIInIte concept, we cannot know what the purpose or end oI the object Is ("an end Is
In generaI that, the concept oI whIch may be regarded as the ground oI the possIbIIIty oI
the object ItseII").
6
ConsequentIy, we aIso cannot estImate how weII or badIy the object
IuIIIIIs Its purpose. ThereIore, "there can be no objectIve ruIe oI taste by whIch what Is
beautIIuI may be deIIned by means oI concepts. Ior every judgement Irom that source Is
aesthetIc, I.e. Its determInIng ground Is the IeeIIng oI the Subject, and not any concept oI
an Object."
7
Once It Is conceded that the aesthetIc experIence InvoIves no appIIcatIon oI concepts, It Is,
Indeed, dIIIIcuIt to escape the concIusIon that no ratIonaI argument about the reIatIve
merIt oI an object as the source oI aesthetIc pIeasure Is possIbIe. ow, It may perhaps be
Page 3 of 10
the case that the pIeasure aIIorded by IIowers Is as pure as thIs, wIthout our brIngIng any
specIIIc concepts to bear on our experIence and wIthout our thInkIng about the IIower's
InternaI end. As Kant put It. "IardIy any one but a botanIst knows the true nature oI a
IIower, and even he, whIIe recognIzIng In the IIower the reproductIve organ oI the pIant,
pays no attentIon to thIs naturaI end when usIng hIs taste to judge Its beauty. Ience
{p.237) no perIectIon oI any kInd-no InternaI IInaIIty, as somethIng to whIch the
arrangement oI the manIIoId Is reIated-underIIes thIs judgement."
8
ven here, am not
entIreIy persuaded. on't we have to brIng the manIIoId at Ieast under the concept oI
"IIower," II we are to enjoy It at aII? s It not IIkeIy that otherwIse, wIthout the pIeasIng
thoughts and assocIatIons that the concept oI "IIower" carrIes Ior us, when encountered
In a jungIe rather than a garden, we mIght IInd It threatenIng or repuIsIve rather than
beautIIuI? More to the poInt, even II the exIstence oI aesthetIc pIeasure as pure as Kant
wouId have It Is conceded In certaIn cases, It Is hIghIy unIIkeIy that the pIeasures we
derIve Irom the practIce oI the arts are ever so pure.
To be sure, Kant's severe posItIon Is soItened somewhat when he recognIzes that "there
are two kInds oI beauty. Iree beauty (pulchritudo vcgc), or beauty whIch Is mereIy
dependent (pulchritudo cdhcerens). The IIrst presupposes no concept oI what the object
shouId be, the second does presuppose such a concept and, wIth It, an answerIng
perIectIon oI the object."
9
The exampIes oI the Iormer are "IIowers, . . . many bIrds, . . . a
number oI crustacea, . . . desIgns c lc grecque, IoIIage Ior Iramework or on waII-papers,
. . . |as weII as| what In musIc are caIIed IantasIas (wIthout a theme), and, Indeed, aII musIc
that Is not set to words."
10
The exampIes oI the Iatter are "the beauty oI man (IncIudIng
under thIs head that oI a man, woman, or chIId), the beauty oI a horse, or oI a buIIdIng
(such as a church, paIace, arsenaI, or summer-house)."
11
What want to suggest Is that
the beauty oI art, InstrumentaI musIc IncIuded, unIIke perhaps that oI nature, Is
dependent, rather than Iree.
The pIeasures experIenced by the Iover oI the arts are much cIoser to those enjoyed by
the partIcIpant In, or spectator oI, a game than to those oI Kant's absentmInded botanIst.
The anaIogy between the kInd oI pIeasure that attends upon aesthetIc contempIatIon and
the kInd that resuIts Irom partIcIpatIng In a game Is very cIose Indeed (and has been much
expIored, by Gadamer, In partIcuIar).
12
To be sure, an art cannot be reduced to a game,
or a game raIsed to the status oI an art, because It cannot be saId oI games, as It can oI
art, that they produce IIctIve representatIons (here part company wIth Gadamer). An
athIete's body does not represent anythIng other than ItseII, aIthough we may Iook at It
wIth the eyes oI a IenI IIeIenstahI, take It the way we take an abstract artwork, the
movIng body oI a dancer In an abstract dance, say, and Interpret It to represent
suppIeness, grace, power. ut even II games dIIIer Irom art, the pIeasures that games
provIde are just IIke aesthetIc pIeasure In that they aIso can be "dIsInterested." Iowever,
whIIe dIsInterested, they are Iar Irom subjectIve.
One cannot derIve much pIeasure Irom a game, even as a spectator, II one has no Idea oI
what Its poInt Is, no sense whatsoever oI the goaIs the pIayers are pursuIng and the ruIes
they are, ImpIIcItIy or expIIcItIy, obeyIng. A game oI IootbaII or basebaII, the source oI
Page 4 of 10
Intense enjoyment to the connoIsseur, Is a tedIous bore to someone who Iooks at It as II It
were an abstract dance. The pIeasure a game gIves Is, thereIore, not subjectIve In Kant's
sense. t InvoIves our brIngIng the contempIated spectacIe under a compIex concept such
as "soccer game," a concept {p.238) one Is abIe to use onIy when one understands the
overaII poInt oI the game as weII as the purposes oI the muItItude oI actIons the pIayers
undertake. n thIs case, the enjoyment InvoIves brIngIng the contempIated object under a
concept and hence knowIng the purpose oI the object. The net resuIt Is that we can
estImate how weII or badIy the object IuIIIIIs Its purpose and hence, as every sports
amateur knows, we can argue ratIonaIIy about the reIatIve merIts oI a partIcuIar game. A
game Is pIayed accordIng to Its tradItIonaI ruIes, whether they are expIIcItIy IormuIated or
not, and whether they are IoIIowed entIreIy conscIousIy or not. t Is pIayed In a
partIcuIarIy satIsIyIng IashIon, when the pIayers do more than sImpIy IoIIow and obey the
ruIes, when, rather, they negotIate these ruIes In a sInguIarIy InventIve and eIegant way.
(Moreover, we mIght even be abIe to argue about the reIatIve merIts oI varIous kInds oI
games. A pIausIbIe hypothesIs, subject to empIrIcaI verIIIcatIon or IaIsIIIcatIon, oI course,
mIght be that games oI greater compIexIty, ones that requIre more skIII Irom the
partIcIpants or spectators, wIII be more amusIng In the Iong run to those capabIe oI
masterIng them.)
n thIs respect, the arts are very much IIke games. AIso here, the pIeasure Is at the same
tIme dIsInterested and objectIve, that Is, It depends upon our gettIng the poInt oI the
practIce, and hence, here, too, ratIonaI arguments about the reIatIve worth oI a partIcuIar
work are possIbIe on the basIs oI how weII, or badIy, the work serves as an object oI
pIeasurabIe contempIatIon. A practIce oI an art Iorms a tradItIon wIth Its own codes and
ruIes, wrItten or unwrItten. Most reIevantIy, an artwork Is never entIreIy sui generis.
Iather, It Is aIways a member oI a IamIIy oI works oI Its kInd, a member oI a genre, and a
genre can be conceIved oI as a set oI generIc ruIes, ruIes Ior makIng art wIthIn thIs
partIcuIar tradItIon, Ior pIayIng thIs partIcuIar game, the game oI portraIture, say, or oI
strIng quartet composItIon. ThIs gIves us the chance to engage In a ratIonaI argument wIth
someone who denIes that a gIven work provIdes aesthetIc pIeasure. We can begIn by
teIIIng hIm thIs. ", and others IIke you and me, have had much Iun pIayIng thIs game, and
so mIght you, II you took the troubIe to master It." Once he begIns to master It, we mIght
go on to poInt out Ieatures oI a partIcuIar work to hIm that, when seen agaInst the
background oI the generIc ruIes, are sInguIarIy unusuaI, unexpected, orIgInaI, and hence
partIcuIarIy amusIng. t Is one oI the tasks oI art crItIcIsm to draw attentIon to precIseIy
those amusIng Ieatures oI the work, the ones that IuIIIII the generIc ruIes oI the game, or
even extend the ruIes, In a partIcuIarIy InventIve and eIegant way.
