CASES ON PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals 266 SCRA 627 January 27, 1997

Facts: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named Consuelo Garcia.
Santiago already died when this controversy arose.
Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case against Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain an
attachment over the land. While the case was pending, the 9 children sold their 1/10 share in the lot to
Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents here.
Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo Garcia. The land was sold at
public auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina.
Atayan however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the TCT claiming that
they own 9/10 of the land.
The RTC said that the land was presumed to be conjugal hence Consuelo Garcia owned 50% of
the land plus 5% as her share in the intestate estate of her husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered the
amendment of the TCT to show that Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%.
Both parties appealed.
The CA modified the judgment. The CA held that lot was the exclusive property of Santiago
Garcia and not conjugal. It held that Estonina only owns 1/10 or 10% and Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%.

Issue: Is the property exclusive or conjugal? Exclusive share of the deceased Santiago
Whats the real share of Estonina and Atayan? 10% and 90%, respectively.

Ruling: SC affirms CA in toto.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership only when there
is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition
during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership.
Here, Estonino failed to present any proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.
Estonino merely relies on the certificate of title which was issued during the marriage. The TCT does not
suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property.
Acquisition of property and registration of title are two different acts. Registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
Thus, the property is the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago and when he died leaving
10 compulsory heirs, each one got 10% of the lot. Hence, what the Estonino spouses purchased in the
public auction was merely the rights of Consuelo Garcia consisting of 10% of the lot.

MOISES JOCSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents.


Facts: Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving
offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the
husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being
settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during
his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what
apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his
wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void
and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of
their deceased parents.

Petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 27, Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the then
Court of First Instance of Naic, Cavite (docketed as Civil Case No. TM- 531), and which was twice
amended. In his Second Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein petitioner assailed
the evidence documents for being null and void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and
reversed that of the trial court's.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed properties are part of the conjugal partnership of property of their
parents.

Held: NO. It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article
160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his
claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married
to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does
not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.It may be that the properties under dispute
were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage
to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the
latter. There being no such proof, the condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption
does not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of
Emilio Jocson.



FRANCISCO v. CA
299 SCRA 188 (1998)
Facts:

Teresita (petitioner), is Eusebios (private respondent) legal wife secondmarriage. Conchita
Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco (privaterespondents) are children of Eusebio
by his first marriage.
Teresitas allegations:
Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, theyve acquired properties in BarangayBalite, Rodriguez,
Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal.
These properties were administered by Eusebio til he was invalidated onaccount of tuberculosis,
heart disease and cancer, which rendered him unfit to administer them.
Private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which
authorized Conchita to administer the house and lottogether with the apartments situated in
Rodriguez, Rizal.
Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, thus enjoining
its enforcement and sought to be declared administratrix of properties in dispute.
RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding that Teresita did not show thatsaid properties were
acquired during the second marriage, or that theypertained exclusively to her. As such, those
properties belong exclusively toEusebio, and he has the capacity to administer them. On appeal, CA
affirmedthis decision. Teresita files this petition, claiming that:
o
CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of new CC as said title hasalready been repealed by
art. 253, FC
o
It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC However, issue in Teresitas reply: WON Art. 116, FC
applies to this case as Art.253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the
CivilCode" 4

Issue:
WON properties are not conjugal but capital properties of Eusebioexclusively.

Held and Ratio:

Yes. Petition denied. Arts. 158 and 160, New CC have been repealed by the FC,specifically by Art.
254, FC (not Art. 253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 inrelation to Art. 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of
Art. 158&160 doesnt operate toprejudice or otherwise affect prior vested rights. Rights accrued and
vestedwhile these articles were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then beresolved based on
provisions of New CC.

Art. 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to theconjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to thehusband or to the wife". However, the party who
invokes this presumption mustfirst show proof of acquisition during the coverture (marriage). The
presumptionrefers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operatewhen
there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal wasacquired. Moreover, presumption
in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with strong,clear and convincing evidence showing exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses.

In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that theproperties which she
claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriagewith Eusebio.

As regard land in Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut Eusebios testimony thathe inherited the same
from his parents. She even admitted that Eusebio broughtinto their marriage the said land, albeit in
the concept of a possessor only as itwas not yet registered in his name.

Whether Eusebio inherited the property before or after his 2nd marriage isinconsequential as the
property should be regarded as his own exclusively,pursuant to Art. 148, New CC.

Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties acquired gratuitously andinclude those acquired by
either spouse during the marriage by inheritance,devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be
assumed that Eusebio'sacquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage,
theland would still be his "exclusive property" because it was acquired by him,"during the marriage,
by lucrative title."

As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner showed building permits for thehouse and the
apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio and the business license for
the sari-sari store issued in her name alonein support of her claim that it was conjugal property.
These, however, do notprove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage.
Thefact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as towhether or not the
property is conjugal or not. They even counter her claim asher documents all described Eusebio as
the owner of the structures (Art. 1431,New CC; Rule 129(4), Revised Rules on Evidence).

