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CONTRASTING FAA AND USAF DAMAGE TOLERANCE

REQUIREMENTS
Robert G. Eastin*
Damage tolerance requirements were formall a!o"te! b t#e $nite!
States Air %orce &$SA%' for t#e !esign of new air"lanes an! b t#e
%e!eral A(iation A!ministration &%AA' for t#e certification of new large
trans"ort t"e !esigns in t#e )*+0,s. -#e un!erling reasons were
!ifferent an! it is t#erefore not sur"rising t#at t#e requirements a!o"te!
are !ifferent. -#e "rescri"ti(e nature of t#e $SA% requirements is
contraste! wit# t#e more ob.ecti(e nature of t#e %AA requirements. It is
also note! t#at t#e outcome of eac# set of requirements is !ifferent. -#e
$SA% requirements result in structure wit# a s"ecifie! le(el of tolerance
to !efects "lus in/ser(ice ins"ections if necessar. -#e %AA requirements
result in maintenance actions &i.e. 0ins"ections or ot#er "roce!ures1'
!etermine! to be necessar to "re(ent catastro"#ic failure !ue to fatigue
from all "otential sources. -#e "rimar intent of t#is "a"er is to
ob.ecti(el i!entif similarities an! !ifferences between t#e two sets of
requirements as t#e are written wit#out "assing .u!gment on t#em or
getting into t#e nuances of #ow t#e #a(e been im"lemente!. -#is "a"er
also e2amines 0fail/safet1 as inclu!e! in t#e current $SA% !amage
tolerance requirements an! in t#e %AA fatigue requirements from )*53 to
)*+4.
INTRODUCTION
-wo well 5nown an! wi!el a""lie! sets of !amage tolerance requirements are t#ose
t#at must be a!#ere! to for t#e !esign of $SA% aircraft an! t#ose t#at must be use!
for t#e certification of ci(il aircraft t"e !esigns in t#e $nite! States. Alt#oug# eac#
set is commonl referre! to using t#e wor!s 0!amage tolerance1 significant
!ifferences e2ist in intent an! a""lication. -#is "a"er e2amines some of t#ese
!ifferences.
In con!ucting an com"arison it is im"ortant to clearl !efine e2actl w#at is
being com"are!. -#e $SA% !amage tolerance requirements #a(e been sub.ect to
re(isions since t#e were first a!o"te! an! often custom tailore! to s"ecific aircraft
sstems. 6owe(er t#e basic "#iloso"# an! intent #as remaine! unc#ange! since t#e

* %e!eral A(iation A!ministration7 8os Angeles 9ertification :ffice

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ASI P 2 0 0 5
first requirements were "ublis#e! in )*+;. -#erefore for t#e "ur"oses of t#is
!iscussion t#e $SA% requirements being com"are! are t#ose in <)=.
E2tra care must be ta5en w#en i!entifing w#at %AA requirements will be
com"are!. -#is is because somew#at !ifferent requirements #a(e e(ol(e! o(er t#e
ears for small air"lanes7 trans"ort air"lanes7 small rotorcraft an! large rotorcraft.
-#ese requirements are containe! in "arts 2>7 257 2+ an! 2* res"ecti(el of <2= an!
t#e !ifferences #a(e been !iscusse! b Eastin <>=. In t#e !iscussion t#at follows t#e
%AA requirements t#at will be com"are! are a subset of t#ose t#at were originall
"ublis#e! for trans"ort air"lanes in <;=. -#is subset is inclu!e! in "aragra"#s &a' an!
&b' of section 25.5+) of <2= as amen!e! b <;=. :t#er requirements are inclu!e! in
"aragra"#s &c'7 &!' an! &e' of section 25.5+). -#ese are Fatigue (safe-life)
evaluation, Sonic fatigue strength an! Damage-tolerance (discrete source)
evaluation res"ecti(el an! are beon! t#e sco"e of t#is !iscussion since t#e #a(e
no similar counter"arts in t#e requirements of <)=.
CATEGORIES OF FATIGUE
-#e aut#or belie(es it can be useful to se"arate fatigue into t#ree categories. -#is
was first "ro"ose! in <5= an! t#is con(ention will also be use! #ere to facilitate t#e
!iscussion. -#e categories are normal7 anomalous an! une2"ecte! normal7 an! are
!escribe! below.
Normal Fatigue
?ormal fatigue is t#e ine(itable accumulation of !amage wit# resultant crac5ing t#at
can be e2"ecte! to occur at some "oint in time in an structure t#at is sub.ecte! to
cclic loa!ing of sufficient magnitu!e an! frequenc. It occurs in structure t#at is
!esigne! an! fabricate! wit#out error7 o"erate! as "lanne!7 an! ser(ice! as
e2"ecte!. As !efine!7 normal fatigue is "re!ictable an! t#e "robabilit of it
occurring is stea!il increasing wit# time. %atigue testing can be "erforme! to
c#aracteri@e normal fatigue at t#e !etail7 com"onent7 an! aircraft le(el. A normal
fatigue e(ent occurring in one aircraft can be e2"ecte! to occur in ot#ers. In t#is
sense t#e crac5e! aircraft is re"resentati(e of t#e rest of t#e fleet.
?ormal fatigue can occur locall w#en t#ere are isolate! areas t#at are
significantl more fatigue sensiti(e t#an surroun!ing areas !ue to #ig#er stress le(el7
unique geometr7 etc. ?ormal fatigue can also occur o(er large areas w#en similar
!etails are sub.ecte! to t#e same stress le(els. A#en large areas are sub.ect to
normal fatigue t#e term 0multi"le site !amage1 an! 0multi"le element !amage1 are
often use!. -#e tra!itional strateg use! to !eal wit# normal fatigue is safet/b/
retirement w#ic# is more commonl referre! to as t#e 0safe/life1 a""roac#. Safet/
b/ins"ection ma also be an effecti(e strateg for normal fatigue "ro(i!e!
ins"ection reliabilit is acce"table an! e(entual terminating action &e.g. mo!ification7
re"lacement' ta5es "lace base! on ins"ection fin!ings.