What thIs suggests Is that eIIectIve arguments about the reIatIve worth oI an artwork,
arguments that wouId want to use the work's reIatIve abIIIty to provIde pIeasure as the
crIterIon oI vaIue, wIII have to consIder the work In the context oI other works oI Its kInd.
t IoIIows that crItIcaI arguments oI thIs sort cannot be conducted In a hIstorIcaI vacuum,
that a persuasIve crItIc wIII have to be abIe to IdentIIy the genre that Iorms the reIevant
context Ior the work, and wIII have to take the hIstorIcaI deveIopment oI thIs genre, the
tradItIon oI makIng an art oI thIs kInd, Into consIderatIon. OnIy agaInst the background oI
Page 5 of 10
the tradItIon can one see the InterestIng and amusIng Ieatures oI the work.
{p.239) The cIoseIy reIated IunctIons oI edIIIcatIon and oI provIdIng non-aesthetIc
pIeasure make room Ior dIIIerent, and consIderabIy more compIex, arguments about the
vaIue oI IndIvIduaI artworks. t has been cIaImed here that an artworId consIsts oI IIctIve
representatIons and that one oI the uses oI such representatIons Is to aIIow us to
compare the actuaI worId wIth the worId as It mIght be and thus to make us consIder
ways we have not yet taken. Art produces experIences oI actIons and passIons that mIght
be subject to justIIIcatIon and thus oIIers exampIes Ior how we mIght, shouId, or shouId
not, act and IeeI. !ItImateIy, It heIps us to IInd out who we are and how we shouId cope.
CIearIy, II we want to argue about the worth oI a work on the basIs oI how weII It IuIIIIIs Its
edIIyIng, as opposed to pIeasure-gIvIng, roIe, we wouId have to pIace the work In the
context oI IIIe rather than art. To demonstrate the worth oI a work, In thIs case, Is to show
how and why It may heIp us IIve better.
A work may heIp us IIve better IIves, II the worId It represents eIther dIscIoses an
essentIaI truth about our worId that has been hIdden or obscured, or suggests IruItIuI
ways oI copIng that have not been suggested beIore. Greek tragedy dIscIosed wIth
unprecedented cIarIty somethIng that not even ArIstotIe, Iet aIone IIato, reaIIzed, nameIy
that our hIghest vaIues and aspIratIons cannot aIways be harmonIzed, that tragIc conIIIcts
between the IIkes oI AntIgone and Creon may be InescapabIe. An argument about Its
vaIue wouId have to take the Iorm oI an argument about Its truth, about whether the
dIscIosure that conIIIcts between uItImate worIdvIews are InescapabIe Is persuasIve and
whether It teIIs us somethIng we need to know, whether we shaII IIve better once we are
equIpped wIth thIs knowIedge. SImIIarIy, The Tempest and The Mcrricge oj Figcro teII us
somethIng about the vaIue oI mercy and reconcIIIatIon. Arguments about theIr worth
wouId have to show that we are better oII knowIng what they have to teII us. Our
evaIuatIon oI Die Meistersinger, whIch embodIes a vIsIon oI the kInd oI passIon worth
embracIng and the kInd oI art worth cuItIvatIng, wouId necessarIIy InvoIve, In part, our
own vIews on these matters.
n short, we cannot evaIuate a work unIess we pIace It wIthIn a context. ut when we
evaIuate a work Ior the aesthetIc pIeasure It gIves, we may remaIn wIthIn the IImIts oI the
reIevant artIstIc practIce, oI the genre and Its deveIopment. When we evaIuate a work Ior
Its edIIyIng potentIaI, we must move beyond the IImIts oI art Into the much broader
context oI IIIe and we must brIng our own uItImate convIctIons Into pIay. Ioger Scruton
argues that "II there are to be standards oI crItIcaI judgment, then they cannot be
dIvorced Irom standards oI practIcaI reasonIng generaIIy. . . . To show what Is bad In a
sentImentaI work oI art must InvoIve showIng what Is bad In sentImentaIIty. To be certaIn
In matters oI taste Is, thereIore, to be certaIn In matters oI moraIIty. ethIcs and aesthetIcs
are one."
13
Art, we have seen, teaches us how to IIsten to, and come Into conversatIon wIth, others,
totaI strangers even. t enIarges our cuIturaI repertoIre and It IIexes our sympathy. t Is
thus perhaps the maIn tooI oI the kInd oI muItIcuIturaIIsm worth havIng, the one that
encourages us to IIsten attentIveIy to what others have to say, and especIaIIy to those
Page 6 of 10
voIces that have not been heard beIore. What {p.240) emphatIcaIIy does not IoIIow Is
that aII art, aII cuItures and works, are IncommensurabIe and hence equaIIy vaIuabIe,
equaIIy deservIng oI not onIy an InItIaI hearIng, but aIso our repeated attentIon.
GIven the tremendousIy hIgh voIume oI productIon and avaIIabIIIty oI cuIturaI goods
today, and gIven that our IndIvIduaI and coIIectIve tIme and resources are IImIted, we
need to dIstInguIsh voIces we want to hear agaIn because they have somethIng
partIcuIarIy arrestIng and Important to say Irom those we Ignore aIter the InItIaI hearIng
because what they are sayIng Is trIvIaI. IscrImInatIon oI one sort or another Is sImpIy
InescapabIe, and we aII practIce It whether we admIt It or not. IscrImInatIon Is InvoIved In
a schoIar's decIsIon to study Iembrandt just as It Is In someone's decIsIon to devote
attentIon to comIc strIps or sIasher movIes. The onIy reprehensIbIe kInd oI dIscrImInatIon
Is that whIch sIIences certaIn voIces beIore they have been heard. The same goes Ior that
other scary word, eIItIsm. our weII-justIIIed abhorrence oI aII Iorms oI InherIted prIvIIege
does not, and shouId not, entaII the denIaI that hIerarchIes among cuIturaI achIevements
are possIbIe.
The reIusaI to dIscrImInate among the voIces one hears, to compare and evaIuate them, Is
not onIy a practIcaI ImpossIbIIIty, It Is aIso wrong Ior deeper reasons. t Is a Iorm oI
aesthetIcIst detachment whereby we aIIow the voIces that we hear to entertaIn us, but
not to chaIIenge our most IundamentaI assumptIons and thereby to change our IIves. To
engage In a genuIne dIaIogue wIth others InvoIves more than just poIIteIy IIstenIng to
them. t InvoIves comparIng theIr vIews wIth other vIews, IncIudIng our own. There can
be no dIaIogue II we assume the superIorIty oI eIther sIde, or II we assume that aII vIews
have equaI vaIIdIty, In both cases the possIbIIIty oI anyone changIng hIs mInd, and IIIe, Is
precIuded In advance and aII that remaIns Is IdIe taIk, amusIng at best, but a source oI
neIther genuIne pIeasure nor edIIIcatIon.
ncommensurabIIIty, the InabIIIty to measure vaIues wIth precIsIon, Is one thIng,
IncomparabIIIty Is another and does not necessarIIy IoIIow Irom the Iormer. t Is, oI
course, true that we cannot measure the reIatIve rank oI artworks, or artIstIc tradItIons,
wIth any precIsIon. ut It Is equaIIy true, and hope It has been demonstrated above, that
we can argue about the vaIue oI artworks. I we can do thIs, It means that we can aIso
compare artworks, as weII as the artIstIc tradItIons Irom whIch they emerge, wIth one
another and IInd some more worthy oI our repeated attentIon than others. Such
comparIsons wIII not yIeId precIse, measurabIe resuIts, and they wIII certaInIy not yIeId
stabIe, ImmutabIe, and IncontestabIe canons. ut they wIII aIIow us to cIaIm, and to
support our cIaIms wIth ratIonaI arguments, that some works are comparabIe, that Is, are
In the same Ieague, whIIe others do not quIte make It, and they wIII aIIow us to Iorm ad
hoc, IIexIbIe, constantIy revIsabIe canons. And these are the onIy resuIts we need, II we
want to separate the art that gIves us pIeasure and enrIches our IIves In an endurIng
IashIon Irom the art that Is comparatIveIy trIvIaI and ephemeraI. The "cuItIvatIon oI the
unIversaIIty oI thought Is the absoIute vaIue oI educction," {p.241) says IegeI.
