Summary: This article examines

the role of NATO in deterring

threats to non-member states.
The recent crisis in Ukraine
has raised the question of
the responsibility for NATO to
intervene in security threats
beyond the alliances borders,
particularly in instances that
affect the stability of the regional
neighborhood. The author also
highlights the need for further
burden sharing with interna-
tional partners.
Transatlantic Security Task Force Series
Policy Brief
Deterrence Beyond NATO Borders
by Sinan lgen
German Marshall Fund of the
United States-Paris
71 Boulevard Raspail
75006 Paris
T: +33 1 47 23 47 18
E: infoparis@gmfus.org
October 2014
Te Ukraine-Russia crisis has rekin-
dled the debate on the role of NATO
as a security provider in Europe.
Many observers criticized the Alliance
for not doing more to deter Russian
aggression against Ukraine, yet the
question remains if it was NATOs
role to do so.
Te short answer is no: it was not
incumbent upon NATO to deter
Russia from its territorial ambitions
against a non-NATO state. Nonethe-
less, NATO has a role to play in the
long term stability of the European
continent, and the Ukraine crisis has
helped better identify this role and
frame the question of deterrence
beyond the borders of the Alliance.
First, the Ukraine crisis has helped
to frmly reset the priorities of the
Alliance. NATO has a commitment
to defend its members, and only its
members. Article 5 does not apply to
countries that are beyond the borders
of the Alliance. For NATO members,
however, and especially in Eastern
Europe, there has been an identi-
fed need to strengthen the reassur-
ance provided by NATO. What the
Ukraine crisis therefore unravelled is
a debate on the credibility of Article
5 in a context that harkens back to
the conditions of the Cold War. As
the diferent policy papers and latest
NATO Strategic Concept highlighted,
the focus for the Alliance shifed to
areas such as crisis management and
cooperative security. Te issues of
collective and territorial defense and
Article 5 commitments have become
less preeminent in an Alliance
emphasizing asymmetric threats and
partnerships. With an increasingly
ambitious and assertive Russia
almost a self-styled adversary of the
West the terms of the debate have
now changed.
Te crisis has also demonstrated the
continued commitment of the United
States to the security of the European
continent, but also more importantly
to the credibility of Article 5, and has
helped eradicate some of the uneasi-
ness the pivot to Asia introduced
in the debate. Tis does not neces-
sarily change the strategic outlook for
Washington, whose main strategic
challenges continue to be in Asia, but
who has nonetheless demonstrated
that their shifing long-term priorities
did not have to come at the expense
of the credibility of the Alliance. Tus,
NATO was able to launch actions
such as the deployment of addi-
tional aircraf for Baltic air policing
designed frstly to reassure those
Allies who started to view Moscows
ambitions with increasing concern.
Tis latest crisis has also confrmed
the need for a transatlantic response
Transatlantic Security Task Force Series
Policy Brief
2
to the burning challenge of ensuring the stability and
security of a geography beyond NATOs borders. In other
words, NATO could not be, and was not, the sole institu-
tional vehicle for coordinating such a response. Te trans-
atlantic framework provided a more suitable structure for
addressing this policy challenge. A clear division of labor
emerged in the transatlantic context with the United States
and the EU taking the lead role in the political containment
and gradual economic isolation through sanctions and
measures that aimed to ostracize Russia from the G8, while
NATO was tasked with the reassurance of its members.
Whether the transatlantic reaction will be sufcient
to deter Russia from the continuing destabilization of
Ukraine remains to be seen. It can be contended that the
transatlantic community has so far been able to dissuade
Putin and his followers from engaging in further military
adventurism. A key factor in this respect has been the
maintenance of political cohesion, both across the Atlantic
and within Europe. Equally important in this game of
deterrence is the looming threat of a strengthened regime
of sanctions, which can be scaled up to include measures
against specifc companies or sectors. Tis threat has
been instrumental in a worsening outlook for the Russian
economy with a drop in growth forecasts, an acceleration
of capital fight, and overall higher borrowing costs.
But going beyond the deterrence debate, the crisis with
Russia heralds the beginning of a new era in the conti-
nental order that is set to be characterized by rising
East-West tensions. Tese tensions will not be as under-
pinned by ideological diferences as was the case in the
past, but rather by the ambitions of a Russian leadership
which intends to re-establish a regional order based on a
contested vision of its zone of infuence.
Te strategic shif undertaken by Vladimir Putins Russia is
a watershed moment for the European order. Te Kremlins
decision to position Russia as an adversary of the West by
violating the rules of the international system, including
the changing of state borders by force, heralds a more
confrontational era for U.S.-Russian and Europe-Russian
relationships. By doing so, Russia has chosen to undermine
some of the most basic tenets of peaceful order in Europe.
Tis should not, however, be seen as a return to the Cold
War dynamics. Russias revisionism should be better under-
stood as being rooted in the resentment of Moscows loss
of power in the post-Soviet period, the internal political
dynamics in the country, and the growing rejections of the
cultural values of liberal Europe.
Tis more confict-riddled context has ramifcations for
global and regional security governance institutions,
and therefore on the ability of the transatlantic partner-
ship to contribute to the establishment of a stable and
secure neighborhood. For instance, it should be expected
that under these conditions, the United Nations Security
Council will be less functional in managing future crisis
scenarios, especially in cases where Russias interests are
divergent; we may not see the UNSC adopt resolutions
such as Resolution 1973 that condoned the international
intervention to Libya. Syria was a real test case as Moscows
(and Beijings) opposition has made it impossible to get
a UNSC mandate for an international intervention. As a
result, the Syrian crisis has spiraled into a civil war and
created the conditions for more long term and possibly
permanent security spillovers, such as the rise of radical
Islamist groups.
Te transatlantic community has not come to terms with
the full implications of this perceived dysfunction. Tere is,
therefore, a need to fully explore the consequences of such
a development.
It can, for instance, mean that the transatlantic partnership
will need to muster the political willingness to operate and
intervene in regional conficts that have the potential to
severely afect the stability of our neighborhood, even in
the absence of a UN mandate. Te coalition of the willing
approach will need to be relied upon more frequently. At
the same time, the burden of crisis management will be
shifed to regional organizations, and inter-regional gover-
nance institutions setup by like-minded states will be faced
with a heavier burden in terms of managing security chal-
lenges. One clear implication is the need for improvement
The crisis with Russia heralds
the beginning of a new era in the
continental order that is set to be
characterized by rising East-West
tensions.
Transatlantic Security Task Force Series
Policy Brief
3
in NATO-EU relations in a world where these organiza-
tions are likely to have a greater role. EU and NATO should
be able to have a more sustained discussion about security
threats. Tis is necessary not only to calibrate responses but
also pre-empt some of the difculties that can emerge due
to diferent threat perceptions. Te more challenging the
strategic environment becomes, the less room there will be
to maintain and defend these non-cooperative solutions
that are inimical to our sense of overall security.
Te views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the
views of the author alone.
About the Author
Sinan lgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels,
where his research focuses on the implications of Turkish foreign
policy for Europe and the United States, nuclear policy, and the secu-
rity and economic aspects of the transatlantic relations.
About GMF
Te German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by
supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic
sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business
communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic
topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed
commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-proft organization through a gif from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also
has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.
Contact
Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Schefer
Director, Paris Ofce
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Tel: +33 1 47 23 47 18
Email: adehoopschefer@gmfus.org