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Anomalous Fatigue
Anomalous fatigue is t#e result of an off nominal "#sical con!ition. It is
une2"ecte! an! un"re!ictable. 9lassic sources inclu!e material !efects7 tool mar5s
an! "oor qualit #oles. :t#er sources inclu!e ser(ice in!uce! !amage suc# as
corrosion "its an! !ings an! scratc#es. All t#e sources mentione! abo(e are b t#eir
nature un"re!ictable. 9onsi!erable effort is ma!e !uring !esign an! manufacture to
mitigate t#e ris5 of intro!ucing anomalous fatigue sources. 8i5ewise controls are
t"icall "ut in "lace once an aircraft enters ser(ice to minimi@e t#e ris5 of ser(ice
relate! anomalies. Anomalous fatigue occurring in an aircraft is not7 b !efinition7
re"resentati(e of t#e fleet. Swift <3= refers to suc# an aircraft as a 0Rogue %lawe!
Aircraft1 an! ot#ers commonl use t#e term 0rogue1 to !escribe anomalous sources
of fatigue.
Anomalies are7 b t#eir (er nature7 !ifficult to quantif before t#e occur.
-iffan #as !iscusse! t#is in <+= an! questione! t#e (ali!it of e2tra"olating
equi(alent initial flaw !istributions alt#oug# #e also notes t#at t#is #as been !one.
Anomalies ten! to be singular e(ents resulting in (er locali@e! fatigue crac5ing.
-#is is reflecte! in t#e crac5ing scenarios t#at are s"ecifie! for use b t#e $SA% in
<)=.
-#e most effecti(e strateg for anomalies is to !esign t#e structure to be tolerant
of t#em. -#is is t#e essence of <)= as will be !iscusse! in more !etail below.
Unexpected Normal Fatigue
-#ere are man e2am"les of une2"ecte! an! "remature fatigue t#at can,t be blame!
on an off nominal "#sical con!ition. Some t"ical root causes inclu!e incorrect
e2ternal loa!s an!Bor internal loa!sBstress7 o(erl se(ere usage &as com"are! to
!esign assum"tions' an! ot#er s#ortfalls in our abilit to accuratel mo!el t#e
structure an! "re!ict t#e future. In #in!sig#t t#is categor of fatigue #as to be
consi!ere! 0normal1 an! we t"icall !o well at 0"ost!iction1 once we correct our
in"ut !ata. In most cases une2"ecte! normal fatigue is re"resentati(e of t#e fleet
an! s#oul! be a!!resse! accor!ingl.
BACKGROUND
A re(iew of 5e e(ents lea!ing u" to t#e a!o"tion of t#e requirements is consi!ere!
#el"ful in un!erstan!ing t#e !ifferences t#at e2ist. As note! below t#e $SA% an! t#e
%AA #a! uniquel !ifferent e2"eriences t#at resulte! in somew#at !ifferent
conclusions7 ob.ecti(es an! requirements.

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USAF
Ce e(ents an! e2"erience t#at lea! to t#e a!o"tion of !amage tolerance
requirements b t#e $SA% #a(e been re(iewe! b 8incoln <4=7 <*=7 <)0=. A summar
illustration is "ro(i!e! b %igure ) below.
$" until )*54 t#e $SA% #a! no formal fatigue requirements. Accor!ing to
8incoln <4= aircraft were generall !esigne! base! on static strengt# consi!erations
onl an! t#e factor of safet a""lie! was e2"ecte! to account for !eterioration from
usage an! qualit "roblems as well as uncertainties about loa!ing an! material
strengt#. Dase! on t#is all t#ree &normal7 anomalous7 an! une2"ecte! normal' of t#e
aut#or,s categories of fatigue s#oul! #a(e been accounte! for. 8incoln <*= attributes
t#e success of t#is a""roac# u" t#roug# t#e mi!/)*;0,s to conser(ati(e analsis
met#o!s7 t#e in#erent fatigue an! fracture resistance of a(ailable an! generall use!
airframe materials an! t#e relati(el low usage of $SA% aircraft. -#ese factors
combine! an! resulte! in aircraft !esigns t#at were in#erentl tolerant to fatigue an!
ot#er 5in!s of !amage in s"ite of t#e lac5 of an formal requirements.
6owe(er t#ere were factors coming into "la t#at resulte! in an erosion of t#e
in#erent robustness of $SA% aircraft. -#e a!(ent of new #ig# strengt# allos7 t#e
increase! im"ortance of aircraft "erformance an! more refine! !esign tools were
some of t#em. -#is loss of robustness resulte! in an e(er increasing number of
structural integrit relate! "roblems. 8incoln <*=7 <)0= s"ecificall cites t#e fatigue
"roblems e2"erience! on t#e D/;+ as being one of t#e "rimar !ri(ers t#at le! to t#e
$SA% a!o"ting formal fatigue requirements7 to be use! in t#e !esign of future
$SA% aircraft7 in )*54. -#ese requirements s"ecificall require! t#at !eterioration
!ue to re"eate! loa!ing in ser(ice be consi!ere! an! minimi@e!. -#is was
accom"lis#e! in "art b requiring full scale fatigue testing to a multi"le of t#e
s"ecifie! ser(ice life. An significant fatigue crac5ing t#at occurre! !uring t#is test