14
When
"cuIture" Is understood not In the sense gIven thIs term by anthropoIogIsts and IdentIty
poIItIcIans, that Is, as an aIIIrmatIon oI a dIstInctIve group IdentIty, but rather In the
Page 7 of 10
opposIte sense gIven to It by the nIIghtenment and IuIIy artIcuIated by IegeI, nameIy, as
the transcendence oI narrow group IdentIty through the IormatIon oI character and the
educatIon to a relctively and compcrctively (key words) more unIversaI, ratIonaI, and
Iree poInt oI vIew, comparIsons are not onIy possIbIe, but requIred. The greatest
tradItIons and works are those that make the greatest contrIbutIon to cuIture In thIs
enIIghtened sense, cuIture whIch makes us Ireer Instead oI ImprIsonIng us In trIbaI
prejudIces, and whose aspIratIon to unIversaIIty stIII resonates In the name oI Its chIeI
custodIaI InstItutIon, the unIversIty.
There are, however, serIous, nontrIvIaI reasons why suspIcIon oI the comparatIve
evaIuatIon runs so deep today. A IIberaI and egaIItarIan socIety Is justIIIabIy Ieery oI the
dIscrImInatIon and eIItIsm we assocIate wIth the arIstocratIc socIetIes oI the past. IIberaIs,
In partIcuIar, argue that the state shouId keep out oI the busIness oI evaIuatIng, that each
IndIvIduaI and each group Is entItIed to theIr subcuIture wIth Its assocIated tastes as Iong
as they do not harm other IndIvIduaIs and groups, and that the roIe oI the state shouId be
IImIted to ensurIng IaIr treatment oI aII IndIvIduaIs and groups. ThIs Is aIso my vIew. ut
what emphatIcaIIy does not IoIIow Is that not onIy the state, but aIso IndIvIduaIs and
groups shouId avoId comparatIve evaIuatIng. The neutraI state, separated Irom church
and cuIture, can very weII coexIst wIth, and accommodate, IIveIy debates over moraI and
aesthetIc vaIues as Iong as It does not produce and enIorce the resuIts. There Is sImpIy
no good reason to assume that vuIgarIty and trashIness Is the InescapabIe Iate oI art
produced by modern, IIberaI and egaIItarIan socIetIes. One shouId expect Instead that
these socIetIes wIII wItness vIgorous competItIon over the sources oI support Ior artIstIc
practIces and InstItutIons that serve the whoIe spectrum oI tastes, IncIudIng the most
demandIng ones. MoraIIy and poIItIcaIIy, It makes no sense today to hanker nostaIgIcaIIy
aIter the arIstocratIc cuIture oI the past. t makes perIect sense, however, to make sure
that art oI the hIghest quaIIty can aIso survIve and IIourIsh under modern condItIons.
eedIess to say, democratIc socIetIes wIII produce Iots and Iots oI artIstIc junk. They
produce Iots oI gadgets oI dubIous quaIIty too. ut thIs makes dIscrImInatIon aII the more
necessary. We dIscrImInate when buyIng cars. Why shouId we not do the same when
decIdIng whIch artIstIc InstItutIons to support, or whIch books to read?
Over a hundred years ago, our ancestors (ostoevsky, Ietzsche) used to caII the
reIusaI to dIscrImInate, the rejectIon oI aII dIstInctIons In vaIue, by the name oI "nIhIIIsm."
We preIer to caII It, despaIrIngIy or approvIngIy, "postmodernIsm." WhIIe a modernIst
myseII, see no reason to despaIr, because do not beIIeve that the habIt oI makIng
dIstInctIons oI vaIue Is reaIIy IIkeIy to dIsappear. have aIready expIaIned why thInk we
cannot heIp dIscrImInatIng whether we want to or not. can onIy add that we shouId want
to. I we Iost the habIt oI {p.242) dIstInguIshIng moraI good Irom evII, we wouId become
quIte deIenseIess In the Iace oI evII. AesthetIc vaIues are not IdentIcaI wIth moraI or
poIItIcaI ones, but, as have argued at Iength In thIs book, they are contInuous wIth them.
The makIng oI dIstInctIons when evaIuatIng art Is a good habIt to have, as It supports and
traIns the other necessary habIt, that oI makIng moraI dIstInctIons.
t mIght be objected here that my IavorIng the endurIng over the ephemeraI bespeaks a
Page 8 of 10
cIassIcIst rather than modernIst taste and thus III beIIts modern art. ModernIst temper Is
attuned to the ephemeraI, as audeIaIre weII knew, sInce he deIIned modernIty as "the
transIent, the IIeetIng, the contIngent."
15
t Is the temper oI the modern capItaIIst market,
stImuIatIng the appetIte Ior the new and thus promotIng obsoIescence and consumptIon.
(To be sure, even audeIaIre thought that the artIst's aIm was "to dIstIII the eternaI Irom
the transItory."
16
ndeed, what constItutes the greatness oI a paInter IIke Manet Is In
part the abIIIty to see the tImeIess In the ephemeraI, a Venus In a modern courtesan. And
It wouId be a mIstake to suppose that onIy a modern artIst can do thIs. recaII how the
bIbIIcaI pastoraIs oI jacopo assano suIIuse everyday proIane reaIIty wIth sacred
sIgnIIIcance.) evertheIess, beIIeve that my cIassIcIst posItIon Is more than mereIy a case
oI unthInkIng tradItIonaIIsm and can be deIended wIthIn the context oI my generaI
argument. IecaII IegeI's warnIng, dIscussed at Iength at the end oI chapter 3, that we
moderns are In danger oI IovIng our rIght to subjectIve Ireedom so much that we mIght
IaII to make It objectIve In the onIy way In whIch Ireedom can be made objectIve, by
makIng a commItment to partIcuIar aIms. The danger Inherent In the modernIst taste Ior
the ephemeraI Is precIseIy that It Iavors uncommItted "absoIute" Ireedom and hence
uItImateIy a meanIngIess and empty exIstence. ven audeIaIre, we have just seen,
wanted more than a sImpIe ceIebratIon oI the ephemeraI, wanted to dIstIII the eternaI
Irom the transItory. n thIs sense, modernIsm needs to be Ieavened wIth cIassIcIsm Ior
the same reasons Ior whIch Ireedom needs to be sItuated and commItted.
The modernIst sensIbIIIty can create a IarIsIan pcsscge or an AmerIcan shoppIng maII, but
It cannot make a home. We need to have a home, because onIy the context oI a home can
gIve meanIng to our most IundamentaI experIences, to bIrth, Iove, suIIerIng, death. We
can be truIy at home onIy In what endures, because onIy that can we Ieave and come
back to. Moreover, onIy what can be home can be beautIIuI Ior us, beauty is what we can
caII home. The myrIad IIeetIng ImpressIons receIved by a jlcneur In a great modern cIty
are one oI the genuIne pIeasures oI IIIe today, but they are pIeasures accessIbIe onIy to
those who are at home somewhere. the homeIess are not jlcneurs.
We need a home, but we aIso need to be abIe to get out. home nurtures us, but It can
aIso be stIIIIng. What we need Is to have It both ways. just as we demand both the rIght to
subjectIve Ireedom and the duty to make thIs Ireedom objectIve, so we need both the
rIchness and IIexIbIIIty oI the ephemeraI and the meanIngIuI reassurance oI the endurIng.
