West to uphold the foundations of a world order. The author compares past successes with recent failures, rooted in a series of crises, to maintain stability and questions the Wests common vision of the interna- tional order or the stability and credibility of NATO. Transatlantic Security Task Force Series Policy Brief The Point of Departure: The Seven Crises of the West by Ferry de Kerckhove German Marshall Fund of the United States-Paris 71 Boulevard Raspail 75006 Paris T: +33 1 47 23 47 18 E: infoparis@gmfus.org October 2014 It is very hard to fnd any solace in the world today. Events seem to be ripping apart conventional wisdom about the evolution of the interna- tional system and uprooting some of the basic tenets which we, maybe arrogantly or naively, thought were the foundations of international order, underpinned by a growing body of international law. Yet, on three major issues, 1 a fundamental failure of that order has occurred for which transat- lantic partners are ill prepared: Te frst piece of territory, Crimea, taken by one sovereign nation (Russia) from one of its sovereign neighbors (Ukraine) in contra- diction with the UN Charter and bilateral agreements. Te last such attempt, during the frst Gulf War, with Iraqs invasion of Kuwait, was denied. Crimea is a fait accompli that will not revert in our time. Te blatant, banned use of chem- ical weapons by a government (Syria) against its own people leading to a double reward the removal of the stockpiles by the international community and the maintenance in power of the responsible leader, Bashar Al-Assad. More importantly, it 1 The three issues were suggested at a recent confer- ence in Ottawa by my former DFAIT colleague Paul Chapin. puts a serious dent in past eforts on arms control and disarmament. An armed struggle that either harkens back to the days of the crusades or portends a very worrying future, i.e. the Shia-Sunni armed struggle across nation-state borders, which there is little if any legal framework to counter. Many smaller failures such as continued nuclear proliferation by North Korea, expanded settlements by Israel in occupied territories and Chinese muscle fexing in the East Asian Seas, add themselves to a growing list of insurgencies before which the international community appears helpless. Each of the failures has a practical explanation. Te 1954 gif by Nikita Khrushchev of Crimea to Ukraine as recognition of the Communist Party of Ukraines role in building his career was a tragic mistake that should have been remedied by Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk in 1992 before enshrining Ukraines territorial integ- rity in exchange for Ukraines renun- ciation of its nuclear weapons two years later. With regard to Syria, there was the Russian-U.S. deal involving the removal of Syrias chemical stocks to obviate a U.S. attack. Te third goes back to the early days of the politico- Transatlantic Security Task Force Series Policy Brief 2 religious struggle between conservative Wahabism and popular Khomeinism, with a spicing of Persian vs. Arab attempts to dominate the region. Yet today, the pressure of nationalism having taken a beating with the ousting of local dictators, religion is gaining sway, adding fuel to the underlying political fre. Tese signifcant events and many others underscore the cumulative onset of seven crises with a particular impact on the West, even though the areas of dispute underscore the increasing salience of the New Kings at the periphery. 1. Tere is an evident crisis of leadership explained in part by war-weariness, considerable neo-isolationism in public opinion and uncertainties regarding national interests in the face of an increasingly complex and polarized world. But there is defnitely a failure on the part of leaders themselves, with a lack of trust fostered by WikiLeaks and Snowdens revelations. If one compares the kind of communications between leaders on Ukraine (admittedly improving over time) and on the Islamic State insurgency in Iraq or the EU response to Mali and Central African Republic, on one hand, to the kind of reactions at the time of George H.W. Bush facing the fall of the Soviet Union or the coup against MikhailGorbachev, on the other hand, one realizes the timidity and irresolution of todays world leaders. U.S. President Barack Obama is not alone in this but there is a legitimate question as to U.S. leadership post-2016. Indeed, the crisis of leadership appears pandemic in the West. Tere is a failure of leadership to articulate the specifc national interests at risk or at stake in situa- tions as they arise. Leaders statements undoubtedly crafed by communications professional appear to obfuscate to the point that either or both the leader and composer simply do not understand the situation well enough to be clear, accurate, relevant, and logical in messaging. Tis leads to a poorly informed public even misinformed- that does not indulge in any critical analysis and hence accepts superfciality and spin as substance that it does not understand. 2. Ever since the failure of the World UN Summit of 2005 to bring about essential changes to the management of crises by UN members and to the supporting insti- tutional framework, including the Security Council as well as more broad reforms, there has been a worldwide institutional crisis accompanied by a diminution of confdence in multilateral diplomacy that is plaguing todays ability to difuse crises at an early stage. Tis institutional crisis particularly afects NATO, which rattles a worn and rusty sabre while failing to realize that its means hardly meet its language and that its victories are Pyrrhic at best, when victory is claimed e.g. Libya, Afghanistan. Old speak dominates. But the institutional crisis may also stem from a failure to get back to basics. What is the role of the UN: the preven- tion of war and collective security in the collective (global) interest. It was the UN that called for the total membership to respond to the attack on Kuwait under the collective security rubric within its expectation of preventing war. An unprovoked attack on a member state must be met with a collective response. NATO, on the other hand, was formed as a collective defense alli- ance of like-minded nations (common values of democ- racy, freedom, and human rights) to defend against the non-disarmed adversary apparently bent on expanding the Communist world into and across Western Europe. Afer the fall of the Wall NATO undertook out-of-area operations justifying regional stability as its common interest as well as defense of common values seen at risk in the new and challenging security environment. In other words, we must restate the roles and reasons of our institutions in international relations and how we expect them to function. Tis is both an analytical and educational mission. 