;
1950 1970 1960 1980
Fatigue
(8866/8867/Durability)
Damage Tolerance
(83444)
1958
F-111
!!"D#$T
%-47
!!"D#$T&
1969 1974
%'T(
1950 1970 1960 1980
Fatigue
(8866/8867/Durability)
Damage Tolerance
(83444)
1958
F-111
!!"D#$T
F-111
!!"D#$T
%-47
!!"D#$T&
%-47
!!"D#$T&
1969 1974
%'T(
Figure 1 )&F *ey #+ent,
ASI P 2 0 0 5
#a! to be a!!resse! suc# t#at it woul! not be e2"ecte! in fiel!e! aircraft !uring t#eir
ser(ice li(es.
Alt#oug# t#e new $SA% safe/life requirement force! t#e aircraft !esigners to
consi!er fatigue7 in a!!ition to static o(erloa!7 as a t#reat to structural integrit it
was soon reali@e! t#at it !i! not "re(ent t#e use of low !uctilit materials o"erating
at #ig# stress le(els. -#e e2am"le of t#is most commonl cite! is t#e %/))). -#e %/
))) e2"erience "ainfull illustrate! #ow suc# !esign !ecisions combine! wit# an
une2"ecte! !efect coul! be !e(astating. As "art of t#e %/))) engineering
!e(elo"ment "rogram a successful full scale fatigue test of t#e wing bo2 was
accom"lis#e! to )37000 simulate! flig#t #ours. Accounting for test s"ectrum
se(erit t#e $SA% inter"rete! t#e results as !emonstrating a safe/life of 3000 #ours
using a scatter factor of four. ?e(ert#eless on December 227 )*3* an %/))) cras#e!
as a result of a fatigue failure in t#e lower "late of t#e left wing "i(ot fitting. -#e
total time in ser(ice at t#e time of t#e acci!ent was )00 #ours. -#is failure was
attribute! to a !efect t#at was "ro!uce! !uring manufacture of t#e forging t#at t#e
"late was fabricate! from. -#is an! ot#er ser(ice inci!ents con(ince! t#e $SA% t#at
t#e e2isting fatigue requirements nee!e! to be augmente!. It was reasone! t#at t#e
requirement to fatigue test b itself coul! still result in !esigns t#at were not
sufficientl tolerant to manufacturing an! ser(ice in!uce! !efects. -o ac#ie(e t#e
!esire! tolerance somet#ing #a! to be !one to "ositi(el affect t#e !esign relati(e to
material c#oices7 stress le(els an! !esign !etails. -#at somet#ing was !etermine! to
be "rescri"ti(e crac5 growt# an! resi!ual strengt# requirements assuming t#at
!efects are "resent w#en t#e air"lane first enters ser(ice.
In summar w#at moti(ate! t#e $SA% to a!o"t t#eir !amage tolerance
requirements was t#e conclusion t#at t#e safe/life a""roac# b itself #a! not
!eli(ere! t#e o(erall structural integrit !esire!. S"ecificall t#e were missing a
le(el of robustness largel !ue to unfortunate c#oices of materials an! stress le(els
t#at were not influence! b t#e fatigue requirements t#at were on t#e boo5s at t#e
time. -#e a!!e! requirements !irectl influence material selection an! stress le(els
at t#e !esign stage. It s#oul! also be note! t#at t#e $SA% !amage tolerance
requirements were su""lemental to t#e fatigue requirements alrea! embo!ie! in
<))= an! <)2=. -#at is7 t#e $SA% !i! not get ri! of t#e e2isting requirements but
sim"l a!!e! to t#em to ac#ie(e t#e o(erall !esire! result.
FAA
A summar of 5e e(ents t#at are im"ortant in t#e e(olution of %AA !amage
tolerance requirements is "ro(i!e! b %igure 2 below.

5
1950 1970 1960 1980
Fatigue (&a-e-li-e)
Fail-,a-e
1954
.)&*
!!"D#$T
!'/#T
!!"D#$T&
1956 1978
#"T(#0
1977
Damage-tolerance
(m1t 45)
Is D-
Im"racticalE
?o
Fes
1950 1970 1960 1980
Fatigue (&a-e-li-e)
Fail-,a-e
1954
.)&*
!!"D#$T
.)&*
!!"D#$T
!'/#T
!!"D#$T&
!'/#T
!!"D#$T&
1956 1978
#"T(#0
1977
Damage-tolerance
(m1t 45)
Is D-
Im"racticalE
?o
Fes
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%atigue requirements of some 5in! #a(e been "art of t#e ci(il a(iation
requirements for some time. %or e2am"le if we go bac5 to )*;5 an! loo5 in t#e
9i(il Air Regulations &9ARs' at section 0;.>)> we fin! a requirement t#at states
t#atG
The structure shall be designed in so far as practical, to avoid points of
stress concentration where variable stresses above the fatigue limit are liel!
to occur in normal service"
6istor in!icates t#at7 similar to $SA% e2"erience7 fatigue was not a ma.or issue
earl on wit# ci(il aircraft. -#e lac5 of ma.or fatigue issues ma be attribute! in "art
to t#e e2istence of a formal requirement to consi!er fatigue. -#is s#oul! #a(e
resulte! in more attention to fatigue b t#e ci(il aircraft manufacturers. 6owe(er in
t#e aut#or,s o"inion it is also !ue to man of t#e same factors at wor5 in t#e !esign
of earl $SA% aircraft t#at were mentione! "re(iousl.
As ci(il aircraft !esigns became more c#allenging &e.g. "ressuri@e! fuselages'
fatigue e(ents became more common "lace. A!!itionall it was recogni@e! t#at e(en
if normal fatigue is a!equatel a!!resse! aircraft will alwas be (ulnerable to
anomalous an! une2"ecte! normal fatigue. It was reasone! t#at an alternati(e
a""roac# to !ealing wit# fatigue mig#t be to acce"t t#at fatigue crac5ing is ine(itable
an! !esign t#e structure to crac5 gracefull. -#is conce"t was base! on !esigning
suc# t#at an crac5ing woul! be ob(ious !uring normal maintenance before it
re!uce! t#e strengt# of t#e structure to an unacce"table le(el. -#is was generall
referre! to as t#e 0fail/safe1 a""roac#.
-#e 5e e(ents t#at are consi!ere! t#e "rimar catalst for t#e a!o"tion of fail/
safe requirements b t#e %AA are t#e 9omet I air"lane failures t#at occurre! in )*5;.
-#ese failures #a(e been !iscusse! in some !etail b Swift <)>= an! will onl be
briefl re(iewe! #ere.
-#e 9omet was !esigne! an! manufacture! in t#e $nite! Cing!om b
De 6a(illan! Aircraft 9om"an. -#e 9omet !esign was a ma.or tec#nological
a!(ance at t#e time. It was t#e first commercial .et an! was !esigne! for relati(el
#ig# altitu!e o"eration. S#ortl after entr into ser(ice a 9omet fling at >07000 feet