We moderns cannot aIIord to be one-sIded here. The dIIIIcuIty IIes In gettIng the baIance
between the two sIdes rIght.
At the outset oI hIs Lectures on Fine Art, IegeI announced. {p.243)
ow, In thIs Its Ireedom aIone Is IIne art truIy art, and It onIy IuIIIIIs Its supreme task
when It has pIaced ItseII In the same sphere as reIIgIon and phIIosophy, and when It
Is sImpIy one way oI brIngIng to our mInds and expressIng the Divine, the deepest
Interests oI mankInd, and the most comprehensIve truths oI the spIrIt. n works oI
art the natIons have deposIted theIr rIchest Inner IntuItIon and Ideas, and art Is
oIten the key, and In many natIons the soIe key, to understandIng theIr phIIosophy
and reIIgIon. Art shares thIs vocatIon wIth reIIgIon and phIIosophy, but In a specIaI
Page 9 of 10
way, nameIy by dIspIayIng even the hIghest |reaIIty| sensuousIy, brIngIng It thereby
to the senses, to IeeIIng, and to nature's mode oI appearance.
17
t wIII not be a secret to the reader oI thIs book that share a vIsIon oI art as capabIe oI
gIvIng sensuous embodIment and representatIon to our most proIound needs and
concerns. ut beIng capabIe oI such a task Is one thIng, reaIIzIng It Is another. Art "IuIIIIIs
Its supreme task" onIy occasIonaIIy, and It Is the job oI the crItIc to dIstInguIsh these rare
occasIons Irom the more common ones and to ceIebrate them, just as It Is the job oI the
crItIcaI hIstorIan to Interpret them. {p.244)
Notes:
(1.) mmanueI Kant, The Critique oj ]udgement, trans. james Creed MeredIth (OxIord.
OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1952), 217, p. 58.
(9.) bId.
(10.) bId.
(12.) See Ians-Georg Gadamer, Truth cnd Method (ew York. ContInuum, 1975), pt. 1,
ch. 2, sec. 1. "IIay as the cIue to ontoIogIcaI expIanatIon" (pp. 91-119).
(13.) Ioger Scruton, Art cnd lmcginction: A Study in the Fhilosophy oj Mind (Iondon.
Methuen, 1974), pp. 248-49.
(15.) CharIes audeIaIre, "The IaInter oI Modern IIIe," In Selected Writings on Art cnd
Artists, trans. I. . Charvet (Iarmondsworth. IenguIn ooks, 1972), pp. 402-3.
(16.) audeIaIre, "The IaInter oI Modern IIIe," pp. 402-3.
Page 10 of 10
OxIord !nIversIty Iress, 1975), pp. 7-8.
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Index
Page 1 of 19
A Theory of Art
Karo Berger
IrInt S-13. 9780195128604
O. 10.1093/0195128605.001.0001
Index
Abbate, CaroIyn, 262nn. 22, 23, 264n. 20
Abrams, M. I., 154
abstractIon, 62, 63
archItecture and, 153
ceIebrItIes and, 155
InterIorIzatIon and, 158-59
IIterature and, 153, 154-55
moods and, 211
musIc and, 28-30, 34, 46, 62, 110, 132, 133-52, 153-54, 160, 172, 210, 256n. 82
paIntIng and, 25-28, 29, 141, 146-47, 150, 151, 153-54, 173, 174, 175, 181, 199,
246n. 15, 257n. 91
scuIpture and, 20-22, 26-27, 29
sIgnIIIcance oI, 152-61, 184
subjectIve Ireedom and, 155-58, 159-60, 161, 184
vIsuaI medIa and, 46, 62, 153
work versus worId and, 154 See clso autonomIzatIon
Ackerman, ruce, 98
actIons, 202-4, 206, 211-12
paIntIng and, 197-98 See clso passIon
Index
Page 2 of 19
actor, as character, 19
Adorno, Theodor W., 97, 119, 142, 144-45, 148, 149, 152, 155, 172, 177
aesthetIc pIeasure, 100-104, 235-37, 239
AgrIcoIa, johann IrIedrIch, 134
Aidc (VerdI), 94
aIIegory, hermeneutIcs and, 219-20
aIIusIon
In IIterature, 177, 178, 180
In musIc, 178, 180
In paIntIng, 179-81
AIpers, SvetIana, 196-97, 198
aIphabetIc wrItIng, 57
Amadeo, GIovannI AntonIo, 27
amusement, aesthetIc pIeasure as, 103
anaIysIs, InterpretatIon and, 225-26, 227
ApoIIInaIre, GuIIIaume, 57
archItecture, 62
abstract, 153
autonomIzatIon and, 153
settIng oI, 183-84
as work, 23
argumentatIon, 81
representatIons versus , 57-64, 249n. 70 See clso phIIosophy, scIence
ArIstotIe, vIII, 35-36, 39, 44, 46, 47, 59, 61, 68-70, 74, 76, 77-78, 79, 80, 82, 102, 103,
106, 118, 120, 131, 142, 165-66, 169, 170, 191, 192, 193, 194, 204, 216, 219, 223, 239
art, 15-64
hIstory versus , 61-62
ImagInary worIds and, 62-63
Issues oI (see ethIcaI IIIe, art and)
medIa oI cuIture and, 15-19 {p.278)
pubIIc attItudes toward, 9-10
representatIons and arguments and, 57-64, 249n. 70
works/perIormances and orIgInaIs/copIes and, 52-57 See clso IunctIon and vaIue oI
art, Ianguage, musIc, vIsuaI medIa
artIIacts, works versus , 23-24
artIsts' art, 5
art musIc. See musIc
ArtusI, GIovannI MarIa, 126, 127, 131, 132
artworId. See narrator, personage, settIng, worId
AugustIne, St., 3, 9, 56
auraI medIa. See musIc
author
InterpretatIon and IntentIon oI, 230-32, 233-34
reaI and ImpIIed, 184-88, 263n. 29
autonomIzatIon, 4-5, 6, 119
Index
Page 3 of 19
achIevement oI, 152-53
aesthetIc, 141, 142, 146, 148, 149
archItecture and, 153
artIstIc, 137-38
IIterature and, 153
musIc and, 115-20, 138, 153
orIgIn oI Idea oI, 8
paIntIng and, 153
practIce and, 113
ach, CarI IhIIIpp manueI, 132, 134
ach, johann SebastIan, 116, 134, 160, 188
acon, IrancIs, 111, 180
akhtIn, MIkhaII, 167, 169, 178
aIthus, 111
ardI, GIovannI de, 124, 125
arthes, IoIand, 188
artk, eIa, 110
assano, jacopo, 242
audeIaIre, CharIes-IIerre, 22, 79, 242
eardsIey, Monroe, 231
beauty oI art, 237
eethoven, IudwIg van, 77, 102, 137, 138, 140, 160, 179, 180
eIIInI, GIovannI, 37
eItIng, Ians, 110, 220
enedettI, GIovannI attIsta, 130
enjamIn, WaIter, 55
erg, AIban, 110, 145
erIo, IucIano, 150
erIIn, saIah, 39-40, 66-67, 76
erIIoz, Iector, 139
ernInI, GIan Iorenzo, 46
esseIer, IeInrIch, 119, 199-201, 202, 205
Bird in Spcce (rancusI), 21
Ismarck, Otto von, 97
Ioch, rnst, 144, 145, 258n. 112
oethIus, 120-21, 127
oIInow, Otto IrIedrIch, 200, 206
ourdIeu, IIerre, 8
rancusI, ConstantIn, 21, 53