3. Te third crisis has economic and social underpinnings as it is a general crisis of confdence by our popula- tions in the face of growing income inequalities and diminished opportunities and of an evident inability or deliberate refusal by governments to do anything about it. Triumphant globalized capitalism and deregulation, minor tinkering notwithstanding, remain the economic architecture of the world. While efcient in terms of allocation of resources, it is less so in productivity terms as the model of supply creating demand is the source of major wasted gains. Further, at some stage, reduction in There is defnitely a failure on the part of leaders themselves, with a lack of trust fostered by WikiLeaks and Snowdens revelations. Transatlantic Security Task Force Series Policy Brief 3 standards of living of the lower classes further estranges people from their governments. 4. Te latter crisis has its companion piece in the crisis of governance, namely the relationship between the governments and the governed, where long-term issues are punted while short-term responses are given strictly according to electoral calendars. While the political logjam in the United States as evidenced in the fscal clif episode and subsequent sequestration measures is but one example, other Western nations also face block- ages and a visceral failure of cooperation across the aisles of power. Ofen, domestic institutions no longer meet the requirements of modern societies; new legisla- tion barely plays catch up with existing problems while new ones await. It can be seen as a crisis of democracy, in that democracy is dependent upon an informed, engaged, and involved electorate. Low voter turnout, the almost negligible membership in political parties, and the continuing difculty in getting quality candidates to run should be looked upon as scandalous. Yet, these are met by ignorance and apathy even though it screams for frank leadership that speaks to nations at large and not to only one political constituency. 5. Probably one of the most formidable crises is a civi- lizational one, in a Huntingtonian sense or, more specifcally, the role of religion, particularly Islam, in the political evolution of societies. Tis an issue that makes Western governments uncomfortable. It is high time we recognize this clash of civilizations, of funda- mental values and cultures that we have not wanted to clearly state in some misplaced political correctness. Te caliphates are totally unaccepting of the Western values and way of life. Tis must be made clear to our publics lest they be lulled into some unrealistic sense of security. While there are certain rapprochements between Muslim moderates and the West in terms of values, there is no fundamental efort at joining on either side if anything, as evidenced in Muslim Africa, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the gap is widening. Of course, Islamism/Wahhabism is the primary and most forceful component we commonly have to deal with. Again, democratic governments must be forthright and clear in stating the source of risks, dangers, and threats to prepare their populations for the kinds of conficts that may arise. We have been using the terrorism rubric but must develop a new and distinct descrip- tion of what we have to do and why the articula- tion of a basic strategy to address some fundamental and stark incompatibilities in the global international environment. For this is where the New Kings reign, all the more so since the Arab Spring freed signifcant religious/political forces, including extremists. Te role they played in the Arab revolutions gave them legiti- macy and allowed them to claim a leadership role in the shaping and development of their countries. Yet, we are now witnessing military-inspired anti-Islamist coun- terrevolutions, adding to the complexity of choosing the right friends and fghting the right enemies. Our learning curve is all the more slow that factors that have fostered radical Islam are numerous and that our nations, welded by history, are facing states mostly created by us over the previous century and whose unity stems far more from Islam than from their Arabism or ethnicity. Indeed, Islam imbues politics and transcends the boundaries of Muslim nation states. On the other hand, for other nations such as China, Japan, and, in large part India, religion or philosophy, culture, history, and the concept of civilization are entirely embodied within the nation-state. Hence the need for a sophisti- cated and nuanced understanding of each case on how the outside world is perceived and approached. Tere are many diferent kings. 6. With the latter crisis comes another phenomenon: the crisis of history catching up with geography. When one sees the Kurds in Iraq building their own sub-state entity for lack of a better term in a non-federal state and doing it very well one cannot but refect that the failed Treaty of Svres of 1920 that called for an auton- omous Kurd territory, followed by the treaties of Kars and Lausanne, is but one example of external leaders It is high time we recognize this clash of civilizations, of fundamental values and cultures that we have not wanted to clearly state in some misplaced political correctness. Transatlantic Security Task Force Series Policy Brief 4 failing to take into account history, geography, ethnicity, and political aspirations. Tis provoked, a century later, insurgencies and failed states now that both the Cold War overlay of forced stability and Western inspired or fostered dictatorships have given way to multiple revolutions and renewed irredentism. While the Arab World is today the epicenter of counter-revolution and the new war on terror, Joseph Stalins geographic legacy in the post-Soviet Union era will eventually wrack havoc in Central Asia and beyond. Te Western creation of colonial divide in Africa leading to todays nations in name have also turned into chaos in some multi-ethnic, multi-language states. 