3
Figure 2 F *ey #+ent,
ASI P 2 0 0 5
!isintegrate! an! cras#e! into t#e He!iterranean Sea. All air"lanes were remo(e!
from ser(ice an! were not returne! until fleet mo!ifications were ma!e to correct
w#at was t#oug#t to be t#e cause of t#e acci!ent. 6owe(er s#ortl t#ereafter a
secon! 9omet !isintegrate! at >57000 feet an! cras#e! into t#e He!iterranean. -#e
acci!ent in(estigation t#at followe! inclu!e! a full scale fatigue test of t#e fuselage
an! re(eale! fatigue critical locations at o"enings in t#e "ressuri@e! fuselage t#at #a!
not been i!entifie! "re(iousl. It also was foun! t#at t#e critical crac5 si@e was
relati(el small an! coul! not be e2"ecte! to be !etecte! !uring normal maintenance.
-#e 9omet e2"erience reinforce! t#e t#oug#t t#at t#e fail/safe a""roac# mig#t be
an acce"table an! e(en su"erior alternati(e to t#e safe/life a""roac#. 9onsistent
wit# t#is t#e %AA re(ise! t#e 9ARs in Harc# )*53 <);= an! a!!e! fail/safet as an
o"tion to t#e safe/life a""roac#.
%ail/safe became t#e o"tion of c#oice for t#e ma.orit of large trans"ort aircraft
certifie! in t#e )*30,s an! )*+0,s. -#is inclu!e! t#e Airbus A>00G Doeing +0+B+207
+2+7 +>+7 +;+G Douglas D9/47 D9/*BHD/407 D9/)0G %o55er %/24G an! 8oc5#ee!
8/)0)). -#e fail/safe a""roac# was (er attracti(e for se(eral reasons. If a
structure can be !esigne! suc# t#at crac5ing will be rea!il !etecte! before it
becomes !angerous it can be reasone! t#at crac5ing in itself is not a safet issue.
A!!itionall t#e 5nowle!ge of w#en crac5ing mig#t be e2"ecte! becomes an
economic issue an! is not necessar to insure safet. 9onsistent wit# t#is t#e fail/
safe rule !i! not inclu!e a requirement to "erform full scale fatigue testing or i!entif
an s"ecial !irecte! ins"ections to su""lement normal maintenance. 9om"are! to
w#at safe/life require! of bot# t#e a""licant an! t#eir customers t#e attraction of
fail/safe is easil un!erstoo!.
Alt#oug# t#e fail/safe o"tion was wi!el a""lie! t#ere was an un!erling concern
b man relati(e to its effecti(eness in t#e long term. Ha2well <)5= !iscusse! t#is
an! consi!ere! #some of the potential dangers that have developed in the
application of the fail-safe approach over the !ears. :ne of t#e biggest concerns
was t#e e(entual loss of fail/safet as t#e air"lane ages an! normal fatigue crac5ing
becomes more an! more "robable. -#is is because a structures, fail/safe
c#aracteristics are !e"en!ent on successful re!istribution of loa! from faile! or
"artiall faile! elements to intact surroun!ing structure. In man cases success is
!e"en!ent on t#e surroun!ing structure being in near "ristine con!ition. At some
"oint in t#e life of t#e structure normal fatigue wear out ma5es t#is an unrealistic
e2"ectation. It is at t#is "oint t#at t#e fail/safe conce"t can no longer be relie! on
for safet.
-#e concern o(er long term reliance on fail/safet for continue! airwort#iness
became more wi!es"rea! wit#in t#e a(iation communit as t#e .et trans"orts t#at
#a! been originall certifie! using t#e fail/safe o"tion starte! to a""roac# t#eir
!esign ser(ice goals. $ltimatel t#is concern is w#at "rom"te! t#e 9i(il A(iation
Aut#orit &9AA'7 in t#e $nite! Cing!om &$C'7 in t#e earl )*+0,s to limit t#e
o"erational life of large trans"ort aircraft t#at #a! been certifie! as fail/safe. %or
e2am"le all Doeing +0+ air"lanes in $C registr were limite! to 307000 flig#t #ours.

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-#e Dritis# Aut#orities also announce! t#at for t#ese aircraft to be allowe! to
o"erate beon! t#e s"ecifie! life limits somet#ing more woul! nee! to be !one.
In t#e mi!st of all t#e concern o(er t#e long term effecti(eness of fail/safet an
acci!ent occurre! t#at is consi!ere! b man to be t#e 5e e(ent t#at ser(e! to
soli!if an! accelerate c#anges in ci(il a(iation requirements an! "olicies !ealing
wit# t#e t#reat of metal fatigue in "rimar airframe structures. -#is was t#e cras# of
a Doeing +0+/>0097 o"erating un!er Dritis# registr7 !uring final a""roac# to
8usa5a air"ort on Ha )+7 )*++. -#e !etails of t#is acci!ent an! its im"act on
airwort#iness requirements #a(e been !iscusse! b Eastin an! Dristow <)3=. An
e2tremel t#oroug# acci!ent in(estigation conclu!e! t#at t#e cras# was a
consequence of t#e loss of t#e #ori@ontal stabili@er !ue to un!etecte! fatigue an!
subsequent failure of t#e aft u""er s"ar c#or!. -#is was in s"ite of t#e fact t#at t#e
!esign #a! been certifie! in accor!ance wit# t#e fail/safe rules of 9AR ;b.2+0 b
bot# t#e %AA an! 9AA. -#is is a classic e2am"le of structure certifie! as fail/safe
t#at !i! not7 in ser(ice7 fail in a safe manner. -#e failure of fail/safet in t#is case
was !ue to insufficient attention gi(en to !etectabilit7 a lac5 of un!erstan!ing of t#e
e2ternal loa!s an! incorrect assum"tions ma!e about t#e fatigue an! resi!ual
strengt# c#aracteristics of t#e structure.
As note! "re(iousl t#e 8usa5a acci!ent #astene! ma.or c#anges to ci(il a(iation
requirements t#at were alrea! being consi!ere!. 9onsi!eration was alrea! being
gi(en to requiring s"ecial !irecte! ins"ections for fatigue crac5ing base! on
quantifie! crac5 growt# an! resi!ual strengt# c#aracteristics. -#is became 5now as
t#e 0!amage tolerance1 a""roac#. Gui!ance for t#e use of t#is a""roac# for
"rotecting t#e safet of ol!er aircraft was "ublis#e! b t#e %AA in <)+=.
Hanufacturers of t#e fail/safe certifie! aircraft "re(iousl note! (oluntaril followe!
t#e gui!elines an! "ro!uce! Su""lementar Ins"ection Documents &SIDs' t#at were
man!ate! b Airwort#iness Directi(es starting in t#e mi! )*40,s.
9onsistent wit# t#e c#ange of "#iloso"# for continue! airwort#iness for ol!er
aircraft was a c#ange to t#e certification requirements for new t"e !esigns.
Amen!ment ;5 to "art 25 was issue! in )*+4 <;=. -#is re(ision remo(e! t#e fail/
safe o"tion com"letel an! a!!e! !amage tolerance as t#e a""roac# t#at must be
use! unless s#own to be im"ractical. In t#e "ast t#ere #as been some !ebate on
w#et#er or not fail/safet was actuall remo(e! an! if so w#et#er or not it was
intentional. Some lig#t is s#e! on t#ese questions b t#e res"onse to a comment on
"ro"ose! !eletion of t#e "arent#etical e2"ression 0fail/safe1 from t#e #ea!ing of
section 25.5+)&b'. -#e res"onse is inclu!e! in <)4= an! is as followsG
#"Fail-safe and damage-tolerance are not s!non!mous terms" Fail-safe
generall! means a design such that the airplane can survive the failure of
an element of a s!stem or, in some instances one or more entire s!stems,
without catastrophic conse$uences" Fail-safe, as applied to structures
prior to %mendment &'-(', meant complete element failure or obvious
partial failure of large panels" )t was assumed that a complete element
failure or partial failure would be obvious during a general area