Brcque Triptych (van der Weyden), 175
rodsky, joseph, vII, 110, 222
ruckner, Anton, 144
buIIdIngs. See archItecture
urnham, Scott, 220
Cage, john, 154
Index
Page 4 of 19
Cclligrcmmes (ApoIIInaIre), 57
CaravaggIo, 37, 46
Ccrmen (Izet), 138
Carr, avId, 203
Carter, IIIott Cook, 150
Castagno, Andrea deI, 27-28
CastIgIIone, aIdassare, 125
categorIcaI ImperatIve (Kant), 71-72, 73
CeIan, IauI, 110
censorshIp, 106-7
ChamIort, 19
Chcrles l (Van yke), 61
Chatman, Seymour, 249n. 70, 263n. 17
Chekhov, Anton, 168
Chomsky, oam, 70
ChopIn, IrederIc, 110
ChrIsto, IeIchstag and, 21
CIcero, 120
CIaIr, jean, 146-47, 258n. 120
cIassIcIsm, modernIsm and, 242
cognItIon, aesthetIc pIeasure and, 236
CoIIIngwood, I. ., 211
Commentcry on the Drecm oj Scipio (MacrobIus), 120
communItarIanIsm, 92
comparatIve evaIuatIon, 240-42
Constant, enjamIn, 94-95, 157
context, InterpretatIon and, 224, 225, 227 {p.279)
CorbIn, AIaIn, 29
craItsmens art, 5
crItIcIsm, InterpretatIon and, 226, 227, 230, 232-34, 243
Croce, enedetto, 58, 60, 76, 211
Crucijixion oj St. Feter (CaravaggIo), 37
cubIsm, 31
cuIture
determInatIon oI object as work based on, 22-24
medIa oI, 15-19, 65-66, 87
currIcuIum, art In, 11
ahIhaus, CarI, 96, 97, 102, 135, 143
dance, abstract, 21
ante, vII, 77, 104-5
anto, Arthur C., vIII, 23, 89-90, 109-10, 154, 211, 246n. 15, 253n. 1
ebussy, CIaude, 110, 140
Deposition (CaravaggIo), 37
Deposition (Iontormo), 38
errIda, jacques, 42-43, 50
Index
Page 5 of 19
escartes, Iene, 63, 131
determInIsm, Iree wIII versus , 66-67
ewey, john, vIII, 109, 196
Dicbelli Vcrictions (eethoven), 180
Iderot, enIs, 133
dIegetIc mode, 191
In hIstory, 183
In IIterature, 165, 166, 168-69, 170, 174, 177-79, 182-83, 262n. 18
In musIc, 176-78, 181-82, 262nn. 22, 23
In paIntIng, 174-76, 179-81, 182 See clso narratIve
dIscrImInatIon, 240-42
ostoevsky, Iyodor, 241
dramatIc mode, In IIterature, 165, 166, 167, 170, 176, 191, 192
uchamp, MarceI, 20, 154
uIay, GuIIIaume, 121, 152
uIrenne, MIkeI, 211
edIIIcatIon/educatIon
aesthetIc pIeasure and, 99-107
censorshIp and, 106-7
chIIdren and, 106-7
as IunctIon oI art, 15-19, 66, 75, 77-78, 99-100, 235, 239-42 See clso ethIcaI IIIe, art
and
Either/Or (KIerkegaard), 59
IIas, orbert, 5-6, 36
eIItIsm, 240, 241
emotIon, 204-5 See clso passIon
end-oI-art thesIs, 84-86, 89-90, 92, 95
nIIghtenment, 70-73, 91, 92, 229, 266n. 28
ephemeraI
modernIsm and, 242
musIc as, 53-54, 57, 119
epIc, 191, 192 See clso narratIve
"rIknIg" (Goethe), 168, 181
escapIsm, nonaesthetIc pIeasures oI art and, 105
ethIcaI IIIe, art and, 65-107
hIstory and art and, 75-80, 81, 93, 94
justIIIed choIces In, 65-75
phIIosophy and art and, 80-90
pIeasure and, 99-107
reIIgIon, state and art and, 90-99
scIence and, 80, 81, 82
exceIIence, practIce and standards oI, 112, 114
externaI goods, practIce and, 113
IeeIIngs. See passIon
IIcIno, MarsIIIo, 131
Index
Page 6 of 19
IIaubert, Gustave, 19
IogIIano, IodovIco, 130
Iorm, 190, 193 See clso IyrIc, narratIve
IoucauIt, MIcheI, 22
IoundatIonaIIst vIew, oI InterpretatIon, 227, 229-30, 234
Irancesca, IIero deIIa, 55
Ireedom, aesthetIc pIeasure and, 102 See clso subjectIve Ireedom
Iree wIII, determInIsm versus , 66-67
Irescos, 27-28
IrIed, MIchaeI, 154
IunctIonaI/popuIar musIc, 116, 118, 120, 138, 141-42, 146, 152
IunctIon and vaIue oI art, 3-12
comparatIve evaIuatIon and, 240-42
edIIIcatIon and, 15-19, 66, 75, 77-78, 99-100, 235, 239-42
pIeasure and, 99-107, 235-38, 239
taste and, 100, 235-43 See clso ethIcaI IIIe, art and
{p.280) Fundcmentcls oj Music (oethIus), 120-21
Iux, johann joseph, 121
Gadamer, Ians-Georg, vIII, 23-24, 47, 54, 68, 73, 86, 87, 157, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216,
223, 237
GaIIurIo, IranchIno, 130
GaIIIeI, VIncenzo, 124-25, 127, 129, 130, 132, 143
games, pIeasure Irom, 237-38
GeIIner, rnest, 252n. 74
Genette, Gerard, 190-91, 192, 195, 196
GIbbon, dward, 75
GIorgIone, 188
GIarean, IeInrIch, 121, 122, 124, 134
Goethe, johann WoIIgang von, 44, 134, 168, 181
GombrIch, rnst I., 31, 150, 153, 198
GombrowIcz, WItoId, 108-9
Gondolc in the Lcgoon, The (GuardI), 25
Goodman, eIson, vIII, 220
goods, practIce and, 112-14
Greek tragedy, 239
Greenberg, CIement, 146
Grey, Thomas S., 256n. 82
GrunewaId, MathIas, 175
GuardI, Irancesco, 25
"Gusev" (Chekhov), 168
Hcmlet (Shakespeare), 182
IansIIck, duard, 32, 35, 36, 133, 142-44, 145, 152, 207, 208
Iaydn, Iranz joseph, 137, 138, 200
IegeI, Georg, vIII, 35, 40-41, 42, 43, 44, 50, 57, 59, 66, 71-73, 79-80, 84-86, 89, 90, 92,
95, 103, 109, 136, 141, 148-49, 155-56, 157, 158, 159, 160, 202, 219, 242-43
Index
Page 7 of 19
IeIdegger, MartIn, vIII, 18, 25, 79, 109, 157, 178, 200, 205, 206, 211, 221, 223, 262n. 18
IeIne, IeInrIch, 108
Ierbert, ZbIgnIew, 110, 235
Hercules cnd Antceus (IoIIaIuoIo), 26-27
Ierder, johann GottIrIed, 16, 18, 73
hermeneutIc cIrcIe, 222-23
hermeneutIcs. See InterpretatIon
heteronomy, premodern art and, 5
hIerogIyphIc wrItIng, 57
IIrsch, . ., jr., 230-31, 232, 233, 234
hIstory, 218
argument In, 59
art versus , 61-62
dIegetIc mode In, 183
ethIcaI IIIe oI justIIIed choIces and, 75-80, 81, 93, 94
InterpretatIon and, 225-27, 243
narrator In, 170
phIIosophy and, 109-10, 253n. 1
representatIon In, 60, 61-62, 63
oI socIaI practIces, 111-15
IItIer, AdoII, 95, 97
IoIImann, rnst Theodor Amadeus, 135-36, 138, 144, 145, 148, 160, 210, 220
Iomer, 165
homophony, musIc and, 171
Iorace, 132
Iughes, Iobert, 107
Iugo, VIctor, 60
IdentItIes, narratIves and, 87-88
ImmedIacy
medIated experIence versus , 15-17
musIc and, 34
ImpIIed author, 184-88, 263n. 29
IncommensurabIIIty, 240