7. Finally, we are going through a crisis of transition of major proportion. During the Cold War, liberated colonies became pawns in the powerful claws of the two superpowers, non-alignment notwithstanding, and afer the fall of the Berlin Wall, we all fell under the illusion of triumphant democracy and liberalism underpinning a vibrant capitalism. It seems that the inevitability of liberal democracy spreading all over the world has taken a beating over the last few decades, notably in many countries on which we now depend for our economic growth and well-being. 2 Whether it is a by-product of the emerging multipolarity, a retrench- ment of the United States, the assertiveness of China, or the failure to abide with international law by Russia, it is clear we are entering unchartered waters and that the international security paradigm of old no longer applies. Admittedly, ever since September 11, 2001, we imposed an anti-terrorism superscript to our security policies that altered our understanding of the undercur- rents. It is odd that today one fnds NATO members either searching for or dusting of defense plans of old as if the paradigm still held. It is equally odd that many a writer refers in a deeply derogatory way to revision- ists in talking about Russia, mainly, and China, as if there was a sacrosanct order mostly characterized as ordained or imposed by the United States that could not be contested, although one could argue that an over- whelming majority of the worlds nations actually resent Pax Americana. Yet, it is not so much revisionism that is worrisome but the narrative that underpins it, particu- larly by Russia. Te latter postulates that every color revolution Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Ukraine has been partly or totally provoked by the West with 2 As suggested by Doug Bland, from Queens Universitys School of Public Policy. regime change being the new tool of war. 3 Russia thus calls for an alternative, an ofsetting Euro-Asian Empire or Alliance, to counterbalance the old order. Te problem with Putins antagonistic Russia is that the country is, or never was, a full-service superpower and that it increasingly resembles a dying star. Like all dying stars, before imploding, it might take out at least its closest neighbors. It is unclear whether Europeans and North Americans share a common vision of the evolution of the global order inasmuch as up to now, despite September 11, Fortress America is much less under threat than Europe, all the more so that terrorism has changed its way and destina- tions. Most formal meetings across the Atlantic produce generally very short term, lowest common denominator views of the world, allegedly to reassure their publics that the old system still works, that the Alliance is solid like a rock and that reform at the margins is toddling along. Maybe it is time to lock up a full contingent of policy planners from most if not all countries of Europe and North America in a conference center ably supported by outside experts until they arrive at a common under- standing if not a common vision. Although revisionist powers is a bit of NATO speak, engaging the Russians and others is indispensable while trying to understand where they are coming from as opposed to try to convince them that we are right. All the crises listed above underscore the need to engage with Europes difcult neighbors since despite Crimea and other major diferences, greater dangers in the European near abroad loom more ominously. Tere are serious doubts about the solidity and credibility of security provision to non-NATO members, and there is no agreement within NATO as to who should beneft and 3 See the remarkable summary of the 3d Moscow International Conference on Security, May 22-24, 2014 written by Anthony Cordesman Russian and the Color Revolution, CSIS, May 28, 2014. It is clear we are entering unchartered waters and that the international security paradigm of old no longer applies. Transatlantic Security Task Force Series Policy Brief 5 to what extent. More importantly, there is no consensus on what to support and who should be supported and how in countries on the other side of the Mediterranean pond. Tis takes a huge amount of leadership backed by a solid analysis and understanding, which our political leaders and our institutions are presently incapable of providing. Transatlantic partners come to Asia as well as to the Middle East and North Africa region in what the French military called en ordre dispers 4 at a time when there should be unity of purpose, common commitment, and adequate means. GMFs focus on all these issues is salutary but it will also take a real discussion with revisionists and others to see to what extent like-mindedness still exists and if it can be operationalized in a more productive way even within the Alliance. But for that to happen, there must frst be an accepted and common awareness that there is indeed a problem that we have been studiously avoiding because of the potential of confict within the alliance. A restate- ment of the fundamentals for the Alliance and a clear recognition that a search for a pax-NATOnia will be elusive and even dangerous, as the Arab Spring and current and forthcoming sub-Saharan African adventures have demon- strated. 4 In a disorganized manner or an uncoordinated fashion. Te views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the author alone. About the Author Ferry de Kerckhove is a senior fellow at the Graduate School of Public and International Afairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa; a member of the Canadian Defense and Foreign Afairs Institute; and a member of the Board of the Conference of Defense Associations Institute. From 2008 to 2011, he served as Canadas ambassador to Egypt. About GMF Te German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-proft organization through a gif from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm. Contact Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Schefer Director, Paris Ofce German Marshall Fund of the United States Tel: +33 1 47 23 47 18 Email: adehoopschefer@gmfus.org