4
ASI P 2 0 0 5
inspection and would be corrected within a ver! short time" The
probabilit! of detecting damage during routine inspections before it could
progress to catastrophic limits was ver! high" Damage-tolerance, on the
other hand, does not re$uire consideration of complete element failures or
obvious partial failures, although fail-safe features ma! be included in
structure that is designed to damage-tolerance re$uirements" % part ma!
be designed to meet the damage-tolerance re$uirements of Sec" &'"'*+(b)
even though cracs ma! develop in that part" )n order to ensure that such
cracs are detected before the! grow to critical lengths, damage-tolerance
re$uires an inspection program tailored to the crac progression
characteristics of the particular part when sub,ected to the loading
spectrum e-pected in service" Damage-tolerance places a much higher
emphasis on these inspections to detect cracs before the! progress to
unsafe limits, whereas fail-safe allows the cracs to grow to obvious and
easil! detected dimensions"
-#e aut#or belie(es t#at t#is res"onse un!erscores t#e fact t#at t#e 0%ail/safe1
o"tion was remo(e! an! in!icates t#at it was !one intentionall.
In summar w#at moti(ate! t#e %AA to a!o"t t#eir !amage tolerance
requirements was t#e conclusion t#at t#e fail/safe a""roac# as a""lie! #a! not
resulte! in t#e le(el of safet !esire!. S"ecificall t#ere #a! been a lac5 of attention
gi(en to ma5ing sure t#e !etectabilit assume! was consistent wit# t#e actual crac5
growt# an! resi!ual strengt# attributes of t#e structure. -#is was a!!resse! b
re"lacing t#e fail/safe requirements wit# !amage tolerance requirements an!
retaining safe/life as a contingenc a""roac# if !amage tolerance is s#own to be
im"ractical.
As "re(iousl note! t#ere are waters#e! e(ents t#at are commonl reference! as
"ro(i!ing t#e ma.or im"etus for t#e a!o"tion of !amage tolerance requirements. %or
t#e $SA% t#is was t#e %/))) acci!ent an! for t#e %AA it was t#e 8usa5a acci!ent.
It is of interest to note #ow !ifferent t#ese acci!ents were. -able ) below
summari@es some of t#e !etails for eac#. About t#e onl t#ing t#e #a! in common
was t#at metal fatigue was a factor an! e(en t#en t#e categories were !ifferent.

*
$ne2"ecte! normal Anomalous 9ategor of %atigue
Rig#t 6ori@ontal Stabili@er
Aft S"ar $""er 9#or!
8eft Aing Pi(ot %itting
8ower Plate
9om"onent In(ol(e!
.4 .0+) %raction of D8 at %ailure
)3+2> %lig#tsB;+32) 6ours )00 6ours
-otal -ime in Ser(ice at
%ailure
+0+*/-3 Aluminum
D3ac Steel &220/2;0
CSI'
Haterial In(ol(e!
207000 %lig#tsB307000
6ours
37000 6ours Design 8ife &D8'
?o Fes I )37000 6ours %atigue -est
9AR ;.2+0 %ail/safe Safe/life %atigue Design Dasis
D+0+/>00 %/))) Air"lane Ho!el
Ha );7 )*++ December 227 )*3* Date
8usa5a %/)))
$ne2"ecte! normal Anomalous 9ategor of %atigue
Rig#t 6ori@ontal Stabili@er
Aft S"ar $""er 9#or!
8eft Aing Pi(ot %itting
8ower Plate
9om"onent In(ol(e!
.4 .0+) %raction of D8 at %ailure
)3+2> %lig#tsB;+32) 6ours )00 6ours
-otal -ime in Ser(ice at
%ailure
+0+*/-3 Aluminum
D3ac Steel &220/2;0
CSI'
Haterial In(ol(e!
207000 %lig#tsB307000
6ours
37000 6ours Design 8ife &D8'
?o Fes I )37000 6ours %atigue -est
9AR ;.2+0 %ail/safe Safe/life %atigue Design Dasis
D+0+/>00 %/))) Air"lane Ho!el
Ha );7 )*++ December 227 )*3* Date
8usa5a %/)))
ASI P 2 0 0 5
In t#e case of t#e %/))) it was anomalous fatigue t#at resulte! in t#e wing
se"aration. As note! b 8incoln <*= t#e $SA% coul! not re"ro!uce t#e failure in t#e
laborator an! !i! not see suc# a failure on anot#er %/))) aircraft.
In t#e case of 8usa5a une2"ecte! normal fatigue lea! to se"aration of t#e
#ori@ontal stabili@er. As note! b Eastin an! Dristow <)3= t#e failure was
re"ro!uce! in t#e laborator an! t#e fatigue nucleation site was retros"ecti(el
i!entifie! as a fatigue critical location re"resentati(e of t#e basic !esign. -#is was
furt#er (ali!ate! b "ost acci!ent ins"ections t#at !etecte! crac5s in t#e same local
area on +J of t#e fleet.
-#is again illustrates t#e fun!amental !ifferences between t#e $SA% an! %AA
e2"erience wit# fatigue an! #el"s to e2"lain some of t#e !ifferences t#at e2ist in t#eir
a""roac#es to fatigue t#at are reflecte! in t#eir requirements.
THE REQUIREMENTS
At a #ig# le(el t#ere are some similarities between t#e $SA% an! %AA !amage
tolerance requirements. Dot# are a""licable to new aircraft !esigns an! com"liance
wit# t#em requires t#e quantification of crac5 growt# an! resi!ual strengt#
c#aracteristics. A!!itionall7 w#en t#is is !one analticall7 fracture mec#anics base!
analsis tools are use!. 6owe(er7 at t#e !etail le(el7 t#ere are significant !ifferences.
Some of t#e !etails are !iscusse! below an! -able 2 "ro(i!es a summar com"arison
.
)&F F
3rimary moti+ation -or4 Safe/life a""roac# %ail/safe a""roac#