ndIa, SIgIsmondo d, 132
ngarden, Ioman, 33
InherItance, oI cuIturaI medIa, 17-18
InstItutIonaI theory oI art (anto), 23
InterIorIzatIon, abstractIon and, 158-59
InternaI goods, practIce and, 113
InterpretatIon, 213-34
anaIysIs and, 225-26, 227
authorIaI IntentIon and, 230-32, 233-34
context and, 224, 225, 227
crItIcIsm and, 226, 227, 230, 232-34, 243
IoundatIonaIIst vIew (IegItImacy) and, 227, 229-30, 234
Index
Page 8 of 19
hIstory and, 225-27, 243
IIterature and, 220-21
metaphor and metonymy Ior, 213-27
musIc and, 220-21, 223-24, 225
need Ior, 213-15
paIntIng and, 220-21
pragmatIc vIew (persuasIon) and, 227, 228-30, 233, 234 {p.281)
sIgn sequence and, 230, 231
vaIIdIty oI, 227-34
lsenheim Altcrpiece (GrunewaId), 175
josquIn de Irez, 116, 121, 122, 123
joyce, james, 180
justIIIcatIon, 67-74
KandInsky, WassIIy, 140, 141, 153, 257n. 91
Kant, mmanueI, vIII, 35, 49, 71-72, 73, 87, 100, 101-2, 135, 136, 137, 143, 160, 211,
222, 229, 236-37, 266n. 28
Kardon, janet, 107
KIeIer, AnseIm, 111, 151
KIerkegaard, Sren, 34, 59, 158
KIee, IauI, 150
Kokoschka, Oskar, 141
Krner, ChrIstIan GottIrIed, 200
Kovcs, nge, 146
Koyre, AIexandre, 130
Kramer, Iawrence, 262n. 22
Kretzschmar, Iermann, 140
KrIsteIIer, IauI Oskar, 102
Kuhn, Thomas, 114
Kurth, rnst, 144
Ianger, Susanne K., 32-33, 211
Ianguage
arguments In, 58-64
codes oI, 44-46
eIectronIc communIcatIon and, 51-52
Independence oI, 40-42
InherItance oI, 17, 18
IogIcaI powers oI, 46-47, 58
mImetIc musIc and, 120-33, 134, 138-52
moods and, 209-10
musIc versus , 39-40, 41-42, 44-45, 46-49, 52, 58
nature oI, 16-17, 39-52
orIgInaI-copy dIstInctIon and, 56-57
reIerentIaIIty oI, 40, 42-43, 44-45, 48, 51, 58, 172
representatIonaI powers oI, 46-50, 58-64
seII-presentatIon and, 42-44, 45, 48, 51, 58-59
Index
Page 9 of 19
sIgns In, 44-46, 47-48, 56
text oI, 39-40
transIatIons and, 45-46
vIsuaI medIa versus , 41, 42, 44-45, 46-49, 50, 58
voIce versus wrItIng as embodIment Ior, 50-52, 56-57
work versus worId and, 41
wrItIng and, 57 See clso hIstory, IIterature, perIormIng arts, poetry
Iassus, OrIande de, 121, 124
Lcst Supper (Castagno), 27
Lgende des Sicles, Lc (Iugo), 60
IegItImacy, InterpretatIon and, 227, 229-30, 234
IenIn, V.., 95
IevI, IrImo, vII
Ieys, SImon, 246n. 8
IIberaIs, 92-93
IIgetI, Gyrgy, 150
IIstenIus, IcoIaus, 117-18
IIszt, Iranz, 139, 180, 181
IIterature
abstract, 153, 154-55
aIIusIon In, 177, 178, 180
dIegetIc mode and, 165, 166, 168-69, 170, 174, 177-79, 182-83, 262n. 18
dramatIc mode and, 165, 166, 167, 170, 176, 191, 192
exIstence oI reader ImpIIed In, 188
ImpIIed/reaI author oI, 184-88, 263n. 29
InterpretatIon and, 220-21
IyrIc In, 169, 190-91, 195-96, 263n. 18
mIxed mode and, 166, 169
monophony and, 167, 169, 170
musIc and, 172
narratIve In, 190-94, 263n. 17
narrator In, 167-69, 170, 171, 174, 175, 182, 270
paIntIng and, 172, 176
personage In, 166-67, 168, 169, 170, 171, 182
pIot and, 192-93, 194
poIyphony and, 167, 169, 170
presentatIon and, 166-71
quotatIon In, 177, 178-79, 180
representatIons and, 58-59
seII-reIIexIvIty and, 182
settIng oI, 170, 171, 182 {p.282)
temporaI Iorm and, 194
unIty oI, 187
voIce In, 166-70, 171 See clso Ianguage, poetry
Index
Page 10 of 19
IutosIawskI, WItoId, 150
Iyotard, jean-IranoIs, 6, 90
IyrIc, 190-91, 204, 218
In IIterature, 169, 190-91, 195-96, 263n. 17
In musIc, 199-202
In paIntIng, 196-99
romantIc art and, 159 See clso mImetIc mode, narratIve, passIon
IyrIc poetry, 169
McGInn, CoIIn, 70, 106
Macntyre, AIasdaIr, 68, 69-70, 73, 82, 111, 112, 113, 114, 160, 203
MacrobIus, 120
Mcdonnc oj the Filgrims (CaravaggIo), 37
MahIer, Gustav, 110, 140, 144, 150, 172
MaIevIch, KazImIr, 257n. 91
Manet, douard, 179-80, 242
Mao Tse Tung, 95
MappIethorpe, Iobert, 107
Marc, Iranz, 140
Mcrricge oj Figcro, The (Mozart), 239
MarxIsm, 6, 8
MatIsse, IenrI, 150
Mattheson, johann, 132
meanIngIessness, modern art and, 157-58
medIa, oI cuIture, 15-19, 65-66, 87
medIated experIence, ImmedIacy versus , 15-17
MeI, GIroIamo, 124, 125
Meistersinger, Die (Wagner), 95-98, 239
MendeIssohn, IeIIx, 210
MerrIII, james, 110, 213, 233
meta-narratIves, 7-8
metaphor, Ior InterpretatIon, 213-27
metonymy, Ior InterpretatIon, 213-27
MIcheIangeIo, 19-20
MIcheIet, juIes, 75
MIIosz, CzesIaw, vII, 110
mImetIc mode, 191
In musIc, 120-33, 134, 138-52 See clso IyrIc
mIxed mode, In IIterature, 166, 169
modern art
ChrIstIan roots oI, 155-56, 159
cIassIcIsm and, 242
ephemeraI and, 242
meanIngIessness and, 157-58
postmodernIsm and, 7-8
premodernIsm and, 7-8, 22
Index
Page 11 of 19
secuIarIzatIon oI uropean art and, 91 See clso abstractIon
MondrIan, IIet, 257n. 91
monophony
IIterature and, 167, 169, 170
musIc and, 171
MontaIgne, MIcheI, 158
MontesquIeu, aron de, 157
MonteverdI, CIaudIo, 110, 116, 126, 127, 128, 131
MonteverdI, GIuIIo Cesare, 126-27, 130
moods, 205-12
abstractIon and, 211
Ianguage and, 209-10
musIc and, 200-201 See clso passIon
MorItz, KarI IhIIIpp, 137
Mozart, WoIIgang Amadeus, 5, 6, 137, 138
muItIcuIturaIIsm, art and, 239
musIc, 22, 108-61
abstract/absoIute, 28-30, 34, 46, 62, 110, 132, 133-52, 153-54, 172, 210, 256n. 82
accompanIment In, 173, 174, 201
actIve-synthetIc hearIng and, 199-200
aIms oI, 120-24, 126-27
aIIusIon In, 178, 180
ancIent, 120-21, 123, 124-25, 126, 129, 143
atonaIIty and, 30-31, 40, 145-46, 151, 247n. 22
autonomIzatIon and, 115-20, 138, 153
avant-garde, 145, 146, 147, 151, 154, 258n. 120
church and, 136-37
CoId War and, 146-48, 151
composIng and, 116, 117-18, 120, 125, 133
current condItIon and, 110-11, 151
armstadt and, 146-48
dIegetIc mode In, 176-76, 181-82, 262nn. 22, 23