Further, she cannot argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio has thereby
become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain theproposition that it was constructed at the
expense of their partnership (Art.158(2), New CC). Presumption of conjugality for lack of absence of
evidence onthe source of funding (Art. 160, New CC) cannot be invoked because there isalso lack in
proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage.

Certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim over the property atSan Isidro is
inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to
Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the propertywas acquired during the spouses coverture.
Acquisition of title and registrationthereof are two different acts. Registration merely confirms title
already existingand phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio.

Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator of the propertiesconsidering that the assets
are exclusively his capital. Even if the properties areconjugal, petitioner cannot administer them
inasmuch as Eusebio is not so ill asto incapacitate him to administer property



AGAPAY vs. PALANGG.R. No. 116668July 28, 1997
Facts:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina (or Cornelia) on July 16,1949. A few months
after the wedding, in October 1949, he left for work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas only child,
Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950. During his visit in 1964 to the Philippines, he stayed with
his brother in Zambales. The trial court found that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce
Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in1972, Miguel refused to stay with Carlina but stayed
alone in a house in Pozorrubio,Pangasinan. On July 15, 1973, 63 yr old Miguel contracted with second
marriage with 19 yr old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a
parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in Binalonan,
Pangasinan was also purchased by Erlinda as sole vendee. On October 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang
executed a deed of donation as a form of compromise agreement. The parties agreed to donate their
conjugal property to their only child, Herminia Palang. Migueland Erlinda had a son, Kristopher A.
Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years later, Miguel
died.On July 11, 1979, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia filed an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of the Riceland and house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan
allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda Agapay. The RTC dismissed the case
and ruled in favour of Agapay. On appeal, the
respondent court reversed the trial courts decision and declared Carlina and Herminia
Palang the owners of the properties in question.
Issue(s):1.Whether or not the court erred in granting the ownership of the two parcels of land to Carlina
and Herminia Palang?
2. Whether or not the court erred in not declaring Kristopher Palang as Miguelsillegitimate son and thus
entitled to inherit Miguels estate?
3. Whether or not Kristopher Palang should be considered as party-defendant inthe civil
case?Decision:1.
No. Under Art 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines, only properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property,or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required in this provision. In the case at bar, Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed moneyto the
purchase of the Riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, the court finds no basisto justify her co-ownership
with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the Riceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang.2.

No. The issue is resolved in the respondent courts pronouncement regardingKristophers heirship and
filiation inasmuch as question as to who are the heirs
of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the
latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for that purpose and cannot
be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action xxx.
3. Yes. The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, wastherefore not a party to
the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called hisguardian
ad litem
for he was not involved in the case at bar.Wherefore, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

BA Finance Corp vs. CA
GR 61464, May 28 1988

FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a
promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto
presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the
business and under whose name the said business was registered, purportedly authorized the husband
to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto
left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became
due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.

The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of
fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and interests over a
construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ
hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the order, petitioner filed a
motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff
were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court.

ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.

HELD:
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship
was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Hence, it is
presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for
the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligation
contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred such
obligation, he had already abandoned his family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it
appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the
petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of
the spouses.

Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his
conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the said
properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amounting to P660,000.00.

PISUENA vs. HEIRS OF PETRA UNATINGG.R. No. 132803, August 31, 1999
Facts:
Petra Unating inherited Lot No. 1201 from her mother. During her marriage toAquilino Villar, she
registered the lot in her name. They had two children Felix and Catalina.In 1948, Petra died. In 1949,
Felix and Catalina sold the entire lot to Agustin Navarra butrepossessed the same upon the latters
death in 1958. Meanwhile Aquilino died in 1953.In 1982, defendant Jessie Pisuena, son-in-law of Agustin
wrested possession of theproperty from the heirs of Felix and Catalina. The latter filed a complaint for
its recovery,assailing the validity of the deed of sale in favor of Agustin.
Issue:
Did the Deed of Sale in 1949 transfer the whole lot in favor of Agustin despite thefact that Aquilino did
not consent to the sale of his share?
Held:
No. In 1949, Felix and Catalinas interest in the share of their father is stillinchoate. They cannot dispose
such share without the consent of their father. At most theyconveyed only their 2/3 share over the
lost. However, when Aquilino died in 1953
withoutdisposing of his1/3 share, Felix and Catalinas interest on it was actualized becausesuccession
vested in them the title to their fathers share and consequently, the entire lot.Thus, the title passed to
Agustin pursuant to Art. 1434 of the present Civil Code, whichprovides: When a person who is not the
owner of the thing sells or alienates or delivers it,and later, the seller of grantor acquires title thereto,
such title passes by operation of law tothe buyer or grantee.