)0
Table 15 !om6ari,on o- 7ater,8e1 #+ent,
ASI P 2 0 0 5
ina!equate ina!equate
66licability4 ?ew air"lane !esign I
safet of flig#t structure
?ew air"lane !esign I
safet of flig#t structure
'b9ecti+e4 Safet !uring ser(ice life Safet in!efinitel
'utcome4 Design attributes &K in/
ser(ice ins"ections as
require!'
Haintenance actions &In/
ser(ice ins"ections
e2"ecte!'
"ncor6oration 68ilo,o68y4 Re"lace safe/life Re"lace fail/safe
T8reat, a11re,,e14
?ormal fatigue
?o &A!!resse! b
!urabilit requirements'
Fes
Anomalous fatigue Fes Fes
$ne2"ecte! normal fatigue ?o ?o
3ro+i,ion -or alternate a66roac8 i-
1amage tolerance im6ractical:
?o Fes &Safe/life'
3re,cribe1 re;uirement,4
Design conce"t &i.e. single or
multi"le loa! "at#'
?o ?o
Initial crac5 si@es Fes ?o
In/ser(ice !etectable crac5 si@es Fes ?o
9rac5ing scenarios Fes ?o
Hinimum crac5 growt# life Fes ?o
Ins"ection inter(als
Fes ?o
Resi!ual strengt# Fes Fes

))
Table 2 !om6ari,on o- )&F an1 F Damage Tolerance 0e;uirement,
ASI P 2 0 0 5
USAF
A com"re#ensi(e !escri"tion of t#e $SA% !amage tolerance requirements along
wit# a !iscussion of t#e su""orting rationale #as been "ro(i!e! b Aoo! <)*=. -#e
following is limite! to a brief o(er(iew.
-#e sco"e "aragra"# of <)= states t#at7
This specification contains the damage tolerance design re$uirements
applicable to airplane safet! of flight structure" The ob,ective is to protect
the safet! of flight structure from potentiall! deleterious effects of
material, manufacturing and processing defects through proper material
selection and control, control of stress levels, use of fracture resistant
design concepts, manufacturing and process controls and the use of
careful inspection procedures"
It is clear t#at t#e sub.ect requirements are inten!e! to !irectl im"act t#e !esign
of t#e structure. %or e2am"le t#ese requirements7 wit# some mo!ifications7 were
im"ose! on t#e 9/)+A air"lane an! t#e !esign was significantl im"acte! as
!iscusse! b Eastin an! Pearson <20=. In a number of areas on t#e 9/)+A t#e
requirements #a! a !irect affect on material selection7 allowable stress le(els an! in
some cases structural arrangement. 8e(ing suc# requirements ser(es to insure t#at
a minimum le(el of in#erent robustness or tolerance to !amage is ac#ie(e!.
-#e manufacturer is gi(en some latitu!e relati(e to !esign conce"t. Single or
multi"le loa! "at# !esigns are allowe! #owe(er single loa! "at# structure wit#out
crac5 arrest features can onl be qualifie! as 0slow crac5 growt#1 w#ile multi"le
loa! "at# structure can be qualifie! as eit#er 0slow crac5 growt#1 or 0fail/safe1.
Aoo! <)*= offers some e2"lanation for t#e allowance of t#is o"tion w#en #e notes
t#at7 )t should be emphasi.ed that while the Fail Safe concept appears to offer
a larger degree of safet!, it is the intent of the new criteria that structure $ualified
to either categor! have e$ual safet!.
:nce t#e !esign conce"t is i!entifie! t#e !etail requirements are (er "rescri"ti(e
an! s"ecif certain crac5 growt# an! resi!ual strengt# attributes t#at t#e structure
must "ossess. Pro"ose! !esigns not "ossessing suc# attributes must be c#ange!. In
general t#e requirements s"ecif t#at a structure must e2#ibit a minimum amount of
crac5 growt# life7 assuming an initial "rescribe! crac5 arra7 before its strengt# falls
below a "rescribe! le(el. A!!itionall assum"tions to be use! about t#e crac5ing
scenario are also "rescribe!.
-#e initial crac5ing arra an! subsequent crac5ing scenario #as been
c#aracteri@e! as re"resenting an 0esca"e1 or 0rogue1 e(ent. It is meant to
a""ro2imate t#e occurrence of an unintentionall intro!uce! !efect or flaw in an
ot#erwise nominal structure. $sing t#e aut#or,s fatigue categories t#is woul! be
consi!ere! anomalous fatigue. It is somet#ing t#at is e2"ecte! to be rare but
"ossible. Swift <3= articulate! t#is w#en #e wrote #"the /ogue Flawed %ircraft

)2
ASI P 2 0 0 5
needs to be accounted for" This is the one or two aircraft in the fleet having some
ind of initial manufacturing damage not representative of the rest of the fleet.
In accor!ance wit# "rescribe! initial con!ition assum"tions7 t#e initial crac5ing
arra7 if #oles are "resent in t#e structure7 woul! t"icall consist of a singular .051
crac5 locate! on one si!e of t#e most critical #ole along wit# .0051 crac5s locate! in
all ot#er #oles. -#e subsequent crac5ing scenario to be assume! is also s"ecifie! an!
a!!resses t#e growt# of t#e 0rogue1 .051 crac5 an! also growt# of t#e .0051 crac5s.
Assum"tions to be ma!e relati(e to continuing growt# "atterns are also inclu!e! in
t#e requirements.
-#e $SA% requirements also allow t#e manufacturer some latitu!e relati(e to in/
ser(ice ins"ection. $n!er certain circumstances it ma be assume! t#at in/ser(ice
ins"ections will occur. If t#is is !one t#e requirements "rescribe w#at si@e crac5s
s#oul! be assume! subsequent to ins"ection an! #ow muc# crac5 growt# life t#e
structure must "ossess wit# t#ose crac5s "resent.
In all cases t#e structure must alwas retain a minimum le(el of strengt#.
Resi!ual strengt# requirements are s"ecifie! as a function of t#e le(el of ins"ection
require! to !etect t#e "ostulate! crac5ing.
-#e $SA% requirements lea(e little un!efine! or o"en to inter"retation. -#e are
inten!e! to insure t#at t#e structure #as a minimum amount of robustness relati(e to
!efects t#at mig#t be unintentionall intro!uce!. -o ac#ie(e t#is t#e structure must
"ossess s"ecifie! crac5 growt# an! resi!ual strengt# attributes. In t#is conte2t t#e
are !esign requirements.
FAA
It #as been an! is t#e general "olic of t#e %AA not to !ictate !esign. -#is is t#e
case wit# t#e !amage tolerance requirements an! t#is was clarifie! in a res"onse to
"ublic comments to t#e requirements as originall "ro"ose!. -#e ?otice of
Pro"ose! Rulema5ing <2)= inclu!e! te2t t#at coul! be inter"rete! to mean t#at t#e
!esign #a! to #a(e certain intrinsic "ro"erties. Se(eral comments ob.ecte! to t#e
wor!ing conten!ing t#at it woul! im"ose an absolute requirement t#at woul! be
im"ossible to com"l wit#. In res"onse to t#ese comments in t#e Discussion of
S"ecific 9omments section of <;= t#e %AA note! t#at7 The purpose of the proposal
was to establish an evaluation re$uirement rather than an absolute re$uirement for
the strength, detail design, and fabrication of the structure. 9onsistent wit# t#is
t#e wor!ing was c#ange! for clarification.
8i5e t#e $SA% requirements t#e %AA requirements lea(e it u" to t#e
manufacturer to !eci!e on t#e !esign conce"t to be use!. Dot# single an! multi"le
loa! "at# structural !esigns are allowe!. -#is was ma!e clear in t#e Preamble
Information section of <2)=. 6ere it states t#atL
# the applicant would be allowed to appl! the damage-tolerance
approach to both single load path and multiple load path structure" The