duratIons and, 116 {p.283)
engagement oI body In, 36-38
exIstence oI IIstener ImpIIed In, 188
IunctIonaI/popuIar, 110, 116, 118, 120, 132, 138, 141-42, 146, 152
Iuture and, 151-52
Germany and, 137-38, 256n. 82
harmony In, 120, 121-22, 123-24, 126-27, 128, 130-32
homophony and, 171, 201
IdeaI "work" and, 54-55
ImagInary motIon In, 31-34, 247n. 22
ImmedIacy and, 34
InstrumentaI, 173-74, 176-77, 181, 182, 210, 211, 237
Index
Page 12 of 19
InterIorIzatIon and, 159
InterpretatIon and, 220-21, 223-24, 225
Ianguage versus , 39-40, 41-42, 44-45, 46-49, 52, 58
IyrIc In, 199-202
meanIngIessness and, 148-50
meIody In, 30, 31-32, 34, 126-27, 128-29, 171-72, 173, 174, 201
meter and, 30, 31, 32, 38, 146
MIddIe Ages and, 120-21, 129
mImetIc, 120-33, 134, 138-52
modern era and, 115-16, 124-25, 126, 129, 143
monophony and, 171
mood and, 200-201 (see clso passIon and, below)
narratIve/IyrIc In, 199-202, 264n. 20
narrator In, 176-77, 179, 181, 182
nature oI, 28-39
opera and, 125, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135-36, 138, 139, 204, 220, 262n. 22
orIgInaI-copy dIstInctIon and, 55-56
paIntIng and, 129, 172, 176
passIon and, 121, 122-23, 124, 125, 127-28, 129-32, 142-43, 199-200, 207-11
passIve hearIng and, 200
perIormIng and, 116, 117, 118, 119, 125, 132-33
personage In, 173, 174, 182
pItch and, 116, 118
poetry and, 131
poIyphony and, 171, 177, 201
practIce and, 111-15
presentatIon In, 171-74, 176-77
as process and work, 118-19
quotatIon In, 178-79, 180
recordIng and, 52, 55-56
repeatabIIIty In perIormances oI, 53-55, 57
representatIonaI powers oI, 46, 48-49, 146, 256n. 82
rhythm and, 36, 38, 127
scIence and, 130
seII-reIIexIvIty and, 182
settIng In, 173, 174, 182
symboIs oI, 47-48
symphonIes and, 138-39
tempo and, 36, 38
temporaI Iorm and, 201-2
text and, 39-40, 54, 116, 117, 118, 127
tonaIIty and, 29, 30-32, 33-34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 44, 46, 146, 151, 201
as transItory and ephemeraI, 53-54, 57, 119
unIty oI, 187
vIsuaI medIa versus , 28-29, 34, 35, 36-39, 40
Index
Page 13 of 19
vocaI, 173, 174, 181-82, 210
vocaI poIyphony and, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 153
voIce In, 40, 171-72, 173, 176-77, 181
work versus worId and, 28-39
wrItten text and, 28
MussoIInI, enIto, 94
muthos, narratIve and, 192, 194
das, Ieter, 79
amIer, IewIs, 93
narratIve, 190-91, 204, 218
IdentItIes and, 87-88
In IIterature, 190-94, 263n. 17
In musIc, 199-202, 264n. 20
In paIntIng, 196-99 See clso actIon, dIegetIc mode, IyrIc
narrator, 182-83, 218
In hIstory, 170
In IIterature, 167-69, 170, 171, 174, 175, 182, 270
In musIc, 176-77, 179, 181, 182
In paIntIng, 175-76, 182
seII-reIIexIvIty and, 182 {p.284)
natIonaIIsm, art and, 93-94, 95-98, 252n. 74
ewcomb, Anthony, 210-11
Nicomcchecn Ethics (ArIstotIe), 68-70, 223
Ietzsche, IrIedrIch, vIII, 16, 36, 65, 67, 73-74, 79, 88, 92, 93, 96, 97, 107, 138, 139,
208-9, 210, 220, 235, 241, 251n. 73
nIhIIIsm, 241
nonaesthetIc pIeasure, 104-7, 235
ussbaum, Martha C., 68, 86
Oj Grcmmctology (errIda), 42-43
Olympic (Manet), 179-80
opera, 125, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135-36, 138, 139, 204, 220, 262n. 22
paIntIng
abstract, 25-28, 29, 141, 146-47, 150, 151, 153-54, 173, 174, 175, 181, 199, 246n.
15, 257n. 91
actIve-passIve contrast and, 197-98
aIIusIon In, 179-81
avant-garde, 198
current abandonment oI, 110-11
descrIptIve, 197, 198
dIegetIc mode In, 174-76, 179-81, 182
exIstence oI vIewer ImpIIed In, 188
IIguratIve, 26, 173, 174, 176, 181
InterpretatIon and, 220-21
Index
Page 14 of 19
Iandscape, 173, 184
IIterature and, 172, 176
IyrIc In, 196-99
mImetIc, 151
musIc and, 129, 172, 176
narratIve/IyrIc In, 196-99
narrator In, 175-76, 182
personage In, 40, 171, 173, 183, 184
presentatIon and, 171, 172, 173, 175-76
quotatIon In, 179-81
representatIonaI, 37-39
seII-reIIexIvIty and, 175, 176, 181, 182
settIng In, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175-76, 182, 183
stIII IIIe, 173
unIty oI, 187
voIce In, 171, 172, 173, 175-76
work versus worId and, 24-28 See clso vIsuaI medIa
IaIestrIna, GIovannI IIerIuIgI da, 121-22, 124, 136-37
Fcrcde (SatIe), 180
Fcrsijcl (Wagner), 138
IascaI, IaIse, 8
passIon, 203-4
emotIon and, 204-5
justIIIcatIon oI, 74
Ianguage and, 209-10
moods and, 205-12
musIc and, 121, 122-23, 124, 125, 127-28, 129-32, 142-43, 199-200, 207-11
roIe oI art In educatIon oI, 78 See clso actIon
Iater, WaIter, 153
IauI, jean, 135
IendereckI, KrzysztoI, 147, 150
perIormIng arts, 52 See clso Ianguage
personage, 182, 183, 218
absence oI, 184
In IIterature, 166-67, 168, 169, 170, 171, 182
In musIc, 173, 174, 182
In paIntIng, 171, 173, 183, 184
persuasIon, InterpretatIon and, 227, 228-30, 233, 234
Fhenomenology oj Mind (IegeI), 59
phIIosophy
arguments In, 60, 63-64
ethIcaI IIIe oI justIIIed choIces and, 80-90
hIstory and, 109-10, 253n. 1
Ficno Lesson (MatIsse), 150
IIco deIIa MIrandoIa, GIovannI, 15
Index
Page 15 of 19
IInker, Steven, 51
IIato, vIII, 15, 36, 41, 59, 68, 69, 74, 77, 105, 106, 120, 127, 130, 131, 165, 166, 167,
169, 170, 191, 204, 239
pIeasure
aesthetIc, 100-104, 235-37, 239
ethIcaI IIIe oI justIIIed choIces and, 99-107
as IunctIon oI art, 99-107, 235-38, 239
nonaesthetIc, 104-7, 235 {p.285)
IIIny the Younger, 23
Foetics (ArIstotIe), vIII, 39, 79, 80, 106, 120, 131, 165-66, 191, 192, 193, 194
poetry, 19, 79, 191
current popuIarIty oI, 110
expressIve, 154-55
Independence oI, 40-41
IyrIc, 169
musIc and, 131 See clso Ianguage
Folitics (ArIstotIe), 120
IoIIaIuoIo, AntonIo, 26-27
IoIonIus, 21
IoI Iot, 95
poIyphony