Title:
ANTONIO S. VALDEZ
, petitioner, vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102,QUEZON CITY
and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ
, respondents.
Case:
Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the law that shouldgovern
the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage isdeclared void ab initio because of
psychological incapacity on the part of either orboth parties in contract.
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971. Begottenduring the marriage were
five children. In a petition, dated June 22, 1992, Valdezsought the declaration of nullity of marriage
pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition, thereby delaring their
marriage null and void onthe ground of mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin was placed
in thecustody of their mother and the older children chose which parent they want to staywith. The
petitioner and respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their property as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and tocomply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding
theprocedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage.During the hearing
on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressingdesire to stay with their father.
Issue:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the causethereof, the property relations
of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership (Art 147 Family Code). Any property acquired
during the union is primafacie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
didnot participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
havingcontributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care andmaintenance of the
family.

Villanueva vs. IAC
GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987

FACTS:

Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro,
Modestos illegitimate children, borrowed money from private respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as
collateral their fathers property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as the absolute
co-owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage in 1977 and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the highest bidder. Aftewards, the
Aranases executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they adjudicated the same land
unto themselves in equal share pro-indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when
the mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the name of
Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name.
In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against respondents
spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases,
and they be declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and Victoria in
1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and Raymundo and to
Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said Victorias shares from the conjugal
partnership property; and second Modestos interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as
his separate properties bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint,
declaring herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC likewise affirmed the
lower courts decision.
ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon made by Victoria who
rendered the lot as conjugal property.
HELD:
The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. It was Modestos exclusive
property since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of Modesto,
Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of
otherwise to Consolacion.
Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility or adornment made on the
separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry
of either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense of the
partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership,
but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
There was no proof presented by Villanueva. Such proof is needed at the time of the making or
construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used thereof in order to determine the
character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse
separately. What is certain is that the land on which the improvements stand was the exclusive
property of Modesto and that where the property is registered in the name of one spouse only and
there is no showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that is belongs
exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible to declare the improvements to be conjugal in
character.
Furthermore, Bernas mode of acquisition of ownership over the property appears in all respect to be
regular, untainted by any defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquired
indefeasible and clear title to the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently
arising and of which he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their assertion and ventilation.


CHEESMAN V IAC 193 SCRA 93
FACTS: This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to
annulfor lack of consent on his partthe sale by his Filipinowife (Criselda) of a residential lot and
building to Estelita Padilla

December 4, 1970 Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman weremarried but have been separated
since February 15, 1981

June 4, 1974 a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights wasexecuted by Armando Altares,
conveying a parcel of land in favor of CriseldaCheesman, married to Thomas Cheesman. Thomas,
although aware
of thedeed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Taxdeclarations for the said prope
rty were issued in the name of CriseldaCheesman alone and she assumed exclusive management andad
ministration of the property

July 1, 1981 Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla without knowledgeand consent of Thomas

July 31, 1981 Thomas filed a suit for the annulment of the sale on theground that the transaction had
been executed without his knowledge andconsent. Criselda filed an answer alleging that the property
sold wasparaphernal, having purchased the property from her own money; that

Thomas, an American was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land and; that
Estelita was a buyer in good faith

During the trial, it was found out that the transfer of property took placeduring the existence of their
marriage as it was acquired on June 4, 1974

June 24, 1982 RTC declared the sale executed by Criselda void ab initio andordered
the delivery of the property to Thomas as administrator of theconjugal property

Thomas appealed to IAC where he assailed the granting of Estelitas petitionfor relief and resolution of
matters not subject of said petition; in declaringvalid the sale to Estelita without his knowledge and
consent. On January 7,1986, IAC affirmed summary judgment decisionISSUE: Whether or not the wife
can dispose of the property in question; Whether ornot Cheesman, being an American citizen, can
question the saleHELD: Section 14, Art. XIV of 1973 Constitution provides that: save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except toindividuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of thepublic domain. Thus, assuming
that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased byhim and his wife, he acquired no right
whatsoever over the property by virtue of that purchase

; and
in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, hewas knowingly v iolating the Constitution.
As such, the sale to him was nulland void. At any rate, Cheesman had and has NO CAPACITY TO
QUESTION THE SUBSEQUENTSALE OF THE SAME PROPERTY BY HIS WIFE ON THE THEORY THAT IN SO
DOING He
IS MERELY EXERCISING THE PREROGATIVE OF A HUSBAND IN RESPECT OFCONJUGAL PROPERTY. To susta
in such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the Constitutional prohibition.
If the property were to bedeclared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantiall
interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to itstransfer or disposition. This is
a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
Even if the wife did use conjugal funds to make the acquisition, his recovering
andholding the property cannot be warranted as it is against the constitution.Consequently, Estelita is a
purchaser in good faith since she knew that Thomas cannot intervene in the sale or disposition of the
said property. AFFIRMED

Carino vs Carino

Facts:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4
contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage,
SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage
with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a
total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her
marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but
the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage
license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the
previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage
license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article
40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity
of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is
void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to
him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop
even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for
there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they
earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this
includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have
contributed at all