)>
ASI P 2 0 0 5
F%% believes the applicant can, b! sufficient anal!sis and testing, establish
that a single load path structure has sufficientl! slow crac growth
properties so that, if a crac were to develop, it would be discovered
during a properl! designed inspection program"
It is wort# noting t#at t#e "rece!ing statement is consistent wit# t#e remar5s b
Aoo! <)*= t#at were "re(iousl reference!. It a""ears t#at at t#e time t#e $SA%
an! %AA !amage tolerance requirements were a!o"te! t#ere was t#e same
"#iloso"# regar!ing t#e merits of single loa! "at# (ersus multi"le loa! "at#
structure. It was belie(e! t#at eit#er !esign conce"t coul! be ma!e equall as safe
an! t#erefore t#e c#oice was left u" to t#e manufacturer.
-#e requirements state t#at fatigue from all "otential sources must be consi!ere!.
In terms of t#e aut#or,s fatigue categories t#is woul! inclu!e bot# normal an!
anomalous fatigue. -#e requirements also state t#at crac5 growt# an! resi!ual
strengt# e(aluations must be "erforme! an! base! on t#e results ins"ections must be
establis#e! unless s#own to be im"ractical.
-#e !etail requirements are (er ob.ecti(e for t#e most "art. -#ere are no
s"ecific requirements relati(e to suc# t#ings as initial crac5 si@es7 in/ser(ice
!etectable crac5 si@es7 ins"ection inter(als or minimum acce"table crac5 growt# life.
-#e e2ce"tion is resi!ual strengt#. 8e(els of strengt# t#at must be maintaine! are
s"ecifie!.
In summar t#e %AA requirements lea(e man !etails un!efine! an! o"en to
inter"retation. -#e are inten!e! to result in t#e establis#ment of in/ser(ice
ins"ections t#at will !etect fatigue crac5ing from an "otential source before t#e
strengt# of t#e structure falls below "rescribe! le(els. -#ere is no !esign conce"t
s"ecifie!. -#ere are no s"ecific attributes t#at t#e structure must "ossess. -#ere is
onl a requirement to "erform an e(aluation an! establis# ins"ections unless t#e
a""licant !emonstrates t#at ins"ections are im"ractical. If it is !etermine! t#at
ins"ections are im"ractical t#e safe/life a""roac# is allowe! an! safet is insure! b
retirement instea! of ins"ection.
FAIL-SAFETY
As "re(iousl !iscusse! fail/safe was com"letel remo(e! from t#e ); 9%R "art 25
requirements wit# amen!ment ;5 in )*+4 <;=. 6owe(er it is still wort# some
!iscussion. -#is is because t#e sub.ect of fail/safet #as at times been a contentious
issue an! t#is #as been !ue in "art to !iffering (iews of w#at fail/safe 0is17 0was1 or
0s#oul! be1. -#e intent of t#e !iscussion t#at follows is to clarif w#at t#e %AA
requirements were an! w#at t#at $SA% requirements are.
As is t#e case wit# t#e !amage tolerance requirements "re(iousl !iscusse!
similarities e2ist between t#e two !ifferent fla(ors of fail/safet w#en (iewe! at a
#ig# le(el. In bot# cases fail/safet wasBis inclu!e! as an o"tional a""roac# an!
wasBis associate! wit# multi"le loa! "at# structure. A!!itionall bot# (ersions of

);
* Stable loa! "at# failure or crac5 arrest.
Table 35 !om6ari,on o- )&F an1 F Fail-&a-e 0e;uirement,
ASI P 2 0 0 5
fail/safet s#are a similar requirement t#at t#e structure must retain a relati(el #ig#
le(el of strengt# wit# a relati(el large amount of !amage "resent. Deon! t#at
t#ere are significant !ifferences. Some of t#ese !ifferences are !iscusse! below an!
-able > "ro(i!es a summar com"arison.
)&F F 3re-m1 45
"nclu1e1 a, '6tional
66roac84
Fes Fes
,,ociate1 <it8 /ulti6le
.oa1 3at8 &tructure4
Fes Fes
'utcome4 Design attributes &Plus in/
ser(ice ins"ections as
require!'
Design Attributes
3re,cribe1 re;uirement,4
Initial crac5 si@e for
intact structure
Fes ?o
Damage si@e after
"rimar failure*
:nl for 0fail/safe crac5
arrest1 structure
?o
In/ser(ice !etectable
crac5 si@es
Fes ?o
9rac5ing scenarios
before an! after
"rimar failure*
Fes ?o
Hinimum crac5 Fes ?o

)5
ASI P 2 0 0 5
growt# life before an!
after "rimar failure*
Ins"ectabilit of
"rimar failure*
Determine! b manufacturer.
:b(ious !uring normal
maintenance.
Resi!ual strengt# Fes Fes
USAF
%ail/safet is full integrate! into $SA% !amage tolerance requirements as an
a""roac# t#at can be use! for qualification of certain t"es of structure. -#e ot#er
a""roac# is referre! to as 0slow crac5 growt#1 an! can be use! for all t"es of
structure. In t#e conte2t of t#e $SA% requirements fail/safe is a !esign conce"t t#at
must be matc#e! wit# a !egree of ins"ectabilit to i!entif a !amage tolerance
categor. Detail requirements are "rescribe!7 as "re(iousl !iscusse! in t#e section
on 0Requirements17 an! !e"en! on t#e categor.
If t#e fail/safe o"tion is selecte! t#ere are "rescribe! requirements for bot# t#e
intact structure an! t#e structure subsequent to a loa! "at# failure or crac5 arrest.
-#is ma5es qualification of structure as fail/safe relati(el onerous an! since t#e
selection of categor is left u" to t#e manufacturer it #as been a(oi!e! in t#e "ast. It
is note! in <22= t#at7 at t#e time of "ublication of t#at !ocument7 t#ere were no
aircraft in t#e $SA% in(entor t#at #a! been originall !esigne! an! qualifie! to t#e
$SA% fail/safe requirements. -#e aut#or belie(es t#at t#is still #ol!s true to!a.
FAA
Prior to amen!ment ;5 t#e fail/safe a""roac# was inclu!e! as an o"tion to t#e safe/
life a""roac#. -#e requirements were inclu!e in ); 9%R7 section 25.5+)7 "aragra"#
&c' Fail safe strength7 w#ere it state! t#e followingL
)t must be shown b! anal!sis, test, or both, that catastrophic failure or
e-cessive structural deformation, that could adversel! affect the flight
characteristics of the airplane, are not probable after fatigue failure or
obvious partial failure of a single principal structural element" %fter these
t!pes of failure of a single principal structural element, the remaining
structure must be able to withstand static loads corresponding to the
following0###
-#e s"ecifie! static loa!s were associate! wit# !esign en(elo"e t"e con!itions.
Swift <3= succinctl summari@e! t#e generall acce"te! a""roac# use! for
com"liance wit# t#e abo(e requirements w#en #e wrote t#e followingL
1enerall!, manufacturers satisf!ing the re$uirements under the fail-safe
concept merel! substantiated the structures for failure of single principal
elements under static loading conditions" %lthough it was recogni.ed that