IIterature and, 167, 169, 170
musIc and, 171, 177
Iontormo, jacopo da, 38
Iopper, KarI IaImund, 81
popuIar musIc. See IunctIonaI/popuIar musIc
pornography, 107
Fortrcit oj Emile Zolc (Manet), 179, 180
Fortrcit oj Fope lnnocent X (acon), 180
postmodernIsm, 7-8, 241
practIce(s)
hIstorIes oI, 111-15
theory and, 9-10
pragmatIc vIew, oI InterpretatIon, 227, 228-30, 233, 234
premodern art, modern art and, 4-6, 22
presentatIon
IIterature and, 166-71
musIc and, 171-74, 176-77
paIntIng and, 171, 172, 173, 175-76 See clso narrator, personage, settIng
Iroust, MarceI, 18, 19, 59, 60, 79
ItoIemy, 130
quotatIon
In IIterature, 177, 178-79, 180
In musIc, 178-79, 180
In paIntIng, 179-81
Index
Page 16 of 19
Iameau, jean IhIIIppe, 128-29
IaphaeI, 48
Iaz, joseph, 157
reaI author, 184-88
reIerentIaIIty, oI Ianguage, 40, 42-43, 44-45, 48, 51, 58, 172
reIIgIon, art and state and, 90-99
Iembrandt, 6, 77
representatIon
argument versus , 57-64, 249n. 70
musIc and, 46, 48-49, 146, 256n. 82
paIntIng and, 37-39
phIIosophy and, 84 See clso art, hIstory
Republic (CIcero), 120
Republic (IIato), 15, 63, 68, 105, 106, 120, 127, 130, 131, 165, 191
resources, aIIocatIon oI to arts, 4
Rest During the Flight into Egypt, The (CaravaggIo), 46
Rhetoric (ArIstotIe), 39, 74, 142
IIcoeur, IauI, vIII, 78, 191-93, 203
IIeIenstahI, IenI, 98, 237
IIemann, Iugo, 32, 119
IIIke, IaIner MarIa, 221
Rite oj Spring, The (StravInsky), 31
romantIc art, 159
IomantIcIsm, 91, 92
Iorty, IIchard, 59, 80, 88, 187, 231, 233, 234
Iosenberg, IaroId, 146
Iosen, CharIes, 179
Iousseau, jean-jacques, 67, 70, 71, 73, 128-29, 131, 135, 143, 209
IusseII, ertrand, 59, 70
IybczynskI, WItoId, 153
SadoIeto, jacopo, 130-31
SatIe, rIk, 180
Schenker, IeInrIch, 32, 144
SchIIIer, IrIedrIch von, 77
Schoenberg, ArnoId, 30, 140-41, 144-45, 153, 257n. 91
Schopenhauer, Arthur, vIII, 34, 96, 136, 139, 142-43, 144, 148, 160, 210, 220
Schubert, Iranz, 110, 200
scIence
argument In, 60, 63
ethIcaI IIIe oI justIIIed choIces and, 80, 81, 82
musIc and, 130
Scruton, Ioger, vIII, 68, 78, 87, 147, 174, 239, 247n. 22
scuIpture
abstract, 20-22, 26-27, 29
In reIIeI Iorm, 27 {p.286)
Index
Page 17 of 19
as repIIca, 20
work versus worId and, 19-24 See clso vIsuaI medIa
seII-InventIon, cuIture medIa and, 17
seII-representatIon, 17
settIng, 182, 183, 218
In archItecture, 183-84
In IIterature, 170, 171, 182
In musIc, 173, 174, 182
In paIntIng, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175-76, 182, 183
Shakespeare, WIIIIam, 182, 239
sIgns, symboIs versus , 44-46, 47-48, 219
sIgn sequence, InterpretatIon and, 230, 231
socIaI practIces, hIstorIes oI, 111-15
Socrates, 15, 63, 158, 165
Souchay, Andre, 210
Spataro, GIovannI, 130
StaIIn, joseph, 94, 95
state
avant-garde musIc and, 147
reIIgIon and art and, 90-99
SteIner, Wendy, 107
SteIIa, Irank, 25-26, 154
StendhaI, 19, 79
Strauss, IIchard, 140
StravInsky, gor, 31, 110, 140, 144, 152, 222
Strohm, IeInhard, 29
Structure oj Scientijic Revolution, The (Kuhn), 114
subjectIve Ireedom, 242-43
abstractIon and, 155-58, 159-60, 161, 184
symboIs
hermeneutIcs and, 219-20
In musIc, 47-48
sIgns versus , 44-46, 47-48, 219
In vIsuaI medIa, 47-48
Tchkt-l-Sulcymcn, Vcriction ll (SteIIa), 25-26
TaruskIn, IIchard, 146
taste, power oI, 10, 235-43
TayIor, CharIes, 8, 9, 73, 88, 154-55
Tempest, The (Shakespeare), 182, 239
temporaI Iorm, 196
IIterature and, 194
musIc and, 201-2 See clso narratIve
text
Ianguage and, 39-40
musIc and, 39-40, 54, 116, 117, 118, 127
Index
Page 18 of 19
theory, practIce and, 9-10
ThucydIdes, 75
TIeck, IudwIg, 135
Timceus (IIato), 120
TInctorIs, johannes, 117, 121, 122, 124, 132
TItIan, 6, 37, 180
TocquevIIIe, AIexIs de, 75-76, 89, 108, 155-56, 157, 158, 184
totaIItarIanIsm, 93, 94, 95
Triumph oj the Will (IIeIenstahI), 98
Ulysses (joyce), 180
unIversItIes, art In, 11
vaIIdIty, InterpretatIon and, 227-34
Van der Weyden, Ioger, 175
Van yke, SIr Anthony, 61
Van Gogh, VIncent, 25
Vecchic, Lc (GIorgIone), 188
Velctc, Lc (IaphaeI), 48
VeIzquez, 56
Venus oj Urbino (TItIan), 180
VerdI, GIuseppe, 94, 97
VIcentIno, IcoIa, 123, 126, 129
vIrtues, 68-70, 82
vIsuaI medIa
abstract, 46, 62, 153
copIes oI, 52-53, 55
InherItance oI, 17-18
Ianguage versus , 41, 42, 44-45, 46-49, 50, 58
musIc versus , 28-29, 34, 35, 36-39, 40
nature oI, 19-28
orIgInaIs oI, 52-53, 55-56
representatIonaI powers oI, 46, 48-49
symboIs In, 44, 47-48
three-dImensIonaI, 19
two-dImensIonaI, 19 (see clso paIntIng)
work versus worId and, 19-28 See clso paIntIng, scuIpture
voIce, 182
dIscrImInatIon and, 240-42
In IIterature, 166-70, 171
{p.287)
In musIc, 40, 171-72, 173, 176-77, 181
In paIntIng, 171, 172, 173, 175-76
Wackenroder, WIIheIm IeInrIch, 135
Wagner, IIchard, 22, 93, 95-98, 135, 139, 140, 143, 144, 152, 172, 262n. 22
WaIker, . I., 131
WaIton, KendaII I., 173-74
Index
Page 19 of 19
Weber, Max, 3, 83, 94, 98
WIIIaert, AdrIan, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126
WImsatt, W. K., 231
WIttgensteIn, IudwIg, 4, 47
WoIIheIm, IIchard, vIII, 26, 174
Woodmansee, Martha, 8, 137
work
artIIact versus , 23-24
cuIturaI determInatIon oI object as, 22-24
work, worId versus , 18-19
abstractIon and, 154
Ianguage and, 41
musIc and, 28-39
paIntIng and, 24-28
representatIon versus arguments and, 57-64
scuIpture and, 19-24
worId. See ImpIIed author, reaI author, work, worId versus
Wozzeck (erg), 110, 145
wrItIng, ChInese art oI, 246n. 8
ZagajewskI, Adam, 110
ZarIIno, GIoseIIo, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131
Zhdanov, AndreI, 146 {p.288) {p.289) {p.290)

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