)3
ASI P 2 0 0 5
inspections were necessar! there were no specific re$uirements to
determine safe inspection periods based on crac growth or remaining life
of secondar! structure in the event the primar! member failure was not
immediatel! obvious"
Swift <2>= #as also note! t#at ##reliance was placed completel! on the
correctness of the arbitrar! selection of sites and the final si.e of damage chosen
for residual strength substantiation. Goranson <2;= s"ea5ing to t#is same issue
wrote t#at7 This would often lead to residual strength demonstration b! anal!sis of
defined obvious failures rather than showing that all the partial failures with
insufficient residual strength were obvious. A#at constitute! a 0fatigue failure or
ob(ious "artial failure of a single "rinci"al structural element1 was a !etail to be
negotiate! wit# t#e %AA an! (arie! from manufacturer to manufacturer an! e(en
from air"lane mo!el to mo!el for t#e same manufacturer. -able ; below illustrates
t#is. -#e information was ta5en from fail/safe re"orts t#at were submitte! to t#e
%AA to !emonstrate com"liance wit# t#e fail/safe requirement for basic fuselage
s#ell structure.
ir6lane
/o1el
=Fatigue -ailure or ob+iou, 6artial -ailure o- a ,ingle
6rinci6al ,tructural element>
&?in
!rac?
&i@e
D9/)0
)
2 %rame ba s5in crac5 wit# central crac5 sto""er
faile!.
;01
D9/* ) %rame ba s5in crac5. 201
D+>+ ) %rame ba s5in crac5. 201
D+2+ ) %rame ba s5in crac5. 201
D+;+ )21 s5in crac5. )21
8)0))
2
) 9rac5 sto""er ba s5in crac5 wit# center frame faile!. 201
If t#e fail/safe o"tion was c#osen b t#e manufacturer it was onl necessar to
submit a fail/safe re"ort to t#e %AA t#at !emonstrate! b analses an! su""orting
tests t#at t#e structure was sufficientl 0fail/safe1. -#ere was no requirement to
"erform an fatigue testing or analsis or submit an corres"on!ing !ocumentation.
%ortunatel t#e manufacturers t"icall "erforme! t#eir own fatigue analses an!
tests but it was not sub.ect to re(iew or a""ro(al b t#e %AA.

)+
). 9rac5 sto""ers locate! un!er frames.
2. 9rac5 sto""ers locate! between frames
Table 45 #Aam6le, o- !erti-ie1 Fail-&a-e !a6ability -or Fu,elage &tructure in
.ongitu1inal Direction
ASI P 2 0 0 5
-#e "ast %AA fail/safe requirement can be best c#aracteri@e! as a !esign rule t#at
resulte! in multi"le loa! "at# !esigns t#at coul! tolerate single element failures or
relati(el large but somew#at arbitrar "artial failures. It #as its origins in t#e belief
t#at structure coul! be !esigne! suc# t#at it woul! alwas annunciate its !istress
lou!l an! clearl before ant#ing catastro"#ic occurre!. Gi(en t#is it was reasone!
t#at fatigue crac5ing7 in itself7 was not a safet issue since it woul! alwas be
!etecte! an! correcte! in t#e normal course of o"eration7 before a catastro"#ic e(ent
coul! occur.
COMMENTS IN CONCLUSION
-#e use of t#e same wor!s for !ifferent t#ings can lea! to confusion an! nee!less
!ebate. -#is #as been t#e case wit# t#e wor!s 0!amage tolerance1 an! 0fail/safe1.
It is #o"e! t#at t#is "a"er "ro(i!es some clarification relati(e to $SA% an! %AA "art
25 requirements for new air"lane !esigns. Some of t#e more significant !ifferences
are summari@e! below.
%or t#e $SA% 0!amage tolerance1 is a !esign "#iloso"# t#at must be followe!
t#at results in a !esign t#at "ossesses "rescribe! crac5 growt# life an! resi!ual
strengt# attributes. It was a!o"te! to a!!ress t#e t#reat of anomalous fatigue an! is
su""lemental to ot#er requirements t#at a!!ress normal fatigue.
%or t#e %AA 0!amage tolerance1 is a fatigue management strateg t#at must be
use! unless s#own to be im"ractical. It relies on ins"ections to !etect fatigue
crac5ing before it becomes !angerous. If s#own to be im"ractical anot#er strateg is
allowe!.
%or t#e $SA% 0fail/safe1 is a !esign conce"t t#at ma be selecte! for qualification
of a !esign as !amage tolerant. -#e le(el of ins"ection associate! wit# it must be
!etermine! b t#e manufacturer an! can range from ob(ious !uring flig#t to
requiring a s"ecial !irecte! !e"ot le(el ins"ection. Structure qualifie! as fail/safe
must also meet ot#er fatigue requirements.
%or t#e %AA 0fail/safe1 was a fatigue management strateg o"tion t#at relie! on
!esigning t#e structure to crac5 in a manner t#at woul! be ob(ious !uring t#e course
of normal maintenance an! t#erefore !etecte! an! re"aire! before it became
!angerous. Structure qualifie! as fail/safe !i! not nee! an s"ecial !irecte!
ins"ections an! t#ere were no ot#er fatigue requirements t#at #a! to be met.
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t#
Sm"osium of t#e International 9ommittee on
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8ecture7 )+
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